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\I
CASTILLERO'S REGISTRY
AND
ACT OF POSSESSION
TO THE
CM
mt of S^to 3Umabp,
IN
1845
O'Meara & Painter, print.
*6^

Senor Alcalde de 1a Nominacion:
Andres Castillero, Capitan de Caballeria permanente, y
residente hoy en este Departamento ante la notoria justi-
ficacion de Yd. bace presente, que habiendo descubierto
una veta de plata con ley de oro, en terreno del rancbo
perteneciente al Sargento retirado de la compaiiia presidial
de San Francisco, Jose Reyes Berreyesa, y queriendo tra-
bajarla en compaiiia suplico a Yd., que arreglado, a la orde-
nanza de mineria, se sirva fijar rotulones en los parajes pu-
blico de lajurisdiccion para que llegado el tiempo de la pose-
sion juridica, asegure mi derecho, segun las leyes de la mi-
neria, aYd. suplico provea de conformidad, en lo que recibire
merced y justicia: admitiendo este en papel comun por
falta del sellado correspondiente. Mision de Santa Clara,
JSToviembre veiute y dos de mil ochocientos cuarenta y
cinco. Andres Castillero.
Senor Alcalde de 1a Nominacion del Pueblo de San
Jose Guadalupe:
Andres Castillero, Capitan permanente de Caballeria,
ante la notoria justificacion de Yd. comparezco y digo:
ensayando el mineral que con anterioridad denuncie a ese
juzgado, lie sacado, a mas de plata con ley de oro, Azogue
liquido, en presencia de algunos concurentes que podre
citar en caso oportuno. Y por convenir asi a mi derecbo
le he de merecer a Yd. que unido al escrito del denuneio,
ee archive esta presentacion, no llendo en papel del sello
por no haberlo.
A Yd. suplico provea de eonformidad; en lo que recibire
merced y justicia.
Santa Clara, Diciembre 3, de 1845.
Andres Castillero.
Ko eneontrandose en el Departamento de California,
Diputaciones de Mineria : y siendo esta la uniea vez desde
la poblacion de Alta California, que se trabaja, con arreglo
a las leyes, un mineral
; y careciendo ademas de Juez de
Letras el 2° distrito, Yo, el Alcalde de la Nominacion, C.
Antonio Maria Pico, he venido, acompanado de dos testi-
gos, para actuar por receptoria a, falta de escribano publico
que no lo hay, para dar posesion juridica de la mina cono-
cida con el nombre de Santa Clara, en esta jurisdiccion,
situada en el rancho del Sargento, Jose Reyes Berreyesa
;
porque habiendo fenecido el tiempo que senala la orde-
nanza de mineria para deducir su accion el C. D. Andres
Castillero, y que otros pudieran alegar mejor derecho,
desde el tiempo del denuncio a la fecha. Y eneontrandose
dicho mineral con abundancia de metaies explotados, el
pozo hecho con las reglas del arte, y produciendo la elabo-
racion de la mina, abundancia de Azogue liquido, segun
las muestras que tiene el juzgado; y estanclo tan reco-
mendado, por leyes vigentes, la proteccion de un articulo
tan necesario para la amalgamacion de oro j plata en la
Republica, he venido en concederle tres mil varas por
todos rumbos, a reserva de lo que senale la Ordenanza
General de mineria, por ser trabajada en compania, de lo
que doy fe, iirmando conmigo los testigos, quedando agre-
gado este acto de posesion al cuniulo del expediente que
queda depositado en el archivo de mi cargo no llendo
puesto en papel del sello respectivo que no lo hay en los
terminos de la ley.
Juzgado de San Jose de Guadalupe y Diciembre
de 1845.
Antonio Maeia Pico.
De asa
—
Antonio Sunol. De asa
—
Jose Noriega.
[Indorsed.]
No. 366.—Andres Castillero. New Almaden. A. P. L.
Exhibit to deposition of Antonio Sunol, March 19th, 1855.
Filed in office March 19th, 1855. Geo. Fisher, Secretary.
Recorded in Record of Evidence, Vol. 18, pp. 621, 622.
U. S. Surveyor General's Office,
San Francisco, Cal.
I, James W. Mandeville, U. S. Surveyor General for
California, and, as such, having in my custody the papers
of the late Board of Land Commissioners to ascertain aud
settle the private land claims in California, do hereby cer-
tify the foregoing to be a correct copy of a document on
file, in case No. 366, on the docket of said Board, in which
Andres Castillero is claimant of New Almaden.
Given under my hand and official seal, at the
City of San Francisco, this fifteenth day of Sep-
tember, A. D. 1858.
J. W. Mandeville,
U. S. Surveyor General for California.
TRANSLATIONS,
' Senor Alcalde of 1st Nomination :
Andres Castillero, Captain of permanent cavalry, and
at present resident in this Department, before your noto-
rious justification, makes representation: that having dis-
covered a vein of silver, with a ley of gold, on the land of the
raneho pertaining to Jose Reyes Berreyesa, retired sergeant
of the presidial company of San Francisco, and wishing to
work it in company, I request that, in conformity with the
ordinance on mining, you will be pleased to fix up notices,
in the public places of the j urisdiction, in order tomake sure
of my right when the time of the juridical possession may
arrive, according to the laws on mining. I pray you to
provide in conformity, in which I will receive favor and jus-
tice ; admitting this on common paper, there being none
of the corresponding stamp.
Mission of Santa Clara, November twenty-second, eight-
een hundred and forty-five.
Andres Castillero.
Senor Alcalde of 1st Nomination of the Pueblo of
San Jose Guadalupe:
I, Andres Castillero, permanent captain of cavalry, before
your well known justification, appear and say: that on
opening the mine which I previously denounced in this
Court, I have taken out, besides silver with a ley of gold,
liquid quicksilver, in the presence of several bystanders,
whom I may summon on the proper occasion. And, con-
sidering it necessary for the security of my right, so to do,
I have to request of you that, uniting this representation
to the denouncement, it may be placed on file, it not going
on stamped paper because there is none. I pray you to take
measures to this effect, in which I will receive favor and
grace.
Santa Clara, December 3d, 1845.
Andres Castillero.
There being no deputation on mining in the Department
of California, and this being the only time since the set-
tlement of Upper California, that a mine has been worked
in conformity with the laws, and there being no " Juez de
Letras," (professional Judge,) in the second district, I, the
Alcalde of First Nomination, citizen Antonio Maria Pico,
accompanied by two assisting witnesses, have resolved to
act in virtue of my office, for want of a Notary Public,
there being none, for the purpose of giving juridical posses-
sion of the mine known by the name of Santa Clara, in this
jurisdiction, situated on the rancho of the retired sergeant,
Jose Reyes Berreyesa, the time having expired which is
designated in the ordinance of mining, for citizen Don
Andres Castillero to show his right, and also for others to
allege a better right, between the time of denouncement
and this date, and the mine being found with abundance
of metals discovered, the shaft made according to the rules
of art, and the working of the mine producing a large
quantity of liquid quicksilver, as shown by the specimens
which this Court has; and as the laws now in force so
strongly recommend the protection of an article so neces-
sary for the amalgamation of gold and silver in the Re-
public, I have granted three thousand varas, in all direc-
8tions, subject to what the General Ordinance of Mines
may direct, it being worked in company, to which I cer-
tify, the witnesses signing with me ; this act of possession
being attached to the rest of the expediente, deposited in
the archives under my charge ; this not going on stamped
paper, because there is none, as prescribed by law.
Juzgado of San Jose Guadalupe, December , 1845.
Antonio Maria Pico.
Assisting witnesses
:
Antonio Sunol,
Jose Noriega.
[ Indorsed. ]
No. 366.—Andres Castillero. New Almaden—A. P. L.
Exhibit to deposition of Antonio Sunol, March 19th,
1855. Filed in office March 19th, 1855. Geo. Fisher,
Secretary. Recorded in Record of Evidence, Vol. 18,
pp. 621 and 622.
U. S. Surveyor General's Office, }
San Francisco, Cal. $
I, James W. Mandeville, U. S. Surveyor General for
California, and, as such, having in my custody the papers
of the late Board of Land Commissioners, to ascertain
and settle the private land claims in California, do hereby
certify the foregoing to be a correct copy of a document
on file, in case No. 366, on the docket of said Board, in
which Andres Castillero is claimant of New Almaden.
z^^^s Given under my hand and official seal, at the
[ SEAT.. ]
J
\zr$-^J city of San Francisco, this fifteenth day of Sep-
tember, 1858.
J. W. Mandeville,
TJ. S. Surveyor General for California.
THE
$Uto gJmatonUta
A LETTER
FROM THE
SAN FRANCISCO DAILY HERALD,
AS PUBLISHED ON THE
Mornings of December 31, 1858, and January 1, 1859,
SAN FRANCISCO:
PRINTED AT THE SAN FRANCISCO HERALD OFFICE.
1859.

THE NEW ALMADEN HIES
"All persons holding titles to real estate, or in quiet possession of lands under color of right, shall
have those titles guaranteed to them "
—
Proclamation of Com. Sloat, Commander-in-Chief U~. S. Naval Force
on raising the American Flag, July 1, 1846.
CHROSOLOGICAL DATA.
The following chronological data, in connec-
tion with this subject, may be interesting :
(1815-6.)
In November and December, 1815, Castillero
petitions and Pico (Alcalde) srants a mining
possession
—
See Expediente on file in Records of
Santa Clara county.
Wm. G Chard, merchant of Tehama, testifies
that be was foreman of the mine under <"astel-
lero, Padre Real, and James Alexander Forbes,
from November, 1845, to August or September,
1846. Was present when the Alcalde came with
a number of witnesses, and gave Castellero pos-
session.
—
Evidence on file in United States Dis-
trict Court.
(JUNE, 1846 )
lieutenant Revere visits '' the famous quick-
silver mine near Santa Clara " K elates the pro-
cess by which the ore was reduced, ere —Lieut J.
Warren Revere, U. S. A., (Militarg Commandant,
Sonoma,) J owe, 1846. " Tour of Duty, p. 54-5.
" The Commander in-chief * * * gives his
inviolable pledge to all persons in California * *
that they shall not be disturbed in their property,
their persons, or their social relations."
—
Wm. B.
Ide, Bear Flag Revolution, June 18 1846.
(JULY, 1846 )
" I declare to the inhabitants of California that,
although 1 come inarms with a powerful force, I
do not come among them as an enemy to Califor-
nia; but, on the contrary, I come as their best
friend. They will enjoy a permanent government, !
under which life and property * * * will be
secured.
" All persons holding titles to real es-
tate, OR IN QUIET possession of lands under
CjLOR of right, shall have those titles
guaranteed to them "
—
Com. Sloat, Comman-
der in chief, U. S Navalforce. Proclamation on
raising the American Flag, July 7, 1846.
(A. GUST, 1846J
"The flag of the United States is now flying
from every comanding position in the Territory.
* * California now belongs to the United
Sta es. Until * * the various * * depart
ments of the Government are arranged, military
law will prevail, and the Commander-in-chief will
be the governor and protector of the Lerritory."—
Proclamation of Com Stockton, Commander-in-
chief and Governor of Ter. California.
(MARCH, 1847.)
The undersigned * * is instructed by the
President of the United States * * to protect
the persons and property of the quiet and
peaceable inhabitants of the country. * *
Those who remain quiet and peaceable will be
respected in their rights and protected in them —
P'reclamation of S. W. Kearny, Brigadier Gen.
U. S. A., and Governor of California, March 1,
1847.
[MEXICO, DECEMBER. 1816.
J
* * * * a That in Upper California, in the
Presidio of Santa b osa, there has been discovered
hy Senor Don Andres Castillero a great mine, the
leys of which are truly surprising, since the result
of the assays made in the College of Mining
gives, as the common fruits, over thirty-five and
a half per cent., while that of the best mine which
is known, that of Almaden, (in Spain,) does not
exceed thirteen percent.; and finally, that, from
all the data collected, it may be hoped, resting on
a good foundation, that our mines o. quicksilver
are more than sufficient to-upplyall that is re-
quired for the reduction of our silver."
* * * " Xhe Junta, on the 21st of April last
(1846), sent to the professional Board {Junta
Fiicultatica) of the College some specimens of
cinnabar which Don Tomas Ramon del Moral
presented, in the name of Don Andres Castillero,
a resident of Upper L alifornia, with a representa-
tion in which he asked for assistance to work a
mine which he had discovered in the Mission of
Santa Clara, known by the old Indians, who got
out of it vermilion to paint their bodies. The
assay, made by the Professor of Chemistry, of
the ores in common, produced the extraordinary
ley of thirty-five and a-haif per cent., which was
communicated to the Government on the 5th of
May, representing that Senor Castillero had been
asked what assistance he required of the Junta.
" That Senor presented his petition in due
form, and it was very attentively examined by the
Junta, etc. * * * — heport of the First Sec-
retary of State of Mexico to the Mexican Con-
gress, in December, 1846. Printed in Mexico, 1847
;
pp. 136, 146*
* 'Memnria de la Primero Secretario de Estado de
los Fstadns-Unidos Mezicanos, al suberano Comgreso
anstttuyente, era Deciembre, 1846 Imprenta en Mexico,
IM7 " lr.is sap rily vo ume ol between 3U0 and
4u0 pages, of a pieerth imilar nature to the reports
ol our owt. SeTctavies'oF state to Cong ess. The edi-
i on WdS prinied in 1 847, ;ind then distributed, and
in y l>e fou A in all pu die and impoitant private Lbra-
rits in the Republic of Mexico.
Ll 8 4 8.]
Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo, February, 1848
—
Proclaimed Jidy 4th, 1848.
[WASHINGTON, 1849-50.]
Benton's Speech on California Land Claims—
Cong. Globe, vol. 21, pp. 2,045-2,047. Debates
in Congress on California Mines— Congressional
Globe, %\st Congress.
(MARCH, 1851 )
" And be it further enacted, that the commis-
sioners herein provided for, and the District and
the Supreme Court, in deciding the validity of
any claim brought before them under this law,
shall be governed by the Treaty of Guadaloupe
Hidalgo, the law of nations, the laws, usages
and customs of the government from which the
claim is derived ; by the principles of equity, and
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States so far as are practicable."
" For all claims finally confirmed by the said
commissioners or by the said District or Supreme
Court, apatent shall issue to the claimant."— Cali-
fornia Land Commission Act, U. S. Stat. vol. 9, p.
633.
LJANUARY, 1856.1
"In this case, on hearing the proofs and alle-
gations, it is adjudged by the commission thaf
the claim of said petitioner to the mine known
as New Almaden, together with the rights of en-
joying the privileges as mine owner under the
Mexican law, within the space of 3,000 varas in all
directions from the mouth of said mine, as origi-
nally opened by Castillero, is valid, and it is there-
fo'e decreed that the same be confirmed to him.'"
(Claim for two leagues of land rejected.)
ALPHEUS FELCH,
R. AUG. THOMPSON,
S. B. FARWELL.
—Decree of Commissioners appointed by the Uni-
ted Mates to dscertaia and settle Land Claims in
California.
(AUGUST, 1858.)
James Eldridge to John A. Collier.—*' Whereas
said Eldridge * * is justly indebted to the said
party of the second part in the sum of one mil-
lion of dollars * * (secured to be paid by his
certain bond * * in the penal sum of two mil-
lions of dollars) * * with interest * * at
the rate of ten per cent, per annum * * said
interest and principal * * to be paid * * in
New York to said Collier or the Assignee * *
and holders of said bond and this mortgage. For
the better securing (of which) the said James Eld-
ridge * * does grant, bargain and sell * *
the one undivided half * * of the tract of land
* * known as Los Capitancillos, in the county
of Santa Clara * * the s. idpremises including
the New Almaden mines and mine/ als," etc., etc.—
Mortgage : James Eldridge to John A. Collier, of
Binghamton. N . Y. Done in Santa Clara, Aug.
16, 1858. Witnessed by H. Laurencel. Recorded,
Aug. 16, 1858.
In this month the United States files its bill in
the United States Court, setting forth that the
United States had owned the land and mine
of New Almaden since July 7th, 1846, and also
owned all the " workshops, warehouses, build-
ings, furnaces, forges, engines, dwelling houses,
shops, sheds, and other buildings, which were of
the value of $500,000;" and praying that John
Parrott, and others, (the owners,) might be re-
strained from mining on the said land, or using
the improvements.— U. S versus Parrott and oth-
ers. In Equity, complaint for U. S. P. Delia
Torre, District Attorney.
EDMUND RANDOLPH,
EDWIN M. STANTON.
Counselfor United States.
Filed, August 30, 185S.
(Mem.—As explanatory of these two data, it
may be remarked that James Eldridge, who mort-
gaged, and H. Laurencel, who witnesses, are the
owners of a rival claim to Almaden mines, known
as the Fossatt claim to the Capitancillos Ranch,
and that Edmund Randolph is their counsel in,
California, and Edwin M. Stanton was their coun-
sel before the Supreme Court in Washington,
against the Government. If the suit commenced
by the United States were really to recover Alma-
den for the Government, of course the counsel
for Eldridge and Laurencel, who claim the mine
against the Government, would not bring, or sup-
port, such a suit.)
[OCTOBER, 1858 ]
" It is now hereby considered and ordered that
an injunction issue in this case * * to restiain
until the further order of this Court—the said
owners of (Almaden) from mining and digging
in and upon the said tract of land and the
said mine * * and from extracting quicksilver
from the one mine in and upon the said land and
mine.
—
Injunction, U. S. Circuit Court for Cali-
fornia. Oct. 29, 1858.
[DECEMBER, 1858.]
" The General Government has ever been a lib-
eral parent to the territories, and a generous con-
tributor to the useful enterprises of the early set-
tlers."
—
President's Message, Washington, Dec.
1858.
Part First.
It will have been perceived, in the course of
our discussion on this question, that we* are un-
versed in the intricacies and elaborations of law.
Happily, however, the greater the principles in-
* Some one in the National supposes the writer has
" great influence with Mr. Peachy and Mr. "Vale ;" and
requests him to urge them to do something he thinks
desirable. He takes this opportunity to say that he
has no influence whatever with them. He has not ex
changed three words with either of them for three
years, directly or indirectly, on this subject, or he
thinks on any other, as it has happened. He is simply
a private essayist, discussing a matter of public inter-
est in his own way, without asking whether it aids or
prejudices the judicial proceedings iu the case.
volved in a case, the simpler become the truths
by which they are to be illustrated and enforced.
Less technical knowledge is required to elucidate
constitutional, or international, equities than is
needed to administer the affairs of a Township
Court. It is easier to drink at the fountain, from
whence flow those mighty truths, Which, conveyed
in a thousand channels of statute and prac-
tice, make the law, than it is to draw from
its numerous streams and branches. In the
consciences of men, and in their common sense,
have been implanted by a Divine hand, those
feelings of rectitude which the law does but
3enunciate, and apply, to the exigencies of daily
existence. They will not be far wrong, who, in the
multiform phases of their life, keep the Ugh*-
within ihem undimmed by prejudice or selfishness,
and by it guide their course.
In the consideration of this case, we are per-
plexed, at the very outset, to understand how the
Court, sitting as an equity tribunal, obtains juris-
diction over it. As jurisdiction pertains rather to
the practice, than to the principles, of law, we
distrust our competency to discuss it ; and we
only give our views as the common sense reflec-
tions of a business man, for what they may be
worth. Equity, if we comprehend it, may be de-
fined, as a judicial interference to enforce the in-
tention of parties, or a party, to a contract or un-
derstanding, where no remedy exists at common
law, or by the provisions of an express statute.
It is the unexpressed reason of the thing, apparent
to the mind of a Court, upon looking at the
circumstances, the collateral surroundings, and
the history of the case ; and at the events out of
which the contract or understanding arose. The
subject of this controversy, is the ownership of
certain lands by the Government, in possession
of the defendants.
These lands are recently acquired Cali-
fornia property. They have been made by the
owner, the subject of an express agreement or
special statute. That statute, contemplates a con-
troversy as to the ownership of portions of them,
and directs a precise mode of procedure, to ascer-
tain the facts. With regard to claimed portions,
the owner places his rights in abeyance, during
the investigation he has instituted ; for the law
directs that these lands shall only be deemed
public lands—that is his own—after the claims
of occupants shall have been finally rejected by
his own Courts ; or if after two years of oppor-
tunity, claimants do not present their claims.
The subject of his ownership to these lands, is,
therefore, not a matter to be determined by
equity ; but by a precise and positive statute, and
in only one defined mode.
During the pendency of this inquiry, as direct-
ed by law ; after these defendants had brought
their claim before a Court organized under the
statute ; and after that Court had confirmed their
mining possession ; comes the plaintiff and
asks for an injunction in equity, to restrain them
from waste, or mining, during an appeal from
the decision of his own Court. The equity relief
is sought, and granted, on the ground that it was
the intention of the Government, to prohibit min-
ing during its inquiry into the title of claimants
in possession. Equity could interfere on no other
ground.
We think we have clearly stated the case. The
prerogative of the Court we submit, was there-
fore to ascertain what were the intentions of the
Government on this particular matter. This it
has to infer from the surroundings of the case
itself. Inferences drawn from ancient usage, or
English practice do not apply. They are to be
drawn strictly from the circle of events which sur-
round this especial property ; and from the wishes
and purposes of its owner with regard to it. Here,
the law maker was the owner of the land, subject
to certain engagements which his predecessor
(Mexico) had made. The law which he promul-
gated, after he had for three years owned the prop-
erty, contains his wishes and instructions. Equity
cannot interfere, with these recorded expressions
of his will. It can only interfere at all, with re-
gard to this property, if it be shown that circum-
stances have subsequently arisen, not contem-
plated at the time of that record, which substan-
tially contravene its intentions. We suppose it
is claimed that waste, or mining, is such a cir-
cumstance.
At the time of the enactment of the statute the
defendants were, and had been for a long time
previously, extracting minerals. The business of
the entire country, and their bnsiness, had been,
was, and was expected to be, the extraction of
minerals. This was personally known to the
entire California representation, who brought in
the statute. It was fully known and discussed
by both Houses of Congress, (See Debates on
California Mines.) It had been made famous
throughout the world, by three successive Presi-
dential messages. The waste was seen, notorious
and recognized. It was not deemed waste, but
thrift. It was not an unforseen incident, but a
thing known, existent, permitted, and encouraged.
It was the very thing which made the entire prop-
erty of the plaintiff in California valuable.
The statute which expresses the will and inten-
tion of the Government on this subject, was made
in full view of the fact of such waste, or mining,
and did not forbid it. An intention is as thorough-
ly proven by the absence of express provision,
when the thing to be provided for is a current
daily event, as by its presence. If Congress had
desired to prevent mining on lands in California
during the inquiry into titles ; knowing that min-
ing existed and would continue to exist ; it would
have enacted, that during such inquiry, persons
should forbear to mine. It did not so enact, be-
cause it did not intend that mining should be re
strained. The Court therefore might most truly
have answered the application for an injunction
in this case : " If we take jurisdiction in equity,
of this matter, we interfere with another mode
prescribed by a special statute, which embraces
the whole subject of inquiry into the ownership
of California lands, and their use during that in-
quiry. Were we to grant an injunction to re-
strain mining, we should do that which the law
makers fully considered, and refused to do. In"
stead of carrying out the intention of the plaintiff
in this suit, we should contravene that intention
and do something, which he never intended to be
done. Besides which, we should be opposing the
policy and practice of our Government in collat-
eral cases. There are special statutes anal-
agous to this, directing the survey and sale
of public lands in new territories, for the purpose
of vesting them in private ownership. Pending
that survey and preparation for sale, it has been the
custom of our people to use such lands freely;
graze them, farm them, cut down timber upon
them, and extract coal, iron lead, and copper
therefrom. The Government has never intetered
with this practice. There is no record in any
case in which the Govornment sought to restrain
its settlers. No Federal Court has granted such
an injunction. As the Chief Magistrate says in
his annual message : " The Federal Government
has ever been a liberal parent to the Territories,
—
and a generous contributor to the useful enter-
prizes of the early settlers." Besides which, it is
a matter of grave doubt whether mining in Cali-
fornia be waste ; and whether the Government be
not in fact richer, by having its metals extracted
than it would be, if they were not touched. Were
mining waste, the whole State would be by this
time impoverished ; instead of which it is the
richest, for its population, in the Union."
"We do not know what lawyers may say to such
a view of the subject; but business men, who
neither know, or care, about English Chancery pre-
cedents, will be very apt to coincide with_us. In-
deed, men who have been long in California, know
of their own knowledge pretty nearly, what the
intentions of Congress were. They all, more or
less, participated in its action, and it is so recent
that time has not obliterated the recollection.
Moreover, they can never agree that, with the
Government for plaintiff, in the most technical
sense mining in California can be considered
waste. Not to mine is laziness. To shut up a
mine is waste—of time, of the comforts of the
people, and of the very substance of the State;
whose wealth is only realized when its minerals
see daylight. What California would have been
to-day had the Government always restrained
such waste is exemplified by what she was, btfore
mining commenced at all.
The application of all law, resolves itself into
the enforcement of men's promises. The great
fabric of civilized society, is but an aggregation
of human units, bound together by the cement of
mutual promises. Man with man promises to be
peaceable, kindly and true ; that each will respect
the other's rights ; that all will perform their
mutual obligations, industriously subserve the
common weal, and pay to each other the debts of
love, honor, or work, whether expressed or im-
plied, which their joint condition imposes upon
them. The top-stone of the fabric, the Govern-
ment, promises to protect its people ; and with an
impartial hand adminis ers the rules, which they
have agreed upon and recognize. Nations prom-
ise responsive forbearance with, and laviolate
regard for, the honor, welfare and possessions of
each other. The world is ruled by, and depends
for its peace and moral advancement upon the
sanctity of promises, tacit or proclaimed.
It appears to us, that in the case of the Govern-
ment prosecution against the owners of New Al-
maden, much profitless inquiry and angry discus-
sion would have been saved, both in Court and
out of it, if this grand elementary doctrine had
been applied and the simple fact, of the case pre-
sented. The facts are historical and concise, the
application palpable, and the result as demon-
strable and inevitable, as a mathematical truism.
The whole lies in a nutshell. From November,
1845, to September, 1846, it is proven beyond con-
troversy that these owners of Almaden, or their
gran.ors, were in quiet possession of this mine,
at least under a color of right
—
(to our mind the
evidence discloses a perfect right, but as this is
not necessary to our argumeut we do not urge it.)
In July, 1846, the only authorized agent of the
American Government on the Pacific, the com-
mander-in-chief of its forces, in that formal and
solemn act by which he took possession of the
country, promised, "All persons holding title to
real estate, or in quiet possession of lands under
color of title, shall have those titles guaranteed to
them." This promise was the inducement held
out to the people of California—to these owners
amongst others—to yield their country to the
United States. The almost immediate submission
of the people showed, that they responded to the
offer and accepted the promise. The United
States therefore, is bound to guarantee to them,
and to all others similarly situated, their titles ; at
the very least, such as they had, which was iu this
case, quiet possession—although it seems to us
that the legitimate result rf this promise even
goes further, and engages to give them something
more, as the reward of their non-resistance. An
inducement is something more, than a man has
;
they had quiet possesion; the something more
could hardly be less than absolute title.
The spirit and the letter of this promise, after
running through every American proclamation
made in California, were confirmed at the treaty
of Guadaloupe Hidalgo ; and it takes thereby a
constitutional force, superior to ordinary statute or
common law.
It is not pretended that any subsequent aban-
donment of the mine released the United States ;
nor can it be for a moment supposed that, any
subsequent act of those owners, except their
solemn consent, could vitiate the right, then and
there vested in them, by the promise of the federal
power.
To the end of time, therefore, so far as the
Government is concerned, its promise gives
them quiet possession; the only thing left open
being as to how, it should guarantee their title.
That it was to be guaranteed, was a proclaimed
pledge. The method chosen by the United States,
was enacted into a law, by the act constituting the
Land Commission. The law and principles by
which that commission was to be guided, as stated
in an extract at the foot of this article were, the
Treaty ofGuadalaupe Hidrfgo, the laws ofNations,
and the principles of Equity. The original promise
runs like a thread of gold through all the gov-
ernment's acts.
The Law Commission is opened. America's own
officers enquire in their own way into the rights
of the owners of Almaden. They redeem the pro-
mise given when the American flag was first
unfurled—that their title should be guaranteed,
and they finally confirm it. This was in 1856,
ten years after the first promise. The thread of
gold holds out yet.
Another promise of the United States in the
Land commission act is, "that for all claims finally
confirmed by the Commissioners, the patent of
the United States shall issue."
In November 1858, instead of the patent, the
injunction of the United Mates issued. Instead
of being confirmed in, they were turned out of,
possession. Promises on promises were violated—
the golden thread was broken.
There are also promises implied, as well as ex-
pressed. The very existence of our State for
instance, rests on the implied promise of the gov-
ernment to permit men to mine upon its public
domain. This promise is implied, first, by the
well known policy of the government to surrender
its wild laws to the public, until they are reserved
by statute ; second, by the message of the Presi-
dent promulgating the discovery of mineral wealth
in California, without announcing restrictive
laws; third, by the action of the law makers in
Congress, who after long debate, formally left the
mines of California to the people without limiting
statutes ; and fourth, from the fact, that the gov-
ernment of the United States knew that its pro-
mise was implied by the people, from ther univer.
sal action in working the mines ; and while it had
the power, it neither interposed its proclamation
nor its force to restrain them—thus consenting
to their occupation, in the most palpable way.
Under this implied promise also, for eight or
ten years, at least, the owners of the New Alma-
den have been mining extensively ; developing
their property, and adding largely to its present
and prospective value. It is trifling to suppose,
as we have said before, that the Government dis-
criminated, between mining for gold and mining
for quicksilver ; or that it yielded to its people
the minerals of the Sierra Nevada,—and reserved
those of the Sierra Azul—all were equally in-
cluded.
Two promises of the American Government—
the one expressed in words, the other implied by
acts—and both accepted; guarantee to the owners
of Almaden the quiet possession of their mine.
We submit that these po&itions are impregnable
—
clear, homely, brief and comprehensive—they-
embrace the law, the equity and the common
sense of the issue; so plain, as that he who runs
may read; so strong that legal quibble and
circumlocution, will but break into thin spray
against them.
How, then, can we regard the fact that now, Al-
maden is locked up by the Government from its
owners by force—that they are turned out of their
possession, and left melancholy sentinels on the
hilltops of their property—but an example of
American law violated, a Government promise
broken, a national word of honor to conquered
men desecrated ?
And for whom ? For men of a class, whom the
American people hold both in fear and contempt
;
for a' clique of speculative politicians and schem-
ing counsel. It is such wh© would pluck the
plumage of the national eagle—its honor—to
feather their own paltry nests.
Fart Second.
"We may expect to be asked why, if the law and
the equity of the case lay in such compact form,
the United States Court spent weeks in the trial
of the injunction suit, and why we have occupied
so many columns in our argument heretofore.
We presume the Court was compelled to de-
cide on the case as it was presented, and to listen
to the lawyers, who were engaged in discussing
the acts of these owners, since the promise of
the United States confirmed their " quiet pos-
session under color of title." With all defer-
ence to the counsel engaged, we submit that no
subsequent act of the owners, except a formal
release, or a distinct abandonment of their mine
to the United States, could possib'y vest in that
power the right to interfere with their quiet pos-
session. By their possession, prior to the con-
quest, they would have been entitled, upon the
commonest principles of national equity, as
against the United States, to perpetual quietude.
But that possession was guaranteed by a solemn
and formal national promise, in 1846 ; reiterated
in 1818, in a national treaty ; and finally fulfilled,
in 1856, by a national Board of Commissioners.
It is n^t possible for a citiien to be more assured
by his government of any property, or privilege,
than these owners have been assured of quiet pos-
session, by the confirmed promises of the United
States. What have their actions since that
6promise, to do with the rights acquired by it ?
"They sought title from Mexico since the con-
qest !" They did not; but suppose they did,
does that release the American Government?
Suppose they obtained a license from France, or
a quit-claim from the Emperor of Japan, or did
any other absurd act, to which their fears might
prompt them ; could any or all of these vitiate
the promise of the United States ? It is nonsense
to suppose so.
We have been led away into long arguments on
this subject, we confess ; for we did not see,—so
heavy was the mist in which it was enveloped,
—
the simple broad rock on which the case of the
defendants rests. It requires, after all, only
common sense to distinguish its imposing
strength. Upon the national promise, guarded
by the national power, and surrounded by the
national hono? , reposes their claim to quiet pos-
session.
The reader must not lose sight, of the point at
issue. It is not whether the owners of Almaden
have, or have not, a perfect title—whether some
one else may not have a better—or whether their
two league Mexican grant be, or be not, valid
;
but it is, whether the United States, who came to
the country and found them working their mine
in 1846 ; who promised then to guarantee their
title ; who let them remain ten years in quiet pos-
session, and then by their Land Commission act-
ually did guarantee that title by confirming it
shall now, have the right to restrain them from
working, and oust them from possession ; upon
an allegation that since 1846 they had sought and
obtained a Mexican grant. This is the matter at
issue fairly stated.
To our mind the affirmative seems in the last de-
gree absurd. We own a Quartz Lead in Tuolum-
ne county. We have possession of it, by the per-
mission of the United States—our tenure is its
implied promise. If we were, from a freak of fear
or of fancy, to proceed to Mexico and get a Mexi-
can grant for the land, does any sane person sup-
pose that we should thereby lose our Quartz Lead.
There are a hundred persons in San Francisco
owning lots under city titles, who have procured
the Limantour quitclaim, well knowing it was
an arrant fraud. Does anybody pretend that
the city has a right to resume those lots, because
the owners were fools enough to buy a title from
Limantour ?
But, urges an opponent, " the promise of the
Commander-in-Chief in 1846, is nothing in law
;
he was not invested with authority to bind his
government ; he was not the agent of the Federal
power to grant previleges, or to promise titles.
It is out of the scope of his duty."
Of all the arguments advanced on this subject,
this is the most despicable. We confess we do
not know whether in technical law the promise of
an American Commander-in-Chief would be bind-
ing on his Government or not. Unfortunately,
we have no authorities in our possession upon
international law; but our sense of justice tells us
that such promises are held «by that code to be
binding ; and if they are, they then become
by the Act of Congress, the law of America with
regard to California titles ; for the statute orga-
nizing the Land Commission enacts, that it shall
be governed by the law of nations in adjudi-
cating upon them. This would settle the ques-
tion, even technically, and make the promise
and proclamation of a high American officer, as
valid before the courts, as they are sacred in the
hearts of the people.
" Not authorized to bind his government"
—
" not an agent to make promises"—" out of the
scope of his duty !" He was authorized to bind
a new country to his government, he was the
agent to make conquests—it was within his scope
of duty to take California. " But in the means to
be employed he was restricted"—to what ? To
gunpowder and round shot, to the rifle ball and
the deadly bayonet, to slaughter and destruction ?
Are these the only modes of conquest ? May he
not use the language of conciliation, and reason
;
of equity, of hope to the people he comes to
subdue? If he finds an enemy on the inherit-
ance of his fathers, or surrounded by the products
of his industry, must he send a bullet through
his brain—of necessity ; or may he say " We
come as friends ; the possessions of your industry
shall be guaranteed to you ?" And if he does,
in mercy and human kindness so promise, and
thus conquer ; shall this, his nobler, act be ac-
counted naught, while a butchery, would have
been legal and approved ?
Commodore Sloat, in the celebrated proclama-
tion that went forth to California^with the breeze
which first unfurled the national banner, spoke as
a wise, good and brave man would naturally speak.
Conciliatory, as the tone of his proclamation is,
it does not contain a single inequitable promise.
Though kindly, it is sternly just. We venture to
say, that it did more towards the peaceable con-
quest of California, than any other act of the war.
But for it, doubtless many noble forms would
have bit the dust, that now look on the fair light
of day ; by it, many a hearth, both of the invaders
and the invaded, was saved from desolation and
lament.
It is an axiom of common law and common
sense, that a principal cannot at once repu-
diate the acts of his agent, and accept the bene-
ficial result of those acts. If a man acquire
lands, by a promise of his agent that he shall
pay for them, he cannot keep the lands and deny
the authority of the agent to bind him to that
payment. If by the arms or the promises of its
agents, the United States acquire California, the
very fact of its retaining the country, acknowl-
edges all the acts of her agents by which it was
acquired.
Besides, there is something in a national proc-
lamation from the battle field, which sets the soul
of a people, quivering with susceptability. A
proclamation issued as this was, at the first up-
raisal of the nation's flag, to a people who sub-
mitted and confessed themselves a conquered race,
becomes the word of honor of a sensitive nation.
Their impulsive chivalriy will unite with their
sense of right at a welding heat, to forge a weapon
for its defence, which those who would desecrate
its pledges, had better not encounter.
The most cruel and faithless foe, that in mod-
ern times has braved a civilized people, is the
Mohammedan Hindoo, Nana Sahib, whose name-
less atrocities have curdled the blood of Christen-
dom,—a shout would rise up from the white man's
world at his capture and destruction. Suppose
that he were penned up with his followers, in an
Indian jungle, by the forces under Colin Camp-
bell. Lord Clyde.—a scorching sun, and nightly
malaria, are consuming the precious lives of the
commander's soldiers, and he proclaims that if
the murderer and his force, will lay down their
arms, their lives shall be spared, and their prop-
erty guaranteed to them. They lay down their
arms. They are in the power of the men whose
wives, sisters, and infants, they tortured to death.
Those men gnash their teeth, while standing spell
bound, and sick at heart with thirst for vengeance.
The civilized world joins in their feelings. But
let the murderer and his band go their way. A
soldier's word shields their worthless lives. A
nation's honor chains a nation's wrath— for it is
better that the accursed should encumber the
earth, than that the pledge of a great people
should be violated.
This is the extremest case that can be imagined
;
and even in it, civilization would say that the
commander's promise must be held sacred. Then
how much more the fair, and not more than equit-
able promise of Commodore Sloat to the unoffend-
ing people of California ! Could our voice reach
the utmost boundaries of the Federal sway, and
were the question put, "Shall the promise of an
American commander-in-chief to a conquered
people be held sacred ?"'—how great an aye !
would sweep up from the length and breadth of
the land. " What, under all circumstances ?"
Tbere might be a pause for reflection, but momen-
tary however, and the affirmative answer would
outcrowd the echoes of the first response.
We see before us the genius of American
honor, standing in* the proud gaze of its own
millions, and commanding the respect of distant
nations. Its head is amongst the stars, its dais
is a wide continent. Its august shadow, falls as
the earth revolves, on the frigid, and on the torrid
zone;on the waters of the Pacific in the mo rning,
and upon those of the Atlantic in the evening.
Its voice intoned with the clear energy of truth,
falls inquiringly upon our ear.
"Is an American proclamation to be debased, or
an American Commanders pledge to a conquered
people, to be violated ? Shall the first unfolding
of the national banner on the Pacific, inaugurate
a lie ? I, the honor of this great people, speak-
ing by my gallant representative, was pledged
amidst the exultations of conquest to this people,
' that all persons in quiet possession of lands,
under color of right, should have those titles
guaranteed to them.' You acknowledge that the
defendants, were, at the time this pledge was
uttered, in quiet possession of a mine, and had
a color of title thereto. They believing the Ame-
rican power would be as truthful as it was mighty
amongst others submitted. Their posses-
sion, my pledge, and that submission, made a
title which cannot be infringed by the national
power to the end of time. " Quiet possession,"
as against us, vested in them, then and from
thenceforth. The Act was written by the hand
of the Conqueror and sealed with the glory of
the conquest. How is it, that I find them to day
ousted from that possession ? Has the great gov-
ernment of America broken the national faith,
that it might steal a mine ? Who has done this
wrong ?"
" But," interposes the National, " since July,
1846, they have sought titles from Mexico to this
mine, and have antedated them."
"I pity them," the great voice replies, "because
they had not more faith in American honor, and
so saved themselves the trouble. Their fears,
however, do not absolve my pledge. I guaranteed
them such a title as they had then, which was at
least quiet possession, and it matters not to you
or to me; if since that date they have made forty
pilgrimages to Mexico, and have antedated do-
cuments sufficient to carpet the intervening con-
tinent : their right and my pledge remain un-
affected. If they have committed any crime,
punish them as your code directs—but do not
break your word."
"But," replies the National, "they had not quiet
possession ; Don Jose Berreyesa, or the Fossatt
claimants had." "Enough," says Honor, "if they
were in possession 1 confirmed it to them, and
why does the government claim it ? If there is
a strife aj to who was in quiet possession, let
Berryesa, Fossatt, and these defendants settle
the fact before the proper tribunals ; my pledge
of quiet possession, inures to the benefit of who-
ever was there, under color of right—it was not
the government of the United S;ates at that
time."
"Mighty honor !" says National, again ; "these
people are not of us; we are the victors, and to
8us belong the spoils ; they have a splendid mine
;
it is nobly equipped, and they are aliens and for-
eigners. What a shame is it that they should have
so much, while many devoted adherents of the
Government are poor."
"And would you take their 'quiet possession,' "
answers the Genius, "because they are foreigners ?
Remember, they were not foreigners when my
piedge was given ; and would not have been for
eigners until this day, had we not come. They
were here at work, when we came and proclaimed
ourselves as ' their best friends.' We have, hith-
erto, done them no good, except to protect them
from the exactions of Mexican officials, who rapa
ciously tithe the industry of their people. And
shall we new, obliterate ten years of such friend-
ship, by wresting the whole of their property at
one grasp? Who counsels such infamy? Who
would confiscate the industry of the alien that re-
poses in our honor; and violate their country's
conquering pledge, for filthy lucre's sake ?"
Some names are whispered. A shade pass-
es over that grand face. He takes a volume
of history from the Records of Time, inscribed
" The Roll of Fame." He opens a page, in
which are writ, in lustrous characters, the names
of the Fathers of the Republic. The sky brightens
—for the world grows lighter every time that page
is opened. He reads some names there, and with
a pained expression, adds
—
"Greatness and lotty virtue, are not fam'.ly heir-
looms. The glorious Fathers of America must
look for their sons—not by name—but wherever
the noble in spirit, and the good of purpose, dwell
—among the millions of the people."
" But," deprecates a pleading voice, "these were
but counsel, or editorial friends—employed "
Honor closed the volume, as if to say, he would
not discuss subtle distinctions.
•'Go to, Sirs !" he adds; " were you to win
these men's possessions by legal technicalities, in
the name of the people, and did your proceedings
show nothing but the pure effect of patriotism;
the people would not receive, that which you won.
They would ask who discovered and rescued this
mine from the wilderness ; who made those roads,
excavated that mountain, built those costly viorks,
erected that mining town, and started this new
branch of commerce ? Did the United States, or
these dispossessed defendants ? Would we be
richer or better if, to-day, the metals they have
dug from the bowels of the earth, still reposed
within their primeval fastnesses ? Do we, as a
people, so lack buried wealth, that we grudge them
the portion they have exhumed ? Give them their
possessions, and a title thereto. Let them sit
under the vine, and the fig tree, theyhave cultured,
and nursed, and eat of their fruits in peace.
Charge them, if it be our due, with the value of
the naked hills, at the time when they took pos-
session
; but let it not be said, that a proud and
powerful people, meanly took a legal advantage to
rob the stranger of his eneerprise and toil. Our
honored Chief Magistrate this month has pro-
claimed, The federal Government has ever \been a
liberalparent to her Territories, and a generous con-
tributor to the useful enterprises ofthe early settlers.
These men were early settlers ; their enterprise
was useful ; our contribution shall be a fee to the
land they have improved.
" And my people," says Honor, " would speak
as becomes my name and their nobility."
Part Third.
We think we understand the American people
sufficiently to tell the movers in this business that
they will never get Nueva Aimaden in the name
of the Government. Let us see the aspects this
case presents to the public mind.
To start with, no Government prosecution
resulting in the confiscation of private property,
has ever been popular with any modern people,
even if undertaken with upright motives, and
reluctantly from a painful sense of officiai duty.
The only Government confiscation amongst the
Anglo-Saxons, any where near our own times,
which had a gleam of popularity, was the absorp-
tion of the Abbey properties in England, by that
royal brute, Henry the VIII. Even this could not
have happened had there been a free press to
instruct the national intelligence. Over one hun-
dred years ago the Derwentwater estates were
confiscated by the Crown, for the treason of their
owner ; and to this day that act is regarded with
feelings of sorrow and regret by the people. If
this repugnance prevails generally, what will be
the national sensation when the repulsive features
of this attempt are scrutinized. It will arouse its
resentment, as it provoked our own. Its results
are to deprive early settlers of the fruits of their
enterprise. This will be hateful. The manner in
which the prosecution has been conducted by the
counsel—without dignity, with acrimony and
vituperative language, will be distasteful. The sol
evidence on which the prosecution rests—the con-
fidential correspondence of the defendants with
their agent, the disclosure of which was in itself
infamous—added to the fact that this evidence
was purchased by adverse private claimants for
the enormous sum of twenty thousand dollars-
will be repugnant. The singular inequality of
the procedure which singles out these defendants,
and arrests their mining operations, on the pre-
tence that they have not obtained a Government
release of their mine, while a whole State full of
miners are left undisturbed, will be resented.
When, in addition to all these things, it is dis-
covered that in order to disturb them, the pro-
claimed pledge of an American commander must
be treated as the idle wind ; we need hardly say,
9that the inherent dislike of the national mind to
confiscatory processes, will be inflamed into indig-
nation. The people will resent a Government
prosecution, if meanness, malice, or private spe-
culation, becloud its high purpose. Oppress a
man, and were he full of errors, they will take
him into the shelter of their strong sympathy.
Rob a man of that which the national promise,
given under the national flag, has guaranteed to
to him, and the lightning will be scarcely less
swift than their anger.
Counsel in a case at law, even of a private
nature, fill a quasi-official capacity. Counsel for
a Government are public officers in all that relates
to the matter at issue. The acts of public officers
and their private position in relation to those acts,
have always been deemed appropriate matters for
public discussion. We have sedulously avoided
everything personal while giving our views on
this matter; and we adhere to the same course
now, in alluding to the position of the counsel for
the Government. That position belongs to the
publicities of the case. The idiosyncrasies of
conspirators, belong to a conspiracy. The actions
of actors in a drama explain its plot as well as their
words. We have stated that this case is not a govern
ment prosecution, but a prostitute use of the gov-
ernment name and title, to further a private specu-
lation. This has been denied. We can only inform
ourselves by enquiring what may be the object of
the men who represent the Government, and are
supposed to have originated the prosecution. The
counsel for the United States, upon whose
shoulders the case for the plaintiff has rested;
are, or at least have been until recently, the coun-
sel for Messrs. Eldridge Laurencel and others,
the owners of the Fossatt claim, which they say
embraces *' the mines and minerals of New Al-
maden." One of these gentlemen appears as
counsel for those claimants in San Francisco, the
other appeared for them before the Supreme Court
in Washington. The Fossatt claim was decided
by the Land Commission not to cover Almaden
;
by the District Court it was adjudged to embrace
that mine, and by the Supreme Court that judg-
ment was reversed and the claim remanded for
further evidence on the subject of boundaries. We
believe this to be a plain statement of the tran-
saction, though perhaps not explained in legal
phrase. As it stood, with the Government for
umpire, it was a very pretty fight. The parties
were well matched—wealth and obstinacy on one
side; political influence, fine manouvering, geni-
us, and the hope of a splendid prize, on the other.
First one made a successful hit, and then the
other; and it was quite doubtful who would
finally remain master of the field and take the
spoils. Suddenly Fossatt—that is, all of him that
had as yet appeared, viz : his counsel—comes
equipped in the Government regimentals, bearing
the flag and credentials of the supreme power, and
charges down upon Almaden in the name of the
United States, outflanks its defenders, and ties
them up. We admire the generalship of the
counsel ; but what was the Government about, to
let them steal its colors to accomplish a ruse ? The
facts are : Fossatt claims Almaden, and Messrs.
Randolph and Stanton are, or were the counsel of
Fossatt. The United States claim Almaden, and
actually shut it up; and Randolph and Stanton
are the counsel of the United States. Publicly
their position appears duplicate and self-en-
tangled. Two rivals claim Almaden, and the same
gentlemen urge both claims. Yesterday, they
proved that Almaden did not, and could not,
belong to the United States, but to Fossatt; and
they get a judgment to that effect. To-day, they
prove that Almaden beyond all controversy, does
belong to the United States, and therefore cannot
belong to Fossatt, and they get a judgment to
that effect also. Who does the mine belong to
gentlemen ? You should know, for you have-
proved up both sides of the question.
Some weak minded person sugests, as a solution
to the enigma, that these gentlemen were, the
counsel for Fossatt against the United States ; but
now are, the counsel for the Uuited States, against
all comers, including Fossatt. We <eject the ex-
planation, as rank blasphemy ; it implies profes-
sional treachery to a client, which is the unpardon-
able sin of the legal fraternity. Of course, a coun-
sel having been retained in a case, and having, in
his official capacity, obtained full insight into it;,
is bound forever, from employing that knowledge
against his client, albeit that client ceases to em-
ploy him. The rule is just and rigid—even in this
State, so lax in its morals, as compared to Phila-
delphia. " Once counsel, always counsel, or out
of the case ;" every lawyer's errand boy knows
the proverb.
Two rivals for the same mine—the Government
and Fossattt—claim the counsel. They have said
pleasant things for each ; spoken brave words on
both behalves. Which do they prefer in their
hearts ? They smile on both suitors, and, we-
doubt not, receive support from each ; would, they
had panes in their stomachs, as Charles Lamb's
friend had, so that we might see thefr inward
minds ! Every truthful and faithful tendency of
nature, leads us to infer, that their first , is their
only love ; the other is flirted with, merely for the
benefit of the early choice. Fossatt is the happy
man. He first procured their kindly regards, and
no doubt retains them still.
Seriously, we regard the appearance of the coun-
sel of Fossatt, on behalf of the Government, as
conclusive proof that the suit is brought for the
benefit of Fossatt. Were it brought really that
the United States should obtain the mine, which
would finally deprive Fossatt of it altogether ; the
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Counsel for Fossatt would not have originated and
supported such a suit. The supposition, that they
have lefc Fossatt and joined an antagonistic claim-
ant, is so contrary to professional honor and eti-
quette, that it is not to be tolerated. Having once
claimed the mine for Fossatt, they can never claim
it, except for him ; therefore, the present suit is a
movement in support of the same claim.
And now we ask the counsel, if it is becoming
and proper, that they should make a catspaw of
the Government, for the uses of their clients ?
They can not say, their clients do not claim this
mine ; for at the time the counsel must have been
drawing the bill for an injunction, at the suit of
the Government, these clients were drawing up a
mortgage for one million of dollars, upon half of
their claim, " including the mines and minerals
of Almailen," and recording it at San Jose. As
private citizens, of name and station, it appears
to us, that they should not have so debased the
great and equal name of the Government. As
officers, clothed with the livery, and speaking in
the name of the Government, honor, surely, for-
bade them to exercise their functions for any pri-
vate advantage whatever.
'We only discuss this unpleasant view of the sub
ject to prove that the Government is not the real
party in the suit against the possessors of Alma-
den. We have already shown that Congress never
intended that mining should be restrained, during
the inquiry into California land claims. Lest it
might be urged in reply, that such an intention is
displayed by the fact that Government institutes
a suit to restrain such mining, we prove that the
suit is not brought for the Government—the acts,
and the honor, of the Government counsel are our
witnesses.
Were we so disposed, the anomalous position of
the counsel, would afford a fine opportunity to re-
tort the personalities, they and their supporters
have indulged in ; but such is not our object. We
merely wish to show
—
That the real party in, in-
terest was not a made pary to the suit ; and that
the nominal plaintiff did not want an injunction.
The counsel, their clients, and their friends,
probably anticipate that a continuance of the
calumniating style they have hitherto adopt-
ed, will conceal the real demerits of their case, and
palliate its audacity. Fraud, forgery, Mexican
grants, ante-dating ! have been reiterated with
such apparently virtuous vehemence, that they
have taken the semblance of criminality. A little
common sense, a few plain words, will dispel such
absurd becloudings. What is the charge ? This
—
that the defendants, after the American flag was
raised in California, went to Mexico, and got a
Mexican grant of the wild land on which the mine
was situated which they were working; and that
Alexander Forbes, one of the owners, writing from
Monterey, in the spring of 1848, to his agent*,
admits that Castillero procured his grant after the
occupation of the country by the Americans.
Now, we are bold to say that, admitting all this
to be true, there is not one business man in this
community who would regard such acts as moral
delinquencies. The idea is too puerile to need
discussion, but yet we give it a sentence or two,
In 184-5-46 the parties were working the mine, and
had an Alcalde's grant, and formal possession.
Their title required strengthening. In July, 1846,
the American flag was hoisted, and the American
proclamation guaranteed them their title. This
was good, so far as the United States was con
eerned. But war raged in Mexico still. Mexico
might recover California ; and then where woul
be the American guarantee—it would be of no
value at all. The Government's own, and almosl
sole, witness in this suit—the gentleman who got
$20,000 for the confidential correspondences of hia
principals and partners—says, speaking of Janu-
ary, 1848, "at that period it was the opinion of
foreigners" (i.e. Americans, English, etc.) and
Mexicans, that California would be restored to
Mexico." The Government prosecution estab-
lishes the fact, that in those days it was antici
pated that the United States would evacuate Cal-
ifornia. Instead of this, the United States pur-
chased California, when peace was contemplated,
for $15,000,000.
* Theletter^in which this admission of Mr. Alexande]
Forbes appears, is a curiosity of legal evidence. Fron
the published correspondence it claims to be one of :
correspondence of four letters on the same subject, al.
written in the stilted, hurt, semi-dignified style of two
persons who are politely quarrelling with each other.1
Mr. Alexander Forbes swears point blank he mveiT
wrote this one; and produces a blotter copy of what he]
did write. Mr. says the one he produces is the!
simon-pure. Here the matter comes to a dead-locks
so
—
produce the letter ; let us see the paper, the ink!
the appearance, above all let us scrutinize the Aa?i<24
writing—that mysterious tell-tale which one knows, as
one knows a face, without being- hble to describe itJ
Hey Presto! the letter is lost. Stolen. Mr.
]
brought it to the city to give it to the District AttorneyJ
and somebody broke open his room door at the Railroad]
House, broke open his earpet bag, took out the precious
document, then put everything tidy, and left ; all whilel
the gentleman was refreshii g himself. But he haifl
something better
—
lie had a copy. Thinking it might be]
stolen he had had a careful, copy made, and by a mad
who could swear it was a copy. How fortunate ! Supj
pose the gentleman had r.ot wished to produce tha
original he could not have done better. We must needs
examine the copy. Look, at it inductively. It don't fii
into the place Mr. says it ought to go ; Mrl
Forbes's, blotter copy does. It is not an answer to thJ
letter which precedes it—the letter which follows doea
not answer it. The blotter copy answers and is anJ
swered. The whole correspondence is querulous ana
comp'aining—this is frank and hearty. Put the fiva
letters without date or name before a stranger and hJ
would arrange four in order
—
pat, and threw the stolen
one out as not belonging to the correspondence. Place
the stolen letter without a date before any person verseJ
in the thoughts, feelings and expressions of people in
California, from 1848 to 1858, and he would date it
185:', or after (its date purports to be 1848) Less inj
genious counsel than those for the Government woulJ
find no trouble in proving from circumsta' tial primM
facie and inductive evidence that it is not a genuinJ
letter.
11
Had we, or you, reader, or even the virtuous
and fulminant counsel, in 1846-7, owned this
mine under incipient Mexican titles, and had also
the guarantee of the American power ; hut ex-
pected that at the close of the war, Mexico would
resume her sway—what should we have done ?
We should have gone to Mexico, if ice could, and
have got her title also. The most tender conscience
would have seen nothing in the act but ordinary
common sense, and not particularly shrewd cau-
tion. The idea of fraud and forgery would never
—
could never—once have occurred to us. "Why
should we not have got a title from Mexico, bo as
to protect our property, in the event of her sway
returning ? We should have been stupid dunces
if we had not done so. What trash—and worse
than trash—what hypocrisy is it, to talk of fraud
and forgery ! If Mexico had, in 1848, resumed
her empire over California, what would have been
the effect of such acts, and such grants ? Would
they have been forgeries and frauds, or honest
titles ? The latter indisputably. Who, then, is
foolhardy enough to say that the purchase of Cali-
fornia by the United States converted those
straight-forward business proceedings, into im-
moralities and crimes ? The very conception is
preposterous. All the effect, that the ultimate
cession of California had on any such grants, was
to deprive them of their legal effect. The United
States Land Commissioners, apparently assuming
these defendants' Mexican grant to have been thus
procured, or imperfect, rejected it ; while they con-
firmed their Alcalde mining grant, and their pos-
session. There were no tirades about frauds and
forgeries.
We neither know nor care where Castellero pro-
cured his Mexicant grant for two leagues of land.
The Government proves the fact, that it was prior
to the ultimate cession of California to the United
States, and the published reports of the Mexican
Minister, made in 1846, show that in April of
that year he had applied for a concession from his
government, and that it was willing to assist him.
Transcripts of the grant, as strongly authentica-
ted by the Mexican Government, and by the Amer-
ican and English Ministers, as such documents
can well be, have been filed by the defendants
but the counsel insists they are fabricated. When
asked to appoint a Commissioner to go to Mexico,
and examine for themselves, they decline ! "We can
imagine nothing to be more unjust, than to per-
sist in disparaging imputations made by them-
selves, and at the same time to refuse to join in
the only steps which can prove the truth, or fal-
sity, of their assertions.
"We repeat from the consideration of this case,
as developed in this article, that the attempt by
interested parties to obtain the mine of Almaden,
in the name of the Government, is futile. It
may, and does injure the defendants—it may, and
does injure California, and prostrates an impor-
tant branch of its industry. It may, and does for
the moment, slur the national honor ; but it will
not gain the mine. Until they can blot out the
fact of the early possession of its owners from the
pages of history, erase a national promise from
the records of a nation's triumphs, or blind with
chaff that keen popular vision which goes straight
to the bulls-eye of truth—they cannot lord it over
Almaden.
"We have been accused of being discourteous to
the Government, and disrespectful to the Court,
in our discussion. If we have been, we have un-
wittingly betrayed feelings which are foreign to
us. "We have been compelled to use the name of
the Government to designate the ostensible plain-
tiff—but we have carefully insisted that the Gov-
ernment had nothing to do with the matter beyond
this—that the Attorney General had been deceiv-
ed, by interested representations, into a permission
to use the Federal title, and that upon further
light he would withdraw that permission. Towards
the Court we are strangely mistaken if we have
been in the least wanting in the respect which it
is our duty to manifest. Why should we ? It is
especially the alien's Court, and we happen at the
moment to be a plaintiff suitor in it, for a large
amount. If we differ in opinion with the Court
on any subject, and occasions arise for us to ex-
press our opinions, we freely do so. "Why not?
Were we to differ in a matter of legal ethics with
Lord Brougham, in a geological inference with
Murchison, or with Professor "Whewell upon a pro-
position in inductive science, and express our
views—should we intend disrespect for those em-
inent men ; or if they regarded us at all, would it
be with unkindly feelings ? Certainly not.
They and the Court live for the establishment of
truth. By intelligent discussion, truth is evolved.
As the fall of an apple suggested to Newton the
discovery of the laws of gravitaion ; so the ideas
of the humblest may suggest imporant results.
If we have exhibited any feeling toward the Court,
it has been that of confidence in its superiority to
all personal prejudice, and in its high rectitude;
in that, while a suitor before it, we have not hesi-
tated to express opinions at variance with its own.
We have endeavored to show, in this article,
that the real party in interest in this issue has
not been made a party to the suit ; that an injunc-
tion to restrain defendants from mining, contra-
venes the intention of the law, and of the law
makers, who had fully considered the subject;
and that the United States is precluded by its own
promises—one proclaimed, ratified, and confirmed;
the other implied, and both accepted in good faith
—from interfering with the quiet possession of the
owners of Almaden.
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Will the public undertake the case, or decline the jurisdic-
tion ? If the former, the public, as a conscientious tribunal,
1

THE NEW ALMADEN MINE.
THE DISCUSSION REVIEWED.
I hope no one will expect graces of composition from me,
although I essay to write upon the subject of the case of the
Hew Almaden Mine, now on appeal to the public from the
United States Courts.
And first, I ask, what does the public know about this case ?
Very little, I am afraid ; not from lack, but excess, in the ma-
terial thrust upon it for consideration and judgment. The
printed matter in the case, now to be found in San Francisco,
amounts to : Arguments of counsel before the Land Commis-
sion, seventy-two octavo pages, chiefly from the hands of the
counsel for the Company; in the United States District Court,
pleadings and depositions, about one thousand octavo pages
;
in the United States Circuit Court, say another hundred octavo
pages ; opinions of Judges McAllister and Hoffman in the in-
j unction matter, with a little appendix of motions and orders,
eighty-one octavo pages more ; and in the shape of newspaper
commentaries, the space of about twelve columns in the S. F.
Herald, (counting in one article from the Bulletin,) by a writer
in behalf of the Company, who usually signs himself " Citizen"
;
some five columns in the National, from an opponent of "Citi-
zen," who delights to distinguish himself as "No Alien"; and
editorials of the Bulletin, National and Alta, to the amount per-
haps of half a dozen columns each, besides the editorials of the
inferior sheets of the city and of the country papers.
Will the public undertake the case, or decline the jurisdic-
tion ? If the former, the public, as a conscientious tribunal,
1
assumes the duty of mastering all the facts, and weighing well
all the arguments offered on either side. This sounds formida-
ble enough, but it is a consequence not to be avoided when the
public hears a cause upon appeal.
Of the two branches of its duty, that of weighing well the
arguments on either side will, I opine, be found the lightest,
and I can but hope, entertaining if not useful, seeing that the
chief advocates who have volunteered for plaintiff and defend-
ant, have entered so ambitiously on their task. They both
deserve a passing word.
"Citizen" is blessed or cursed with fluency and effects sensa-
tion. To use a metaphor—and it is not possible to speak of
him without one—his thoughts are blown-glass bubbles, and
when they strike upon the mirror in his brain, a mutual crash
ensues, and the scattered fragments—of idea and intellect—
give back dancing thousands of such irrelevant images that we
seem to be looking through our spectacles into a kaleidoscope.
"Witness, notably, the passage in one of his communications
touching on the old common-law mode of conveying lands,
where we are first treated to an English landscape in the feudal
times, with cavaliers, maidens and priests, ancestral swords,
plumes, palfreys, Genoese silks, hoods and cowls in the fore-
ground ; and then, by a magical transition, are all at once trans-
ported into Palestine, to find ourselves surrounded by virgins,
tapers, and other pageantry of an oriental marriage • all which
pleasing enough in its place, can hardly be called sane when ap-
plied to the elucidation of the doctrines of common assurance,
which was his matter in hand. Nor can he speak of dissolving
an injunction, without depicting the circumstances of a general
thaw!
" No Alien," too, has his variety. He affects severity—but his
philippics are only coarse invectives, savage but not pointed
;
whilst his wit, if not mere puerility, is, to say the least, too del-
icate and refined for my apprehension. He gives some signs
of vigor when he endeavors to grapple with his antagonist in
argument, but the unsubstantial texture of the propositions
generally eludes the awkwardness of the grasp. He would
have done better to have avoided the tantalizing pursuit of
phantoms, (perhaps these gladiators would be flattered if I
should call one the Secutor and the other the Retiarius of the
ancient amphitheater) and adhering to facts, gone deliberately
to work to develop his case. "Within these limits he might still
have had the advantage of " Citizen," for I see no reason why
he might not at least be rational. The draught animal is use-
ful, though he cannot perform like the Arabian courser.
Neither of the gentlemen, I trust, will take offense at these
remarks. I suppose they wanted notice, or they would not
have written in a manner so ostentatious of self, nor left the
unwrought bulk of New Almaden to press so heavily as at this
moment on the public mind.
Stripped of the nonsense of its expounders, it is obvious that
the interest of this case arises from its bearings upon business.
The public cares nothing for the New Almaden Company, but
it does care for quicksilver. "Citizen," in his peculiar style,
tells us that the county of Santa Clara " grumbles in discon-
tented poverty," and that some hundreds of unoffending work-
men have been thrown out of employment—that the hammer
makes clamor no longer in deserted Almaden, nor do the mule-
bells tinkle along its precipitous hights, etc.— and it is true
;
and a much more important consideration is that the price of
quicksilver has doubled, which is doubling the amount of a
large and constantly increasing item of the cost of the produc-
tion of gold in California. This is a great fact, with conse-
quences which extend beyond the range of a mere scribbler's
vision and will deserve a conspicuous place in the annals of the
country. It will deserve to be noted and recorded as a cala-
mity; but were the calamity greater still, what light would
that consideration have upon these questions which embrace
the New Almaden case ? viz
:
Had the Judges the power under the law to enjoin the New
Almaden Mine Company—or are they usurpers ?
Were the officers of the government justified in asking for
the injunction—or are they tyrants ?
Ought the New Almaden Company to have been enjoined
—
or have they a good title to the mine ?
I submit that neither the price of quicksilver, the discontent
of counties, the suffering of unfortunate workmen and their
families, nor the tinkling of mule-bells, can vary the answers
to be rendered—that the answers must be the same when mil-
lions and multitudes are involved, as when only a pittance and
the humblest individual ; for when considerations of material
interests affect the public judgment on issues like these, the
people will already have suffered the corruption of bribery and
consented to the sale of justice.
To seek, as "Citizen" has done in sundry of his fine passa-
ges, to maintain, on the admission that the title of the New
Almaden Company is fraudulent, that they still have a right to
the property, by reason of their labor and expenditures in con-
structing, on a before untenanted spot, improvements which he
paints as elegant, solid and useful, is but to attempt to justify
the crime of forgery. Eugene Aram, with even more elo-
quence, once sought by similar reasons to justify the crime of
murder, but is yet considered to have been justly hanged.
"Citizen" intimates that he is engaged in some species of traffic
himself, but in the name of mercantile as well as every other
species of honesty, I repel his suggestions—the product, it is to
be hoped, rather of the levity of his fancy than an expression of
his principles—and say to him that his Clerk may with his own
arguments justify the forgery of his check, provided he looks
well to the application of the proceeds.
First. Are the Judges of the U. S. Circuit Court usurpers ?
This is a main question, because it is simply by the words of
their mouth that the labors of the New Almaden Company are
suspended. It is they who have so ordered. Is the suspension
tyranny ? Then the judges are usurpers, for there are no laws
of the United States which authorize judges to do anything
which is tyrannical. But let the public be cautious. Usurpa-
tion by a judge is not to be lightly assumed. It ought to be
almost self-apparent, and but little need to be shown by argu-
ment or enforced by declamation— as if, for instance, a court
Should assess taxes and proceed to collect them by execution—
•
otherwise the public may be misled to condemn the judge
before it has fathomed the merits of the cause.
The argument for the company evades an open announce-
ment of this charge of usurpation, and pretends to put the court
in the position of a monarch, whose ministers, not himself, are
responsible for his acts. This is disingenuous, and but a simu-
lated deference ; a sophistry designed to cloak the malevolent
purpose, not shield the judges; a wreath that conceals a dagger.
They had the pleadings, the evidence, the arguments, the law,
before them ; they, only, had the power in their hands ; and if
there was not law to close the New Almaden Mine with an
injunction, they and none other must bear the responsibility.
If there was crime, no one can be searched until the judges are
first condemned. Therefore
—
Second. The law-representatives of the government stand
justified of tyranny whilst the judges remain unconvicted of
usurpation. They need no other defense than that after an
unusually protracted argument, study, and long reflection, the
judges concluded that their prayer ought to be granted. The
judges said that the New Almaden Company ought not to be
permitted to go on working the New Almaden Mine, because,
so far as the case could then be investigated, the New Almaden
Company did not own the mine, but were enjoying its enor-
mous profits under a forged title. If the judges were correct,
the agents of the government could not be wrong in asking for
the prohibition now, just as on final judgment they would ask
for an execution. In either case the right to sue is included in
the sentence. If they had the right to make the demand, it is
difficult to understand that they had the discretion to forbear.
That would be a dangerous prerogative in any case ; and there
is surely nothing in the insignificance of the value of the New
Almaden Mine, or in the venality of the offense of forgery,
which could make it tyranny not to forbear to enforce the
rights of the government in the present instance—no matter
what may be the pecuniary loss to the public at large, nor
whether the action of the government eventually resulted to
the benefit of the national treasury, or of some honest owner
for whom the United States assumed the place of trustee under
the stipulations of that treaty by which they perfected in them-
selves "the paramount legal title" (as expressed by Judge
McAllister) to the soil which they had conquered.
There was no guilt on the part of the agents of the govern-
ment, unless there was a conspiracy, in which those that wear
the ermine, not those who wear the gown, were the greater
criminals. If there was neither usurpation, tyranny, nor con-
6spiracy, the New Almaden Company would have no better
right to force their sorrows on the public than any other suitor
who had lost a cause.
To assail before a people those who administer their laws, in
newspaper articles written at the instance of parties who have
that moment issued from the precincts of justice under sentence
of condemnation, is an enterprise too bold to be attempted
openly. Hence we have not only the hypocritical fiction of the
non-responsibility of our judges, but it is to be extended to the
Attorney-General at Washington, who, also, it is artfully pre-
tended in words, has been misled by advisers, and thus the
assault is limited, apparently, to the local attorneys. But the
artifice is too transparent ; a charge which could not be avowed
is again clearly insinuated, and we are desired to believe that
Mr. Black, too, is one of the conspirators.
The people of California are not more incredulous than oth-
ers. I am myself not incapable of believing judges and other
officers of the law guilty of even as great crimes as these ; but
sensible men will wait for some better ground than the issuing
of an injunction in a particular case by a court of equity which
was made for the purpose of issuing injunctions; and honest
and fair-minded men will at least require a respectable accuser
and sufficient evidence before they yield their convictions.
Such an accuser is not, at this moment, the New Almaden
Company. The provisional sentence of forgery stands unre-
versed against them—and the rhapsodical essays of "Citizen"
are not that evidence. Putting away, then, the newspaper van-
ities of the writers who have figured on either side—lamenting,
though to no purpose, yet sincerely, the loss of employment to
laborers, and the rise in the price of quicksilver to the country
—declining the leperous touch of a morality that would justify
forgery, by the money laid out on the thing forged for—totally
indifferent to mule-bells, and turning an adder's ear to charges
or insinuations of usurpation, tyranny, conspiracy, or any other
crimes, against the judges and the law officers of the govern-
ment—I approach the mountain of the New Almaden contro-
versy with the desire to offer an honest opinion, as in any other
case, great or small, of the correctness of the judgment of the
court, not on questions of the law of procedure—the when, and
where, and wherefore, of granting injunctions—but on the facts,
viewed in the untechnical light of a common understanding,
which brings me to this question
:
Third. Have the New Almaden Company a title to the New
Almaden Mine?
If they have a title, it is either without papers or with papers.
They allege that they have both, but I shall not go further
when I find either.
Independently of papers, their title must be found in the
events of the following history. From the first foundation of
missions in California, now some dozen years less than a cen-
tury, a cave had been known to exist in the hills constituting
part of the mountain range which bounds the valley of San
Jose* on the side next the coast, and about fifteen miles to the
southward from the Santa Clara Mission. From this cave the
Indians obtained vermillion for painting their bodies, whilst
they continued in the savage state, and for painting the Mission
Church after they had been converted. The color of the earth,
and the weight of the fragments of stone, which were easily
broken off from the sides of the cave, soon—it is not known
how soon
—
gave rise to the impression that it contained metal
of some sort. The first known of any attempt to work it as a
mine seems to have been in 1324, when Antonio Sunol, in
partnership with one of the Chabollas, (from whom the range
of hills in which the mine is situated received a Spanish name,
which signifies in English "The Eange of the Mine of Luis
Chabolla,") worked it, or attempted to work it as a silver* mine.
They built a mill on a neighboring stream for grinding the ore,
and singularly enough procured, it is said, a flask of quicksil-
ver to facilitate their operations. Of course, this early Califor-
nia mining enterprise proved a failure. In 1834, '35 or '36, a
Chabolla made another effort with no better success. The cave
seems to have remained unmolested, but not forgotten, for about
ten years longer, when Captain Andres Castillero, of the cavalry
of the Mexican regular army, came to California on the business
of the central government, as an agent, I have heard, to look
after another agent who had preceded him to this coast on some
special service of a political nature. A Californian, of the name
of Eobles, (nicknamed Chato
—
-Jlai-nosed), carried the captain to
8the old cave, and he, being a man of some knowledge of min-
eralogy, soon discovered that the hitherto inscrutable substance
was quicksilver. History finds its charm in the details of great
events, and so it may not be amiss to relate that Castillero made
his experiments at the Mission of Santa Clara, in the quarters
of the priest, the Eev. Father Keal, and that his process was
by putting small pieces of ore into a gun barrel, and the touch-
hole stopped with clay, and the muzzle inserted in water, sub-
jecting it to a strong heat. The condensation of the mercurial
vapor in the water, made the first quicksilver produced in Cali-
fornia. Andres Castillero knew the value of quicksilver—all
Mexicans do. He formed a copartnership with Chato Eobles
and his brother, his friend, the priest of the Mission, and Gen.
Jose Castro, then military commandant of this Department.
Their agreement was to combine their efforts to procure a title,
and money to work the mine, which was to remain provision-
ally under the charge of Father Real, in the absence of Castillero.
They stipulated with one another, that of the products no more
should be taken out than was necessary to enable them to com-
plete their arrangements. Father Real furnished some Indians
of the neophytes under his pastoral charge. Gen. Castro pro-
bably furnished a supply of gun-barrels, and the two Robles
contributed a brother-in-law, an American, named Chard, who
sometime in the fall or beginning of the winter of 1845 took
charge of the operations of the company. He put the Indians
to breaking off ore from the cave, and erected a sort of battery
of gun-barrels over an impromptu furnace in the side of the hill,
each gun-barrel charged, touchhole stopped, and muzzle in wa-
ter, as before described. From each charge of a gun-barrel
he obtained half an ounce of quicksilver, but a very few charges
unfortunately consumed the gun-barrel, so the extraction went
on slowly and at some expense. Whilst he was thus employed
he was one day visited by the partners and some of their friends,
in all perhaps a dozen or fourteen persons. "What they did is
in some respects variously related. The witnesses all agree,
however, that the party was a merry one ; they walked about
the mouth of the cave, and lounged under the trees or sat upon
stones, rode around a little way through the brushwood, and
chatted and laughed ; and the witnesses upon whom the New
9Almaden Company chiefly rely, say that Antonio Ma. Pico, Al-
calde, standing up, surveyed the scene, and declared to Andres
Castillero that he granted him three thousand varas of land in
all directions.
Castillero and partners, and Pico, and the witnesses, at that
moment believed that the land belonged to a retired sergeant,
whose name was Jose" Eeyes Berreyesa, as they have since
declared.
Chard, the only American witness, (it is rather unusual to find
one to a transaction of that date,) can not, however, remember
that Castillero was present at all, and yet he was in charge of
the place under Castillero's appointment and orders, of course
knew him perfectly well, and must have been the host who re-
ceived the party. He can not either distinctly remember any
granting, giving, or taking possession, but thinks he heard some-
thing said about taking possession ; in fact, if he was the only
witness, it might all well pass for a pleasure excursion made up
amongst the parties to the contract I have referred to, to see how
their agent was coming on with the gun-barrels. All the wit-
nesses say there was no surveyor and no instruments, no meas-
urement, no marking of lines or fixing of corners, and but one
saw any paper or writing materials, and the Alcalde's secretary
was not that one.
Of how much land did these proceedings make Castillero the
owner, whether it was public or private land ? How much
further did his and his partners' rights extend than the Indians
had that day thrust the crowbar ? Night left them as the
morning found them, naked occupants. They say they had
thirty- six millions of square varas.
After this, Chard descended the hill to the creek, a mile from
the mine cave, but within the three thousand varas. Here he
built a log cabin, dug a trench, at the bottom placed a trough
filled with water, covered the trench with iron-bars in the fash-
ion of a grating, heaped the ore upon the grating, inverted one
of Father Eeal's iron pots (in which in the days of the hide
trade the priests were wont to try out tallow at the Mission),
over the heap, built a fire around and upon the pot, and sat
himself down to wait until the fumes of mercury descending
into the trench deposited quicksilver in the water in the trough.
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The results were unsatisfactory, as the waste was great and the
product small. He then built an adobe furnace ; two chambers
or ovens, one above the other ; in the lower a fire which com-
municated through flues with the one above, which was charged
with ore through a hole at the top, and that closed with an iron
door made secure with cement. He charged it but once ; the
first time the fire was lighted it exploded, and he pulled down
the adobes to gather what quicksilver might have insinuated
itself into crevices. He fell back upon the try-pots, and
continued to work at them until he had secured quicksilver
enough to half fill or quarter fill, a pot of dimensions not given.
He never weighed it, but another witness, who most probably
did, says that it was about eighteen hundred pounds ; the which
remained in the aforesaid pot, deposited in a room of Chard's
cabin on the creek.
On the fourth of April, 1846, Andres Castillero left Califor-
nia. For some time before he had taken up his quarters at
Monterey, and Chard with his mine had, in accordance with the
articles of partnership, passed under the charge of Father Eeal.
In May, the disturbances of the war began with Fremont ; on
the seventh of July the flags were changed, and California be-
came the soil of the United States. In September, Father
Real, the priest, transferred the mine to the keeping of James
Alex. Forbes, British Yice-Consul. In October, Chard aban-
doned the mine, and the try-pots at the creek salivated. Forbes
continued to keep an Indian or two for a while about the mine,
but carrying on no works, unless perhaps occasionally breaking
out a little ore. He sometimes had as many as four Indians there,
but most generally only one, who was a wild or unconverted
Indian, called gentiles, to distinguish them from the neophytes.
Finally, there was nobody there ; the bears broke into the cab-
in and eat some prosivions that Chard had left, and the bands
of Indians from the Tulare plains, who were in the habit of
visiting the settlements to steal horses, selected the place at the
creek as a camping ground. The story runs, that they were
greatly perplexed at the quicksilver in the pot, and shouted
over it in admiration when they found it would float a stone.
In the spring of 1847, Isaac Branham, of Santa Clara County,
then recently arrived in the country, was hunting in that region
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and came upon this cave. He says, in an affidavit in the in-
junction suit, that it was then a lonesome and solitary place ; a
crowbar lying in the cave, also some broken lumps of ore, and
close by, a small shanty without an occupant.
If Branham had found a spot like this, in precisely the same
condition and with a similar history, in the mountains among
the gold mines, might he not have occupied it and kept it ?
Was there then any right of Andres Castillero, or Father Eeal,
or any of their associates, which would have stood an obstacle
in his way, to prevent him from taking and holding the now
world-renowned New Almaden Mine? It would not have been
necessary to drive away an Indian—not the British Vice-Con-
sul's Grentile. He might have taken his turn at carrying ore
down the precipitous paths, (where until of late mule-bells were
jingling,) and at the try-pots by the creek, in the same manner
and with the same right that Chard had done before him. Why
not ? One naked occupancy may follow another, as shadow
flits after shadow, even across the slopes looked out upon from
Almaden.
At this time, Andres Castillero was in Mexico, perhaps on
the retreat from Buena Vista ; chronology, at least, would not
conflict with the supposition.
For aught that appears from the foregoing relation, (taken, I
wish to be understood, from the depositions of Antonio Sunol,
Jose' Noriega, Jos£ Fernandez, Antonio Ma. Pico, James Alex-
ander Forbes and William Chard—all of them but Forbes wit-
nesses for the New Almaden Company—and from the book of
Severe, quoted by " Citizen,") it would be as hard to find the
connecting link, at that time, between Andres Castillero and
the New Almaden Mine, as between that captain of the enemy's
cavalry and the white house at Washington.
. Not so, however, thought Castillero. He found time from his
campaigns to sell a portion of his interest, and found a purchaser
in Alexander Forbes, the British Consul, then established as a
merchant at Tepic in Mexico, and consequently as much an
enemy of the United States, by public law, as any Mexican.
Forbes bought of him five twenty-fourths of the choicest spot
of the soil of California, but on the prudent condition of paying
for it when he got it. A Mexican notary's certificate, however,
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is now produced to show that this proviso was abandoned.
Alexander Forbes enjoyed already the experience of more than
three score and ten years ; he was not only a sagacious man of
business, but also something of a man of letters ; he had pub-
lished a passable book on California ; and his proceedings
showed that his energies remained unbroken. Belonging to an
indestructible breed of Scotchmen, he is supposed to be still
living in the city of London, something short of ninety. He
sent up first as his agent, to make a reconnoisance, Mr. Robert
Walkinshaw, another Scotchman domiciled in Mexico, the same
lately deceased. Walkinshaw did not tarry long, and on his
return made a report which induced Forbes to come up in
person, to verify things with his own eyes. He reached Mon-
terey on the last day of September, 1847, and undivested of
his Mexican nationality, attaching from his domicil, coming
from a Mexican port with Mexican goods and people on board,
seems in conformity to the peculiar romantic notions with which
it pleased people in command to conduct that war, to have been
permitted to enter the country, and without serious molestation
to proceed with his workmen and tools to the mine. He sought
to know whether there was a quicksilver mine there or not
;
for his Mexican experience had taught him that there is not
always a mine of value where a little cinnabar is found. He
suffered much anxiety on this subject, and it was not until the
24th of November that he wrote to a friend, " We have at last
discovered the vein;" and as late as January he was not afraid
to write to Monterey that "there is no mine, nor does there
appear to be any quantity of this kind of stuff"—so little was
there yet known with certainty about this marvelous deposit
of quicksilver. But there was a mine ; and so soon as Alex-
ander Forbes, who, at the age when other men are tottering
around their hearths, was lodging during winter in a cabin in
the wilderness diligently searching for it, had discovered it,
he set to work to make sure of it. From the Alcalde of
San Jose he obtained a grant of a tract of land two hundred
varas broad and eight hundred varas long, which was sur-
veyed and marked off upon the vein including the cave. He
also procured a surveyor who had no more authority than him-
self, (there was not nor could be any surveyor authorized to
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survey the public lands, before the appointment of a Surveyor
General by the Federal Government) to survey and mark the
boundaries of two leagues of land including the small grant
by the Alcalde, and the lines of which were after much debate
settled in such manner as he supposed would, meet least oppo-
sition from the rancheros around him, and with a total indiffer-
ence to calls of any grant of his own—his plan being to fence
others off rather than to fence himself in. These were his
acts. Then he went away and has not come back since.
Did he by these surveys and delineations acquire any title
to the rectangle of two hundred varas by eight hundred, or to
the two square leagues of land ?
Assuredly not. At least a loyal American citizen who at
that time had settled upon the public lands, and by the same
surveyor, marked off and inclosed one hundred and sixty
acres, could not in that way have secured his homestead. Un-
less he afterwards complied with the laws passed by Congress,
the Surveyor of the United States would in due time run his
lines over him and obliterate him. Nor is such the possession
taken and held by the miners for the gold, of which the Unit-
ed States have made largesse to the people who occupied
these shores. State-builders and founders of empire—they yet
acknowledge the title of the United States, and accept as their
portion of the general bounty that which falls to them by the
allotment of their neighbors.
I have now with the most scrupulous fidelity, stated all the
material facts, as well as I could gather them from the im-
mense record. They come down to a naked occupancy by
Castillero, soon relinquished as was to have been expected,
and two unlawful surveys, one within another, by Alexander
Forbes. This is the title of the New Almaden Company
without papers—their alleged equitable title resulting from
their acts—and the public has no choice but to render a ver-
dict against it.
Something has been said by " Citizen," rather exceeding in
strangeness the usual extravagance of that fantastical writer,
about a proclamation of Commodore Sloat. What I can make
out from a half column in the JS. F. Herald, in which we have
of course, the waving of banners, roaring of artillery, and
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shouting of tlie troops and foreigners, down there at Monterey,
on the 7th of July, 1846—which, by the way, I believe was
rather a quiet day, certainly by no means so noisy as he repre-
sents—is, that the continued possession of this mine, as it was
held in July, 1846, was one of the conditions of the submission
of California, otherwise Father Eeal would never have surren-
dered
;
and Chard, forgetful that he was born an American,
with his Indians would have piled the navy upon the army in
the denies round about New Almaden. He says it makes no
difference what the Constitution of the United States may be,
that proclamation was the first American law in California and
hence above it ; nor what laws may have been since passed by
Congress, Father Real was not a party to that legislation. This
is strong doctrine and looks like an inversion of the order of
our laws—most people would have supposed that Commodore
Sloat meant what the Constitution authorized him to promise,
and that the guaranties he intended were such as Congress
might by law define, and that the object of the present pro-
ceedings was to test the right of the New Almaden Company
to the benefit of those guaranties as then promised and since
defined,—but let him have the law his own way, and the pro-
clamation merely assures Father Keal that he shall be considered
what we have found him, a naked occupant of the mine, with
a right to no more than he was standing on, so long as he stood
there, and at sufferance only. We will not differ about this
proclamation.
But if the New Almaden Company really had a good title, in-
stead of none nor shadow of one, different from and outside of
their papers, I may remark that it would not affect the question
of their right to complain of this injunction, because no such title
is before the Court, but only their title by papers. Thej^ com-
menced their suit in 1852 before the Board of Land Commis-
sioners, which could try no titles but written titles
—
grants on
paper from the former Spanish or Mexican Governments—as I
am advised. They there filed their papers and upon these
prayed confirmation of the aforesaid "tract of two leagues of
land "—and they have to this day prayed for nothing else, no
mining rights, no naked or other occupancy rights. They
brought their suit against the United States, and it is the only
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one in reality that has yet been brought involving the New
Almaden title. That suit is on appeal in the U. S. District
Court, and the injunction, though it comes from the U. S. Cir-
cuit Court, is not a new suit, but merely a proceeding in aid
of the old suit on the paper title on the other side of the passage
in the Court-House. The United States, required in the Dis-
trict Court to execute their bill of sale for all the quicksilver at
New Almaden, deny their obligation ; the Company, notwith-
standing, and in the meantime, proceed to carry off $8,000,000
worth of quicksilver, and the United States seeks protection from
the Circuit Court until the right can be determined. Both Judges
sit in both Courts, and it is only because of the technical divi-
sion of jurisdiction, it is said, that both Courts are called into
action on one and the same matter. In our State Courts, if
such a case was on trial, the same judge who tried the title
would grant the injunction. There is no dispute as to this
;
the Government asked for the injunction on the ground that it
was no new suit, but in aid of the old one ; on that ground it
was resisted, and that was a question decided. I might then,
seeing that all these undocumented equities were not before the
Court, have overlooked them altogether and contented my-
self with the remark that it was enough to try one case at a
time ; and a remonstrance against any attempt to forestall pub-
lic sympathy by urging claims yet unsubjected to the test of a
legal scrutiny. But the record furnished material to meet the
case in the newspapers, as well as the case in the Courts, and I
am persuaded that the public will prefer to hear, as far as pos-
sible, all the New Almaden story, and to give it the benefit in
full latitude, of an untrameled sense of right and the most
comprehensive liberality.
From the title without papers we pass to the title with papers.
There are two series of these papers—one for California and
one for the city of Mexico ; the acting powers, respectively,
being the Alcalde of the Pueblo of San Jose, and the Supreme
Government of the Mexican Eepublic. Of the first, this is the
essential one
:
" There being no deputation on mining in the Department of California, and this
being the only time since the settlement of Upper California that a mine has been
worked in conformity with the laws, and there being no lJuez de Letras ' (pro-
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fessional judge) in the second district, I, the Alcalde of first nomination, citizen
Antonio Maria Pico, accompanied by two associating witnesses, have resolved to
act in virtue of my office, for want of a Notary Public, there being none, for the
purpose of granting juridical possession of the mine known by the name of Santa
Clara, in this jurisdiction, situated on the rancho of the retired Sergeant, Jose
Reyes Berreyesa, the time having expired which is designated in the ordinance of
mining, for citizen Don Andres Castillero to show his right, and also for others to
allege a better right, between the time of denouncement and this date, and the
mine being found with abundance of metals discovered, the shaft made according
to the rules of art, and the working of the mine producing a large quantity of
liquid quicksilver, as shown by the specimens which the Court has; and as the
laws now in force so strongly recommend the protection of an article so neces-
sary for the amalgamation of gold and silver in the Republic, / have granted three
thousand varas of land in all directions subject to what the general ordinance of
mines may direct, it being worked in company, to which I certify, the witnesses
signing with me ; this act being attached to the rest of the expediente, deposited
in the archives under my charge
;
this not going on stamped paper, because there
is none, as prescribed by law.
Jusgado of San Jose Guadalupe, December 30th, 1845.
[Signed] ANTONIO MARIA PICO.
Assisting "Witnesses :
Antonio SuHol.
Jose Noriega."
This document, the New Almaden Company call their "ju-
ridical possession of said mine and land, to the extent of three
thousand varas in all directions."
Admit that it is genuine, and it is utterly worthless. In
their own papers the highest mining authority in Mexico is
made to say that the possession was not in conformity with the
mining ordinance ; that is to say, contrary to law. The reason
given, is that the quantity of land was too great, and it is a
good one. Antonio Ma. Pico had as much power to grant thirty
leagues in all directions, as three thousand varas
; 36,000,000 of
acres, as 36,000,000 square varas. But there is a better reason,
still. The paper says the mine is on the land of Jose Eeyes
Berreyesa, and that the three thousand varas are of his prop-
erty. No matter whether such was the fact or not, the paper
says so, and so it must be for that instrument, which is there-
fore null on its face. In law, it may be said to read, that,
whereas, the mine is on private land, I, Antonio Ma. Pico,
have no power to dispose of it, and grant you not one inch.
True, in the mining law of Mexico, authority is given to con-
demn a very small extent of private land for the benefit of a
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miner, compensation being first made, just as a man's land may
be condemned for a public highway in California ; but the ut-
most of that extent was four squares of two hundred varas,
(called pertenencias,) the quantity that Alex. Forbes afterwards
took in 1848, whilst the three thousand varas in all directions
—or "to every wind," as expressed by one of the Company's
witnesses in the Californian vernacular—taken according to the
well-known custom of the country, in a square upon the double
of the distance named, amounts to exactly nine hundred of
those pertenencias. Such monstrous and arbitrary spoliation,
was as much unknown to Mexican mining laws as it is now to
our own laws. For an officer to go out upon any land and
repeat the formula of this Act of Possession, would then as now
have been a jest which acquired neither gravity nor conse-
quence by being reduced to writing, on paper sealed or un-
sealed. It is the first time a Court ever witnessed the solemn
mockery of the exhibition of a paper containing such recitals,
as a title.
But it is not genuine. Pico, Sunol and Noriega, have sworn
that it was executed on the day, at the place, and for the pur-
pose expressed. They have not sworn truly. Three concur-
ring false Witnesses—this sounds strangely. But if there was
nothing but the nature of the paper itself, it would be more
difficult to believe in such a violation of common sense, than
to disbelieve these witnesses. There is a great deal more, how-
ever, which I will introduce, first noticing some things which
it is time that some one was not afraid to say before the public.
The testimony of the present generation of native Californians
—I do not deny that there are exceptions—is irretrievably dam-
aged. The Land Commission and the U. S. District Court have
been the grave of their reputations. Look to the Limantour
case, and tell off the number of those who have testified in sup-
port of that stupendous forgery—not obscure men, but those
who from their youth were habituated to the honors of the soil
on which they were born. I name the Limantour case as the
most remarkable, in other respects than for false testimony, of
those yet decided. In that particular it is equaled by a long
list of inferior, but as well detected frauds. Who does not
know that there are professional brokers in this kind of evi-
4
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dence, and that the men that they bring up from the magazines
of this sort of merchandise—well known haunts in this city
—
are often of more respectable names than those subscribed
to this Act of Possession ? That there is even a division of
professions among them—one set finding papers, another prov-
ing signatures, and a third re-collecting old improvements, etc.?
"Who has not heard that the outlay for witnesses
—
always, of
course, merely topay their actual expenses, tavern bills and the like—
on the trial of an ejectment suit, depending on facts occurring
before the American conquest, amounts commonly to thou-
sands of dollars ? Whoever is ignorant of these things, though
fortunate as a man, has yet to learn a chapter in the history of
California. In justice and charity I must say that native Cali-
fornians are not alone to blame in this lamentable business, but
are entitled to divide the shame with men of a different race
shrewder minds and stronger wills, who have abused their
facile dispositions and reaped dishonest gains from their neces-
sities. May a happier era soon dawn upon this land
!
But to the Act of Possession. Pico dare not have made it.
It was too grossly illegal—Castillero would not have taken it.
It was too plainly useless.
The story told in the Act of Possession is not that told
by the witnesses. The possession there purports to have
been given to Andres Castillero. Not only does Chard not
remember to have seen him there when he should have been
so prominent receiving his investure, but says the posses-
sion he heard of was the possession of the Company, and as
two of his brothers-in-law were members, he is confident he
should have heard of the fact if the whole property had been
put into the hands of any one man.
The Act of Possession says that the mine " was found with
abundance of metals discovered, the shaft made according to
the rules of art, and the working of the mine producing a large
quantity of liquid quicksilver." When Eevere visited the
place in 1846 he found only a cavity in the mountain of about
twenty cubic feet worked by two Indians. These are in his
own words. Shafts and rules of art were things better under-
stood after Walkinshaw and particularly Forbes had arrived
in 1847—and instead of the working of the mine producing a
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large quantity of liquid quicksilver, Chard was experimenting
painfully with his little battery of fast-consuming gun-barrels
—-each of which yielded for a charge of ore something less
than half an ounce of quicksilver—and on a scale so small
that he had not yet descended to the water which was indis-
pensable to any considerable extraction of the metal.
On the 12th day of December, 1857, Antonio Suriol, the
subscribing witness, was examined in open Court before Judge
Hoffman. He was asked : " At the time of giving possession,
how much quicksilver had you seen from that mine?" He
answered: "I never saw but one small drop." The other sub-
scribing witness, Noriega, said they had never seen any—that
when at the cave they washed with a pan for gold.
If the paper had been made at its date there would have
been no misstatement or even exaggeration of any fact, for
there would have been no motive. The recitals would not
have accorded with the more ambitious pretensions of a later
day. The paper first appears in use in January, 1848. The
British Yice-Consul then, at the request of the British Consul,
made a copy of it, to wit : James Alex. Forbes for Alexander
Forbes from papers handed him by the latter, which he return-
ed to him again and never saw afterwards. This was done at
the New Almaden Mine, at the time that the same Alexander
Forbes was receiving from the Alcalde of that day, whose name
was Weeks, another possession of four pertenencias above men-
tioned. When the copy of this and the accompanying papers,
constituting, what they called an Expediente, we, a Eecord, was
completed, the two Forbes procured of the Alcalde a certificate
that the whole was a faithful copy, to the letter, of the original
Expediente or Eecord in the archives under his care. The
certificate was false. Of it, Judge Hoffman says: "The orig-
inal from the archives of the Alcalde," he means not wnat was,
but what the New Almaden Company allege to be, the orig-
inal, as fully appears in his opinion, "has since been produced,
and it shows that the copy certified by Weekes is neither
! faithful ' nor ' to the letter.' It is evident that the copy certi-
fied to by Weekes could neither have been prepared from, or
compared with, any original existing in the archives under his
charge." At this moment the ancestor of New Almaden com-
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parries stood upon the ground with these two papers in his
hands : Weekes' grant of four pertenencias ; Weekes' false cer-
tificate copy of a former grant of nine hundred pertenencias,
from Antonio Maria Pico, including the four; and in his
pocket the original of that copy, declared in the certificate to
be at that moment in the records of a public office ; and a few
days afterward he surveyed his two square leagues, including
all within its ample verge.
Not only had Jas. A. Forbes when he made the copy—agent,
manager arid part owner as he was—never seen or heard of this
Act of Possession from Antonio Ma. Pico, which now turned
up in the keeping of Ales. Forbes, but there is the best reason
to believe that Castillero, Father Keal and the Robles, had not,
as they had made no allusions to it in their numerous deeds
transferring shares among one another. When they bought
and sold, they had uniformly referred to the writing of part-
nership of Nov. 2d, 1845 for description of the property ; and
seemed to think that the quantity of land they were to have
under it was three pertenencias not nine hundred. A copy from
James Alex. Forbes' copy, including the false cerificate of
Weekes, and a long tail of Mexican certificates, was filed by the
company, with their petition and as their first exhibit.
The next time the Act of Possession appears, was two years
later, the 21st of Jan. 1851. It was then in a record found by
Capt. Halleck, Superintendent and General Director of the oper-
ations and engineering at the mine, and in other cases, the law
partner of Messrs. Peachy & Billings, Attorneys for the New
Almaden Company ; who, with some inaccuracy, appear to
have signed the pleadings in this case with the firm name of
Halleck, Peachy & Billings. Mr. Halleck, in October, 1857,
was called as a witness for the company. He testified that he
found the document containing the Act of Possession in the
office of Josiah Belden, Mayor of San Jose ; and that it was
taken by Mr. Belden in his presence, and transferred to the
office of the County Eecorder of Santa Clara County. He was
looking for papers connected with the New Almaden Mine for
the purpose of making translations. On his cross-examination,
Mr. Halleck was asked by the counsel for the United States
this question
:
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"Ques. 54.—In September. October, November and December of the year
1850, where were the papers of denouncement and juridical possession of the mine
of New Almaden ?
Ans. 54.—I do not know.
Q. 55.—Were they not, to the best of your knowledge and belief, in Mexico?
A. 55.—I have no knowledge of their being in Mexico. My belief is that they
were in San Jose.
Q. 56.—Have you a good memory?
A. 56.—I have a good memory of occurrences and of persons, but not a very
good memory for names or dates.
Q. 57.—During the time of which I have inquired, did you not verily believe
that they were in Mexico ?
A. 51.—I did not. I had no reason to believe that they were in Mexico, and
my reasons for believing that they were in San Jose are that I found them there
in 1851, as I have stated."
Yet Mr. Halleck is in error. He did believe at the time
referred to, that they were in Mexico. "We have his own word
for it. On the 23d day of Dec. 1850 he made this affidavit
:
" State op California, )
County of Santa Clara. ;
James A. Forbes, Robert Walkinshaw,
v.
Maria Bernal de Berreyesa, et als.
The defendants in this cause, in answer to the order of Court, made on the 13th
day of Sept. 1850, requiring defendants to produce in Court certain papers upon
which they intend to rely as a defense in this cause, answer and say
:
That they have exercised all due diligence to procure and produce said papers
in Court, by writing immediately on the receipt of the above mentioned order to
the parties in Mexico who hold them ; but to this date the defendants have not
received them ; this delay having been caused, as defendants verily believe, by the
failure of the mail steamers running from Panama to San Francisco to touch at
the port of San Bias in Mexico, from which place the defendants have expected
and still expect to receive said papers. The defendants therefore ask of your
Honorable Court such further time as may be necessary to procure said papers,
and comply with the said order of Court.
And the defendants further aver, that the said papers and other documents
which they have sent for in Mexico, and which they are daily expecting to receive,
are absolutely necessary to them in the above entitled cause, (it was ejectment
against the company,) and that they cannot proceed with the trial of this cause
without said papers and documents.
And the defendants specify, among others, the following papers and documents
as absolutely necessary to them before they can proceed with the trial of this
cause, viz : 1. The original denouncement of the mine of New Almaden,
AND THE JURIDICAL POSSESSION GIVEN OP THE SAME IN 1845. 2. Etc., etc.
3. Etc., etc. 4. Etc., etc.
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State op California, \
Comity of Santa Clara. J
Henry W. Halleck, one of the attorneys (this must be taken, of course, with
the explanation above given,) in the above entitled suit states, on oath, that he
believes the facts mentioned in the foregoing answer and petition are true, that
all due diligence has been exercised to produce in Court the aforementioned papers,
that further time is necessary to defendants in order to enable them to produce
said papers, and that defendants can not go to trial in this cause till said papers
are procured. H. W. HALLECK.
Sworn and subscribed to, before me,
John H Watson, Judge.
Filed Dec. 23d, 1850. H. C. Melone, Clerk."
So Mr. Halleck had forgotten. He did believe in Dec. 1850,
that this Act of Possession, which as the No. 1 of his affidavit
he describes with the greatest precision, was in Mexico. His
affidavit will not permit us to indulge any other supposition,
and what he then believed must have been the fact, for he was
in a position to know. He had been six months in charge of
the mine, and more than eight months acquainted with the
reputed character of its title, by information from one of the
partners in the company who had come to California as the
agent for the rest, and from whose hands Mr. Halleck seems to
have received his appointment as Superintendent, etc. His
affidavit is recalled to his memory in the following manner
:
" Ques. 58.—It is now seven years since the period of which I have ques-
tioned you. The human memory is treacherous. I therefore desire you to reflect
well upon the answer you have just given. Do you answer in the same manner?
Ans. 58.—I have no change to make in my answer, except to say, as I have
before said, that I cannot say positively that the paper produced by Mr. Hough-
ton (from the Recorder's Office of Santa Clara County), is the same I found in Mr.
Belden's office. I believe it to be the same, as I have before stated.
Q. 59.—Tou regard the paper which you found in the office of Belden, as the
original denouncement and juridical possession of New Almaden, do you not ?
A. 59.—I do.
Q. 60.—In reference to that paper, you then repeat the answer you have given
above, do you ?
A. 60.—I do.
Q. 61.—Did you not in Dec. 1850, declare on oath in a Court of Justice, that
the original denouncement and juridical possession of the mine was at that time
in Mexico?
A. 61.—I may have done so. ' I had copies or a copy of that original denounce-
ment and possession, and may have supposed then that the original, which is
usually delivered to the parties, was in Mexico," etc.
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Here are two more mistakes. He could not have had any
copy of the paper at that time, and could not have supposed
that the duplicate usually given to the parties was the paper
called for, because the order of the Court was that " the said
papers or copies thereof" should be produced, and this order
would have been satisfied by any copy which Mr. Halleck had
at that time, or by the original itself from the old Alcalde's
record, or any copy from his copies or that original made on the
moment ; and Mr. Halleck consequently could not have sworn
as he did that he had used all due diligence to produce what
the Court had called for, and that the papers the Court wanted
were then held by parties in Mexico, that he had written for
them and expected to receive them from San Bias.
It follows from the affidavit and the deposition of Mr. Hal-
leck that the Act of Possession which he found in the office of
Mr. Belden, Mayor of San Jose', on the 21st of January, 1851,
had been lodged there since 23d of December, 1850, and it is
only to be wondered that he had not been convinced of that
fact himself, or perhaps how the impressions of that remark-
able occasion have since so entirely passed from his mind.
There is also some minor evidence to corroborate the testi-
mony of Mr. Halleck, that the document had not been accumu-
lating dust and cobwebs in the repository where he found it.
J. M. Jones, (late Judge IT. S. District Court, S. D.,) the attor-
ney who now called for it, had the year before defended the
Company in two suits brought by, or at the instance of, Walk-
inshaw for the possession and property of the mine and con-
ducted with the bitterness to be expected from a former agent
and now dissatisfied partner. Jones had evidently never seen
the document, for he speaks of it as a "pretended denounce-
ment made in 1845 or thereabouts, upon the land in the plain-
tiff's complaint herein mentioned, pretended to be made by
one Cartearas, a military officer," showing that he had not been
yet apprised that the denouncement was made in December,
1845, nor that Castillero was the name, and captain of perma-
nent cavalry, the rank of the fortunate man to whom at that
time Antonio Maria Pico had given three thousand varas in all
directions of the land of Jose* Eeyes Berreyesa, all of which
would have appeared if this Act of Possession, found by Mr.
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Halleck, had ever fallen under his eyes. Again, Melone, the
first American who held the office of Clerk of a Court at San
Jose*—first of the Alcalde, then of the Judge of First Instance,
and finally County Clerk—and who officiated in person in the
suits of Walkinshaw, never saw the document, nor heard it
spoken of, neither during that feud, nor after it was composed,
when he caused all the papers in his charge to be carefully ex-
amined one by one, and a separation to be made between such
as should go to the County Eecorder's office and those which he
should keep as County Clerk under the Constitution and laws
of the State of California, then just organized. But Jose Fer-
nandez who was connected with the Alcalde's office during a
part of this time, says he saw it tumbling about among the
other papers.
When Mr. Halleck and Belden carried the document to the
Recorder's office, John T. Richardson, the Recorder, wrote on
it in pencil, "Filed June 21st, 1851." It was fortunate that
he did so, for it would appear to have immediately returned
to Mexico, or at least to have escaped from the Recorder's Of-
fice, and was not seen there for two years when it was found
again. Mr. S. 0. Houghton, Deputy Recorder, and a witness
for the New Almaden Company, shall relate in what manner
:
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
" Ques. 5.—Can you or can you not say whether that paper was in that office
in the year 1852, to the best of your recollection, knowledge and belief, founded
upon your custody of the office and knowledge of its contents, as you have
stated ?
Ans. 5.—I can not state positively either way. It may have been there and it
may not. The first recollection I have of the document is a few days before the
date of this filing on the back of it, which is, 'Filed Feb. 25th, A. D. 1853, at 12
o'clock, A. M. J. M. Murphy, Recorder, by S. 0. Houghton, Deputy.' I think it
was sometime in the month of February. I think so from the time this filing is
dated. Mr. James A. Forbes came to the office and desired to see the record of
this paper, describing the paper to me. I examined the record, and told him it
was not recorded there. He then looked for it himself, and insisted that it was
recorded there. He did not find it. He was looking for the record of the paper,
not for the paper itself. Some days after that, I found the paper in the office.
There was a safe in the office, in the top of which were some papers, and there
was also a desk, with pigeon-holes containing papers. I found it in one or the
other of them ; I do not recollect which.
Q. 6.—When you found the paper, how did you recognize it ?
A. 6.—By the description given by Mr. Forbes.
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Q. 7.—If you had ever seen such a paper before in the office, would you not
have remembered it?
A. 7.—I think that I should.
Q. 8.—Were you not surprised when you saw the paper ?
A. 8.—I was surprised that such a paper should be there without its being
known.
Q. 9.—Did Mr. James A. Forbes appear to be making a thorough search ; and
about how long was he searching for the record of that paper of which you have
spoken ?
A. 9.—I think he and I searched more than one day. He represented the pa-
per to me to be of great importance, and I made a very thorough search for the
rscorcl of it ;p*!"*i»H! * j »*is *is H»'p*i»
Q. 11.—After you found the paper, what did you do with it?
A. 11.—I kept it there until Mr. Forbes came, and filed it at his request."
Under these circumstances, we may venture to say that this
Act of Possession which Mr. Houghton, to his very natural
astonishment, discovered one day lying under his hand, was in
reality found the second time by Mr. Jas. Alex. Forbes, then
the most active partner of the New Almaden Company in Cal-
ifornia.
After the finding of the document by Mr. Halleck, which he
regards as the record of Castillero's grant from the Alcalde in
December, 1845, of the mine of New Almaden and circumja-
cent tract of three thousand varas in all directions, the New
Almaden Company filed their petition before the Land Com-
mission, and with it as their first exhibit not a copy of that re-
cord in the archives, but as we have seen, a copy of James
Alex. Forbes' copy from the original in the pocket of Alexan-
der Forbes. These papers I will distinguish for clearness, the
one as the Halleck document, the other as the Forbes docu-
ment. Both contain the Act of Possession prefaced by two
short petitions from Castillero. In other respects they are en-
tirely different, though both purport to be the record of the
original mining title. There are other differences, but princi-
pally each contains an important writing which the other does
not : the Forbes document, the writing of partnership imme-
diately following the Act of Possession ; the Halleck docu-
ment, a petition of Gen. Jose* Castro, preceding the Act of
Possession which in the latter is dated December, 1845, and in
the former December 30th, 1845. A record can not vary from
itself; made up of writings which record events as they hap-
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pen it must always be and remain one substance inscribed with.
the same words in the same order. It cannot have a double
being, but is always a unit and identical, just as a man can be
born but once, live one life and die one death.
"When they file the Forbes document with their petition in
the Land Commission, the New Almaden Company in effect
say : Here is our Act of Possession in this little volume, con-
sisting of these sheets containing these writings, made up in
the Alcalde's office as the record of our original mining title.
"When they produce the Halleck document they say : Here is
our Act of Possession in this other little volume, consisting of
other sheets and containing other writings, made up in the Al-
calde's office as the record of our original mining title. It is
positively certain that both of these records produced by the
same person cannot be true, and it is morally certain, conse-
quently, in accordance with a well established rule of our daily
judgments, that both of them are false. Indeed, the New Al-
maden Company have themselves declared them so by making
use of first one and then the other.
The question may be asked, why holding both they did not
suppress one ? I cannot say what were the motives of other
men, but I can discover good reasons for accepting and equal-
ly good reasons for rejecting both the documents. The Forbes
document contained the writing of partnership which is the
only evidence as to who were associated with Castillero, and of
their rights. Therefore keep it—we claim under these men.
But it contradicts flatly Castillero's petitions on no less a point
than his knowledge of the existence of quicksilver in the mine.
Thus: the writing of partnership, dated Nov. 2d, is "of a
mine of silver, gold and quicksilver" but in his first petition
to the Alcalde, dated Nov. 22d, twenty days later, Castillero
says he has "discovered a vein of silver with a ley of gold"
and not until the 3d day of December, in his second and sup-
plementary petition, put in for this purpose alone, does he say,
" that on opening the mine which I previously denounced in
court, I have taken out, besides silver with a ley of gold, liquid
quicksilver in the presence of several bystanders." Therefore, let
the Forbes document be allowed to sleep on the files ; it is in-
credible that a man should make his arrangements on the 2d
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of November to dig quicksilver which he had not discovered
till a month afterward. Then the Halleck document has also
its good points. The petition signed with so respectable a
name as Gen. Castro's, relates that possession was given to Cas-
tillero on the 30th of December ; we want that date, we will
keep that document. But it also says, that the possession was
only for one perteuencia and prays for three more ; that flies in
the teeth of our Act of Possession which calls for uo less than
nine hundred. It will not do, then, to rest upon the Halleck
document
—
put it aside.
The New Almaden Company might have argued in that way
or they might not. But there was only one way to avoid their
dilemma and that they took, namely,, to reject the end of the
Forbes document and the beginning of the Halleck document,
and put in evidence only the middle that was common to both,
the two petitions of Castillero and the action thereon in the
shape of this Act of Possession. On the 19th day of March,
1855, Frank Lewis, then a Deputy Treasurer of Santa Clara
County, was examined in the Land Commission
:
" Ques. 5.—Examine now the paper marked "A" (P. L.), purporting to be a copy
of the petitions and action thereon in the document of which you have been testi-
fying, (the Halleck document which he had brought with him,) and state whether
it is a true and exact copy of said original papers, and how you know it ?
Ass. 5.—It is a true and exact copy. I know it from having carefully compared
it at the present time. I have the original and copy both now before me."
I have examined the printed copy of the Transcript, as it
came from the Land Commission to the TJ. S. District Court,
and find the two petitions of Castillero and the Act of Posses-
sion, annexed as an exhibit to the depositions of Lewis, Sunol
and Noriega, and no more of the Halleck document. Of the
Forbes document I find no trace at all, but an Euglish transla-
tion following the above exhibit. The deficiencies in both
documents were cured in the District Court, and they both ap-
pear now, set out in full upon the record—and the dilemma is
restored.
The petition of Gen. Jose Castro, which stands first in the
Halleck document, is a forgery. Benito Diaz, a native Califor-
nian witness, whose credit was much assailed, however, by the
counsel for the company, swears that he wrote it at the request
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of Father Real, after its date and after the American conquest.
The witness, in the present instance, had in his favor the fact
that the New Almaden Company had proved by their witnesses
that the petition was in his handwriting, and thus imposed the
necessity upon the Government of calling him, as a failure to do
so might well have been argued as an admission of the genuine-
ness of the paper. For the effect upon the Act of Possession,
it seems to me, that the Government might well have made the
admission. But the proof of the forgery was not left to rest
upon his testimony. It is shown by public documents, includ-
ing many of his own letters, that Gen. Castro, at the date of this
petition, was on the march against Fremont ; and that for weeks
and even months before, had been too much engrossed with the
political troubles fast brewing around him, to give a thought to
the question whether the New Almaden Mine consisted of one
or three pertenencias, or to have any leisure to bestow on the
study of the mining ordinances, as I am informed was suggested
by the counsel for the company in argument. Genuine or forged,
the petition was made by some of the parties claiming an interest
in the mine, and is contained in one of the records brought to
light by the New Almaden Company. It shows that on the
26th day of June, 1846, or later, its makers looked to a source
of title which was not the Act of Possession signed by Anto-
nio Ma. Pico, witnessed by Antonio Sunol and Jose Noriega.
Against all these things, weigh the bald assertion of Pico,
Sunol and Noriega. The man who will then believe that this
Act of Possession was made at the time and for the purpose
in it expressed,' is capable of believing in Mormon miracles.
II. Castillero left California in the Kanaka barque Don
Quixote, Capt. John Paty, on the 4th day of April, 1846,
reached Acapulco on the 21st of the same month, and on the
24th set out for the city of Mexico. He carried with him, Capt.
Paty says, about a common bucket full of ore, of which he
thinks some was of silver. During the present year, the New
Almaden Company sent one John P. Brodie to Mexico on ur-
gent business which will require notice hereafter ; it took him
about thirteen days to go from Acapulco to Mexico and ten to
return, which he tells us may be taken as the average of the
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time required for the trip. We will assume, therefore, that
Castillero was ten days on his journey, and that he reached
the city of Mexico on the 4th day of May, 1846. On the
very next day—the 5th of May, 1846—begins the second series
of the New Almaden Company's papers—what they call their
title from the Supreme Government of the Mexican Eepublic.
The dispatch of the government equaled its promptitude
—
the eagerness of all its branches exceeded both. On the 23d
day of May the job was finished, and Castillero held under the
authority of Paredes, then in the exercise of unlimited powers
:
1. A ratification of the possession of three thousand varas
in all directions, as granted by the Alcalde.
2. A grant of two square leagues of land, as a colonist, on
the surface of his mining possession.
Such is the story of the petition filed in the Land Commission.
The ratification is not in any paper delivered to Castillero, but
is gathered from a correspondence between an establishment at
the city of Mexico, known as the " Board for the Encourage-
ment and Direction of Mining," and the Minister of Justice;
the originals of which correspondence are said to exist to this
day, on the letter-books and files of those offices respectively.
May 5th, 1846. Vicente Segura, President of the Board, writes
to Becerra, Minister of Justice, and informs him that a certain
professor, named Don Tomas Ramon del Moral, had presented
to the board some specimens of cinnabar and two letters which
had been received from Don Andres Castillero, in California,
"with the object of inciting the Supreme Government, that it
may be pleased to aid so important an enterprise ;" that the board
had immediately sent them to be assayed at the College of Min-
ing
;
that the Director of the College reported the percentage
of metal to be thirty-five and a half per cent., and therefore
thought " Serior Castillero has, by such an important discovery,
made himself deserving of the efficacious protection of the Su-
preme Government and of the Junta (Board), for the Encour-
agement of Mining, and is persuaded that your Excellency
will interpose all your influence to the end that this individual
may receive a proof that the Supreme Government knows how
to distinguish and reward those citizens who contribute to the
prosperity of the country ;" and the President, then resuming,
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says in behalf of his board, that ", it has already asked Seflor
Castillero what kind of aid or protection he needs for the en-
couragement of his brilliant enterprise, congratulating the Su-
preme Government on a discovery which, if it meets from the
beginning with the protection it deserves, may completely
change the aspect of our mining, freeing it from the necessity
in winch it has been until now, of foreign quicksilver," etc.
One of the letters referred to, though written by Castillero
at the Mission of Santa Clara, describes the mine as five leagues
to the west, when it is not to the westward at all, but five
leagues to the south and perhaps somewhat to the east. It
also informs us that coal "is very abundant, and is found on
the bay of San Francisco, so that the /Steamers, sending out
their small boats, may load all that they require." At this
day, coal is abundant on the bay of San Francisco only in the
coal-yards, and at that day, " the /Steamers " were not in exis-
tence, nor for two years after was their presence in the bay of
San Francisco dreamed of. In 1849, however, "the steamers"
were upon this coast, and, for want of wharves, were in the
habit of taking in coal with small boats, at San Francisco and
at the little Mexican towns, (they stopped regularly at San
Bias,) just as Castillero with miraculous detail had prophesied
three years before—before the Mexican war—before the con-
quest—before that great change which brought white men,
civilization and steam, to these remote and unfrequented
shores.
May 9th, 1846. Becerra, Minister of Justice, acknowledges
the receipt of the foregoing, and says that his Excellency, the
President ad interim of the Eepublic, learns with satisfaction
that Castillero "has discovered a deposit of quicksilver of ex-
cellent quality, according to the assays made in that College,
and that said Senor Castillero has been asked by the Junta,
(Board,) what kind of assistance he needs to encourage his
brilliant enterprise."
It is certain that this reception of Andres Castillero, return-
ing from his domestic mission with a bucket full of ore, pre-
ceded though he had been by "some specimens of cinnabar,"
sent to his friend Moral, exceeded in warmth anything record-
ed in the annals of diplomacy. Alighting from his mule, after
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his wearisome journey from Acapulco, on the 4th, he nest
morning finds himself the man of first consequence in all the
Capital. There was at that moment gathered on the horizon
a cloud black with the fate of Mexico. Blood had already
been shed upon the frontier by the orders of Parades. He had
heard that his army had crossed the Eio Grande ; that a blow
had been struck and American troops captured or slain ; the
blow would be immediately returned, and soon he was to hear
that on that very day—the 9th of May, 1848—his army had
been annihilated at the Resaca de la Palma. He had not a
dollar, an hour, or a thought to spare from the fearful contest
he had provoked
;
and yet, entirely unconscious of his situa-
tion, he concurs in the ecstacies of the Mining Board, thinks of
freeing his country, not from foreign troops, but foreign quick-
silver, and awaits only the pleasure of Castillero to know how
and in what sums he shall expend the resources of the nation
on a vein of metal situated in the most distant and exposed
part of the national territories.
May 14th, 1846. The President of the Board of Mining
again writes to the Minister of Justice. He now incloses Cas-
tillero's petition to the Board for its aid, dated the 12th of
May, 1846. He says the Board "has no hesitation in recom-
mending said petition to your Excellency for being persuaded
of the great importance of the enterprise, it considers it enti-
tled to all the protection of the Supreme Government, and also
the particular circumstances of the Department, and the just desire
which his Excellency, the President, has shown to preserve the
integrity of the national Territory, render it worthy of the greatest
consideration.'1 '' The Board is, consequently, of opinion that
Castillero should have what he wants on his own terms. In
his petition, Castillero recites the discovery, the percentage of
metal in the ore, "richer," he says, "certainly than were ever
seen before, not only in the Kepublic but perhaps in all the
world,"—which may be true—his denouncement and the pos-
session of three thousand varas, the formation of a company,
and "the fact that repeated and advantageous offers" had been
made to him by " several foreign houses in California," of all the
means he needed, but which offers he had rejected because the
business would then "result in advantage to foreigners, when
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it may be entirely national," and his patriotism had prompted
him rather to apply to "your Excellency and your Honors,"
to wit: the President and Board of Mining, "to obtain the
small and only resources " which he required.
" These," he says, "are reduced to a small advance of five
thousand dollars in money in consideration of the excessive
scarcity of coin in that department, and the quick remittance
to it of retorts, cylinders, and the small distilling apparatus, as
also iron flasks for bottling up the quicksilver. I would have
proposed a contract of partnership to the Junta, an i avio ' or
some other agreement, if there had been time to be able to fur-
nish the proofs and the detail which would be required for said
contracts, but being compromised by the Supreme Government
to leave this Capital within a few days, I find it necessary to re-
strict myself to that which appears to present no difficulty, and
which may open the way to our future agreements. I am well
persuaded that the Junta will accede to my request, so far as
may be within its powers, and it will send up to the Supreme
Government with a recommendation that which may require the
decision of the latter. My propositions, then, are the following
:
' 1. The Junta, in the act of approving the agreement, will give me a draft for
five thousand dollars on some mercantile house in Mazatlan.
2. On my part I bind myself to place in said port, within six months after leav-
ing it, fifty quintals of quicksilver, at the rate of one hundred dollars each, which
I will send from the first taken out, with absolute preference over every other
engagement.
3. The Junta will order that there be placed at my disposal, before leaving the
Capital, the eight retorts which it has in its office, and all the quicksilver flasks
which can be found in the negotiation of Tasco which are fit for use, and lastly,
it will deliver to Seflor Don Tomas Ramon del Moral, my attorney, the sums to
pay for the retorts, cylinders and other kinds of small apparatus, which may be
ordered to be made for the negotiation, to the amount of one thousand dollars.
4. I will receive the retorts of the Junta at cost price, and the flasks which I
may select at two dollars a piece, agreeably with their valuation.
5. The ascertained value of said retorts and flasks, and that of sums which may
be delivered to Seflor Moral, I will repay in the term of one year from this agree-
ment, and also the premium on the draft on Mazatlan, in quicksilver placed in
said port at the price of one hundred dollars per quintal ; but if the Junta should
wish to take one or more acetones in the mine, it shall be left as a part payment of
the sum corresponding to one or more "barras."
6. While the company is being formed, during the period of one year counted
from the date on which this agreement shall be approved and the five thousand dollars
spoken of in the first proposition being paid, I will give the preference to the Junta
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in the sale of the quicksilver placed in Mazatlan, at the rate of one hundred dollars
the quintal.
7. The Junta (Board), shall represent to the Supreme Government, the necessity
of approving the possession which has been given me of the mine by the local
authorities of Californias, in the same terms which I now hold it.
8. It shall also represent the advantage of there being granted to me, as a colo-
nist, two square leagues upon the land of my mining possession, with the object
of being able to use the wood for my burnings.
9. For the compliance of this contract, I pledge the mine itself and all its
appurtenances.
The subscriber submits this request to the deliberation of the Junta, (Board),
which, if accepted, may be made into a formal contract, and made legal in the
most proper manner. God akd Liberty.
Mexico, May 12th, 1846. ANDRES CASTILLERO.' "
May 20th, 1846. Paredes, through his Minister of Justice,
acknowledges the receipt of the foregoing letter of the 14th,
inclosing Castillero's petition. " His Excellency has been
pleased " (reads this note), to approve in all its parts the agree-
ment made {convenio celebrado), with that individual, in order
to commence the extraction of said mineral, and on this day
the corresponding communication has been made to the Minis-
ter of Exterior Eelations and Government, to issue the proper
orders respecting that which is contained in the eighth proposi-
tion for the grant of land in that department."
Paredes had now heard of the loss, eleven days before, of
that army which he had boasted was to conquer Texas to the
Rio Grande. It existed no longer. His soldiers were killed,
captured or dispersed ; his artillery, munitions, camp equipage
and the standards of his regiments were in the hands of the
enemy. Taylor had passed the Rio Grande, yet bearing on its
swollen current to the sea the corpses of the defenders of the
integrity of the soil of Mexico, drowned in their hurried flight
from the field of their disaster—the flag of the invader floated
over Matamoras. But Paredes is no wise embarrassed, never-
theless, and bent upon commencing the extraction of quick-
silver in California, he dashes off his consent to an appropria-
tion of five thousand dollars of the public money to Captain
Castillero and his mine in the Mission of Santa Clara.
The ratification is now complete.
The Board of Land Commissioners say it is no ratification at
all, but a distinct original grant of the mine and its nine hun-
3'
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dred pertenencias, and on that footing confirmed it. Judge
Felch, in delivering the opinion of the majority of that Board,
said : " The Junta (the Mexican Board for the Encourage-
ment of Mining), was not an appellant tribunal. It had no
authority to review the proceedings of any local officer, and to
affirm or disaffirm his decision." In other words, could not
ratify a mining possession. The mining title then rests upon
the contract made, the convenio celebrado approved by Paredes.
These are formal words, meaning a contract executed in due
form of law. There is no such contract anywhere yet disclosed.
We have Castillero's nine " propositions," as he very properly
calls them
;
but propositions are not a contract. These terms
might be modified or finally declined. A paper is wanting—
a
convenio celebrado—in which the terms should be reduced to
covenants, and the parties bound by their signatures. Castillero
and the Mining Board both tell us that there was not time to
make one. Nor is there any informal or implied contract.
After receiving the propositions, and expressing a favorable
opinion of them to the President, the Mining Board no where
appear in these papers to have had one word to say to Castillero.
No implications can be raised in his favor from what the board
thought proper to say to third persons. Paredes himself does
not make any contract, because none was asked from him, and
he speaks of it as a thing already done before the affair reaches
his hands.
That Paredes was mistaken in speaking of a formal instru-
ment, convenio celebrado, we know from both parties, and if he
had read their communications during the six days he had them
under consideration, he could not have fallen into that error.
That he was not warranted in inferring an agreement of an in-
formal nature, any one can see from the papers themselves, the
matter not having progressed further between the parties than
a proposition. And that there never was at any time after-
ward an agreement of either class, has been put in evidence by
the New Almaden Company.
By Castillero's first proposition, the token of the consumma-
tion of the agreement was to be the delivery of the draft for
$5,000 on Mazatlan. He never got it. The Company inform
us that: "On account of the declaration of war made by the
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United States of the North, when he was going to receive the
draft on Mazatlan, the Ministry issued the order of Sept. 19th,
of this year (1846) directing the suspension of all payments of
the branch of quicksilver, except the support of the College
and the expenses of the office." And in another place, that
the Mining Board was reduced to the "lamentable extremity "
of having no money at all, " by the order of the 10th May,
last, which directed the suspension of all the payments which
were made by the public treasury. The sad results of such
determinations, the Junta (Board) will not stop to detail."
Either of these orders would appear to have been sufficient
to have prevented Castillero from receiving his draft, and de-
feated the contract conditioned thereon. If he was stopped by
the order of the 10th of May, he must have been as much sur-
prised as we are, at the unreflecting eagerness of Parecles in
this matter of quicksilver mines, which would induce him to
draw on a fund which he had suppressed ten days before. If
by the order of the 19th of September, the wonder is that he
should have applied for the draft, long after it was known in
Mexico that California, whither he proposed through blockad-
ing fleets to transport this money, was in the hands of the
Americans—an event then some two months and a half old.
If there was no contract, there was no mining title made at
Mexico. Whether there was or was not a contract, is a ques-
tion which, with the facts before it, the public can adjudge as
well as the Board of Land Commissioners, and hence without
arrogance may assume to decide whether, on their own show-
ing, this branch of the title of the New Almaden Company
has any foundation in law. The Courts are the proper tribu-
nal to determine whether, if the contract is proven to have been
made, Judge Felch is right in saying that it amounted to a
grant.
Vicente Segura, President of the Mining Board, in this let-
ter of the 14th of May, estimates the extent of the concession
by the Alcalde to Castillero, as only fifteen pertenencias. From
the nature of his office, being chief of the " highest mining
tribunal in the Republic of Mexico," as described by the New
Almaden Company in the petition presented to the Board of
Land Commissioners, in the name of Andres Castillero, we
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must presume that no one was more skillful than he in all the
calculations belonging to his department. Yet he does not
know how many pertenencias are contained within the space
of three thousand varas in all directions from the mine. The
shape of the tract which he speaks of, would be something like
a plank, the width being two hundred varas, the length three
thousand varas, making fifteen pertenencias. Estimated accord-
ing to the custom of the country, it would be a square on the
double of the three thousand varas—something more than nine
square miles, making nine hundred pertenencias. As it would
be commonly understood from the words, it would be a circle
with a radius of three thousand varas, making seven hundred
and six and eighty-six one hundredths pertenencias.
We have no explanation how this astounding blunder came
to be committed by this high officer, nor how it escaped the
observation of the Minister of Justice and the President of
Mexico, who had the means of making the calculation un-
der their eyes. Nor is Segura alone in this confusion of ideas
on the subject of the territorial extent of the mining rights of
this company. They have put in the case the certificate of the
functionary next below Segura in the mining establishment, one
Grondra, the Secretary. He certifies that the grant to Castil-
lero was of one pertenencia, of three thousand varas. Pertenen-
cias of the larger class are always squares, and if this one is
to be understood as such, it would give a square of three thou-
sand varas, or two hundred and twenty-five pertenencias of the
ordinances ; and he further says that their grant of two square
leagues was contiguous to, not covering this vast pertenencia,
as represented by everybody else. And so in California. The
parties, those upon the spot, are all this time in Egyptian dark-
ness on the subject of a three thousand vara grant, however
calculated, from their neighbor and associate Antonio Ma. Pico,
the Alcalde. On the 27th day of June, 1846, they date the
petition of Gen. Castro, in which he is represented as declaring
that the grant, at first, was for one pertenencia, and as praying
for an addition of three more. And for several years, in a
series of deeds and other documents, they persist in alleging
that they have but three. Until finally, on the 27th of ISTov.
1852, Yecker, Torre & Co. sell out all their interest in the
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concern, by an act before a Notary, without allusion to any
estimate of pertenencias, or to a grant of two square leagues of
land, unless it is to be found in this singular stipulation, that
they are to be "without responsibilityfor the past and in future."
But it is not only in the mathematical line that the President
of the Mining Board utterly surprises us. He recommends the
ratification of the Alcalde's grant as a measure of defense—the
particular circumstances of the department of California and
" the just desire which his Excellency, the President, has
shown to preserve the integrity of the national territory," ren-
der Castillero's plans and requests, " worthy of the greatest
consideration."
And again: "But that which is most worthy of considera-
tion, is that Californias being a frontier department, and fre-
quently threatened by the emigrants from the United States of
America, and by the new colonists of Oregon, it seems proper
to grant the first mine in a department so extensive, a greater
number of pertenencias.'1
'
1
But why ? Human wit cannot discover how nine hundred,
a greater or a less number of pertenencias granted to Castillero,
could conduce to "preserve the integrity of the national terri-
tory," or restrain the "emigrants from the United States of
America," or the " colonists of Oregon," to say nothing of the
land and naval forces of the United States, with whom Mexico
was at open war—nor of what avail would be the five thou-
sand dollars, nor the retorts which were not mortars, nor the
flasks, even if, as one of the counsel for the United States is
reported to have said in argument, they were charged with the
fulminate of mercury, instead of quicksilver. It is impossible
to believe that high functionaries made such papers. It is tax-
ing public credulity too heavily, to put forth such absurdities,
under such signatures. The grant of two square leagues of
land is only a branch from the same stem. In the same note
of May 20th, 1846, in which Becerra communicates to Segura
the President's approval of the contract—as yet undiscoverable
—he informs him that orders had been issued to the Minister
of Eelations to expedite the proper orders in respect of the
"eighth proposition for the grant of lands." Upon the receipt
whereof the Minister of Relations makes the following
:
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"Ministry of Exterior Relations, )
Government and Police. )
Most Excellent Sir:
—
His Excellency, the illustrious Minister of Justice, in an official communication
of the 20th inst., says to me that which I copy :
—
' Most Excellent Sir:
—
I to-day say to his Excellency, Don Vicente Segura, President of the Junta,
for the encouragement of mining that which follows :
—
Most Excellent Sir:
—
Having reported to his Excellency, the President ad interim, the note of your
Excellency, of the 14th inst., with which you were pleased to transmit, with a re-
commendation, the petition of Sefior Don Andres Castillero, for the encouragement
of the quicksilver mine which he has discovered in the Mission of Santa Clara, in
Upper California, his Excellency has been pleased to approve in all its parts, the
agreement made with that person to commence the exploration of that mine, and
on this date the corresponding communication is made to the Minister of Exterior
Relations and Government, that it may issue the proper orders relative to what is
contained in the 8th proposition with respect to the granting of lands in that
department.'
And I have the honor to inclose it to your Excellency, to the end that with
respect to the petition of Senor Castillero, to which his Excellency, the President
ad interim, has thought proper to accede, that as a colonist, there be granted to him
two square leagues upon the land of his mining possession, your Excellency will
be pleased to issue the orders corresponding. I repeat to your Excellency, etc.
Wlierefore, I transcribe to your Excellency, in order that, in conformity with what
is prescribed by the laws and dispositions upon colonization, you may put Senor Cas-
tillero in possession of the two square leagues which are mentioned.
God and Liberty.
Mexico, May 23d, 1846. CASTILLO LANZAS.
To his Excellency, the Governor of the Department of Californias."
Of this document, the point is in the conclusion. The sig-
nificant words are those in italics. It is merely a letter written
by Castillo Lanzas to Pio Pico, which was never delivered, as
the New Almaden Company admit ; and for aught that appears
never left the possession of Castillo Lanzas, until it was to be
forwarded to California to be filed as an exhibit to the petition
before the U. S. Board of Land Commissioners. Whether such
a paper is a title to those two square leagues of land, which, by
referring to the Pico Act of Possession it describes as being the
private property of Jose" Eeyes Berreyesa, it would be a waste of
time to argue. I shall refer only to what Judge Felch, in
whose eyes even it could find no favor, said when he rejected it
:
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" The petitioner (the New Almaden Company, under the name of Andres Cas-
tillero), claims that these documents establish a grant made by the President of
the Republic to him.
The decree of the President is not, in my opinion, a grant nor was it intended
to be such. The colonization law of 1824 and the regulations of 1828, made
under it, had committed the granting of the national land to the Governors of the
department, subject to the approval of the local assemblies, and, in certain cases,
the Supreme Executive of the Republic.
The Minister of Foreign Relations and Government was the proper organ of the
Executive to communicate with the Governors of the departments, and hence the
decree not that the grant be made, but, that the Minister communicate the appli-
cation to the officers having charge of the subject of grants where the land was
situated, with an expression of the favorable disposition of the Executive thereto.
The Minister of Relations so understood the decree, and acted in accordance, by
his communication to the Governor on the subject.
If a grant had been intended by the President, a document of title would have
been issued and delivered to the party, instead of directing a simple communica-
tion to the Governor of California. The inference from the whole proceeding is
irresistible that the President did not assume to make a grant, but that he referred
the matter, with an expression of his favorable appreciation of the object of Cas-
tillero, to the Governor to proceed according to the colonization laws on the sub-
ject. The land asked for was, in part at least, according to Castillero's represen-
tation, granted in colonization to Berreyesa. It could not, therefore, be granted
to Castillero, unless by denouncement, which could be decreed with propriety only
by the local authorities."
Coming from an approved friend, this is plain and conclu-
sive enough on the New Almaden Company's title to two
square leagues of land. For the public and myself, a more
edifying subject of contemplation is found in this certificate,
which was filed with and yet remains attached to that title.
!
Stamps )
f
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1851. )
Jesus Vejar, Notary Public.
I certify and assure that the preceding authentic instrument, signed by his Ex-
cellency, the Minister of Exterior Relations, Government and Police, Castillo Lan-
zas, has been respected under that signature, and obeyed by the Mexican authori-
ties who governed in Upper California, in the year one thousand eight hundred
and forty-six, according to insertions which the same authorities made of that in-
strument in acts which they authenticated upon the matter treated of, and which
I certify I have seen ; and for this reason the signature to the said instrument
ought to be considered as genuine, and as the hand-writing and letter of his Ex-
cellency, the Minister, and also because Senor Don Andres Castillero recognized it
as such in acts which have passed before me. And, at the request of Messrs.
Barron, Forbes & Co., I affix my notarial mark and signature to this present, in
Tepic, on the fifteenth of March, one thousand eight hundred and fifty.
JESUS YEJAR."
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Loreto Corona and Eusebio Fernandez, respectively Consti-
tutional First Alcalde and a Notary Public, attest the official
signature of Vejar, and are in turn attested by E. L. Barre,
Acting Consul of the United States.
Upon this document, Judge Hoffman, in his opinion, re-
marks :
"Almost every statement contained in this certificate, is admitted to be false. It
is not pretended by the defendants, that the dispatch of Lanzas was ever delivered
to the Governor, nor that it was ever presented to, much less, respected and obeyed
by the Mexican authorities of California, in the year 1846. The insertions of said
instrument, made by those authorities, in acts which they passed upon the
subject and which the Notary certifies to have seen, are purely imaginary. "When
a certificate of this character is procuredfrom a Mexican Notary and by them filed
as an exhibit, the Court is surely justified in regarding with suspicion, not only all
documents which are authenticated in a similar manner, but also those the genu-
ineness of which is assailed by other proofs."
When the learned Judge used so mild a term as suspicion,
the most cautious will observe that he set an example of ex-
treme moderation.
Here is another false certificate, already noticed, that of
Weekes to the Forbes' copy of the Pico Act of Possession, of
which the same Judge said it was admitted to he untrue ; neither
"faithful," nor "to the letter," as it pretends.
" Court of the Justice op the Peace, )
San Jose, Guadalupe, Upper California. J
I certify, in due form, that the foregoing is a faithful copy, to the letter, from its
original, the expediente of the mine of Santa Clara or New Almaden, which exists
in the archives under my charge, to which I refer.
And in testimony whereof, I have signed it this twentieth day of January, one
thousand eight hundred and forty-eight.
JAMBS W. WEEKES."
And here is the third false certificate, the most remarkable of
all:
" [seal.] Carlos Horn, First Lieutenant of the National Navy and Captain of
this Port
—
I certify that according to the documents existing in the Archives of the office
of the Captain of the Port, the Hawaiian Bark Don Quixote, Captain John Paty,
anchored in the roadstead of San Bias the thirteenth day of April, eighteen hun-
dred and forty-six, coming from the Port of Monterey, in the Alta California.
CARLOS HORN."
Being shown to Captain John Paty on his examination, he
was asked if it contained the truth, he replied:
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" Ans. 23.—It does not. I went direct from Monterey to Acapuleo. I stopped
there on my way up to Monterey, about the middle of June. I was also there
with the Don Quixote in April, 1845. I do not recollect being there with the Don
Quixote at any other times.
Ques. 24.—How long did you remain at Acapuleo in 1846, before you left for
Upper California ?
A. 24.—I remained there from the 21st of April to the 18th of May."
The manner in which this certificate was procured requires
a word of explanation. In the summer or autumn of 1857 it
was ascertained that Castillero left Monterey on the 4th of
April, 1846, in the Don Quixote, and inquiries were at once
instituted, and the probabilities much and openly discussed,
whether he had reached the city of Mexico by the 5th of May,
the day on which the preliminaries of his title begin. One
Domingo Danglada, who appears to be the same person who
had been called by the company as a witness before the Land
Commission, and who had lived in Mexico twenty-two years
before 1849, was employed in behalf of the Government to
ascertain whether the Don Quixote had put in at San Bias,
and, if so, on what day. He wrote, he says, to some elderly
retired gentlemen of wealth and high respectability at Tepic,
and in due time received the above certificate of Carlos Horn
;
the substance of which is that the Don Quixote after a remark-
ably good run down the coast, in nine days from Monterey,
cast her anchor in the port of San Bias, and, therefore, that
Castillero had ample time to reach the winning post of this
race. Captain Paty upset this theory which had issued so
mysteriously from the head-quarters of the New Almaden
league, but the Government thought it proper, nevertheless, to
prove the whole transaction by Danglada, and filed the cer-
tificate.
Vejar's certificates appear almost everywhere throughout the
company's papers. He may be regarded as a piece of the
office furniture of the house of Barron, Forbes & Co.
Taken together, from the 5th to the 23d of May, the second
series of New Almaden papers are thus, -it will be seen, a
clumsy patch upon recent history—a tale repugnant to itself
—
rejected of common sense—that scouts at probabilities, and de-
fies belief. There is no object in disputing their sufficiency
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under the law, they are so plainly fictitious ; nor their genu-
ineness, they are so obviously worthless as a title.
However, proof was offered in their support. On the 30th
day of January, 1855, there appeared before Peter Lott, Com-
missioner, a witness who had recently arrived from New Or-
leans by the way of Nicaragua. He was a lawyer by profes-
sion, had held the office of Minister of Interior and Exterior
Relations of Mexico, in the latter part of 1846 ; from 1848 to
1852 was Senator of the Republic of Mexico
;
and had several
times been a Deputy in the Mexican Congress—he has within
the last year been embassador to Spain—and he gave his name
as Jose Maria Lafragua. I am informed that the representa-
tives of the Government have not been able to learn that the
arrival of this distinguished personage was noticed in the cus-
tomary manner by the newspapers ; that with the excusable
vanity which exists among other nations, and is not supposed
to be wanting to Mexicans, he made himself known to the
Governor, or other dignitaries, or the distinguished citizens of
the State of California, or evinced any curiosity to learn the
actual condition or future promise of American institutions on
the Pacific, or that he was seen outside of the precincts of the
Land Commission and the couuting-room of Bolton & Barron,
in this city—agents and partners of the New Almaden Com-
pany. He gave his testimony, and disappeared as noiselessly
as he came.
If what I now write should reach the eyes of any member
of the Cabinet at Washington, I beg to be permitted to say to
him that he can do no better service to the cause of justice
than to remove the doubt which rests upon us here, whether
this man was or was not the Lafragua he represented himself
to be. Let our Government put the question directly to La-
fragua himself and let us have his answer. It is time to know
whether the highest Mexican officials will, in the service of pri-
vate individuals, make long voyages in this obscure manner,
will condescend to. enter our courts, as it were, by stealth, will
there venture to contradict cotemporaneous history, and com-
mit themselves, in support of monstrous frauds, to perjuries
which their intelligence would teach them that no art couM
conceal, all of which did the Lafragua who came before the
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Board of Land Commissioners. Shown a copy of the corres-
pondence between Segura and Becerra, he swore that he had
compared it with the originals in Mexico ; that it was correct
;
that he knew the signatures to the originals and they were
genuine; that he made the comparison in November, 1854,
and he then found something which had been overlooked up to
that time, but was now regarded as very important, viz : these
words, written on the margin of Andres Castillero's petition of
May 12th, and signed with the rubric of the Minister of Jus-
tice : " May 20th, 1846. Granted in the terms which are pro-
posed, and with respect to the land, let the corresponding order
issue to the Minister of Eelations for the proper measure of his
office, with the understanding that the Supreme Government ac-
cedes to the petition " ; that at the end of 1846 he saw the peti-
tion of Castillero and marginal note, in the office of the Minister
of Relations, over which he then presided, and to which the
mining business had been removed since May of that year; that
he knew the signature of Castillo Lanzas and found it genuine
on the dispatch to the Governor of California.
The papers which he saw in November, 1854, he knew to be
the same he had seen in 1846, because at that time he was
obliged to examine all the acts of Paredes, for the purpose of
laying them before the Mexican Congress. By the same rule,
Mr. Cass should have such a knowledge of every paper filed in
the office of the Secretary of State during the administration
of Mr. Marcy, that he could swear to its identity with a cer-
tainty that would exclude the possibility of an imposition.
Lafragua here makes oath to that which is not proved by the
chiefs of office but the subordinates, the actual custodians of
the paper as a material thing, not those who review the acts of
Government. Nothing could be more preposterous.
He said that after making this examination in 1846, he made
his report in which he referred to Castillero and his quicksilver
mine. He produced a fragment of that report with the places
marked which related to this subject. His words are: "This
document is taken out of a large bound volume, which em-
braced my whole report as Minister of Eelations, upon all sub-
jects pertaining to my office with accompanying documents. I
took this portion for convenience, because it embraces every-
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thing which my report contained relating to said Almaden
Mine, or Castillero's connection therewith. The booh I speak of
is a ponderous volume." Too ponderous to be brought into
Court, or perhaps he means from Mexico. He is right at any
rate, that it is too ponderous to be filed in evidence, as the
representatives of the Government admitted, when at last by
accident they saw the whole book, of which there was but one
copy in San Francisco, however common they may be in Mexi-
can libraries. It is a " portly volume of between three hun-
dred or four hundred pages," not of a "precisely similar
nature to the reports of our own Secretaries of State to Con-
gress ;" but, on the contrary, stuffed full of an incomprehensible
medley upon every subject, except the great interests of Mex-
ico at that day. The report itself is reasonably short, but all
the rest between the lids might as well be old newspapers,
from which indeed it would seem to be made up. The rubbish
is dignified with the name of "accompanying documents."
The cost of making up such a volume would be the printer's
bill. The actual history of the making up of this volume as
given in a note at the end, is this : In November, I think,
1846, Lafragua made his report and Congress ordered it to be
printed $ there was no money until May, when the work was
begun ; it was not finished when the Americans took the city
of Mexico in September ; the Government fled, but took the
precaution, though their flight was hurried and in the night, to
carry this inestimable document along with them—copy, proofs,
materials and all—to Queretaro, where it was completed and
issued with the same title page which had been designed for it
in Mexico—at the office, to wit, of certain printers, on a certain
street of that city—so that but for the explanations of the note,
the job might be supposed to have been executed under the
supervision of Gen. Scott. What was all this trouble for?
When the printing was resumed at Queretaro, Paredes, who
was the subject of the history, was down ; Salas, for whom La-
fragua wrote the history, was down
;
Santa Anna, the successor
of Salas, was conquered ; and the men of an opposing party,
who had collected at Queretaro, hardly aspired to the name of
a government at all. If there was money for this printing in
May, where were the means obtained after September ? or if a
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dollar could possibly be had then, would it possibly be ex-
pended in canying through a business so stale and useless ? If
the report itself was worth the trouble and expense, what occa-
sion was there for printing the accompanying mass constituting
more than three-fourths of the portly volume, and relating to
mines, to the price of quicksilver, to administrative details of a
country utterly broken down and in the hands of a foreign
enemy? Why, finally, should this report have been printed
and none other ? The only reason that can be imagined must
be found in the extracts which the testifying Lafragua thought
proper to cut out from his ponderous tome, and bring into the
Land Commission. These two extracts are all which comes
from the report itself:
Page 65.—" In the State of San Luis Potosi the metals reduced and quicksilver
extracted are in proportion ; and in Upper California, a mine (criadero), has been
discovered whose ley surpasses that of the best mine known, that of Almaden,
which does not produce more than thirteen per cent., while ours, by the assays
made in the College of Mining of this Capital, exceeds thirty-five and a half
per cent."
This might all very well be, and no harm done. I have to
note, however, that criadero does not mean a mine, but simply
a vein ; and that if Lafragua really wrote in this way about a
mine or vein in Upper California, in November, 1846, calling
it " ours," and congratulating himself on the richness of its
yield, when it had been four months in the hands of the American
army and navy, without the slightest evidence of any intention
on their part to give it up voluntarily, but, on the contrary, an
avowed fixed purpose to retain it, he manifested a courage and
a hopeful patriotism which exceeded that of the Romans, who
bought and sold the land on which Hannibal was encamped at
the same prices as if there had not been a Carthagenian in
Italy, as much as his case was more desperate than theirs.
Page 66.—" I recommend the Sovereign Congress to direct its attention to this
subject, making the production of our quicksilver a truly national enterprise, the
importance of which cannot be overrated, either by creating a fund, or dictating
other suitable measures. 1 '
But that Congress was not then sovereign over that mine,
and if it would ever again have the privilege of saying "our
quicksilver," when speaking of the vein in Upper California,
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Mr. Lafragua should have advised them to direct their atten-
tion to sending an army to recover it, instead of creating a fund
and dictating other such measures, which were in no wise suit-
able to that end.
The supposition of a Minister at that day and under such
circumstances, holding such official language to a grave delib-
erative body, and of that body taking all this trouble to print
and perpetuate it, so exceeds the bounds of the most extrava-
gant burlesque, that one is tempted to pause and inquire if it
is really true that the American flag was hoisted at Monterey
on the 7th of July, 1846, or if the same Minister proposed a
tariff for that port and for San Francisco
;
we know that even
later, some of their officials actually did make grants of land
in California, so much were they confused in their latitude and
chronology. It is evident that all Mexico was possessed still
with the idea that had gotten the better of Paredes, Becerra
and Segura, in the spring—that peace or war, Castillero, with
funds, retorts and flasks, was the thing for California; and
that whoever was master there, the quicksilver would still be
Mexican. The JSTew Almaden Company, alone, could have
enabled us to solve this mystery.
In these posthumous recommendations for California, Judge
Felch found nothing so extraordinary. The New Almaden
Company appeal to them, as a triumphant vindication of the
genuineness of the second branch of their title. Other people
will wonder where such ignorance was bred, how it came to be
allied with so much audacity, and how that apathy was engen-
dered which suffered such a blundering crime to pass unde-
tected. It may be that the rest of Lafragua's report is genu-
ine, the quicksilver extracts can not be, and they are a mill-
stone about the neck of the witness who appeared under the
name of Lafragua.
The other passages cited in the Lafragua fragment are taken
from the Appendix of Miscellanies. They are also two in
number and have been already mentioned as fixing the date of
the stoppage of payments from the treasury, which prevented
Castillero securing his draft on Mazatlan, in one, as the 10th of
May, 1846, and in the other, as the 19th of September, of that
year. In the latter, referring to Castillero's projects, Vicente
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Segura (for it is on no less authority that we have all these
details), says: "This grand national enterprise, the Junta,
(Mining Board) has not been able fully to carry out because it
has been deprived of one of its funds of one per cent, on the
circulation of money," etc. Otherwise, the New Almaden Mine
would have been in operation on the account of the Mexican
Government, in 1846. Fremont, Sloat, Stockton and Kearney,
notwithstanding—the same story over again.
But the ponderous book contains still other matters of inter-
est not cut out with the Lafragua fragment. The distinguished
witness declared, on his examination, that, "In consequence of
the revolution, Paredes became clothed with absolute power,
embracing the Legislative as well as the Executive, and all
other functions of the Government." Nobody was better qual-
ified to speak about this fact, except Paredes himself. Among
the materials from the great book, gathered up perhaps in
haste, there was included, possibly by accident, the plan of San
Luis Potosi of the 14th of December, 1845, with the amend-
ments made to it at the city of Mexico, January 2d, 1846.
In this charter of his revolution Paredes declares that he had
no powers but those of the laws in force, and pledged himself
never to exceed them unless it became necessary in repelling
the Americans. The validity of these grants, for so they would
have them considered, of the mine by force of the contract,
and the two square leagues of land by the dispatch of Castillo
Lanzas, was supposed to depend upon making good this un-
limited despotism in the person of Paredes. Paredes denies the
usurpation and flatly gives the lie to the traveling Minister of
Eelations.
For more than two years Lafragua had been the pillar on
which the case rested, and his book the corner-stone. Eecently,
the foundations of the edifice have been inspected, and a prop
thought necessary. John P. Brodie, in July last, made his trip
to Mexico before spoken of. He carried with him a neatly ex-
ecuted traced copy of all these documents testified to by Lafra-
gua, and sundry other documents which had not been brought
to light in Lafragua's day. He compared his copies with most
painstaking accuracy, and found them to agree with their origi-
nals in the archives at Mexico, even to the very blots and stains
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upon the paper, as he relates in his deposition taken since his
return. Where were those traced copies made ? Wherever
that was, of course there were their originals. Brodie does not
know ; he did not make them. They were put into his hands
by William E. Barron, who, as long ago disclosed by his affida-
vit, is the managing agent for the New Almaden Company, of
which he is also a partner in the prosecution of this claim. At
the same time he received another package'—smaller, he is care-
ful to tell us, than that containing the traced copies, (but that
might well be, for with these appears to have been inclosed a
stout notarial document on common paper, which would greatly
increase the bulk of that package,) which, upon his reaching
Acapulco, he forwarded by express to the elder Eustace Bar-
ron, at the city of Mexico, who, since the superannuation of
Alex. Forbes some six or seven years ago, has been the head
of the New Almaden league. If the package which went by
express contained the originals, they were on the spot when
Brodie arrived to make the comparison. This, of course, is but
a guess; but Wm. E. Barron had just arrived from Mexico
when he sent back Brodie with the copies. If they had been
traced in Mexico, he should have brought up with him the man
who traced them. He would have had no difficulty in this.
People are easily brought from Mexico ; Brodie brought up
two with him—one an attorney of Eustace Barron, the other
no less a personage than the Secretary of the present " highest
mining tribunal in the Eepublic of Mexico," successor of that
with which Castillero dealt in 1846. This Secretary, however,
who has been all his life a Clerk in the department, and has the
custody, as he swears, of a part of the originals, did not make
the traced copies, had never seen or heard of such a thing in
Mexico
;
and, with these in his hands, persisted in saying that
they were pressed copies. And Brodie declared, that in the
thirty years he lived in Mexico he never saw a traced copy, not
until he came to California. Traced copies, so completely un-
known in Mexico, are made every day with the utmost nicety
in the Surveyor-General's office at San Francisco. And unless
Wm. E. Barron, after having his traced copies made in Mexico,
was so indifferent to expenditure that he came away with the
papers, and left the witnesses to prove them behind, and so had.
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immediately to dispatch Brodie back upon his route. And
unless the art of tracing had been lost as soon as these, the first
and only Mexican copies, were achieved, and therefore no new
traced copies could be made, and the trouble saved of returning
those improvidently brought to California, one would suppose
"
that the originals of Mr. "Win. E. Barron's traced copies were
once many thousands of miles nearer to us than they are repre-
sented to be at present.
The Secretary of the Mining Tribunal, who accompanied Bro-
die when he came back—Manuel Couto by name, and nephew,
he says, of Bernardo Couto, one of the signers of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo—says that he has had his portion of the ori-
ginals always in his custody very safely at Mexico. He swears,
also, to the office and the signatures of Segura, Becerra, Lanzas
and the rest. Cross-examined, it appears, that these facts ex-
haust his whole knowledge. He is not helped to the recollec-
tion of these things by suggestions from surrounding facts, but
he remembers everything by the aid of the great central light,
of the transaction with Castillero. Thus he knows that Becerra
was Minister of Justice, and Castillo Lanzas, Minister of Rela-
tions at this time, because he sees their names on Castillero's
title papers, but he remembers not another Minister of Justice
or Eelations for years before or since. He has absolutely no
knowledge of revolutions, and the storms of state have broken
over his head like the storms of nature over a man asleep in a
cavern.
Add now some scores of Mexican certificates, many of them
from Vejar and his colleagues, in the 1STotarial Office, and a few
from consuls and foreign ministers—including Mr. Forsyth, the
American Minister, and who was present and sat by the side of
the Mexican attorney of Eustace Barron when the traced copies
were compared at Mexico, as Brodie says—certifying to the per-
son and office of some of the Mexican certifiers, and we have
the evidence with which the New Almaden Company sustain
the second series of their title papers.
On the other side, we have the papers themselves, testifying
on their face, conclusively, to the forgery of the alleged title, as
we have seen ; all the evidence that has been arrayed against
the Act of Possession, which becomes a part of the second series
4
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also, as it is the thing to be ratified, is incorporated with the
Castillo Lanzas dispatch, and the circumstances which have
been noted, show it to have been fabricated, not only after .its
date, but after the 23d of May, 1846 ; the impossibility of be-
lieving that any court would execute its patent for more than
nine square miles, under the name of a mining right, or for two
square leagues, for the purposes of colonization, averring in its
very, grant that it was already the private property of a citizen
;
and, finally, we have the well-considered declaration of Mexico
made to the United States on the most solemn occasion known
among nations.
The President of the United States instructed Mr. Trist, the
celebrated embassador, when he should agree upon the terms
of peace with Mexico, to insert a provision to the effect that
grants of land in California made after the 13th of May, 1846,
on which day Congress recognized the existence of a war by
act of Mexico, should not be valid. The Mexican Commis-
sioners who met Mr. Trist objected to the form of this stipula-
tion, on the ground that it would give them the appearance of
consenting to the confiscation of Mexican property, and induced
Mr. Trist to waive it, by assuring him that as a matter of fact,
no such grant had been made. They said they would insert a
declaration in the treaty to this effect, and thus Mr. Trist's' ob-
ject would be as fully secured, in a manner less offensive to
their feelings. Mr. Trist, before he gave his consent to the
change, desired them to look again and be certain of what they
stated. They returned and reported that there was not a sha-
dow of doubt, that no grant of land Tin California had been
made after the 13th day of May, 1846. The Xth Article of
the original draft of the treaty was then inserted : it guaranteed
Mexican grants of land in California, qualified with this decla-
ration. When the treaty came before the Senate of the United
States, they struck out the whole of the Xth Article, both the
guarantee and its qualification. Mr. Benton, in one of his sub-
sequent speeches, says that the Senate did this because they
were afraid that the guarantee would cover some inequitable
claims of an earlier date than the 13th of May, 1846, and had
in mind particularly the immense grant to the Irish Catholic
priest, Eugene Macnamara, of whom I shall presently speak,
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some of the incipient steps in which were taken in the summer
of 1845. With the Xth Article stricken out the treaty came
back to Mexico for ratification. Mr. Clifford, now Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Mr.
Sevier of Arkansas, were the Commissioners on the part of
the United States, and Luis de la Eosa, Minister of Eelations,
represented the Mexican Eepublic. The place was the city of
Queretaro, and the time the 26th of May, 1848, when and
where we are told that the Eeport of Lafragua, setting out ,the
whole affair with Castillero, had now been printed, by the or-
der, and at the expense of the Commissioners who negotiated
with Mr. Trist, and the Minister of Eelations who was about to
ratify with Messrs. Clifford and Sevier. The Mexican Govern-
ment feared that it would be charged with failure to secure the
protection of the property of the ceded Mexicans, and before
ratifying the treaty without the Article, exacted a protocol ex-
planatory of the intention of the omission, which was signed by
both parties and contained these words, which I take as trans-
lated from the Spanish
:
"These concessions, notwithstanding the suppression of the Article of the Treaty,
shall preserve the value which they may have in law; and the grantees may avail
themselves of their lawful titles before the American tribunals.
According to the law of the United States, those are lawful titles to 'property of
every kind, moveable or immovable, existing in the ceded territories, which may have
been lawful titles under the Mexican law up to the 13th of May, 1846."
This is the most exalted evidence. If it is not so declared
in the law, let the lawyers re-write their books and assign it
the first chapter. In this declaration of a State stipulating for
peace and a continued existence, is included with the voice of
millions, that of Andres Castillero and all his associates, and
all who now claim under them the mine and two square leagues
of New Almaden.
Against this evidence to offer the oaths of spectral ministers
of State, document finders, and collators of traced copies, is
but to affront the courts and the public, with a mocking insult.
Not the fact, but the manner of the forgery, is in truth the
inquiry.
We have seen the first time the three thousand vara Act of
Possession, which is the basis of the whole, appeared in use,
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was when James Alexander Forbes made his copy, from an
original handed him for the purpose by Alexander Forbes,
which he had never seen before and never saw again after he
handed it back, on or about the 21st of January, 1848. For
practical purposes we may assume that we have here the for-
gers and the date of the forging of that document.
Before that time, in the spring of 1847, to-wit, Eobert "Wal-
kinshaw had brought with him a copy of one version of the
Castillo Lanzas document, consequently it was made before he
came to California. That version is not the same which now
appears on file-—for "Walkinshaw laid it before James Alex.
Forbes to whom he was the bearer of a letter of Alex. Forbes,
yet at Tepic, and whose advice he was instructed to take ; he,
after seeing it, wrote the letter dated May 5th, 1847, which has
been put in evidence by the New Almaden Company. It is as
follows
:
" (Private.)
Santa Clara, 5th May, 1847.
My Dear Sir;:
It is with much pleasure that I acknowledge the receipt of your letters by Mr.
Walkinshaw, and another of the 27th of January.
I have much satisfaction to inform you that Mr. Walkinshaw has taken quiet
possession of the Quicksilver Mine, by virtue of your agreement with Mr. Macna-
mara ; and has made the necessary assays and observations for his entire satisfac-
tion, which will be welcome intelligence to you.
I have done everything I could do for the advancement of your views in this
undertaking; and have communicated to Mr. Walkinshaw all the information
relative to the necessary measures that must be taken in order to preclude the
possibility of an intrusion by the Americans, or any other persons who may find
a pretext for litigation ; and I now lay before you my views, that you may see the
necessity of immediate action.
It is of the most vital importance to obtain from the Supreme Government of
Mexico, a positive, formal and unconditional grant of the two sitios of land con-
ceded to D. Andres Castillero, according to the decree appended to the contract,
and also an unqualified ratification of the judicial possession which was given of
the mine by the local authority of this jurisdiction, including, if possible, the three
thousand varas of land given in that possession as a gratification to the discoverers.
The documents should be made out in the name of D, Andres Castillero and So-
cios. I think that it will not be difficult to obtain these documents, on making
known to the Supreme Government that this Departmental Government is com-
pletely ' acefalo' ; in consequence of which, the possession of the two sitios
ordered to be given by the dispatch of Seflor Castillo Lanzas, has not been ob-
tained, nor cannot be obtained, nor even mentioned without imminent risk of
opposition on the part of the American Government in this Department. It is
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indispensable that the title and ratification of possession should be of the date of
the decree of Sefior Lanzas.
It is of great importance also to the future security of all titles to land in Cali-
fornia, that Her Majesty's Minister at Mexico be advised of the expediency of
using his influence with the Government, in case of a cession of California to the
United States, (which God forbid,) that there be inserted in the treaty of cession
a distinct and special clause, that all titles of land that may have been granted by
the Departmental Government to British subjects, even if they be not according
to all the prescribed forms of colonization law, be held inviolable and valid.
There is a sufficient quantity of land in the vicinity of the mines to supply the
grant of the two sitios, without encroaching upon the land of Berreyesa, whose
title Castillero tells you is but for one sitio. This is true in respect to his first
title, which was given by D. Manuel Jimeno, as Gdbernador interim, during the
administration of Alvarado. But Berreyesa afterward made a representation to-
Micheltoreno, and obtained the other sitio ; he, however, did not receive judicial
possession of the land.
With respect to the ratification of the contract between yourself and Mr. Mac-
namara, for the habilitation of the mine, as promised by Don Andres Castillero, I,
as attorney or procurator of the two Robles, send that document, in which I ratify
(in their name) the contract, and make allusion to the privileges conceded by the
Mexican Government to the owners of Quicksilver Mines ; for, in lieu of these
privileges, it was expressly stipulated by D. Andres. Castillero and his Socios, that
they should all participate in the two sitios of land to be asked of the Departmental
Government.
This will also be advantageous to you, independent of its justice.
I have made arrangements with Mr. Walkinshaw for the extraction of the ores
that I have taken out of the mine, for our mutual account, in the manner that is
expressed in a contract made between us, which will, of course, be manifested
to you.
I have only to add that you shall surely rely on me, as you have been so pleased
to honor me with the title of a friend, which I shall be proud to prove to you. I
shall stand between all difficulties that may occur on the part of these new and
arbitrary Governors of California, or any other person. Trusting to hear of your
speedy measures in relation to the title, etc.
I am, my dear sir,
Tour most obedient servant,
(Signed.) JAMES ALEX. FORBES.
Alex. Forbes, Esq."
Mr. Forbes, as requested, here gives his views of the " nec-
essary measures that must be taken in order to preclude the
possibility of an intrusion of the Americans, or any other per-
sons " upon the quiet possession which Mr. Walkinshaw had
taken of the quicksilver mine under the agreement with Mr.
Macnamara. He finds that the Castillo Lanzas document which
"Walkinshaw had brought, will not answer, for two reasons, one
that they dare not even mention it, much less take possession
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of the land, and the other that it does not contain the ratifica-
tion of the mining possession given by the local authorities.
The Castillo Lanzas document in the exhibits, does contain this
ratification, and Forbes, with the paper before him, could not
have avoided seeing it.
The ratification which Jas. Alex. Forbes desired, was "of
the judicial possession which was given of the mine by the
local authority of this jurisdiction including, if possible, the
three thousand varas of land given in that concession as a grat-
ification to the discoverer."
This contemplates two things to be ratified, one of which did
not necessarily include the other, which might be ratified one
without the other, and which he discriminates as the judicial
possession of the mine, and as a gratification to the discoverer.
The thing produced as ratified is one and indivisible
;
a single
subject matter, not two, which might be ratified separately, not
susceptible of description by terms, which discriminate parts
—
that must be accorded or refused as a whole. In the Act of
Possession, which a year later, Jas. Alex. Forbes copied for
Alex. Forbes, the outline of these ideas is preserved, but their
distinctions are confounded, and the mining possession, and the
gratification, are blended in a single phrase: "I have granted
three thousand varas of land in all directions." The nicer lines
traced in the meditations of the younger Forbes, seem to have
been lost under the fusing heat of the action of the elder
Forbes, and the elements of the future title were taken to
Mexico in a common mass. We have returned to us, therefore,
a Castillo Lanzas document, which is not the one that "Walkin-
shaw brought up with him, because it contains a ratification
and an Act of Possession which is not the one that Jas. Alex.
Forbes analyzed, because it can not be resolved into parts.
But it is necessary to go back to Father Macnamara. The
business which occupied him *at the city of Mexico in the sum-
mer of 1.845, detained him until the spring of 1846. It was a
vast speculation ; a project to colonize California with Irish
Catholics, with the double purpose of protecting the territory
from the rapacious Yankees and the Catholic church from what
he describes as "Methodist wolves," in his communications
with the Government. He obtained favorable letters from the
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Central Government to the Government of California
;
passed
through Tepic; received on the 15th of April a letter from
Alex. Forbes to James Alex. Forbes, of which the "object
was," in the words of Mr. Alex. Forbes, " to request of you
(Mr. James Alex. Forbes), to procure as correct information
as you could respecting the quicksilver mine or mines lately said
to be discovered in California, one of which you mention as
being worked by Mr. Castillero;" sailed from Mazatlan, after
the 11th of May, in the British ship-of-war Juno ; arrived at
Monterey some time in June, but was disappointed in meeting
Mr. James Alex. Forbes, who felt it his duty at that time, as
British Vice-Consul, to be present in the lower part of the State
advising with the Governor and other influential Californians,
how they should make the approaching crisis redound most to
the advantage of Great Britain and least to that of the United
States. He followed down the coast in the Juno, and found
Mr. Forbes at Santa Barbara. There Mr. Forbes drafted for
him the petition upon which shortly afterward Pio Pico granted
him the whole valley of the San Joaquin. At Santa Barbara
they separated ; Macnamara, with his petition, going to Los
Angeles, and Forbes sailing on the Juno for San Francisco.
Whilst Forbes was at sea, Commodore Sloat plan-ted the Ameri-
can flag at Monterey, and Father Macnamara coming up by land
soon afterward met Gen. Jose Castro on his retreat to the south.
About the middle of July Forbes reached San Francisco, and'
on the road thence to Santa Clara was met by a courier from
Admiral Seymour of the Collingwood summoning him to Mon-
terey. The Collingwood had watched the movements of the
Savannah and endeavored to get first to Monterey, but when
Seymour arrived, Sloat was already in possession. If the Col-
lingwood had been the winner of the race, the last ten years of
history might have been differently written for us now upon
the Pacific.
At Monterey, Forbes again met Macnamara, and for the first
time saw this power of attorney
:
" POWER OF ATTORNEY,
la the port of Monterey, the twelfth day of the month of June, one thousand
eight hundred and forty-six, I, Jose Castro, in presence of the witnesses hereinafter
named, in exercise of the powers which my partners have granted to me, for the
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purpose of executing any contract which might offer in regard to the three perte-
nencias, which by just title and as discoverers we possess in the mine of quicksilver
situated in the district of Santa Clara; and being favored by the Mining Ordinances
and the respective laws, and more especially by the supreme law of seventh Octo-
ber, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-three, in the procuring of the great
advancement and profit in the working of this class of mines, and the mine which
we now possess being first, sole, and most important for its richness which has
been discovered in Mexican territory ; considering that the Government cannot
extend to us the assistance to which we are entitled on account of the mine being
at such immense distance, and beyond sea ; and there existing no hopes that this
country of itself can forward this important branch, for want of disposable funds;
and likewise, because of there being no professed mineralogist to be found here,
nor laborers for the continuous working, which are required for the advancement
of this branch of industry unknown in this department,—have agreed, and do agree
to confer special, full and sufficient power, as much as may be necessary in law,
and convey most authority, and be binding, to the Presbyter Don Eugenio Macna-
mara, that, representing my person and my copartners, he may contract with an
English company, with exclusion of any other nation, to undertake the working of
the three pertenencias of said mine for the term of nine years, with the purpose of
procuring the supplies, (avios,) defraying the necessary expenses, and maintaining
the mine in good working order, in conformity with the Mining Ordinances; one-
half of the products of the three pertenencias of the mine to be for the owners, and
the other half for the English company ; and in the case that he may not be able
to make such arrangement, he may offer two-thixds to the English company, and
the owners shall receive the other one-third, in the understanding that the portion
falling to the owners shall be free of all expenses ; and should he not be able to
effect any contract even on these terms, he may make other stipulations, with the
concurrence of Don Andres Castillero, so as to expedite the effecting of a contract
;
and after the expiration of the said term of nine years, the contract will be extended
for seven years more, on the same terms as the first may have been formed ; after
all which time the negotiation shall be at the absolute disposal of the owners of
the mine, as likewise all the materials, buildings and other appurtenances, such as
machinery, and other utensils appertaining to said working ; and the English com-
pany shall not be entitled to claim any other expenses which they may have in-
curred for their own proper use and benefit. And to the security and validity of
whatever may be executed in virtue of this power, I bind myself in full form of law
to its fulfillment ; and to this effect I subject myself to the judges who may have
cognizance of the case.
In testimony whereof, I sign this with the four witnesses, who are—Don David
Spence, Don Juan Malarin, Don Manuel Diaz, and Don Antonio Maria Osio—the
day and year above written.
JOSE CASTRO,
DAVID SPENCE,
MANUEL DIAZ,
JUAN MALARIN,
ANTONIO MARIA OSIO."
This instrument is dated on the 12th of June, when Jose Cas-
tro was in the neighborhood of Santa Clara most probably, and
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absorbed in his preparations for the contest •with Fremont, who
had returned from the mountains of Oregon to northern Cali-
fornia, and was there mustering his hardy band of veteran
frontiersmen under the bear flag ; and when Macnamara had
not yet seen Forbes, from whom he was to obtain his informa-
tion about the quicksilver mine. It was undoubtedly made
after Castro had left this region of the country, and when
Forbes and Macnamara met again at Monterey. Their first
meeting had been devoted to the most important business, the
grant of the San Joaquin Valley ; their second was given to the
Quicksilver Mine of Santa Clara, as it was then called, now
New Almaden. It is not at all unreasonable to suppose that
it was made on board of the Collingwood, where, unquestion-
ably, the Yice-Consul and the semi-diplomatic priest were fre-
quent and distinguished guests.
This power of attorney, it will be seen, at this early day
ignores, like so many other papers in this case, the presence or
the danger of the coming of the Americans, and upon the sup-
position that California is always to remain a part of Mexico,
Gen. Castro goes on to authorize " the Presbyter, Don Eugenio
Macnamara, that, representing my person and my copartners,
he may contract with an English company, with exclusion of
any other nation, to undertake the working of the three perte-
nencias of said mine for the term of nine years," etc.
With this instrument in his possession, on or about the 22d
of July, 1846, Macnamara sailed on the Collingwood for the
Sandwich Islands. There he wrote to Mr. James Alex. Forbes
this letter
:
" Honoltjlu, September 21, 1846.
Dear Mr. Forbes : I take advantage of the first favorable opportunity that
presents itself, to send you a few hurried lines, in accordance with a former pro-
mise. Here I am, still, very much annoyed, as you may easily conceive, at being
detained in this half savage place, having nothing to do, and my anxiety to reach
Mexico amounting almost to madness. I am daily, nay hourly, expecting the
arrival of the Palinurus, transport ship, which is to carry me to San Bias. The
only English man-of-war here at present is the Juno, with our friend, Capt. Blake.
The Grampus, a fifty-gun frigate, reached this shortly after our arrival, but was
sent off almost immediately to Tahiti. The Collingwood left for the same desti-
nation on the 3d inst. ; the Spy, brigantine, has gone more recently, also for
Tahiti ; the Cormorant steamer, the Fisguard, the Modesta, and two surveying
vessels under the command of Capt. Kellett, are in the Columbia River. The
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American Ship Columbus is here, lately from Japan ; she was destined to co-
operate with the squadron on the coast of California, but, now that the storm is
blown over, she goes to Valparaiso.
The only news of any importance by the last mail, is an account of the settle-
ment of the Oregon question. The treaty fixes the boundary by the line of 49
deg. 20 min., with the free navigation of the Columbia to British vessels, until the
expiration of the H.'s B. Company's charter. By this you will perceive that Eng-
land gives up all the good harbors of the north-west coast and gets nothing in
return. Thus has the country been again sacrificed by assinine stupidity of old
Aberdeen. Every Englishman with whom I have spoken on the subject, seems
utterly disgusted at the whole proceeding, and none more so than the officers of
H. M. Navy, who looked forward with pleasure to a brush with the Yankees, but
who now must hide their diminished heads, while Jonathan may well boast, if not
of his bravery, at least of his superior sagacity.
I fully expect to leave this before a week, and soon to enjoy a long palaver with
our mutual friend, Mr. Forbes. I am most anxious to set about forming a com-
pany to work the mines of Santa Clara. In the event of my succeeding, (of
which I have very little doubt), would you consent to take charge of the whole
concern ? Pray let me know in your next letter. I am also very desirous of
doing something about that grant of land. I will give the Yankees as much an-
noyance as I possibly can in the matter. May I beg of you to write to me by the
very first opportunity to Mexico. Send your letter to me under cover, directed to
Mr. Bankhead. I inclose a letter, which I got for you at Los Angeles, but which
I forgot to deliver when last we met. I shall write to you again when I reach
the city of Mexico. I forgot to mention, that by the last accounts the Americans
were rapidly advancing into the very center of Mexico, and it was even feared
that they would overrun the country, if England or France did not interpose.
The " ilustre sangre Mejicano" seemed to be below zero.
I remain, my dear Mr. Forbes,
Your very sincere friend,
EUGENE MACNAMARA."
In the expression, " I am very desirous of doing something
about that grant of land," he certainly refers to the grant of
the San Joaquin Valley. In this, " I will give the Yankees
as much annoyance as I possibly can in the matter," he ex-
pressed his disposition and that of his friend, the Vice-Consul,
toward the American people in the matter of the quicksilver
mine, as well as in every other regard whatsoever. To the
same era, with the power of attorney from Jose Castro, belong
evidently his petition to the Alcalde for three more pertenencias
in addition to the first one, and the precaution of putting the
mine under British protection. These acts are all in the same
sense and to a common purpose, and were done while Father
Eeal yet had a controlling influence. On the twenty-eighth
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day of November, 1846, at the city of Tepic, Macnamara con-
tracts with. Alexander Forbes for the working of the three per-
tenencias for sixteen years instead of nine. This contract has
yet four years to run. On the seventeenth of December, An-
dres Castillero ratified this contract for the working of the
three pertenencias, at the city of Mexico. Having done this, he
cedes for the sixteen years something, which with the three
pertenencias, he represents as the whole of his property at that
time in and about the mine, viz: two square leagues of land of
which the Supreme Government had made him a concession,
as shown by the official document which he presents to be
copied. After the signature and attestation of this writing,
comes a copy of the present version of the Castillo Lanzas
document, which a Mexican Notary assures us with the solem-
nity of a certificate was the paper offered by Andres Castillero.
We have seen that it was not, and how it was the very different
sort of a Castillo Lanzas document which Walkinshaw shortly
afterward brought up to California and submitted to James
Alex. Forbes for his opinion. We may fairly assume, then,
the seventeenth day of December, 1846, as the date of the forg-
ing of the first false title paper in the case—this Walkinshaw
version of Castillo Lanzas' dispatch to the Governor of Cali-
fornia. On the same day, we have the sale by Castillero to
Alex. Forbes of five of his twelve barras or shares in his mine,
under the writing of partnership of November 2d, 1845, in
which sale occurs the cautious proviso, that it should not be a
bargain unless Forbes should succeed in getting possession
;
which another notarial certificate informs us, was nevertheless
immediately waived, and the money, four thousand dollars,
paid down. In this sale Alex. Forbes is represented by his
friend, Don Francisco Martinez Negrete, in whose house it was
that the Notary afterward saw the money paid.
Whereupon Alex. Forbes writes to James Alex. Forbes,
this letter
:
"Tepic, January 1th, 1841.
James A. Forbes, Esq., California.
My Dear Sir :—I had the pleasure to receive your very obliging letter of the
29th of October last, which chiefly relates to the mine of quicksilver about which
I wrote you at so much length by Mr. Macnamara. I had previous to the receipt
of your letter been iu treaty with D. Andres Castillero, respecting this mine, and
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on the arrival of Mr. Macnaniara with the powers from the other proprietors, the
treaty was much facilitated, and I am now happy to inform you that I have con-
tracted for the " habilitation " of the mine, and have also purchased a part of Mr.
Castillero's 'barras,' all of which will be made known to you by Mr. Walkinshaw,
who goes to California as my attorney and agent for the examination and working
of the mines. Mr. Walkinshaw will wait upon you as soon after his arrival as
possible, and will show you all the documents, and ask your advice and assistance
in carrying out my views.
It is needless for me to say more, than that I count on you as a friend who will
lend your best assistance to bring this negotiation to a good account, and as you
inform me that you are proprietor of two ' barras,' it will be for your interest,
and that of all others concerned, that every means may be used to make the most
of it. I have sent up a small sum of money to make a beginning, and if Mr.
"Walkinshaw is of opinion that the business ought to be carried on to a large
extent, the necessary apparatus will be ordered, and ample funds sent to carry on
the business properly.
I have for the present only sent one hundred and fourteen iron bottles, but I
can get a large quantity in this country when they may be required.
Mr. Walkinshaw will inform you that everything is left open respecting the
interest which he and others may take in this enterprise, and I trust you will also
leave to me the regulation of the affair which must depend on after prospects.
For the present I wish no one to run any risk or to incur any expense but my-
self, which, however, you must be aware will be very considerable ; but if the
mine turns out well there will be sufficient for all.
I, in conclusion, beg leave to recommend most strongly my friend, Mr. Walkin-
shaw, to your best attentions and assistance, and I am sure you will find him
most worthy of your confidence.
I am, my dear sir, yours most sincerely,
ALEX. FORBES."
We have seen that Mr. Walkinshaw did wait upon Mr. Forbes
as soon as he^coukkaeconiplish. his over-land journey from the
south, where Mr. Haileck met him, and that he did ask his ad-
vice and receive it, and what it was. It will be noted that Mr.
Alex. Forbes, in the spring of 1847, first sends up " a small
sum of money to make a beginning," and that everything was
then " left open respecting the interest that he (Walkinshaw),
and others may take in the enterprise."
Whilst Walkinshaw was gone, Jose Castro, constrained to
abandon California, came within reach of Alex. Forbes. The
General was always notorious as a prodigal, and we are not
surprised to find that the foresighted Scotchman easily got pos-
session of his four barras or shares for about three thousand
eight hundred dollars. In each of these acts of sale—executed
of course before the immaculate Mr. Yejar—the property is
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described solely by reference to the writing of partnership of
the second of November, 1845, so often alluded to.
I have already told how, on the return of Walkinshaw from
California, Alex. Forbes went up himselfm tW'WitH-am, how
he explored and doubted for weeks, and finally discovered the
vein. Here is one of his letters to James Alex. Forbes, of con-
temporaneous writing Avith the copying of the Act of Posses-
sion:
"New Almadeit, 19th January, 1848.
My Dear Sir:
I am very much obliged to you for your very prompt attention to the matter in
hand, and return the expediente immediately.
I am much surprised at the result of your assay, and shall try what I have.
It will, of course, be better to say nothing about it, particularly as I have already
written to Monterey that there is no mine, nor does there appear to be any quan-
tity of this kind of stuff. I hope soon to see the Alcalde.
My dear sir, yours truly,
A. FORBES.
James Alex. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara."
This is one of the best letters on record. It contains a whole
history.
We have seen what the Alcalde did, and how the two square
leagues were surveyed.
Alex. Forbes now quarrels with Jas. Alex. Forbes, and the
occasion was the obstinacy of the latter in not letting him have,
on satisfactory terms, the shares of the Eobles which were in
his disposal. The quarrel culminated, (several letters having
passed, as they were both writing men,) just before Alex.
Forbes sailed for Mexico, terminating his first and last ever
memorable visit to Upper California. This was his parting
shot
:
"Monterey, 28 March, 1848.
James A. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara.
My Dear Sir : I have to apologize for not writing you before this, as I promised
I would, respecting the purchase of your shares in the mine of Xew Almaden ; but,
really as your opinion of their value is so widely different from mine, I considered
it almost hopeless to make you any further proposals.
I do not, however, leave this without making the necessary arrangements to
effect that object, and have therefore authorized Mr. Walkinshaw and Manuel
Diaz to wait on you with my final offer for the purchase of those shares.
Were I not already so deeply interested in this negotiation, I would never think
of investing another dollar in it ; but this interest renders it necessary for me to
have the control of all the shares, in order that I may dispose of the whole when-
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ever an opportunity may offer, and save myself from the heavy loss that would en-
sue should it unluckily leak out that in fact the documents procured by Castillero,
in Mexico, as his title to the mine and lands, were all obtained long after the oc-
cupation of California by the Americans.
This unfortunate irregularity cannot be easily repaired, and serious objections
might be made even to the legality of our new Act of Possession.
I need scarcely remind you of the importance of preserving profound secrecy in
all these matters, and in case you do not accept my offer, I hope you will not fail
to send me your power to act for you in any arrangement I may make.
I send you three vols, of the Mechanic and Engineers' Magazine, which I beg
your acceptance of, and I hope you will continue your correspondence as usual
and inform me of what is passing in California.
I am my dear sir, yours, very truly,
ALEX. FORBES."
In their sworn answer filed to the bill for the injunction, the
defendants, Parrott, Halleck, Bolton, Barron and Young, say
this letter was "never written on the 28th day of March, or on
any other day, by the said Alexander Forbes, but that the
same is a forgery." If they mean what they say, they mean
that there is such a paper written by some one other than Al-
exander Forbes, and if so they must have seen it, and should
produce it that others may judge whether it is a forgery or not.
James Alex. Forbes says it was stolen from his carpet-bag, in
his locked chamber, at the Eailroad House in this city, on the
night of the 30th day of June, 1858, on which day he had been
called to this city by the New Almaden Company, and at their
instance given testimony in the U. S. District Court. Birnie,
who is an unassailed witness, swears that in the employment of
Wm. E. Barron, he had on the evening of the 29th, obtained
from Mr. Forbes the privilege of reading this letter, and on the
morning of the 30th had repeated its contents to Barron, who
after hearing all that the letter contained, expressed the
strongest desire to get possession of it, or at least a copy ; and
accordingly that on the evening of the 30th he got the letter
again, made a copy and returned the letter to Mr. Forbes;
further, that on the 1st of July he carried his copy to Wm. B.
Barron who now expressed himself indifferent about it, but
still received it, and paid him for his services which had been
continuous in the pursuit of documents from Mr. Forbes, since
the month of January. In corroboration of the story of Bir-
nie, the New Almaden Company produced the copy which he
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had delivered to Barron, and he remains in every other parti-
cular, to this day uncontradicted. Here is an affidavit made
by Birnie, after having given his testimony more fully in a de-
position :
" AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT BIRNIE.
In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Districts of California, in and for
the Northern District.
The United States of America,
v.
John Parrott,
Henry "W. Halleck,
James R. Bolton,
Wm. E. Barron,
John Voukg, and
Robert Walkinshaw.
- In Equity.
Robert Birnie being duly sworn deposeth and saith, that in January or Febru-
ary last he was employed by "William E. Barron to obtain from James Alexander
Forbes a paper purporting to be a document of title to the mine of New Almaden
to Andres Oastillero, purporting to be an order to the Governor of California to
put Oastillero in possession of the mine, or something of that nature. I made in-
quiry for that document of Mr. J. A. Forbes, and reported to Mr. Barron that I was
unsuccessful in my search for that document. I was also employed by Mr, Bolton
and Mr. Billings to get from James Alex. Forbes any document that would be pre-
judicial to the mine. Mr. Bolton asked me to go and try and get a copy of any
papers which Jas. Alex. Forbes might have. I applied to James Alex. Forbes,
and he informed me that he had papers which were prejudicial to the mine. I re-
ported it to Messrs. Bolton, Billings and Barron. Mr. Bolton and Mr. Billings
said that they would pay liberally for any document that Mr. Forbes might have
in his possession that would be injurious to the mine, and would pay me liberally
for my services. I made proposals to Mr. Forbes for any paper or papers which
he had, prejudicial to the mine. Mr. Forbes objected to have anything to do with
any of the agents of Bolton, Barron & Co. I afterwards got a copy of a letter from
James Alex. Forbes. I made the copy myself. It was a letter directed to Jas.
Alex. Forbes from Alexander Forbes, dated I believe, on the 28th March, 1848,
from Monterey. I made the copy on the 30th day of June, 1858, in a room at
the Railroad House, in San Francisco. I left it with Mr. Barron. A copy of the
same original letter is hereto attached. It is the same as the copy I left with Mr.
Barron. I am acquainted with the handwriting of Alex. Forbes, and the original
letter which I copied as aforesaid, was in his handwriting. I got from Mr. Barron,
the day that I gave that copy, two hundred dollars, and two hundred dollars a few
days afterwards. Mr. Barron afterwards told me that he could explain that letter
away. This was after I gave him the copy. My traveling expenses were also
paid. They were between two and three hundred dollars. I traveled from San
Francisco to Oakland, San Jose and Santa Clara four or five times for Mr. Barron.
The distance is about fifty-four miles. It was about nine o'clock in the morning
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of the 1st July, 1858, that I gave the copy of the letter aforesaid to Mr. Barron.
I had made the copy at about six or seven o'clock on the evening preceding. I
had told Mr. Barron before I made the copy that I had seen the original in this city
in the possession of Mr. Forbes. After I made the copy I gave the original back
to James Alexander Forbes.
KOBBRT BIRNIE."
"Sworn to and subscribed before me this 13th day of September, A. D. 1858.
cutler McAllister,
U. S. Commissioner."
For services, which contained nothing substantial but the
procuring 1^iis copy, and were not in the least troublesome to
himself, Birnie received from Wm. E. Barron about seven hun-
dred dollars. Barron is the only witness needed to prove the
genuineness of the stolen letter, his own oath to the contrary
notwithstanding. If the letter is genuine it is difficult to avoid
the further conclusion, that some one has been guilty of bur-
glary. The title to lands alluded to in the letter was the Wal-
kinskaw version of the Castillo Lanzas document, none other
having yet appeared in California ; the title to the mine was
that Act of Possession which James Alex. Forbes had just
copied. These are the titles which Alexander Forbes says
" were all obtained long after the occupation of California by
the Americans." The new Act of Possession, was that recent-
ly granted by Weekes, of four pertenencias.
It will be borne in mind that the genuineness of every other
letter is admitted by the New Almaden Company.
One year now elapses. We come down to April, 1849. On
the 9th, Alexander Forbes writes to James Alex. Forbes, to
inform him that he had resigned the chief direction of New
Almaden affairs, to younger hands, as he touchingly observes,
but not to abler, as events have proved. The successors are
the great house of Barron, Forbes & Co., of Tepic. They as-
sure Mr. James Alex. Forbes that the mine will now be work-
ed energetically, "to the utmost of its capabilities of produc-
tion," as will be seen in the following letter, written on assum-
ing the command
:
" Tepic, 11th April, 1849.
Jas. Alex. Forbes, Esq., San Francisco.
Dear Sir :—We beg leave to refer you to Mr. Alex. Forbes' letter of the 9th
inst., respecting the arrangement of the affairs of the mine of New Almaden, and
beg to recommend that negotiation to your best care and management until we
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can forward the necessary instructions for your government. Tou may now rely
on this mine being worked to the utmost of its capabilities of production and sale
of quicksilver on the arrival of the apparatus, and we hope to make up for the delay
which circumstances have hitherto prevented this important concern from being
productive. We shall soon have the pleasure of sending you a list of the company
of which the ' habilitadores ' are composed. The House of Tecker, Torre & Co.,
of Mexico and Mazaltan, and our own are chiefly interested, and as Don Tsidoro
de la Torre has gone to Europe, he will concert with Mr. Barron everything which
can tend to the successful development of this enterprise.
"We are, dear sir, your most obedient servants,
BARRON, FORBES & CO."
James Alex. Forbes, upon the receipt of the above, goes
down to Tepic. There this letter is put into his hands by the
new rulers
:
"Tepic, 20th May, 1849.
James A. Forbes, Esq.
Sir:—From certain circumstances which you have communicated to us, it may
be necessary to purchase some lands in the vicinity of the mine and hacienda of
New Almaden, California. We hereby empower you to make such purchases as
may be necessary to secure the possession of this mine and hacienda, or to effect
such other arrangements as you may deem necessary for that purpose. The prices
of such purchase not to exceed five thousand dollars, without consulting with us
upon the subject.
We are, sir, Tour most ob't serv'ts,
BARRON, FORBES & CO."
The land intended was part of the rancho of Berrejesa.
Why it should be necessary to purchase any land to secure the
mine and hacienda is not explained. A year before they had
surveyed and marked out two square leagues of land, includ-
ing everything that could be wanted in every direction. But
as they were going to purchase their own property, we ought
not to be surprised at the moderate limit of five thousand dol-
lars.
Whilst he was at Tepic, James Alex. Forbes wrote and de-
livered to Alexander Forbes, for Andres Castillero, a memo-
randum, the translation of a copy of which is as follows
:
" (Very private.)
MEMORANDUM
Of the Documents which Don Andres Castillero will have to procure in Mexico.
1. The full approbation and ratification by the Supreme Government of all the
acts of the Alcalde of the District of San Jose, in Upper California—in the pos-
session given by the said officer of the quicksilver mine situated in his jurisdiction,
to Don Andres Castillero, December, 1845.
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2. An absolute and unconditional title of two leagues of land to Don Andres
Castillero, specifying the following boundaries : On the north by the lands of the
Eancho of San Vicente, and Los Capitancillos ; on the east, south and west by
vacant land, or vacant highlands.
3. The dates of these documents will have to be arranged by Don Andres ; the
testimony of them taken in due form, and besides certified to by the American
Minister in Mexico, and transmitted to California as soon as possible.
Tepio, May 27, 1849.
[Indorsed.] Copy of Memorandum left with Alexander Forbes for Castillero,
May 27, 1849."
The genuineness of this document is admitted, also the fact
stated in the indorsement. Comment is impossible.
With a power of attorney to take the management of Jhe
mine out of the hands of Walkinshaw, James Alex. Forbes
now returned immediately to California. His attempt to use
this authority, in August, caused the breach with Walkinshaw
and caused him to rush vehemently into law, as I have stated.
Whilst this danger was hardly yet passed, Forbes wrote this
letter to Wm. Forbes, of the house of Barron, Forbes & Co.,
to " again call your attention to the importance of my sugges-
tions relative to perfecting the title of the mine of Almaden," and
wishes to impress upon the Tepic mind " the vast importance
of securing from the Supreme Government of Mexico the doc-
uments comprised in the memorandum left with Mr. Alex.
Forbes."
"(Private.)
San Francisco, Oct. 28th, 1849.
William Forbes, Esq., Tepic.
My Dear Sir:—I have been detained in this place until the present moment
occupied in completing the arrangements, explained to B., F. & Co., under the date
of yesterday, having raised the sum of twenty-seven thousand one hundred and
eighty dollars and sixty-seven and one-quarter cents, from Probst S. & Co. and
Webster, alone.
I must again call your attention to the importance of my suggestions, relative
to the perfecting the title of the mine of New Almaden, and without entering now
into the particulars, already explained to yourself and to Mr. Alex. Forbes, ver-
bally, I desire only to impress upon your mind the vast importance of securing
from,the Supreme Government of Mexico the documents comprised in the memo-
randum, left with Mr. Alexander Forbes, when I was in Tepic, for Castillero. By
my own letters of this conveyance, you will be informed of all the particulars of
the transactions that have occurred recently in the affairs of the mine, and you
will see the risk in which this valuable property is placed by the delay that has
occurred in the acquisition of the documents referred to.
I remain my dear sir, yours sincerely,
JAMES ALEX. FORBES."
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And also this letter to Mr. Alex. Forbes on the same subject,
more urgent and graphic, and more specific, as to Walkin-
shaw :
" (Private.)
Santa Clara, Oct. 30 th, 1849.
Alexander Forbes, Esq.
My Dear Sir;—By my letters to yourself and to B., P. & Co., from the 22d to
this day, you will be informed of the great danger in which the mine of New Al-
maden has been thrown, and the disagreeable and vexatious proceedings caused
me by Mr. Walkinshaw and his associates in their denunciation of the mine for
abandonment; you will, however, have the satisfaction of knowing, also, that I
am to be reinstated in the possession of that property, both mine and hacienda,
in two or three days hence, by judicial process.
Although I feel much gratified at my successful defense of the case, yet I am
extremely apprehensive of further difficulties in the event that those parties should
succeed in purchasing the part of the land of the Berreyesas that they have offered
to purchase, (which embraces the mine and hacienda,) for twenty-five thousand
dollars—-just five times the amount you all authorized me to pay for the same
identical tract.
Figure to yourself the position of the affair of the mine, if I do not strike
boldly at our opponents by purchasing the land at a higher price than they have
offered to pay for it, and by thus frustrating their plans, secure the mine and haci-
enda from further risk.
You will now readily perceive the great importance of my advice to you to
purchase a part both of the lands of Cook and of the Berreyesas. Tou were of
the opinion that this measure would not be necessary, in view of the supposed
facility of getting the title to the mine perfected in Mexico.
It is now more than five months since it was decided that Castillero should pro-
cure the necessary documents in that city, and that they should be sent to me as
soon as possible. On the one hand, I depend upon the precarious and illegal pos-
session of the mine granted by the Alcalde of this District to Castillero, who was
in reality the judge of the quantity of land given by the Alcalde, and on the
other side, I am attacked by the purchasers of the same land, declared by Castil-
lero, himself, to comprise the mine. In the absence of the all important docu-
ment of the ratification of the possession so given, I am compelled to purchase the
part of the land of the Berreyesas which Walkinshaw and his party have offered
to purchase, and you must not be surprised if I shall go far beyond the price that
they have offered, because it is the only mode of securing the title to the mine
and hacienda, for if Castillero should fail in getting the desired documents from
Mexico, it is the sole mode of safety of this property.
I shall endeavor to procrastinate, as far as possible, this purchase, and, more-
over, to frustrate all the plans of Walkinshaw and his associates for accomplishing
their purchase, and I do entreat you to use every effort to send me the document
of the ratification of possession of the mine, and the grant of land thereon, at the
very earliest opportunity, properly authenticated and certified, as explained by me
when I was in Tepic. In one of my precited letters I requested you to send me
a certified power of attorney from B., F. & Co. to you, authorizing you as the rep-
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resentative of the Compania de Abio, to appoint other attorneys in fact under
you.
The object of this is to be able to refute the allegations of the lawyer of Walkin-
shaw, that you had no power to authorize me to take charge of the mine.
I remain, my dear sir,
Tours truly,
JAS. ALEX FOKBES."
Then Barron, Forbes & Co. wrote to James Alex. Forbes,
thanking him warmly for his able and successful conduct of
the war with Walkinshaw. They send him a notarial copy
(doubtless from Mr. Vejar
—
possibly the very one now on file
as an exhibit with Yejar's certificate attached) of a forged grant
to Castillero, which they think will be cheaper than buying a
title. This letter, like others of the same correspondence, is in
the handwriting of Wm. E. Barron, who was then confidential
clerk in the establishment at Tepic. Here it is in full
:
" Tepic, 30th November, 1849.
James A. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara.
Dear Sir :—We had the pleasure to write to you on the 13th inst., by the steam-
er ' Oregon,' the chief object of which was to inclose a notarial copy of the grant
of land by the Mexican Government to Castillero, and which we hope has come
safe to hand.
We have perused with much interest and attention the whole of your letters
and documents received by the steamers, the ' California' and 'Panama,' and we
beg you will excuse us from minutely entering into a reply to those valuable and
important papers. Suffice it to say, that we not only approve of your proceed-
ing?, but have to give you our most sincere thanks for the most energetic and able
conduct in the whole affair, and we hope to request that you will not hesitate
continuing to take such steps as may seem to you fit for securing the mine from
all attempts made by evil-minded persons to impede its being freely worked for
its legitimate owners.
We are glad to find that you had not been obliged to purchase Berreyesa's land.
This is certainly a most important point, and we trust that the document sent will
be of great consequence in that respect ; but you will of course take care that no
risk is run, and you will do in this affair as your best judgment shall direct you,
keeping in view that at all hazard and at whatever cost the property of the mine
must be secured. Castillero we expect will soon be here from Lower California,
and if anything can be done in Mexico, he is the fittest person to procure what
may be wanted. It is incredible that Mr. Walkinshaw should lend himself to such
proceedings when he considered the very large capital invested in this enterprise,
and when he well knows that by the mining laws no ' denuncio ' could possibly
be heard under the circumstances in which this mine has been occupied. We trust,
however, that these vile machinations will by your active proceedings be put an
end to.
We hope you will, by the time this reaches you, have got up at least a part of
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the apparatus, and that some of it will be soon at work. The price of quicksilver
here still keeps up, and the supply as yet not abundant. Every body writes of
the very high price it bears in California, and we have no doubt you will in a
short time be able to supply the demand and to send us the surplus to San Bias.
Trusting to the continuance of your best exertions in behalf of all concerned in
the mine of New Almaden.
"We are, dear sir,
Your most obd't servants,
BARRON, FORBES & CO.
Note.—Castillero we expect will soon be here from Lower California, and if
anything can be done in Mexico he is the fittest person."
Alexander Forbes writes to James Alex. Forbes—two Cas-
tillo Lanzas documents in view at once—and some instructions
in sleight of band are given
:
" (Very private.)
Tepic, 1st Dec, 1849.
James A. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara
—
My Dear Sir :—The document sent up to you by the last steamer for the grant
of the lands to D. Andres Castillero, was, by mistake, not the one meant to be
sent. I find now that the proper one was registered by me in Monterey, and the
original deposited there.
The one sent you was directed at foot to the Governor of California, and the one
deposited at Monterey was directed to D. Andres Castillero. The difference is,
that by one the delivery by the Governor was perhaps necessary to make the
grant valid, whereas the other, being addressed directly to D. Andres, did not
require that formality, nor was any other proceeding necessary; thus making it a
'
better document than a greater part of the other titles for lands in California. I
fear you may have made use of the notarial copy sent ; if not, you will of course
apply for the copy of the one at Monterey. I, however, have hopes that your well
known cleverness will have enabled you to find out this mistake, which would
show itself, if you had applied for the document from Monterey ; and at all events,
you may be enabled to withdraw the one sent and substitute the other. Either,
however, I take to be as good as the usual California titles, few of which have
been officially delivered or sanctioned by the local authorities.
Another difficulty, however, occurs. A document was made out in the city of
Mexico when I purchased the bars from Castillero, for the purpose of securing his
consent and approval of the contract of habilitation ; in this document is also in-
serted the grant of the two sitios, being an exact copy of what has been sent
you, and directed to the Governor. All this will show you how that matter stands.
And as I think this document may be of use to you, I send a copy of the whole,
leaving you to your own good judgment to make such use of this document and
of what I communicate, as you shall think proper.
I shall send the document alluded to in a separate cover to Probst, Smith & Co.
I am, my dear sir,
Yours, very truly,
ALEX. FORBES."
TO
This letter is supposed to contain the first introduction into
California of the useful theory of lodging and finding public
documents.
On the 7th of January, 1850, Alexander Forbes writes an-
other letter to James Alex. Forbes. It is long, but the interest
is confined to the following extract
:
" By the tenor of your letters, I have hopes that you will have got rid of the
villainous proceedings of Walkinshaw and his party.
I hope the document which now goes up, (the habilitation, etc.) will be useful.
Castillero is still somewhere in Lower California."
And again on the 3d of February, 1850
:
" Castillero has returned. * * * * I have every reason to believe that the
documents you mention will be found in the city of Mexico, and as Mr. Castillero
will return there, they will no doubt be procured; but we are at some loss to know
what is exactly wanted, and I beg you will by the next steamer give a sketch of
the documents you allude to, particularly a description of the limits of the grant.
I think you must not have received information sent you of the existence of the
grant of the two sitios directly to Castillero, and registered at Monterey ; nor am
I sure that will mend the matter. In a few days, however, we will hear again from
you, and act accordingly.
One last-resort I will mention—and it is with great reluctance that I do so
—
which is, that if the Berreyesas were unreasonable and intractable, or insist on the
extension of their lands to our hacienda, the company will be justified in promo-
ting the invalidation of their own rancho. * * * This I throw out for your
consideration ; and I should think these people would do themselves no good in oppos-
ing you. We think at present it may be the best plan to get an authenticated copy
of the approval of the Mexican Government of the grant of three thousand varas
given by the Alcalde on giving possession of the mine, as a doubt may be started
as to whether the Alcalde, acting as the Juez de Mineria, (Judge of Mining,) had
a right to make this grant
;
yet, if approved before the possession of the country by
the Americans, there could be no doubt on the subject. This takes in our hacien-
da, and unless opposed by the Berreyesas, would, I should think, settle the question.
Castillero says such approval was given, and that on his arrival in Mexico he will
procure a judicial copy of it. This is the plan we shall adopt if we hear nothing
from you to alter this resolution. Since writing the foregoing, I have looked over
your private letter to Mr. Forbes, dated 18th October, and find you state the limits
or boundaries, as follows
:
The boundaries must be expressed as joining on the north and north-west by
lands of the Ranchos de San Vicente and de Los Capitancillos, and on the east,
south and west by Serrania or ' tierras baldias.
'
Castillero is not certain of accomplishing this latter plan, and thinks the first,
that is, the three thousand varas, the best."
James Alex. Forbes writes to Alex. Forbes, expressing his
dissatisfaction with Castillero, and repeats his memorandum of
nthe 27th May, 1849, making it clearer, by adding these words
that I underscore : " Both these documents to be of the proper
date, and placed in the proper governmental custody in Mexico."
Here is the letter in full
:
" (Private.)
New Almaden, Feb. 26, 1850.
Alexander Forbes, Esq.
My Dear Sir:—Tour favor of the 3d instant, came duly to hand, and in answer
to that part of it relating to the documents sent up to me in Nov., serving as titles
to the property, I will again address you ' por seperado.'
I really did have more faith in the tact and ability of Castillero, to perceive the
important object set forth in my memorandum of what was to be done nine months
ago in Mexico by that eccentric individual, and that with the powerful influence
he was to have exercised, by the efficient aid that was to be lent him, he would
meet with no obstacle to the attainment of the important documents explained in
that memorandum. But Castillero has deceived himself, for he thought that
boundaries were not necessary, as I shall presently show you. He succeeded in
obtaining the grant of two sitios to himself in the mining possession in Santa
Clara while that very act of possession declares that the mine is situated on the
lands of Jose R. Berreyesa, five leagues distant from Santa Clara, and you will at
once perceive that such a discrepancy would not fail to attract the attention of the
TJ. S. Land Commissioners and to put the case of the mine in great risk in the judi-
cial ordeal to which its title will be subjected. *
"Without troubling you with what I have so many times written and explained
to you verbally on the importance of the acquisition of the document, I will only
say now what it must be and it is this:
1. A full and complete ratification of all the acts of the Alcalde of this jurisdic-
tion in the possession of the mine.
2. A full and unconditional grant to Castillero of two sitios of land, covering
that mining possession, expressing the boundaries stated by me in the memoran-
dum I left with you in Tepic. Both these documents to be of the proper date,
and placed in the proper governmental custody in Mexico. And
3. The necessary certified copies of them, duly authenticated by the American
Minister in that capital, taken and sent to me at the earliest possible moment.
Tou will receive my advice of the 19th inst., regarding my "views of not sup-
plying W. with any quicksilver.
Tours sincerely,
JAS. ALEX. FORBES."
Barron, Forbes & Co. wrote to Jas. Alex. Forbes, of date,
Tepic, March 2, 1850, to say that Mr. De La Torre, one of the
partners of the New Almaden Company, after consulting with
Mr. Barron, had consented to go up " to arrange respecting the
future operations of this enterprise." Also, that " Mr. Barron
and Don Andres Castillero, are about to proceed to the city of
Mexico and will attend to what you have recommended?
72
Then Alex. Forbes writes, Tepic, 1st March, 1850, to the
same person, that " Mr. Barron and Castillero have gone off to
Mexico and I wrote them to-day respecting the document you
know of, which if possible will be procured. * * *
Let us have quicksilver and all will be well."
The same to the same. " Tepic, 7th April 1850. Mr. Bar-
ron and Castillero have arrived in Mexico and have every pros-
pect offinding the documents you are aware of and which will
of course be forwarded as soon as possible."
They did find them just sixteen days afterward, as we dis-
cover from the following certificate
:
" IT IS A COPT.
Mexico, April 23, 1850. 0. MONASTERIO."
Which is appended to each and every of the separate writ-
ings which made up Exhibit C, which annexed to the petition
of Andres Castillero was filed before the U. S. Board of Land
Commissioners on the 30th day of September, A. D. 1852.
After this there are other letters, but they decline in interest.
" (Private!)
Tepic, 6th June, 1850.
James A. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara.
My Dear Sir:—I had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 28th of April, hy
the steamer, but of course not in time to reply by the one from Panama, which
arrived the day after that from San Francisco.
I remark what you say of Dr. Tobin and the cylinders, which has caused me
some uneasiness, and I wait with anxiety to know how those he is putting up
himself will succeed, which we expect to do by the steamer which ought to ar-
rive at San Bias on the 10th inst.
I find that it has been deemed necessary to appoint an American citizen as mana-
ger of the mine, and am most happy to know that this meets with your approbation.
This approval on your part, I am quite sure will be estimated as it deserves, and
shows to those interested in this enterprise, that you do not hesitate to sacrifice
your own private interests for the general benefit of the concern. For my own
part, I feel most grateful and highly obliged, and the members of the house of
Barron, Forbes & Co. express strongly the same feeling.
We are all convinced that whoever may be in the management of the New Al-
maden will receive the assistance of your knowledge and experience, and the
company and proprietors cannot fail to be sensible of your services. It gives me
great pleasure to hear from yourself as well as from M. La Torre, that the closest
friendship had existed between you, and that both were animated by the same
desire of making the mine productive. I had the pleasure to know Mr. Halleck
at Monterey, and I think a better selection could not have been made. I think
he is a gentleman with whom you will be much satisfied as manager of the mine,
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and who I have no doubt will be glad to avail himself of your experience in
whatever may be new to him.
I am very happy to hear that Mr. Walkinshaw has been settled with, and that
all annoyance from that or any other quarter has ceased.
I shall avoid saying anything respecting the Berreyesa affair till the letters by
the steamer come to hand, which will no doubt confirm the arrangement between
them and Mr. La Torre.
I am, my dear sir,
Tours truly,
A. FORBES."
We gather that they have no longer use for the man who
sketched their title for them as far back as May 5th, 1847, and
that James Alex. Forbes is to be discharged, and Mr. Halleck
to be honored with the succession, because " it has been deemed
necessary to appoint an American citizen as manager of the
mine." Mr. Alex. Forbes says, "I had the pleasure to know
Mr. Halleck at Monterey, and I think a better selection could
not have been made." This was when Mr. Halleck was Secre-
tary of State, in the days of the military government of Cali-
fornia.
The following shows the amiable feelings of the New Alma-
den Company toward their former friend, but more recent
adversary, the late Judge of the U. S. District Court for the
southern district of California ; and also gives us the results of
Mr. Eustace Barron's researches into California land titles :
"Tepic, 10th January, 1851.
J. A. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara.
My Dear Sir:—I was duly favored with your obliging letters of the 12th and
29th of Nov., in which you mention that I had stated some disappointment by
your not writing, and allude to some other matters I have no recollection of. I
have always reckoned upon you as a friend, and am well convinced that you have
every disposition to promote the interests of the mining negotiation as much as in
your power, which William Barron confirms in his late letters to the house.
We have nothing to fear from the lawyer Jones should he come here, but I
understand he has gone to the Sandwich Islands, and is likely to make a journey
to the other world. Mr. Barron has caused a most minute examination to be made
in the archives in the city of Mexico, the result of which has been, that neither
Alvarado nor Micheltorena were authorized to grant titles for lands in California,
nor does there appear to have been any approval or confirmation of such grants
as they took upon themselves to grant—so that the title to Berreyesa's land, either
by Alvarado or Micheltorena, if opposition is made, is valueless.
This being the ca3e, few of the California titles would be good if determined by
the vigorous application of the Mexican law. Mr. Barron has procured docu-
ments to confirm this view of the case, but we have resolved not to make use of
u
such documents except in our own defense, as we do not wish to injure any one
;
but in the case of the Berreyesas we are compelled to use all means in our power
to counteract their proceedings or those of their abettors if they persist in their
late proceedings.
If I was not an interested party I would recommend to them to secure their
rancho by silence, for I am well assured that by adopting hostile measures against
us they may lose it altogether. The Rothschilds have a large quantity of quick-
silver on hand, and the miners thought that by competition between them and
New Almaden it might come down greatly in price, and kept off from purchasing,
but an agreement has been come to between both parties, by which the competi-
tion is done away with, and the price will be maintained at a fair rate.
In consequence however of the expectations of the miners, few sales have been
made, and little of the proceeds of sales realized, but from the arrangement alluded
to it is hoped that the sales will soon be considerable. You will find by B., F. &
Co.'s letter that your wishes have been complied with in debiting you with the
one thousand seven hundred dollars in the account of your share of the sales of
quicksilver. With best respects to Mrs. Forbes and your family.
I am, my dear sir, yours very truly,
ALEX. FORBES."
This closes my inquiry.
The New Almaden title without papers is a naked occupancy
in its inception. Another Indian might have entered the cave
and dug by the side of the first ; another operator with try-
pots might have set himself down by the creek, and extracted
quicksilver within three feet of Chard. There was no mining
right of square miles in extent, nor colonization right of square
leagues in extent, nor any other known quality or color of right
to any portion of land, which furnished subject matter for the
operation of guarantees of title. Father Real, Chard and his
Indians had the possession which travelers hold of the spot on
which they encamp for the night, and on the morrow may be
occupied by the next wayfarer. It was nothing.
The possession of Walkinshaw and Forbes was a fraudulent
seizure by alien enemies in time of war, and of a nature which
could confer no right if it had been taken with honest intent
by an American citizen.
The title papers, valueless if genuine, are all forgeries, exe-
cuted at different times and places, of which the forgers were
the founders of the New Almaden Company. Eustace Barron,
one of these, is reputed to be the largest shareholder, and from
the city of Mexico is now directing the maneuvers of the asso-
ciation in the pending controversy with the United States.
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Under these pretenses, the New Almaden Company have in
eight years, taken from the soil of California eight millions of
dollars.
The members of the New Almaden Company are Eustace
Barron of the city of Mexico, Martinez Escandon, E. W. Bar-
ron, Wm. Forbes, the heirs of Walkinshaw, John Parrott, J.
E. Bolton, Wm. E. Barron, and it is said, some English and
South American mercantile houses. All of these persons are
non-resident aliens but three—which three assert between them
ownership to but two twenty-fourths in the New Almaden
Mine.
Wm. E. Barron is an English-Mexican and resides in San
Francisco. He is a partner in the house of Bolton, Barron &
Co., who act as agents for the New Almaden Company in com-
mercial business ; he is the local manager of the prosecution
of the company's claim before the United States District Court.
John Parrott was born an American, but has passed in trade
in Mexico, those years of his life in which the commercial
character receives its strongest impressions. He has also held
the office of American Consul at Mazaltan. It may be other-
wise, in other parts of the world, and Mr. Parrott may have
been an exception there, but the experience of too many luck-
less Americans has taught us that on the western coast of
Mexico the trader who has the keeping of our consular flag re-
gards it merely as a part of his trading capital. The mode of
making it available is very simple. It is only to sacrifice his
countrymen to his customers.
James B. Bolton, also, was born an American, received his
education in Mexico, and once in the absence of Parrott acted
as American Consul at Mazaltan. He is supposed to be the
man whose name occurs in the reports of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Yecker, Torre & Co., against
Captain Montgomery of the American Navy, for unlawfully
capturing the American ship Admittance during the Mexican
war. The ship was condemned for trading with the enemy.
In the evidence, is a letter from the house of Yecker, Torre &
Co., to the Master of the Admittance, persuading him to go
into San Bias, and assuring him, on the word of Mr. Bolton,
that he could do so without risk. If this was true, Mr. Bolton
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was encouraging the trade of the enemy, giving him aid and
comfort ; and engaged in that which contained all the elements
of treason and for which a man ought in justice to be hung.
Such is the New Almaden case—such the New Almaden
Company, who plead improvements on land to justify a breach
of public morals ; and because they are arrested in a career of
profitable fraud, stun the public ear with their clamorous
lamentations, and endeavor to stifle the Judges with newspa-
pers.
The public will render an unhesitating judgment against the
criminals, unembarrassed for a moment by the fact that the
crime lies at the bottom of a great trade, and with its punish-
ment may be seriously involved the chief material interest of
the State.
The public may then turn the opportunity to its profit. It
may dwell upon the fabulous wealth which has been the prize,
the eager greed with which it has been pursued, the singularity
of the plan adopted to secure it
—
yet the gross inadequacy of
the measures and grosser ignorance manifested in their execu-
tion—and from this veritable Californian prodigy, learn the cha-
otic nature of the times through which we have been passing.
And the Government of the United States may learn the in-
efficiency of its machinery which did not put a stop to this
plunder until it had amounted to more than half the sum stip-
ulated in the treaty as the price of California and New Mexico
together. Let it learn, also, its relations to that State at whose
capital this knot of conspirators make their head-quarters, all
of whose public offices they assuredly use at pleasure, and the
very highest of whose functionaries, they say, are devoted to
their service.
My business, is not to moralize. I have sought ' fairly to re-
late and explain the New Almaden case, which the newspaper
commentators seem unwilling or unable to do. Much I have
left out on both sides, which I deemed not material to an un-
derstanding of its merits. If I have rendered the case intelli-
gible, I have accomplished all my purpose. In any event, I
shall recur to it no more.
BURGHER.
San Fbancisco, January 3, 1859.
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NOTE.
The following Argument is printed from the notes of Messrs. Sumner & Cutter,
who reported it. It is due to Me. Benjamin to say that he had no opportunity
to revise it before leaving California.
AEGUMENT.
Wednesday, Oct. 24th, 1860.
Mr. Benjamin said :
—
May it please your Honors : It seems to me convenient in
opening this case, to ask your Honors to recur in memory to
the condition of the subject-matter of this litigation at the date
of the breaking out of hostilities between the United States
and Mexico in the year 1846. I desire first to call the atten-
tion of the Court to so much of the testimony contained in the
Transcript of this case, as will satisfy the Court in relation to
the knowledge that had been acquired by the officers of the
Government of the United States in relation to the fact of the
possession and ownership of this mine prior to the breaking
out of the war.
On the 13th of May, 1846, the Congress of the United States
declared by resolution, and the President of the United States
announced by proclamation to the people of the United States,
that war existed between the United States and Mexico, by
virtue of the commencement of actual hostilities on the part
of the Eepublic of Mexico.
On the 7th of July, 1846, according to the established juris-
prudence of the Supreme Court of the United States, recog-
nized also by Congress, the conquest of California was effected
by proclamation made of that conquest by the forces of the
United States.
On the 2d of February, 1848, the war was closed by the
Treaty of Peace ; and by that treaty California, previously a
conquered province, became a ceded territory
—
part of the do-
main of the United States.
Prior to the breaking out of the war, the Government of the
United States had public officers in California, whose duty it
was to report to the Departments at "Washington the condition
of things as they existed in this (then) Mexican Province. I
propose to call the attention of the Court to what was known
by the Government of the United States, through its officers,
in relation to the possession and ownership of this mine early
in the year 1846, and prior to the breaking out of any hostili-
ties whatever.
On page 2678 of this record, we have the testimony of a
man of the highest distinction, whose name is known not only
from one end of our own Eepublic to the other, but to every
civilized nation on earth. I refer to John 0. Fremont. He
had crossed the continent under the orders of his Government.
He came hither for the purpose of ascertaining the most direct
route across the continent, He came for the purpose of exam-
ining the country to which the jurisdiction of the United States
then extended, and of ascertaining its adaptation to the purpo-
ses of habitation, occupation, cultivation, and its general value
to the country.
In January, 1846, in pursuit of information to be commu-
nicated to his Government in relation to everything that could
interest his country, Capt. Fremont visited the New Almaden
Mine ; and there he found it in the possession of Andres Cas-
tillero, as owner. He found Castillero working the mine. He
saw the piles of ore. He became impressed with the great
value of the mine. He, and a gentleman who accompanied
him, each spoke to Castillero in relation to the purchase of the
mine, and the propositions of both were by Castillero coldly
received. I state this merely en passant, in answer to a remark
which fell from the lips of the special counsel for the Govern-
ment the other clay : that Andres Castillero had made a false
statement to the Government of Mexico, when he returned and
said to the Junta that foreign houses wanted an interest in
this mine, but that he had reserved all of its benefits for his
own country.
Fremont in his examination says
:
I think no one went with me to the mine but Hinckley ; ar-
rived there, I should think, about noon ; at the mine Capt. Hinck-
ley introduced me to Mr. Castillero, the owner of the mine, who
showed me about ; showed me the excavation from whence he
had the ore, and showed me two or three heaps of ore, and gave
me some specimens, some of which I brought away. Before vis-
iting the mine, Captain Leidesdorffand myselfhad had some con-
versation together with regard to purchasing the mine. When
there, I spoke slightly with Castillero on the subject, and Mr.
Hinckley also said something to him, at greater length, tending
to the same end ; but Castillero was not at all disposed to con-
verse about selling. At this time, I think Castillero was en-
gaged in building a house below in the valley, to be used for
the occupation of himself or workmen.
He also went through the process roughly of extracting the
quicksilver from the ore, by putting some on red-hot iron and
collecting the fumes in a cup. We remained there perhaps
some two hours."
This is not the whole of the statement of the visit of Capt.
Fremont.
Captain Fremont on that visit acquired information which he
subsequently put to practical purposes. He had a conversa-
tion with Castillero about the means by which mines were ac-
quired. Castillero told him that he had acquired his mine by
denouncement. He told him what a denouncement was ; how
it was made ; and gave Fremont the information upon which
that American officer, years later, denounced the mines upon
his own property in Mariposa.
I know not whether this testimony is to be contradicted or
not. I have listened to the arguments upon the other side of
this case until sometimes I was tempted to doubt my own exist-
ence by reason of the persistent denial of facts that appear to
me plain as the noon-day sun. We have not been favored by
any comment by brother Randolph upon this testimony of
Captain Fremont ; and I am not aware whether his testimony
is to be attacked or his character impeached—I hope neither.
Me. Randolph, (interrupting.) No, sir. Col. Fremont is
my personal friend.
Mr. Benjamin.—He is your personal friend. Very well,
then. May it please the Court, we have got some common start-
ing point now. We have got one witness, whom we can all
believe. Captain Fremont is to be believed ! That was the
condition of the mine then.
6But these things rest not upon the frail tenure of human
memory. Captain Fremont was not the only officer of the
United States that knew of the existence of this mine. There
was another active, intelligent, competent public officer, whose
duty it was, under instructions of the Government, to examine
into and report upon these things.
Thomas O. Larkin, United States Consul, did examine, did
make a report ; and that report is spread upon this Transcript,
as taken from the archives of the Government of the United
States in the City of Washington.
Your Honors will find on page 2657, extracts from the cor-
respondence in the Department of State, certified by Lewis
Cass. This certificate bears date 28th November, 1859. The
documents there presented are mere extracts from letters which
your Honors will find at length on page 2669, and following.
I read from a letter addressed by Thomas 0. Larkin to James
Buchanan, Secretary of State
:
Consulate of the United States of America, )
Monterey, California, May 4th, 1846.
j
Sm : The undersigned has the honor to forward to the De-
partment, the following information respecting the mines of
California, most of them discovered within six or nine months
;
for many years previous to this the inhabitants have supposed
the places in question contained metal of some kind. Ninety
miles (by sea) south of San Diego, there are some very extens-
ive copper mines, belonging to Don Juan Bandini ; the under-
signed is informed by D. Jose Kafael Gonzales, that on his
rancho, sixty or eighty miles south of Monterey, there are coal
mines ; at San Pablo, in the Bay of San Francisco, there are
others. At the Mission of San Juan, twenty-five miles north
of Monterey, there are sulphur beds, or mines ; fifty to eighty
miles north of Monterey, there is said to be several silver
mines. There are several places throughout California where
the people obtain a bituminous pitch to cover the roofs of their
houses ; some make a floor of it by mixing earth with it. At
these places, rabbits, squirrels and birds often get half-buried
in the pitch, and some die ; even horses and horned cattle are
lost there. A few miles north of Santa Barbara, the sea for
several miles upon the coast is colored by the pitch oozing from
the banks. Five or six miles from the town of San Jose", and
near the Mission of Santa Clara, there are mountains with veins
of quicksilver ore, discovered by Don Andres Castillero, of
Mexico, in 1845, which the undersigned has twice seen produce
twenty per cent, of pure quicksilver, by simply putting the
pounded rock in an old gun-barrel, one end placed in the fire,
the other end in a pot of water for the vapor to fall into, which
immediately becomes condensed ; the metal was then strained
through a silk handkerchief. The red ore produces far better
than the yellow. There appears no end to the production of
the metal from these mountains. Working of quicksilver is
but now commenced under great disadvantages from not hav-
ing any of the materials generally used in extracting that metal.
So, then, prior to the declaration of war this mine was not
only possessed but it was owned, as the Government of the
United States was informed, by a Mexican. And it was not
only so owned, but it was worked, although the working was
imperfect. The Consul had twice seen the work. He describes
it. The accuracy of the description is unchallenged. The fact
is not controverted. It comes from under the very eye of the
Attorney General [Black], who hoped that it would be impos-
sible for us to get our proofs in this case.
This is not all that is contained in this letter. The letter
tells your Honors what the laws and customs of Mexico were
understood to be in California at that time, in relation to the
acquiring of mines. Mr. Larkin goes on to say
:
By the laws and customs of Mexico, respecting mining, every
person or company, foreign or native, can present themselves
to the nearest authorities- and denounce any unworked mine
;
the authorities will then, after the proper formalities, put the
denouncer in possession of a certain part of it, or all, which is,
I believe, according to its extent ; the possessor must hereafter
occupy and work his mine, or some other may denounce against
him
; in all cases the Government claims a certain proportion
of the products ; up to the present time there are few or no
persons in California with sufficient energy and capital to carry
on mining, although a Mexican officer of the army, a padre and
a native of New York are, on a very small scale, extracting
quicksilver from the San Jose" mine.
Now, who was this " Mexican officer "? "Who was this
"Padre "? Who was this "native of New York"? The Mex-
ican officer was Andres Castillero. The padre was Padre Eeal.
The native of New York was Chard. And we make our ac-
8knowledgments on this, as we shall have occasion to do in sev-
eral other instances, to the astute and persevering special counsel
for the Government, who brought out the fact from Chard on
his cross-examination, that he was a native ofNew York ; thus
making his testimony correspond precisely with the archives
of the United States Consul at Monterey, which at that time
we did not have in our power.
Then, may it please your Honors, without reference to
another syllable of testimony in this case, I have secured
through our Government officers and Government archives,
conclusive proof of the fact that so far as the Government of
the United States was concerned, it had not merely the con-
structive notice which the law would imply, but it had actual
notice, brought home to it prior to the declaration of war, that
this mine was private property, claimed, possessed and worked
by private owners.
But this is not all. From all parts of the world the evidence
of the facts sought to be controverted in this case rises up be-
fore us. From the distant Sandwich Islands comes back the
echo, at that date, of this discovery and ownership, and of the
means by which the ownership was acquired.
At page 2223, your Honors have an extract from The Poly-
nesian, printed in the Sandwich Islands on the 25th of July,
1846.
And what does that contain ? A letter written by this same
Consul, under date of 24th of June of that year, addressed to
the Minister of Finance of that Government, giving him an ac-
count of this discovery—of the denouncement and ownership
of the mine.
First, from this Polynesian is extracted a letter of G. P. Judd,
the Minister of Finance, to the editor of The Polynesian, inclos-
ing Thomas 0. Larkin's letter.
Now, here is Mr. Larkin's letter, dated " 24th June, 1846 ;"
it is addressed to G. P. Judd, Esq.
:
Consulate of the United States of America, (
Port of Monterey, California, July 2, 1846. J
Sir :—I have the pleasure of forwarding to you a specimen
of California quicksilver ore, from a mine seventy miles north
of Monterey, and ten miles from the Pueblo of Jose, discovered
in 1845 to have quicksilver in it. The place was koown for
eighteen years, and supposed by the Oalifornians to be a silver
mine ; they, in 1828, having with some foreign quicksilver ex-
tracted the other metal. In 1845, a Mexican being in the
vicinity, heard that the mountains contained rock different
from any other, went to examine it, and immediately denounced
the place before the nearest Alcalde, and then made known
what it contained.
The owner, with a priest, in a small and imperfect manner
has commenced extracting the metal. The mine is in the top
of a steep mountain, a mile or more from the plain, to which
it is brought down on a mule, piled up with a whaler's pot
covered over it, well cemented with clay, some six or eight
cords of fire-wood placed over and fired ; in fourteen or sixteen
hours the quicksilver is found below in a small wooden tank
of water, though much of the rock is thrown away afterwards
that has not been well heated. They obtain about fifteen per
cent, of the metal.
The receipt of that letter in the Sandwich Islands is known
by the party who edited and published this paper [The
Polynesian]. His testimony is unimpeached. The fact of that
announcement appearing on that day in that paper, is proved
by a gentleman of San Francisco, who read it, and had his at-
tention particularly attracted to it. The fact of the receipt of
the letter by Mr. Judd is apparent on the face of this Trans-
cript, by the production made by young Larkin from his
father's papers, of Judd's reply—having Judd's sign-manual
affixed. And that reply is proven.
Mr. Eandolph—Of what date is that ?
Mr. Benjamin—This is dated on the 20th of July, 1846.
It is produced by young Larkin from among the papers found
after his father's death, and the signature of Mr. Judd is proven
by those intimate with him—men who had lived with him.
This letter gives the name of the vessel which brought Mr.
Larkin's letter:
Treasury Office, Honolulu, \
Oahu, 20th July, 1846. j
Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter
per bark " Angola," of the 24th ulto., together with a specimen
of California quicksilver ore.
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I thank you sincerely for your kind attention in sending me
the specimen, as well as the very interesting particulars relative
to the mine.
I am happy in thinking that this is but the beginning of dis-
coveries which will tend to make California a valuable country.
My onerous duties as His Majesty's Minister of Finance, will
not permit me to assay the ore in order to test its quality, as I
might do if still in practice as a medical man.
I have sent your letter to the editor of the " Polynesian " for
insertion, and have no doubt it will be found as interesting to
others as it has been to me.
I beg to assure you that I shall always be happy to receive
information on any subject of interest connected with Califor-
nia, whenever it may suit your convenience to favor me.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
G. P. JUDD.
Thomas 0. Larkin, Esq.,
U. S. Consul, &c, &c, &c, Monterey.
[Endorsed.]
G. P. Judd, July 20th, 1846, S. Islands.
Now, may it please the Court, in the year 1860 we are told
that this mine never was denounced ; that all our proofs to the
effect that the mine ever was denounced are falsehoods; that the
papers of the denouncement are forgeries ; that the witnesses
who prove the denouncement and the papers are perjurers.
And this comes from the Government that holds in its own
archives the proof to the contrary. And this comes from the
Attorney-General of the United States who, when implored,
besought in every possible manner by the claimants to send
and satisfy himself by inspection of the records in this country
and Mexico—to take his own commissioners and send them
out at our expense, and satisfy himself directly of the justice
and equity of our claims—utterly refused to do so, and con-
tented himself with denouncing them as forgeries.
He answers to all our appeals of this nature: " I will not
satisfy myself ; I will not look ; I will look at nothing. I say it
is forgery, and I will not assist in procuring any evidence
which may tend to prove the contrary."
Fool! Fool!
"Truth crushed to earth will rise again."
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All the efforts of men cannot strangle her. Strangle her in
San Francisco, she reappears in the Sandwich Islands. Choke
her there, and, lo 1 she is under your very eyes in the archives
at Washington. She permeates the air ; she is in the atmos-
phere you breathe. As well might man endeavor to destroy
the Almighty as to destroy his essence, the truth. And yet
this is what the United States is trying to do ; seeking, as the
assistant of a band of unscrupulous speculators, to acquire a
valuable property developed by the capital and labor of others
;
undertaking to say that that does not belong to us which they
were thoroughly and officially informed did belong to us before
the United States Government had an interest in one foot of
ground in California.
Now, may it please your Honors, having shown you that
this mine was private property to the knowledge of our Gov-
ernment before the declaration of war, I proceed to the exami-
nation of some of the testimony in this case that puts that fact
beyond the possibility of human controversy. I do not mean
to say that it cannot be denied. I do not mean to say that no
human being can assert the contrary ; because, with all due
respect to my brother Eandolph, I must say to him, that his
power of assertion exceeds anything that I ever imagined could
exist in a human being ; and having now seen and confessed
that the contrary can be asserted, I venture to say that it can-
not be proved to the satisfaction of any intelligent, disinterested
mind.
I will proceed now to take up what is disclosed in this record
in relation to the action of Andres Castillero, from the time he
found his mine to the date of his departure from California—to
which he has never returned.
He finds his mine in November, 1845 ; leaves California in
April, 1846, and has never returned.
Now, the first point to which I wish to call your Honor's
attention is this : Years and years after the title of this prop-
erty claimed by us had been presented to the inspection of the
United States Land Commissioners, with such evidence of title
as was sufficient to satisfy them prima facie of our right to the
mine, not one syllable was breathed against or in question of
this denouncement, or of the truth of these documents. It was
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long subsequent to that period that a controversy arose on the
allegation made that these papers were forged, ante-dated and
fraudulent. Serious charges, requiring prompt repulse.
For this purpose, search was directed to be made in the
archives of Mexico, and there was found what we had never
seen before ; that is to say, that prior to the date of the grant
made by the Mexican Government to us, there had been a short
correspondence between the President of the Eepublic and the
Governor of California—a thing never dreamed of before.
That correspondence was brought here. And now, if your
Honors will refer to page 1805, you will see what it was.
On the 13th of February, 1846, the Governor of California
communicated to the President of Mexico, through the Minister
of Relations, the fact of the existence of this mine, of its de-
nouncement, and of the joy experienced by the public officers
in California by reason of so happy a discovery. And the
announcement was made by inclosing to the President of
Mexico the letter which the Governor of California had re-
ceived from Andres Castillero, making the announcement to
him. This letter of Andres Castillero, which I will first read
to the Court, is dated on the 10th of December, 1845, and
will be found at the foot of the page which I have just given
[1805]:
To His Excellency, Governor Pio Pico :
Mission of Santa Clara,
10th December, 1845.
My Most Esteemed Friend :—I send you a sample of the
quicksilver I have taken out in the presence of many witnesses.
The mine has been denounced by me, and between a few we
have formed a company. I am sure that yourself and the
Departmental Junta will appreciate a discovery which will
form the riches of the country, and we wish that the vacant
lands near to our works be conceded to us, to cut wood, with
the order of possession.
There is such an abundance of quicksilver, that eight arrobas
of ore gave one of metal ; and, in my belief, there is much,
and a great extraction can be made.
I will also thank you to order that possession be given to
me of the Island of Santa Cruz, which was granted to me by
the Supreme, at the same time as to the Messrs. Carrillos ; the
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cattle which is to be shipped, is already bought, and Don
Anastacio Carrillo can give me the possession.
May you continue in good health, and order your wishes to
your friend, who esteems you, and regards your orders.
Andres Castillero.
P. S.—My kind regards to my friends Covarrubias and Valle;
and to Mr. Hijar, why he does not reply to the three letters I
have sent him, giving him also my remembrances.
Now, this letter may be said to constitute the first action of
Castillero, after the denouncement of this mine. It is barely
a week afterwards. What does he propose then ? He says :
"I have now denounced the mine ; I want a grant of land close
to it, on which to cut wood ; I want that from this Department;
I want it from you, the Governor of California. I want a title
here. I also send to you my title to the Island of Santa Cruz,
and beg that you will order me to be put in possession.
Now, this letter was transmitted by Governor Pico to the
President of Mexico, through the Minister of Eelations, on the
13th of February, 1846, in these words :
Office of the Department \
of Californias.
j
April 6th, 1846. Excellent Sir:—By the accompanying letter
noted with satis- 0I> Senor Don Andres Castillero, which I re-
faction, and with spectfully transmit to your Excellency, original,
respect to the other y0U w ji} De informed of the important discovery
matters contained J * • ,-, . .
-n . « •' -i -i •
in the letter let made in this Department ot a quicksilver mine.
him inform atten- In consequence thereof, I avail myself of the
tively what he may good opportunity to send to your Excellency,
by the Commissioner of this Government, Don
[Rubric] jogg* Maria Covarrubias, the quicksilver, which,
as a sample, was sent to me by Senor Castillero, and to which
he refeis in the above mentioned letter.
With such a motive, I beg your Excellency will be pleased
to put this in the superior knowledge of his Excellency the
President, showing him the quicksilver which said mine pro-
duces, so that his Excellency may be made aware and satisfied
at so happy a discovery.
I repeat anew to your Excellency the assurances of my
consideration and respect.
God and Liberty. Angeles, February 13th, 1846.
Pio Pico.
To His Excellency, the Minister )
of Exterior Relations. )
uUpon the margin of this letter is the order of the Minister of
Relations in reference to a reply. This will be found on page
1805. I will call your Honor's attention to this marginal refer-
ence, particularly, because it is an answer to the whole tirade
about the " Hannah."
This is the answering order of the President of Mexico, to be
sent to the Governor of California. The answer is accordingly
sent on the same day. See the next page of the Transcript,
page 1806
:
Excellent Sir :—His Excellency, the President ad interim,
has seen with satisfaction by the letter from Senor Castillero,
which your Excellency sent me with your official communica-
tion of the 13th of February last, the important discovery
which has been made of a mine of quicksilver in that Depart-
ment. His Excellency having seen the sample of that ingre-
dient cited in said letter, and which your Excellency sent me
by Don Jose Maria Covarrubias, I have the honor to say this
to you by Supreme order in reply to the said communication,
and that with respect to the other matters referred to in Senor
Castillero's letter, that Government will please report atten-
tively what it may deem convenient.
D., April 6th, 1846.
To His Excellency, the Governor of the )
Department of Californias, Port of Los Angeles, f
Now, a very remarkable fact occurred. When this paper
came back from Mexico—and this was not until January,
1859—the question arose : Where is the original of this corres-
pondence, that emanates from California, goes to Mexico, and
comes back here from Mexico, in 1860 ? Nobody had ever
heard of any such correspondence here. The parties claimant
employed Mr. Hopkins, the keeper of the archives, to examine
the early California records and find the original of these com-
munications. Did they exist in California ? No man knew of
it. Mr. Hopkins' testimony is here on file. He swears that at
the request of the parties claimant, he searched and found the
original. I will read his testimony.
Now, if your Honor, will look at page 3068, you will find
what Mr. Hopkins tells us about the California archives, and
how this paper came to be found here. They were not found
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until last year, and not until our attention !^P been directed
to them by the copy sent here from the City of Mexico
:
I hereby certify, that I am, and have been for the last five
years, in charge of the Spanish archives in the office of the
United States Surveyor General for California ; that during
this time, I have, from time to time, been employed by Messrs.
Halleck, Peachy & Billings, to search said archives for any
document in relation to the discovery and development, by one
Andres Castillero, of the quicksilver mine of New Almaden,
and generally to search for any evidence tending directly or
indirectly to sustain the title of said Castillero to said quicksil-
ver mine ; that in the prosecution of said searches I have found
—
First. A letter from Andres Castillero to Governor Pio Pico,
dated Monterey, December 15th, 1845, saying : That at the
distance of thirty leagues from Monterey, he had discovered a
mineral of azogue of the best quality, etc., etc. This letter was
first seen by me about the month of May, 1856.
Second. -The borrador of a letter from Governor Pio Pico to
the Minister of Exterior Eelations in Mexico, dated February
13th, 1846 (Angeles), in relation to the discovery by Andres
Castillero of a quicksilver mine, forwarding at the same time a
letter of Castillero in relation to the matter, together with a
sample of the ore, which he asks may be presented to the
President; the borrador is in the handwriting of Agustin
Olvera, and was first discovered by me in the early part of
1859.
Now we are on the track. Olvera is brought in. I need
not say who he is. I do not know him personally. I know
him by reputation. I have been told by those familiarly
acquainted with the early native California population, that
he is a gentleman of the highest respectability ; that he was
admired as well as respected by his fellow-citizens. I have
been told that he was selected by them as one of the Presi-
dential electors at the last general election; and I judge, that
from the granite of his character, the attacks of the special
counsel for the Government would have recoiled, defeated. I
think he ventured to put to him no cross-questions.
Mr. Eandolph.—You will observe that I pursued the same
course in regard to other witnesses of the same class. There
was no need of cross-examining such witnesses.
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Mr. Bexjam^—All ! now I understand. The special
counsel for the^rovernment never cross-examines unless he
thinks it will be for his benefit. And this is all proper and
right ; for if you cannot gain anything by cross-examining
never attempt it.
Olvera's testimony is found at page 2609. These letters are
presented to him. He is asked if he wrote them ; or if he
knows in whose handwriting they are.
At page 2610, he says—speaking first of this rough draft
:
Look at this document, produced from the office of the
United States Surveyor General of California, purporting to
be a borrador, or rough draft of a communication, addressed on
the 13th February, 1846, to the Minister of Exterior Eelations
of Mexico, in which is made known to him the discovery of a
quicksilver mine in California, a copy of which borrador is on
file in this case, marked " Exhibit Pio Pico No. 1, W. II. C."
and state in whose handwriting is said document ?
[The counsel for the United States admits that said document
is found on file among the archives in the office of the United
States Surveyor General.]
A. It is in my own handwriting.
Q. When was it written ?
A. I don't know ; but I suppose I wrote it on the day it
bears date.
Now, observe that this testimony was taken in 1859, in
relation to a letter written thirteen years before, found in the
archives in this city, by the keeper, who is an officer of the
United States, and identified as in the handwriting of Olvera.
He does not remember the date on which it was written, but
he supposes that it was written on the day on which it bears
date.
Q. How came you to write that borrador ?
A. Because I was Secretary of the Assembly at that time
;
and it was also my duty to assist in the office of the Governor's
Secretary, when called upon, and I suppose that the Governor
directed me to write it.
He says that it is a copy of the borrador written by himself.
The letter of Castillero was sent by Pico.
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So that here we have this irrepressible truth rising up
again ; rising up in despite of all opposing efforts of the Govern-
ment through the Attorney General ; rising up thirteen years
afterwards to confound the men engaged in the conspiracy
formed against the owners of this property.
But this was not all that was found here in the archives.
"What else did Mr. Hopkins find ?
He found, also, a letter from Manuel Castro, page 8068 :
Third. A letter from Manuel Castro, Prefect of the Second
District, to the Secretary of State, dated Monterey, December
31st, 1845 ; in relation to the denouncement and working by
Andres Castillero of a quicksilver mine in the jurisdiction of
San Jose, and saying that he has made a petition for two square
leagues of land in the immediate neighborhood of the same.
This document was also discovered by me about the beginning
of the year 1859.
Now, let us look at these letters ; or, in other words, let us
look for a moment at the California General Archives referred
to in my index, at page 9 ; from which it will appear that they
are to be found at page 2546 of the Transcript.
We find at page 2550, Manuel Castro's letter, directed to the
Governor. This is dated on the 31st of December, 1845 :
Prefecture of the 2d District :—Don Andres Castillero has
denounced and is now working a quicksilver mine which was
found in the jurisdiction of the town of San Jose Guadalupe,
on private property ; and this prefecture which interests itself
in the encouragement of all branches of industry in the depart-
ment, felicitates your Excellency, and through you the most
excellent Senor Governor i f the department, upon so benefi-
cent a discovery ; inclosing also a petition which the said Senor
Castillero makes, soliciting a piece of land of two square leagues
which is adjacent to the said mine, so that your Excellency, if
you think tit, order what may be proper, so that this prefecture
may be able to make the necessary reports.
Please accept my esteem and distinguished consideration.
God and Liberty,
Manuel Castro.
Monterey, December 31, 1845.
For Secretary of Departmental Government.
2
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Now, what is the letter of Andres Castillero, inclosed in this
letter of the Prefect to the Government? Your Honors will
find it at page 2552 :
Excellent Senor Governor, Don Pio Pico.
Monterey, December 15, 1845.
Esteemed Friend whom I value :—I have the grateful satis-
faction of informing you, if you have not received my other
letter through the Prefecture, that at thirty leagues from here,
in the jurisdiction of the town of San Jose Guadalupe, I have
discovered a mine of quicksilver of the best quality, eight
arrobas of ore having yielded one arroba of liquid metal.
Senor Don Pablo Noriega, the bearer, will present to you a
petition from me, which is based upon an order (disposicion) of
the Supreme Government, asking that you order that possession
be given me of the Island of Santa Cruz, the Messrs. Carrillo
having already chosen that of Santa Rosa, which impediment
prevented my occupying it, but now I have already purchased
the cattle to occupy it, and I will be obliged by your sending
me by said gentleman the title and order of possession.
May you continue in good health. Salute Messrs. Valle and
Covarrubias for me, and order your affectionate friend who
kisses your hand.
Andres Castillero.
What can be answered to all this ? The archives are searched
and nothing was found till 1859. Why ? Because what Mr.
Hopkins was looking for were formal petitions to the Governor,
and acts of the Departmental Assembly in relation to the pe-
tition for two leagues. He was not looking out for correspond-
ence with the President of Mexico not known to exist, and
accordingly did not find it.
But when, in 1859, we return from the City of Mexico with a
copy of the espediente in the Department there, showing that
such a correspondence as this had occurred, his attention was
directed to what had taken place in Mexico ; and at once he
finds these originals in the archives here.
Did we put them there ? Did he put them there ? How
came they there ? Is the Surveyor General—is anybody in that
office—engaged in fabricating titles, and putting them there
while Mr. Hopkins is searching for them, and in order that
Mr. Hopkins may find them? How came they there ? All
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these papers, we are told, are forgeries and frauds. This we
hear, not as proven by anything in the record, but by repeated
assertions.
And here allow me to say, that one would be almost inclined
to believe that by some rule of this Court causes are permitted
to be argued on the assertions of counsel, and not by reference
to the proof in the record. Then, to the assertion, that not a
solitary paper presented here, by us, is true and genuine, we
oppose our denial. And if your Honors establish such a rule,
how are you to determine whose assertions are true ? I take
for granted that you have established such a rule, for we
have heard statement after statement—that men were perjurers,
that documents were forged—all made with perfect conviction
by my brother Randolph, but without a solitary word in the
entire Transcript to back these assertions.
I heard brother Randolph, the other day, accuse a poor man
who came into Court, compelled by the process ot your Honors,
to testify that he knew certain books, because it was his mis-
fortune years ago to be a clerk in the Consul's office, of per-
jury and forgery. I say that man was denounced as a perjurer
and forger because he stated that he knew certain books. Yet
he had written in those books, and knew them to be genuine.
Not a syllable in the record, not a word in the Transcript, to
impeach the character of this gentleman ; and for aught the
Court knows, he stands as high in point of reputation for per-
sonal integrity as the humble individual who addresses you, or
even the special counsel for the Government. There is nothing
in the record to the contrary; yet that man is denounced in the
name of the Government by my brother Randolph, over and
over again, in a volume of words ; and by their repetition in
distant countries, his family, his relations, his friends, will
shrink back with a blush of shame whenever his name is pro-
nounced, because they could not believe that he would be so
denounced by an officer of the Government when there was
not a syllable of testimony on which to lay the foundation for
such charges. This is cruel, cruel indeed !
Now, may it please your Honors, Andres Castillero is still
in California. Let us see if there is any other archive in Cali-
fornia, establishing beyond contradiction the existence of this
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denouncement and registry—independent, I mean, of the papers
themselves produced to the Court.
Let me refer the Court to some of the archives in San Jose.
Look at page 807 of the Transcript. By the Mexican law the
outgoing officer takes a receipt from the incoming officer of all
the former delivers up to the latter.
On the first day of January, 1846, or the second day rather,
Antonio Maria Pico ceased to be the officer properly charged
with the keeping of the archives of San Jose, and Pedro Cha-
bolla took his place; and on that day, in compliance with
law, an inventory was made of everything delivered up by the
outgoing to the incoming officer, and the latter gave his receipt
therefor. That inventory is produced at page 807 of the Trans-
cript. It is there in Spanish. It comprehends everything in
the line of " papers" existing in the Alcalde's office. Nothing is
omitted, everything is enumerated, even to the old tin candle-
stick, to the piece of board used in the office for publishing or-
ders, to an old padlock, of which the key was lost—everything
delivered up by the old Alcalde is put down in the inventory
and receipted for by the new officer. Now, here is the inventory
of what was delivered up on the 2d January, 1846 ; and if
your Honors will look towards the bottom of page 807, you
will find in Spanish, though you will readily understand the
meaning of the words
:
1. Posecion de la Mina de Sta. Clara a D. Andres Castillero.
The old Alcalde, on the 2d January, 1816, delivered to the
new one " the record of the possession given to Don Andres
Castillero of the mine of Santa Clara."
The possession had been given but two or three days before.
So that you have the Mexican Archives in the City of Mexico
;
you have the California General Archives
;
you have the Ar-
chives in the Alcalde's office in San Jose
;
you have the papers
of contemporaneous dates coming from the Sandwich Islands
you have the records of consular communications describing
this mine in Castillero's possession and working, from the De-
partment of State in the City of Washington— all of which
stand in direct proof of the origin of our just and equitable
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claim to this property. And yet your Honors will be treated
with the same assertions as heretofore : that not one word of
this is true
;
that these omnipresent forgers in all parts of the
world are forging newspapers, records, letters, archives, in every
possible place in which it could be conceived that a forgery
would be beneficial to their interests. In this the special
counsel for the Government is but carrying out the attempt of
the Attorney General of. the United States—to prevent your
Honors seeing any evidence upon our side at all. The settled,
persistent, continuous efforts to head off these claimants by
every possible means that human ingenuity could suggest, are
shown in this record. If they can only strangle all the evi-
dence, then they can take our property. If they cannot sup-
press all of the evidence, they will conceal as much as possible,
and then coolly deny, without contradictory proof, the truth
of whatever evidence is introduced. And all this is done in
violation of the plighted faith of the nation, given before the
civilized world.
In 1848, when this country was acquired, our Government
said to Mexico, in the face of Christendom we will respect the
property titles of your people. They shall stay with us and
become our citizens if they choose. If they do not so choose,
they shall go home in peace. Their property rights shall be
respected. The plighted faith of the United States of America
is given to you, that your citizens shall not be despoiled of what
was their own before you ceded the territory to us. "We promise
this ; we pledge the honor of the Nation to its fulfillment, and
this promise has been fulfilled to all, except to those who hold
title to property in California under Andres Castillero.
Now, may it please your Honors, from amongst the papers
produced in evidence in this case, testimony is rising up every
hour to confound the designs of those who are seeking to rob
us of our property.
After eight or ten years of painful uncertainty and search,
the original documents of our title are found amongst the papers
of a deceased individual to whom we once intrusted them as
our agent, and who basely betrayed his trust, and endeavored
to pervert his possession of them into an instrument for despoil-
ing us—they had passed from his hands to those of my brother
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Hall McAllister. They are found by accident. They are pro-
duced in Court, and they throw a flood of light on this whole
proceeding.
Now, your Honors will find in this paper what seems to
me the most incontrovertible evidence, proof conclusive that
these papers were made early in the year 1846. And that proof
comes from the certificate of Mr. Hopkins. How does this
occur ?
Most fortunately for us, the Alcalde Chavolla, in making a
copy of the act of possession to hand over to Castillero for his
title, omitted a line. When he handed the paper to Castillero,
the latter saw the deficiency ; and upon the face of the paper
appears the correction in his own handwriting. Now, we have
already seen that he left California early in the year 1846, and
has never since returned. Will it be pretended that this paper
was sent to Mexico to Castillero, in order that he might put in
an interlineation ? How did the handwriting of Castillero get
upon this certified copy, unless it was made in '46, before his de-
parture from California ? There are but two possible solutions
to these questions. Either this interlineation was made by An-
dres Castillero in '46, before he left California, or this paper has
been sent back to Castillero, in Mexico, for him to interline
these words. Certain it is that these words are here, interlined.
Certain it is that Andres Castillero has never been back to Cali-
fornia since his departure in 1846, in the month of April of
that year. Tell me now how these words got there in his
handwriting ? Hopkins swears that they are in Castillero's
handwriting, and most fortunately does it so occur that the in-
terlined words contain his signature. There is the date and
signature.
It occurred in this wise: The Notary or Alcalde in making
out a copy of this testimonio, in regard to giving Castillero pos-
session of this mine, copied out the different denouncements
;
and in copying the first denouncement, neglected to copy into
it the date and signature, and these are filled up -in the hand-
writing of Andres Castillero as proven by Mr. Hopkins' certifi-
cate. Again, I say, how did it get there ?
Now, this little circumstance was not known until about two
months ago ; so we find that nothing transpires in relation to
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these papers, here or elsewhere, which does not point to their
truth and genuineness. Nothing occurs in any part of the civi-
lized world in connection with this case which can serve to raise
or create a doubt as to the authenticity of the documents. All
concur in forcing conviction of the truth of our claim on the
most incredulous human mind. They force conviction in spite
of all opposition and prejudice against us—compelling belief,
so that no reasoning man can escape it.
Mr. Hopkins' testimony is on file in relation to this matter,
and none of it is disputed.
Now, may it please your Honors, we have got certain facts
thus far established ; established by what may be considered as
the history of the day, of the age.
"We have the fact that the mine was discovered, was taken
possession of by an individual as its owner ; that this possession
was not clandestine, as has been frequently urged against it, but
was open, notorious, and communicated to all the public authori-
ties of California and Mexico, and that so far from disapproving
that possession, those authorities expressed gratification and de-
light
;
and that all this occurred before the United States acquired
one foot of ground in California. We have the fact, that as soon
as Andres Castillero discovered this mine, he told everybody
that he had denounced it. His letters abound in that assertion.
We have the fact that the United States Consul informed the pub-
lic through the newspapers that Castillero had denounced this
mine. We have the fact that the United States Consul inform-
ed the Government of the United States that Castillero was in
possession and working this mine as owner. We have the fact
that Castillero declared to Fremont that he had denounced this
mine. We have the fact that the archives contain what pur-
ports to be a record of denouncement and possession. We have
the schedule of papers in the Alcalde's office in 1846, in San
Jose, in which these Castillero documents of denunciation and
possession are enumerated. We have copies from the Mexican
archives. We have the archives in the keeping of Mr. Hopkins,
substantiating our claims ; and we have about forty witnesses who
all swear to the facts demonstrative of the genuineness of our
title. Not one man swears to the contrary. And yet, I am here
in the presence of an intelligent Court, arguing to your Honors,
that these papers are true, and are not forgeries.
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And all this is proven, not merely by our own witnesses, but
by the evidence introduced by the Government. We might, I
think, safely agree that your Honors should take up this record
and decide it by the evidence introduced by the Government.
For, we say again, that that evidence itself gives a direct
contradiction to the assertions made by the counsel of the
United States. I will not say the Government Of course the
Government of the United States makes no such averment.
They are made in its name, but do not emanate from it.
Now, I say I put this point—of the existence of this record
of possession—upon the testimony of the Government wit-
nesses alone ; and I agree that you shall forget everything else,
—take up everything else in this record, and walk to the win-
dows and throw it out, as the special counsel invites you to do.
Mr. Eandolph.—Your certificates ?
Mr. Benjamin.—Exactly ; take them and tear them all up,
and throw them out of the window. I have no fear of the re-
sult; because the Government has taken pains to prove our
papers for us. I say again, you may take all our evidence and
throw it out of the window, and decide this case on the evi-
dence produced by the Government.
And yet, my brother Eandolph has a curious way of treat-
ing even his own witnesses. When they say anything that he
don't want them to say, he calls them "perjurers."
There is one witness who, I believe, brother Eandolph does
not call a perjurer, although he identifies these papers. I refer
to Mr. Weekes. He brings Weekes up into Court. Now, he
informs us, he is going to prove that our papers are forgeries.
Now I have found you out. Come up here Mr. Weekes ! Did
you give a copy of certain documents to Alexander Forbes in
January, 1848?
I did. Were the original in your office ? They were. They
were in a little paper book which I saw as far back as when
Burton was Alcalde in 1846—and again in 1848, when I was
Alcalde.
Weekes is then shown the original record of registry and
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possession from the County Eecorder's Office, and he identifies
it.—Trans. 306.
Now brother Eandolph dismisses this witness for the Govern-
ment, who has proven contraiy to his expectation, that the pa-
pers are genuine, with the exclamation that he is nothing but
a " drunken Alcalde."
Me. Eandolph.—Do you vouch for his sobriety ?
Me. Benjamin.—I am not a witness in this case. There then
we have the testimony of one Government witness. Being a
" drunken Alcalde," the Government turns him out of Court.
Then the Government introduced A. M. Pico, and examines
him very closely. Unfortunately, Pico persists in stating that
these documents are genuine. What says the Government in
such a predicament ? " Your Honors know what credit to at-
tach to California witnesses."
And so with all the witnesses that come up at the call of the
Government, and tell brother Eandolph: "You are mistaken
in regard to these papers ; they are genuine, and we know
them to be such." All are disposed of, one after another, with
" California witnesses
—
your Honors know what they are ; "
drunken Alcaldes!—what credit can you attach to their oath? "
Well, how are we ever to prove this thing ? We can never
prove anything according to the theories of the Government.
Our own witnesses are all to be denounced as perjurers, and the
Government's own witnesses are dismissed as false and drunken.
All on the other side consists in bare assertions. Now, my
brother Eandolph can out-assert us all day long, and if your
Honors have established that rule of ascertaining truth, we give
up our case at once. But if you are going to decide this case
upon the proof contained in the Transcript, then it does not ad-
mit of discussion so far as the question of the genuineness of
this record of possession is concerned. In this particular, there
is no case before you.
I was much struck with the contradictions in my brother's
argument. At one moment he charges that we commenced
forging in 1850 ; in a few moments he says that the forgeries
began in 1847 ; and still again, that the record of possession
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was forged in 1848. In this assertion he ran foul of several
pieces of stubborn record evidence, and amongst others he en-
countered the testimony of his main witness.
James Alex. Forbes, as Yice Consul of Her Britanic Ma-
jesty, wrote an official letter, which was found in the archives
of San Jose in 1847. And in that letter, brought from the
archives and filed in this case, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul
complains to the Alcalde that persons have intruded on the
ujuridical possession of the mine" By looking at page 810,
your Honors will see what the Consul says to John Burton,
Alcalde
:
British Vice Consulate for California,
)
Santa Clara, 14th August, 1847. f
Sir : I have received information from the person in charge of
the Quicksilver mine of Sta Clara that two persons have com-
menced digging a pit by the direction of Mr G Cook, within the
limits of the juridical possession of the said mine, and upon re-
monstrating with them, they have refused to discontinue their
operations.
Permit me to refer you to the documents which exist in your
office upon which was founded your conviction of the justice
of your decision in relation to the claim of Mr Cook in March
last, and to request that you will be pleased to adopt such
measures for protecting the rights of the owners of the said
mine and of those who are legally interested in the same as
you may deem most conducive to that end.
I have the honor to be sir,
Your most obedient servant,
J. Alex. Forbes,
Vice Consul.
John Burton, Esq.,
Justice of Peace, Pueblo de San Jose.
Thus, may it please your Honors, we have gone back from
the pretended forgery of 1848, to James Alex. Forbes' letter
in 1847, and the existence of the documents of possession in
the Alcalde office—the previous month of March, 1847.
Here my brother Eandolph—and we must renew our ac-
knowledgments to him
—
produces the record of the previous
suit in the month of March. See page 815 of the first volume
of the Transcript:
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G-. C. Cook )
vs. V
James Alex. Foebes. )
On complaint of plaintiff that Andres Castillero, James Alex.
Forbes, Jose Maria del Real, Jose Castro, Secundino Robles,
and Chato, alias Theodore Robles, were to work on his land
contrary to law, and prayed that they be removed.
Here we have got these miners at work on the land claimed
by Cook ; and this in March, 1847.
A summons was issued bearing date March 17th, 1847, re-
turnable on Friday next, which was served and returned
according to law. The parties having appeared the case is con-
tinued, until the mine can be surveyed.
Just here : "What was to be surveyed ? "What was to be
surveyed ?
Mr. Randolph—That's the question.
Mr. Benjamin—If there was no title to the land, if there
was nothing which the Alcalde could order to be surveyed un-
der this title, how could a survey have been ordered at all ?
How could the surveyor do anything without an}' title with
which to make a survey. Something then in the shape of a
definite title paper did then exist, by which the surveyor was
enabled to execute his duty of perfecting a survey. What was
it? James Alex. Forbes says, " The juridical possession of the
mine, according to the documents which exist in your (the Alcalde's)
office.^
Two men were sent to the mines to measure and report
thereon, who went and returned their report.
What did they measure ? Did they go there and measure
any quantity of land ad libitum f Or, did they find something
definite to measure ? They go to the mouth of the mine. How
far do they measure around it ? There must have been some
paper declaring the limits which they were to measure. They
go and make the measurement, and return and report. What
is the result ? It appears in a letter of James Alex. Forbes
that the Justice decided in favor of the mine owners, on the
survey of their mining possession. What was that mining
28
possession ? On the 5th May, 1847, you have James Alex.
Forbes' letter, so often referred to, in which is a description of
the mining possession as being a mining possession of 3,000
varas on all sides. That is what James A. Forbes certifies was
surveyed. That was what existed in the archives, and was
called a "juridical possession." That was the direction the
surveyors received from the Justice.
Thus, may it please your Honors, we have Andres Castil-
lero claiming the mine in California before his departure. We
have him proved to possess a full knowledge of the mode by
which mines are acquired, and the mode by which lands are
acquired. His mining possession he asks from the Alcalde.
His lands he asks from the Governor. He had previously ob-
tained a grant of land from the Supreme Government. It was
an island. And that island was immediately given to him in
accordance with the order of the Supreme Government, when
he presented his claim. Being now absent from Mexico, and
desirous of obtaining a two-league grant in California, he was
obliged to make application to the local authorities.
But, before action is had on this petition for two leagues,
Andres Castillero leaves California ; and when he gets to the
City of Mexico, remembering his success in relation to the for-
mer grant of the Island of Santa Cruz, he determined to make
his petition for a two-league grant directly to the Government
;
and he abandoned his proceedings before the local authorities
here. Accordingly, the moment he reaches the City of Mexico,
we find him carrying out precisely what had been designed in
California.
He goes before the Mining Junta. The first thing he does
is to apply for aid in carrying on his mining operations. He
says to the Junta, I want my mining possession confirmed by
the Supreme Government. In all his plans there stated, he fol-
lowed out precisely what he had commenced in California.
There was no variation, no interruption, no change of purpose.
His plan was the straightforward one of a man who had one
object in view, and who seeks and adopts the best measures to
secure its prompt execution.
He had previously sent a special messenger with his speci-
mens of ore and his letters, and now that the Governor required
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to send a special commissioner to Mexico, he attends to his in-
terests in person.
But it is said that he sent no special messenger. It is said
that Lazaro Pina went with him, and did not go previously on
the "Hannah."
The statement on the other side is, as I suppose, that the
" Hannah" did not leave the port of Monterey at the time in-
dicated in evidence. This is one of the most puzzling subjects
in this whole case for me to treat. I do not understand the
pretext of the argument to the contrary. . I cannot make it out.
I can clearly show to your Honors by direct testimony that the
" Hannah" did leave the port of Monterey at the time we spe-
cify. How is the contrary made out ? I listened attentively
to the gentleman for two days, and could not get at what he
meant. I could not make out by what species of ratiocination
he hoped to satisfy the Court that all the documents proving
that fact did not exist ; that they were all forged.
What is the evidence?
At page 2605, we have two letters of Andres Castillero,
written to General Vallejo in February or March, 1846. Now,
unless General Vallejo had forged these letters, the proof is there
complete—that Lazaro Pina did leave the port of Monterey, and
that he was sent from that port by Castillero early in March.
"What is the proof? Andres Castillero writes to General Val-
lejo. Now, let your Honors read those letters
;
look at them,
and you will see on the face of the papers themselves, the in-
trinsic, absolute proof of their verity. You will see from the
statement in these letters that they cannot but be true. They
refer to matters shown to have connected both the parties in
strict intimacy. General Yallejo explains that a short time be-
fore Andres Castillero acted as godfather at the christening of
one of his children. Hence he is called " compadre" a sacred
tie amongst the Spanish population.
Now what does he write to his " compadre V He writes on
the 21st February, 1846:
Mission of Santa Claea, Feb. 21, 1816.
Colonel Commander of the Line of the North,
Don Mariano Guadalupe Yallejo:
My Dear Compadre.—I have the pleasure to transmit to you
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a letter from His Excellency the President, in which he informs
me of the reasons why the expedition should not have come
here, but in an official communication received by Don Jose
Castro, he is advised by the Ministry of War that Colonel Don
Tanacio Triesta had set out.
By the brigantine schooner which brought these communica-
tions, we have received information that the Eepublic is in per-
fect peace. This vessel sails shortly, and will carry communi-
cations of what has occurred lately.
Myself or Pina will leave in it, or both together. I am only
detained waiting the arrival of the division which may touch
here in a day or two.
Tell me what commands you have for the Capital, and I shall
execute them faithfully in person, or order Pina to do so, as
the circumstances may be.
Nothing has been done regarding the uniting of the Govern-
ment to the Commandancy-General, and this matter will not
be decided until I have an interview with the Supreme Gov-
ernment, or communicate with it.
Do not fail to reply to this soon, and write to me with the
frankness which is congenial to you.
Eespects to my comadre, and a kiss to my godson, and order
your affectionate compadre and obedient servant,
Andres Castillero.
On the 11th March he writes to General Yallejo :
Mission of Santa Clara, March 11, 1846.
Colonel Don Mariano Guadalupe Yallejo :
My Dear Compadre.—In the mountain range of the Gabilan,
over against the Natividad, Captain J. C. Fremont has fortified
himself, and he has been joined by some foreigners; but the
Commandant-General is upon them, and I set out immediately
to accompany them. This I advise you of for your informa-
tion.
Pina embarked on the fourth of this month in Monterey,
and was dispatched in perfect order. He will travel post to
Mexico.
Eespects to my comadre and family, and order your affec-
tionate compadre and obedient servant,
Andres Castillero.
P. S.—Expressions to Don Salvador and Don Victor.
Were these letters forged in Mexico by Castillero, and sent
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up here for General Vallejo to swear to ? So the Govern-
ment's attorney would intimate.
The statement of General Vallejo is direct and positive—that
he received these letters in due course from the day of their
date. He presents the originals. Do they contain the truth ?
How do we prove that they contain the truth ? We produce
the archives of the United States Consul, and in the letters of
that Consulate the fact is found that the " Hannah" did leave
at the time we specify
;
that Larkin stopped her two or three
days in order to send important letters by her ; that he sent a
courier to meet her at Santa Barbara to take later dates ; and
that letters by the " Hannah" of that date were received in
Mazatlan.
ISTow, may it please your Honors, if Andres Castillero forged
these letters, he must have known what was in the Consulate
archives. Because it does so occur that this vessel, the " Han-
nah," was intended to leave on the 4th. She was "up" to
leave on that day, and therefore it is, that Castillero, from Santa
Clara, writes to General Vallejo that Pina embarked on the
4th, and was dispatched in perfect order.
But the American Consul finds Fremont in a dangerous po-
sition
;
and discovering that Fremont wanted to write home,
he detains the " Hannah " three days. When the Consul's
memorandum book is brought into Court, which states that the
"Hannah" left for Mazatlan on the 7th of March, 1846, no
human being could read these several papers and give any
other construction to them—always excepting the Government
counsel.
There are numerous other letters reading the same way.
The books of the Consul are in Court.
[Mr. Randolph objected to introducing as evidence any
portion of the Consul's books, except such parts as were directly
proven at the time the books were introduced and sworn to
before Commissioner taking the testimony.]
Mr. Benjamin—The book was introduced before the Com-
missioner. Here it is.
On page 26(50, I read from Mr. Swasey's testimony
—
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Ques. 7.—Where did you next go, and what was your occu-
pation ?
Arts.—I went to Monterey, where I arrived about the last of
February or first of March, 1846, and immediately engaged
with Mr. Thomas 0. Larkin as his Consular clerk.
Ques. 8.—What were your duties as such ?
Ans.—Writing and copying official and other dispatches. I
also kept some of his private books.
Ques. 9.—Did he keep copies of all his official correspond-
ence
;
if yea, in what books were they kept?
Ans.—He did. They were kept in one book, entitled on the
back : " Correspondence with the Department of State. Thos.
O. Larkin, Monterey." Also, in another book, entitled
:
" Copies of Official Letters. Thos. 0. Larkin, Monterey."
They are large record books, strongly bound in calf. These
books are now here before me.
ISTow I say, as a matter of law, that the Commissioner repre-
sents the Court in receiving the testimony, and these are the
same books which were before him. The Consular archives
are brought into Court—the books were placed before the Com-
missioner first, and now they are here for inspection. The
witness swears that he was the clerk who wrote in them, and
that these are genuine Consular archives. In opposition to
these we have—what? The denial of the Government. Pas-
sages are read from official documents of the year 1846, with a
view to have your Honors draw the conclusion that these are
forged papers. And then when the books themselves are
handed in for inspection, the special counsel for the Govern-
ment gets up and tells your Honors that the case is closed, and
you must not look at the books. That is it. Shut your eyes.
If they can only keep your eyes shut they can gain this case,
Don't look at anything. This is perfectly consistent with his
entire management of this case. If the Judges will only shut
their eyes, the Government may possibly gain this case.
But we mean to open this case to full examination. We in-
tend that the Court shall see all. We never yet feared the
closest scrutiny. We never raised an objection to the taking
of any testimony. If in the whole range of facts existing upon
earth in the shape of evidence, there is one which in the judg-
ment of the counsel militates against our title, we say let him
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bring it in now. We never shut the doors. You have got
the universe before you ; range it. Find something. Find, if
you can, some owe fact inconsistent with the genuineness of these
papers, and we give up our case. That is not all. We pro-
duce volumes of Mexican official newspapers. We first bring
them before competent witnesses. We prove them to be gen-
uine newspapers, published in Mexico. We offer these vol-
umes in evidence. They are Mexican daily newspapers for the
year 1846. This is the "Diario Oficial." The other volume is
a bound copy of " El Monitor Eepublicano," for the year 1846.
We point out to the witnesses in these papers certain ex-
tracts having reference to this mine. We have them copied
into the record for our use.
Mr. Randolph—That is in evidence ; the rest is not.
Mr. Benjamin—Now, brother Randolph has spent two
days before the Court, arguing about what? That it is not
likely, it is not to be believed, it is against all human probabil-
ity, that the "Hannah" carried the dispatches which this gentle-
man, Pina, was to carry. Why ? Because the Mexican news-
papers would have spoken of Fremont's affairs
;
whereas they
only speak of the mine. Now these newspapers were before
my brother's face ; and he examined them with reference, of
course, to other passages than those we offered in evidence, as
well as in reference to what we did offer—he himself offering
extracts from them in evidence. [See Trans, pp. 2361 to 2365.]
We could not copy the whole newspaper into this record. But
it so happened that the very pages from which we copied our
statements about Andres Castillero, do contain the statements
about Fremont.
[Mr. Randolph objected to the introduction before the
Court of any portion of the Mexican papers which were not
displayed or referred to in the Transcript.]
Mr. Benjamin—That is it. Shut the eyes of your Honors,
and the Government may gain this case.
Mr. Randolph—I do not know of any evidence but what
34
is in the record. If the claimants have any evidence outside
of the record they should have introduced it in the proper
place and time. I had no opportunity to examine these papers
after the examination of them before the Commissioner. I had
to make my argument on the basis of what was contained in
the record.
Justice Hoffman—What would you estimate the effect of
your argument on this point to be, if after these assertions of
Mr. Benjamin's you close the books? How is the Court to
know that these papers do not contain a notice of the Fremont
affair, if we cannot look into them ?
Mr. Randolph—If your Honors please, I pointed to the
printed Transcript, and showed the evidence put into Court on
that subject. It is to that evidence that your Honors are con-
fined in the trial of this cause ; when there is no rule of evi-
dence by which I am called upon to answer the matter intro-
duced to our notice for the first time at the present moment.
Mr. Benjamin—If your Honors please, I will read the state-
ments in this paper concerning Captain Fremont, as a part of
my speech. I anticipated this objection. It is in perfect ac-
cordance with everything which has been done by the special
counsel for the Government here, and the Attorney- General at
Washington. Keep out the evidence, they say, and we can
gain the case.
Mr. Eandolph—What do we know about what has been
placed in those newspapers ?
Mr. Benjamin—Well, I am now going to read some sen-
tences which we have newly forged !—since we heard brother
Randolph's argument—and placed in this pretended Mexican
newspaper.
Mr. Randolph—I have little doubt about its being a forgery.
Mr. Benjamin—Yery well. I will, with your Honors' per-
mission, proceed to read this " forgery " as a part of my speech.
Your Honors will have the paper to examine hereafter ; and
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you can place sucli reliance upon this " forgery " as you think
proper, while you are weighing my brother Randolph's argu-
ment on this particular omission which we have within the last
two days taken -particular pains to supply.
Now, in the " Diario Oficial " of the 5th of April, 1846, is
the statement of this arrival from California, and of the Fre-
mont affair.
The Supreme Government has also received news from
Upper California, down to the 5th of last month, and nothing
particular had occurred in that department.
Commandants Castro and Yallejo express themselves full
of enthusiasm to defend that important Territory, and are re-
solved to sustain it even if the enemy should pass over their
dead bodies. Our hearts swell at noticing the noble • enthusi-
asm of the Mexicans who, at the places of greatest risk, bravely
sustain the sacred rights of their country.
Now what did my brother Randolph say ? He said "your
' Republicano ' newspaper, published in the City of Mexico,
contains nothing but the forged story about your quicksilver
affairs. All Mexico is represented as mad with astonishment
and joy about the quicksilver discoveries in California." Can
the Court believe, urges my learned brother, that they received
intelligence of nothing but the quicksilver mine, when Fre-
mont was here with his flag flying on the Gravilan ? At great
trouble and expense we procured these files of old Mexican
newspapers, placing such extracts in the record as had refer-
ence to this mine, which we supposed was all that was in liti-
gation. We had no idea that Fremont's expedition was in liti-
gation before your Ilonors. But as soon as it was said by my
brother, that this omission proves that the files are not genuine,
we " forged " these volumes afresh, and here they are in Court,
or, at least, here a small portion of one of them is in my speech.
The "Monitor Republicano" of the 12th of April, contains
this extract from the Tepic newspaper, of which we quote in
the record only the first paragraph, relating to the discovery of
the mine, that being all that concerned us.
We have now forged this additional portion, so that your
Honors may be prepared to answer that portion of brother Ran-
dolph's argument relating to the supposed omission to mention
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Fremont's expedition. This forgery appears in my argument,
not in the Transcript.
After stating all about the quicksilver mine, this Mexican
newspaper goes on to say :
—
Recently, the greatest alarm has been produced by the entry
into the country of a small force of Americans under the com-
mand of Capt. Fremont, of the Engineers. The military au-
thorities of the department were preparing themselves to fulfill
their duties by driving these invaders out of the limits of the
Republic.
The copy of the document which we transcribe (which has
been given to us by a respectable merchant of this place to
whom it was sent) will inform our readers of this remarkable
event.
Then it copies a letter of Jose Castro, directed to the Minis-
ter of War and Marine, stating these facts
:
In my communication of the 5th current, I announced to you
the arrival of a Captain, at the head of fifty men, who came, as
he said, by order of the Government of the United States to
survey the limits of Oregon. This person presented himself
at my headquarters some days ago, accompanied by two indi-
viduals, with the object of asking permission to procure pro-
visions for his men that he had left in the mountains, which
was given to him. But two days ago I was much surprised at
being informed that this person was only two clays' journey
from this place ; in consequence, I immediately sent him a com-
munication, ordering him, that on the instant of its receipt he
should put himself on the march and leave the department,
but I have yet received no answer ; but in order to make him
obey, in case of resistance, I sent out a force to observe their
operations, and to-day I march in person to join it and to see
that the object is attained. The hurry with which I undertake
my march, does not permit me to be more diffuse, and I beg
that you will inform his Excellency the President, assuring
him that not only shall the national integrity of this depart-
ment be defended with the enthusiasm of good Mexicans, but
those who attempt to violate it will find an impregnable barrier
in the valor and patriotism of every one of the Californians.
Receive the assurances of my respect, etc.,
Grod and Liberty. Monterey, 6th March.
Jose Castro.
To the Minister of War and Marine.
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Now, what becomes of the argument about the " Hannah's"
not leaving the port of Monterey, and not reaching Mazatlan at
the time we name ? It appears that we have not only forged
in these papers an account of the arrival by the " Hannah" of
important quicksilver intelligence, but we have also forged an
account of news from Fremont's expedition, of the latest dates.
Of course this is all forged and fabricated. Everything con-
nected with this trip of the "Hannah" is forged; and I should
not be surprised to hear that the "Hannah" herself was forged
for the special fraudulent purposes of these claimants.
[The Court took a recess for half an hour.]
ON RE-ASSEMBLING,
Mr. Randolph said:—Before Mr. Benjamin resumes his
argument, I wish merely to notice at this particular time an
inference which might be drawn by the Court, or intended to
be drawn by the Court, that I was at the time of making my
argument acquainted with or cognizant of the rest of these arti-
cles in the newspapers, but did not candidly make my argu-
ment on that point. In answer to that, I have to say, that I
was unapprised of any such matter existing at all, much less
as evidence in this case. As to what the fact may be, I shall
of course make observations in my own proper place. I merely
rise now to disabuse the mind of the Court of any such im-
pression, accidentally or intentionally conveyed.
Mr. Benjamin said:—I will answer for my brother Ran-
dolph. Nobody who knows him, could by any possibility sup-
pose that he would endeavor to impose upon the Court. No
one supposes that he would have made use of arguments which
he did, if he had supposed we could overthrow them in the
manner we have done. And that makes my argument all the
stronger, and shows him and the Court how dangerous is that
style of argument in which my brother Randolph indulges all
through this case ; when he dwells upon certain prominent facts
in general history which he supposes to be inconsistent with this
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particular case, without giving us any opportunity of explana-
tion. We cannot explain the entire history of the country in
this record. We cannot put in our record everything that
occurred in Mexico and the United States for ten years, but must
select only that which bears on this mine. And I trust that my
brother Eandolph will see himself, that arguments which he
hourly draws from just such facts as these, have no more foun-
dation than the argument which he sought to draw from the
supposed omission of these papers to speak of Fremont's affairs
;
that his whole fabric of similar arguments has just as little
basis as the one which has just been destroyed and is now aban-
doned.
Me. Eandolph—No, sir ; I abandon nothing.
Mr. Benjamin :—Now, may it please the Court, I take it to
be a matter of some consequence, since the question has been
raised, that there shall be no shadow of doubt left upon a
human mind, that that brig " Hannah" left Monterey at the
time we name, that she carried this correspondence, and had
Lazaro Piila on board. I have not done with the proof.
The official documents which Mr. Eandolph himself intro-
duces, show the facts.
The facts are : that the " Hannah" is to leave on the 4th of
March
;
that the Consul detains her until the 7th, and then
sends correspondence by her. Now, we say that this vessel
stopped at Santa Barbara, on her way down ; and we say, that
although Consul Larkin had written by her before her depart-
ure from Monterey, other facts had occurred in the interval
which rendered it necessary to dispatch a courier down to Santa
Barbara to the " Hannah," and send communications to the
American squadron at Mazatlan. My brother Eandolph has
read a letter of the 9th of March, written by Consul Larkin to
President Buchanan, then Secretary of State. It shows that
after the 7th of March Mr. Larkin got frightened in relation
to Fremont's position. On the 9th, he had intelligence that a
company were being raised to proceed against Fremont ; and
there was danger of this American officer's being overwhelmed
by the enemy. It was this fresh danger that incited Larkin to
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send couriers to Santa Barbara, and to send double couriers to
Premont. And I call upon brother Kandolph to tell me this :
How came Mr. Larhin to know in Monterey that there would be a
vessel at /Santa Barbara to take his dispatches down to Mazatlan f
Me. Kandolph :—He took his chances.
Me. Benjamin :—Pretty chances. He took his chances to
inteecept the vessel by his messenger, because he knew that
the brig " Hannah" had been dispatched three days before from
Monterey for Mazatlan, intending to call at Santa Barbara.
Do your Honors want further proof? Look at page 3020,
at the letter of Mott, Talbot & Co., which I read
:
U. S. POETSMOUTH, )
Port of Mazatlan, 1st April, 1846.
j
T. 0. Laekin, Esq.,
Monterey,
Dear Sir : It has been hinted to us that this ship is bound
to Monterey, and although the fact is doubtful, we avail of the
chance to acknowledge receipt of your much valued favors of
the 2d, 4th, and 5th ult., the former enclosing a remittance of a
Eussian bill for $2000 for account of Mr. A. B. Thompson.
Your letters have this moment reached us per "Hannah," and
we are much obliged for their contents. You were correct in
supposing that the destination of this vessel when she sailed
from this was not known to us. AYe have only time to return
you our sincere thanks for your kindness in collecting the debt
of Mr. Thompson, which we frankly confess we had written off
as lost. We are also much obliged for the fruit, which, how-
ever, as the Hannah has just anchored, we have not yet received.
Now here we have got this fact : the arrival of the brig
" Hannah" at Mazatlan on the 1st of April, her arrival from
Monterey, bringing down letters of the 2d, 4th and 5th of
March.
My brother says that there is no proof in this record that the
" Hannah" ever left Monterey from the 1st to the 10th of
March.
There is Consul Larkin's original book with the entry of the
7th of March—" The ' Hannah ' for Mazatlan." Here is Mott,
Talbot & Co's letter, dated on board the ship Portsmouth on
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the 1st of April, announcing the arrival of the " Hannah" at
Mazatlan, with letters up to the 5th ; and what occurs on the
arrival of the " Hannah." The " Hannah" has just cast her
anchor. Suddenly the intelligence is spread among the persons
on the Portsmouth, that that vessel is going up to Monterey.
How is this ? For what purpose is this sudden dispatch of the
Portsmouth ? It is not known publicly. It has been hinted
to Mott, Talbot & Co. by some friendly officer. But this fact
is known on ship-board, and preparations are at once made
agreeably to the requirements of such a determination ; and
in twenty-one days from the date of the arrival of the " Han-
nah" at Mazatlan, the Portsmouth is in the Port of Monterey.
And the next thing that we find is a letter from Consul Lar-
Mn to Mr. Gillespie, who is sent out with confidential instruc-
tions. Gillespie is there in pursuit of Fremont, who is on his
way to Oregon. Gillespie goes in pursuit of Fremont, and
brings him back. The Consul, in the meantime, writes and
sends a letter to Gillespie, telling him of the arrival of the
Portsmouth, by reason of letters dispatched to the American
squadron at Mazatlan, by the "Hannah." Now, brother Kan-
dolph says that the "Hannah" never left for Mazatlan at the
date we fix, and that consequently it was not in reply to any
letters sent by her that the Portsmouth made her trip to Mon-
terey. You have the entry of her arrival here in the news-
paper :
1st day of April, American hermaphrodite brig, Hannah, of
89 tons, Captain Benjamin F. Thusum, crew 10 men, proceed-
ing from San Bias, 5 days' sail, in ballast. Passengers, Ansel
mo, Latayada, and Gregorio Aguirre.
This gives ample time for the " Hannah" to leave Monterey,
stop at Santa Barbara and receive further Government dispatches
for the Portsmouth, which secured the prompt dispatch of that
vessel to Monterey for the succor of Captain Fremont.
Now, let us look at what the Consul writes on April 23d,
1846, to Mr. Gillespie. It will be found on page 2674-5 of
Transcript
:
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Consulate of the U. S. of America, )
Monterey, April 23, 1846. f
Sir:—Captain Montgomery, of the "Portsmouth," being
under sailing orders (the 1st or 2d instant) at Mazatlan, was
•waiting for the Mexican Mail, when Commodore Sloat heard,
per brig "Hannah," of the situation of Captain Fremont near
San Johns, and immediately dispatched the ship. She was
twenty-one days from Mazatlan to Monterey. I send to you
four or five New York, and one Mexican, newspapers—the
former to 5th February, the latter of March. New York pa-
pers of Feb. 25 was in the hands of the Commodore. Captain
Montgomery has not any certain information of Mr. Slidel's
situation in Jalapa, in March ; he says that the Commandante
General of Mazatlan had later news by six days than Commo-
dore Sloat ; that ail Custom-House and other Government offi-
cers had left Mazatlan, taking away the archives and Govern-
ment property, publishing in the street that Commodore Sloat
would in all probability declare a state of blockade the next
day, thereby giving reasons to suppose they were aware of the
cause.
The " Portsmouth" will remain here and in San Francisco
some weeks, perhaps a month, according to circumstances. I
have (as my opinion) said to Senores Castro, Carillo, and Val-
lejo, that our flag may fly here in thirty clays. The former
says, for his own plans, war is preferable to peace, as, by war,
affairs will at once be brought to a close, and each one know
his doom. I answered, without war he could make certain
officers, and secure to himself and his friends fame, honor,
permanent employ, and pay. He and others know not what
to do or say, but wait advices from Mexico, per their Commis-
sioner, by "Don Quixote." She ought to be here by the first
of July.
In the meantime, Andres Castillero, on the 4th of April had
gone down to Mexico, as Commissioner, on the Don Quixote.
He had left on the 4th of April. The California local officers
were awaiting his return by the Don Quixote, which was ex-
pected by the 1st of July, in order to determine what their
own conduct should be.
Now, I want your Honors to look at another little circum-
stance, insignificant perhaps, but yet, when an entire body of
papers and transactions—as in the present case—are stated to
be forged, when the most trifling fact is denied, every little
particle of proof serves as some guide, some indication by
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which, you can be enabled to arrive at a conclusion satisfactory
to yourselves.
How about Captain Paty's testimony ? Let us look at it.
First volume of the Transcript, page 424. '
Brother Randolph has read from the memorandum—" In-
formation for whom it may concern"—annexed to Captain Paty's
deposition, a statement, which he says he took from his wife's
journal, of what occurred upon that trip; and the third entry,
to be found on page 429, reads
:
Third.—Don Andres Castillero and his servant, or companion,
("Lazaro Pina" I think was his name,) Mrs. John Paty, child
and servant, were passengers on board.
Now, may it please the Court, this testimony of Captain
Paty's was given on the 15th December, 1857. The name of
the servant in the memorandum is put in with marks of quota-
tion, and in parentheses, to indicate that it did not come from
the original memorandum, but was an impression upon his
memory ; or, in other words, he did not here quote from his
wife's journal, but bethinks that "Lazaro Pina" was the name
of Castillero's servant. It is placed separately from this paper
;
evidently it is something interpolated—no doubt in perfect
good faith—by Captain Paty. Having heard it remarked by
some gentleman interested in this case in the City of San Fran-
cisco, that it was important for the Government to prove that
Castillero had a companion by the name of " Lazaro Pina,"
he was induced to imagine that such was the name of a
person who sailed with him as passenger on the trip referred
to. They said to him, " Didn't Castillero have a companion
on that trip ?" " Yes," he replied. " Wasn't his name ' Lazaro
Pina' ?" Naturally enough he answers, " Yes, I think that that
was his name." This is the whole story. The evidence of it
is on the face of the paper. It is in the past tense, "was his
name." Evidently somebody had been talking to Captain
Paty, and had directed his memory as to the names of passen-
gers, ten or twelve years ago, in this way. If this memoran-
dum had been a contemporaneous entry, it seems to me that it
would not have expressed any uncertainty as to the name of
the person in company with Castillero.
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And this is the only evidence, introduced by the Govern-
ment, tending to shake the truth of the circumstances we
allege as connected with the whole of these papers and Consular
archives.
Now, my brother Eandolph has got something like testi-
mony. I congratulate him on that, and hope that he will make
a proper use of it.
But the sixth item of this same memorandum:
Sixth.—I agreed to wait twenty days at Acapulco for Don
Andres Castillero, and after waiting until the 16th of May, I
heard that he wished to meet me at Mazatlan ; consequently I
left Acapulco on the 18th of May for that place and St. Bias.
I ask your Honors to remember that Castillero's bargain with
the Junta in the City of Mexico was, that they should give him
a draft on Mazatlan. He had to go there to get his money.
He expected to receive his money at Mazatlan.
And here we find the evidence furnished by the Govern-
ment itself, in an out-of-the-way place, iu a memorandum of
Captain Paty. Instead of waiting at Acapulco for Castillero,
as the terms of his first agreement bound him to do, he got in-
formation on the 16th of May from the City of Mexico from
Castillero, that the latter wanted him to go to Mazatlan to meet
him
;
not to wait longer at Acapulco. This is in precise ac-
cordance with the arrangement made by Castillero with the
Junta when he did get to Mexico.
Andres Castillero followed Lazaro Pina very closely. The
date of the latter's arrival in Mexico does not appear. We
know this, that on the 13th of April Herrera, the President of
the Eepublic, communicated to the Junta extracts from two let-
ters of Castillero's, dated late in February, 1846, which he said
he had just received in relation to the quicksilver mine; and
we know that Don Tomas Moral received also a letter dated
19th February, and we know that specimens did reach the City
of Mexico early in April, and were placed in the Cabinet of
Minerals, and were exhibited to and inspected by the profess-
ors. That we do know. How they got to Mexico it was not
incumbent upon us to say. In order to prove the genuineness
of our title, it is not incumbent upon us to prove every fact in
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regard to the passage to and from Mexico of letters, documents
and minerals which the United States may think proper to
question.
Really, it appears to me as if all legal principles were in-
verted in this case. Everything we have done is denounced
as fraudulent ; and when we produce documents and papers,
and witnesses to prove our title, the Government of the United
States seems, and actually is disposed, to call upon us to prove
that forgery is an impossibility. Not to raise a doubt them-
selves, not to prove themselves that anything is wrong, but we
are called upon to prove that it is absolutely impossible that any
of our papers could be forged. Now that is a hard burden to
place on any man.
I do not know how far the art of the forger has gone. I can-
not tell what can or what can not be done by accomplished
forgers. I only know that we prove these documents to be
true. Whether they could have been forged by accomplished
forgers I do not know, I cannot tell. Certainly it is no part of
my duty to prove that it would have been an impossibility to
have forged them.
Now Andres Castillero had reached Mexico, and commenced
a series of communications with the officers of the Government.
But, says brother Randolph, he did not get there until the 6th
of May. Well, the argument upon that point was very much
like the argument upon all the other points,—in relation, for in-
stance, to the Fremont news not reaching Mexico until the 5th or
6th of April. Because an evening paper in the City of Mexico,
on the 6th of May, inserts in its issue, at the last moment before
going to press, a statement that the Supreme Government had
received news from Upper California; because that evening
paper did not receive, or did not publish that news till the 6th
May, my brother Randolph argues, as if he was perfectly cer-
tain of it, that Andres Castillero did not arrive till that date-
that he did not arrive in the City of Mexico until that paper
got that news. Now I would have drawn just the opposite
conclusion. I would have supposed that a messenger sent by
the Governor of California to the President of Mexico with
special dispatches, would not first run to the office of an evening
newspaper and tell its editor what tidings he had brought, be-
45
fore even going to see the President. I should suppose that
the first thing which he would do would be to call upon the
President of the Republic, or the Minister to whom his dis-
patches were addressed, and give his dispatches ; and that after
they had examined the dispatches, and consulted in relation to
their contents, they would allow the dispatches to be published,
or not, as they might judge best for the interests of the coun-
try. But it did not occur to me, that because the evening
paper did not have this news before the 6th May, therefore it
was impossible that Castillero should have arrived in Mexico
before that day. I am willing to leave that point of inference
to your Honors. I do not think that it is worth spending
breath upon.
We find communications in relation to Andres Castillero on
the 5th of May. That we know. We are therefore authorized
in saying that he arrived on the 5th of May.
And here let me comment on a series of papers obtained
from Mexico, which are most remarkable. We have again to
thank brother Randolph for a most important piece of evidence.
We had sent to Mexico to obtain from the different public
offices, copies of the proceedings in those offices in relation to
this mine.
We applied to the Junta de Fomento for a copy of the
espediente there. We applied to the Faculty of the College for
a copy of their proceedings relative to the assay of this mineral,
and what the result was, and the richness of the ore, was spread
before your Honor. We applied to the Ministry of Justice,
and all that appeared in this connection in its archives is
brought here. We applied to the Minister of Relations, and
obtained a record of the espediente existing in that office in
relation to this matter; and here we rested our case.
But brother Randolph's acuteness put us upon a new track,
inoculated as with a new and valuable idea
—
just as he cross-
examined Chard and proved that he was a native of New
York—thus making his testimony exactly tally with the con-
sular archives. It was brother Randolph's acuteness that put
this question to the witness [Couto] : " You say that all these
things were done by the Junta ?" " I do." " You know that
they were done by them ?" " I do."
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Q. 173. Was there any record kept of the discussions of the
Junta on the subject of such applications?
A. 173. The result of each day's deliberations was written
down in a book, and signed by the gentlemen of the Junta.
This record was called the book of the Adas.
Q. 174. Where is that book now ?
A. 174. In rny possession, in the office in Mexico. Those
books are not allowed to leave the office.
Q. 175. Were not the final resolutions of the Junta on the
subject of any application extended more formally than in the
book of the Acta, or journal of their proceedings, to which you
have referred ?
A. 175. This book of the Acta is a formal record. The first
and last sheets in the book are stamped. The book is stamped
in the stamp-paper office, and the pages are all numbered in
that office before it is stamped, so that it is the same as if each
leaf was stamped. The same amount of fees were paid to the
stamp office as if each leaf were stamped. The Administrador
de papel Sellado certifies on the first page of the book the num-
ber of pages in it. This book undergoes all this preparation
before it is used by the Junta.
Q. 176. Is this the only book in which the final resolutions
of the Junta are recorded ?
A. 176. Yes.
t£ 7^ *£ & & *7f *3f
Q. 188. Have you brought with you a copy of the Adas of
the Junta in reference to the application of Andres Castillero?
A. 188. I have not.
Q. 189. Why did you not bring a copy of the Acta of the
Junta upon his petition, that being, as you have said, a mode by
which the Junta executed contracts and assumed obligations?
A. 189. Because my business here was only to prove my
own signatures, and to prove that the dates upon the docu-
ments in the expediente of which I have spoken, were the true
dates of those papers, and to prove that they had been in my
custody. I had nothing to do with any other matters.
Now, brother Eandolph has got us. We have been keeping-
back all these actas, which would demonstrate that the whole
of our papers were forged, fabricated, simulated, etc.
But we send to Mexico, and we find not only the minutes
of the Junta, but the original rough draft of the minutes, as
taken down in brief, whilst the Junta was in session ; and
we bring up traced copies of these original borradores and
traced copies of the clean copies drawn from them. These
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copies of tile actas and minutes contain the entire proceedings
relating to the mining body of Mexico ; contain thousands of
facts and names, embodying all the doings of that office, and
afford a complete picture of the whole mining business of
Mexico at that time. We have here every possible indication
which any human being could desire of the accuracy of all our
statements in regard to the acts of the Mining Junta. Take
up any one item in these thousands of statements. Here is a
whole year's business of the mining body, their proceedings
day after day and hour after hour. Every two or three days,
everything that has been done during the two or three days
previous, is entered carefully into a well-written volume, in
order that the record may remain. We have done in this
instance just what we did in reference to these newspapers.
We have brought in files of the public newspapers of the day.
You say that they are not true
; that we have forged entries ;
that we have forged proofs in them which the true papers do
not contain. We have brought in these entire files of papers
which prove and vindicate themselves. We anticipated these
charges. We bring in these minutes as we brought in the
papers, and we challenge you to prove one single fact in them
to be untrue. You have not brought a witness to disprove a
single fact in them. If the newspapers are forged can't you
get a true copy ? If this official newspaper is forged, we say,
bring in a true copy. Then we will give up the case. The
whole mining proceedings of the Eepublic for fifteen months
are thrown open to you. Prove one statement forged
;
prove
one single entry forged by us and we give up the case. You
have had years to do it in.
Mr. Bandolph.—These papers don't belong to me.
Mr. Benjamin.—Don't belong to you ? ISTo. They were
offered in evidence. They are produced ; the dates are given
;
the full record is there.
Mr. Bandolph.—We don't keep them.
Mr. Benjamin.—No ; but mark what you do have. The
Department of State has duplicates of them. The Depart-
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ment of State at "Washington keeps the official newspapers of
all nations with which we' hold any relations. Now, prove
that we have forged or interpolated one solitary newspaper item,
and we give up the case. You have got the evidence. You
can prove that we are forgers, and drive us out of Court in
shame. Make us hang our heads for our attempt to impose
upon this Court. You can do it with the greatest possible
ease, if your charge is true.
They offer no evidence on these points. They offer no
proofs in this connection. And it is because all the evidence
proves the charges unfounded, that we have this regular, per-
sistent determination that your Honors shall see nothing that
they can keep from your view.
Hence the refusal at Washington, when we urged the au-
thorities there to send down their own officers to Mexico at
our own expense to examine the archives and witnesses there.
Let them look at the records. If you do not feel authorized to
draw on the Treasury for such an object, here is the money to
pay for all expenses. Name anybody ycu please. Let them
go down to Mexico, investigate, and come back and make
their report. Take any men you choose. Send down such
men as you sent before—such men as Henry May. Let them
search the entire archives. Give them ample time and oppor-
tunity.
Now, we say to you, Mr. Black, if your object is to do
justice, if you uphold in your office those traditions of the
honorable men who have occupied your seat before you—if you
have any regard for the memory of the Wirts, the Legares, the
Berriens and the Johnsons, who have illustrated that office
—
pursue their example. Send out intelligent, skillful, scrutiniz-
ing, honest men to examine into the truth of this whole busi-
ness, and if they satisfy themselves that our titles are forged
then we will admit that we are in the wrong, and we will do
what we can to repair the injuries we have inflicted upon the
just owners of this property. But Black exclaims, " No ; /know
that you are forgers, and /will not agree to your bringing any
evidence into Court." " Then you won't send down a commis-
sion to look into this matter ?" " No." Well, we will do one
thing; there is one thing remaining which we can do. We think
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that under the law we have the right to take testimony in
Mexico before the United States Consul. "We are going to
take our witnesses before the Consul, and we give notice to
•you what examinations we propose to make ; so if you choose
to take any steps by way of cross-examining the witnesses, or
introducing evidence of your own, here you have an equal
opportunity with us. The names of our witnesses are given.
What is the answer to that ?
The Attorney General runs post-haste to Secretary Cass, and
gets him to issue an order to the United States Consul at Mexico
to take no testimony for us. That is in the record. That is
the way our Government does j ustice ; with the plighted faith
of the Nation, published to the world, that it would respect
California titles.
Now, may it please the Court, these documents, these archives,
are sworn to by witnesses by the dozen. Men have been
brought up here from the City of Mexico, of high position.
It has cost a great deal of money. My brother can make any
thing from that admission which he pleases. We have been
compelled to charter a steamer for the work. We have been
compelled to send down agents upon her to Mexico. We have
been compelled to get brother Billings to go down to Mexico
and induce some of these officers to come up here and give us
their testimony. He succeeded in his mission.
These men were not coming to a distant country without
some indemnity, and no sensible persons would ask them to do
so for utter strangers. They could not afford to leave their
business and come up here on a chance of payment for their
trouble and losses, or for a trifling consideration.
But there is one of these men who would not receive any
indemnity, and to him I will again refer. All the rest were
examined by us on this point, and they stated that they had
received money for coming up and giving in their testimony,
and made no secret of the amount.
Who were they that came up from the City of Mexico ?
Manuel Couto. He was Secretary of the Administration of
the Mining Fund.
The next man is Jose M. Bassoco, a member of this Mining
Junta that made these very bargains with Castillero which we
4
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allege. He was not a Government official. He was elected by
the creditors of the Mining Fund to sit in that Junta and watch
their interests. He represented $5,000,000 of the creditors of
the Junta.
The next man is Bias Balcarcel, Director of the Mining
College.
The next man is Antonio del Castillo, Professor of Mine-
ralogy, who divided out the specimens into different depart-
ments, and marked them. And this witness testified to the
intense interest with which these specimens were received and
examined.
Then comes Yrisarri, Fifth Clerk in the Ministry of Justice.
Brother Randolph sneers at this witness, as "only a clerk."
Clerks can't tell the truth. He is only a clerk, the same as any
clerk in one of the Federal Departments, he says. Are our
Department Clerks here incompetent to tell the truth ? Does
the fact that they are clerks effect their credibility ?
Who else will you prefer to bring up to testify to a certain
writing, rather than the man himself who did the writing ?
Here is Mariano Miranda, a former Clerk in the Ministry of
Justice. Here is Velasco, Clerk in the State Department. Then
here is Castillo Lanzas, Minister of Foreign Relations. Then
here is Jose Maria Lafragua, Minister of Foreign Relations, who
made a report in 1846, speaking distinctly of the matters now
in controversy. Then here is Francisco Villalon, Notary Pub-
lic, who put his signature and seal to a large number of the
instruments introduced in this record from Mexico.
Every official in the City of Mexico, whom we thought could
be of use in explaining and verifying any of our papers, was
brought up here and examined before the Court—and, need I
say it, crass-examined. Those cross-examinations are a part
of the judicial history of the country—a remarkable portion.
Upon that cross-examination I may have something hereafter
to say. It is something totally unprecedented in the whole
history of j urisprudence. Six or seven hundred questions to
one witness are what is termed, in familiar language, a mere flea-
bite. That constitutes a mere commencement. Every possible
thing which human ingenuity could devise, in the shape of a
cross-question in such a case, is brought up and propounded.
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Men are not only asked their age and birth-place ; their entire
domestic relations are inquired into. They are asked where
they went to school, who were their school-mates, and school-
masters.
They are asked whether they are the men they profess to be,
and if they have brought proof of their own identity !
Castillo Lanzas is called "upon the stand. My brother Ran-
dolph asks him : Who are you ? What is your name ? Can
you prove that you are the person you say you are.
Well, I am Castillo Lanzas, is the reply. Mr. Buchanan
knows me. I knew the whole diplomatic corps in London,
when he and I were there together. It did not suggest itself to
me to come here with certificates of identity. " Who knows
you here?" inquired brother Eandolph. "I think that
there is a gentleman here by the name of Arce, who keeps a
tobacco store, who knows me, and to whom I gave a passport
in London."
" Well," says brother Randolph, " I give you permission to
summon this witness, in order to prove that you are Castillo
Lanzas." Now, my friend Mr. Peachy plays rather a scurvy
trick. Brother Peachy pretended that he was very apprehen-
sive that Castillo Lanzas would be proven to be not Castillo
Lanzas. At least I take this to be so, for he objected very
strenuously. Brother Peachy would not allow of the intro-
duction of this tobacconist on the stand. Brother Randolph
then insisted upon his own right to bring him forward, and
summons him in behalf of the United States. Well, in comes
Mr. Arce. Castillo Lanzas is pointed at, and the question is
put: "Do you know that man?" "Yes." " Who is he ? "
" That is Castillo Lanzas." " Where did you know him ? "
" I knew him in London. He was Mexican Minister there."
"Well, now," exclaims brother Randolph, "who are you, sir?
Who knows you ? " That is the question next put to the wit-
ness.
[The Marshal had to call "order" in Court, the laughter and
demonstrations of applause being very loud.]
The moment the man said that he knew Castillo Lanzas,
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brother Eandolph wants to know who knows the witness that
he himself had summoned
!
Now, may it please the Court, I will do my brother Ean-
dolph the justice to say, that towards the close of the examin-
ation, the mild conduct, the gentlemanly bearing, the evident
respectability of the witness upon the stand, was such that my
brother became somewhat repentant of the mode in which he
had conducted the examination
;
and he testified his admiration
of the witness and his respect for his character, by asking him
for his photograph, and has his thanks for the 'portrait carefully
recorded in the Transcript.
Now, there is Castillo Lanzas. I suppose we have afforded
sufficient proof of his identity. Mr. Head, who likewise was
called by Mr. Eandolph, knew him at the Mansion House, Phil-
adelphia. He remembered Castillo Lanzas.
"But," says Eandolph, "Who knows you, sir? Who are
you ? " I presume that the result of all this must have been,
that my brother Eandolph became satisfied of Castillo Lanzas'
identity.
Mr. Eandolph.—No ; I am in doubt yet.
Mr. Benjamin.—You don't believe it yet ! May it please
the Court, my brother still remains in doubt on that point !
!
Well, may it please the Court, so it happens with all the rest
of our witnesses.
This large body of unimpeached witnesses, men peculiarly
competent to testify in this case, against whom not a solitary
word of reproach has been produced, have sworn that these
papers are genuine, written by themselves, and bearing the date
at which they were actually made.
How are all these witnesses disposed of? Brother Eandolph
disposes of them with the facility peculiar to himself: " I say
that these papers are all forgeries, and every one of your wit-
nesses is a perjurer." That disposes of them effectually. Not
a syllable in the evidence, not a syllable in the Transcript,
going to show that any one of these gentlemen is capable of tell-
ing a falsehood ; but the whole of them are disposed of by a
single statement to your Honors, that they are all perjurers, and
that all they have sworn to are forgeries.
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Now, amongst these witnesses there was one old man whom
I have never seen, but who has been spoken of to me with
affection and veneration by gentlemen in no way connected
with these claimants' interests, who made the old gentleman's
acquaintance while he was in San Francisco.
Francisco Martinez Negrete has been represented to me, by
gentlemen outside of this case, who know him as a model of a
Castilian merchant of old, as a man above suspicion or taint
of reproach ; as a man whose every action was always open as
the day ; who, to save the life of himself, or the lives of the
members of his family, would not utter a syllable of falsehood.
This man, in 1845, was a merchant in Guadalajara; he is yet
living in the same place, in his sixty-second year. Mr. Peachy
received a letter from him a few days ago, which he was kind
enough to show to me.
In 1846, owing to some circumstances disclosed in the record,
he was in the City of Mexico. He was an old correspondent
of Alexander Forbes of Tepic. Alexander Forbes of Tepic,
had just made a bargain with MclSTamara, the agent of the
owner of the mine, that he would supply this mine for sixteen
years on certain terms. Forbes writes to Negrete in the City
of Mexico, informing him that he wishes to buy some mining
shares, and begs him to act as his agent.
Negrete and Eustace Barron were old friends, and when in
the year 1858 or 1859 Eustace Barron, in the City of Mexico,
was on his dying bed, Francisco Negrete, being then in the
City of Mexico, was requested by him to go up to San Fran-
cisco, and vindicate the character of his old friend, by proving
that he himself bought these barras from Castillero in Mexico,
in December, 1846 ; that he paid for them then ; that he re-
ceived the two-league grant, and forwarded it to Tepic
;
and to
produce such evidence as was in his power to vindicate Eus-
tace Barron from the aspersions thrown upon his character in
the Courts of California. And it was because Eustace Barron
was dying that Negrete promised to do this. He died, and
that Castilian merchant complied with his pledged word, and
did come up to this city to give his testimony in this case.
And it was because he was performing a friendly service,
acting from his love and affection to a dying friend, that he
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agreed to make this journey, and give his vindicating evidence
at great personal inconvenience and without pay or reward.
He is asked, " What did you get for coming up here ?" "I
got nothing," was the reply. " If anything had been offered
me, I would not have come." He did not come up here as a
matter of business. He came here as a matter of duty to a dy-
ing friend, whose character had been aspersed, and whose last
hours were embittered by charges of fraud brought against
him. And this dying man told his son to spend the last dol-
lar of their fortune, and never to compromise this case until
his memory was cleared from these foul assaults ; and it is for
that reason that no compromise has ever been made. All the
wealth that was left by Eustace Barron, and it is large, will be
expended in this case until his character is vindicated. Many
offers have been made to buy us out, and proposals made to
secure the withdrawal of the injunction by compromises. All
these efforts have been made. All propositions for compro-
mise are useless and idle. We expect and ask for nothing but
justice from your Honors.
And now we say that we repel this charge of fraud made
by a body of speculators who have succeeded in deceiving the
Attorney-General of the United States, and cause him to
issue some of the most extraordinary productions that ever
emanated from any public officer; bringing the whole power of
the Government to bear against the claimants
;
suppressing, so
far as lay in his power, all testimony which was suspected to be
of a tendency favorable to our interests. We repel the charge
and defy the proof. Finally, at a cost of nearly $200,000, we
have obtained the evidence in this case now before the Court
;
and this we never could have done if we had not had large
means wherewith to bear up against the whole power of the
Government. Against persons of only moderate means, this
vile conspiracy against rights would have succeeded.
Well, all these witnesses come up here
;
and amongst them
is old Francisco Martinez Negrete. Here we had in our pos-
session the letters which he had written to Alexander Forbes
in 1846. Alexander Forbes left their correspondence behind
him in Tepic, when he departed for England. He is now in
England, eighty odd years of age. These letters were produced
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here. Negrete at once recognized them as the letters written
at the time at which they are dated. He gives his testimony
calmly and consistently from the beginning to the end. The
whole of his transactions with Andres Castillero are spread
before the Court. Castillero's first letter is received. He offers
Negrete two shares for himself. His reply is, that he don't
wish to go into the mining speculations. This prudent old
merchant had never done anything but attend to his mercan-
tile business, and the idea which he entertained of engaging in
carrying on Mexican mines was, naturally enough, that it was
like throwing a fortune into a bottomless pit. He could not be-
lieve that anything was to be realized from this mine. To use
his own very expressive language, "his very flesh quaked " at
the thought of a mine.
Now I want to refer your Honors to the letters of Negrete,
which give a picture of what occurred in Mexico at the time of
this purchase.
I do not intend to detain you by reading largely from the
deposition of Negrete. I merely wish to read his letters, pro-
duced here in the original, and inquire if, from their bare in-
spection, they do not in themsevles rebut the possibility offorg-
ery. Indeed, the pretense that they are forged is not in the
record. Only my brother Eandolph says they are forged.
I will read from pages 2484-5-6-7. The first things that
we have are three checks. Negrete procures them from his
banker in Mexico, and brings them up with him. Here is the
first check
:
Senor Don Donato Manteeola :
Mexico, December 18, 1846.
My Esteemed Friend : I beg of you to deliver to Don An-
dres Castillero the sum of four thousand dollars, for account of
D. Alexander Forbes, charging the same to the account ofyour
sincere friend.
Francisco Martinez Neg-rete.
Eeceived—Andres Castillero.
At the bottom of this check we read " Eeceived—Andres
Castillero." There is the payment. This comes out of the
banker's vaults. Check No. 2 reads:
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Senor Don Donato Manteeola :
Mexico, December 22, 1846.
My Esteemed Friend : I beg of you to deliver to Senor Don
Nasario Fuentes the sum of one hundred and thirty-seveu
dollars and twenty-five cents, for account of the Sres. Barron,
Forbes & Co., charging the same to the account of your sincere
friend.
Feancisco Maetinez Negeete.
Eeceived on the above date—Nasario Fuentes.
We read at the bottom of this : Eeceived on the above date,
"Nasario Fuentes."
There is the order on the banker to pay the Notary his fees
for drawing up the papers ; and this paper also he procures
direct from the banker's vaults.
Again, on the 2d of February, 1847, as appears on the face
of these papers, Forbes wrote to the City of Mexico, and asked
Negrete to send him a second copy of the contract. Under the
Mexican law, Negrete was obliged to go before a Judge and
request him to order the Notary to make out this second copy
;
otherwise, the Notary could not furnish one. The Judge's
order is here. The petition to the Judge is here. The copy
delivered by the Notary is here. And here again is the check
on the banker for payment of charges on this second copy :
Senor Don Donato Manteeola.
S. C. Mexico, February 6, 1847.
My Esteemed Friend :—I beg of you to have the kindness
to order the payment of the sum of seventy-five dollars to the
Senor D. Nasario Fuentes, charging the same to the account of
your sincere friend.
Feancisco Maetinez Negeete.
Received—Nasario Fuentes.
Now, not only are these banker's checks here, showing the
payment by Negrete at that time, but there is a letter here
showing the whole transaction precisely as it occurred.
On the 5th of December, 1846, Negrete first acknowledges
the receipt of orders from Forbes to buy for him
:
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Senor Don Alejandro Forbes :
Mexico, December 5, 1846.
My Esteemed Friend :—Pursuant to your favors dated 24th
ultimo, I have spoken to Senor Castillero in the terms which
you express in one of them, and he has promised to think over
the business arid bring me his propositions to-day, and also the
document of the ownership of the mine which he has in his
possession. It is now eight o'clock at night, and he has not
brought his proposals, from which I understand that he has not
been able to finish them, and should it be so I shall send them
to you by next mail.
Your affectionate friend and servant,
Francisco Martinez Negrete.
Postscript.—After having signed the above, Senor Castil-
lero has come in and has brought me the contract of partner-
ship in the mine, with a copy of the original, which I transmit,
as I have not time to make a second copy. You will observe
the simplicity of that document, and that it is wanting in ex-
planation. By article second, none of the associates can alien-
ate his share. Senor Castillero says that he drew up this arti-
cle to prevent any of his partners from disposing of any share
(barra) to the North Americans. He has also handed to me
the letter, the original of which 1 send you, for the purpose
that having informed yourself of their contents, you may com-
municate to me your orders in the terms you may think
proper. According to Senor Castillero, the half of the proceeds
belongs to the supplier (aviador) of a mine. You, in view of
the contents of the contract, and of the proposals which he
makes in the letter addressed to me, can decide upon what is
most expedient, and I assure you that on my part I will obey
your orders to the best of my ability. Said Senor Castillero
places much value on the Island of Santa Cruz, which is his
property. He says it is thirty-two leagues in circumference,
with a good harbor, timber and fresh water. He is disposed to
sell it rather than have it taken from him by the Yankees. It
is distant four leagues from the port of Santa Barbara, and he
considers that it would be of much importance to England,
should the United States take possession of the Californias. If
you are inclined to purchase, you can inform yourself of all this
leisurely.
The mail is about to close, and without time to say more, I
remain your affectionate friend and servant,
Francisco Martinez ISTegrete.
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]STow, here is a letter (page 2486) dated Mexico, December
9th, 1846 :
Senor Don Alejandro Foebes :
Mexico, December 9, 1846.
My Esteemed Friend :—Don Andres Castillero delivered
to me, just as the last mail was leaving, a copy of the papers of
the mine in Upper California, and a letter addressed to myself
on the subject of the terms on which he would agree to enter
into a contract with you. That you may carry this business
into effect, it is requisite to make it sure that it be done in a
manner which shall leave no room for disputes afterwards ; and
as the said documents sent to you in my letter of the 5th, fur-
nish some information, it would be conducive to this end to
submit the business to the judgment and opinion of a good law-
yer, who will draw up the conditions in conformity to the ordi-
nances of mining and the existing laws. "With this and the in-
structions you may give me, I can do everything else here
which I may be ordered. Senor Castillero appears to be a se-
date person, and he manifests a great interest that this negotia-
tion may be placed under the protection of the English flag, as
being the only means of securing that property, in which he
owns twelve shares (barras), having ceded the other twelve out
of consideration to the persons who now own them.
I had written thus far when I received late through the Eng-
lish Minister your esteemed letter of date 28th ult., and in con-
sequence of its contents I have spoken with S.nor Castillero
again on the subject of the negotiation of the quicksilver mines,
and find him entirely disposed that the half of the mine which
belongs to him be supplied (se refaccione 6 habilite,) or to
sell four shares (barras) as may appear best, on account of the
interest which he has in defending this negotiation under the
protection of the British flag. Seeing him so well inclined,
and desiring to acquire information regarding the value of the
shares, I have resolved not to enter into any complete arrange-
ment before speaking first with Father MacNamara ; neither has
it seemed to me proper to divulge what I know about the con-
tract you have made there, until the arrival of the Father and
I have a conference with him, and it be seen whether it will
not be better that he himself inform Castillero of said contract,
which I have read carefully, and find that it has not all the for-
malities prescribed by the laws, because, in the power of attor-
ney granted by Senor Castro should have been inserted the
power which the other two parties interested gave to him, that
is, the Father Keal and Kobles. I would have been glad that
you had fixed some starting point for me, as I find myself in
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the dark and unable to form any opinion as to the value of
each share ; but let it be what it may, and whatever may be
the opinion of Father MacNamara, I will not go beyond the
price of fifteen hundred dollars, or at the utmost, seven thou-
sand dollars for the four shares which Senor Castillero is dis-
posed to sell, as appears from the letter which he has addressed
to me to-night, a copy of which I inclose. I shall inquire of
said Father what price Don Diego Forbes gave for the two
shares which you mention, and be guided by the same
;
and
you will please observe, that should said price be more than
two thousand dollars each, I will suspend making the purchase
till I receive further orders from you ; as in truth, not being a
miner, nor inclined to that branch of business, my flesh quakes
at only thinking upon the precarious nature of such negotia-
tions and their results, etc.
I am, your affectionate friend and servant,
Francisco Martinez Negrete.
Now, what is it that Castillero wrote to Negrete, in the City
of Mexico, and which the latter forwarded by copy to Alex.
Forbes
:
Senor Don Francisco Martinez Negrete.
Home, December 9, 1846.
Dear Sir :—To the proposals which this morning you were
pleased to communicate to me, regarding the quicksilver mine,
I will say briefly that you may assure Senor Don Alejandro
Forbes of the sale of four shares, and that to conclude the con-
tract I only await the arrival of Father MacNamara, that, in
view of his authority, more validity may be given to the in-
strument, and we may make arrangement of all the matters of
the company. The Board of Encouragement (Junta de Fo-
mento) has offered me one distilling apparatus for quicksilver,
of the two which it has ordered from England, and two thou-
sand flasks which it has in Tasco, which is important news for
our business.
I am, etc., Andres Castillero.
Just here I stop a moment. Brother Randolph, in his cross-
examination, refers to the translation of these words :
—
La Junta
de Fomento de los dos aparatos que ha mandado traer de Ingla-
terra para la distilacion de azogue me ofrece uno. That is to
say, that the Junta, of the two apparatus for distilling quick-
silver which it has ordered from England, offered him one.
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Now, by reference to the actas of the Mining Junta, we find
an entr}r corresponding with this very matter. It appears that
when Oastillero made his bargain, which was broken off be-
cause the Government consumed in their war operations all
the funds in the public treasuries, he proposed to the Junta
that they should give him some iron retorts which it had, and
some flasks from Tasco. The Junta agreed to this proposition.
The negotiations were broken off. Nothing was done. There
was no habilitation of the mine. Oastillero remained in Mex-
ico. Alexander Forbes leases the mine; and in December
Oastillero tells Negrete that the Junta offers him one of the dis-
tilling apparatuses for quicksilver recently ordered from Eng-
land. Now, where is the entry in relation to the distilling ap-
paratus ?
At page 1495 your Honors will find, in Spanish, the acta for
the Session of the 10th of September, 1846 ; and the last entry
but one in that acta reads
:
There was read a petition from Don Jose A. Nieto, request-
ing that there should be sold to him, at cost and charges, one
of Doctor Ure's apparatuses which the Junta has bought, to put
up at Guadalcazar. The Junta acceded to the request, asking
Sor. Nieto whether it would suit him to take the apparatus at
Havana.
Now, we find, by following on these entries, that the Junta
sells, on petition, at cost and freight charges, one of these dis-
tilling apparatuses.
The Junta enter into an agreement for the disposal of one of
these apparatuses, provided that it might suit him to receive
it at Havana. It had not yet got to Mexico.
At page 1529 you find that on the 26th of November, 1846,
the second entry is :
From Messrs. Baring Brothers, in London, 31st October, ad-
vising having placed in Havana, at the disposal of Messrs.
Picard and Alven, the two distilling apparatuses ordered from
them, with the corresponding plans to put them up, and with
the invoice of same.
Let the receipt of said communication be acknowledged, and
let the amount remaining in their hands, of £270 Qs. 5d, be
drawn for. For this purpose Mr. Bassoco is commissioned.
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Here, then., in every little circumstance of their proceeding,
nothing ever issues from the pen of Castillero, or any of these
parties, that does not receive some emphatic confirmation in
these actas.
Now we have all these actas brought in. What are the
entries ?
Here is Castillero's letter of the 9th of December, noticing
the offer made to him by the Junta of one of these distilling
apparatuses. Here are the records of the Junta selling one of
these apparatuses in September. These papers descend into all
these little details of circumstance. Let the United States
prove one of them false or forged.
Negrete, on the 12th of December (page 2188), again writes
:
Senor Don Alejandro Forbes.
Mexico, December 12th, 1816.
My Very Esteemed Friend :—I have given orders at the
stage office to inform me immediately when the Father Mac-
Namara may arrive. I do not believe that he has arrived by
to-day's stage, because if he had they would have sent me
word. As the business which you have on hand is of great
magnitude, as I conceive it to be, and as its success depends
entirely on Senor Castillero, I intend to submit the arrange-
ments to be made in conformity with the requirements with the
laws, to a lawyer in whom I have all confidence ; as in such
cases it is better to spend at the beginning five hundred dollars,
than to have to incur afterwards a lawsuit when the negotia-
tion is fully established and productive. In whatever way it
may be done, this business will be managed in the best possible
manner.
I am neither a miner, nor do I like the business. From the
beginning Senor Castillero offered me two shares (harms'), which
I declined. Eeckoning, with your consent, I might perhaps
take one share for some friends of mine, but this would come
in, like all the rest, in the contract of supply (avio refaccionario).
In this manner, if it should be that the holders did not gain
any great advantages, they would know that at most they
would lose only what the share had cost them.
Wishing you good health, I remain, your obedient servant,
Francisco Martinez JSTegrete.
There are two young men who had got it into their heads
that a share in this mine would be worth a good deal. One of
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them was a relative of Negrete. Castillero told Negrete
that he might have two barras. ISTegrete cannot consent to
enter into a mining company ; but he has two young friends
who would like one share between them. Then Negrete writes
to Forbes.
That share was taken ; and of these two young men, one of
them holds his half-barra. He lives in Mexico, and is owner
of a half-share to this day ; and Negrete gives his name, and
tells his place of residence. This we offer in evidence for the
benefit of the Government, who may prove Negrete a perjurer
in this particular instance.
On the 16th December Negrete again writes
:
Senor Don Alex. Forbes.
Mexico, December 16, 1846.
My Esteemed Friend :—The Presbyter MacNamara arrived
here on the 12th, by the stage, and yesterday, the 15th. he was
in my house for about a couple of hours, when we talked particu-
larly about the business ofthe mine in California, and what should
be done as regards Senor Castillero. To-day at eleven o'clock
we met again, together with Senor Castillero and a lawyer in
whom I have entire confidence, that he might be informed of
what was to be discussed, and draw up the articles of our agree-
ment in conformity to law, or in the best manner possible. I
have instructed him regarding all the essential points of the
transaction, by means of extracts of your letters, that is, of
such portions of them as favor our position, so as to treat on
the conditions which may be most favorable to your interests,
considering the present condition of the business, and I will
inform you of the result of the whole, either in this letter, or
separately ; but, I advance these lines in case I should not have
time.
The measures you have adopted in regard to the vessel which
carries the cotton, are, in my opinion, very proper, and were
even indispensable.
By to-morrow's mail I expect to receive accounts from Ma-
drazo and Palacio of the result of the fair, and although all
complain bitterly, I am sure that they must have sold all the
stock from the factory notwithstanding the Yankee wagons
which came from Santa Fe, which were allowed to enter San
Juan without any difficulty. The Supreme Government is
inclined to prosecute the war, and it is believed that the national
representation is of the same mind ; and such being the case,
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there will naturally follow a formal declaration prohibiting all
communication with the North Americans, and even expelling
those residing in the country, as was done with the French.
The English courier has arrived ; till now I have received no
letter from my compadre, although I have received other letters.
I hope to get it to-morrow.
I am, your affectionate friend and obedient servant,
Feancisco Maetinez Negeete.
And here is a postscript:
P. S.—Senor Castillero desires that you should maintain
possession of the island, and for this purpose he has addressed
me the inclosed letter, which I recommend to your attention.
And here is the inclosed letter
:
[lettee eefeeeed to in this exhibit.]
Senor Don Feancisco Maetinez Negeete.
Home, December 16, 1846.
Esteemed and Eespected Sir :—I would thank you much if
you would recommend to Senor Don Alexandro Forbes, that
on taking possession of the quicksilver mine, my island of
Santa Cruz, situated in front of Santa Barbara, may also ap-
pear as an English possession. Being distant only four leagues
from the coast, it is a very important possession on account of
the abundance of water and timber, and its good harbor. To
English vessels, and even to the company, it may be of service
for the absolute independence in which it is of all the country.
Excuse me for repeating my request, and I remain always your
most obedient servant,
Andees Castilleeo.
Now, may it please your Honors, in relation to the question
made by the U. S. counsel about this mode of passing property
from under the flag of Mexico to that of some other power in
order to save it from spoliation by the United States, then at
war with Mexico, I desire to say a word. Why? Was it not the
duty as well as the privilege of a Mexican, when his country
was at war with the United States, to injure the United States
as much as he could ? Was not this according to the laws of
war? And if he is the weaker party, is it not his duty, is it
not his right, under the law of nations, to hide his property
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from the Government of the United States, and save it from spo-
liation ? "When the war's desolation breaks upon a land, does
not the shepherd hasten to the field, and gathering his flocks
and herds, fly with them to some secret place of safety ? Does
not the prudent housewife take her treasure and bury it in the
earth, safe from the hand of the despoiler ? Does not the mer-
chant send his vessels and stores of goods to distant lands,
where they will be secure from seizure by his country's
enemies ?
But the land cannot be moved. Then every possible
stratagem is employed, and legitimately employed, to hide it
from the power and use of the common enemy of the country.
Does the gentleman suppose we are going to offer excuses for
the Mexicans who avail themselves of this undoubted privi-
lege? Far from it. Is not the instinct of self-preservation
implanted in every created being, animals as well as man ?
The little fish in the sea, when pursued by a superior foe,
will eject an inky fluid, and conceal its flight 'neath the murky
cloud. Every living creature is born with this instinct. Go
out into the field, and observe the little bird hopping away
from the wayfarer, simulating a wounded wing, until it has
turned him from the place where its treasures lie concealed,
and then, when its pretty stratagem has succeeded, it will rise
buoyant in the air and carol forth its thanks to God, who gave
it the instinct by which it preserved its offspring.
All this is natural and proper. Why excuse these Mexicans
for doing this very thing? We do not offer any excuse. It
was proper. It was justifiable. It was the duty of any Mexi-
can when at war with the United States. So much for that
point.
I proceed with Negrete's statement.
On the 16th December, 1846, another letter was written, and
this letter first speaks of the success of the transactions, and
the sending of the papers
:
Senor Don Alejandro Forbes:
Mexico, December 16, 1846.
My Esteemed Friend :—At last, to-day, a little after eleven
o'clock, the Presbyter Don Eugenio MacJSTarnara, Don Andres
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Castillero, myself, and Senor Don Jose Antonio Eomero, met
together to arrange the final result of the business of the mine,
and, as we had to deal with matters of law, I considered it
proper that Senor Eomero should attend, and certainly in this
I was not mistaken, as he was of great service to me in the con-
ference and in the illustration of some points—and he also sus-
tained and elucidated my ideas with the judgment, wisdom and
experience which he has acquired from his practice in the
management of affairs—so that, had he not been so well posted
on the subject relating to which we had already held various
meetings, and fixed the starting points, and noted the flanks on
which we might be approached, probably we would not have
obtained the desired results.
Senor Castillero, then, conforms to the contract executed in
Tepic by his associates, and takes part in it also for his twelve
shares in the mine—and, after various debates, he decided to
sell you four shares. Having agreed unon this, I requested
him to cede to me another share for two friends (who are your
friends also), and he acceded, stating that my mediation and
the regard he professed for me, were sufficient motives for him
to accede to my request. Thus it is, that I have contracted for
the five shares, at $800 each, making in all $4000, which I
shall pay over as soon as the writings are made out—it being
understood that, although the $800 of the share for the two
friends shall be paid by them, this shall be included in the avio
agreeably to the contract which you made in Tepic.
Besides this instrument, there will be executed another for
the supply (avio) for the part belonging to Senor Castillero.
Senor Eomero has taken a note of all the points, so as to order
the instruments to be drawn up in such a manner as to prevent
disputes afterwards. Senor Castillero engages that his associ-
ates will consent to the sale of these shares ; and, if they do
not, he will pay you their cost out of the proceeds of the twelve
shares belonging to him.
He has in his possession the title paper of the Government,,
by which is granted to him in the mining district (mineral) two
leagues of land in circumference, which he has ceded for the
benefit of the negotiation for the sixteen years of your contract.
He has assured us that the Board of Encouragement of Mining
has entreated him to sell it some share, but that he declined,
and I have told him that for no reason nor consideration ought
he to alienate any more shares, as in such case you should be
preferred. I believe that I have acted and worked for your
best interest, and if after this you obtain the advantages you
propose in this enterprise, my gratification will be doubled.
66
By next mail I will send you the writings, and give you any
other details which at present I may have forgotten.
I am, your affectionate friend and obd't serv't,
Francisco Martinez Negrete.
And here follows the letter of the 19th of December:
Senor Don Alejandro Forbes :
Mexico, December 19, 1846.
My Very Esteemed Friend :—Conformably to what I ex-
pressed to you in my last letter, there have been drawn up the
writings of the treaty between Don Andres Gastiilero, as the
owner of the half of the quicksilver mine, and myself, as your
representative, the originals of which were signed yesterday by
both, after having acquainted ourselves thoroughly with their
contents, and in the presence of Father MacNamara, who was
of opinion that they were expressed in the terms best for your
interests, and for this purpose our lawyer, having taken note of
all the points, superintended the drawing up and other matters
connected with it, because being myself no lawyer, I desired
to have the assistance of one, as this would prevent differences
and disputes afterwards. I have been promised the legalized
copies (testimonios) to-day, and shall transmit them with this
letter, together with the instrument which you executed there,
and the document showing the grant which the Supreme Gov-
ernment made in favor of Don Andres Castillero for two leagues
of land (two ranges for neat cattle) at the place where the mine
is situated, and which he cedes for your benefit for the term of
sixteen years.
After having made the contract with said Castillero, and not
having been able to obtain from him more than four shares for
you, I requested him to cede to me one share for two friends of
mine, and he acceded to my request immediately, as is shown
by the inclosed letter addressed to you by said Castillero. I wish
to have this share for my nephew, Don Francisco Maria Ortiz,
and Don Martin Lapiedra, in consideration of the first having
indicated to me that a small interest in this business would
make them happy, and I have desired on my part to gratify
them in the belief that you wish to do the same, as I know the
regard and other considerations which you have for them. As
a matter of course this share is to be included in the supply
(avio) of the company, conformably with the contract made. If
we are to believe the statements of Castillero, that mine is the
richest in the world, and he surely says so in sincerity, and is
to me a man of strict morality and probity. He expresses
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himself to the effect that the contract is very favorable to you,
and says that my mediation overcame everything in the way
of it, so that he would not have done so much with any other
person. Be this as it may, after having done my duty, my
satisfaction will be much greater when I know that by this
means your fortune, and that of your respectable house, has
been increased.
Senor Castillero has promised to give me a certified copy
from the Mining Tribunal of all the concessions which it made
to him, when on the proofs given by the Professional Board
{Junta Facultativa) it engaged to favor the mine, but which it
did not do, because the Government seized upon the funds.
Now, may it please your Honors, that paper was never seen
by any of the owners until 1850, and they did not know that
it had the slightest interest for them. They had not the slight-
est idea that it could be of any interest for them. What cared
they for any agreement which Andres Castillero might have
made with the Junta, when it was known it had not been car-
ried out, because the Government seized the funds ? That bar-
gain had been replaced by a new one. They now themselves
furnished the funds ; and it did not enter into their brains that
the old bargain that Castillero made with the Junta was of any
value to their interests.
It was not then until 1850, when Castillero came to Tepic,
and saw these letters of Forbes, which were shown to him, say-
ing that he ought to get a "ratification" from the Supreme
Government, that he said : " I have got one ; I have got my
grant; the Government gave me a ' ratification.' What do
I want with another?" And then he and Eustace Barron upon
this statement start for Mexico, where they both resided, prom-
ising to get a certified copy of the document showing the rati-
fication of the mining possession. Where is it found? Not
in the dispatch from the Minister of Relations to the Gov-
ernor of California. Nobody dreamed where else it could
be. But the Government communications were two. One
says to the Junta de Fomento that the President had approved
of the bargain made with Castillero for the working of his
mine on the terms proposed ; and the other says to the Minis-
ter of Relations, give him a grant for two leagues. Now the
very language of the Government to the Minister of Relations
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induced the belief that there was nothing contained in the
terms proposed but some bargain about working the mine
;
and men might have gone on under that conclusion, and
looked over these papers forever, and never have dreamed that
under these very words was concealed a ratification. Amongst
the terms proposed, was one providing for a ratification of the
mining title. Oastillero tells Eustace Barron in Tepic that there
is a " ratification." They go on together to Mexico and find
it, and sent it on instantly. This is the paper which Castillero
was to have given Negrete in 1846. It was the paper which
proved the perfect folly and uselessness of the suggestion of
James Alex. Forbes. If James Alex. Forbes had known that
amongst Castillero's propositions there was one to ratify the
mining possession, he never would have suggested the forgeries
which he did. He proposed to forge titles because he did not
know that amongst these propositions so made, was one in-
volving the ratification of the mining title.
And the best possible proof of this fact is contained in James
Alex. Forbes' letter of the 20th December, 1849. It will be
found at page 846. This man is proposing to forge titles ; he
is proposing to forge them because he does not know that
they already exist. Here is his letter of the 20th December,
1849. I read from foot of page 847 :
I know not what conditions Castillero may have proposed to
the Supreme Government of Mexico, but, whatever they may
have been, they, of course, cannot be fulfilled in California by
reason of the change of government.
It never had yet suggested itself to any man, that amongst
Castillero's proposals for working the mine, was one in which
he asked for a ratification. The people in Tepic knew nothing
of it. James Alexander Forbes knew nothing of it. James
Alexexander Forbes had written down letters urging forge-
ries. Castillero arrives in Tepic from Lower California.
James Alex. Forbes' propositions were spread before him. He
exclaims, " Why, what in the world is he writing about ? My
mining possession was ratified when I went to Mexico in 1846.
The ratification is there in the archives. What does he want
now with another ratification ?"
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And then what is the answer written to James Alex. Forbes
by the house of Barron, Forbes & Co. ? " Your letter has
been received. In reply, we would state that Castillero is now
here, and he says that his ratification was given him in Mex-
ico in 1846."
On the 7th of January, Castillero was still in Lower Califor-
nia. On the 3d of February, 1850, Alexander Forbes writes
to James Alex. Forbes: " Castillero has returned, and is also
here." * * * " He says such approval was given, and
that on his arrival in Mexico he will procure a judicial copy
of it."
Now this is the first time that it is ever suggested by any-
body that the propositions for working the mine contained a
condition that the mining title should be ratified. This is the
very first thing that Castillero says when he is shown Forbes'
suggestions.
From 1846 to 1850 there is a separation. War intervenes.
Peace is declared. Castillero has been in Lower California.
When he arrives we will show him James Alex. Forbes' let-
ters and see what he will say. He does come over. The first
words he utters are : " There is already a ratification. I got it
in Mexico in 1846."
This brings us back to Negrete's letter of the 16th December,
1846
:
Senor Castillero has promised to give me a certified copy
from the Mining Tribunal of all the concessions which it made
to him, when on the proofs given by the Professional Board
{Junta Facultativa) it engaged to favor the mine, but which it
did not do, because the Groverment seized upon the funds.
Now, he goes on to say
:
At the end of this letter is a statement of the capital and
expenses of the whole, with the only difference that the Senores
Ortiz and Lapiedra will make good to you the eight hundred
dollars which they have to pay for their share.
I have not- received the instrument which I have mentioned,
but I remit the other documents.
He had been in hopes that the Notary would give him copies
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of the two acts—the power of attorney is sent to Tepic, as
well as the grant of two leagues which Castillero gave him to
send on.
Here, then, this grant of two leagues is traced directly from
the Mexican Government to the hands of Castillero ; from the
hands of Castillero to Negrete, and from the hands of Negrete
it is dispatched—as we have seen in this letter—to Alexander
Forbes. Did Alexander Forbes receive them ?
I read from page 2496 :
Senor Don Alejandro Forbes:
Tepic, Mexico, January 9, 1847.
My Very Esteemed Friend :—By your favor dated 29th ult.,
I noticed that you had in your possession the before mentioned
documents, and I believe that on a close examination you will
find them to be in order.
I shall mention your indications to Castillero, and according
to his opinion the principal supplies for the mine should consist
of goods of the country, mostly domestic cottons and brown
sugar, which articles he noted in the report which I transmitted
to you in one of my former letters.
About the end of September there sailed from New Orleans,
bound for San Bias, a ship loaded with cotton, and I do not
know whether the cargo belongs to Rubio or Drusina.
Without any other particular matter to communicate,
I remain, your affectionate friend and obedient servant,
Francisco Martinez Negrete.
This is from Negrete, acknowledging the receipt of Forbes'
letter, advising the receipt of the report forwarded by Negrete.
From the top of page 2493, I read :
I have paid to Senor Castillero $4000 yesterday, which I
have charged to your house, $120 exchange, at 2 per cent.,
making $4120, of which my house in Guadalajara will give
your office advice.
I will send you, by next mail, a note of the other expenses.
Your affectionate friend and obd't serv't,
Francisco Martinez Negrete.
On December 19th, Negrete forwarded another little note
:
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To Don Alejandeo Foebes:
Mexico, December 19, 1846.
My Esteemed Friend :—Immediately after having put into
the post-office the package addressed to you separately, there
were delivered to me the two instruments mentioned in it, and
which I have the pleasure to transmit to you herewith.
Your affectionate friend and obedient servant,
Feancisco Mabtinez Negeete.
Now, we have got four documents forwarded,—the two
copies of the contract of avio, and the sale of the barras.
Castillero's title for two leagues of land, and Castro's power of
attorney, all leave Mexico for Tepic, and all reach Tepic and
are acknowledged as received by Alex. Forbes on the 29th of
December, 1846.
Now, these same papers are brought forward into Court, and
they are exhibited to Negrete, who recognizes them all. He
recognizes the Castillo Lanzas document as the very one which
he at that date sent to Alex. Forbes in the City of Tepic.
But observe, before these papers went to the City of Tepic,
the two league grant was used in making a notarial act.
When Castillero told Negrete, "I have got two leagues of
land adjoining this mine
; I have got a grant of it for cutting
wood for burning in the mine ; and as you are going to take
the mine for sixteen years you will want it, I throw it in ; I
don't give it to you ; but you may go and cut wood upon it,
just as you need, to supply the mine. Here is the title ; take
it, and send it to Alex. Forbes."
The Notary is then required by Negrete's lawyer, Mr.
Eomero, to put this two-league grant in the deed of avio.
The Notary does this. For what purpose ? That it may be
inserted in the copies sent out of this deed. They wanted them
all to go out together.
And in this connection we have a little incident indicative
of the good heart of this old merchant. He will not engage
in the mining business, but he reserves a share for two young
friends, who would be made "happy" on obtaining such a
possession. He will divide the cost between them. The mine
may turn out well. At least this share will make my young
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friends happy. I don't want anything for myself. I take this
share for these young men, not for myself. That is the tenor
of these letters on this subject.
In February, 1847, Negrete presents himself before a Judge
in Mexico, and petitions for an order requiring the Notary to
make him out a couple of additional copies of these papers.
The Judge grants this order; the copies are made out; and
then Negrete writes as follows :
Senor Don Alejandro Forbes:
Tepic, Mexico, February 6, 1847.
My Dear Friend :—I have written you a separate letter, and
with this I have the pleasure to transmit the inclosed writings,
and also the receipt for their cost, which amounted to the sum
of seventy-five dollars, which you will credit to my house in
Guadalajara.
I am, your affectionate friend and obedient servant,
Francisco Martinez Negrete.
This closes the Negrete correspondence.
[end of first day.]
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SECOND DA.Y.
Thursday, Oct. 25th, 1860.
Me. Benjamin—May it please your Honors, in the course
of my argument yesterday I called the attention of the Court
to the fact, that upon the last examination made in the Mexi-
can archives, some papers had been discovered—the existence
of which was previously unknown to the claimants—those
papers being a correspondence between the Governor of Cali-
fornia and the Mexican President at the date of the discovery
of this mine, and of this denouncement. And I called atten-
tion to the fact that upon the return of these papers from Mex-
ico, the keeper of the archives in California was requested to
make his search, and there found the papers which corres-
ponded with the archives that had recently been discovered in
the City of Mexico.
Amongst those archives is found a statement that the dis-
patches from California to Mexico, were taken by a special
commissioner, Mr. Covarrubias. In addition to the testimony
disclosed by the archives themselves, and by the testimony of
witnesses who state the fact of the transfer of these communi-
cations from California to Mexico at that date, we have what I
had omitted yesterday to call to the attention of the Court. In the
index [holding up a small pamphlet], which I have prepared
for the convenience of your Honors, are stated two entries
from the " Diario Official." One states the arrival of the
brig " Juanita" in Mazatlan, on the 2d of March, 1846, from
San Diego, in twelve days. That is at page 2354 of the record.
And then, on the 12th March, by the marine news at Mazat-
lan, published in the papers of the day, the brig " Juanita "
leaves Mazatlan for San Bias. The paper contains a list of her
passengers
;
and amongst them is Mr. Covarrubias, the mes-
senger from the Governor of California. This fact I omitted
to call to the attention of the Court yesterday.
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I have stated to your Honors what the archives in the City
of Mexico are. I have detailed to you what they contain, and
refer you to the testimony of the witnesses who prove the
genuine character of the documents relied on by us.
All the testimony to which I have hitherto adverted, is the
testimony of Mexican officials. "We desire now to invoke, in
behalf of these claimants, the testimony of a witness sent from
California for the purpose of examining and comparing these
archives
;
and that of the United States Minister, Mr. Forsyth,
who was then in the City of Mexico.
Mr. Brodie, a gentleman well known in this city, of unim-
peached, and I imagine, unimpeachable character, was employed
by the claimants for the purpose of taking the copies to the
City of Mexico. He had long been a resident of the Mexican
Republic ; knew the people, knew their language, and knew
some of their public officers, as he states in his deposition. He
took the traced copies which had been sent from Mexico back
to the City of Mexico, and went to the archives there for the
purpose of comparing them, and ascertaining their accuracy.
His testimony is conclusive as to the entire accuracy of the
copies, and their concordance with the originals there found.
Upon the cross-examination of Mr. Brodie—whose testimony
is at page 1059—the counsel for the Government propounded
to him two questions, to which I will call the attention of the
Court.
The first question is at page 1067. The witness had stated
that he went with Mr. Forsyth, the American Minister, for the
purpose of making this examination of the archives and com-
parison of the copies with the originals.
Ques. 27.—Did you explain to Mr. Forsyth that the papers
that you wanted were to be used in a certain case in California,
in which Eustace Barron, Escandon, and other foreigners, were
claiming the ISTew Almaden quicksilver mine against the
United States ?
Arts. 27.—I did not explain to him anything at all. I did
not know that Escandon had any interest in the matter ; do
not know it yet. In conversation with Mr. Forsyth, after the
papers had been examined, we talked about the purpose to
which these copies were to be put, and he understood perfectly
well that they were to be used in the United States Courts in
California.
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I call the attention of your Honors to this remarkable ques-
tion, as exhibiting the entire theory of the Government in this
case ; that it is the duty of the officers of the United States,
under no circumstances to lend any aid whatever in the taking
of testimony, or in affording any facilities for bringing before
the Court the evidence on which these claimants base their
rights
:
The next question is (Ques 28) : " "Were not those traced
copies, Exhibits G. H. I. and K., all traced in California ?
Ans. 28.—I say no ; impossible, unless they had the originals
to trace them from here.
Now, those originals were in Mexico. Let us see what Mr.
Forsyth says upon this subject. On page 1112, he states the
facts on his examination.
How came Mr. Forsyth to go to the public offices of Mexico
for this purpose ? It was because the Government of the
United States had refused to send any agent, or to authorize
or facilitate any investigation whatever; for that reason, and
in order to show the entire good faith of these claimants, Mr.
Eustace Barron, of the City of Mexico, unwilling that it should
be supposed that he was doing anything clandestinely or
secretly, prevailed upon the representative of the United States
Government to go to the public offices of Mexico, and there
satisfy himself, by actual inspection, of the authenticity of the
originals, of which copies were to be produced.
Mr. Forsyth says (page 1112):
In the months of July and August, 1858, I was Minister of
the United States of America to the Republic of Mexico, and
residing as such in the City of Mexico. In the months of July
and August, 1858, at the instance of Mr. Eustace Barron, of
Mexico, who was one of the parties claiming an interest in cer-
tain quicksilver mines in California, known as the New Alma-
den quicksilver mines, I went in company with the British
Consul in Mexico, Frederick Glennie, "Esq., Mr. John P. Bro-
die, of California, who had come as agent for the claimant
of the mines, and the Licentiate Emilio Pardo, first to the
office of the Junta de Mineria.
And then he describes the production of the originals by the
proper archive keepers, one by one, and the careful examina-
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tion made by him of those archives—by reason of which he is
enabled to testify to the truth of the copies. He says that
these copies were precisely alike in every respect ; and to these
copies he gave his certificate. At the foot of the page he says
:
These original documents were found in the several offices
where they appropriately belonged, and were produced by the
officers having the custody of them ; and I saw nothing what-
ever to cause me to doubt their being genuine originals. I, as
Minister, certified each of the copies hereinbefore mentioned,
and the facts set forth in those certificates are true, and the
certificates are in accordance with the laws of Mexico.
The Government of Mexico will not allow the great seal of
Mexico to be attached to copies of such documents, nor will
they allow the originals to be withdrawn. And the manner in
which the copies herein mentioned have been authenticated, is
the only way in which such copies can be authenticated. The
copies, so as above mentioned certified by me, are not now be-
fore me, but the printed volume hereto attached as apart of my
deposition, and marked Exhibit A, and purporting to contain
printed copies of those copies, I believe to be correct.
Now, having produced these copies, with certificates sworn
by the United States Minister in Mexico, to be the proper cer-
tificates for authenticating them', and the only ones known to
the Mexican law by which copies can be authenticated, I shall
not detain your Honors by referring to the law book, because
you have familiar in your memory the provisions of the Act of
Congress constituting this very Court under which you are or-
dered to determine these cases according to the usages of Mexi-
co, and yet your Honors are invited by the counsel for the Gov-
ernment to take these certificates thus made according to the
laws and usages of Mexico, carry them to the window, tear
them up and throw them out, as impertinent matters in this
case.
They are good, valid, legal certificates. They are proof con-
clusive of that which they purport to state. They are good
certificates in any Court of Justice in Christendom. They are
good by the very words of the law under which your Honors
are bound to decide the cause.
Now, it is said : True it is that all these documents are there
in the archives. True it is that they purport to be original.
True it is, that the Minister of the United States, charged with
the defense of their interests in a foreign country, has examined
them, and can find no reason whatever to doubt their authen-
ticity; but I, the Attorney-General of the United States, in-
struct the special counsel of the United States to say in Court
that they are not true originals ; that they are antedated, fabri-
cated, forged and fraudulent.
Your Honors are called upon to say this, without a shadow
of testimony in support of the assertion. What semblance
of probability is there in this assertion ? If our object had been
to forge papers by which we could show to the satisfaction of
this Court a grant of this mine and of this land—if the gentle-
man [Randolph] gives us credit for sufficient subtlety and inge-
nuity to carry on, without leaving a trace behind us, this long
series of forgeries—why does he not then give us at least,
credit for sagacity enough to make papers that would be un-
doubted grants? For, he says, the papers we have fabricated,
and that we have taken all this pains to forge, are no grants,
and are not legal conveyances of the property. If we wanted
to fabricate papers to prove our title, the papers themselves, on
their face, would have admitted of no two constructions. But
he says our papers do admit of two constructions. He says
they are doubtful, vague, uncertain, no title papers at all. And
yet we forming this scheme to place in the public archives of
Mexico, a body of documents which are to put our title beyond
dispute and contradiction, fabricate titles open to all the objec-
tions as to their true construction which his legal ingenuity has
suggested to the Court ! He says the paper we rely on as title
to two leagues of land, on its face does not purport to convey
it. He says the papers we say are a ratification of our mining
possession, are not such in law, nor do they purport to be such
on their face.
Now, if we wanted to fabricate something, we would not fab-
ricate something that admitted of these doubtful constructions
;
but we would have put in the papers a direct grant of what
we claim—a direct and undeniable grant of the land to us,
without any necessity of referring to local officers in California
to put us in possession, when it is known that no possession
was ever had. All these papers which we produce are such as
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he says do not carry out the object. We had skill, we had sa-
gacity
;
we could put papers in the Mexican archives by the
bundle ; we could do anything we pleased ; and }^et it did not
please us to forge plain and unequivocal papers—but only pa-
pers that are liable to all the legal objections which he has sug-
gested to the Court ; liable to double constructions, not pur-
porting to be grants, and if grants, requiring further proceed-
ings to give them effect according to their true interpretation
!
What a strange system of forgery is this ! All this risk, all
this skill, all this labor and ingenuity, exhausted to forge papers
that are not, he says, good titles ! which, he says, are not good,
if true ! What probability, may it please your Honors, in all
these wild assertions ?
But the gentleman goes farther, and tells us that it is abso-
lutely impossible that all these transactions should have occurred
in the City of Mexico at the time that we say they did occur
there; and why not? With his vivid imagination, with his
artistic power, he has drawn a picture to the Court of the con-
dition of Mexico at the time. He represents the American
armies as thundering at the gates of the city ; the entire Repub-
lic as in alarm ; the whole mind of its public officers as intent
on but one thing—the defense of the country. He says, that
if a thousand witnesses came forward to swear to the fact that
all these transactions about the mine occurred, the inherent im-
probability of the assertion is such that your Honors ought to
reject it as an idle fable. And then, in the fervor of his imagi-
nation, he furnishes us with a comparison : he says, we may
as well believe that such an act could have been performed by
the officers of the beleaguered city, when Cyrus, with his Per-
sian army, was thundering at the gates of Babylon. Does not
my brother Randolph remember what was occurring in Baby-
lon that night ? With Cyrus thundering at the gates, did not
Belshazzar and his Court that night engage in riot and in feast-
ing? So far from the inhabitants of that doomed city keeping
watch and ward, or fearing danger, mad orgies filled that night in
Babylon. Cyrus was entering the gates, yet the people did not
know it, so confident were they in their security. Vainglo-
rious and presumptuous were the Babjdonians ; nor did they
suppose it possible that their well fortified city could be taken.
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Will my brother also call in doubt that relation, and say that
the dread handwriting on the wall was also forged and antedated ?
Mr. Randolph—Certainly not.
Mr. Benjamin—Yet he will see at once how very unfortu-
nate has been his allusion to ancient history, for the purpose of
satisfying the Court that all Mexico was ringing with cries to
arms, and that it was totally impossible that any other business
could have been under consideration. Let him look at the
newspapers, which it is said we have forged, and which are
here offered before the Court. All the daily operations of life
were going on ; the theatres open, people going to their usual
evening amusements ; the administrative acts of the country
spreading over so vast an extent of territory as was then em-
bodied in Mexico, going on in daily routine. And all this
theory that it was impossible that the Government of Mexico
should have been occupied with anything else than the war is
utterly annihilated by the facts which we know to have occur-
red. Besides which, the gentleman's picture is overdrawn. At
the time when these things were going on, it is true there had
been some frontier battles on the Rio Grande ; true that the
American army had dispersed the Mexican army at Palo Alto
and Resaca de la Palma ; but the news of these events had not
reached Mexico.
Mr. Randolph—The news reached the city on the 19th
of May.
Mr. Benjamin—These things all occurred on the 5th, 6th,
7th, and 12th of May.
Mr. Randolph—The grant is dated the 20th.
Mr. Benjamin.—It is proven that all the arrangements were
completed previously, and needed nothing but the President's
" acuerdo " to make the whole complete. All the preceding
forms had been complied with. All the operations, the bar-
gaining, and the communications between the different Minis-
ters, had taken place before even the news of the battles had
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reached the City of Mexico—so that my brother's argument is
false in theory as well as unfounded in fact.
My brother Peachy recalls to my memory the ball in Brus-
sels on the night before the battle of Waterloo, when the Brit-
ish officers were called from their dancing with the ladies to
fight that memorable field.
But, if your Honors please, another ground is suggested. It
is suggested that the demand for the land, alleged to have been
addressed to the President in Mexico, could not in all proba-
bility have been acceded to, because upon the very face of the
papers produced by Castillero himself, it was stated that his
mine was upon private property ; that it was upon the land of
the " retired sergeant, Jose Reyes Berreyesa." Now, if the
mine had actually been upon private property, this argument
would have no force whatever, for the reason that there is no
pretense that the land of Berreyesa extended for two leagues all
around this mine ; and, therefore, the grant of two leagues con-
tiguous to the mine, and upon the mining possession, would of
necessity have been considered by the local authorities, when
giving possession, as subject to the rights of Berreyesa, and
would have been so located as not to interfere with him. The
very purpose of the Spanish law, in requiring the delivery of a
juridical possession, was to take care that the grant—which is
made very frequently in the neighborhood, and sometimes
on the very boundaries of, private land—shall not intrude
upon that private land, but that the land (given by the grant)
shall be so laid out by the public authorities as to respect prior
possession and prior title. So, under any circumstances, the
authorities of California, upon the production of this title, would
have laid out the land without encroaching upon the possession
of Berreyesa. But all this is explained away at once by some
documents that have since appeared in the case.
At page 2729, your Honors will find Berreyesa's title in the
Spanish ; and on the next page, in the English. The title
purports to be issued by " the citizen Manuel Micheltorena,"
then the Governor of California. In the 4th article, the grant
states: "The land of which donation is made is two square
leagues, a little more or less, as is explained by the respective
sketch."
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That paper, purporting to be a grant of two square leagues,
was handed by Berreyesa himself to Castillero. It is in Ber-
reyesa's handwriting, as shown by the evidence. The fact that
it was his handwriting is proven by the testimony of two wit-
nesses.
Well, now, Berreyesa, as is admitted on page 2728, died
about the month of June, 1846 ; so that this paper, which is a
copy of Berreyesa's title, made by himself, was made prior to
June, 1846.
Berreyesa, then, prior to June, 1846, furnishes in his own
handwriting what he says is a copy of his title, and which pur-
ports to be a conveyance of two square leagues.
Now, if your Honors will look at page 542, at a letter writ-
ten on the 7th of February, 1848, by James Alexander Forbes
to Alexander Forbes, at the time that they were making the
survey of the two-league grant through the agency of the Uni-
ted States Surveyor, you will find Forbes says: "My opinion
of the title of the widow of Berreyesa, or rather my first view
of that title, and the information given by her sons, was that
the grant was for two leagues ; but I have been at her house on
my return hither, and I find that the title was given for one
league, or sitio, and that the word one has been converted into
the word two."
Now, when Castillero first applied to the Governor of Cali-
fornia for a grant of two leagues, in the papers which have
since been found here, and in which his petition is described,
he asked for two leagues adjacent to his mine, believing his
mine to be on Berreyesa's land—believing it by reason of this
forged paper of Berreyesa's, in which he had erased the word
"one" and inserted the word "two," and added an "s" to the
word " sitio." Therefore, when he asks this land, before leaving
California, he wants it adjacent to his mine. He goes to Mexico
and determines that he will ask for the grant there directly
from the President.
What occurred in Mexico ? Will your Honors look now at
page 3049 ? On that page is a letter written from the City of
Mexico by Castillero to Alex. Forbes on the 14th of January,
1847, just after he had in the contract of avio leased his two
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leagues of land for sixteen years, and had sent the title to
James Alexander Forbes
:
Esteemed Sir :—The Sor. Don Francisco Martinez Negrete,
has informed me of your willingness to place my Island of Santa
Cruz under the protection of H. B. Majesty's Government. I
thank you as well as Mr. Negrete for this favor, and to that
end I enclose a letter for Sor. Don Antonio Aguirre, a citizen of
California, who holds my power of attorney and a document
which proves my property.
It has seemed to me proper to enclose you a copy of the title
of possession of Don Jose Reyes Berreyesa, in which is situate
the quicksilver mine; in my opinion it is not within the pos-
session of said Berreyesa, but is situate on vacant land. I state
this to you because I was so informed by several adjacent pro-
prietors (colindantes). The copy which I send you herewith is
given by himself, and bears a falsehood on its face ; for Gover-
nor Micheltorena gave him only one league (sitio) of land, as
that gentleman himself has informed me. I remark this to
you, so that you, by an agent of yours, may examine Berrey-
esa's title in the archives office at Los ADgeles, so that you
may take possession of the other two which belong to the com-
pany and which the Government of Mexico has granted.
Now, compare Castillero's application to the Mexican Govern-
ment, after he has gone to Mexico and learned this fraud, with
that which he made before he left California. When he leaves
California, under the impression that Berreyesa has a title for
two leagues, he asks the Government here for a grant of two
leagues contiguous to the mine. When he reaches Mexico, and
finds that that title (Berreyesa's) is a fraud, and that the grant
was indeed but for one league instead of two, he applies to the
President of Mexico for a grant of two leagues upon the mine.
Is that plain? Is that natural? Is that consistent ? There
is nothing on the face of these documents that does not carry
out our theory to the fullest extent. He (Castillero) wanted
his land as near his mine as he could get it, evidently. It was
for the purposes of his mine. In California he thinks his mine
is on another man's land ; he asks for land which is not on, but
near, the mine. In Mexico he finds his mine is not on the land
of another ; he asks for two square leagues on the land of his
mining possession. So much for land on another person's
property.
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Your Honors will find in the record in this case, the espe.
diente of the Berreyesa title ;. he has left out the Micheltorena
grant, and he has put his claim upon a grant from another
Governor (Alvarado) to one league. Mr. Lewis proves that
there is enough land to cover the one league for Berreyesa,
without at all infringing upon this mine, or this mining pos-
session. Castillero's impression in Mexico was that it was
vacant land, and as such he asks for it. Bat whether
vacant, or not, was a matter of very little consequence to the
President of Mexico, for the reason that Castillero had to be
put in juridical possession by the local authorities ; and that
juridical possession would necessarily respect the boundaries
of any preexisting proprietor.
There is nothing in the record contrary to the testimony of
these witnesses, that this copy of Berreyesa's grant was given
by him to Castillero in his own (Berreyesa's) handwriting
;
the fact is sworn to by two witnesses, not controverted by any.
You will bear in mind that Berreyesa's handwriting is here in
different original papers ; that it has been the subject of com-
parison by experts, and no attempt has been made on the part
of the Government counsel to show that that writing was not
Berreyesa's own handwriting.
Well, now, what is the next objection? The next objection
is this, weighed upon and commented upon, detaining the Court
for hours : That in all the early conveyances of shares in this
mine, between the parties, the instrument of copartnership is
referred to, instead of the registry and denouncement, as the
title of the different individuals who sell their respective barras.
Well, I am somewhat surprised at this, because I cannot imag-
ine what possible title they had other than that instrument of
partnership.
Where had Padre Eeal got a title to a barra in this mine,
except under Castillero's grant to him? Where had Teodoro
and Secundino Robles got a title in this mine, except through
the grant by Castillero to them in the instrument of copartner-
ship ? The original denouncement and. juridical possession
gave no title to these other parties, because those stood in Cas-
tillero's name. The parties selling were not those who regis-
tered as denouncers. The registry and denouncement are in Cas-
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tillero's individual name. What, then, more natural ; what else
could be done when Eobles sold his shares, and Castro sold his
shares, and Padre Keal sold his shares ? What else could be
done to show a title, than to show the grant by the discoverer
to them of one half the mine ? What other title had they ?
None other.
And then it is said that these parties, all throughout, speak
of three pertenencias, while the grant is of a mine of three thou-
sand varas as a mining possession. From the very origin, the
gentleman has harped upon this point ; although it was an-
swered in his own first examination of James Alex. Forbes,
who gave him over and over again the whole theory of all the
owners of this mine from the origin, in language too plain to
be mistaken.
A discoverer's mine, under the ordenanzas, is three pertenen-
cias ; therefore, when these parties were selling out shares in
the mine, they sold out their shares in the three pertenencias.
That was the mine.
Now, the Alcalde says, after giving possession of the mine,
" I have thought proper, (' he venido en concederle, 1) I have come
to the conclusion, to grant three thousand varas, as a gratia"
The Alcalde had no earthly power to do it. It gave nothing.
It was of no value as a grant or concession, but still it was
there on the face of the papers. And what is that gratia, or
mining possession ? A tract of land, upon which the hacienda
—the reduction-works—can be established, and upon which the
mining workmen may live ; land for stables for their cattle, and
for every operation that is necessary in the working of a
mine.
Now, the gentleman, after James Alex. Forbes had been in-
troduced as a witness in favor of the Government, by every
possible means endeavored to make him say that there was
something inconsistent in these purchases and sales of shares
"in three pertenencias." But James Alex. Forbes persistently
told him it was all right. I refer your Honors to Forbes' dep-
osition, at pages 446, 455 and 870. Page 446
:
Ques.-—Of what did he give you the possession ?
Ans.—Of the mine itself, the hacienda, the mining utensils,
and the ores that had been extracted from the mine.
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Ques.—What do you mean by the mine. Do you mean the
spot only where the ores were dug, or that spot with a definite
extent of land about it ; and if the latter, of what definite ex-
tent of land around the mine did he give you possession ?
Ans.—I do not recollect that any definite extent of land was
specified, other than that given by the Alcalde. It was under-
stood that the mine contained three pertenencias at the time.
[The latter part of this answer objected to.]
Ques.—By "pertenencias" do you mean the quantity of land
known as such in the mining ordinances of Mexico ?
Ans.—I do.
There that stops. Now we will turn to page 448
:
Ques.—Will you answer yes or no, whether he gave you
possession of a definite tract of land about the hacienda ?
Ans.—There was no definite tract of land stated. The pos-
session of the hacienda was comprised in that of the mine.
Again
:
Ques.—When you delivered possession of this mine and ha-
cienda to Eobert Walkinshaw, agent of Alex. Forbes, of what
did that possession consist. Did you deliver possession of any
tract around the mine and hacienda, or either of them ?
Ans.—I delivered to him that possession which I had re-
ceived, together with a considerable quantity of ore which I
had extracted. At the hacienda I delivered what I had re-
ceived, together with some utensils purchased by me. I did
not deliver to him possession of any definite tract about the
mine or hacienda.
Ques.—When you recovered possession of the mine and ha-
cienda on your return from Tepic, of what did you regain pos-
session ?
Ans.—I did not state that I recovered possession on my re-
turn from Tepic ; I said I received it by virtue of a power of
attorney.
Ques.—Of what did you receive possession on your return
from Tepic ?
Ans.—I received possession of the mine, a large quantity of
cinnabar ore, and of the hacienda, comprising all the works erected
by Mr. Walkinshaw."
The gentleman is not yet satisfied ; and goes on, at page
455, when Forbes again attempts to make him understand
what he means
:
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Ans.— * * *, There was only one act of possession
which I understood to have been given. This embraced three
pertenencias, so far as regarded the mine. Three pertenencias, and
also lands about the hacienda, I understood to have been given
to Castillero in 1845.
Ques.—How much land do you mean to say was granted
about the hacienda ?
Ans.—1 understood there were three thousand varas.
Ques.—When do you mean to say you understood this ?
Ans.—I think I learnt this about the time I received posses-
sion from Real. I am not certain, it may have been subse-
quently.
Ques.—When you bargained and bought of the Eobles two
of their four " barras," did you not obtain from them the half
of all their interest in the mine and its appurtenances?
Ans.—I did.
Ques.—How is it, then, that your deed, drafted by yourself,
expressed only two of their barras in "each of the three per-
tenencias of that mine ?"
Ans.—Quite correct. I purchased two barras, and as a
matter of course the deed expressed according to mining custom all
the pertenencias supposed to be comprised in a mine.
Ques.—How is it, then, that there was no allusion to their
interest in the tract of three thousand varas around the hacienda,
which is one mile from the mine ?
Ans.—The terms of the deed of sale comprise everything
;
all their right, title and interest to lands and mine.
Ques.—Show what words in that instrument convey an inter-
est in the three thousand vara tract around the hacienda.
Ans.—It is that clause which commences, " all their rights
and shares in each one of the three pertenencias," etc.
By Mexican custom a sale of barras in a mine includes an
interest in the hacienda.
Now, what plainer explanation can I give the Court, than
this witness has given—for this witness does not lack intelli-
gence? He has only too much of it. If he had a little less,
or if one-half could be carried to the credit of honesty, he would
be a very considerable man. How am I to explain to your
Honors, better than the gentleman has explained, in his own
testimony, that, according to the mining customs, all these
deeds speak of the mine as a mine of three pertenencias,
although there were other lands comprising the hacienda ; and
which were considered as appurtenant to the mine, and con-
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sequently needed no mention in the conveyances. James
Alex. Forbes so understood it, when he took a title in the year
1847, and when he bargained for his title in 1846 ; and it never
occurred to him that the three thousand varas were not in-
cluded in the sale of the three pertenencias. Yet the gentle-
man stands up here day after day, and calls on your Honors to
infer forgery, from the fact that in their deeds of sale no special
reference is made to the three thousand varas, which, according
to Mexican custom, went with the pertenencias, and required
no mention.
Me. Randolph—You argue, then, that the Junta, misun-
derstanding this document of Castillero's, supposed it to be
for additional pertenencias, and as such recommended its con-
firmation.
Mr. Benjamin—Certainly.
I now come, may it please your Honors, to a paper some-
what celebrated in this record, called the Yejar certificate.
This Yejar certificate appeared to me, when I read the
opinion of his Honor the District Judge upon this evidence,
to have precisely the signification which his Honor attached to
it. I read it over; and whilst I could not see what bearing it
had upon the genuineness of these papers, I could see that it
would certainly have a very prejudicial effect upon the mind
of the Judge to have a certificate brought before him purporting
to be a certificate of facts, known not to have existed.
Now, nothing surprised me more than that there should be
a false certificate from a Mexican Notary. It surprised me for
many reasons. "When a student at law, I passed a two years'
apprenticeship in a Notary's office in Louisiana. I was familiar
with the old Spanish certificates in the notarial offices there
;
I knew the notarial mode of doing business of the old French
and Spanish notaries
; I knew the excessive and almost ridicu-
lous particularity with which they carried out the forms pre-
scribed by law—but in the whole course of my experience I
have never seen such a certificate called into doubt or question,
nor one of them forged or fraudulent. I might have looked
anywhere else for false and fraudulent certificates ; but the
Notary is so hemmed in with pains and penalties, the punish-
ment so severe and exemplary both under the French and
Mexican law (the Mexican law being derived directly from
Spain), that it would require some most extraordinary tempta-
tion to induce such an officer to make a false certificate.
Yet this certificate (Vejar's) did upon its face apparently
bear the construction which your Honor of the District Court
had put upon it. But when I read the record through, and
found a dozen other certificates of the same nature, and noticed
the particularity with which Vejar made up each certificate in
turn, then I began to be shaken in my belief of the correctness
of the translation, or of the correctness of the meaning attached
to the words of this instrument.
In the first place, the certificate, with the meaning which at
first blush would be attached to it, appeared to be nonsense.
I could not understand how a Mexican Notary could say that
he had seen insertions of this instrument in acts done by execu-
tive officers in California. How could a man see an insertion
of an instrument in an executive act ? I did not understand
that exactly.
Then, I did not see how the Notary in Tepic could certify
that he had seen executive acts in California ; nor could I see
the slightest sense in the world in bringing up a certificate
from Tepic to prove that something had occurred in California,
with the remotest idea that any Court would admit it in evi-
dence ! because if any official act had occurred in California,
the evidence would be in California. Why should we go to
Tepic for the evidence of official acts in California ? I did not
understand it. I then took up Vejar's certificates in the Trans-
script, and examined them, and the whole thing became plain
and clear as day, for it turns out that on every occasion
throughout this whole record, in which he certifies to a signa-
ture (except when the parties had passed the signatures before
himself in the usual form), he had stated the grounds upon which
he certified it. He says : " I know such and such facts, and
for that reason I say, that in my judgment that signature is
true." I found that his (Yejar's) certificates did him honor for
their scrupulous regard to facts ; and I found that this very
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certificate, so harshly attacked, contains within itself the proof
of the scrupulous regard of this Notary to truth and honor.
I propose now to call the attention of the Court to those cer-
tificates according to their date, to show how the language of
each certificate changes according to the facts which come by
degrees to the Notary's knowledge, how scrupulously he ab-
stains from certifying a signature when he does not know it,
and how, when a signature is brought before him to certify,
that he does know, he leaves it to those who read it to ascer-
tain whether the grounds upon which he attaches his certificate
are sufficient, or not, in law.
The first certificate in this record, of this Notary, is on page
511. It is a certificate to the power of attorney, of the 23d of
of April, 1849, given by Alex. Forbes to James Alex. Forbes.
This certificate is signed by Jesus Vejar and Panfilo Solis. It is
to the signatures of Alex. Forbes and the two witnesses, Joa-
quin Andrade and William E. Barron. What is the language
of that certificate
:
The undersigned, Notaries Public, certify that the foregoing
signatures are those of Don Alexander Forbes, Don Joaquin
Andrade, and William E. Barron, the same that they use in all
their business transactions. In testimony of which we have
given the present in Tepic on the 19th May, one thousand
eight hundred and forty-nine.
(Signed) Jesus Vejar. Panfilo Solis.
There is Vejar's reason for certifying those signatures. He
says, they are used in all their business. It was not signed
before him, and he does not say it was. But his reason for
believing the signatures is, he says, because they are the same
signatures they use in all their business.
On the 13th of November, 1849, he was called on to certify
a copy of this Castillo Lanzas decree. Your Honors will find
his certificate at page 546.
Now, there was the time, if anything fraudulent was in-
tended, to certify that the original had the true signature of
Castillo Lanzas. But the Notary did not know, had never seen,
Castillo Lanzas' signature. He did not know whether the sig-
nature was his or not, and he would not certify it. Let your
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Honors look at the particularity with which, when this instru-
ment is first presented, he certifies the copy.
"The above is a cop}7- taken," —not from "the original;"
to use which words would imply he knew the original signa-
ture; but—"from ' its original.'" * * * The certificate
reads as follows:
The above is a true copy from its original, which was pre-
sented in this office by Messrs. Barron, Forbes & Co., of this
place, and the same being returned to them marked with my
rubric, the present is given at their solicitation for the appro-
priate use.
In testimony of which I sign and attach my signet to these
presents, in Tepic, 13th November, 1849.
Jesus Yejar.
A paper is presented to Yejar. It purports to be this Cas-
tillo Lanzas decree. He is asked to certify a copy. He will
not certify that the original is signed by Castillo Lanzas ; he
will not certify that it is an original document ; but he will
certify that the copy he makes is a copy from "its original,"
which was handed him by Barron, Forbes & Co., and returned
to them by him. Whether that original be true or not, he will
not certify. He returns them a certificate that it is the original
of the copy. That is all. There is no statement there that it
was signed by Castillo Lanzas. He knew nothing about that,
and he would not certify it.
At page 556 is the next certificate by this Notary
;
given on
the 3d of December, 1849. He was called upon with a copy
of the instrument of avio, which had been passed in Mexico in
December, 1846, and which contained a copy of the Castillo
Lanzas decree, authenticated by the signature of three or four
Mexican notaries, and the seal of the National College of No-
taries. That instrument is now brought to him, and he is re-
quested to certify ; not to the Castillo Lanzas decree—that has
not come up yet—but to a copy of this instrument of avio.
He says
:
At the verbal request of Alexander Forbes, and for the ap-
propriate uses, I give him the present, signing the same in
Tepic, the third of December, one thousand eight hundred and
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forty-nine, Having used common paper, there being no sealed
paper of the fourth class in the office where it is issued, which
I certify. Jesus Vejak.
Now, why was that paper taken to Yejar to be certified ?
"Why was not the copy from the City of Mexico sent up for a
certificate ? The answer is plain. On the 3d of December,
1849, California belonged to the United States. The original
copy from the City of Mexico, certified by the notaries of Mex-
ico, without an authentication of their signatures, would not be
admitted in California. Therefore, Jesus Yejar certifies the
previous copy given by the Mexican notaries, and then that
copy is certified by the British Consul in Tepic. It was sup-
posed that, with the certificate of the British Consul in Tepic,
it would be admitted here in our Courts, or used for any pur-
pose required as an authentication of the notarial copy from
Mexico. A notarial copy, sent from Mexico, being intended
to be used in Mexico^ required no authentication ; but here he
was asked to make a copy to be sent to California. Making
that copy, he saw the notarial certificate of four notaries of the
National College of Mexico attached to a paper containing the
Castillo Lanzas decree, " treating it with deference as genuine,
respecting it, obeying it," as he says in his certificate of that
day.
Then, on the 15th of March, 1850 (page 801), he was called
upon to give a certificate in relation to another signature. On
that day he was, in fact, asked to certify three different signa-
tures. Now, I call your Honors' attention to the manner in
which each of the three signatures was described and certified
to by this Notary. I want your Honors to see the scrupulous
care which he takes with each of the signatures. He certifies
each, giving what he knows about the facts, and leaving the
Court to determine from those facts whether his certificate is to
be treated as sufficient proof, or not.
He is asked to certify to the signature of Jas. Alex. Forbes,
who was in California. What certificate does he give ?
—
I, Jesus "Vejar, Notary Public, hereby certify and accredit,
that the last preceding signature of Don James Alexander
Forbes, is the signature of that gentleman which he is accus-
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tomed to use, it being so known to me, when I knew him in
his transit through this city on his way to Upper California,
by various acts which he executed in the house of Barron,
Forbes and Company. And at the request of those gentlemen,
I sign and execute this certificate at Tepic, on the 15th day of
March, 1850. Jesus Yejar.
That is one thing he is asked to certify—the signature of
James Alex. Forbes: "I certify it to be his signature; and I
certify it because I know it, having seen him use that signature,
when he passed through this city, in various acts. That is the
way I know that signature." He is there asked to certify the
copy of the escritura, or instrument of partnership.
On the same day he is asked to certify another instrument.
Your Honors will find his certificate on page 3132. These
papers were presented to him solely for him to certify signatures.
This (page 3132) is again to the signature of Jas. A. Forbes.
Now, the Castillo Lanzas document is presented to him. We
want him to certify this signature, too. What does he say ?
He is asked to certify the Castillo Lanzas signature to that docu-
ment which had been sent to him before for a certificate, and
which he then declined to certify as being Castillo Lanzas' sig-
nature. What does he say now ?—(Page 68 of the record)
:
I, Jesus Yejar, a Notary Public, hereby certify and attest that
the foregoing authentic instrument, signed by his Excellency
the Minister of Foreign Eelations, Government and Police,
Castillo Lanzas, has been respected under that signature, and
obeyed by the Mexican authorities that governed in Upper
California in the year eighteen hundred and forty-six, accord-
ing to insertions which the said authorities made of the said
instrument in acts which they passed upon the subject of which
they treat, and which I certify to have seen, and for this reason
that signature in the said instrument should be esteemed as
authentic, and signed in the handwriting of his Excellency the
Minister ; and as also by proceedings which have passed under
my observation Sor. Don Andres Castillero recognized it.
The certificate is not offered for the proof of any executive
acts in Upper California ; it is offered to prove a signature.
The Notary says : " I say that it is the signature, and here is my
reason : my reason is that I have seen it respected in insertions
of that document in acts passed in which that document has
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been respected and treated with deference by Mexican authori-
ties."
Now, may it please your Honors, if two meanings could be
given to this certificate, would you select the one which would
brand this man with falsehood, perjury, and official misconduct;
or the one which the act naturally bears on its face ? Observe,
too, he certifies to this certificate for two reasons, the latter of
which you may judge to be sufficient, or not, as you please.
"These are my reasons," he says; "First, I have seen acts
containing insertions of this document in which this signature
has been respected and obeyed, as being a genuine signature,
by the Mexican authorities ; Secondly, by proceedings that
have passed under my observation—Castillero recognized it."
That may be a bad reason, or a good one. It is his reason.
Take it for what it is worth. The grant purports to be made
to Castillero. Yejar says he has two reasons for believing the
signature to be a genuine signature ; one is, that Castillero
recognizes it to be a genuine signature ; the other, that the
Mexican authorities have inserted it in acts passed before them
which " I have seen." We produced the acts in which he had
seen it, and in which it was inserted.
Now, what is there against all this plain and logical sequence
of facts? These words: "that governed in Upper California
in the year 1846." Now, let us put ourselves in the Notary's
place for a moment. He has given his certificate to the genu-
ineness of an instrument which is to go out of the country;
he certifies, therefore, that the signature has been respected by
Mexican authorities ; but it strikes him that, the fact that it
has been respected by Mexican authorities gives it no authen-
ticity in California, which is an American possession ; it is
therefore necessary to state that it was at the time that Mexican
authorities were governing in Upper California, to wit, in the
year 1846. For the purpose required by these parties— to
send it into the United States,—it won't do to simply certify
that it was respected by Mexican authorities ; that does not
help it in the United States ; but it must be at a time when
Mexican authorities governed in Upper California. I must
state the date when it was so respected, the date when the
Mexican authorities were governing in Upper California, to
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wit, the year 1846. The ideas passing through the Notary's
mind become apparent to any individual who will read the
certificate candidly.
It was suggested by his Honor the District Judge, that those
words (ados que autorizarori) might refer to other officials besides
notaries ; and it is asked what reason had we for restricting
"actos" to notarial instruments in this particular case ?
To that I answer, first : That it is true that those words "actos
autorizados" are Spanish law terms which do apply to other in-
struments— as his Honor observed— but that those words are
particularly, and almost invariably, applied in the Spanish law
to notarial instruments. In the Mexican Febrero, vol. 2, page
532, the author, speaking of the various kinds of public and pri-
vate instruments, says: " There are various classes of public in-
struments that the laws of the Partidas recognize, such as docu-
ments authenticated by the seal of the Pope, King, Prince,
Archbishop, Bishop and others; but among them special
mention should be made of those authenticated by the signet
of a Notary, who is the officer created by law for this purpose."
In the whole of these notarial certificates scattered through
this volume, you find these words "actos autorizados" used by
every Notary who attempts to certify a signature. And,
although it is true, as his Honor the District Judge observed,
that those words could be applied to other authorities, yet
when we find about one hundred certificates in this volume,
in all of which the words are applied to notarial acts, the pre-
sumption is that they are in this instance applied also to nota-
rial acts, and nothing else. It is a Notary that is certifying
;
he is using notarial language ; all through the record you find
notarial instruments certified in these words and in no other.
Everywhere else the meaning is undisputed. Why is that
meaning changed for this particular certificate ? Why should
it be so changed ? And why should it be so changed for the
purpose of establishing that the Notary certified a falsehood in
regard to a matter of which he was not asked to certify at all ?
The certificate on its face states its purpose. He is not asked
to certify facts in California ; he is asked to certify a signature;
that is all his certificate purports to be—an authentication of a
signature.
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Now, whether he gave good or bad reasons for his certificate,
is to us a matter of indifference, for he states his reasons—such
as thej are—and your Honors can judge of their weight. All
we asked of him to do, and all he could do, was to certify the
signature to three or four papers—which certificates he made
out as he thought proper. This signature he certifies to be
James Alex. Forbes', because " I have seen him use the same
in various acts ;" "that I know for other reasons." I shall
bring to your Honor's attention some other certificates where
he uses these words "por esta razon." " This one" he says,
" is true because I have seen it inserted in various acts." We
produce the acts in which it was inserted, and those very acts
prove the statement to be true that he had seen the document
inserted in them, and treated as genuine by Mexican authori-
ties. Who made these insertions ? Mexican authorities. The
California authorities were designated as local authorities. All
through these books of record, when California authorities are
spoken of, they are called local authorities. That is not what
this Notary has seen. He has seen the signature respected by
Mexican authorities ; that is, by authorities of the City of
Mexico.
I think, may it please your Honors, that this amounts to
absolute demonstration. We were all deceived in our opinion
of the meaning of the paper ; which I admit, upon its face,
appeared to be that which the Court attributed to it, namely,
that this Notary was certifying to something Which had oc-
curred in California, when he had not the remotest idea of
certifying to anything in California, at all, and could not know
in Tepic what occurred in that department.
Shall I give your Honors more of his certificates ?
On the 18th of March, 1850, he was called to certify to some
other papers. It is another certificate in relation to the signa-
ture of James Alexander Forbes ; and given for the same rea-
sons as before. James Alexander Forbes' ratification of the
avio was presented to him. What is his certificate to this?
(Page 549)
:
I certify and give this certificate, that the preceding signature
of James Alexander Forbes, which is subscribed to the fore-
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going power of attorney granted by Don Jose* Castro, is the
same that he is accustomed to use as Vice Consul of Her Britan-
nic Majesty in Upper California, under his seal of office as it
appears ; and in such character of Vice Consul such signature is
recognized by foreign mercantile houses in this city in giving
faith and credit to authentic instruments which he has issued
—
and for this reason I certify the signature.
That is the reason why he gives that certificate.
On page 2475, this Notary is called upon to certify the cer-
tificates of notaries of the City of Mexico, on this same day
(18th of March, 1850). In so doing, he gives a different rea-
son. He certifies their signatures, and gives his reason for it.
It appears to me, then, may it please your Honors, in the
highest degree unjust to this Notary to give to his instrument
the signification which was formerly given ; a signification with
which we have nothing to do. He was asked to certify Lan-
zas' signature, amongst others, and if he gives bad reasons for
believing it to be his genuine signature, it is nothing to us.
Mr. Justice McAllister—Taking your construction to be
correct, do you say that the certificates of a foreign Notary,
made in a foreign country, should be taken as evidence by this
Court ?
Mr. Benjamin—Not at all. I simply wish to prove good
faith, so far as the certificates are concerned.
Now, how is Jesus Yejar's certificate further assailed? By
a very simple method ; by saying he was a piece of office furni-
ture of Barron, Forbes & Co. Well, so he is, just as my broth-
er Randolph is a piece of office furniture of any of his clients,
and as I am of mine. If it suits him to call me at present a piece
of office furniture of Barron & Co.
—
Mr. Randolph (interrupting).— By no means. I shall
never do so, sir.
Mr. Benjamin—"Why not? They are my clients. Barron,
Forbes & Co. were clients of Yejar. Notaries have clients as
well as lawyers. Each Notary has his clients. Those clients
do all their business in his office. You might ridicule any set
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of certificates brought from any Notary, any where, as signed
by a piece of office furniture, because all the business of the
client is done in the same office. I will say, that so far as my
professional business is concerned, I do all my client's business,
or none. There would not be a particle more of propriety in
the epithet being applied to any gentleman of the bar, because
he was the legal counsel of his client, than in applying it to a
Notary, because he was the Notary of a commercial house.
I now come, may it please your Honors, having reviewed
some of those facts which are spoken of as inducing doubt in
relation to the genuineness of these papers—a genuineness that
is now established beyond all controversy—to inquire into the
origin of this charge of fraud.
How came it to be made ? Whence did it derive its origin ?
and who were its respectable progenitors ?
A man by the name of James Alexander Forbes—who has
been often mentioned in this case—became bankrupt. Not yet
thoroughly bankrupt in character, though that was rather bad,
he became utterly bankrupt in fortune. He came to these gen-
tlemen, who are the claimants in this case, and asked them for
money, and they would not give it. He asked them for a loan
of $10,000. They had already lost money by his bankruptcy,
and declined giving him any more just at the moment when he
had become bankrupt. Animated by motives of revenge, and
by a desire to swindle somebody out of some money, having
failed in his efforts on Barron & Co., he bethought him that
there was a body of men here who were busy in claiming this
valuable property, pretending that it belonged to them under
agricultural grants, who had the ear of certain Government
officers, and who, if they could get rid of the New Almaden
Mine owners, might perhaps defraud the Government out of it
for their own benefit. How were these New Almaden Mine
owners to be gotten out of the way ? Up to that day, not a
human soul had breathed a suspicion of the genuineness or va-
lidity of these papers which had been spread upon the records
of the Courts of this country for years.
"I will go," says James Alexander Forbes, "and get hold of a
shrewd Frenchman here by the name of Laurencel, and satisfy
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him by forging certain papers, and putting them in connection
with certain other true papers, that there is something wrong
in this title. I won't let him have anything until he pays me
$10,000 cash down ; and I will run no risks. The way I will
avoid risk is this : I will stipulate that these forgeries of mine
are not to be used except to effect a compromise ; and if Lau-
rencel can get a compromise by their use, then he shall give me
$10,000 more. If he cannot effect a compromise, why, the pa-
pers are not to be used for any other purpose, and I run no
risk. I will, at any rate, get my $10,000 in my pocket, and
may be these gentlemen, the owners of the mine, will be fright-
ened by this conspiracy into some compromise, and will give
Laurencel some of their property—in which case I will get
$10,000 more. If they do not, why Laurencel will be left to
suffer, and I will have pocketed $10,000."
Forbes proceeds immediately to carry out this notable scheme
—and he finds a willing auditor in Laurencel. Laurencel, in
his testimony, admits this bargain ; Laurencel, under stress
of the orders of the Court, is forced to answer the question put
to him relative to it. He declines answering it at first.
Me. Randolph—Excuse me
;
you fall into an error. Lau-
rencel testifies first, that he gave a large sum of money for the
papers ; and the amount of the money was the only thing
which afterwards it required the order of the Court to induce
him to divulge.
Mr. Benjamin—Certainly. (Deposition of Laurencel, page
377.)
Ques. 18.
—
"What amount did you pay ?
Ans. 18.—I paid a large amount; I decline to say the
amount.
(Page 378). Ques. 21.—What did you pay Mr. Forbes for
those papers.
Ans. 22.—I have already declined to answer that question.
[The Court requires the witness to answer].
I paid Mr. Forbes twenty thousand dollars for the interest
that I was acquiring in depositing these papers, and the en-
gagement on his part to go to Mexico, when I should request
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him to do so, and procure for me the proof of the fraud com-
mitted in this case, which he assured me he could procure. I
was also to pay, if necessary, his traveling expenses.
"Was that your bargain?" "Yes, it was." "Was it in
writing ?"
After some equivocation on that subject, which I do not care
about dwelling on, Laurencel finally answers : " Yes, it was in
writing." Where is it? On page 380, he answers that
—
UT
have destroyedmy counterpart ; it was in duplicate
; I destroyed it
by the advice of counsel ; I did. not preserve a copy of either ; i"
thought it would be inconsistent with the object with which I de-
stroyed the papers"
What moral leprosy was there in that paper which his coun-
sel would not suffer even to appear in a Court of Justice ? Was
it that the infamy of the transaction had so penetrated into the
very substance of the paper on which it was written as to taint
the paper itself? That paper must never see the light
!
He says now, that Forbes' promise was to procure him proof,
proof which he said existed of the fraud. Procure proof!
Was that all ? They say that such were the contents of the pa-
per burnt up
!
What a field is left for the imagination, as to the infamy of
this transaction, when the man who enters into it is told by his
counsel, burn up your paper, sir I It is infamous ! It must
never be seen !
What was this bargain ? Was it that James Alexander
Forbes was to procure other witnesses who would join him in
establishing his forgeries ?
Was it that he was to go to the City of Mexico and endeavor
to get witnesses from there to swear that these papers, con-
taining our title, do not exist in the archives, were not the
original papers, or were not placed there at the time that the
dates purport ?
What was this infamous bargain which polluted the very pa-
per on which it was written ? No man knows but the parties
to this conspiracy ; to others, it will remain a secret forever.
They have disclosed to the Court whatever they chose to dis-
close. They have destroyed the evidence which wOuld disclose
the rest. That, I suppose, is locked up in their own bosoms,
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to be carried into effect between them, on the principle that, as
regards themselves, there is honor between thieves.
The next that we see of Mr. Laurencel, he is inducing Be-
nito Diaz to come in and back the testimony of James Alex-
ander Forbes. He shows him papers; induces him to examine
them ; has conversations with him—which poor Benito Diaz,
who has a bad memory, says he cannot exactly recollect ; and
then comes into Court with him to back the testimony of James
Alexander Forbes in carrying out the conspiracy between
Laurencel and himself (Forbes).
What else do we know of Mr. Laurencel ?
Having in his possession, and under his control, or rather
having access to the records of the United States Consulate of
Monterey, containing in their pages the proof of the departure
of certain vessels
—
Mr. Eandolph (interrupting)—You refer now to a book
which was at the time in my keeping ? I told you the other
day that that book was not within the access of Laurencel.
For all that concerns that book, I alone am responsible.
Mr. Benjamin—If Mr. Kandolph states that Mr. Laurencel
did not see that book, of course I have nothing further fro say.
Mr. Eandolph—Mr. Laurencel, or any other gentleman who
chose to see it, could see it. Further than that, I had charge
of the book which was loaned me by Mr. Larkin ; and I alone
am responsible for its keeping.
Mr. Benjamin—I say nothing to the contrary. My brother
Eandolph does not know what I have reference to. I say that
Laurencel had access to certain books containing certain facts.
Mr. Eandolph—If you refer to the letters to the Depart-
ment of State—they were there. If to the other letters—they
were not there to the best of my knowledge and recollection.
Mr. Benjamin—Of course my brother cannot suppose I re-
fer in the remotest degree to him. I am referring to Lauren-
eel's acts.
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Mr. Eandolph—"When referring to a book in my keeping,
you are referring to me in a great measure.
Mr. Benjamin—I will drop that part of the subject, as Mr.
Eandolph seems sensitive about it.
Mr. Eandolph—No ! I request you to go on.
Mr. Benjamin—I was simply going to state this, that Lau-
rencel had access to these records. It is a fair presumption that
he there ascertained that certain vessels had left California at
a particular date
;
yet he brings up evidence to sustain my
brother Eandolph in the fact that no vessel left. I do not for
a moment suppose that my brother covered up the evidence.
Of courss he only got such evidence as Laurencel brought.
Mr. Eandolph—The records to which you refer were
brought in evidence. It is all in evidence. But not one single
line or word is put in evidence, and you are speaking altogether
in regard to a private document, without warrant from the
record.
Mr. Benjamin—I proposed to abandon the subject. You
said, go on ! When I go on, you object. I will, therefore,
leave all that concerns Laurencel and the departures of those
vessels aside. I will leave aside the fact that he (Laurencel)
produces witnesses in Court (whose memory is eulogized by
Mr. Eandolph) to prove, as they did most emphatically, that
they remembered perfectly well all the vessels that left Upper
California in the first half of the year 1846. Yet here is the
proof in the newspapers and marine news of the day, of other
vesses leaving at that time—facts which they, with a memory
stated to be extraordinary and unimpeachable, had no recol-
lection of when they were brought up by Laurencel.
What else does Laurencel do ?
He sends James Ales. Forbes down into Lower California
to corrupt General Jose' Castro by an offer of a bribe of $10,000.
I say Laurencel did this, because no man can suppose the
United States Government did it. Forbes said to Castro, to
be sure, that he came in behalf of the Government. But, in
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truth, Laurencel had bargained with him that he should go.
Laurencel states that was his bargain.
(Page 2616.) The witness (Castro) called upon the stand, is
asked in relation to a visit paid by James Alex. Forbes to him
in Lower California. The first states the date of the visit, as
April or May ; and then before his testimony is complete he
states that the data given by him previously is erroneous. It
was in January or February, and not April or May. Now,
what was this visit ?
Q. 18. Just before you left Lower California on that occasion,
had not James Alexander Forbes been there on a visit to you?
A. Yes, sir ; he was there about the latter part of April, or
the early part of May.
Q. 19. Please to state what was the object of Mr. Forbes'
visit to you, as disclosed by himself, and what passed between
you in your interviews ; and under what circumstances Mr.
James Alexander Forbes left Lower California.
A. At my residence (the Sausal de Camacho) I received a
letter from James Alexander Forbes, dated at Don Juan Ban-
dini's rancho, in which he stated that he had a matter of great
importance to consult me about, and requested me to come at
ones to see him. I did so, and took my Secretary with me.
When we arrived, after the usual salutations had passed, Mr.
Forbes and myself walked out together from the house, and
he then stated to me that he was authorized by a powerful
company of speculators (empresarios) in San Francisco to
furnish me with the necessary means, if I would consent to
detach Lower California from Mexico, to make it independent,
and that subsequently it should be annexed to the United
States. I listened to this calmly, and told him to go on. He
then said, there is another matter of importance to you. If you
will give your testimony against the owners of the Almaden
mine, the Government will pay you a considerable sum, more
than ten thousand dollars. I answered, "With regard to what
you first proposed, I am an officer of the Mexican Government,
and will not be guilty of treason ; and as to the other matter,
I cannot be bought with money to do an infamous action ; say
nothing further to me on the subject." We then returned to
Mr. Bandini's house.
I then went home, leaving Mr. Bandini an order, directed to
Forbes, stating that my duty, and his own personal safety,
required that he should immediately leave the country. A
few days afterwards I heard from Mr. Bandini that Forbes had
left the day after he received my order.
103
After asking some other questions, he answers to the twenty-
second interrogatory thus
:
A. I did not give him an opportunity to enter into further
details. He was speaking about being dissatisfied with the
house, etc., as I stated before, when I stopped him, saying that
I did not wish to hear any further explanation about his affairs.
Q. 23. Did he mention the names of any members of this
powerful company of speculators in San Francisco, who were
desirous of detaching Lower California from the Mexican
Eepublic, and of annexing it to the United States ?
A. He gave no names.
Q. 24. Did he tell you by what authority he spoke for the
Government, when he promised you ten thousand dollars and
more, if you would give your testimony on its behalf, and
against the owners of the mine ?
A. He did not state how he was authorized to make the
offer—he only said the Government would pay me.
Q. 25. Did he exhibit to you any written authority from the
Government to treat with you about this matter ?
A. No, sir.
Q. 26. Did he tell you who defrayed the expenses [of his
mission to Lower California ?
A. He said that there was a fund here in San Francisco, out
of which his expenses were paid.
In the cross-examination, he is first asked how he came to
recollect and change the date of the visit from April or May to
January or February. He says, in looking over his testimony
it occurred to him. (Page 2621.)
Q. 40. About this date of your interview with James. Alex-
ander Forbes in Lower California, what had happened in the
two or three days which had elapsed, to enable you on yesterday
to remember more accurately what the date was ?
A. Because I thought the matter over, and came to that
conclusion in my own mind; but I am not even now absolutely
certain about the date.
Q. 41. Has not Forbes been to see you and told you that he
could prove your statement was false, and that he was not in
Lower California at all at the time that you have mentioned ?
How did the special counsel of the Government know that
Forbes had come here to have a conversation with General
Castro—except through the omnipresent Laurencel ?
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Mr. Eandolph—I will tell you. Forbes came into my
office and told me so. I should have guessed that.
Mr. Benjamin—I should have guessed the contrary. If
he came to your office, I have no doubt but Laurencel sent
him there. Laurencel had previously been sent for by Forbes,
as stated by the latter, to consult with him as to the proper man-
ner of sending a paper to the United States Attorney. He was
sent for, and had to go all .the way to Santa Clara to consult
about the proper manner of sending a paper to the District
Attorney ! That certainly must have required a very grave
consultation ! However that may be, as soon as Castro on the
stand is forced to divulge this attempt to corrupt him by
money, and to induce him to give testimony against the
owners of the Aimaden mine, Forbes is on the spot. (Page
2624.)
Q. 41. Has not Forbes been to see you, and told you that
he could prove your statement was false, and that he was not
in Lower California at all at the time that you had mentioned?
A. It is not true that Forbes ever told me that any statement
of mine was false. I allow no one to tell me personally that I
am a liar, and I have never received such an insult from any
one in my life. Forbes came to me in a friendly manner, say-
ing that he regretted I had revealed what had passed between
us, that it was a secret, and so on, and endeavored to make
excuses about it. I told him that being under oath I had to
tell the truth.
Now, if Castro's version was not the truth, why was not
Forbes brought up again ? Why—the answer springs instinc-
tively to the lips : the Government counsel were ashamed to
bring him again into Court. This vile creature, with his lips
steeped in lies and his soul blackened with perjury, had been
paraded day after day in the Court room, until the very pre-
cincts of justice were filled with the stench of the corruption
which dripped from his every pore. The Government did not
dare to bring him in again. But if Forbes had not in fact been
down to Lower California—and no other motive for his trip is
suggested anywhere—it was open to proof by other persons
than he that he had not been down. No such attempt was
made.
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Who sent Forbes down ? Laurencel tells us that he had
made a bargain with him that he should go ; and Forbes ad-
mitted that he had made the bargain. The papers which stated
the terms of the bargain are burned up—burned up by those
who wrote them, as too infamous to be produced in Court.
There, then, your Honors have the -names and the characters
of the conspirators who are brought forward to rob the owners
of their property in this mine because it is a rich mine. In the
quaint language of old Gamboa, "suits do not arise about poor
mines; but whenever a mine is rich there are plenty of suits."
Now we come to the famous letters in which this conspiracy
"cropped out,"—I believe I use the appropriate Oalifornian
mining language. Before that the matrix had been in the
bosom of the earth. Parties had been simply "prospecting,"
but finally they found the "cropping out" of this mine, and it
is produced in Court ; and what do we find ?
A series of letters, produced by one whom the Government's
counsel admits to be proven a forger. He ridicules us for im-
peaching the testimony and showing the perjuries in the deposi-
tion of this man—James Alex. Forbes,—"for, he says, " it never
entered my brain that you would take that trouble. Of course
he is a forger ; I bring him in as a forger ; I do not pretend to
defend him."
Very well ; there is one step. Then, a man known to be a
forger,—whose testimony is not, the counsel says, relied on at
all by the Government in anything that cannot be proven by
somebody else,—that is the man who is in constant, confiden-
tial communication with the man who bought his testimony.
The man who is to make money by that testimony is riding
day by day with this known forger, who is not to be believed
on oath, and whom the Government counsel does not pretend
to defend in any way or shape. They go from rancho to
rancho : they seek the old Spanish and Mexican settlers. They
concoct, they combine, they conspire day by day, and hour by
hour,—how can this mine be stolen ? How can we rob this
mine from the owners ? I will tell you how you can steal the
property, says James A. Forbes,—" There are some letters con-
taining expressions which can be made to give resemblance to
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a charge of a conspiracy to forge titles ; take them, use them
;
blackmail these parties into a compromise."
The letters are brought ; they are exhibited to the claimants
;
" How much will you give?"
How much did John Parrott give ? How much did William
E. Barron give ?
They told these people : " Take your forged documents, and
go away with them ; don't insult us with your base proposals."
Mr. Bandolph—Did they ask Hall McAllister ?
Mr. Benjamin—I speak to the record in speaking of those
to whom the proposals were made, and by whom.
"Why did not John Parrott buy up all these proofs about
these forgeries ? He is a shrewd man ; he has the reputation
of knowing where his interests lie. I believe people don't gen-
erally get much the better of him in bargains. Why did not
John Parrott buy up these papers which were going to destroy
his title ? He handed them back to the parties : " Take them !
Take them ! Go away ! No compromise about such matters
here!"
Well, that won't do. John Parrott won't buy. But James
Alex. Forbes has got the money ($10,000), the documents are
deposited in the vaults of a bank here (Davidson's), under a
contract that they shall not be brought out without his (Forbes')
order; and he goes off whistling about the country, contented
in the knowledge that he has defrauded Laurencel out of
$10,000 without any risk run.
But Laurencel is not to be defrauded that way. He comes
into this Court, and procures a subpena duces tecum to bring the
papers into Court. He uses the Government as an instrument
to break his bargain with Forbes. He makes a cat's-paw of
the Government to break his private contract. So the Govern-
ment does lend its aid to Laurencel, who undoubtedly must be
worthy of its protection. Still, it does strike me as curious,
that it is precisely Laurencel's counsel who is so vehement
against my clients for being foreigners. I have sometimes
thought it would be an interesting puzzle to find out how the
Government of the United States got interested in foreigner
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Laurencel against foreigner Barron. That, however, must be
one of the secrets of State, not proper for us to know.
Mr. Kandolph—That is not the case at all. My learned
friend (Peachy) next me, for a year or two—I know not how
long—was engaged in opposing the case known as the Fossat
claim. He acted as the counsel of the United States in that
particular instance, because of his employment by the New
Almaden Company in another instance. His endeavors to
procure testimony were untiring, and a vast amount of damage
was done. In that situation the counsel for the Fossat claim
followed the example, and did the same thing as the New Al-
maden Company.
Mr. Peachy—One word. My connection with the case
has been alluded to, and I desire to say this : that I appeared
for the Government to prove that this mine did not belong to
Laurencel ; that was all. I never did contend that this prop-
erty belonged to the Government.
Mr. Benjamin—I was going to say, further,—if Mr. Peachy
had not desired to make his personal explanation—that Mr.
Eandolph's explanation lacks one little particular.
Mr. Eandolph—It was not an " explanation" but a state-
ment of facts.
Mr. Benjamin—Well, facts. One fact is left out. Did the
Government employ Mr. Peachy, or pay him, or was he em-
ployed by private clients to appear for them in that Govern-
ment suit ? What I am trying to ascertain is, what the secrets
of State are that induce the Government of the United States
to employ and pay counsel for the purpose of having Laurencel
proved the owner of this property, instead of Barron ; Lauren-
cel being as much a foreigner as Barron is. If foreigners have
no rights to justice in the Courts of the United States, how is
Laurencel any better off than Barron ? If, on the contrary, as
has hitherto been believed by people in this country—and will
be hereafter, unless your Honors decide otherwise (which I
doubt)—that foreigners, by law, have a right to own property,
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then I cannot see what difference it makes whether Barron,
Forbes & Co. are foreigners or not. However, in all respects
I say Laurencel and Barron stand on precisely the same footing
—both being born out of the United States.
I have said that this contract being completed remained a
mystery between the two rogues who made it,—the papers
which would show what it was being destroyed.
A failure to obtain witnesses from Mexico, as undoubtedly
had been promised by Forbes to support his testimony, having
occurred ; the papers being in a bank vault ; Forbes having
his money in his pocket,—Laurencel uses the Government as a
cat's-paw to enable him to break his bargain. Instead of a joint
order of Forbes and Laurencel being taken to Davidson, the
banker, to produce the papers that had been deposited in his
vaults, the United States Marshal is procured, through the
agency of Laurencel, to be sent to take the papers by violence
and by stress of law, which Laurencel had bound himself to
Forbes should not leave that depository without his (Forbes')
consent.
They are brought into Court. I propose to examine them.
I propose to show your Honors, in addition to what Mr. Peachy
has said, that a large number of the documents produced from
that case are forged ; that nearly every letter purporting to be
written by James Alex. Forbes, as produced by himself, is a
forgery
;
and I do this with a full knowledge of the fact that
in the answer in chancery William E. Barron swore that he
believed them to be true. In spite of that belief at that time,
I will show the forgery on the face. I will show it so that no
man can doubt. It does so happen, that William B. Barron
being called upon suddenly, and within a very brief delay, to
file an answer in chancery, a large body of correspondence
was brought before him, and he was asked whether it was gen
uine. He saw that one document was undoubtedly a forgery,
and that document purported to be a letter of Alex. Forbes.
The remainder of the documents, which James Alex. Forbes
had forged and brought in as his own letters to the parties>
were forged out of true letters, by picking out paragraphs here
and there. Without an opportunity of comparing the originals
in our own possession ; without an opportunity of looking at
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the letters ; hurried to file an answer in chancery—William E.
Barron said, " I believe they are true." But when we come
to examine the vast mass of documents produced in the cause,
we find the very original letters, of the very dates, and in the
handwriting of James Alex. Forbes,—from which he has forged
and brought into Court what purport to be copies retained by
him of the originals. I will follow him all through these let-
ters. I will follow his track as the huntsman follows the game
—and with the same unerring certainty.
Me. Justice McAllister—On what page do the letters
begin ?
Mr. Benjamin"—If your Honor please, these letters are scat-
tered through four volumes, without order of date, sequence,
or anything by which the Court can follow up my argument
in relation to them, unless I furnish your Honors with a chrono-
logical list, which I will take pains to do, in order that your
labor may be facilitated.
Before speaking of the letters produced in this case that
were forged by James Alex. Forbes, I wish first to call the at-
tention of the Court to a letter which is a true letter; having
no reference, however, to this case, but brought in for the pur-
pose of deceiving the Court, and since made use of by the
counsel for the Government in a former argument. I think I
can show that James Alex. Forbes put this paper into this
bundle of letters for the purpose of deceiving Laurencel ; that
he has deceived the Government counsel and deceived the
Court in so doing ; that it was in relation to an entirely differ-
ent subject, and had no reference to New Almaden at all.
Mr. Bandolph—What letter is it you refer to ?
Mr. Benjamin—The letter of the 19th January, 1848.
The letter is at page 386, and requires reference to but one
other for any immediate purpose—which is at page 542. This
is a part of this conspiracy of James Alex. Forbes to deceive
into the belief that there was some fraud.
Now, I will show to your Honors in a moment or two, that
after the discovery of this New Almaden mine, the whole
110
neighborhood was aroused to the fact that there were veins of
quicksilver in that range of the Sierra Azul, or Blue Ridge, as
they term in Virginia a similar mountain range. The whole
neighborhood was aroused to the fact that there was quicksilver
in that range. It was supposed that other veins would be found
;
and the record teems with proof of denouncements by dif-
ferent parties, who thought they had discovered other similar
mines. Amongst them were the mines of San Antonio and
Guadalupe. In those two mines James Alex. Forbes had an
interest. In those mines he was desirous that Alex. Forbes
should also take an interest ; and they had a correspondence
upon the subject: and this letter (19th June, 1848) is a letter
relating to those other mines, which, as I shall proceed to show
to the Court, was brought into this case, having no earthly
bearing upon it.
First, let me read the letter, premising to your Honors that
only two or three months previous—as late as the 24th of No-
vember—Alex. Forbes had made a thorough examination of
the New Almaden mine, (Vide letter of the 24th JMov., 1847).
After having been first alarmed at the prospect that the mine
was, as he supposed, a mere manto, or horizontal layer—a mere
superficial deposit—he found the vein, and he proceeded to
inform his associates of it in the letter to be found at page 386.
Mine, 24th Nov., 1847.
For Mr. J. A. Foebes
)
and V Santa Clara
:
The Padre Eeal, )
"We have at last found the vein or "cinta" of ores which we
were looking for, so that I have now the pleasure to inform
you and the good Padre of our luck as I promised I should do;
but I fear the mine will be reduced to this "cinta," and the
great body of it will be " Tepetate Muerto."
But perhaps this cinta may be wider below than it is above.
To see whether this is so or not has been the object of our
labors, since discovering the proper direction of the vein of the whole
mine, which discovery makes everything more plain.
This uirection was before entirely mistaken, of which and
other things we will have a great deal to talk about when we
meet. When Mr. Walkinshaw arrives and takes a look at the
mine, I think we shall take a turn to the Mission. I expect
him to be at Bernal's Rancho this afternoon.
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I may say now, that it is impossible we can go off the main
vein of the mine, as it is entirely different from the walls (re-
spaldos), they being of hard rock of quite different character,
whereas the vein is quite soft and easily distinguished.
All we have to do is to look for the " cintas" which have got
ores, which, in my opinion, will be reduced to one, not very
wide.
A. FORBES.
(Endorsed) Alex. Forbes,
Mine of Almaden, Nov. 24, 1847. No. 4.
Here, Alexander Forbes has discovered the vein of the mine.
It is thoroughly distinguished. The walls are clear and plain.
The ore itself is equally plain and manifest. This he is now
communicating. No doubt now amoDgst these mine owners in
relation to the extent of the vein of the New Almaden mine.
As to the quality of the ores, that has been known for years.
There is no necessity for testing the ores of New Almaden.
They were selling the quicksilver ; they were reducing the ores
in their furnaces, as far as their furnaces would permit it ; they
were furnishing quicksilver for the market ; therefore, they had
no necessity, nor was it a time for making tests of the quality
of the cinnabar. That time had passed.
Now, look at this letter of Jan'y 19th. When I first read it
I did not understand it all. The idea did not suggest itself to
me that it did not refer to this mine at all ; and I could not
make head or tail of it until I saw the endorsements. Then,
following up the track, which my friend Mr. Randolph left, I
found out what it meant.
(Page 386).—My Dear Sir :—I am very much obliged to
you for your very prompt attention to the business in hand,
and return the expediente immediately.
lam very much surprised at the result of your assay, and shall
try what I have ?
Is that the ore of New Almaden ? Is it probable that in Jan-
uary, 1848, these two parties have each taken specimens of that
ore, and that James Alex. Forbes is testing one of the specimens
in Santa Clara, and Alexander Forbes testing another specimen
at New Almaden ? Does that paragraph seem at the start to
refer to New Almaden ore ? No ! It looks to something new,
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something strange ; something that Alexander Forbes had no
idea would occur. But he knew the richness of the New Al-
maden ores. The New Almaden ores, from the original assay,
afforded an average yield of 35 to 40 per cent. Some of it was
pure cinnabar, pure sulphurets of quicksilver. He could, there-
fore, be surprised at no assay of New Almaden ore. But he
has been sent the results of an assay of some ore by James
Alex. Forbes. He says, he is greatly surprised, and adds, "I
will try what I have." Hoes that mean New Almaden ores?
(Page 386).—" It will of course be better to say nothing about
it, particularly as I have already written to Monterey that there
is no mine." Is that New Almaden ? Is there no mine there ?
" Nor does there appear to be any quantity of this kind of.
stuff."
Now, what is it that this is written about ? It is some mine,
the ores of which surprise him intensely, and which he is im-
mediately going to assay, to see if his specimen corresponds as
to results with the other. New Almaden ores have gone up,
in some instances, to pure cinnabar. No assay of those ores
would surprise him. But this is something that does surprise
him. Besides, that he has written to Monterey that there is
" no mine." Now, the mine of New Almaden was known to
the public officers, and to the whole world ; and the quicksil-
ver therefrom was being sold ? Is that New Almaden, where
there was " no mine?"
I looked on the back of this paper, and saw that it had been
endorsed in pencil: "Suilol, 4^-; Sainse, 4-§; Pen a, 4-|; Nar-
baez, 4-J- ; Padre, 4 ; Forbes 2." I added that up and found it,
made twenty-four
;
just the number of barras there are in a
mine. Well, that is not New Almaden, because these are not
the names of the owners of New Almaden. This is an entirely
different set of men. Yet that is on this letter. Then this
letter is about a mine ; the assay of some of the ores of which
are then—1848—thought surprising ; and about which Alexan-
der Forbes has written to Monterey that there was " nomine;"
on the back of which letter there is written in pencil an en-
dorsement, showing that the owners are not those of the New
Almaden mine.
Now, James Alexander Forbes was asked about this. I
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want to omit this poor devil's testimony, and will simply state
its substance. He was asked about this endorsement, which
shows the letter is not a New Almaden letter at all. He says
it is a New Almaden letter, and that this endorsement is put
on the back of it—as he supposes, by mistake. {Vide page
489).
Now, what is the face of this paper ? On its face it is unin-
telligible as regards New Almaden. But that is not all. Look
at the letter of the 7th of February, 1848, page 542 :
Santa Clara, 7 Febr'y.de 1848.
Alexander Forbes, Esquire
:
My Dear Sir: By the Mason I send you some specimens of
the new vein, which was duly registered on Saturday, and poso
opened ; I have not had time to make an assay. Your opinion
respecting the abundance of ores of cinnabar in the vicinity of
New Almaden is very correct. I have this morning caused
another denuncio to be made of another veta ! and on my re-
turn from it I have yet another to make.
Is that New Almaden ? We all know that there never were
such denouncements made about New Almaden; but we have in
this record these denouncements made ofother mines all round it.
So you see, by positive archive testimony, that these passages of
the letter of the 7th of February, cannot refer to New Alma-
den. They refer to denouncements and registrations of other
and different mines made on a particular day which we have
brought in and copied in the record.
Your Honors can see that this letter of the 7th of February,
is but a continuation of the correspondence begun a few days
before on the 19th of January. Here you see, that at this very
time he was writing about other mines, and he has written to
Monterey that there was " no mine." That has been perverted
by the counsel for the Government into a statement that he had
written " to the authorities" at Monterey. There is not a word
in relation to " the authorities" in the letter ; and if he had
written to the authorities at Monterey, he would have told
them what the authorities at Monterey already knew—that
there was "no mine" ; that is, in the place he was speaking of.
How did we find that out? Why, brother Randolph turned
114
the attention of the witness (Halleck) to the correspondence of
Governor Mason in this executive document (holding up a
pamphlet), for another purpose ; and he referred to a letter of
Governor Mason relating to Walkinshaw's opinions about the
right of a partnership to four or five pertenencias, under the
Spanish law. Naturally I looked at that—as at everything he
has brought forward in this case—for the purpose of informing
myself, and it occurred to me that there was at this time a false
denunciation made to Governor Mason, of something that was
at that time "no mine." I refer your Honors to Governor
Mason's letter to Alcalde White, under date of 17th April,
1848, at page 551, House Executive Documents, First Session
Thirty-first Congress, 1849-50
—
generally known as the Cali-
fornia Message and Correspondence. In that letter he refers
to his visit to this very neighborhood ; speaks of his examining
this very locality in relation to the business of the mines, and
finding that there was no mine, and that there had been a
fraudulent denunciation. And who are the parties? Who
are the owners ? The very persons whose names are on the
back of this letter—or several of them. Just the names that
James Alex. Forbes penciled on the back of this letter of
January 19, are found in Governor Mason's communication of
the 17th of April, 1848. I must read some of the passages of
that communication to the Court. (Page 551, House Ex.
Doc. 1849-'50.)
Sir :—I received your letter of the 2d inst., late in the after-
noon of the 6th, together with the papers which accompanied it,
concerning the quicksilver mines denounced in your office on
the 17th of December and on the 5th of February last—the
former by Cook, Belden, Abrego, Kicord, and others ; the
latter by Pedro Sainsevain and partners—two days previous to
the reception of your letter, I received one dated on the 4th
inst., signed by Messrs. Abrego and Larkin, though written by
Mr. Eicord, as he informed me, in which it is stated that the
mine denounced on the 17th December was denounced by Mr.
Cook, and shortly thereafter transferred to their company, and
that the one denounced on the 5th of February was denounced
by Jose" Sunol, Abrego and Larkin—" ask for an executive order
for Sunol to desist from digging within their proper limits, and
that the right of Sunol to be put in possession be deferred until
the creation of certain Tribunals :" and state that the denounce-
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ment of Cook on the 17th of December, and that the possession
obtained under it on the 2d of February, were prior to Sufi<>l's
denouncement, which was on the 5th of February ; the other
party, those interested in the denouncement of the 5th of
February, claim to be the lawful and rightful owners of that
mine, and demand possession of it under the 4th article, title
6, of the Mining Laws, and assert that the party claiming
under the denouncement of the 17th of December have no
right to possession, because neither their excavations nor
measurements of possession were made in accordance with the
requirements of the aforesaid fourth article of the Mining Laws.
I availed myself of the opportunity which a visit to your
part of the country last week afforded me, to personally ex-
amine and minutely inspect and measure both of those mines,
denounced on the 17th December, and the 5th February last;
there were three excavations at the mine pointed out to me as
the one denounced on the 17th of December, all three within
a few paces of each other. In one of the excavations, over
which was erected a windlass, a man named Cash was at work;
and near the two excavations lowest down the hill, stood a
small cabin and Mr. Taylor's tent; this was on the 11th inst.
;
the deepest of these three excavations, measuring in the most
favorable manner from the upper side of the hill, did not ex-
ceed fifteen feet, though one of the interested parties states that
one of the excavations was of the depth required by the mining
laws when possession was given, on the 2d of February, but
that it since " caved in." I examined that spot which is said to
have "caved in," with great care; it had the appearance of
having been purposely filled up ; it was dug in rock, not in
earth ; and in my mind it was as much impossible for that
rock to have "caved in," as it would be for an auger-hole to
" cave in " that had been bored in a large solid block of timber.
So your Honors see that there were places around this mine
that were denounced as mines that were no mines. People in
those days were getting specimens of good ores, and going
around and representing them as found in neighboring mines,
and trying to deceive the unwary into purchasing, or taking an
interest with them in the pretended mines. Amongst them, it
seems, there was some mine of which Alex. Forbes had written
to Monterey that there was "no mine;" that he did not be-
lieve any existed there. He was afterwards surprised at the
assay made by James Alex. Forbes, and said he would try what
he had, but did not believe in the thing at all. That is the
letter of the 19th January, 1847.
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There, then, we find on the 17th of December, that a body
of men had been engaged in digging a hole in the rock, and
filling it up, pretending it was their pozo, and that it had caved
in, when, as Governor Mason said, " it could not cave in any
more than could an auger-hole in a block of timber."
But what, in the name of sense, has that got to do with
New Almaden ? To whom was it that Alex. Forbes was
writing, stating that there was no mine ? To James Alex.
Forbes and Padre Real—to whom he had written six or eight
weeks before, that he had found the " cinta" that the vein was
rich. James A. Forbes is asked " Why, what in the name of
sense is the meaning of this letter (19th of January) written to
you, if about the New Almaden mine ?" " Why the reason
Alex. Forbes wrote that is this : He did not want people to
know the richness of the mine ; he wanted to buy out shares."
"But who had any to sell ?" " Padre Real and myself." Well
then, he was writing (on the 24th of November) to the very
men he wanted to deceive, the true state of the case. Only
a few weeks before sending this letter of the 19th January, he
had written to them of the richness of New Almaden, the cer-
tainty that he had found the vein, that the ores were all that
could be desired ; and sends a special messenger with the
pleasing intelligence. Yet James Alex. Forbes says, the pur-
pose of this letter written six weeks later, was to deceive him
by telling him that there was no mine at New Almaden, in
order that the writer (Alex. Forbes) might purchase out his
(James A. Forbes') interest cheap ! What could possibly make
the Court believe such a ridiculous story as that ? Here is the
paper, endorsed on the back with all the names of the partners
in a different and distinct mine, clearly having no connection
with New Almaden. By reference to the correspondence in
the record, I have clearly shown that these parties did have
correspondence in relation to other mines.
Your Honors will find, at page 541, that there had been pre-
vious correspondence of these parties in reference to other
mines
:
Santa Clara, 14th July, 1847.
I was presented yesterday with a splendid specimen of quick-
silver ore, from a spot within or near the limits of the two
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leagues conceded to Castillero and Socios, but situated upon
the land claimed by the American, Cook, of whom you doubt-
less have been informed. The person who brought the speci-
men to me, was sent by one of the discoverers, and informed
me that in May, 1846, this new vein was discovered and de-
nounced before the authorities of San Jose.
So of some other veins he speaks of.
And, finally, we have a letter which has recently been
brought into the record, which the Court will find at page
3050.
In January, 1849, James Alex. Forbes writes to Alex.
Forbes
:
I have received proposals from the house of Jecker, Torre
& Co. for purchasing " barras" in the mine of Almaden. I
have declined entering in any negotiation of this nature, but I
have made proposals for them to take the habilitacion of the
mine of Guadalupe, which is still in the state in which you saw
it. Herewith I accompany a copy of my letter to D. Ysidro
de la Torre upon that subject, for your government, and if he
should not feel disposed to take the habilitacion, it would be
more agreeable to me for you to include this mine in the nego-
tiation of Almaden, upon terms which may be advantageous
to both parties. I may add, that it is possible to obtain the
major part of the shares in the mine of Guadalupe by judicious
management.
Having shown, may it please your Honors, that this letter
cannot, by its subject matter, in any manner apply to the New
Almaden mine—that it is without sense or bearing on that mine,
but has relation to other mines concerning which Alex. Forbes
was corresponding at that time with James Alex. Forbes—
I
say that he (James A. Forbes) in bringing that letter into Court,
commenced the series of frauds by which he attempted to
impose upon the Court, and induced it to deprive, for a time,
these parties of the enjoyment of their property.
At the very time—I think on the same day—that letter of
January 19th was written, in which he (Alex. Forbes) speaks
of his belief that there was no mine, referring to this other
mine, he presents a petition to the Alcalde, setting forth that
the mine of Almaden is a fine mine in beautiful order, and
wants the Alcalde to go there with the "jpenW (mining ex-
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perts) required by the law, enter the mine, inspect it, and
make a record of its good condition. Now, those two things
could not have occurred on the same day, in relation to the
same mine. That thing asked of the Alcalde was done at once,
the record of it made and put in the public office. The whole
matter of this letter of January 19th shows clearly that its pro-
duction here by James A. Forbes was the first of his series of
forgeries. I call it " forgeries," for it is as much forgery to bring
in a.true document and endeavor to palm it off on the Court
with a false meaning, as it would be actually to forge the
paper.
I come next to the forged letter of the 28th of March, 1848.
In relation to this letter I would say at once, that it ought
not to be necessary to make any remark, for I understand Mr.
Eandolph to admit it to be forged.
Mr. Eandolph—ISTo, that is a mistake.
Mr. Benjamin—You said in the opening of your argument,
that all the papers in the City of Mexico had been fabricated
there after the 2d day of February, 1848. I noted that at
once, because I immediately thought it an admission that this
letter was a forgery. The existence of the two facts—that all
the papers in the City of Mexico had been fabricated subse-
quent to the 2d February, 1848, and that this letter of March
28th is a genuine document—is totally impossible ; because
this letter, written up here in California, purports to be a letter
of Alex. Forbes to James Alex. Forbes in relation to his knowl-
edge of the forgery of these papers, in the City of Mexico, by
Castillero.
Mr. Randolph—If you are familiar at all—and you must
be now—with the course of my argument in this matter, you
are aware that I maintain that a document brought up by
Robert Walkinshaw in the spring of 1847, was _a forgery.
Hence, if forged in California, or in Mexico,—where I infer it
to have been forged—it was forged prior to the 2d of Feb-
ruary, 1848.
Mr. Benjamin—I wrote down—Mr. Peachy wrote down
—
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Mr. Johnson wrote down—in fact we all noted at the time
what I have stated. Inasmuch as the Government counsel was
to give me an opportunity to reply, I had a right to know
what his theory was.
Me. Randolph—I think at the time Mr. Benjamin was
taken ill, when I, perhaps, had grown too wearisome to be
longer endured, I was discussing that paper of the 28th of
March.
Me. Benjamin—I do not deny that Mr. Randolph may have
said the contrary of what I allege, in another part of his ar-
gument. I cannot pretend to follow his argument, for he makes
one assertion at one time, and at another, another. But, when
opening his argument—of which I took careful note for the
purpose of reply—he put this proposition before the Court:
that none of these Mexican papers were in existence prior to
February, 1848. I wrote that down,—all of us noted it.
Me. Randolph—I desire the gentleman to precisely under-
stand what he is to reply to. I say that all the papers now in
evidence, including the Castillo Lanzas document as now pro-
duced, in my opinion were forged after the date (2d Feb., 1848)
to which you refer ; and further, that the paper referred to in
the letter of May 5th, 1847, is not the paper now produced
and called the Castillo Lanzas document ; but that that paper
was forged before the 4th of May, 1847,—and that there have
been here two Castillo Lanzas documents, entirely dissimilar..
That is my case from the year 1858 to the present time. The
Court understands it.
Me. Benjamin—As I have to reply, I want to understand
it myself. You say Robert Walkinshaw brought up a forged
paper in 1847. I understand you to allege that another set of
papers were forged after February, 1848. The act of posses-
sion of the mine—that was forged, when ?
Me. Randolph—That may be taken to have been forged
in the month of January, 1848
;
possibly a little before—in
1847.
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Mr. Benjamin—I will endeavor to remember these dates.
Mr. Kandolph—When more familiar with the case you.
will not fall into error.
Mr. Benjamin—My brother forgets in one part of his ar-
gument what he said in another part, I think. I may be mis-
taken in this instance, perhaps. I said I supposed my brother,
in the point made in his opening, had admitted this letter of
the 28th March to be a forgery. He says he does not ; that he
said some documents sent up here were forged in 1847 : and
that the other documents which we produce were forged after
February, 1848. But this letter of March 28, 1848, says, or
makes Alex. Forbes say—which is the most absurd of all pos-
sible suppositions—that he wants to save himself from the loss
that would ensue, should it in any manner leak out that in fact
the documents procured by Castillero in Mexico, as his title to
the mine and lands, were all obtained long after the occupation
of California by the Americans. They were all obtained,
Alex. Forbes says in this letter, long after the occupation of
California by the Americans ; and Alex. Forbes knows this in
Monterey on the 28th of March, 1848.
Let us take that as a start in the matter of this forged letter.
Now let us take up this forged letter, and see the forgery step
by step as it goes along. It is really amusing ; and may serve
to beguile the Court for half an hour, while we go along. But,
before we take up the correspondence of the 28th March, it
may be well to begin with two or three letters that just pre-
ceded it. Your Honors will find the first of those letters at
page 954, the answer to it at page 956, and the reply to the
answer at page 955.
That is the true correspondence, and as soon as we have
gotten through with it, we will see how it tallies with the
forged.
The letter at page 954 is the rough draft, in the handwriting
of Alex. Forbes, left in Tepic when he went to England, being
then from 72 to 75 years of age.
The forged letter was produced here on the 15th of February,
1858. The true letters were produced, in order to show the
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forgery, on the 31st of July, 1858; so that but sixteen days
elapsed after the forgery had been produced in Court before
we produced the true letters. Those true letters are admitted
by the witness (James A. Forbes), in his cross examination, to
be in the handwriting of Alex. Forbes, but he attempts to deny
their receipt. I will show that they were received.
Now let us, with that light before us, observe how utterly
impossible it was for these letters to be made up, by us, within
sixteen days from the 15th of July—for old Alex. Forbes was
in London, and had left the country for many years
—
yet these
were his own rough blotters of his letters, and were produced
immediately after the production of the forgery.
Now let us see what these letters say. The first, which I am
about to read, the Court will find is answered by James Alex.
Forbes two days afterwards ; and that the expressions in the
one are copied and answered in the other.
James Alex. Forbes had gone down to Monterey ; there had
had a quarrel with Alex. Forbes, and had gone home to the
mine. On the 20th of March, Alex. Forbes writes him as
follows (page 954)
:
[Note.—Those portions of this letter printed in italics, and inclosed in brackets, sfcow the
words and sentences erased in the original]
Monterey, March 20th, 1848.
My clear Sir :—I have made an arrangement respecting the
Admittance, by which she is to go down to the coast of Mex-
ico at the same time [with] as the William, which arrangement
amounts to a sale if certain contingencies do not [occur] take
place. I therefore will not leave [this] Monterey till the 27th
of [the] this present month. I mention this that you may know
the latest day on which I can hear from you, and I request the
bearer to be sent from the mine, to enable you to fulfill your
promise of informing me if the Robles, or you as their attorney,
[would] accept of my offer of $6,000 for their two shares.
This letter is a rough draft, and we have printed in italics
what was stricken out of it,—the erasures. At the commence-
ment of the sentence immediately following what I have just
read, the word " as " is stricken out, and the letter goes on as
follows
:
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[As] I repeat what I said to you here, that it will give me
much pain to leave this country with any bad feeling existing
between us ; and however much disappointed I may be in the
arrangement which I hoped to make, I have no other wish
than to do by you what I think is right and friendly. I, at
all events, will expect to hear from you by the bearer [or by
any other conveyance which you think will be more speedy. I
mustfeel most severely the disappointment of not hearing from you
before I leave the country ; and no good can resultfrom a resort to
any legal or harsh measures, on either side, between us who of all
others ought to go in concert
I now beg that you will fulfill your promise in writing me so as
to reach this before I leave, and Ihave still a hope that you will make
such arrangements as will meet both our views and tend to all our]
who will wait your orders, unless you choose to send your let-
ters by some other hand.
Now this letter was received—when ? On the 22d of March,
In the letter acknowledging the receipt the statement is, "I
have this moment received your letter of the 19th instant."
Whether the letter copied from the rough draft was dated the
19th, by mistake, by the clerk who copied it, or whether Jas.
Alex. Forbes made a mistake in calling the letter the letter of
the 10th, instead of the 20th, is of no consequence, because the
letter cannot be mistaken. James A. Forbes' answer copies
the very language of this rough draft
:
March 22d, 1848.
My Dear Sir :—I have this moment received your letter of
the 19th inst, and answer it immediately by your messenger.
The previous letter had stated that he (Alex. Forbes) had
sent a messenger and wanted a reply by that messenger
:
I had already closed a package for you, including a letter
containing my answer to your last proposition, and in relation
to the whole of the shares in the mine of New Almaden, held
in the name of Eobles. I beg to refer you to that letter.
I desire you to accept my thanks for the expression of your
regret on leaving California with any bad feelings existing be-
tween us.
There, the expression in the rough draft of the 20th—"It
will give me much pain to leave this country with any bad
feeling existing between us,"—is copied in the answer.
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Me. Eandolph—That, no doubt, is the answer.
Me. Benjamin—You think there is no doubt of that ? Let
us, then, take that fact as conceded. What, then, does this let-
ter contain ? It contains the answer to the propositions* of the
letter of the 20th. This answer is replied to on the 25th. Let
us see if the letter of the 25th is really an answer to the letter
of the 22d. If it is, it will refer to expressions contained in
the letter of the 22d.
In the letter of the 22d, James A. Forbes says
:
(Page 956.) I desire you to accept my thanks for the ex-
pressions of your regret in leaving California with any bad
feelings existing between us, and also for your friendly and
equitable wishes towards me. None of the first exist in my
breast, and I pray God that all success may attend you. There
is no need of praise or merit attached by me to my actions or
operations in this affair of the mine of New Almaden ; nor
shall I allege any services rendered to you ; but I shall spurn at
those base sycophants, who being no real friends of yours, but
wishing to creep into your favor, have endeavored to poison
your mind with regard to one who never entertained a thought
sinister to your interest ; and who, notwithstanding the cold,
repulsive reception occasioned by your preoccupied mind-, did
not hesitate to manifest a sincere desire to serve you. But in
what manner have those feelings on my part been appreciated?
You declare that I have arrayed myself in defiance against
you, and that you will take measures to counteract all that I
can do ! This has caused in me a poignant wound to my
feelings, knowing that it may be augmented by your incorrect
view of my intentions in relation to the affairs of the mine. I
am quite sure, however, that the right of the Eobles, which I
represent, is most incontestable and tenable in any tribunal of
the civilized world
;
consequently, it never has occurred to me
that any litigation could take place, except by an attempt to
impair that right.
It is difficult for me to believe that you, or any other person
of sound, moral, unbiased judgment, will say that I have done
wrong in the trust reposed in me by the Eobles. But I will
trespass no longer upon your time. I went to Monterey with
a sincere desire to effect an arrangement with you ; but you
formed a misconception of my principles and sentiments. I
have made a last proposition to you with the intention of
retiring from any further intervention in the affairs of the mine
of New Almaden. It remains with you to accept or reject
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that proposition, and also to remain assured of the respect with
which,
I am, my dear sir,
Your most obt. servt,
• James Alex. Forbes.
Here is the answer of the 25th :
Monterey, 25th of March, 1848.
James A. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara.
My Dear Sir:—I have received your letter of the 22d inst.,
and would have answered it immediately, but the man who
brought it has been ill of a boil on his leg, which is the cause
of the delay in writing you.
I shall not trouble you with any remarks respecting what
has passed between us on the subject of the sale of your and
the Eobles' shares of the mine, further than to say that, I
firmly believe your proceedings in the whole affair have been
according to what you thought right.
That is the answer to this : " It is difficult for me to believe
that you or any other person of sound, moral, unbiased judg-
ment will say that I have done wrong in the trust reposed in
me by the Robles."
The letter of the 25th goes on :
(Page 955.) But unfortunately I find the difference in
opinion still as to the value of the shares exists ; but in order
to make another endeavor to effect an arrangement, I have
named Mr. Walkinshaw and D. Manuel Diaz, who will wait
upon you as soon as possible, and who take powers from me
to conclude an agreement. I would not have named D. Manuel
Diaz if he had been one of those whom you suppose had
attempted to prejudice me against you.
In reference to that portion of the letter of the 22d, where
James A. Forbes spoke of false friends, who had endeavored
to prejudice Alex. Forbes' mind :—" On the contrary, he has
always spoken of you as a friend, and as such I name him,
thinking it will be agreeable to you."
" I am most sensible of your [great attention] exertions to
serve me,"—copies the expression of the letter of the 22d,
where James A. Forbes speaks of endeavoring to serve him
—
"and of the great trouble you took to forward in every way
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in your power the interests of [the mine] that concern, and [/
can assure] you may rest assured that whatever way the busi-
ness now depending between us is settled, and whatever pro-
ceedings may ensue, I do not leave California with anj other
sentiment towards you personally than that of friendship and
respect."
There is the corrrespondence
; and what is it ?
First. A proposition to buy the shares of the Eobles, and
the price named.
Second. A reply, refusing the proposition.
Third. An answer to the reply, stating that as the difference
of opinion still exists, the writer (Alex. Forbes) has sent
Walkinshaw and Diaz to treat for the purchase.
When does that correspondence take place ? On the 20th,
22d and 25th of March, 1848. These letters are produced
here by us.
Now, for the forged one. The forged one is dated on the 28th
of March, 1818
;
and the first line begins with an apology for
never having written on the subject ! (Page 864.)
My Dear Sir—I have to apologize for not writing you before
this, as I promised I would, respecting the purchase of your
shares in the mine of New Almaden.
Is there another word necessary to be said ? Is it necessary
for me to go on ? Three days after the 25th ! Six days after
the 22d ! Eight days after the 20th ! The correspondence of
the 20th and 22d, admitted to be that which took place ! That
correspondence was not in Court when this forgery was brought
in, but it is now produced! The forgery copies portions of the
true letters
; is made up of portions of two or three letters, with
an interpolated phrase about antedated titles which does not
exist at all in the genuine correspondence, and the forgery
starts out, being dated the 28th of March, with an apology for
not having written before, as promised, in relation to the pur-
chase of the shares
!
What shall I say in addition to this striking fact ? Can any
human being believe this letter possible, after the previous
ones ? How is this letter, the forgery of the 28th of March,
made up ?
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It states, (page 866) : I have to apologize for not writing you
before this, as I promised I would, respecting the purchase of
your shares in the mine of New Almaden ; but really, as your
opinion of their value is so widely different from mine, I con-
sidered it almost hopeless to make you any further proposals.
I do not however leave this, without making the necessary
arrangements to effect that object, and have authorized Mr.
"Walkinshaw and Man]. Diaz to wait on you with my final offer
for the purchase of those shares.
Two days before, he had written the same thing, viz. (955) : " I
have named Mr. Walkinshaw and D. Manuel Diaz, who will
wait upon you as soon as possible, and who \ivill have] take
powers from me to conclude an agreement." The clause about
D. Manuel Diaz not being one of the men who had attempted
to poison Alex. Forbes' mind is left out, and instead of that
sentence, a forged sentence about antedated titles is put in.
Here is that forged sentence : (Page 864) : Were I not al-
ready so deeply interested in this negociation, I would never
think of investing another dollar in it, but this interest renders
it necessary for me to have the control of all the shares." * * *
Wiry ? in order that I may dispose of the whole, whenever an
opportunity may offer, and save myself from the heavy loss
that would ensue, should it unluckily leak out, that in fact the
documents procured by Castillero in Mexico, as his title to the
mine and lands, were all obtained long after the occupation of
California by the Americans.
The forgery is so clumsy that it reveals itself at every step.
The party who made the forgery did not know that we had the
answer to the letter from Avhich the forgery was principally
made up. We have the answer to that true letter, answering
everything that was contained in it, but saying not a word about
this antedating.
Jas. Alex. Forbes would of course be startled by being told
in that letter, if any such had really been written, that all the
titles are forged and antedated ! Some of the barras belonged
to him. Yet, he holds on to them for years afterwards—until
he can sell them for $54,000. He is not disturbed about this
antedating. I said we had the answer to this letter—or rather
to the true one of the 25th, from which this was made up.
What is it? (Page 957.)
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Santa Clara, 28th. June, 1848.
Alexander Forbes, Esq.
My Dear Sir":—Soon after your departure from Monterey,
Mr. Walkinshaw and Don Manuel Diaz made proposals to me
in your name, for the purchase of the four " barras" or shares
in the mine of New Almaden cle Sta. Clara, of which I am the
agent on the part of the Messrs. Robles. The offer made by
your agents for those shares not being equivalent to their pres-
ent or future value, I have declined entering into any negotia-
tion for their disposal.
"Why, how is this ? Where is the " future value" ? If it
should unfortunately leak out that all these titles had been
forged, where is the " future value" then ? He is informed
that all these titles have been forged ! What has he to say to
that ? Not a syllable in this whole letter about it ! Noth-
ing but an answer to the letter of the 25th of March can be
found in this letter of the 28th of June. There is no answer to
the letter of the 28th of March there. No important part of
the letter of the 28th of March is answered in the letter of the
28th of June.
Mr. Randolph—It was no news to Jas. A. Forbes.
Mr. Benjamin—My brother says it was no news to Jas.
Alex. Forbes. Is that so?
Mr. Randolph—Undoubtedly.
Me. Benjamin—Then why was it written to him as news.
Why then was he informed of it so correctly in this letter ?
What is the object? Do men put down facts of this kind
which may leak out and have the effect of destroying their title
in letters to persons who know it already, and to whom, there-
fore, a slight allusion would be sufficient. On the contrary,
this seems to be the communication of news. Either he (J. A.
Forbes) knew it before—and then it was totally unnecessary to
commit it to writing, and pass it through the mails—or he did
not know it, and it was news to him; if so, why does not he
answer it ? Important as that news would have been to him,
he did not even refer to it. No other answer to the letter of
the 28th of March than the letter of the 28th of June is produced.
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Gro further into this letter of the 28th of June, and what does
it contain ? It contains bitter revilings. It .contains violent
personal reproaches about everything else—not a syllable about
the news communicated by the letter of the 28th of March. It
shows the existence of an embittered feeling between these
parties which was going to bring Jas. Alex. Forbes into Court
against Alex. Forbes. It shows also that he (J. A. Forbes) did
not hesitate to write the grossest lies to those he corresponded
with ; for observe
:
" I have declined entering into any negotiation for their dis-
posal."
That is written by him on the 28th of June. The counsel
for the Government produced here in evidence his sale to
Walkinshaw of those very barras in the previous April. In
other words, the first piece of treachery committed by Walkin-
shaw towards Alex. Forbes, was going to Jas. Alex. Forbes,
as the agent of Alex. Forbes, to purchase certain shares for
him, and buying them for himself instead, and after having
bought them for himself and paid for them, Jas. Alex. Forbes,
who has already sold those two shares to Walkinshaw, and
who has himself bought the other two shares of the Eobles,
writes to Alex. Forbes : " I have declined entering into any
negotiation for their disposal !"
The whole quarrel between Alex. Forbes and Jas. Alex.
Forbes, was in relation to the Eobles' shares. Litigation is
threatened. Alex. Forbes is told to send up some man to
represent him in California—he is going to be sued. All in
this letter of the 28th of June, is a plain, clear answer to the
letter of the 25th of March. Not the slightest allusion is made
to the antedating spoken of in the forged letter of the 28th, or
to the facts contained in the forgery.
This forgery is brought into Court, pieced up with expres-
sions from the true correspondence. It is made up by James
A. Forbes, for his friend Laurencel, after they had broken
down in their first attempt, and all their inventions had been
scattered to the winds by the production of the original corres-
pondence up to that date. After James Alex. Forbes had
sworn in Court everything that could be required of him in
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relation to his first set of documents—had sworn that he knew
nothing about these titles to the mine, and that he had never
seen them, up to a particular date—brother Peachy pulled out
of his pocket letters of a prior date signed by himself (James
A. Forbes), that proved every word he uttered to be a lie.
What is to be done now ? He had sworn that he had not
seen certain documents up to 1848.
What is the document he speaks of in his letter of 1847 ?
When asked, he equivocates, denies, tergiversates—won't
answer. He is drawn back to it again and again, and finally
he answers : " Well, it is the title. I saw them. I saw the
copies he had brought up with him. I saw them in 1847."
He had previously sworn over and over again that he had
never seen them at all.
He is driven out of Court in disgrace. The conspirators
have lost their money. Laurencel had lost his first ten thou-
sand—given for the papers to be used for blackmailing ; he
had lost his second ten thousand dollars, paid Forbes to give
his testimony. Forbes had testified, and his testimony was
routed. How much he was now paid for the forged letter I
do not know. We may well surmise that these little services
among these men were not rendered for nothing. Although
there is said to be honor amongst thieves, James Alex. Forbes
was too cautious to rely on promises for services he was ren-
dering, and without doubt required cash in hand—but how
much he received for this forged letter we do not know.
Forbes' testimony, when at an end, required bolstering up.
My brother Eandolph says forgery is natural to this man. The
Government knows—Laurencel knows—who will forge papers,
and at once they go to him. He is a man from whom any
forged papers can be produced. He brings out this forged
paper from the mine of true correspondence he has, from which
any quantity, any description of forging required can be man-
ufactured by him.
This is the only letter in this entire correspondence in
which the remotest hint or suggestion of antedating is found.
James Alex. Forbes again and again writes, urging these par-
ties to forge titles. Again and again he says to them : "You
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ought to have forged such and such papers. We want other
titles than those we have here got. The titles we have got are
an order to the Grovernnor of California to put us in possession.
That never was done. That is not a good title. We want a
title so manufactured that it shall be a complete title to us
without an order to place us in possession. We want a com-
plete title at once. We have got a registry and a possession,
given by an Alcalde. That is not a good title. We want a
ratification by the Government in Mexico. We want that
forged. Now you must have all those papers forged, and send
them up to me."
That is the constant burden of James Alex. Forbes' letter to
different parties, at different times.
He then says : " Walkinshaw has got our true letters. Walk-
inshaw has got our true titles. • Walkinshaw is a villain, and is
trying to cheat us out of the mine. I am afraid he will burn
up the papers. I am afraid of every possible machination that
villain can devise, by which to rob us of the property."
He (Forbes) never once hints, however, that the papers were
forged or antedated. It is never again referred to in the entire
record. The fact—spoken of in the letter of March 28, 1848,
—that these things had been done, is never again referred to.
Again ; why is not the original letter produced ? James
Alex. Forbes was asked : " Sir, you came here before. You
sold papers for money. You sold papers for the purpose of
blackmailing these parties, as you say. Your blackmailing
project having failed, you afterwards got money to come and
testify. You never came here—as you admit—until you got
$10,000 for entering this Court and testifying. Now, sir, why
did you not bring this letter with you ? Why is it we have
never heard of the original ?"
He tells six different lies on that subject. I have marked
them down. Bat the subject is too disgusting to follow out.
First, he says he lost it; next in sequence, he says it did not
tally in date with the other letters he had sold
; next, he says
he kept it back on purpose, because he knew Mr. Peachy had
gone to Washington to get some law passed, under which he
supposed some new testimony would be brought in from Mex-
ico, and that letter was to vindicate him ; next, he says we
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were not hard on him in the cross-examination—"I would have
brought it in if you had gone hard on me ; when you were
hard on me, I brought it in."
Time and time again he tells this story as the reason why
the original was not brought in at first.
Again: can your Honors suggest—I cannot—what would
make a man sit down at home and make a copy of a letter he
has got in his drawer or desk ? I never did such a thing
in my life, and cannot see any reason for doing it. If you
had a letter from a man, would you amuse yourself, sitting
down and copying it, and then keep the original and the copy
in your desk ? What for ? What did this man make a copy
for unless he was getting ready to have the original stolen ?
He takes care to provide a copjr, in order that he may have the
original stolen, and bring in the copy.
And what is the story about the stealing of this original ?
Why, it would be a miserable thing to put into a comedy
!
People would hiss the play, and drive the actors off the stage,
disgusted with the silliness of such an invention. It does no
credit to Laurencel and Forbes.
Brother Billings, you and Barron went to the hotel and
stole the paper .out of James Alex. Forbes' carpet bag ! You
then said you did not know anything about the letter, and I
will never associate with you again. This thing is proven on
you, and James Alex. Forbes almost swears it.
Mr. Eandolph—For the reputation of the profession, I
must ask what is there in the evidence to show that Mr. Bil-
lings had anything to do Avith this theft ?
Mr. Benjamin—If you will look at Laurencel's friend
Birnie's testimony, you will see his name brought in for no other
purpose that I can perceive, but to hint that Barron and Bil-
lings stole the original letter.
Mr. Eandolph—I have nothing to say as regards Barron.
Mr. Benjamin—It is true Mr. Billings was at that time in
Yermont; but that is nothing. It was just as easy for him to
steal letters here, when in Yermont, as if here ! It is true the
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doors were all locked, the windows closed tight, and the carpet
bag fastened. But what difference does that make ? You
[tapping Billings on the shoulder,] had false keys for all. It
is true that Forbes had carried this letter all day upon his
person, and just left it in his carpet bag for a convenient half
hour—so that could be stolen, and the copy he had prepared,
produced. But that does not make the thing improbable!
You, brother Billings, must have known he intended to leave
it in the carpet bag during that half hour, and you were all
ready to go in and take it from thence. I am astonished at
you!
Brother Billings, you went to Mexico, too. You found a
big book there. You forged two pages in it. Not only
that; you found on the paper "L. G. 15, fo. 140," and
some other hieroglyphics, and got the clerk to swear that
that meant the General Book, page 140, etc. You brought
up the clerk to swear that that was the book of the Min-
istry of Justice, containing part of the original archives
of Mexico. Now that is very astonishing again. Nobody did
it but yourself. Nobody found it until you got there. You
found it—and it is very easy for a man to find everything
where he puts it, and I believe you put it there first. So of
the carpet bag, the locked room, and the comedy—I believe
you had a hand in it all
!
James Alex. Forbes having taken a copy of the original,
with an eye to its being stolen, and having put the original in
his carpet bag for half an hour, so that it could be stolen, now
brings the prepared copy into Court—and necessarily, as it is
his testimony, it must be believed. Your Honors could not,
for a moment, deny your credit to a copy, produced by James
Alexander Forbes, himself, to an original he pledges his honor
he once had ! Once his honor pledged, the Court must be sat-
isfied.
There is another witness for whom Brother Randolph has
more respect than he has for Forbes. I think he does not
admit that Birnie perjures himself for the mere pleasure of it,
nor that he is a forger. Therefore, that not being admitted,
we had to prove it. To prove it we produce only nineteen
witnesses.
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Mr. Randolph—On the other side we produce sixteen.
Mr. Benjamin—"We are three ahead of you. We have
nineteen witnesses to prove that this man is a common and
notorious liar and perjurer. We have all the notables of
the place where he lives, who swear they would not believe
him on oath.
Mr. Eandolph—We have more notables to prove the con-
trary.
Mr. Benjamin—Then, of course, your notables do not know
him. And I say if you had ten thousand witnesses to prove a
man credible, and had ten who would swear they would not
believe him on oath, the presumption would be that your ten
thousand did not know him, and that my ten did.
Who is the first witness, and what does he say about it ? The
first is Colonel Coffee. What does he know about Birnie ? I
will state to the Court that every one of these witnesses brought
to impeach Birnie, were asked the legal question only, viz.,
" What is his general character for truth and veracity ?
Would you believe him on oath ?" Every one says he would
not believe him on oath, and that his character for truth and
veracity is very bad.
But the principal points of his character came out on the
cross-examination by the Government counsel.
Mr. Randolph—I was absent at the time. Had I been
present I might not have asked the questions.
Mr. Benjamin—I don't think you would. You know too
much for that.
Now what does this Colonel Coffee say about Birnie ? He
says that he deceived him in a business transaction :
A man that would deceive me in a business transaction, I
would not believe on his oath, and beside that, I have heard his
reputation very frequently attacked in conversation.
The next witness is Warmcastle, County Judge, and mem-
ber of the Legislature.
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Ans.—From his reputation in the community, and my ac-
quaintance with that reputation, I could not believe him, un-
less I was satisfied that he had no motive for misrepresent-
ation.
Ques. 9.—Does not this rule apply to every person, and
please state why particularly to Mr. Birnie?
Ans.—No, sir ; there are many persons in my community,
whom I would believe on oath, when it would be for their in-
terest to testify falsely, but Mr. Birnie is not one of that class of
men, from my knowledge of his reputation ; my impression is
derived from my acquaintance with Mr. Birnie, through public
rumor, for a number of years.
Next, we have David Boss, who is a farmer. What does he
say?
Ans.—When I find that a man, whose word is not good,
whose note is not good, I would not believe him on oath. I
regard Mr. Birnie as a dangerous man, who would take all
sorts of advantages. I would not trust him out of my sight.
He is a worthless man, who lives on the labor of other people.
For my part I have made money by hard work.
His brother-in-law, William Welch, told me that he stole his
name, and put it down on a piece of paper, without his
(Welch's) leave. I understood him to say that Birnie had
forged his name, and I believed that Welch told the truth
about it at the time.
That is the cross-examination to sustain Birnie.
Nathaniel Jones is the Sheriff of the county. He is cross-
examined.
State some acts of Mr. Birnie's which has caused the bad
reputation which you speak of among the community in which
you knew him.
A. It is not from any single act of his, but it is from his
want of occupation, and the universal belief among people that
he swears falsely, and procures false evidence in land cases.
He is utterly worthless, and he is a loafer. If I were to start
out to find a man who thought well of his character, I should
not know where to go to find him ?
That is the cross-examination which is to sustain Birnie, by
testifying and sifting the evidence.
Again he is cross-questioned.
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What land cases do you refer to ?
A. Anywhere he could get a fee for swearing falsely, and
procuring false evidence.
Now, we come to B. E. Holliday. What does he know
about him, and what does he think of him ?
After speaking of his reputation, and being asked if it did
not arise from some lawsuits, the witness said :
A. Perhaps they did in part—not all. Shortly after his
marriage, his pecuniary credit became bad, and in the com-
munity he got such a reputation that anything that was stated
as coming from Birnie would not be believed.
It was enough that it came from Birnie.
The next gentleman, Nicholas Hunsaker, who was the
Sheriff, was asked if there was anything outside of the law-
suits in which Birnie had been engaged, in which his character
was bad ?
A. Outside of lawsuits it was said he employed a man to
steal barley, which was in the custody of the Sheriff; this is
the only act outside of litigation that I remember ; with regard
to those lawsuits, I have heard a great many people state that
they would not believe him under oath.
The next witness, Smith, on his cross-examination, being
asked, says
:
A. I have no particular feeling against the man ; I would
believe him on oath if I could, but I couldn't do it.
So it goes on. I will not detain your Honors by reading
the rest of this testimony, with the exception of the evidence
of one more witness, Mr. Elam Brown.
He says, when asked when Birnie's reputation commenced
to be bad
:
A. I had known him two or three years before anything
occurred to cause me to lose confidence in him. His reputation
became bad by degrees
;
he was charged with doing one bad
thing here, and one bad thing there, until finally people began
to say that they would not believe him under oath. This is
what I have heard, not what I know of my own knowledge.
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I am on no unfriendly relations ; nothing lias occurred between
us. I am sorry to be here to-day testifying against him.
I consider him a dangerous man, and I believe him deficient
in those principles of honesty which would make him a reliable
witness.
I would observe to your Honors, in relation to the testimony
taken upon Birnie's character, that that taken by us was from
witnesses from Contra Costa, where he had been living five
years.
Now, may it please the Court, what becomes of the forged
letter and all the superstructure built upon it ? These are the
witnesses you have got to prove the existence of the original.
You have paraded before you by the United States, James
Alex. Forbes and Robert Birnie ; to prove that he made a copy
at home, before he brought it here, you have James Alex.
Forbes
; to prove that he made a copy also, you have Robert
Birnie
;
they provided two copies in advance—one for Birnie
and one for Forbes—before the letter was in a condition to be
stolen. That the letter was put in a condition to be stolen,
you have no evidence but that of James Alex. Forbes. No-
body saw him put it in the carpet-bag but himself. You have
no proof but his own, which, I need not say, the counsel for
the Government admits is utterly unreliable. In relation to
the theft you have no evidence but his. When he left his
room to get a cup of tea, he put the letter which he had always
previously kept on his person, in his carpet-bag. Somebody
got into the room and took it from the carpet-bag without
breaking any of the locks of the apartment, or that of the
carpet-bag. That is the story that is brought forward to
bolster up a forgery patent on its face. On that your Honors
are asked to believe that there is forgery, fraud and fabrication
in this case. But I leave that letter.
Observe, if your Honors please, that I wish to deal candidly
with the Court. I do not say there were no propositions to
forge. I do not mean to'say that all the parties who had an
interest in this title, repulsed those propositions to forge with
the indignation with which they should have been repulsed.
I do not expect to gain any case by attempting to hood-wink
the Judges as if they were children. That subject I will come
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to presently, I am now engaged in endeavoring to show that
the original conspiracy against our title was based on the forgery
of nearly all the papers.
I will now come to the next forgery. Your Honors will
now refer to the forged letter of the 28th of October, 1849, at
page 392. The true letter of the same date is at page 844.
Do your Honors want any further proof of forgery than this ?
S. F. Oct. 28, '49.
William Forbes, Esq., Tepic.
My Dear Sir :—I have been detained here until the present
moment, occupied in carrying out the arrangements explained
to B., F. & Co. in my letter to them of yesterday's date.
Here is the forged letter
:
S. F., Oct. 28, '49.
William Forbes, Esq., Tepic.
My Dear Sir :—I have been detained at this place until the
present moment, occupied in completing the arrangements ex-
plained to B., F. & Co., under the date of yesterday.
Is anything further necessary? Two letters of the same
date, to the same man, beginning with the same sentence, both
marked private ! Now I say that letter was forged when he
had the original. Do your Honors want the explanation ?
He had forged a memorandum, which he had said he left in
Tepic the previous May, and he wanted to show that that
memorandum had actually existed there. In order to bolster
up the forged memorandum, he had to forge a letter that would
refer to the memorandum
;
and as the true letter did not refer
to the memorandum, he took the first sentence of it and forged
the remainder for the purpose of referring to that document.
Mr. Bandolph—Which letter do you like best ?
Mr. Benjamin—I like neither best. I want the Court to
look at the true one. The true one is as bad as the false. It
was not necessary to forge the false letter for any other pur-
pose than that which I shall afterwards show. These words
" forgery" and " perjury," are hard words, and they come back
to roost sometimes.
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Mr. Eandolph— * * * New Almaden.
Mr. Benjamin—I have no doubt of it. How about your
friend Laurencel? These things come back to roost. We
will see as the case goes on. Here, then, is the true letter of
the 28th October, 1849 ; and here is the forgery of the same date
to the same man, also marked " Private," and beginning with
the same words. The one brought in by us after the other had
been produced by James A. Forbes, as being a copy of his
letter which he had presented, is the true, original letter.
Now, in the true letter, there is just as much adverse to the
case of the claimants as in the false one ; because the true letter
calls attention to the forgeries he wanted committed, as well as
the false. But in the true letter, the statement in regard to the
forgeries is this
:
(Page 846.) " I now desire to call your attention to the fol-
lowing important matter." .
Now, then. He is now initiating a proposition for for-
gery. (Page 816.) "In order to secure the possession of the
land, you must forge and antedate titles."
But when he first came into Court, it was necessary to carry
the date further back. So he forged a memorandum, which he
said he had left in Tepic; and then forged the letter of this
date (28th October, '49). Instead of the statement in the true
letter, "I now desire to call your attention to the following
important matter," he inserts in the forgery, "I must a^am
call your attention to the subject of the documents comprised in
the memorandum left in Tepic."
And now, let me call your Honors' attention to a remark-
able circumstance throughout the whole thing, to enable you
to perceive the true state of that correspondence as originally
brought before you : That in not a solitary letter throughout,
is that memorandum spoken of, except in letters brought in by
James Alex. Forbes, as being copies preserved by him of let-
ters written by him to the parties. There is no answer, no
allusion in our correspondence to any such memorandum. It
never appears in the whole correspondence, except in letters
which James Alex. Forbes brings in and swears to be copies
of letters which he wrote.
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This is the first one of the copies of the letters he swears he
wrote. It is a forgery. Two letters, of the same date, with
the same beginning, and to the same man ! In one of the two
—that brought in by the claimants—Forbes is initiating the
subject. In the true letter he says, " I now call your attention ;"
in the false, "I must again call your attention"—changing the
word " now" to " again," and putting the initiative back to the
date of the Tepic memorandum, which no man had ever heard
of until it was brought in in this case. It is awful, awful, to
have all this mass of forgery brought in here and put in evi-
dence by the Government of the United States against a
claimant.
Mr. Justice Hoffman—"What do you suppose is the object
in the production of this letter by James Alex. Forbes ?
Mr. Benjamin—His theory was, that there was a certain
date for ante-dating. When first brought in, he had a theory
to maintain. He could not show all his letters to Laurencel,
because, if he did, he would show him the fact of the existence
of our title. He had to pick out certain of our letters, take
his answers and pick out passages, and present them to Lau-
rencel as proof of antedating and forgery. He remained at
home, gathered his correspondence together, excluded every-
thing referring to the existence of the titles. Whenever his
own letters referred to anything favorable to the titles, he cut
the passage out. Pretending that the copies he made were
true copies of the originals, he sold them to Laurencel—but
not to bring into the Court. It was never intended by James
Alex. Forbes that those copies should be brought into Court.
Mr. Justice Hoffman—The suggestions of the Tepic mem-
orandum appear in this letter never to have been acted on.
The whole letter is a reproach on that account.
Mr. Benjamin—What motive influenced his conduct with
Laurencel it has been impossible for me to devise. But cer-
tain it is, that in this correspondence it is not one or two, but
half a dozen letters, that he has forged in this way.
What his purpose was God only knows. He never meant
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the letters to be examined ; never supposed they would be ex-
amined in Court. Again and again he urges in his cross-ex-
amination, that he never intended them to be produced here.
I am going to take up the true effect of the correspondence,
and will show your Honors what I suppose the true theory to
be, not denying any inference that may be drawn, but treating
the Court with entire candor as regards the subject.
On page 393, you have the letter of the 30th of October,
1849. It is from James Alex. Forbes to Alex. Forbes,
the sole purpose of it being to again speak of his having ex-
plained all this matter at Tepic. Nothing in relation to Tepic
is in the original correspondence anywhere. But James Alex.
Forbes left his tracks on the face of this letter. He forged it
from his letter to William Forbes, of the 28th of October.
After forging it and making it up as addressed to Alex. Forbes,
he put on the back the date of the true letter (which he copied
from the true letter,) while indorsing it with a wrong date,
thus showing the origin of the forgery. Here on the back is
the date (28th October) of the letter to William Forbes, con-
taining, substantially, what James A. Forbes put in the forged
letter addressed to Alex Forbes, and the letter to William
Forbes is dated October 28th; that to Alexander Forbes
—which is made up from the former—October 30, and when
James A. Forbes came to indorse his forgery with the proper
date, to bring into Court, he indorsed it October 28, copying
from the letter of that date. There is the track of guilt forgers,
leave behind them. The true letter is addressed to William
Forbes, under date ofOctober 28. Out ofthat is concocted a false
letter to Alex. Forbes, on which the date—October 30—is put.
But when the forger goes to indorse the date on the back, that
it may be brought into Court, he forgot he had made a change
of the date, and writes on it that of the original, of which it is
a copy. The true letter is at page 844.
You observe that every letter that I have shown you to be
forged, is a letter which he brings in purporting to be a copy
made by him of his correspondence.
Here comes another. Page 403; letter of Feb'y 26, 1850.
Now, how was this letter produced in the original papers?
Look at it ! See how it deceives ! The letter is brought in as
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0. H. No. 9. It is followed by 0. H. No. 10, 0. H. No. 11,
and 0. H. No. 13,—all of which seem to have reference to its
contents. Now it never was received, if ever written. But it
never was written.
Mr. Kandolph—How do you know that it was never re-
ceived, if ever written ?
Mr. Benjamin"—The letter of the 7th of April announces
the receipt of letters. As late as that date nothing had been
received from Jas. A. Forbes, posterior to the 19th of Feb'y.
Page 405 : " I wrote to you by the California, dated the 23d
of Feb'y, and since then, have received by the " Oregon," yours
of the 19th of that month." Where is the letter of the 26th?
Mr. Randolph—He had not received it yet.
Mr. Benjamin—Why had not a letter leaving California
on the 26th of Feb'y reached Tepic by the 7th of April?
Whether it ever was received or not, by the face of this corres-
pondence, no man can tell. But it is introduced into this cor-
respondence to make it appear that this is the letter to which
the letters 0. H. No. 10, 0. H. No. 11, and 0. H. No. 13 were
answers. Upon examining those letters, we find that at the
date of their writing this letter had never been received. Yet,
it is arranged by Jas. A. Forbes in this manner, and presented
to Laurencel for purchase. Time was not to be afforded for
examining all of this purchase. Time was not to be given
Laurencel to ascertain how this correspondence fits in. He is
not allowed to do anything beyond making an inspection of
the papers, until his money is paid. He is not to use them ex-
cept to black-mail. And when at last brought into Court, this
man Forbes, with $20,000 in his pocket, is put on the stand.
Then, all these papers coming from this source are produced
by the Government of the United States to break down our
title.
Mr. Randolph—Forbes is one of the claimants in the record.
Mr. Benjamin—No ! no ! You have proven that he sold
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out his interest, and then bought him to come in and give evi-
dence against his partners—such evidence as we have seen in
this case.
Now, may it please your Honors, from all this elimination of
everything that is forged in these papers, I come to state to
the Court what my true theory in relation to these letters is,
and to place it before your Honors for your appreciation : These
parties owned a valuable property in California. They owned
it by titles derived during the existence of the Mexican Gov-
ernment. They had spent a fortune upon it. It is in proof in
this cause, offered by the United States, at page 215 of this
record, that these parties had spent upon this property, up to
May, 1852, $978,114, and had gotten back $553,000, and no
more.
Mr. Randolph—Where do you find that ?
Mr. Benjamin—In the sworn answer in chancery introduced
by you in this case. In these amounts are not included any
allowance for interest on capital expended by the defendants.
They were then $440,000 or $450,000 out of pocket. They
had spent close upon a million of dollars upon a barren peak
in the mountains.
Their liberal expenditures have turned out to have been ju-
dicious. If the mine had been poor, according to good old
Gamboa, it would not have been (muy codiciadd) very much
coveted. Turning out to be rich, a host of harpies gathered
around. These obscene birds of prey were befouling every-
thing they touched. First came a body of people and said the
mine was on the Berreyesa Rancho, because it had been so
described in the original papers ; Berreyesa having made a
fraudulent alteration, and in that way defrauded Castillero into
declaring it was on his land.
Next comes a body represented by my friend, the special
counsel of the Government. Laurencel and his associates have
been depicted with the feeble powers that I possess, and I have
stated to the Court as plainly and as impartially as possible
what their true character is.
The New Almaden Co. had sent up their titles through an
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agent—an agent they had taken up and invested with their
confidence—Robert Walkinshaw. He was their agent, and
had all their documents of title. He, also, turned on them,
with an attempt to defraud them out of shares of the mine, to
get a larger portion for himself. He formed a combination with
others to denounce the mine as having been abandoned, to
represent the original title as bad, and to share the property
with others, thereby getting a larger share for himself. In that
he was playing a certain game. If he succeeded, he got a
bigger share ; if he failed, he still retained what he had. He
had nothing to risk, something to gain. In those days, with
people combining all around them to defraud them out of their
property, Jas. Alex. Forbes—who had written to them of
Walkinshaw's intentions—commenced afresh, in 1849, the sug-
gestions made in 1847. When the suggestions were made in
1847, he was not their agent. They were not responsible for
what he chose to write, but treated his propositions with entire
disdain. This is best proven by his own letters, since brought
into the record, to which I now refer your Honors, dated Jan'y
13th, 1849. (Page 3050.) In this letter to Alex. Forbes, he
says to him
:
I have much to say to you upon other points, but I cannot
write too much upon the subject to which I have alluded, con-
tained in my letter above mentioned, and which I fear has es-
caped your memory.
"What is the letter above mentioned ? Observe that, when
that letter was written, the mine of these parties was in the
possession of Walkinshaw
;
yet, Jas. A. Forbes, writing this
letter to persons who were part owners of the mine, got no an-
swer to his proposition. He had their interests in his charge,
yet they did not answer it. No answer is produced, or pre-
tended to have been sent. On the contrary, in Jan'y, 1849, he
(J. A. Forbes) writes that he fears that letter has escaped the
memory of Alex. Forbes. Nothing has ever come of it.
Here you have in Jan'y, 1849, this : that his letter of May,
1847, had been forgotten. Nobody had ever paid any atten-
tion to his counsels. But, towards the fall of 1849, (and here
I come to a point suggested by your Honors when you asked
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me what the difference was, whether it occurred in May or
Nov'r) for the first time the propositions are made to Barron,
Forbes & Co., who, in the interval, have taken possession of
this mine, in behalf of the avio formed in Mexico for supply-
ing it. At page 390, you find the first connection of Barron,
Forbes & Co. with this mine.
Tepic, 11th April, 1849.
Jas. Alex. Foebes, Esq., San Francisco.
Dear Sir :—We beg leave to refer you to Mr. Alex. Forbes'
letter of the 9th inst., respecting the arrangement of the affairs
of the Mine of New Almaden, and beg to recommend that ne-
gotiation to your best care and management until we can for-
ward the necessary instructions for your government. You may
now rely on this Mine being worked to the utmost of its capa-
bilities of production and sale of quicksilver on the arrival of
the apparatus, and we hope to make up for the delay which
circumstances have hitherto prevented this important concern
from being productive. We shall soon have the pleasure of
sending you a list of the company of which the " Habilitado-
res" are composed. The House of Jecker, Torre & Co. of Mexico
and Mazatlan, and our own, are chiefly interested, and as Don
Ysidoro de la Torre has gone to Europe, he will concert with
Mr. Barron everything which can tend to the successful devel-
opment of this enterprise.
Now, fix your Honors' attention on this. The first propo-
sition in May, 1847, never answered and nothing done, com-
plained of in January, 1849, as forgotten. In April, 1849, for
the first time, Barron, Forbes & Co. take an interest in this
matter. They enter into it as aviadores ; they furnish funds.
They join with them Jecker, Torre & Co. of the City of Mexico,
and the common funds furnished by these parties are to be used
for putting this mine into active and successful working opera-
tion. Up to that time the funds had been insufficient. Prob-
ably there was doubt among the owners as to the amount of
funds they were willing to expend. But now a new and vigor-
ous impetus is to be given the enterprise. Alex. Forbes, long
at the head of the business, then on the point of retiring and
going to England, gives up his charge to the new company, and
they begin to operate for the supplies of the mine, necessarily
under the influence of this old gentleman who had probably
reached his three score years and ten nearly.
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That is the condition of things in April, 1849. Now, James
Alex. Forbes goes down to Tepic, and succeeds in getting the
house to make him the agent of the mine. What he told them
about Walkinshaw, what means he used for that purpose
(securing the agency), none know better than himself. We
know not. He comes back, turns Walkinshaw out of the mine
and takes possession ; then comes warfare ; then Walkinshaw
and James Alex. Forbes have a long and bitter litigation
;
then James A. Forbes begins to dread the destruction of the
titles; then he writes again and again to his princijDals, " This
man Walkinshaw is a villain ; I do not know what I shall do
he is going to steal away the original registries from the
Alcalde's office ; he is going to destroy the documents of title
which you gave him to bring up here, and which he refused
to give me ; he is buying up the rights of the neighboring
proprietors that he may bring suits ; he has denounced your
mine as abandoned, and claims that he has a right to take it
under the mining ordinances ; there is no species of villainy
which you may not expect of this man ; I am struggling
against him
;
I am desirous of defeating him ; I have your
interests at heart, but I do not know how I shall succeed ; in
my judgment and opinion, your titles are informal ; I told you
so years ago, yet you won't send me other documents that I
wanted fabricated."
"On the other hand, I am acquainted with the machinations
of the neighboring proprietors, who say that their titles extend
over this mine ; I want help; that help consists in your ob-
taining for me fraudulent, fabricated and antedated papers,
which must bear the date of the Castillo Lanzas decree. That
is what I want, and what you must send."
That is what he writes, for the first time in any original
letter produced to Barron, Forbes & Co., or William Forbes,
in the fall of 1849.
Now, under these circumstances, what are the answers?
This property is in a foreign country, far from those men, in
the hands of agents whom they distrust—one of whom has
turned his back upon them, and is endeavoring to swindle them
out of their property ; the other of whom is writing them
propositions for forgery. Perhaps you will say, and perhaps
10
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a man of rigid morality would declare as his judgment, that
they ought instantly to have repelled the propositions with
contempt and scorn, and driven him (James A. Forbes) out
of the mine. But where would their property have been then?
Then it would have been necessary for some one else to go and
take charge of it in his place. They were not ready for that.
The partners were abroad. The proposition amongst them is,
" Let us temporize ; let us wait a month or two, until one of
our partners comes home, that we may send him to take charge
and put an end to the scene of fraud and corruption going on
up there." To that end Alex. Forbes conducted the corres-
pondence in his own name, but of course for Barron, Forbes &
Co., in his letter, and appears to accept the proposition.
Perhaps I am going too far in saying that it is apparent on
the face of the papers, that if he could have done so safely he
would have been willing to join James Alex, in the forgeries.
But recollect another man existed in the firm—the man who
controlled the house, and who was on the eve of his arrival
in Tepic.
On the 3d of February, Eustace Barron returned from
Europe. Your Honors will find the announcement in the
letter from Tepic of the 3d of February, 1850, at page 400.
Eustace Barron has arrived in Tepic on the 3d of February.
What is the result of his arrival ? Within thirty days this
man James Alex. Forbes is turned out of the mine
; Ysidoro
de la Torre is sent up here to take possession of it, and when
James Alex. Forbes is turned out it is put in the possession of
Captain Halleck in behalf of the owners.
I have already read to your Honors the letters of the previous
spring, in which the statement is made that De la Torre will
confer with Eustace Barron, who is in Europe ; that is in April,
1849. Castillero was in Lower California; De la Torre had
gone to Europe; the owners were scattered; their interests
were in the hands of strangers who were endeavoring to
swindle and defraud them.
Eustace Barron returns on the 3d of February, as shown in
this letter. Castillero has just arrived, and the parties meet.
What does Eustace Barron find? Walkinshaw endeavoring
to swindle the partners ; James Alex. Forbes proposing forge-
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ries ; the vast interests belonging to his house apparently in
the hands of thieves and swindlers. That is the condition of
things on the 3d of February.
Now, here is the letter of the 2d of March, page 404. Eus-
tace Barron had not then been in Tepic a month
:
Tepic, 2d March, 1850.
James A. Forbes, Esq., New Alraaden :
Dear Sir :—We duly received your letters up to the 29th of
January per steamer Panama, which have had our best atten-
tion, and as our friend, Dn Ysicloro de la Torre of Mazatlan
has been appointed, and has consented to proceed by this
steamer to California, with full powers to act in behalf of all
concerned, it is needless to enter into any particulars respecting
the various matters contained in your letters, as you will be
enabled personally to communicate your views to him ; and to
arrange every thing in the best manner possible. Mr. de la
Torre came to Tepic to meet Mr. Barron and the others con-
cerned in this negotiation, and it was deemed necessary that
some of the partners in the" Habilitacion" should proceed to
New Almaden in order to consult personally with you, and to
arrange respecting the future operations of this enterprise, and
Mr. de la Torre has been prevailed upon, at much inconven-
ience to himself, to undertake the present charge.
We are sure that no one could be named more agreeable to
you, than Mr. de la Torre, and have no doubt but that his
presence will be most useful in sanctioning and arranging a
plan of future operations, and of assisting in adjusting any diffi-
culties which now exist, particularly as he has the full author-
ity of the association to act, as to him shall appear necessary.
Mr. de la Torre takes Lip with him Dr. Tobin in the hopes that
he will resume his labors, and act in conformity with his duty.
Mr. Barron and Don Andres Castillero are about to proceed
to the City of Mexico, and will attend to what you have recom-
mended.
That recommendation was, as stated in the previous letter,
to get a " copy of the ratification which Castillero says exists
in the archives," unknown previously to the associates.
Now, at page 328, you have the deposition of Captain Hal-
leck. In March or April, 1850, Capt. Halleck takes the charge
of this mine. De la Torre does not temporize for a moment
after he gets here. James Alex. Forbes is at once turned out,
and Capt. Halleck put in in his place.
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Mr. Justice Hoffman—Just read the letter of the 29th of
January, 1850, from James Alex. Forbes to Alexander Forbes.
Mr. Benjamin—Page 399 :
I have received the copy of the contract of Habilitacion, and
as you request me to address myself to B., F. & Co. on the
affairs of the mine, I have now written to them upon this par-
ticular subject to which I request your earnest attention, not
as regards the habilitacion, but another document which you
know of.
Now, what is the answer to that letter? What are "the
documents"? In the very next letter, dated February 6th,
1850, Barron, Forbes & Co. write to James Alex. Forbes, (page
543)':
Dear Sir :—In reply to your private letter of the 20th De-
cember, respecting the two sitios of land, we have to say that
we had hoped the document lately sent for this grant to Mr.
Castillero would have been sufficient, but as you seem to be
doubtful on this point, we have spoken to him, he being now
here, and his opinion is that if this grant is not tenable it will
be better to go upon the three thousand varas of the Alcalde,
granted at the time of giving possession of the mine, and ap-
proved of by the Mexican Government, which approval will
be taken from the Mexican archives and sent on to you. Al-
though by the ordenanzas of Mineria, the Alcalde or Judge
may not have had strictly a right to grant these three thousand
varas, yet being approved by the Mexican Government, would
make this valid as a grant. We hope, however, you will find
the Berreyesas' lands not to include the hacienda, and conse-
quently either the grant of the two sitios or the three thousand
varas would be a sufficient title. Mr. Alexander Forbes will,
however, write you more particularly on this subject.
In Alex. Forbes' letter of the 3d of February, he says, (Page
400):
Castillero has returned and is also here, so am I and William
Forbes. This leaves out only the four California barras, and
I think I may venture to act for you, if necessary, as you ver-
bally told me I might. * * * * I have every reason to believe
that the document you mention will be found in the City of
Mexico.
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I beg that the Court will notice that that man, James Alex.
Forbes, forged a mark of italics under the word " found," thus
altering the meaning of the letter—as is shown by the press
copy of the original introduced by us.—See Transcript, 475
:
And as Mr. Castillero will return there they will no doubt
be prooured, but we are at some loss to know what is exactly
wanted, and I beg you will, by next steamer, give a sketch of
the document you allude to, particularly a description of the
limits of the grant. I think you must not have received the
information sent you of the existence of the grant of the two
sitios directly to Castillero, and registered in Monterey, nor am
I sure if this will mend the matter.
He then speaks of attacking the Berreyesas' title as not
valid.
Finally, he says (Page 402)
:
We think at present that it may be the best plan to get
an authenticated copy of the approval of the Mexican Govern-
ment of the grant of three thousand varas, given by the Al-
calde, on giving possession of the mine. As a doubt may be
started as to whether the Alcalde, acting as the " Juez cle Mi-
neria" had a right to make this grant, yet, if approved of by
the Government of Mexico before the possession of the country
by the Americans, there could be no doubt upon the subject.
This takes in our hacienda, and unless opposed by the Berrey-
esas, would, I should think, settle the question. Castillero
says such approval was given, and that on his arrival in Mex-
ico he will procure a judicial copy of it; this is the plan we
shall adopt if we hear nothing from you to alter this resolution.
This is the state of the correspondence in February. On the
2d of March this man Forbes is turned out of the mine. Capt.
Halleck is put in possession when the owners resume their
property, and then Eustace Barron goes to Mexico. I now in-
tend to follow him to Mexico, and see what he did there. It
is in the record.
Look at pages 59, 1794 and 1797, if you wish to see what
Eustace Barron did in Mexico, when he went there in 1850.
Mr. Justice Hoffman—In the letter of March 2d, 1850,
addressed by Barron, Forbes & Co. to Alex. Forbes, they say
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Eustace Barron is about to proceed to the City of Mexico, to
attend to what he (Forbes) had recommended. Is that part of
the temporizing policy ?
Me. Benjamin"—That was a part of their policy to keep
James Alex. Forbes quiet until De la Torre could get up here
and turn him out of the mine. Having previously stated what
they were going to do, that is, to procure certified copies of the
proceedings in Mexico in May, 1846, alluded to by Castillero
;
and they carried this out by what they actually did do, as I
shall show the Court. They actually took steps in Mexico,
and the first step taken the Court will find at page 59.
Forbes recommended a ratification and confirmation of the
mining possession by the Supreme Government. The other
recommendation was to procure a grant of the land.
Now, what did Eustace Barron do in Mexico, on the 30th of
June, 1850 ? He procured the following certificate (Page 59)
:
I, the undersigned, Minister of Internal and External Rela-
tions, certify that, although in the communication which the
Junta for the Encouragement and Administration of Mining
directed on the 5th of May, 1846, to his Excellency the Min-
ister of Justice, relative to the mine of cinnabar discovered in
California by Don Andres Castillero, it was written that it was
situated in Lower California, and the same is said in the answer
from the Ministry, dated the 9th of the said month, of which
documents copies were given on the 23d of April last, to Senor
Eustaquio Barron. This is a mistake, for said mine and the
lands granted to Castillero are in the territory of Upper Cali-
fornia, which grant the Supreme Government afterwards ap-
proved and declared legitimate.
And I give this certificate for the purposes which it may
serve, at the request of the said Senor Barron, in Mexico, on
the 30th of June, 1850.
(Signed) Lacunza.
Mr. Randolph—"Where is the evidence in the record on
that subject ? Has there been a witness called to testify to
this ?
Mr. Benjamin—That is one of the documents offered in the
Land Commission.
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Mr. Eandolph—Not proved there.
Mr. Benjamin—The certificate of Lafragua proves that ex-
hibit in the Land Commission. I am going on to argue on it,
if it is a forgery.
Now, your Honors have in your possession what Eustace
Barron goes to do in the City of Mexico. Suppose he wanted
to forge a grant. According to the gentleman (Randolph) is
it not easier to forge these papers than to get a certificate from
the Minister that these contain clerical errors ? for Castillero to
get a correct description copied, than to apply to the Minister
of Eelations to correct clerical errors? He has no difficulty in
getting that certificate. That is fair, honest and upright.
Where are the clerical errors ? If your Honors will look at
page 1794, you will find that in the communication of the
Junta of the 5th May, 1846, to the Minister ofJustice, it is stated
that the specimens of cinnabar came from the Mission of Santa
Clara, in Lower California.\^pQn page 1797 you will find the
same error.
Eustace Barron has gone to Mexico, to get the documents to
send up here in proof of the title. What does he send up ?.
A certificate that the errors are clerical errors ; that the true
place where the mine is situate, is Upper and not Lower Cali-
fornia, as stated in the papers.
Mr. Randolph—When you first dwelt on the certificate of
Lacunza, I asked you to point to anything that proves such a
thing in evidence.
Mr. Benjamin—I can't. I will state that it is; you prove
the contrary, if you can. It was filed before the Land Com-
mission at the time.
The application is made to Lacunza, Minister of Relations,
to correct the errors ; that is done by Eustace Barron. Is
anything else done ? Look at the letters here. Eustace Bar-
ron is stated in the letters to be busy in the public offices of the
City of Mexico, searching. Searching for what ? For proof
that the Berreyesa title is not good, that according to the ar-
chives neither Micheltorrena nor Alvarado had the right to
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make the grant ; and to seek up evidence of that fact to send
up to beat off the disputes about the boundaries. That is what
Eustace Barron is about. He is getting proof from the archives
to beat off the neighbors who are going to swindle him and his
partners out of the mine by extending their limits. He is cor-
recting clerical errors.
These things show conclusively that what he did in Mexico
was honest and correct—and it is before the Court.
Mr. Kandolph, the other day, called the attention of the
Court to a document "the most extraordinary," he says, "ever
produced before a Court within- his knowledge." Upon it he
called the Court to stamp its reprobation, because the party
subscribing it had presumed to say that the doubts of the
Court in relation to the authenticity of these papers were offen-
sive. That is an extraordinary document, and the most pre-
cious used in the case. It overthrows your whole case, little
as you seem to think it. It proves—notwithstanding all you
say of the power, the influence, the wealth of this house, and
of its chief—that with the aid of the American Minister and
the British Minister, Eustace Barron was unable to obtain from
the Mexican Government the poor privilege of putting the
great seal of State on his papers. They told him : " No, sir!
our laws are against it. We will not do it." You (Randolph)
say we could get them all to make up such papers as we
pleased
;
put espediente after espediente in their archives ; buy up
nine different witnesses. All of those witnesses, it is said, are
perjured. Castillo Lanzas is a perjurer
; these documents do
not exist in the c riginal ; were never issued. All this you say.
"We have procured the forgery of all this by means of our
power in Mexico ! And yet, all this vaunted power you as-
cribe to us could not procure the poor privilege of having the
seal of State appended to these papers, because refused by law.
Castillo Lanzas is the man who refused it, a yeax before he
came up here. Instructed by the President, he told Mr. Bar-
ron, " We cannot violate the laws for you. I am instructed to
tell you that, by the laws of the Mexican Republic, the great
seal cannot be used for certifying such papers, and we will not
go outside of those laws for your interests. The President in-
structs me to tell you that if the American Government will
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not respect that document, authenticated as we authenticate all
such documents, it is not our fault. As regards the matter of
national interference, that is a matter we will attend to at the
proper time. As regards this seal, which you pray for, it can-
not be granted."
They could not get it. All the British and American Min-
isters' influence could not get it. It cost nearly $200,000 to
bring up witnesses—all of which might have been saved by
that little seal. Oar Government would not admit evidence
taken there without it. All the money in Mexico could not
get it. If disposed to bribe or forge, what was easier than to
hand $50,000 or $100,000 to Castillo Lanzas, to put that seal
on this paper. If he is a man who could be bribed to come up
here and give false testimony, is it not much easier to bribe
him to put the seal on our papers ? All the power in Mexico
could not do that, yet, your Honors are asked to believe that
we could put a bundle of forgeries in the archives in Mexico,
and then bring up all the Ministers to swear to it. All that we
could do in Mexico, while all the power and influence of the
British and American Ministers and of our house could not get
those officials to swerve one hair from the letter of the law in
relation to their archives. Those archives, it is said, we can-
not offer in evidence, because the Government, which is claim-
ing our land, and which ought to ask them itself, will not do
so—therefore, it has a right to take our land !
This is all I have to say, may it please your Honors, in
defense of Eustace Barron. After the existence of these
facts came to his knowledge, he turned James Alex. Forbes
out, put the mine in possession of another person, went to the
City of Mexico, busied himself in getting such certificates as
the laws of the country would allow, endeavored to get proper
authentications, and was refused, and finally was driven by the
persecutions of the Government to spend $200,000 to defend
his character ; the faith of the nation, bound by the Treaty, be-
ing violated by the acts of the Government.
This is what Eustace Barron did. This is ALL that he did.
And it is a labor of love for me to say so ; because I knew him
personally ; because I became indebted to him in the City of
Mexico for acts of kindness I will ever remember ; because I
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loved his son Eustace, as noble-hearted a gentleman as I ever
knew ; because the other members of the family are my friends
and acquaintances whom I also respect and honor. It is a labor
of love for me to defend that family, because I believe them to
be men of as high and pure character as any gentlemen on this
floor. I believe it, and believing it, say it openly. Eustace
Barron, senior, was a man of austere manners, upright, respect-
ed by everybody who knew him, with extended influence
by reason of his character for probity and honesty, against
whom no human being ever heard a single word of reproach
or calumny. Yet, Eustace Barron had his dying moments em-
bittered by the statements spread broadcast throughout the
country
;
and it was at his request that his friend Negrete came
up here to give testimony to the truth of the documents brought
forward, without fee or reward ; testimony unimpeached and
uncontradicted, and which the whole power of the Government
has been defied repeatedly to deny or disprove. It cannot be
impeached or contradicted.
Protected against the slanderous charges of the Government
by such a character and by such testimony, even the lightning
of Edmund Randolph's invective plays innocuous around the
name of Eustace Barron.
THIRD DA.Y.
Mr. Benjamin—In the course of my argument on the facts
of this case, I omitted one reference to a communication not
hitherto adverted to in the case, to which I now desire to ad-
dress the attention of the Court for a moment only before I
proceed to discuss the questions of law. In Executive Docu-
ment, JSTo. 17, (House, 1st session, 31st Congress, 1849-50)
previously referred to, is a communication from Col. Mason,
then Governor of California, addressed to the Adjutant General
at Washington, giving a report in relation to California mines,
and a history of a visit made by him to this particular mine in
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the spring of the year 1848. As a part of the history of the
country in relation to this mine, I desire to read a passage or
two to the Court. (Page 534)
:
"Before leaving the subject of mines, I will mention that on
my return from the Sacramento I touched at New Almaden
—
the quicksilver mine of Mr. Alexander Forbes, Consul of Her
Britannic Majesty at Tepic. This mine is in a spur of mount-
ains, 1,000 feet above the level of the Bay of San Francisco,
and is distant in a southern direction from the Pueblo San
Jose about twelve miles. The ore (cinnabar) occurs in a large
vein dipping at a strong angle to the horizon. Mexican miners
are employed in working it, by driving shafts and galleries
about six feet by seven, following the vein.
The fragments of rock and ore are removed on the backs of
Indians, in raw-hide sacks. The ore is then hauled in an ox-
wagon from the mouth of the mine clown to a valley well sup-
plied with wood and water, in which the furnaces are situated.
These furnaces are of the simplest construction, exactly like a
common bake-oven, in th^arown of which is inserted a wha-
ler's frying kettle
; another inverted kettle forms the lid. From
a hole in the lid a small bnck channel leads to an apartment
or chamber, in the bottom of which is inserted a small iron
kettle. This chamber has a chimney.
In the morning of each day the kettles are filled with mine-
ral (broken in small pieces) mixed with lime ; fire is then ap-
plied, and kept up all day. The mercury, volatilized, passes
into the chamber, is condensed on the sides and bottom of the
chamber, and flows into the pot prepared for it. No water is
used to condense the mercury.
During a visit I made last Spring, four such ovens were in
operation, and yielded in the two days I was there, 65Q pounds
of quicksilver, worth at Mazatlan $1.80 per pound. Mr. Walk-
inshaw, the gentleman now in charge of this mine, tells me
that the vein is improving, and that he can afford to keep his
people employed, even in these extraordinary times. This
mine is very valuable of itself, and becomes the more so, as
mercury is extensively used in obtaining gold. It is not at
present used in California for that purpose, but will be at some
future time. When I was at this mine last Spring, other par-
ties were engaged in searching for veins ; but none have been
discovered that are worth following up, although the earth in
that whole range of hills is highly discolored, indicating the
presence of this ore. I send several beautiful specimens prop-
erly labeled. The amount of quicksilver in Mr. Forbes' vats
on the 15th of July, was about 25,000 pounds."
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At the close of my argument yesterday, my brother Ran-
dolph asked me on what authority I read the certificate of
Lacunza, annexed to one of these espedientes. He will find
it as part of Exhibit A, produced by Lafragua, offered in evi-
dence in the Land Commission, and received without objection
by the United States. I have now, may it please your Honors, '.
closed my argument on the facts of this case. Imperfect and
incomplete as it is, I trust sufficient has been shown to satisfy
the Court to the fullest extent of the genuineness and truth of'
the papers brought before it as the titles of these claimants.
'
Of the vast mass of testimony contained in these four or five
octavo volumes, comprising 4,000 or 5,000 pages, necessarily
a good deal must be omitted in the resume of counsel.
But we rely on the diligent care of your Honors, on your
candid consideration of the evidence, both on the part of the
claimants and on that of the United States, and on your con-
clusion, drawn from all these factefrproduced. that there is not j
one shadow of doubt remaining M relation to the truth of the
titles presented before you. We rely on your conclusion there-
from, that the very documents and letters offered by the Gov-
ernment of the United States, for the purpose of establishing
that at one time some antedated and fraudulent papers were
contemplated by some of the parties to these transactions,
referred to the documents, now offered by us in evidence, as
being true and genuine—describing them with an exactness
which makes their identity absolutely certain—and proposed
the forgery of the papers containing features, not one of which
is to be found in one of the papers now brought into Court by
lis, which, on the contrary, possess all the defects which the;
forger, James Alex. Forbes, proposed to remedy by fabrication.
We pointed out the defects in the title now produced before
the Court ; the statement of those defects being admitted by the
Government counsel, and urged on the Court as ground on
which this title is to be declared invalid—even if genuine. I
leave, I say, the argument on the facts, and proceed to discuss
the law.
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The jurisdiction of this Court in this case is a preliminary
question, and must therefore be first discussed.
It is urged by the Government, that if the nature and char-
acter of a mine under the laws of Spain and Mexico are con-
sidered, it resembles an easement at common law, is a usufruc-
tuary interest, and therefore is a "property" which cannot
be protected by this Court under the Act of CoDgress of the
3d March, 1851.
It is urged again, that such Act limits the jurisdiction of this
Court to claims of land held in fee simple only ; and lastly, it is
asserted that no test of the jurisdiction of this Court is found,
in inquiring into the question whether a mine owned by a per-
son constitutes him the holder of real estate, or not.
Now, as to the idea that the jurisdiction is limited to the
determination of only fee simple estates in land, such construc-
tion would render the carrying out the Act of 3d March, 1851,
almost impracticable. Neither the owner of land under a col-
onization grant, nor the holder of a mine under titles from the
Mexican Government, could be deemed tenant in fee simple.
The former held under a grant fettered in many instances with
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stringent conditions ; among them even one against alienation
of the estate. Such was the fact in the Fremont case, and we
have met with it in others. The owner of a mine held a pecu-
liar estate under the laws of Mexico, and subject to the pro-
visions of the Mining Ordinances. Neither can be said pro-
perly to have held an absolute fee simple estate.
To adopt the construction contended for, that fee simple
estates in land are alone protected by the Statute of 3d March,
1851, would impute to Congress an intention in framing the
Act to forfeit, or leave to their fate, all estates in land less than
fee simple ; for a clause in the 13th Section of the Act declares,
that all lands, the claims to which shall not have been presented
to the said Commissioners within two years after the date of
the Act, shall be deemed, held and considered as part of the
public domain of the United States. 9 Statutes U. S. at large,
633.
The word estate is derived from the latin status, it signifying
the condition or circumstance in which the owner stands with
regard to his property. 2 Blk. 103.
Under the Mexican law, two separate parties might be the
owners of different interests in the land, and each recognized
as the holder of a distinct estate.
In this case the claimant presents his claim for two different
estates in land ; the one under a title from the Mexican Gov-
ernment in the form of a grant for land eo nomine, the other
under a title from the same Government in the form of a mine.
In discussing this question, as the objection to the jurisdiction
is limited to such portion of the substance of the land only as
has been converted to mining purposes, the inquiry will be
confined to it; nor will the Court consider the proposition urged
by a portion of the argument of claimant's counsel, that the
mining right being "property," such as is protected by the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, is entitled to the protection of
this Court, under the Act of Congress of 3d March, 1851.
In the view this Court takes of this case, a decision of that
question is unnecessary to fix a construction upon the Statute
of 1851, upon which the jurisdiction of this Court solely rests.
The Treaty may well be borne in mind when the Court at-
tempts to fix a construction upon that statute from its face, and
when the intention of the law makers is to be ascertained,
whether a literal and stringent, or a fair and more liberal con-
struction, will best carry out the statute. Such, regard to the
Treaty, and to that extent on this question, we think salu-
tary.
The object proclaimed by the Act of 3d March, 1851, and
in its first section, is the ascertaining the " private land claims'11
in the State of California. The eighth section of the Act re-
quires that each and every person claiming lands in California
by virtue of any right or title derived from, etc. The subject
to be adjudicated then is a " claim to land." The nature of such
claim, the estate and interest, are wholly unlimited. It would
seem, therefore, from the very words of the statute, that a claim
to land by any right or title derived from the Mexican Govern-
ment, and whether acquired for the purposes of extracting the
minerals from it, or for any other purposes to which it could be
applied, every such claim would be within the Act. So it
would appear from the language of the statute, that a claim
under a title or right from the Spanish or Mexican Govern-
ment to any estate or interest in land, whether a conditional or
absolute estate, whether for term of years, for life, or in fee,
is within the statute.
For all the purposes of this case, it is only necessary for this
Court to decide, that the fair interpretation to be applied to the
Act of 3d March, 1851, is to include all species of property
claimed under titles from the Spanish or Mexican Government,
which are considered and deemed by the laws of either of those
governments, and by the law of our own country, as belonging
to that class of property whose il nomen generalissimum" is ex-
pressly mentioned in the statute.
If land be designated in the statute in relation to title, as in
this case, every portion which formed its originalsubstance is
deemed in the eye of the law a part of the land, the law not
recognizing a change of substance by a change of use or name.
A simple license to dig gold or quicksilver is a mere incor-
poreal hereditament, and would not come within the rule of
interpretation; but the owner of a mine, under the laws of
Spain or Mexico, has a jus in re, and not a mere jus ad rem.
Under that interpretation, he who claims a mine as owner un-
der these laws, is, in legal contemplation, claiming land under
a title from Mexico, as well as he who claims under a coloni-
zation grant.
We think that it has been correctly stated, that "Although
the things belonging to each species (land and mine) possess all
the attributes of land, being immovable corporeal heredita-
ments, the name land is therefore generic, and, in strict legal
acceptation, applicable to both species
;
yet, in common par-
lance, and frequently even in legal language, this generic name
is used to designate one of the two species, while the other, to
designate its species, is called a mine, or by some characteris-
tic name."
" The nomenclature is not, perhaps, perfect, but sufficiently
so for all practical purposes, for, while the name land is usually
applied to one species, from the greater frequency of its use in
that respect, its definition (in a legal sense) is so plain that no
one can fail to perceive that it includes both, when it be-
comes necessary to predicate of either the generic attributes of
land."
But the three thousand varas of surface land, as well as a
vein of cinnabar included in this mining claim, are certainly
to be considered land.
But, leaving mere verbal speculation, let us ascertain the
solution of this question by reference to authority. What,
then, are the nature and character of the property held in a
mine by its owner under the Spanish and Mexican laws ?
We know no better authority to refer to than the celebra-
ted commentator on the mining laws of New Spain. The
references are to Heathfield's Translation, 2 vols.
Speaking of a mine, and the indispensable necessity of keep-
ing it at work, Gamboa says, that this being required by law,
and being a condition the Sovereign has thought proper to an-
nex "m granting the right of property" it must be performed.
(2 Gamboa, Heath. Trans., 92, Sec. 18.) Again, he states, in
considering the privileges awarded to the miners by the au-
thors he was at the time combatting : "Another circumstance
treated by the authorities (authors) as a privilege, is the per
mission given to the miner to appropriate nine parts of the
produce, paying to the crown a tenth only, as an acknowledg-
ment for giving its subjects a beneficial and direct interest in this
valuable class of property." Both Gamboa and his opponents
seem to have considered the miner's interest in his property
both " beneficial and direct." Ibid, p. 157, Sec. 15.
Again : Gramboa makes reference, in a case he is discussing,
to the laws of Peru, which directed that upon the death of the
proprietor of a mine, his executors shall, if his heirs be in
Spain, sell it, " like other landed property, within thirty days."
Ibid, p. 95, Sec. 22.
Under the laws of Mexico, all remedies, whether framed for
originally acquiring, maintaining or recovering the possession
of immovable or landed property, were held applicable to
mines. 2 Gamboa, 258, Sec. 6.
Gamboa, in the 14th section of his Commentaries, vol. 1, p.
20, discusses the doubts which had arisen whether the mines
in the kingdom of the Indies were to be regarded as the 'pecu-
liar right of the crown, or whether they are to be considered
as the absolute property of the subject. This he does with his
usual ability, and comes to the conclusion that the mines of the
Indies " are a right of the Crown, and that as this right is quite
consistent with the property granted to,the subject therein, it must fol-
low, beyond dispute, as a consequence of their being made over to the
latter; with the power to dispose of them as of anything of his own,
that all the incidents of property must attach in favor of the pro-
prietor, and that, therefore, they (the mines) may be exchanged,
sold, leased or alienated by contract, donation, or inheritance
;
may be given in marriage or charged with a rent, and that
interest may be demanded for the purchase-money while re-
maining unpaid. Ibid, Sec. 25, p. 28.
" But all the above qualities," continues this eminent com-
mentator, " are to be understood as governed by this essential
condition : Those to whom the property devolves, by univer-
sal or particular succession, must conform to the ordinances
and fulfill the obligations thereby imposed, being the law."
1 Gamboa, Sec. 24, p. 27.
He further tells us : " The grant of the Sovereign, therefore,
conveys to his subjects a direct and beneficial right of prop-
erty." This last clause has been translated more literally,
using the technical terms employed by Gamboa, thus : " And
6there passes to the subject this dominiun directum, or right of
property (a propiedacl), and also the dominiun utile, by virtue
of the gift and concession of the Sovereign, which we hesitate
not to name una modal donation"
The learned writer then proceeds to say, that such qualified
gift will appear upon considering the rules by which that spe-
cies of gift is defined by law, that is to say, that it be a free
and complete act, which being perfected, a charge attaches on
the donee from that time forth (and the being worded as a con-
dition makes no difference), and that upon the failure of the
modification limited by the donor in his own favor, or in that
of a third person, or the kingdom or republic, the gift determ-
ines, as will be seen by reference to various texts and doc-
tors," a reference to which is made in a note. Ibid, Sec. 25,
p. 28.
These rules Gramboa considers precisely applicable to the
second ordinance he is considering, for he states it thereby
gives "and makes a grant to his subjects of the property and
possession of the mines discovered, or to be discovered, with
power to dispose of them as of anything of their own," which
amounts to a complete act of gift, no price being paid for the
grant, nor for the registry or denouncement of the mine. But the
ordinance proceeeds, " observing, both in regard to what they
have to pay us by way of duty, and in all other respects, the
regulations and arrangements established by this edict in the
manner hereinafter mentioned," which is the charge or quali-
fication, and which refers to the payment of the fifth from that
time forth, and to the observance of the ordinances which
regulate the mode of working the mines, the number of hands
to be kept at work in them, their boundaries, and the other
matters required to be observed, upon the omission or non-
performance of which the gift determines, and the mine be-
comes liable to be denounced by any one." 1 Gramboa (Heath-
field), p. 29, sec. 26.
Jf any title has been acquired by the claimant—a question
hereafter to be discussed—and the inquiry shall arise as to his
forfeiture of his title, it will be more appropriate to the discus-
sion of such forfeiture than to the question of jurisdiction, as
to the matters alleged as ground of forfeiture. "We have cited
thus fully from Gramboa, although his Commentaries, which
have given him so much celebrity, were made upon the Ordin-
ances of 1584, known as the New Code, and are alluded to by
a majority of the Board of Land Commissioners in this case as
"the celebrated Commentaries of Gramboa on the Mining Laws
of Spain, which, although published before the Ordinance of.
1783 was adopted, is a work of inestimable value at the present
time." Transcript, p. 85. The dissenting Commissioner in
the case, also, does not place his dissent in the matter in which
he disagrees from the majority of his associates to any want of
authority in Gramboa's Commentaries, but upon their alleged
misconception of certain passages in that work. Ibid, 108. The
same favorable testimony is borne to them by the counsel of
both parties in this case who cite from and rely on them.
But we rely more on them by reason of the statement, veri-
fied by examination, that the " Mining Ordinances of 1783,"
which were promulgated about twenty years after the publi-
cation of Gamboa's Commentaries, adopted his views both as
regards the rights of the Crown and the rights of the subject
in the mines, and made the law as he said it was :— '! a compari-
son of the twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-sixth para-
graphs of the second chapter of Gramboa's Commentaries with
the fiftieth of the Mining Ordinances of 1783 will illustrate
this."
The caption to this title is, " Concerning the fundamental
ownership (dominio radical) of mines, of their concession to
individuals, and of the duties for which they are to be paid."
Mining Laws of New Spain of 1783
;
(Halleck), p. 222.
The first article declares the right of the Crown in mines. It
describes that right by the term dominio radical, which conveys
a similar meaning with the dominium altum of which Gramboa
speaks. This we infer from the second article. This is in the
words : " Without separating them from my royal patrimony,
I grant them in property (en propiedad) and possession in such
manner that they may sell them, exchange them, rent them,
donate them, pass them by will, either in the way of inherit-
ance or legacy, or in any other manner alienate the right which
in the mines belongs to them on the same terms on which they
themselves possess it, and to persons capable of acquiring it."
This article certainly did not intend to separate the mines
from the royal patrimony. The dominio radical stated in the
grant, the dominium altum spoken of by Gramboa, and "the
rights of sovereignty in the mines," as they are designated by
the Supreme Court in the case of Fremont, it was intended not
to separate from the Crown ; but in the same instrument in
which this reservation is made, the royal donor granted the
mines to his subjects in property and possession (en propiedad
y posecion) in such manner that they may sell them, etc.
There can be no doubt that this grants the mines to individuals
in property and possession.
The framers of these Ordinances of 1783 undoubtedly
adopted the views and opinion of Gamboa, in the sections cited
at large from that commentator by this Court especially. (1
Ganlboa, ch. 2, Sec. 24, p.27.)
The mine is land in the Spanish, as "fundo" and "bienes
raices" and "bienes immobles; " the one translated, is land
;
the second, real estate ; the third, immovables.
We deem the foregoing authorities, without citing others, suf-
ficient to establish
:
1. That the transfer of a mine under Spanish and Mexican
law was the granting of " a direct and beneficial right in this
valuable class of property."
2. That such property was deemed by the Mexican laws of
conveyance, and those as to the remedies to be applied to the
recovery of the possession of it, as property in land.
3. That while the dominio radical or the dominium altum
remained in the Crown, the dominium directum or right of prop-
erty (6 propiedad) and also the dominium utile were in the
subject.
4. That there was no inconsistency between this right of the
subject and the reservation to the Crown of the dominium
eminens.
Having ascertained the nature and character of the property
held by the owner of a mine under the Spanish and Mexican
laws, the inquiry is : " What view does the common law which
obtains in our country take of the property of a mine as one
in land ?"
This is an important investigation in discussing the question
of jurisdiction under the statute. If property in a mine is
considered, under the laws of Mexico, real estate because it is
land, and if it is so viewed by the common law, these facts
will illustrate the propriety of the interpretation this Court has
placed upon the statute. Such illustration will have been de-
rived from the laws and acts of the two parties to the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, to carry out which such statute was
enacted.
The venerable father of the common law (Lord Coke) lays
down the rule: "By the name of minera or fodina plumbi, the
land itself shall pass in a grant, if 'Livery of Seizin ' be made,
and also be recovered in assize et sic de similibus." 1 Co. 6, A.
"We learn from any text-writer of modern times on the sub-
ject, that an action of ejectment cannot be brought for incorpo-
real hereditaments that lie in grant, except for tithes, and
that by statute in England of 32 Henry VIII., Ch. 7.
That ejectment can only be maintained for the possession of
a corporeal hereditament, such as land or a mine.
Notwithstanding the difference which exists between the ab-
solute ownership of the gold and silver in the King of Eng-
land, and the distribution of the property in mines which sub-
sisted in Spain and Mexico between the Crown and its sub-
jects, it is held at the common law that land does not cease to
he because converted to mining purposes, and grants for cop-
per, lead and other mines have been held to pass estates in
lands and be recoverable, as it always had been, by ejectment.
Ejectment lies for a coal mine (or any other) upon the princi"
pie that it is not to be considered as a bare profit apprender,
but as comprehending the ground or soil itself which may be
delivered in execution. Adams on Eject. 19.
In the case of Stoughton vs. Leigh (1 Taunton, 402), an ap-
plication was made for dower, out of several mines and strata of
lead out of the lands of the husband, to a Court of Equity ; a
case was directed by the high Court of Chancery to the Court
of Common Pleas of England for its opinion on the case. The
counsel for the doweress admitted rather reluctantly in open
Court, " that where mines have been actually wrought as part
of the estate of the husband, they may perhaps be collaterally
subject to dower, together with the rest of his real property.''
Ibid, pp. 404, 405.
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In that case a second argument was prayed on behalf of the
heir, which the Court refused, thinking the case sufficiently
clear.
The Court of Common Pleas certified to the High Court of
Chancery in the above case their opinion, arising out of the
first and second statements in the case, submitted as follows.
Their response to the first statement applicable to this question
will be only given. The remaining portion of the case refers
to the mode in which the Sheriff should act in the service of
an execution against mines.
To the first statement of the case presented, the Court of
Common Pleas certified : "That the widow of John Harbury
(the deceased) was dowable of all his mines of lead and coal,
as well those which were in his own landed estates as also the
mines of lead, or lead ore and coal, in the lands of other per-
sons, which had been in fact open and wrought before his
death, and wherein he had an estate of inheritance during the
coverture ; and that her right to be endowed of them had no
dependence upon the subsequent continuance or discontinu-
ance of working them, either by the husband in his lifetime,
or by those claiming under him since his death." Ibid, 409.
Such decision, which solemnly enunciates the principle that
the property in a mine is real estate, and constitutes a part of
.
the estate to which a widow is entitled at common law, as ten-
ant in dower, affords a conclusive proof that land converted to
mining purposes remains land in substance, and the law there-
fore considers it real estate.
A few observations on the above case of Stoughton vs. Leigh
will illustrate to what extent a mine is deemed by the common
law land. As early as the time of Littleton, a widow was en-
titled, as tenant in dower, only to a portion of the lands and
tenements of which the husband was seized during the covert-
ure ; and such has been the law ever since in every country
where the common law has obtained.
The Courts in that case (both the Chancery and the Common
Pleas) could not have cut out the heir and awarded dower to
the widow out of any property other than lands and tenements
of which the husband had been seized. Now, it cannot be
urged with propriety that a mine is to be deemed a tenement.
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The Chief Justice said that " the words (lands and tenements)
must receive the same exposition." The Court, though, evi-
dently placed their decision upon the ground that the mines
being landed estates were real estate. Apart from any legisla-
tion like that of Spain and Mexico, which creates a different
ownership of the surface of the soil and of the soil beneath
between individuals, land extends downwards to an indefi-
nite extent, and, by the common law, beneath the soil is a
part of the land, and belongs to the owner of the surface of the
earth above.
The change of the ownership of the intermediate soil to
another owner does not change it from its original substance of
land, even in Mexico, where the change is made, as we have
seen by the review of her laws. Blackstone, discussing the
general character and attributes of land at common law, tells
us that land has indefinite extent downwards as well as up-
wards ******* s0 that the
word land includes not only the face of the earth, but every-
thing under it ***** * an(j there-
fore, if a man grants ^all his lands, he grants thereby all his
mines of metals and other fossils. * * * not but
the particular names are equally sufficient to pass them. But
the capital distinction is this, that by the particular name nothing
else will pass except what falls with the utmost propriety un-
der the name used, "but by the name of land, which is nomen
generalissimum, everything terrestrial will pass." 2 Black, pp.
18,19.
In the case of Townley vs. Gibson (2 Term Eep. 701), the
construction of an Act of Parliament was before the Court
;
one of the Judges, delivering his opinion, says: "Whether by
this Act of Parliament the mines passed to the tenants ? That
is the question here. The soil undoubtedly passed; now what
are the mines but part of the soil ?" When a review of the
common law teaches us, that by the name of mine the land
itself will pass ; that an action of ejectment is an appropriate
remedy to recover possession of a mine as well as land ; that
mines can be recovered by a widow as part of her dower,
although she is entitled to a portion only of the lands and ten-
ements of which her husband had been seized during his co-
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verture ; that mines pass by an Act of Parliament, by which
the soil passes as part of it ; that in a deed, where mines are
mentioned eo nomine, that nothing but what properly and
strictly comes within that term—such as his metals—will pass,
but by the name of land which is nomen generalissimum, the
grant passes thereby all his mines and fossils. When such
review gives such results in our country, which harmonize
with our view of the Spanish and Mexican law on this point,
must not an American tribunal consider, that when Congress
used the words " claiming lands" in the Statute of 3d March,
1851, they were used in the sense they are understood and in-
terpreted by the laws of this country and of Mexico—the two
parties to the Treaty of Gruadalupe Hidalgo ?
The case of Fremont vs. The United States (17 How. 542), has
been cited as a controlling authority on this question of jurisdic-
tion. It cannot be deemed so, without a violation of the rules of
judicial construction. In Carroll vs. Carroll's Lessee (16 How.
287), the Court say : " If the construction put by the Court of
a State upon one of its statutes (and the proposition is appli-
cable to any Court) is not matter in judgment, if it might be
decided in either way without affecting the rignt brought in
question, then, according to the principles of the common law,
an opinion on such a question is not a decision. To make it
so, there must have been an application of the judicial mind
to the precise question necessary to be determined, to fix the
rights of the parties, and to decide to whom the property in
contestation belongs."
ISTow, the Supreme Court in the Fremont case could have
decided either way upon the title of the colonization grant,
under which Fremont claimed, without affecting the question
before us ; and this is what they actually did do, and they in
so many words tell us: "The only question before the Court
is the validity of the title." What title ? It could have been
none other than that of the colonization grant, the only title
presented to the Court. If the only question that was before
them was the validity of that title, how can an authoritative
decision upon a totally different question be imputed to the
Court? All that was suggested in the argument of counsel
for the Government in relation to mines, was referred to by
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the Court in these words: "And whether there he any mines
on this land, and if there be any, what are ' the rights of the
sovereignty in them,' are questions which must be decided in
another form of proceeding, and are not subjected to the juris-
diction of the Commissioners or the Court by the Act of
1851." (565.) In a word, no claim to landed property known
as such under the laws of Mexico and this country as a mine,
was before them, and it therefore was not decided upon by
them.
The Court does refer, as it seems to us, to the dominio radi-
cal found in the Title V. of the Ordinances of 1783, the do-
minium altum spoken of by Gamboa, and designates the prop-
erty reserved by the Crown as " the rights of the sovereignty
in the mines." But no decision was made which should con-
trol this Court in its action on the claim of an individual to a
right in a mine which he alleges he has derived from the Gov-
ernment of Mexico.
The only case in which such question has come before a
Court in this country, is that of Delassus vs. The United States
(9 Peters, 117). The suit was instituted in the District Court
of the United States for the District of Missouri, and carried
on appeal to the Supreme Court.
In the language of Chief Justice Marshall (p. 131): "The
suit was instituted under the Act of the 26th of May, 1824,
enabling the claimants to lands within the limits of the State of
Missouri and Territory of Arkansas, to institute proceedings
to try the validity of their claims."
This case has been cited by counsel for claimant as authority.
We do not consider the question was so directly adjudicated
as to make it a decision which should control this Court.
It is true, that substantially a lead mine was recovered, and
the decree of the Court was in favor of the petitioner's claim
as a tract of land ; and lastly, Chief Justice Marshall says
(p. 142) : " The lead mine has been mentioned, but the Act of
Congress makes no reservation of lead mines." This leaves
this implication, that the term "land" included "lead mines,"
and that it required an express reservation in the Act to ex-
clude it ; but the question arose in the case like that in the
Fremont case, from the suggestion of counsel, and was not so
raised so as to constitute a res adjudicata.
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The Ordinances of 1783, under which we have heretofore
discussed the question of jurisdiction, continued in force
throughout New Spain to the time of the captivity of Ferdi-
nand YII, when great changes were made by the general
Cortes between 1811 and 1814. The Cortes passed the Act of
January 26, 1811. This Act is to be found in Gralvan's " Col-
lection of the decrees and orders of the Cortes of Spain, which
are actually in force in the Republic of the United Mexican States"
is translated by Eockwell from the "Printed volumes, pub-
lished by Authority," and by Halleck from " Note to Article
22, Title YI, Mexican ' Ordenanzas de Mineria.'1 " This decree
abolished the monopoly of quicksilver reserved by Law 1,
Title 23, Lib. 8 of the Recopilacion de las Indias, and the right
reserved by Article 22, Title 6, of said Ordinances of 1783, of
taking mines of that metal from the discoverer, and working
them on account of the Royal Teasury, which in the language
of the decree, " leaving uncertain the interest of the owner,
and taking it out of trade, necessarily restrain people from
engaging in the useful and expensive undertaking of discover-
ing and working mines of quicksilver." It consequently
modified considerably the tenure by which the quicksilver
mines had been previously held. Though this Act made no
alteration in the mode of acquiring title, or in the principles of
the mining laws regulating mines which previously existed, it
certainly enlarged the tenure of the holder of a quicksilver
mine, and rendered his right of property more secure and"
certain.
It is true that this decree of the Cortes, with all their other
acts, were annulled by Ferdinand YII, on his restoration in 1814,
but the troubles which ensued in Mexico constrained him to
re-establish the Constitution on the 9th day of March, 1820.
—
•
Gralvan's Decretos del Eey Don de Ferdinand YII, p. 284.
Subsequently, by decree of April 15, 1820, he declared the
" Decrees" of the said general and extraordinary Cortes in full
force through America.—Gralvan's Decretos de Ferdinand YII,
p. 292.
Independently of these reluctant decrees, the Courts in this
State have held that the decrees of the Spanish Cortes, except
so far as they were incompatible with the new order of things,
were in full force in Mexico.
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" It is true," says one of the members of the Board of Land
Commissioners in this case, "that this decree of the Cortes
was, in common with all the other acts of that body, annulled
on the restoration of King Ferdinand ; but it is also true, that
this, like the others, was revived by the revolution of 1820,
and was in force at the time the independence of Mexico was
achieved." He then asserts that the principle above cited has
been "universally admitted, and has been so decided repeat-
edly by this Commission."—Trans. 111.
After the most careful review, the conclusion to which we
have come is, that the Court has jurisdiction.
The next question which, like that of jurisdiction, is a pre-
liminary one, will now be disposed of.
It arises out of the objection that the proceedings in Cali-
fornia, in obtaining title to and possession of the mine, being
before the Alcalde, the whole were therefore void, not having
been made before the mining deputation. It is gathered from
the record of the proceedings of the local authority in this case,
that there was no mining deputation in the department, and
that was the only time since the settlement of Upper California,
that a mine had been worked in conformity with the laws ; and
there being no Juez de Letras in the second district, the Alcalde
of first nomination, etc. The fact of there being no mining
deputation in Upper California was thus announced in a public
judicial proceeding in December, 1845, the evidence of which
has been on record for years in the archives : the petition in
this case was filed in 1852, with the documents of title in which
the fact was asserted ; and in the years which have intervened
not a scintilla of evidence has been introduced to contradict
the statement thus publicly made in a public document some
fifteen years ago. The reasons why Mining Judges and
Deputies did not exist in California, will be found in the con-
struction in Mexico of the portion of the Ordinances of 1783,
which constructed this somewhat complicated machinery of
mining tribunals.
Those reasons are such, even if that portion of those Ordi-
nances was not expressly repealed when Mexico achieved her
independence, as would authorize the claimant as a discoverer
of a mine which gave him an incipient right, and entitled him
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under the raining laws in full force to denounce, register, and
take possession of the mine before the ordinary judges, there
being no Mining Judges.
Even the strictest common law rule adopts the axiom, uNon
cogit ad impossibilia" and a Court acting on principles of equity
as this Court does, would violate them by enforcing a forfeiture
solely on that ground. We will now inquire into these
reasons.
Gamboa tells us that judicial matters, such as registry, de-
nouncement, the giving possession, and so forth, are the pro-
vince of the Justices and (by way of appeal) of the royal audi-
ences, as we shall more particularly show in the proper place.
—1 Gamboa, p. 149, Sec. 15.
In his Commentary, 2d v. p. 286, Sec. 1, he observes,
speaking upon this subject: " This ordinance is not observed
in the Indies, nor could it be enforced there, without great
damage to the public, and particularly to the miners, etc.
—
Ibid.
Sec. 1. He then proceeds to discuss the question, p. 288, Sees
5, 6; and on p. 290, Sec. 10, he states, " Such as denouncements,
insufficient working, boundaries, questions of the right of pos-
session or property, the proving of entries in the register, the
removal of the pillars of support, or the embezzlement of bul-
lion; all which belong to the Chief Alcaldes or Mayors, (whom,
he designates, p. 286, Sec. 2.) ' Ordinary Judges,' and by way
of appeal to the Eoyal Audiences."
Now if special Mining Judges did not exist, and the Ordi-
nance of 1783- on the subject was not observed, nor could be
enforced in the Indies (Mexico), how could they have obtained
in California without special legislation?
Independently of the fact that no special Mining Judges
existed, and the provisions of the Ordinance in relation to
them were not enforced in Mexico, there are other reasons for
the non-existence of them in California.
To authorize their legal existence here, special legislation
was absolutely necessary to organize them in a mode essentially
different from that prescribed by the Ordinances of 1783.
Those provisions demanded, previous to any legal organiza-
tion of " Mining Deputations," a state of things which did not
exist in California, a country where the first mine that was
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ever worked in conformity with laws was the one in contro-
versy.
Title 2d of those Ordinances, Section 2, provides the source
from whence the Mining Deputies were to receive their election
and authority. It prescribes that " all those, who, for more
than one year, shall have worked one or more mines, expend-
ing on them, as owners thereof in whole or in part, their capi-
tal, their labor, or their personal attention and care, shall be
enrolled (matriculados) as miners of that place (lugar), and
their names shall be entered in the Book of Enrolled Miners,
which shall be kept by the Judge and Notary of that Mining
place (Minerid).—Mining Laws of Spain and Mexico, 1783
;
Halleck's translation, p. 201, Art. 2.
By the third article of same law it is prescribed that the
miners so enrolled, and certain suppliers being miners, the
millers (maquideros) and_the owners of Haciendas, for grinding
and smelting in each place (lugar), shall annually assemble in
the beginning of January in each year, in the House of the
Judge of Mines, to elect persons who are to fill the office of
Deputies of said Mining Place (Mineria).
—
Ibid, pp. 201, 202,
Art. 3.
By fourth article of said law it is prescribed that each of the
enrolled miners shall be entitled to a vote at such elections,
and some qualification is then provided for by this section in
relation to the voting by the suppliers, millers, and owners of
Haciendas. Ibid, p. 202, Art. 7.
In the seventh article it is provided that the Judge of each
Real or Asiento, (which words are translated by Eockwell,
Mine-town or Establishment ; Eockwell, p. 35, Sec. 7), and
the Deputies of the preceding year, shall preside over and reg-
ulate the election ; and in case of disagreement, the casting
vote is given to the Judge of Mines.
—
Ibid, p. 202, Art. 7.
By the eighth article it was provided that in each Meal or
Asiento of Mines, there shall be a Deputation composed of two
Deputies.
According, then, to Gramboa, that portion of the Ordinances
which related to Mining Deputations was not of force, and ex
natura rerum could not practically exist in California, for there
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was no one Real or Asiento nor no Reales or Asientos (enrolled
merchants in some or any of those places, who, under the Ordi-
nances, were to elect and organize the " Mining Deputations").
It is urged by the Government, that a complete answer is
found to all the above suggestions, inasmuch as the ordinance
requires the discoverer to present his written application, if
there be no Deputation of Mines in the district in which the
mine was discovered, to the nearest thereunto.
The most reasonable construction to place on these words, is
to refer to the nearest mine-town, mining district or establish-
ment within the limits of the jurisdiction of the department
within whose borders the mine was discovered. Under the
mining laws the origin of the title by denouncement and regis-
try has always been left to the local authorities ; and when these
words were used in the Ordinances of 1783, the intention of
carrying, under any circumstances, a local jurisdiction into a
distant tribunal which might exist in a foreign department, is-
not to be imputed.
In this case the claimant certainly applied to the proper local
authority, the Alcalde. In the case of Mena vs. Le Eoy (1-
Cal. 220) the Supreme Court of this State decided that
Alcaldes in Departments of California, New Mexico and Ta-
basco, had, under the laws of Mexico, the powers of Judges
of First Instance, where there was no such Judge of First
Instance in the district.
In conclusion, on this point, we refer to what Gamboa says
:
1 It is to be observed that when a question arises concerning a
contract for the purchase or sale of a mine, the right of suc-
cession, under a will or otherwise, or any point of like nature,
it is competent not only to the Mining Judge and Chief Al-
calde, but to the ordinary Justices of the Territory, to enter-
tain the suit, and that it is only upon questions arising under
the Ordinances, that the jurisdiction, in the first instance, be-
longs to the Mining Judge. If there be no such Judge, the
question must be tried by the other Justices, as may be noticed
in the Ordinances of Peru, above referred to."— Rockwell,
p. 362.
The last authority we will refer to on this subject, is that of
19 •
Pena y Pena. It seems to be a principle in the jurisprudence
of Spain and Mexico, that where cognizance of any particular
matter is given to a special tribunal not being in existence, the
matter reverts to the ordinary tribunal which had jurisdiction
of the same kind of matter, if judicial in its character.
Pena y Pena (2d v. p. 53), says : "A special tribunal is des-
tined to take cognizance only of a certain class of causes, or of
particular persons. It is called special in contradistinction to
the ordinary, which is established to take cognizance indiscrim-
inately of all classes, causes and persons, so that a special tri-
bunal is an exception to the ordinary tribunals ; so that some
writers on public law call them exceptional tribunals. From
this it is inferred, that an exception being extinguished, the
general rule remains in force. So, also, a special tribunal being
extinguished, all its jurisdiction returns to the ordinary tribu-
nals as to its source, and remingles with them from the very
nature of things, without its being necessary to invest them
with the authority of the new tribunal." Pena y Pena, 2, p.
371-2.
Such seems to be the principle of the Spanish Law, although
it is not one of the common law.
.We have heretofore considered the power of the Alcalde to
deliver the juridical possession of the mine in the absence of
any Mining Judges in California, in view of the Ordinances of
1783, and the construction placed upon them by Gramboa, and
that view has induced us to conclude that he had the power
to do so.
But the question may be viewed in another aspect. Since
Mexico achieved her independence, we believe that her legisla-
tion has expressly transferred the denouncement and registry
of mines to the ordinary Judges. By the 7th " Article of the
Constitutive Acts of the Mexican Federation," passed 31st
January, 1824, by the " Second Constitutive Mexican Con-
gress," the Federation was made to " consist of States, and
Territories, the Californias belonging to the latter class, and re-
maining directly subject to the Supreme power."—White's Col.
vol. 1, p 375.
By the 18th Article, it was provided that the judicial power
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should be confided to a Supreme Court of Justice, and to such
tribunals as may be established in the several States, and by
the 23d Article, that " the judicial power of each State shall be
exercised by such tribunal as may be established by its Consti-
tution, but that the Legislatures of the different States may
provisionally organize their interior government ; and until that
is done, the laws actually in force shall be observed." White's
Col. pp. 378, 379.
In Article 123 of the " Federal Constitution of the United
Mexican States," established by said " Constitutional Congress"
on the 24th day of October, 1824, it was declared, "the judi-
cial power of the Union shall reside in a Supreme Court of
Justice, and in Circuit Courts and District Courts." White's
Col. p. 404.
From the time, therefore, of the above "Constitutive Act,"
and the " Federal Constitution of the Mexican States," the
whole judicial power became vested in the " Supreme Court of
Justice," in the " Circuit," and " District" Courts, and in such
tribunals as the Constitution of each State should "establish.''
From that time, even if Gamboa should be in error in suppo-
sing that the portion of the Ordinances of 1783 in relation to
Mining Deputations did not obtain, nor could be enforced in
Mexico, it is still certain that since the legislation we have re-
ferred to, it could not legally exist in California.
The influence which had been exerted by that legislation is
evident from the decree of the Mexican Congress of May, 1826,
which in the first article prescribes—
Art. 1. "The Tribunal General of Mining must cease, accord'
ing to the General Constitution, in so far as it relates to the
Administration of Justice, with which it was charged."—Decree
of 28 May, 1820 ; Halleck's Mining Laws, 409. And whether
such Mining Depuations could exist in the States, depended,
from the time of the adoption of their respective constitutions,
upon the fact whether they were "established," or "designa-
ted" thereunder.
The Federal Constitution of 1824 was overthrown in 1836,
and the "Constitutional Laws" adopted in its place, but these
did not establish special tribunals.
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Subsequently, with that kaleidoscopic irregularity which
distinguishes the movements of the Mexican Government,
Santa Anna, having displaced the said " Constitutional Laws,"
and assumed dictatorial powers under the plan of Tacubaya,
on the 27th day of November, 1841, issued a decree creating
a Junta, to form and present, as soon as possible, a new pro-
ject for the re-establishment of the Special Tribunals of Mining,
with the modifications which the present system ofgovernment re-
quires," etc.—Laras' uDecretos y Ordenes de Oobierno Provisional."
Halleck's Mining Laws, p. 425. •
" The Establishment of Mining," created by the 2d article
of the Mexican Congress (Halleck's Mining Laws, p. 409), con-
tinued in existence until the 2d day of December, 1842, when
by a decree of that date issued by Nicolas Bravo {provisionally
substituted for Santa Anna), a new regulation was made, re-
organizing said Establishment of Mining, under the name of
the Board for the Encouragement and Administration of Min-
ing {Junta de Fomento y Administrativa de Mineria).
By the 10 th Article of Title 1st of said Decree it is provided,
that the attributes of this Junta shall be those which include
an economical and faithful administration of the fund mention-
ed in this decree, etc., in conformity with the regulation which
it shall draw up and transmit to the Supreme Government for
its approval. In this regulation, there shall, moreover, be de-
termined : 1st, the manner in which quicksilver shall be ob-
tained, distributed, and sold to those who reduce ores, fixing
the cases and mode in which the working of quiclfsilver mines
in the Eepublic is to be supplied, rewarded, or in other ways
stimulated and protected.
2d. Everything relating to the redemption of the debt of the
endowment fund, according to what may be directed in the re-
spective title.
3rd. The regulation and direction of the Junta itself; and
finally, it shall be an attribute and object of its most efficacious
solicitude, to promote the encouragement of the business or
branch {ramo), its funds, and its College {Seminario).
The 16th article of the same title authorizes the said Junta
to settle the business pending by the extinguished " Tribunal
22
of Mining," and the " Establishment of Mining." The 24th
Article, Title 4, of said Decree provides, " The Governors of
Departments, in concert with the Departmental Juntas, and
with the previous approval of the Supreme Government, will
establish in each of them the number of Courts of First In-
stance which are required within them."
Article 25 of the same title directs that " Each Court shall
be composed of three Territorial Deputies, elected in the manner
which is prescribed in the old Ordinance of Mining, and of these
three individuals, the first shall be President of the Court, and
the other. two, associates."
The foregoing decree is wholly translated in Halleck's Min-
ing Laws, p. 434 (Laras' Dec. y Ord. del Gob. Prov. 1842-3.
No. 549, p. 221, 229). On the 24th day of May, 1843, Santa
Anna having resumed the functions of Provisional President
of the Mexican Eepublic, issued a decree that " In accordance
with my intention to encourage whatever may contribute to the
national aggrandizement and wealth, and considering as one
of the means most suitable for that purpose the granting of re-
wards and exemptions to the important branch of Mines of*.
Quicksilver, so necessary for the reduction of the precious metals,
the most important branch of the industry of the Eepublic, with-
out which*the others can make no progress." After this pre-
amble, the Decree, in its first article, prescribes that the Eoyal
Orders of January 13, 1783, November 12th, 1791, of Decem-
ber 6th, 1796, and of August 8th, 1814, with respect to ex-
emption froaa excise duties (alcabala), granted to articles of
consumption in mining, will be observed with respect to mines
of quicksilver in the Eepublic.
Article 2d. No general municipal impost shall be levied upon
quicksilver extracted from the mines of quicksilver of the Ee-
public.
Article 3d. Permits quicksilver to be sold throughout the
nation without permits, passes, or other Custom House papers.
Article 4th. Provides there is granted to each one of the
first four operators who shall extract in one year from the
mines of the Eepublic 2,000 quintals of quicksilver, a premium
of $25,000.
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Article 6th. Exempts all operatives in mines of quicksilver
from all military service and all personal taxes. (Laras' Dec. y
Ord. del Gob. Prov. 1842-3. Translated in Halleck's Mining
Laws, p. 452, 453.)
On the 5th July, 1843, Santa Anna issued another Decree,
having the same object in view—the encouragement of quick-
silver mines. {Ibid, 1843. Halleck's Mining Laws, p. 454, 455.)
- In conclusion, on this point, we consider that it has been
shown by the preceding observations, that according to the
views of Gramboa, that portion of the Ordinances of 1783 which
related to "Mining Deputations," were not enforced in Mexico
(New Spain)—that they could not be legally organized in Cal-
ifornia by reason, of there never having been " Reales" or
"Asientos " there, and, as a consequence of none such having
existence in Mexico prior to her independence, they could not
in California,'—that Gramboa lays down the rule, that in the
absence of Mining Deputies the ordinary judges may act—that
a similar principle is asserted by Pena y Pefla—that it is proof
that no Mining Deputations existed in California ; on the con-
trary, that the alcaldes acted. Such is the testimony of Mr.
Larkin, the United States Consul at Monterey.
In conclusion on this point, " no Courts of First Instance "
were ever created in Upper California under the decree of
Nicolas Bravo, of December 2d, 1842. Such fact, if it ever
existed legally, would be proved and must be to have had the
"previous approval of the Supreme Government," and that the
election had been made in the manner which is "prescribed in
the old Ordinance of Mining," which was the only mode in
which such tribunal could be legally constituted—that is, the
members must be elected by the miners of each "Real" or
"Asiento" not one of which existed in Upper California.
The Court cannot consider the objection to the jurisdiction
of the Alcalde who delivered the juridical possession of the
mine an available one.
The next question to be considered is the genuineness of the
documentary title presented by the claimant.
.
There are two classes of this title.
The first consists of documents which are connected with the
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proceedings -which took place in California in relation to the
mine.
The other is the evidence of the action of the Supreme Gov-
ernment of Mexico, on which the claimant relies as a ratifica-
tion and confirmation of the title to the mine, and as curing all
defects, if any such exist in it.
It is alleged by the Government that both classes of the doc-
umentary title, and each one of them, whether executed in Cal-
ifornia or Mexico, are forged, and consequently void.
The number of witnesses called to testify in this case, the
protracted examinations to which they have been subjected, the
mass of immaterial facts which have been elicited, have swollen
the transcript to four volumes, amounting to upwards of three
thousand printed pages, and has had the effect of presenting to
our attention about nine hundred pages of briefs.
In exhibiting such a case the Court is like a man who stands
by an immense magazine of wheat. He may take a handful
and hold it out to view, but he cannot exhibit each grain in the
mass to the eye of any purchaser.
All that is practicable to do is to take a general view of'
the testimony, save where minuteness to ascertain the weight
of testimony to prove the authenticity or genuineness of docu-
ments where forgery is alleged.
"We shall first consider the evidence given in relation to the
documentary title given to the claimant by the local authori-
ties of California, then turn to that connected with that which
was obtained by claimant in Mexico.
There are three links in the chain of the claimant's title.
The first two are the registry of Castillero in his two commu-
nications addressed to the Alcalde, dated respectively Novem-
ber 22d and December 3d, 1845.
Pico, the Alcalde who signed the Act of Possession and gave
juridical possession of the mine to Castillero, proves the signa-
tures of the latter to those applications. Jose' Noriega and
Antonio Sunol, the attesting witnesses to the Act of Possession,
both swear to the genuineness of Castillero's signatures, being
acquainted with his handwriting, and having seen him write.
The third link in the chain of claimant's title is the Act of
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Possession. The Alcalde, Pico, who signed it, and delivered
the juridical possession of the mine, and the two witnesses Jose'
Noriega and Antonio Sunol, each and all swear directly each
to his own, and the signatures of the two others. The testi-
mony of these witnesses is direct and positive, and if the doc-
uments are forged or antedated, each and all are guilty of per-
jury. Now, the testimony of Antonio Maria Pico has been on
the files of this Court in this case nearly three years, and that
of the two attesting witnesses, Jose Noriega and Antonio Sunol
have been five years. No attempt fhas been made to impeach
their testimony by witnesses against their character or their
want of reputation for veracity.
So far from such attempt having been made, it appears from
the transcript that each and all of these witnesses have been
called and examined by the parties in this case at different
stages of it, each in its own behalf.
They, then, who have testified as to the genuineness of these
documents, stand unimpeached, and must be treated by this
Court like all others who stand in the same attitude. So long
as the law deems them competent, and the Court finds their
testimony not disproved, it must act upon a belief in it. In this
case, however, a strict invocation of that rule is not necessary.
The forgery or antedating of documents is a fact which is to be
proved by those who allege it. Now, the most careful review
of the evidence in this case has induced this Court to believe
that the testimony of the witnesses is confirmed by other tes-
timony from various quarters—by individuals, by facts and
events so nearly simultaneous with, and following so imme-
diately, the proceedings of the local authorities in California,
that they cast their shadows upon them.
Those events and facts are proved by the Mexican Archives
under the charge of the Surveyor-General of the United States,
from the official correspondence of the time, and the judicial
records of this State.
Before reference to them we proceed to a witness who was
not a party to, nor attested either document. Jose" Fernan-
dez was Sindico del Juzgado at one time, at another a second
Alcalde. He proves as directly the signatures of Pico, the Al-
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calde, and those of the two attesting witnesses to that docu-
ment, as they proved their own. " I know this document," says
the witness, "saw it twice, once in 1845, in Court, afterwards
when second Alcalde." He farther states, " he was Secretary
to Alcalde Pico ; that this document was handed to him by
Gutierrez, who wrote the body and paid him his fee of $3.50."
He is asked, " When handed to him by Gutierrez, what did
you do with this document ?"
He replied : " It remained there in the Court." He states,
"he was in charge of the Archives." We will now refer to
some facts.
Alcalde Pico, in the concluding clause of the Act of Pos-
session, after stating the grant by him of three thousand varas
to Castillero, declares : " This Act of Possession being attached
to the Expediente deposited in the Archives under my charge."
Pico's term of office expired one or two days after these pro-
ceedings, and he was succeeded by Chavolla as Alcalde. On
such occasion, under the law and usages, an inventory of all
papers and effects in the Juzgado is taken and signed by the •
outgoing, and a receipt given for them by the incoming Al-
calde. Such inventory produced from the Archives of the City
of San Jose, by the Clerk of that City, Chapman Yates, on the
30th January, 1858, is filed in this case, and it designates,
among numerous other papers, one "Posecion de la Mina de-
Santa Clara, a D. Andres Castillero.'''1
This record of possession must be the one preserved by the
Alcalde in the Archives of his Court, and when the old Alcalde
system was, in 1850, replaced by the Municipal Authorities of
the City of San Jose, it passed into the Mayor's office, whence,
in January, 1851, it was taken to the office of the County Ee-
corder of Santa Clara county and filed, where it has remained
to the present time.
Unless these records are forged, and got clandestinely intro-
duced upon the records (of which there is no proof), they con-
firm the truth of the attesting witnesses to the documentary
title. The next circumstance which confirms that truth is this
:
Under the Mining Laws, the Ordinances of 1783 prescribe, that
after the written statement of the discoverer shall be noted in
substance in the book, for bis security, tbere be given to him,
as his corresponding title, a copia autorizada of all proceedings
in giving possession. The written statements or representa-
tions of Castillero in registry were not returned to him, but
remained in the Alcalde's office. He, however, received cer-
tified copies of them on the 13th January, 1846, signed by
Pedro Chavolla, Alcalde, and by Jose Sunol and Pedro Sainse-
vain, as attesting witnesses.
The Copia Autorizada was delivered to Castillero. This doc-
ument, which is a copy of the expediente, has been filed in this
case.—Transcript, p. 2693.
The history of this document, so far as the evidence goes, is
that one Eobert "Walkinshaw, at the time acting as the agent
of Alexander Forbes, part owner and sole lessee of the mine,
placed in the hands of a professional legal firm in the City of
San Francisco, in January, 1853, this Copia Autorizada, to be
used in relation to some litigation which had arisen in relation
to the possession of the New Almaden mine. It remained in
the office of those gentlemen, when it was delivered back to
Walkinshaw with other papers, and a receipt taken for them.
These facts are established by Mr. Hall McAllister, one of
the said legal firm, and Mr. Eeese, in their depositions.
—Trans. 2698, 2712. •
Walkinshaw, on receiving this document, with the others,
from Mr. McAllister, handed them with others to his agent,
John Young, with whom he deposited all his papers when he
left this country, to which he never returned, as he died in
Scotland in April, 1848, and Mr. John Young became the sole
executor of his last will and testament. On receiving the
papers Mr. Young enveloped and labeled them " Papers rela-
ting to disputed barra between Walkinshaw," etc.
The time when, and the circumstances under which, this
document was discovered, are detailed by the depositions of
John Young and Thomas Bell.—Trans. 2684, 2696.
To prove the identity of this Copia the Alcalde, Antonio
Maria Pico, was examined in July, 1860. He swears that the
Act of Possession in this document was signed by him, "An-
tonio Suiiol and Jose Noriega ; these latter signed in my pre-
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sence as witnesses." He also testifies : " I have no doubt that
I delivered this document to Castillero, because I see my re-
ceipt thereto for twenty-five dollars, my fee. The body of the
document is the handwriting of Gutierrez, and bears my signa-
ture, which was placed on the day of date."
In this Copia there are two copies, purporting to be such, of
the two representations of Castillero to the Alcalde of 1st
Nomination. Each of these is signed by Castillero, Pedro
Chavolla, Alcalde Pico, and two attesting witnesses, P. Sainse-
vain and. Jose Sunol. The Alcalde testifies that he is ac-
quainted with the signatures of all of them, and that they are
genuine. Jose Sunol is dead. Pedro Chavoya proves his own
signature and those of P. Sainsevain and Jose Sunol. He was
Alcalde at the date, and signed the documents at their respect-
ive dates. Pedro Sainsevain proves his own signature, that of
Pedro Chavolla and Jose Sunol.
The document in the Copia of the act of possession, the
third link in the chain of claimants' title, is the document
which Alcalde Pico, as we have seen, has sworn to be genu-
ine, and he has no doubt he delivered it to Castillero, was pre-
sented to the witness, Jose Noriega, one of the attesting wit-
nesses. He testifies the handwriting of the body of the docu-
ment is that of Gutierrez. "It bears the genuine signature of
Antonio Maria Pico, Antonio Sunol and myself; we all signed
it at the same time, and in each other's presence, I presume on
the date of its date. I have no reason to suppose it was not."
He then states, in answer to the inquiry, that the receipt from
Antonio Maria Pico to Castillero for twenty-five dollars is in
the handwriting of Gutierrez.
At the end of many years, on the procurement of this testi-
mony, the parties in interest, with the single exception of Jose
Sunol, who had died, have been able to invoke every witness
who was a party either to the original record or its certified
copy.
The earliest act of Castillero, as the evidence informs us, was
to communicate to Governor Pio Pico, under date 10th Decem-
ber, 1845 : " The mine has been denounced by me, and, be-
tween a few, we have formed a company, etc." He also sent
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a sample of the quicksilver and says : " There is such abun-
dance of quicksilver that eight arrobas of ore give one of met-
al." In this letter he expresses a wish that the vacant lands
near our works be conceded to cut wood, and asks for an order
to place him in possession of the Island of Santa Cruz, which
had been granted to him by the Supreme Government.
This letter was transmitted by Governor Pico through the
Minister of Exterior Eelations, with the sample of quicksilver,
to the President of Mexico, and he requests his Excellency may
be made aware of, and satisfied with, so happy a discovery.
On the margin of this letter is the following order by the
Minister: "April 6th, 1846. Eeceived and noted with satis-
faction, and with respect to the other matters contained, let
him inform attentively as he may think fit."
The letter of the Governor of California, communicating to
the Supreme Government the letter of Castillero, giving the
discovery of the mine and its denouncement, was dated 13th
February, 1846.
The answer made under said order to the Governor is in
these words (Trans, p. 1806): "His Excellency, the President
ad interim, learns with satisfaction, by the letter from Senor
Castillero, which your Excellency sent with your official of
13th February last, the important discovery which has been
made in that department. His Excellency having seen the
sample of that ingredient cited in said letter, and which your
Excellency sent me by Don Jose* Maria Covarrubias, I have
the honor to say this to you, by supreme order, in reply to
the said communication, and with respect to the other matters
referred to in Senor Castillero's letter, that Government will
j
please report attentively what it deems convenient."
Now, all this correspondence between the Governor of the
j
Department of California and the Supreme Government of
| Mexico in relation to the discovery and denouncement by
i Castillero, unless it was forged and clandestinely introduced
1 into the archives, has been filed among them, since within a
! few days after the proceedings of the local authority had
i
placed Castillero into juridicial possession of the mine.
These communications between Castillero (voluntarily sought
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by him) on one side, and the Territorial Government and Su-
preme Government on the other, and the approval of both of
the discovery and denouncement of the mine, is certainly
another circumstance tending to confirm the authenticity of
the documents as sworn to by the witnesses.
If Castillero had anything to do with this alleged forgery,
crime took an^extraordinary course with him, for it impelled
him as soon as possible while the event was recent, to give to
the public authorities an opportunity of ferreting out his
crime, before the dust of the future should have settled upon
his foot prints.
Five days after writing to the Governor about the mine,
Castillero makes a second communication under date of 15th
December, 1845. He supposes that his Excellency may not
have received his previous letter, and he again informs the
Governor of the discovery of the mine. This letter is also in
the Mexican archives.—Statement of Hopkins, Trans. 3068;
proved by 13th answer of Governor Pio Pico, Transcript, 2533.
Now if this letter has not been forged and clandestinely
introduced into the archives, the presumption is that it must
have been sent to the Governor at the time it bears date, and
such also tends to confirm the testimony of the witnesses.
But the proceedings in giving possession of this mine were not
concluded or done in the dark ; one of the Mexican function-
aries gets hold of them. On the 31st day of December, 1845,
Manuel Castro, Prefect of the Second District, makes an official
communication to the Secretary of the Departmental Govern-
ment, that Don Andres Castillero had denounced, and is now
working, a quicksilver mine found in the jurisdiction of the town
of San Jose Guadalupe on private property. This letter of the
Prefect Castro was answered, the blotter of answer is in the
archives ; Transcript, 2551. Proved by answer 10th of Pio
Pico, Transcript, 2533 ; Hopkins' statement, 3068.
Having thus satisfied ourselves that the witnesses who have
sworn to the genuineness of the documentary title obtained by
the petitioner, so far from having suspicion thrown upon their
testimony, are confirmed by record evidence from the Mexican
archives now in charge of the Surveyor General of the United
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States, we will proceed to one or two additional species of
testimony.
Capt. John C. Fre'mont testifies that he paid a short visit to
the New Almaden mine ; he left it about the 24th January,
1846. This must have been about twenty-four days after the
juridical possession of the mine had been given. He visited
it in company with Capt. Hinckley, who introduced the witness
to the owner, Castillero, who showed him about, and the exca-
vation from which he had taken the ore, showed him two or
three heaps of the ore and gave him some specimens, some of
which he brought away.
Before visiting the mine, the witness states he had conversed
with Capt. LeidesdorfY with regard to purchasing the mine.
"When there, "I spoke slightly with Castillero on the subject,
and Mr. Hinckley also said something to him at greater length
tending to the same end, but Castillero was not at all disposed
to converse about selling. About this time, I think, Castillero
was engaged in building a house below in the valley, to be
used for the occupation of himself or workmen. I learned
from Castillero that he held the mine under a denouncement,
and then I, for the first time, became acquainted with the
Spanish system of acquiring mines by denouncement."
- In an official letter of Thomas O. Larkin, written as Consul
of the United States, at Monterey, to the Minister of the United
States, at Mexico, under date of the 3d April, 1846, among
other things, he states that Don Andres Castillero is going as
Commissioner to Mexico from the Military Commander of Cali-
fornia, Gen. Jose Castro. He concludes his communication thus
:
" Near the town of San Jose, eighty miles from Monterey, Don
Andres Castillero has discovered a quicksilver mine ; the ore
produces from sixteen to sixty per cent. ; I have seen him, from
an old gun barrel, in thirty minutes, run out about thirty per
cent, in pure quicksilver. This must be a great advantage to
California."
On the 4th of May, 1846, Mr. Larkin, as such Consul, ad-
dressed to the State Department a long report upon the mineral
resources of California. Certain extracts are certified by Lewis
Cass, and under the seal of the Department of State, to be true
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copies of the original dispatches of Thomas 0. Larkin, U. S.
Consul at Monterey, dated 4th May, 1846, which are to be
found in the State Department.—Transcript, 2657.
The Consul communicates to the Department, that " From
the town of San Jose, and near the Mission of Santa Clara,
there are mountains of quicksilver ore, discovered by D. An-
dres Castillero (of Mexico), in 1845, which the undersigned
has seen twice produce twenty per cent, pure quicksilver, by
simply putting the pounded rock in an old gun-barrel, one end
placed in the fire, the other in a pot of water, etc. * * *
There appears to be no end to the production from these moun-
tains. Working of the quicksilver is but now commenced,
under great disadvantages, from not having any of the mate-
rials generally used in extracting that material, etc."—Trans.
2657.
In the same communication Mr. Larkin states -what in sub-
stance Castillero told Fremont as to the mode of acquiring
under Spanish laws a title to a mine by denouncement. Mr.
Larkin states that " By the laws and customs of Mexico res-
pecting mining, every person or company, foreign or native,
can present themselves to the nearest authorities, and denounce
any unworked mine ; the authorities will, after the proper
formalities, put the discoverer in possession of a certain por-
tion, which I believe is according to its extent. The possessor
must thereafter occupy and work his mine, or some other may
denounce against him," etc.
There are various other official communications, but enough
of this species of evidence has been cited. Various others
will be found in the Transcript.
If we turn from the record evidence derived from the Ar-
chives of Mexico, and that from the official correspondence of
a Consular Agent of the United States, to the judicial records
of California, we will find historical evidence of the genu-
ineness of the proceedings to which the witnesses have sworn.
In March, 1847, in the suit of Gr. C. Cook vs. James Alexander
Forbes and others, the complaint was that Andres Castillero,
James A. Forbes and others, were working on the land of
plaintiff contrary to law, praying that they be removed. The
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parties having appeared, the case was continued until the mine
was surveyed. Two men made a report, and the case was dis-
missed. If there were no registry, no act of possession, how
could there be a mine in existence to survey?
On the 14th August, 1847, James Alexander Forbes, then
British Vice Consul for California, writes to John Burton,
Esq., Justice of the Peace of San Jose, that two persons have
commenced digging a pit by the direction of Gr. Cook, within
the limits of the juridical possession of the said mine. * * *
" Permit me to refer you to the documents which exist in
your office, upon which was founded your conviction of the
justice of your decision in relation to the claim of Mr. Cook
in March last, and to request you will be pleased to adopt such,
measures for protecting the rights of the owners of the said
mine, and of those who are legally interested in the same, as
you may deem most conducive to that end."—Trans. 810.
This letter was produced by Chapman Yates, Clerk of the
City of San Jose, from the archives of that place, on the 30th
January, 1858 (Trans. 769), and proved by the witness Mc-
Cutchen (767.)
Subsequently, on the 5th May, 1847, James Alexander
Forbes, in a letter to Mr. Alexander Forbes, alludes to the
"juridical possession which was given of the mine by the local
authority of this jurisdiction," and also of " the three thousand
varas of land given in that possession as a gratification to the dis-
coverers.
1,1
—
.Trans, p. 842.
Weekes' amended possession, given 21st January, 1848, re-
fers to the original act of possession, and declares that " the right
and title of the mine to the mine and land granted as a reward
in the original act of possession, shall remain valid."
This circumstance, while it confers no title on the claimant,
being the act of one who, without the consent of both parties,
had no authority, is however the recognition of a de facto mag-
istrate of the genuineness of the proceedings to which the
witnesses in this case have sworn.
In the action between Walkinshaw vs. Forbes, complaint
was filed 18th October, 1849, in which plaintiff claimed (i one-
eighth part of the mine by title derived under the original act
of registry."
226
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The mine was denounced on 6th October, 1849, by Mr. Hor-
ace Hawes, for abandonment and insufficient registry, and the
mine is described as situated on Berreyesa's rancho, and as
known in its original title of registry as the Mine of Santa Clara.
In the pleadings of plaintiff it is alleged its last possessors
were Andres Castillero, Alexander Forbes, James A. Forbes,
Eobert Walkinshaw, and the two Eobles.
Alcalde May's proclamation, on 23d October, 1849, made in
relation to the suit, citing parties to appear, describes it as the
quicksilver mine situated in the District of San Jose, known
and designated, in its original act of registry, as that of Santa
Clara, and now known by the name of New Almaden.
—
Trans, p. 297.
Now, a great portion of the evidence relied on to sustain the
allegation of forgery and antedating of the documentary title
of the petitioner, consists of the letters which passed between
James Alexander Forbes and other parties in interest, filed by
the Government, and which were before the Circuit Court on the
argument for injunction, and some letters interchanged between
James Alexander Forbes and Alexander Forbes, explanatory
of those filed by the Government. Among these numerous
letters from various parties in interest there is one letter alleged
to have been written by Alexander Forbes to James Alexander
Forbes, under date of March 28, 1848, which is the only letter
where a positive assertion is to be found that forgery or ante-
dating had been actually committed.
Nor is the fact asserted in this letter alluded to in any other
part of the voluminous correspondence. We refer to it now
simply in connection with the documentary titles obtained by
Castillero in California.
The letter of 28th March, 1848, speaks a language different
from that uttered in any other. The sentences which do so are
these : " Were I not already so deeply interested in this nego-
tiation I would never think of investing another dollar in it,
but this interest renders it necessary to have the control of all
the shares, in order that I may dispose of the whole whenever
an opportunity may offer, and save myself from the heavy loss
that would ensue, should it unluckily leak out, that in fact,
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the documents procured by Castillero in Mexico, as his title to the
mine and lands, were all obtained long after the occupation of Cal-
ifornia by the Americans. This unfortunate irregularity can-
not be easily repaired, and serious objections might be made to
our new Act of Possession."
Now, the charge of antedating in this letter, if the Court
Could believe in its authenticity, apply to only such documents
as were obtained in Mexico by Castillero, and hence the fact that
the charge is not by the letter applied to such as were obtained
elsewhere, is one to be considered when determining the truth
of witnesses who have sworn directly to their genuineness in
California.
The Court, in view of foregoing considerations, must take
the authenticity of the documentary title obtained there as sat-
isfactorily proved.
We turn, now, to the documentary title obtained in Mexico,
which loses its importance, because, satisfied as the Courtis
with the proofs in this case of the authenticity of the documen-
tary title obtained from the local authorities of California, and
as the title held under them is sufficient to sustain the confir-
mation of the claim to the title to the mine, no aid is requisite
from the action of the Supreme Government to sustain it, save
as to the three thousand varas granted by the Alcalde.
No action of an Alcalde can grant to a party such an amount
of surface land as "pertenencias" or for any other purpose. He,
whatever the President can do, has only power to give such
extent of "pertenencias " as the mining laws allow.
A discoverer of one or more mineral hills (cerros) absolutely
new, may acquire, in the principal vein which they may select,
as much as three pertenencias continued or interrupted.
As discoverer the Alcalde had the power to assign to Castil-
lero three "pertenencias" as such.—Halleck's Mining Ordi-
nances, Art. 1 ; Trans. 54.
Castillero formed a copartnership on the 8th December, 1845,
with the two Eobles', Jose Castro, and Padre Eeal for the work-
ing of the mine, and thus working in partnership, the Alcalde
had the power to assign to Castillero four additional pertenen-
cias,—Ordinances of 1783, p. 252; Halleck's Mining Ordi-
nances
; Trans. 54.
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Thus, seven pertenencias is the largest amount an Alcalde is
authorized to assign as such, and to grant land to any extent
was utterly beyond his jurisdiction.
As the appellate Court may take a different view of the evi-
dence of the documentary title obtained in California, and it is
made necessary, under the view this Court takes of the action
of the Alcalde in relation to his (the Alcalde's) grant of three
thousand varas, that we now refer to the documents of title
obtained by Castillero in Mexico, we will now do so.
It has been before observed, that the allegation of forgery
and antedating as to them, mainly rests upon the letters written
between James Alexander Forbes and some of his associates in
interest.
Both of the judges on this bench have heard the nature,
character and legal effect of those letters as evidence, elabor-
ately argued on two occasions, once on the discussion of the
motion for an injunction in the Circuit Court of the United
States for this Judicial District, and on the present trial of title
in this Court. Everything has been said, and heard by them
from both sides, on the question, which learning and research
could invoke. With the very elaborate arguments presented
to them on that point, it is deemed needless to travel in detail
through the numerous letters offered in evidence on this point.
They are all set forth in the Transcript, and open to the
appellate tribunal, who, after an examination of them, can
correct any error committed by this Court in the conclusion it
has come to, upon the character and legal effect of all the let-
ters on which the allegations of forgery and antedating in this
case rest.
A careful perusal of these letters has satisfied the Court that,
with the exception of the letter of 28th March, A. D. 1848,
which James Alexander Forbes swears he received from Alex-
ander Forbes, there is nothing in them which even tends to
prove that forgery or antedating had been committed. In
other words, there is no proof afforded that the documents pre-
sented by claimant are the result of either.
They do show that James Alexander Forbes was willing to
have titles forged and antedated, for the purpose of curing
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what lie deemed irregularities and defects in the original title.
They also prove that he actually suggested to some of his
associates the importance of prompt action in the premises,
and complained of their delay. This suggestion was made, at
one time, by a memorandum left with one of his associates, and
at others by letters to one or two of them.
Now, the willingness of an owner, or of all the owners, to
better their title by forgery and antedating, will not defeat
their original title if sufficient to pass the estate.
The question presented to the Court, in cases where forgery
is alleged, is whether the titles produced are the fruits and results
of such forgery.
In the United States vs. West's Heirs (22 How. 315), the
Attorney General for the Government contended that a pro-
visional or equitable grant, which may be converted into a
legal title, upon the contingency of the approval by the De-
partmental Assembly, and the performance of other conditions,
must be regarded as wholly abandoned, when the conditions
are not complied with, and another and a different claim set
up under a forged title.
West, the petitioner, died during the pendency of the pro-
ceedings before the Board of Land Commissioners ; the case
was brought up to this Court, which confirmed the claim for a
league and a half.
The Supreme Court say on appeal: "We have only to say
that the fraudulent attempts .to enlarge the grant were made
after California had been ceded to the United States; and
though the proof of it is undeniable, and was an attempt to
dafraud the United States, that cannot take away from the
wife and children of West their claim to the grant, which was
made to him before California had been transferred by treaty."
The Court, therefore, confirmed the claim for one and a half
leagues, about the genuineness of which there was no doubt.
Now, in this case, throughout the whole of these letters,
there is no evidence to prove either forgery or antedating by
any one, even James Alexander Forbes. The only exception
in the whole correspondence is the letter of the 28th March,
A. D. 1848, which Forbes swears he had received from Alex-
ander Forbes.
We have given a copy of this letter, in which the following
language is used : " and save myself from the heavy loss that
would ensue, should it unluckily leak out, that in fact, the doc-
uments procured by Castillero in Mexico, as his title to the
mine and lands, were all obtained long after the occupation of
California by the Americans."
From the evidence set out in the Transcript, we believe this
letter to be a forgery. The loss and contents of the original are
proved by James Alexander Forbes and Robert Birnie, the
former the master spirit and the latter his instrument.
We shall not attempt to go into the details of all the nu-
merous facts which have forced upon the Court the conclusion
that the letter of 28th March, 1848, is fabricated, but refer
only to a few circumstances.
Forbes, the witness, is impeached by nine witnesses, all of
whom resided in the county of Santa Clara, where the witness
did. Some of these knew him in 1846, some in 1847, and
some in 1850.
This letter of 28th March, 1848, alleges that all the docu-
ments procured by Castillero in Mexico, were obtained "long
after the occupation of California by the Americans."
A portion of the letters in evidence in this case were pur-
chased by one Henry Laurencel, who, it seems, had some in-
terest in the event of this suit, from James Alexander Forbes,
after he had sold out his interest in the mine, and had become
hostile to his former friend, Alexander Forbes, for the sum of
twenty thousand dollars.
These letters so purchased were deposited at a banker's in
this city, subject to the joint order of Forbes and Laurencel,
but were brought into this Court by process of this Court, and
filed here by the Government.
Subsequently other letters, explanatory of these, and be-
tween the same parties, were brought into Court.
The attempt by the production of these letters on the part
of the Government, was to prove that forgery had been com-
mitted with regard to the title papers, or some of them, in
1850, in accordance with a memorandum made and left by
James Alexander Forbes in Tepic in 1849.
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This theory was disaffirmed by the letters subsequently filed
by the claimants, particularly by the letter of James Alexan-
der Forbes, on 5th May, 1847, to Alexander Forbes, in which
he tells the latter of his having seen the copy of the two-league
grant, signed by Castillo Lanzas, ordering the Governor of
California to put Castillero in possession of the land, and
speaks of the juridical possession of the mine of three thou-
sand varas as a gratification. Trans., 842.
Now, when James Alexander Forbes sold for twenty thou-
sand dollars the letters filed by the Government, they were
sold for the purpose of proving forgery and ante-dating.
Where was the letter of 28th March, 1848 (if in existence), at
the time of the sale of these letters by Forbes to Laurencel?
It is the only one which gives an express statement of for-
gery, and is the most important in the whole correspondence.
The account of his reasons when in selling certain documents
for a pecuniary consideration, which, for the purpose of enhan-
cing the value of the evidence sold to Laurencel he did not
include this original letter among those he sold, are incon-
sistent.
Forbes, in his answer, in the latter part of it, states in his
197th answer (Trans. 895): "If this letter had been in my
possession, or rather, accessible to me, I"would have presented
it with the others
;
but it had been mislaid, and I had forgotten
where I had put it."
In reply to question 199 : " While you were making selec-
tions from your correspondence for Mr. Laurencel's inspection
and for sale, did it occur to you there was such a letter in your
possession as this of the 28th March, 1848 ?"
The witness had stated that he had sold no documents to
Mr. Laurencel, but " he paid me for a specific use of those
papers."
After reiterating his denial as to a sale, he answers the ques-
tion as to his recollecting the letter. He says : "I certainly
did recollect of the existence of the letter alluded to, and that,
having received it a long time before the dates of the corres-
pondence which I allowed Mr. Laurencel to use, I had laid the
letter in question aside among some other papers, and I was
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unable to lay my hands upon it when the aforesaid correspond-
ence was submitted to the inspection of Mr. Laurencel.—An-
swer 199, Trans. 896.
The attention of the witness was then called to the fact that
among the papers sold or delivered for a special use to Lauren-
cel, there were seven letters prior to the letter of 28th March,
1848. His answer is, in the latter part of it : "My answer (200)
alluded to those letters which were considered of the greater
importance in that correspondence, which were comprised in
the dates I have mentioned, 1849 and 1850." And in his
answer 201, he says : " In my said answer 199 I had in view
the dates of those letters of that correspondence which were
considered of the most importance." Now, what paper could
he consider more important than the one of 28th March, 1848?
He searched, he says, for that letter when he sold the use of
the papers to Laurencel. "When asked, "Did you at the time
mention to Mr. Laurencel that you had received such a let-
ter?" he replied, "I did not."—Trans. 897, Ans. 205.
In his answer 443 (Trans. 943), he assigns as his reason, and
says : "I will now take occasion to state what was my real object
in retaining that letter in my possession. I knew that the coun-
sel himself had gone to the city of "Washington, attended by
William E. Barron, for the purpose of getting a bill passed for
the taking of testimony in Mexico ; and if they should not be
successful in obtaining the passage of such a bill, the witnesses
would be brought here for the purpose of supporting the title
to New Almaden, and after such testimony should have been
given in this Court I was determined to exhibit that letter
to the authorities of the United States."
He was asked " whether he ever wrote to Mr. Alexander
Forbes, requesting any explanation of the expressions in that
letter, or to Castillero, requesting some information as to the
title?"
The witness answers, he never did, and he considered the
attempt useless, inasmuch as he believed the last act of posses-
sion was obtained for the purpose of remedying anterior de-
fects in the title (Answer 371, Trans. 919.) In answer 374
he says . " I made no inquiry with regard to the matter set
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forth in that letter, for the reason already stated, namely : that
I considered it next to impossible for me to obtain such infor-
mation, and more especially as I had been already informed
by Mr. Alexander Forbes that in case everything else failed
we should fall back upon that possession."
The last reason he assigns for making no inquiry about the
letter of 28th March, 1848, was, it stated an important fact
which he considered would never be made the subject of cor-
respondence, neither on the part of Mr. Castillero or Mr.
Forbes, even had there been a less precarious mode of con-
veying such correspondence from Mexico to California. Can
this witness be deemed to have given a clear account of this
letter which he secreted, and made no inquiry for years until
June, 1858, a period of ten years from its date, when it is pro-
duced by a copy ; Forbes swearing the original was stolen from
his carpet-bag on the 30th June last ?
When asked by counsel for claimant, " Do I understand you
to say that on the 30th of June last, and after the conclusion of
your examination before Judge Hoffman, and after you had
suffered Birnie to make a copy of that letter, the said letter
was stolen from your carpet bag at your lodgings, at the Kail-
road House in this city?" This was on the evening of 30th
June, 1858. that Birnie made the copy.
Forbes answered: " That letter was in my possession up to
nine o'clock in the evening. I had occasion to leave my lodg-
ing for a short time ; for security I took that letter out of my
coat pocket and put it into my carpet-bag, locked my room
door and went up as far as Montgomery Street. I was absent
half an hour or more ; on my return I found my room door
locked as I had left it ; and on retiring to bed I had occasion
to go to my carpet-bag, when I found that letter was missing."
This is an improbable story, coming from a man who is
proved by the correspondence as not only willing to have
forged title, but urging his suggestions upon his associates to
fabricate it.
There is improbability in the story, as he tells it, as to the
manner in which he lost it.
The witness deemed it an important document, and he re-
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served it as his real object, as he tells us, to deliver it to the
authorities of the United States, in the event that witnesses from
Mexico should be brought here to testify. "Why should the
character of the letter, as true, depend upon that fact ?
It is improbable that a document deemed so important should
be left in a carpet-bag in a large public house, and left in a
carpet-bag, as the witness swears, for "security."
We shall no farther pursue the facts spread out in the Trans-
cript to establish the forgery of the 28th March, 1848, so far
as James Alexander Forbes is concerned. His coadjutor, Robert
Birnie, takes the stand. Sixteen witnesses, old neighbors of
Birnie for four or five years, who knew him well and his repu-
tation, say it is so bad they would not believe him on his oath.
Whoever desires to arrive at a knowledge of Birnie's reputa-
tion has only to read the testimony of one of these witnesses.
The general fact sworn to by him that he was not to be be-
lieved on his oath, is confirmed by all the rest. That witness
is Nathaniel Jones, and his testimony to be found in the Trans-
cript, p. 2769.
Mr! Jones is a farmer ; held the office of Sheriff in 1850 and
1851 ; was Public Administrator a short time after ; was then
elected Supervisor of the County ; is the Corresponding Secre-
tary of the Contra Costa Agricultural Society, and Vice-Pres-
ident of the Bay District Agricultural Society, representing
Contra Costa county. This witness swears he has lived in the
neighborhood of Birnie for some four or five years. He would
not believe him on his oath.
On his cross-examination this witness testifies : " It is not
from any single act of his, but it is from his want of occupa-
tion, and the universal belief among the people that he swears
falsely and procures false evidence in land cases ; he is utterly
worthless, and a loafer."
Now such was the coadjutor of Forbes, who copied the letter
of the 28th March, 1848, on the night of 30th June, 1858; who
swears he did so, and he swears the letter he copied was one
directed to James Alexander Forbes, dated (" I believe ") 28th
March, 1848, from Monterey.
He swears to every thing about the letter that Forbes did
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about his copying, and also he identifies the original letter
which he copied as that of Alexander Forbes.
He can say nothing about the stolen letter, as no one was
present save Forbes and the carpet bag. But Forbes could not
return the favor Birnie had done him.
On his cross-examination, Birnie deposed that the first no-
tice he had to attend as a witness, " was from a subpoena to ap-
pear instanter. I came over in the boat yesterday with Mr.
Eandall, the Deputy Marshal, Mr. Forbes and Mr. Laurencel
were in company with the Deputy Marshal. I went to Mr.
Forbes and asked him the object of this subpoena so suddenly.
He told me that it was to testify about the copy of the letter I
got from him," etc. Answer 36 ; Trans. 861, 862.
Forbes was called some two days after the examination as a
witness, and he knew that Mr. Eandall, the Deputy Marshal,
if he did not tell the truth in despite of his friend Birnie would
bring out the truth, as he Eandall was cognizant of the false-
hood of Birnie ; he, Forbes, therefore actually told the truth,
and falsified all that his friend had sworn to. "I went," says
Forbes, "on our arrival at Oakland or soon thereafter, at the
request, or rather by his consent, thinking it would be less dis-
agreeable to Birnie to speak to him before the subpoena was
served, as the subpoena called for his appearance instanter."
Ans. 35 ; Trans. 876.
"I told him," says the witness Forbes, "simply, that the
United States Marshal was there and had a subpoena for him ;
that he would not be required to go to San Francisco until the
following morning, provided he would be ready to go at 5
o'clock in the morning. I then left to see the Marshal, and in-
formed him that Birnie would be on board in the morning."
So that what Birnie had deposed to was expressly falsified by
Forbes, from the fact of the Deputy Marshal's presence.
Escaping from this forged letter, we will look briefly to the
testimony adduced by claimant to sustain the genuineness of
the documentary title obtained in Mexico.
Great delay in the administration of justice in this case has
taken place, from the fact of the tenacity of the Mexican Gov-
ernment in adhering to the law or regulation inhibiting the
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use of the great seal to evidence transactions done in Mexico
in foreign countries.
The inability of claimant to clothe the evidence he had to
procure in a form to be received in the courts of this country
under existing laws, has had the effect of making this case drag
along at a very slow pace. They have had the means, how-
ever, to put an end to further delay, and by the exertion of
them to bring their witnesses from their homes in Mexico to
give their testimony, and testify personally to the genuineness
of the documentary title which the claimant obtained from the
Mexican Government. The impression generally has been
entertained that titles may be easily forged, and that the Gov-
ernment of Mexico was approachable by clandestine means.
The correspondence of which so much has been said, which
was filed by the Government in this case, was naturally calcu-
lated to fortify that impression. That correspondence did
establish to some extent the settled purpose of one of the par-
ties to have papers antedated and forged, and that one or more
of the other parties did not promptly repudiate his suggestions,
which the Court consider may have been the result of many
motives into which it is unnecessary to inquire, under the
view entertained and enunciated by this Court, of the nature,
extent, and legal effect of that correspondence as evidence to
prove forgery or antedating. The record shows that an appli-
cation was made by Eustace Barron and Castillero to Castillo
Lanzas, while Minister of Eelations, to authenticate copies of
various documents in the public offices of Mexico relating to
the Almaden Mine, with the great seal of the Eepublic. The
application was refused, upon the ground that the uses to which
the great seal may be put are defined by law and do not em-
brace the authentication of copies of public documents. One
of the witnesses examined in this case was Lanzas himself, and
he gives the laws which regulated the use of the great seal
(Trans. 2237.) See the letter of Castillo Lanzas giving the
reasons why the President denied the use of the great seal save
for the special purposes designated by law (Trans. 2384).
Now, it strikes the Court, if the precision and tenacity of the
Mexican Government about the great seal are so great that it
45
would not yield to the intercessions of Andres Castillero, he
certainly could not have possessed such influence as has been
imputed to him to obtain a forgery of documents in all the
public offices through which his title passed. This Court has
decided that the only evidence produced to prove a fabrication
of these documents is the forged letter of 28th March, 1848,
and the proof which has been produced to prove the authen-
ticity of these documents is as strong as it can be made. We
must come to the conclusion that the archives of the Mexican
Government must have been forged, and the eleven witnesses
sworn in this country under its law, and examined in the
presence of her magistrates, have perjured themselves. The
deposition of John Forsyth, United States Minister in Mexico,
is in the Transcript, 1111. The following motion in relation
to it was passed by this Court
:
" The United States \
vs. I No. 420.
Andres Castillero. )
On motion of Messrs. Peachy and Yale, of counsel for claim-
ants, and by consent of parties, it is ordered by the Court
that the deposition of the Hon. John Forsyth, remaining under
the seal of R. B. Owen, United States Commissioner, be and
the same is hereby published." Trans. 1110.
In his deposition, Mr. Forsyth deposes, he went first to the
office of the Junta de Mineria in company with the British
Consul, John P. Brodie of California, agent of the claimant,
and others, and where was produced from the archives of said
office an expediente, which, being carefully compared with a
copy in the hands of the said Pardo and Brodie, proved to be
absolutely alike and correct in every respect, and to that copy
he made a certificate dated the 4th day of August, 1858.
" On the 30th July, 1858, I was present in the College of the
Mines with the same parties, when an expediente was pro-
duced from the archives, which was compared, etc., which
copy was certified by me on the 4th day of August, 1858. On
29th of July, 1858, I was present at the office of Foreign Bela-
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tions, when and where the Chief Clerk of the Section of Europe
produced from the archives of said office an expediente which
was compared, etc., and to that I certified on the 4th day of
Aug. 1858. On the same day I was present at the office of
the Ministry and Police, when the Chief Clerk of said office
produced from the archives of said office an expediente in the
presence of the same parties, which, on being compared," etc.
" On the 30th July, 1858, I was present at the office of the
Escribano, or Notary, Don Juan Navarro, where and when said
Navarro produced from the archives of his office a book formed
of sheets of stamped paper, stitched together and consisting
(exclusive of the fly-leaves in the beginning, and the index at
the end) of one hundred and twenty leaves, and titled ' Ano
de 1846, Protocolo de Instrumentos del Escribano Don Nazario
Fuentes.'' In the presence of the same persons, certain original
instruments, contained in saM book, were examined, and being
compared unto a copy found to be correct and similar, with
the exception of two slight omissions, which were certified by
the Notary on the same day, and to that copy I certified on the
4th day of August, 1858. These original documents were
found in the several offices where they appropriately belonged,
and were produced by the officers having the custody of them
;
and I saw nothing whatever to cause me to doubt that their
being genuine originals. I, as Minister, certified each of the
copies hereinbefore mentioned, and the facts set forth in those
certificates are true, and the certificates are in accordance with
the laws of Mexico."
Mr. Forsyth further deposes that the Government will not
allow the great seal of.Mexico to be attached to copies of such
documents, nor will they allow the originals to be withdrawn.
"And the manner in which the copies herein mentioned have
been authenticated is the only way in which such copies can be
authenticated."
Now, all these expedientes, in the archives of the Junta of
the College of the Mines, in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, in
the office of the Ministry of Government and Police—four of
the public offices and departments—must have been forged in
each one of them, and introduced clandestinely into the archives
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of each. And the same must have been done in relation to the
original documents produced from the archives as sworn and
certified to by Mr. Forsyth from the archives of the Escribano.
Now this is what is most improbable to do without detection.
The claimants have offered the testimony of the three mem-
bers of the Junta de Fomento in the year 1846, namely : Don Jose*
Yicente Segura, Don Maria Flores and Don Jose Maria Bassoco.
The testimony of the first two was taken in Mexico, and that
of the testimony of some eleven other witnesses was taken in
San Francisco, and proves the genuineness of the documentary
title obtained by Castillero; we shall limit ourselves to their
testimony.
The following witnesses were sworn in San Francisco, and
examined : Jose Maria Bassoco, before the District Judge; Man-
uel Couto, who was a Clerk in the Junta de Fomento in 1846
;
remained Clerk until the Junta was displaced by the Adminis-
tration del Fondo in 1853, and since then has remained Clerk in
that Administration. He copied Castillero's proposals to the
Junta. The testimony of Don Jose Maria Lafragua, Minister
of Foreign Eelations under President Salas, in the latter part
of 1846, proves the expedientes,—Trans. 15.
Professor Balcarcel was a Member of the Faculty of the Col-
lege of Mines in 1846 ; was present at the meeting of the Fac-
ulty when the result of the assay of quicksilver was ordered to
be printed.—Trans. 1865.
Another witness, Antonio del Castillo, Member of the Na-
tional College, kept the minutes of the proceedings of the re-
sult of the assay
;
deposited the specimens sent by Castillero in
1846, in the Cabinet of Minerals.—Trans. 1935.
It is useless to pursue this detailed inquiry into the testi-
mony. It is set out in the Transcript, and direct and positive
to the genuineness of the documents obtained by Castillero, in
Mexico, in 1846.
The witnesses are eleven in number who have been exam-
ined in this country, and they stand free from any impeach-
ment.
In addition to the testimony of Mr. Forsyth, and the eleven
witnesses from Mexico, who testify to the genuineness of the.
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documents obtained by Castillero in this city, there is added a
document of some significance.
The witness Couto was asked on the cross-examination
—
" You say, that all these things were done by the Junta V An-
swer of witness—" I do." " You know they were done by
them ?" " I do." " Was there a record kept of them—of the
discussions of the Junta on the subject of such applications?"
Answer of witness was—" The result of each day's deliberations
was written down in a book, and signed by the gentlemen of
the Junta. This record was called the book of the Adas"
" Where is that book now ?" Answer—" In my possession, in
the oflice in Mexico. These books are not allowed to leave
the office." "Were not the final resolutions of the Junta on
the subject of any application extended more formally than in
the acts or journal of their proceedings, to which you have re-
ferred ?" Answer—" This book of the acts is a formal record.
The first and last sheets of the book are stamped. The book
is stamped in the stamp-paper office, and the pages are all num-
bered in that office before it is stamped, so that it is the same as
if each page was stamped. The same was paid to the stamp
office as if each leaf were stamped. The Administrator de Papel
Sellado certifies on the first page of the book the number of
pages in it. This book undergoes all this preparation before
it is used by the Junta.''''
" Is this the only book in which the final resolutions of the
Junta were recorded ?"
Ans.—" Yes."
"Why did you not bring a copy of the acts of the Junta
upon his petition with you, that being as you have said, a
mode by which the Junta executed contracts and assumed
obligations ?"
Ans.—" Because my business here was only to prove my
own signatures, and to prove that the dates upon the documents
in the expediente of which I have spoken were the true dates
of those papers, and to prove that they h ave been in my cus-
tody."
The result of this examination was to induce the taking
measures to get the actas from Mexico, and they will be found
49
in the Transcript, 1682. Here is a whole year's business of
the mining body, their proceedings, day after day. Session of
6th May, 1846, there is an entry, stating that Don Andres Cas-
tillero appeared and made a verbal report regarding the dis-
covery, denouncement, and actual condition of the quicksilver
mine situated in the mining district of Upper California. The
Junta resolved that Senor Castillero should present his indi-
cations in writing.
Session of 14th May, 1846. "From the Ministry of Justice,
of date 9th, acknowledging receipt of the official letter, in
which was communicated to it the discovery of the mine of
quicksilver in Californias."—Trans. 1684, 1688.
Session 18th May, 1846. " In the third he informs, that of
the one thousand two hundred and seventy quicksilver flasks
existing in the negotiation, there are only a very few having
flaws, and that they ought to be worth three dollars each per
piece. Let this difference be represented to Senor Castillero,
and to the Government, when his propositions are approved."
Trans, p. 1690."
Session of 25th May, 1846. "An official letter from His
Excellency the Minister of Justice, dated 20th, approving
the propositions of Don Andres Castillero, which the Junta
had transmitted to the Supreme Government, and informing
that he had sent to the Ministry of Government the petition
for two square leagues of land (sitio de ganado mayor) as a
colonist, upon his mining property."—Trans. 1694.
"The Junta resolved that the proper judicial agreement be
drawn up immediately, and that application be made for the
five thousand dollars, on Mazatlan or Guadalajara, to which
Castillero agreed ; and finally, that by the mail of Wednes-
day the proper orders be sent to Tasco, that the administrator
deliver to the order of Senor Don Tomas Eamon del Moral
all the quicksilver flasks in good condition in the store-houses
there, at the rate of two dollars."—Trans, p. 1694.
Session 29th May, 1846.—" It was also resolved, in con-
formity with the report of the Controller's Office, that twenty-
five dollars be paid to the notary Calapiz, for the proceedings
in the instrument of agreement, which had been made with
227
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Don Andres Castillero, to assist his quicksilver enterprise in
the mine of Santa Clara in Upper California, embraced in
the official order for the suspension of all payments in this
Branch."—Trans, p. 1697.
These " actas" where we see from day to day entries of facts
made at the proper dates to meet the acts of Castillero to pro-
cure his title, harmonize with the balance of the testimony to
negative the idea of forgery or antedating, or that all the doc-
uments procured by Castillero in Mexico were all obtained
long after the occupation of California by the Americans.
The questions the Court will now discuss are
:
1. Whether the claimant has proved satisfactorily a ratifi-
cation by the Supreme Government, of the act of Alcalde
Pico, granting to him three thousand varas of land at the time
he delivered to him the mine.
2. Whether the claimant openly and fairly submitted that
transaction to the executive supervision, in the propositions he
made.
These are important inquiries, in the solution of which, so
far as this Court is concerned, the destiny of these three thou-
sand varas depends ; for if it be not ascertained beyond reason-
able doubt that the grant of the Alcalde was as clearly and
fairly presented in the propositions as the other things pro-
posed, or that there is not a direct and distinct ratification of
the Alcalde's act, the transaction is a nullity and has no legal
existence.
1 In Castillero's communication to the Junta de Fomento, under
date of 12th May, 1846, submitting his views as to a contract
respecting a mine he had discovered and denounced, he sub-
mits various details ; among them, he states that he had de-
nounced and taken possession " not only of the said mine of
Santa Clara, but also of the extent of three thousand varas in
all directions from that point."
The statement of all he had to say as to his past acts and
future views having been made, he closes with these words
:
"My propositions, then, are the following—
"
Then follow nine propositions.
The seventh only, will now demand our attention.
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The original communication of Castillero, with its various
propositions, were sent by the Junta with their recommendation
in favor of it, through the Minister of Justice to the President,
who, therefore, had them before him.
The result of his action in the premises is the written order
on the margin of the communication he had received from the
Junta, recommending Castillero's propositions to his approval.
It is in these words: " Granted in the terms which are proposed;
and with respect to the land, let the corresponding order issue
to the Minister of Eelations for the proper measures of his
office, with the understanding that the Supreme Government
accedes to the proposition."
It is contended that the above order approves in all its parts
the agreement. Such is the construction placed upon the order
by the Minister of Justice in his letter communicating to the
President of the Junta de Fomento the result of the action of
his Excellency the President, under date of 20th May, 1846.
Counsel for claimant places as comprehensive a construction
on the order as did Mr. Becerra, the Minister of Justice. He
states : "All that is proposed is granted, the two square leagues
among other things.'1 ''—Mr. Peachy's Brief, 5.
Such are the interpretations placed upon the order of the
President by those two gentlemen. The construction to be
placed upon this little document now rests upon this Court ; if
it be erroneous, it is gratifying to feel that there is an appellate
tribunal to correct such error.
As to the interpretation of the Minister of Justice, if his
only object is to give his inferences and his interpretation
of what was done by the President, his course may, in the
estimation of many, be deemed correct; but it must strike
some, that in the performance of his official duty as a subordi-
nate officer, where large interests were concerned, it would have
been as well to issue the order of his superior so that it might
speak for itself, without placing his own construction on it. In
doing so, he has introduced language not to be found in the
order. The words "in all its parts," have been seized upon by
all who, interested, have written or spoken about the title, and
its ratification by the Supreme Government of Mexico, draw-
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ing their inference from those words, and the coloring thrown
upon the order by them, when in fact no such words exist in
the order.
That part of the interpretation of the learned counsel for
claimant, which considers the language operates to convey the
two square leagues, we will consider hereafter. The inquiry
at present is exclusively as to the three thousand varas of sur-
face land.
Castillero was not an illiterate, ignorant man ; the evidence
shows he was well informed and educated. He was familiar
with the mining laws. Colonel Fremont testifies that in the
early part of 1846, he obtained from Castillero all the neces-
sary information which he (Fremont) was able to use for his
individual benefit subsequently, in obtaining a mining title at
Mariposa. It is reasonable to believe, that one so generally
intelligent and cognizant of the mining laws, knew precisely
what an ignorant Alcalde was doing at his suggestion, as it is
reasonable to believe it was, as he was present, and it was done
for his benefit. Castillero must have known that in the annals
of his country there was no precedent for an Alcalde to grant
three thousand varas to a miner, either as " pertenencias," or
by way of grant.
It is important, in justice to the President and to all parties
in interest, to look with care when such important interests
were entrusted to him, to see, when he bound his country and
himself, to what extent he did so. It cannot be urged that the
interpretation of a subordinate of a Government of the legal
document of his superior, is to be conclusive on this Court in
the construction of it. We have cited the construction placed
upon the order by one of the counsel for the claimant. The
first part of it is in these words : " All that is proposed is
granted." We do not differ in this from the learned counsel.
We merely add the negative to his affirmation and add : " All
that is not proposed is not granted."
We now turn to the proposition of Castillero. He had in
his communication to the Junta de Fomento, in the statement
he had made in it. preliminary to his propositions, informed
that body he had " denounced and taken possession not only
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of said mine of Santa Clara, but also of an extent of three
thousand yaras in all directions from that point."
Thus far he as an honest man acted
;
but he looked to his
interests, as we shall see.
By the minutes of the Junta, it appears that he appeared
before them personally, and gave a verbal account of his dis-
covery, and having been requested to make a written state-
ment, he handed, on 12th May, 1846, his written propositions.
These propositions were either prepared or drafted by Cas-
tillero, or under his eye. Conversant as he was with the min-
ing laws, he must have known what a gross violation of the
ordinances the Alcalde had committed in granting him three
thousand varas, which he stated in his communication to the
Junta de Fomento he had denounced. Now, there is no ground
known to the mining laws on which a denouncement could be
made of three thousand varas as the appurtenance to a mine.
The statement of Castillero is not only without proof, but is
negatived. In the act of possession the reason averred by the
Alcalde for delivering the juridical possession of the mine
was, that the time between the denouncement and this date
had expired. This is the only time the word " denouncement"
is used in the act of possession. After stating the delivery of
the mine, he says, " I have granted three thousand varas."
Now the assertion of Castillero that he had denounced these
three thousand varas, is falsified by the very record on which
the title rests which is presented to this Court for confirmation.
No man, shrewd and educated like Castillero, makes a false
statement, deliberately in writing, without some motive. "We
can only gather that motive from his subsequent conduct.
Now, the principal object of Castillero in invoking the action
of the Supreme Government was to procure their ratification
of the title to his mine, so as to secure it from any attack that
might be made by reason of any serious irregularity that may
have been committed in the proceedings; or from want of
power in the Alcalde, there being no Mining Deputation in
California. Another object was to procure pecuniary means
by way of a loan, and the prompt use of retorts, cylinders, and
other apparatus to work his mine. These were his principal
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objects, and with his knowledge of the gross violation of the
ordinances which had been committed, he feared that an inser-
tion of the grant by the Alcalde in his proposals, and asking
a ratification of his possession under it, would jeopardize or de-
feat his whole application. He determines, therefore, to insert
in the preliminary part of his written statement the Alcalde's
grant, and so word his proposition as to possession, that if an
unrestricted ratification was given, he might claim under it the
land as the subject of the grant, as well as that of the mining
title.
His seventh proposition, the only one of the nine which
asks for the approval of possession, is in these words : " The
Junta shall represent to the Supreme Government the necessity
of approving the possession which has been given me of the
mine by the local authorities of California, in the same terms
as I now hold it." Not one word is used that conveys
an idea of the* grant for three thousand varas, or the pos-
session of it. Why was not an approval of the possession of
those asked ? Was it an inadvertence ? It does not look like
one. Castillero, if he intended this proposition to cover the
land he held as well as the mine, could not be deemed acting
inadvertently. He actually converts two separate and differ-
ent acts of the Alcalde into one and the same transaction
;
it confounds two different transfers of different species of
property, conveyed and regulated by different systems of law.
It asks, if so intended, and if not intended why claimed, three
thousand varas of surface, together with a mine, "m the same
terms as Inow hold it."
The statement that he had denounced this land must have
been introdnced from a desire to aid the effort made in the
seventh proposition in converting the two different transac-
tions into one. Now, if Castillero intended to effect his object
of obtaining the approval of the Government in this mode, it
was a fraud
; if it was done through inadvertence, and he only
in fact intended to propose for an approval of the possession
of the mine, the grant gives him no right to the three thou-
sand varas. The possession of them was never confirmed.
To prove the separate character of the two acts, and that Cas-
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tillero only proposed the approval of the possession of the
mine, we submit the following reasons
:
As we consider the views expressed by one of the counsel
for claimant, as to the character of the delivery of the mine
and the transfer of the three thousand varas, as correct, we
shall cite them: It seems that in the year 1848, Mr. Alexan-
der Forbes applied to Alcalde "Weekes to grant an increase of
11 jpertenencias " to the owners of the Almaden Mine, as pro-
vided by the ordinances. Upon this, the counsel for the Gov-
ernment objected: "Why, if the original Act of Possession,
dated 30th December, 1845, had been in existence in January,
1848, by which the Alcalde granted a mining possession of
the three thousand varas in every direction from the mouth of
the mine, should Alexander Forbes have prayed the Alcalde
to grant an increase of ' jpertenencias ' in 1848, as provided
by the Ordinances ? For three thousand varas, measured
in every direction from the mouth of the "mine, includes
many more "jpertenencias" than the seven which Alcaldes are
authorized to grant when a newly discovered mine is worked
in partnership." To this objection the counsel replies : " A
careful examination of the Act of Possession given by Pico in
1845, discloses the fact that the Alcalde gave possession of the
mine, and also granted to Castillero three thousand varas in every
direction from the mouth of the mine. He first declares that he
gives juridical possession of the mine known by the name of San-
ta Clara, and then proceeding to enumerate several reasons for
what follows, he grants to Castillero three thousand varas, etc.,
so that the giving juridical possession of the mine was one act,
and the granting of three thousand varas was another act, both
of which were recorded in the same instrument, which is usu-
ally called the Act of Possession. What, then, did he mean
by the mine ? What was its extent ? Evidently he intended
by the mine such a number of ' jpertenencias ' as the discoverer
of a mine in a new hill was entitled to by the ordinances,
which would be three if he worked the mine alone, and seven
if he worked it in partnership with others."
The distinction between the judicial possession of the mine
and the grant of three thousand varas, is very explicitly, says
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the counsel, stated by Castillero in his proposals to the Junta
de Fomento on the 12th May, 1846. There he says : " "Where-
fore I have denounced and taken possession, not only of the
said mine, but also of three thousand varas," etc.
Now, what we consider is, that Castillero himself being per-
sonally conversant with the difference between the possession
of the mine and the possession of the land, seeks to sustain his
title to the latter upon a grant of the Supreme Government as
a ratification, and to which he is not entitled, as he did not pro-
pose it for ratification in his seventh proposition, or in any
other.
Among the nine propositions submitted by Castillero to the
Junta de Fomento is the eighth, which is in these words : "It
shall also represent [to the Supreme Government] the advan-
tage of there being granted to me, as a colonist, two square
leagues upon the land of my mining possession, with the ob-
ject of being able to use the wood for my burnings."
We have seen that the written communication by Castillero,
with his nine propositions annexed, were transmitted by that
body to the President, with their commendation of the petition
of Senor Castillero. That the petition was before the Presi-
dent, with its various propositions, together with the recom-
mendation of the Junta. On the margin of this communica-
tion from that body the grant for two leagues of land is to be
found, as alleged.
Before giving the language which is relied upon as a grant
of two leagues of land, the Court will advert to the announce-
ment made of its interpretation by Mr. Becerra of the action
by the President, under date 20th May, 1846, which was the
first announcement that was made to D. Vicente Segura, Presi-
dent of the Junta.
Mr. Becerra wrote that " His Excellency has been pleased
to approve, in all its parts, the agreement made with that indi-
vidual." Where is the agreement to which Mr. Becerra
Castillero had made no agreement with the Junta de Fomento.
All he did do, he tells us at the end of his proposals: "The
subscriber submits this request to the deliberation of the Junta,
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which, if accepted, may be made into a formal contract and
made legal in the most proper manner."
The communication of the Junta was not in form or sub-
stance a petition. Petitions are not made from one department
to another of the same Government. In the exercise of their
powers under the mining laws, the Junta exercised their right
to recommend the petition of Oastillero to the Supreme Gov-
ernment.
There was no agreement before the President ; but there
was a recommendation of the Junta. What they sent for his
approval, the only petition made by any one, was the petition
of Castillero in relation to which the Junta say in their letter :
" In this view, the Junta, in sending up to your Excellency the
petition of Senor Castillero, has no hesitation of recommending
it very efficaciously," etc. Now to what petition did the Pres-
ident accede, and what did he grant ? He must have referred
to Castillero's petition, the only one before him, and the word
grant must be of things in the terms proposed by Oastillero in
his propositions.
On one of the papers before him (the recommendation of
the Junta), is an acuerdo or written order signed with the ru-
bric of the Minister of Justice. It is in these words : " May 20,
1846. Granted in the terms proposed ; and with respect to
the land, let the corresponding order issue to the Minister of
Eelations for the proceedings so far as his office is concerned,
with the understanding that the Supreme Government accedes
to the petition."
It is strenuously urged, that among the nine things proposed,
all being proposed are granted, and that the two square leagues
among the rest are conveyed.
Now, all that Castillero asked the Junta to recommend to the
Supreme Government in his eighth proposition was a coloni-
zation grant. His proposal was, in terms, to grant him two
leagues as a colonist.
This was all the President did ; it was all that Castillero pro-
posed. To consider that the word "granted" applied to all
the propositions of Castillero, and conveys and transfers all
property in each, is to do violence to the language, and to an-
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nihilate an axiom of almost universal prevalence
—
uExpressio
unius, est exclusio alterius."
The word " granted " applies to all that is proposed, which
is not excluded. But after using that word, it excepts the land,
and thus qualifies that word in relation to the land. After the
word " granted," in the terms proposed, the language as to
the land is, " and in respect to the land, let the corresponding
order issue to the Minister of Eelations for the proper meas-
ures of his office, with the understanding that the Supreme
Government accedes to the petition."
Becerra, the Minister of Justice, in his communication to
Yicente Segura, President of the Junta de Fomento, states the
agreement made with Castillero had been approved in all its
parts ; also states (and it is the only reference he makes to the
land) " that on this day the corresponding communication is
made to the Minister of Exterior Relations and Government,
to issue the proper orders respecting which is contained in the
8th proposition for the grant of lands in that Department."
The Minister of Justice sent a copy of this letter to Castillo
Lanzas, the Minister of Relations, and says: "I have the
honor to transcribe it to your Excellency, to the end that, with
respect to the petition of Senor Castillero, to which His Excel-
lency the President ad interim has thought proper to accede,
there be granted to him as a colonist two square leagues
upon the land of his mining possession. Your Excellency will
be pleased to issue the orders corresponding."
Lanzas, the Minister of Relations, on the 23d May, 1846, at
Mexico, addresses a communication to the Governor of the
Department of California.
He premises what he has to say to the Departmental Gover-
nor, with a copy of the letter which Mr. Becerra, the Minister
of Justice, had written to the Junta on 20th May, 1846, and
sent one to him, and a copy of the letter which he, Lanzas, had
received from the Minister of Relations, and then Lanzas con-
cludes to the Governor in the following language : "Wherefore,
I transcribe it to your Excellency, in order that under what is
prescribed by the laws and dispositions upon colonization, you may
put Senor Castillero in possession of the two square leagues
which are mentioned."
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Now the interpretation by Lanzas of the grant was correct.
Castillero proposed for a grant as a colonist, in his eighth prop-
osition. It was such, and was the only one proposed that the
Supreme Government had granted. The grant was viewed by
the Minister in its true light, a colonization grant ; he did not
direct the Governor to place Castillero in possession, but stated
that he had transcribed to His Excellency in order that under
what is prescribed by the laws and dispositions upon colonization^
you may put Castillero in possession of the two square leagues
which are mentioned.
In the recommendation made by the Junta in favor of his
application for land, they declined to express any opinion.
It was, in fact, a subject with which they had nothing to do.
The origin of title to mines, and of the granting of lands, and
the regulations of them, belonging to two different systems of
law ; and those laws to the administration of different tribunals.
The colonization decree of 1824, and the regulations of 1828,
made under that law, had given the granting power to the
Governors of departments, subject to the approval of the de-
partment, and in special cases to the Supreme Government.
The Minister of Exterior Relations and Government was
the functionary through whom the President communicated
with the Governors of the departments, and hence the order in
this case to the functionary having charge of the granting
power where the land was situated, and where the provisions
made by the Colonization Decree of 1824, and the regulations
of 1828, made for the protection of the rights of third parties,
which by the local authorities could be more practically enfor-
ced than in Mexico.
Here ends the Expediente of the two square leagues of land.
A grant was never issued, nor was a solitary movement made
by the Governor towards one, nor a survey of the land made
or possession of it given by any Mexican functionary.
The letter addressed to the Governor of California by Cas-
tillo Lanzas, was dated in Mexico, May 23d, 1846, some ten
days after the 13th May 1846, the day the Congress of the
United States declared by resolution, and the President announ-
ced by proclamation to the people of the United States, that
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war existed between the United States and Mexico by virtue
of the commencement of actual hostilities on the part of the
Republic of Mexico.
The Supreme Court of the United States say : From the cap-
ture of Monterey on the 7th July, 1846, till the surrender of
Los Angeles, and the organization of a Territorial Government
by Commodore Stockton, under the United States, there were
about six weeks. * * * In the Act of 1851, and the decis-
ions of this Court, that day is referred to as the epoch at which
the power of the Governor of California under the authority
of Mexico to alienate the public domain terminated.—U. S. vs.
Pico, 23 How. 321.
The case of the United States vs. Castillero (23 How. 464),
has been cited as a controlling authority in this. If it be in
fact so, it will be the duty of this Court so to consider ; but
in its opinion, it cannot be so regarded, without violating clear
principles of judicial construction.
In the case of Cohens vs. Virginia (6 Wheaton, 264), the
canons of judicial construction are thus laid down by Chief
Justice Marshall : " It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that
general expressions in an opinion are to be taken in connection
with the case in which those expressions are used. If they be
beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to
control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point
is not presented. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The
question actually before the Court is investigated with care
and consideration in its full extent ; other principles which
may seem to illustrate it, are considered in relation to the case
decided ; but their possible bearing or relation on all other cases
is seldom completely investigated."
Now, apply these rules of judicial construction to the case
cited.
For years the granting of lands situate in the Department of
California, and up to the time of the acquisition of this country
by the United States, were regulated by the Colonization Law
of 1824, and the Eegulations of 1828, of Mexico. Provisions
which she deemed called for by her colonization policy, and
conditions and terms having for their object the protection of
the rights of third parties, were embodied in them.
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Among them, one of vast importance confided the granting
of lands to the local authorities—the Governors, or, as they
once were termed, " Political Chiefs," subject to the approval
of the Departmental Assemblies, and, in cases specially provided
for, to the action of the Supreme Government.
This was the uniform, almost universal law. This Court is
asked to decide in this case, where no grant from the Governor
was ever placed upon the record, where no grant by that
functionary was ever made, where no "informe 11 was taken,
where no solitary provision of the law made for the protection
of third parties was observed, to consider the decision of the
Supreme Court in the above case, which enunciates the princi-
ple " that the Colonization Law of Mexico of 1824 and the
Eegulations of 1828," do not apply to " islands" situate on the
coast, a decision authoritative in this case. If it is to be so
treated, this Court will violate all the principles of judicial
construction, and decide that whether or not islands on the coast
are subject to the Colonization Law and Regulations is the "very
point presented" in this case, which is, whether those laws and
regulations apply to colonization grants of lauds in the interior of
the country.
In the case of the United States vs. Osio (23 How. 273), the
Supreme Court decided, that an " island " situated in the Bay
of San Francisco, not claimed under the Colonization Law of
1824 or Eegulations of 1828, but under certain special orders
issued to the Governor by the Mexican Government, and the
Governor issued a grant under them, the power of the Supreme
Government to grant the island was deemed undoubted ; but
the claim to it was rejected on other grounds.
At the same term (23 How. 464), between the same parties
now before the Court, after making a statement of the pe-
titioner's title, the Court in that case discuss the question of the
character of the property claimed. They say (p. 465) " islands
situated on the coast, it seems, were never granted by the
Governors of California or by any of her authorities, under the
Colonization Law of 1824 or the Eegulations. of 1828. From
all that has been exhibited in cases of this description, the
better opinion is, that the power to grant the lands of the
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1 islands ' was neither claimed nor exercised by the authorities
of the Department prior to the twentieth day of July, 1838,
as was satisfactorily shown in one or more cases heretofore
considered and decided by this Court.
11 On that day (July 20, 1838), the Minister of the Interior, by
the order of the Mexican President, addressed a communication
to Governor Alvarado, authorizing him, in concurrence with the
Departmental Assembly, to grant and distribute the lands of the
desert islands adjacent to that Department, to the citizens of
the nation who might solicit the same. *****
u Grants made by the Governor under the power conferred by
this dispatch, without the concurrence of the Departmental
Assembly, were simply void, for the reason that the power,
being a special one, could only be exercised in the manner
prescribed. It was so held by this Court in United States vs.
Osio, decided at the present term, and we are satisfied that the
decision was correct."
—
Ibid, 466.
But the grant in this case (say the Court), was not made
under the general authority conferred by that dispatch.
On the same day, the 20th July, 1838, a dispatch of a special
character was addressed by the same Cabinet Minister to the
Governor.
"By the terms of the communication the Governor is
informed, that the President, regarding the services rendered
by the claimant, etc., has directed the Minister to recommend
strongly to the Governor and the Departmental Assembly, that
one of the islands, such as the claimant might select, near where
he ought to reside with the troops under his command, be
assigned to him, before they proceed to grant and distribute
such lands under the general authority conferred by the
previous dispatch."
It is upon the following remark of Mr. Justice Clifford, upon
the facts stated by him above, that reliance is placed to show
that the case is decisive upon the question before this Court on
a colonization grant. "Beyond question," says Mr. Justice
Clifford, " the legal effect of that second communication was to
withdraw such one of the islands as should be selected by the
claimant from the previous order, and to direct that it be
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assigned to this claimant." And the following remark is also
relied on, which will be found on page 469: "Emanating as
the dispatch did from the Supreme power of the nation,
it operated of itself to adjudicate the title to the claimant,
leaving no discretion to be exercised by the authorities of the
Department."
On what was based the assertion of the doctrine the Court
had above enunciated ? Why, upon the decision made that
the granting of "islands" on the coast had never been claimed,
nor the power over them exercised by the authorities of the
Department; and that the power of granting "islands" was in
the Supreme Government, and to which the colonization laws
and regulations did not apply.
There is nothing in this case to justify the idea, that if the
Court had decided that those laws and regulations did apply
to islands, they would have decided as they have done; and by
so doing, thus impute to them a decision which would sanction
the repeal by the President of Mexico of all the colonization
laws by an act embodied into an order for the violation of them.
Such was not the action of the Court.
Having decided that the Colonization Laws and Eegulations
did not apply to " islands," they administered to them those
laws which in their opinion did.
Now, Spain was an absolute Government, but at the same
time a government of laws, and the absolutism of the monarch
consisted in the concentration in his person of all the powers of
Government, executive and legislative. He could, therefore,
change the law at pleasure, but while the law continued in
force, he was as much bound by it as was his subject ; and any
act done by him in contravention of existing laws should be
disregarded by the Judiciary.
By one of the decrees made as early as the year 1369, it
was provided : "Royal Letters or Warrants that may be granted
contrary to law or contrary to our judicial system, invalid
and not to be executed."
This is the caption of the decree which was issued by Henry
II, at Tors. The decree itself provides, " That sometimes it
happens, that by personal importunities, or in some other
manner, we grant Eoyal Letters or Warrants contrary to law
or contrary to our judicial system, by the present decree we
ordain that such Eoyal Letters or "Warrants shall be of no
value, and shall not be executed, although they may contain a
clause that they may be complied with, notwithstanding any
privilege, order, or ordinance to the contrary."
—
Novisima
Itecopilacion, Book III, Law 11.
In the year 1448. John II, at Valladolid, issued a decree
with the following caption
:
"Eoyal orders to dispossess any person of his property,
without being first heard and sentenced, invalid and not to be
executed." This is the caption.
The Decree itself prescribes : " If it shall happen that we
have given, or shall give any Eoyal Letter that any be dispos-
sessed of his property, or public office, and should it be given
to others, it is our will and command that such letters may be
respected, but not to be executed ; and as it is never to be
understood that we take property from any person without
being first notified and sentenced, and care must be taken that
the laws of the kingdom must be complied with in all such cases,
and the same to be strictly observed in every particular as
they are written, etc. ***** But if any one in a
public office commits any notorious malpractice, the same being
certified up to us, the letters we thereupon may give, we com-
mand they shall be complied with."
—
Ibid, Book III, Title IY,
Law VI.
To repeal a system of laws and regulations made under them,
which have prevailed for a series of years " in writing," and
have become a rule of property in the acquisition of it, from
the Government, without any legitimate exercise of the right
of previous repeal, is not a principle to be recognized by this
Court as existing in a government of laws, unless the appellate
tribunal shall so decide. This we do not consider that Court
has yet done. In the case cited as controlling this ; they have
decided that the Colonization Law of 1824, and the Eegu-
lations of 1828, " did not apply to islands," and this is all they
have decided. We return now to what is called the grant.
" If this grant is anything that passes title, it is a colonization
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grant." Such a one the petitioner applied for in terms, " as
a colonist." Such an one, the President, therefore, in the
" acuerdo " granted, when he directed, with respect to the land,
" let the corresponding order issue to the Minister of Exterior
Eelations for the corresponding measures of his office, with the
understanding that the Supreme Government accedes to the
petition."
Mr. Becerra, the Minister of Justice, tells the President of
the Junta de Fomento what kind of grant it was, if we did not
learn it from the eighth proposition of Castillero, and the fact
displayed on the marginal title by the direction of the Presi-
dent, that the grant to become one must take the course that
all colonization grants of lands must take to be valid; that is,
must be made under the then existing laws.
Mr. Becerra, in his communication of 20th May, 1846, to Cas-
tillo Lanzas, transcribes for the latter a copy of foregoing letter
he had written on same date to the President of the "Junta"
to the end " with respect to the petition of Senor Castillero, to
which His Excellency the President ad interim has thought
proper to accede, that there be granted to him, as a colonist, two
square leagues upon the land of his mining possession. Your
Excellency will be pleased to issue the orders accordingly."
Lanzas addresses in Mexico, in obedience to foregoing
orders, a communication to the Governor of the Department of
California, and concludes his letter in these words : " wherefore
I transcribe this letter [the copy of which he had received from
Mr. Becerra, the Minister of Justice] to your Excellenc}', in
order that under what is prescribed by the laws and dispositions
upon colonization, you may put Senor Castillero in possession
of the two square leagues which are mentioned."
Now, this order for two leagues, from the President down
to the last functionary, had been treated as a coloniza-
tion grant, and none other can it be considered ; as such it
must have applied to it the laws and regulations which govern
such, or it is invalid to pass title.
This Castillo Lanzas dispatch was issued, as we have seen,
on the 23d May, 1846, in Mexico, so short a time before the
day when, by the decision of the highest judicial tribunal in
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our country, the power of the Government of Mexico to alien-
ate any of its public domain had ceased to exist (23 How. 321).
There could not have been a sufficient time within which to
place Castillero in possession " in conformity with the laws
and dispositions upon colonization."
The condition of California is portrayed by James Alexan-
der Forbes at the time he held an interest in the claim in this
case, and was on friendly terms with his associates, in his
letter of the 5th May, 1847 : " This Departmental Government
[he writes to Alexander Forbes] is completely l acefaIo /' that
is to say, it has no Mexican head, or Governor ; in conse-
quence of which, the possession of the two sitios, ordered by
the dispatch of Senor Castillo Lanzas, has not been obtained,
nor cannot be obtained, nor even mentioned without imminent
risk of opposition on the part of the American Government in
this Department."—Trans. 843.
And yet the Government made as much speed as it well
could do. On the 20th May, 1846, the alleged grant was made;
on the same day it was transmitted by the Minister of Justice,
Mr. Becerra, to the Minister of Exterior Relations, and the
dispatch drafted in less than three days from the date of the
alleged grant. All was vain ; the Government found she had
undertaken to alienate a large body of land, the possession of
which she could not deliver under either the laws of poloniza-
tion or any other.
That the Lanzas dispatch is no grant—that the Supreme
Court has confirmed no one claim under what purported on its
face to be a colonization grant—and no grant was given, where
not a single provision of the law or regulations on colonization
had ever been complied with—this Court has been unable to
find
;
and if it existed, the learning and untiring research of
the numerous counsel in this case would have detected such.
In the case of The United States vs. Osio, and of The United
States vs. Castillero, both claimants had grants from the Gov-
ernor. The title of the claimant in the latter case is thus de-
scribed by the Judge who delivered the opinion : " All of the
documentary evidences of title produced in the case are duly
certified copies of originals found in the Mexican Archives, as
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appears by the certificate of the Surveyor-General, which
makes a part of the record. * * They consist of a special
dispatch from the Minister of the Interior of Mexico addressed
to Governor Alvarado, the petition of the claimant for the
same, and the original grant to the petitioner, signed by the
Governor, and countersigned by the Secretary of State of the
Department." The grant was made by the Governor in 18S9.
The case of the United States vs. Osio was rejected, mainly
on the ground that the granting power was not exercised in
strict conformity to the general dispatch from the General
Government under which he acted.
The Castillero case was decided in favor of the claimant, on
the ground that the Governor acted in strict conformity with
the special dispatch on which he based his grant.
They gave precedence in both cases to the action of the
Supreme Government in the granting of " islands " over the
Departmental Governors, as the colonization law and regula-
tions did not apply to them.
We cannot consider The United States vs. Castillero cited as
controlling this case. There are some curious features here,
apart from those already alluded to. Considering this docu-
ment in any light, it must be regarded as 'inchoate and imper-
fect. It left the President's hands in a direction given to all
colonization grants.
The Secretary of Foreign Eelations drafted the order to the
Governor of California, and closed his communication with
these words : " Wherefore I transcribe to your Excellency, in
order that in conformity with what is prescribed by the laws
and dispositions upon colonization, you may put Senor Cas-
tillero in possession of the two square leagues mentioned."
This seems to be plain enough. If the land is not found,
and cannot be delivered—if the condition of the country is
such that the grantor has lost the power of consummating
the contract and delivering the land—it is difficult to perceive
how either equitable or legal principles interpose to demand
relief in equity in a case where such claim is not legal.
By the insertion by Mr. Becerra, the Minister of Justice, in
his letters of the action of the President, we find the land
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located by Mr. Becerra on the mining possession of Castillero.
As the mine is described in the act of possession as situated on
the rancho of the retired sergeant Jose Reyes Berreyesa, it follows
that the location of two square leagues upon the lands of Cas-
tillero's mining possession must inj uriously affect the rights of.
a part at least of another man's land for the use of that other.
While we admit the power of the Supreme Government to
take the land of one and give it to another, under the laws of
Spain and Mexico, for mining purposes, and on the terms they
prescribe, we cannot acquiesce in its power to take from its
owner his lands for any purpose not authorized by law.
This Court have decided in this case, that the three thousand
varas granted by the Alcalde to Castillero, was an unwarrant-
able exercise of authority on the part of the Alcalde. We
regarded, however, the merits of the claimant as both discov-
erer of a mine of quicksilver, and as working it in copartner-
ship
;
and the Court so considering, concluded to award him
the highest number of "pertenencias" allowed to any discoverer
and partner in working a mine.
The "pertenencias" as to mines, are regulated by a separate
body of laws, and the Court has awarded the claimant the
highest number that those laws concede.
It considers, therefore, that it has gone as far as any equity
demands in such a case.
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The proceedings in this case were supplementary to final
decree, and arose under the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of The United States v. Fossat, 21 How. 445, in which
the Supreme Court determined that the power of the District
Court over the cause, under the Acts of Congress, does not
terminate until the issue of a patent, conformably to the de-
cree.
The case was argued on the part of the United States by
Mr. Edmund Randolph, and on the part of the claimants by
Mr. R. Aug. Thompson and Mr. John J. Williams ; and the
discussion, generally, was participated in by many other mem-
bers of the bar. The argument was made before both Judges.
Hoffman, District Judge:
A decree having been entered at a former term, confirming
the claim in this case according to the boundaries mentioned in
the grant, the appeal therefrom was, by consent of the District
Attorney, acting under the instructions of the Attorney-Gen^
eral, dismissed. A motion is now made that the survey be
brought into court to be examined and passed upon, and that
a final decree be entered confirming to the claimants the lands
so surveyed. This motion is made that the court may exercise
the jurisdiction which, by the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of The United States v. Fo&sat, (21 Howard,
p. 445,) it is supposed to possess.
As the same proceeding may be taken in the case of every
claim confirmed by this court, and as the jurisdiction the court
is invited to exercise is one it was not by any one suspected to
possess until the decision referred to appeared,, an argument on
the point was called for, in the hope that on a full discussion
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some of the difficulties and embarrassments which were felt on
all sides to surround the subject might be removed.
It would be idle to conceal the fact that the questions pre-
sented and the doubts raised by the recent decision of the Su-
preme Court have been found, by this court and the counsel
engaged in these cases, in the highest degree perplexing and
embarrassing. No construction of the opinion of the Supreme
Court was suggested by which all the difficulties could be ob-
viated, or objections answered.
But, as the latest decision of the Supreme Court on a class
of cases to us, in California, of vital importance, it is the duty
of this court to endeavor to ascertain its true interpretation and
the principles it establishes, and to adopt those principles in all
cases to which they are applicable—without pretending to
judge of their correctness, or to inquire, except in order to ar-
rive at its meaning, how far previous decisions of the same
court have been followed or overruled.
A brief statement of the case of The United States v. Fossat,
as it was presented to the Supreme Court, is necessary to a
correct understanding of its recent decision.
The original decree of this court confirmed the claim to land
within four external boundaries mentioned in the decree.
Three, only, of these boundaries were designated in the grant,
but it appeared to this court that the fourth, or northern boun-
dary, the existence and location of which was not disputed,
was sufficiently indicated by the petition and the diseno, to both
of which the grant referred, as well as by the name {Capitancilr
los) of the land granted. The land within these boundaries
was found to exceed, by a fraction, the quantity of one square
league. But as that quantity was described in the grant as
'? one league of the larger size, a little more or less, as is explain-
ed by the map accompanying the espediente" and as the Su-
preme Court in the case of The United States v. Sutherland has
declared, " that in Mexican grants a square league seems to
have been the only limit of estimating the superficies of land,"
and that " if ' more or less ' was intended in the grant it was
carefully stated," it seemed to this court that the whole land
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within the boundaries, and including an excess of a fractional
part of the unit of measurement, might reasonably be consid-
ered as intended to be conveyed by a grant which described
the quantity as " one league, a little more or less."
The Supreme Court, however, decided these views to be
erroneous, and held that as only three boundaries were men-
tioned in the grant, the fourth must be run for quantity, " which
was the only criterion for determining that boundary furnished
by the grant; " that the words " more or less " must be disre-
garded, and the precise quantity of one league be considered to
be clearly expressed ; that "if the limitation of the quantity
had not been so explicitly declared " it might have been proper
to ascertain the fourth boundary by referring to the petition,
the diseno, and to evidence, to ascertain what land was included
in and known by the name of Capitancillos, but that no such
reference or inquiries were admissible in that case, as the grant
was free from ambiguity or uncertainty.
The Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the claim "for one
league of land, to be taken within the southern, western and
eastern boundaries designated in the grant, to be located at
the election of the grantee or his assigns, under the restrictions
established for the location and survey of private land claims
in California by the executive department of the Government."
It further ordered that the " external boundaries designated in
the grant may be declared by the District Court from the evi-
dence on file and such other evidence as may be produced be-
fore it." (20 How. p. 427.)
The duty thus imposed upon it, this court thereupon pro-
ceeded to discharge. It was not suspected by the court, or
suggested by any of the counsel, that that duty extended fur-
ther than to " declare the three external boundaries mentioned
in the grant," i. e. to designate them, unmistakeably, in its de-
cree, and to decide the vexed and only disputed question in
the case, viz: whether the southern boundary was the ridge
known as the lomas bajas, or the sierra behind it.
The fourth boundary was, by the decision of the Supreme
Court, to be determined by quantity alone ; nor was this court
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required to declare it, for it was directed to declare only " the
external boundaries designated in the grant, within which the
land confirmed was to be located at the election of the grantee
or his assigns, under the restrictions established by the execu-
tive department of the Government."
A decree was accordingly made by this court, in which the
three external boundaries mentioned in the grant were ' : de-
clared " and described with as much precision as was possible
without a survey; and the only disputed question in the cause,
as to what was the southern boundary, (viz. : the lomas bajas,
or the main sierra), was elaborately discussed and decided.
An appeal from this decree having been taken to the Su-
preme Court, it was dismissed as "improvidently taken and al-
lowed." In its opinion, the court considers at large the nature
and extent of the jurisdiction conferred on the District Court
by the Act of March 3, 1851, and it decides that it possesses
the power to inquire into and decide all questions of extent,
locality, quantity, boundary, and legal operation which may
arise in the cause. It further decides that as under the Acts
of 1824 and 1828, it was the duty of the Surveyor to fulfill
the decree of the court, and the court had power to enforce the
discharge of that duty, so, under the Act of 1851, the duties
of the Surveyor begin under the same conditions, and the
power of the District Court over the cause ' does not terminate
until the issue of the patent conformably to its decree."
It would seem that the right and the duty of the District
Court to control and correct surveys by the Surveyor-General,
in all cases, could not be more explicitly declared.
But the Supreme Court goes further. The appeal was dis-
missed because this Court had not entered a final decree. And
this court is directed to " ascertain the external lines of the
land confirmed, and to enter a, final decree of confirmation of
that land." This direction, when taken in connection with the
previous remarks of the court as to the power and duty of the
District Court with respect to surveys, and also with the fact
that this court had already declared the boundaries with as
much precision as was practicable without a survey, can only
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mean that it must direct a survey to be made, and that such
survey, when approved, must be embodied in a final decree of
confirmation.
The decision of the Supreme Court is not based on the
ground that this court had failed to execute any special man-
date directed to it ; for, as before stated, this court had been
merely directed to declare " the external boundaries," not of
the land confirmed but, " designated in the grant, within which
the land was to be located at the election of the grantee or his
assigns, under the restrictions established by the executive
department of this Government."
As the three boundaries mentioned in the grant were not
those of the land confirmed, but of the tract within which the
one league confirmed was to be taken at the election of the
grantee, subject to executive restrictions ; and as this court
was directed to declare only those three boundaries, it is clear
that it performed all the duties enjoined by the Supreme Court,
and that the case was not remanded because the court had
failed fully to comply with the previous mandate of the Su-
preme Court. This fact is, by the Supreme Court itself, admit-
ted in its recent decision. " The District Court," it states, " in
conformity with the directions of the decree, declared the external
lines on three sides of the tract claimed, leaving the other line
to be completed by a survey to be made." (21 How. p. 447.)
The defect in the decree of this court must have been other
than a non-conformity with the mandate of the Supreme Court.
I have been unable to give any other construction to the opin-
ion referred to than that this court, after declaring the three
boundaries within which the league confirmed was to be taken,
at the election of the grantee, and after the grantee had made
his election, subject to executive restrictions, should have
caused or permitted a survey to be made, and should have, by
its final decree, confirmed the land so surveyed to the claim-
ant.
Such being the clear purport of the decision, with regard to
the case before the court, we are next to inquire to what extent
the principles laid down are to be applied to the other cases.
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The view generally taken by the bar regards the decision as
laying down new rules, by which all the land cases in Califor-
nia are to be governed ; and the case is considered to decide
that the decrees of this court, or of the Supreme Court, by
which the authenticity and general boundaries of a grant are
declared, are not "final decrees," but that the court is, in all
cases, bound to direct a survey to be made, or to revise and
pass upon surveys already made, and by its final decree to
adopt a survey, and declare with precision the boundaries of
the tract confirmed.
In support of this construction, reference is made to that por-
tion of the opinion of the Supreme Court which decides that
this court has, under the act of 1851, jurisdiction to determine
all questions of extent, locality, and boundary, as fully as it
was possessed by the courts under the laws of 1824 and 1828
;
to the declaration that the decrees of this court, hitherto sup-
posed to be " final," were not final decrees under the Judiciary
Act of 1789, and that the Supreme Court has entertained
appeals from them by " a relaxation of its rules," rendered
proper by the " peculiar nature of these cases ;" and to the order
at the close of the opinion that the appeal be dismissed as
improvidently allowed, and that this court " proceed to enter a
1
final decree ' of confirmation of the land confirmed."
If the language of the opinion of the Supreme Court be
alone considered, it is perhaps not easy to avoid giving to it this
construction. But the objections to it seem insurmountable.
The 13th section of the act of 1851 prescribes the duties of the
Surveyor-General with regard to private land claims in Califor-
nia. It is declared to be his duty to cause all private land
claims in California, which shall be finally confirmed, to be accu-
rately surveyed, and to furnish plats of the same," etc. It is
obvious, therefore, that the final decree of confirmation must
precede the survey, for, until the claim is finally confirmed,
the Surveyor is not required or authorized to act.
Again : The 10th section provides that in cases of appeals
from the decisions of the Board of Commissioners, the District
Court shall proceed to render judgment, etc., and shall, on
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application of the party against whom judgment is rendered,
grant an appeal to the Supreme Court, etc.
The authority to entertain such appeals is not explicitly
given to the Supreme Court, but it results, by necessary impli-
cation, from the provisions above cited, and from the allusion
in the 15th section to the "final decrees rendered by the said
Commissioners, or by the District or Supreme Courts of the Uni-
ted States." Unless, then, the decrees of this court which have
been appealed from were, in some sense, "final decrees," it
is not easy to perceive how the Supreme Court, by any relax-
ation of its rules, or from considerations of convenience, could
have had jurisdiction to review them on appeal.
The fact that the Supreme Court has heretofore entertained,
and will hereafter entertain, appeals from such decrees, must
therefore be taken as proof that they regard those judgments
and decrees as " final," and appealable under the act of 1851
;
though it appears that they are not final decrees under the
judiciary act of 1789.
It is also evident that such decrees must be final decrees of
confirmation, and the lands confirmed must be deemed " finally
confirmed " within the meaning of the 13th section, for other-
wise the Surveyor would have no authority, nor could he be
required, under the provisions of that section, to survey them.
A contrary construction would lead to the most important
and perhaps disastrous consequences.
It is well known that both the Boards of Commissioners, as
well as both the District Courts of this State, in common
with all the gentlemen of the bar, have hitherto regarded the
decrees by which the authenticity and validity, and the gen-
eral boundaries of a claim have been declared, as " final
decrees " of confirmation, under which the survey was to be
made and a patent issued. In no case has a survey first been
made and adopted or embodied in any subsequent final decree
of confirmation.
In pursuance of such decrees, or similar ones, by the
Supreme Court, many patents have issued.
If, then, it should be held that none of those decrees were
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final, and that the lands confirmed by them were not " finally
confirmed," in the sense of the act of 1851, it might follow-
that the patents have been irregularly issued, and are void as
having been issued without authority of law.
There also may be cases in which no appeal has been taken
from the decision of the Board to the District Court, or in
which such appeals have been dismissed. If, then, the deci-
sions of the Board are not final decisions, or decrees, it is diffi-
cult to perceive how final decrees in those cases can be made.
For the Board has ceased to exist, and the District Court may
never have acquired jurisdiction over the cause. I am persua-
ded that a construction of the opinion of the Supreme Court
involving such grave consequences, ought, if possible, to be
rejected.
By referring to the cases cited by the Supreme Court in its
opinion (viz: those of Mitchell, 15 Pet. 52, and ex parte Sibbald,
12 Pet. 488,) as instances where the court directed, by its man-
date, certain lands to be surveyed, and "maintained and de-
clared the duty of the Surveyors to fulfill the decree of the
court," it will be found that the decrees of the Supreme Court,
requiring those duties to be performed, are expressly called, by
the court itself, its "final decrees."
In Mitchell's case, the language of the court is—"on con-
sideration whereof, this court is of opinion that the title of the
petitioner, etc., is valid by the laws of nations, etc., and do fi-
nally order, decree, determine, and adjudge accordingly ; and
this court doth in like manner, order, adjudge, determine,
and decree, that the title of the petitioner is valid to so much
of a certain other tract as shall not be included in an exception
hereinafter made ; " and it proceeds to give particular direc-
tions for ascertaining the land so excepted.
In Sibbald's case, after declaring the duty of the Surveyor to
fulfill the decree of the court, it orders " that the Clerk of this
court make out a certificate of the final decree heretofore ren-
dered in the case of The United States v. Sibbald; and, also, a
mandate according to such final decree, the opinion of the court
in that case and on these petitions." (12 Pet. 495.)
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It appears, therefore, that the decrees of the Supreme Court
by which the general validity of the claims in those cases was
ascertained, and by which directions for a survey of certain
tracts were given, were not only regarded by the court but in
terms declared to be final decrees ; although some proceedings
subsequent to and in execution of the mandates were required
to be had by the inferior court and by the Surveyor,—the lat-
ter of whom, it may be remarked, was by the sixth section of
the Act of 1824, required to make a survey after a final decis-
ion in favor of a claimant.
That the decrees under which the Surveyor, by the Act of
1851, was required to survey, were not by the Legislature in-
tended to contain or embody a precise description of the land,
as ascertained by a previous survey, is further evident from the
fact that the same section confers upon the Surveyor-General a
certain provisional and quasi judicial authority to fix and set-
tle disputed boundaries between adjoining ranchos.
But if the final decree of this court, under and in obedience
to which he acts, has already fixed with precision every line
of the claim which is confirmed, the Surveyor can never exer-
cise the authority which the law-makers have been at pains to
confer.
It would seem clear, that the statute contemplated that the
claim might be finally confirmed, and the Surveyor called up-
on to survey it under a decree affirming its validity and fixing
its general boundaries or those of the tract out of which the
quantity confirmed should be taken, thus leaving to the Sur-
veyor the opportunity to exercise the authority with respect
to interfering claims or boundaries which the law-makers
intrusted to him.
On the whole, I incline to the opinion, that the decision of
the Supreme Court ought not to be construed as determining
that none of the decrees heretofore rendered by the Boards, the
District Courts, and by itself, are final decrees ; and that final
decrees, defining with precision the boundaries of the land,
must in all cases be entered.
I am aware that this view is apparently in conflict with some
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expressions in the opinion ; but it has seemed less open to ob-
jections than the other construction suggested—to adopt which
would involve as consequences
:
1. That no final decree has ever yet been made in any land
case.
2. That the survey is to be made by the Surveyor-General
of claims no? finally confirmed, but which are finally confirmed
only after survey ; when the language of the statute is express,
that the claims to be surveyed by him are those which shall be
" finally confirmed."
3. It would leave the regularity and even the validity of all
patents, heretofore issued, open to grave doubts.
4. It requires us to suppose that the Supreme Court have
treated as final, and therefore appealable, decrees which were
not final—and this by a relaxation of their rules, which, as the
law only gives to that court jurisdiction of appeals from final
decrees, it cannot be supposed that they would have felt them-
selves at liberty to make.
Assuming, then, that the decrees of this court, heretofore
rendered, are to be deemed " final," in such a sense as that an
appeal from them can be taken, and that the Surveyor-Greneral,
under the thirteenth section of the Act of 1851, may be re-
quired to survey them, we are next to inquire what further
jurisdiction over the case this court is, by the opinion under
examination, declared to possess.
That the case of Fossat was remanded in order that a survey
might be made, and a decree embodying such approved survey
entered, is clear.
It may be said, however, that such a proceeding is merely
decided to be necessary in that particular case—and that it
should not be taken except in cases precisely similar to that of
Fossat, viz : where the question of boundary or location has
been raised and decided in the regular course of the suit, and
where the Supreme Court has remanded the cause, in order
that the location might be fixed. But this interpretation of
the opinion is inadmissible.
It has already been shown that this court had performed
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every duty required of it by the previous decision of the for-
mer court, and that the cause was not remanded because this
court had failed to fulfill the previous mandate in the case.
That the Supreme Court have, in their opinion, laid down
principles generally applicable to all cases, I think, is evident.
In the first place, they discuss and decide the point whether
this court has, by the Act of 1851, any authority to decide
questions of extent, location, and boundary. Such questions
they declare may be "essential in determining the validity of
a claim,"—and the power to decide upon "validity" involves
the power to decide upon all questions of boundary.
Secondly. In answer to the objections that this court has no
means to ascertain the specific boundaries of a confirmed claim,
and no power to enforce the execution of its decree, the Su-
preme Court decides that this court has such power and that it
is the duty of the Surveyor to fulfill the decree of the court
;
and the court declares, "that the power of the District Court
over the cause does not terminate until the issue of a patent
conformably to its decree."
I am aware that in a previous opinion, delivered in the same
case, (20 How. 425,) the same court declared that "the jurisdic-
tion of the Board of Commissioners in the first instance, and
the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of the United States,
are limited to the making of decisions on the validity of the
claim, 'preliminary to its location and survey by the Surveyor- Gen-
eral of California, acting under the laws of the United States."
No mode of reconciling this declaration with any construc-
tion of the last decision in the case of Fossat, was suggested
at the bar or has occurred to either of the Judges. It must,
therefore, be treated as overruled by the later case.
As then, "the power of this court over the cause does not
terminate until the issue of a patent conformably to its decree,"
and as it has jurisdiction to determine all questions of extent,
location, and boundary which may arise, it is the duty of the
court to exert this power, and to exercise the jurisdiction at the
instance of a suitor.
I therefore think, that in all cases where a decree of confir-
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mation lias been entered, and a survey under it has been made,
on which a patent is about to issue, which survey is objected
to as erroneous, it is the duty of the court to direct the survey
to be returned to it, that it may hear and determine the ques-
tions of location and boundary which may be raised.
In coming to this conclusion, I have not overlooked the
great difficulties of reducing it to practice.
The first and most perplexing question is that of parties.
By whom can objections to a survey be made? Every party
entitled to object to the survey must have a right to take testi-
mony in support of his objection, and a right to appeal from
the decision of this court to the Supreme Court.
It is, therefore, of the utmost consequence to determine who
are the proper parties to the proceeding.
At first blush, the answer might seem obvious, viz : That
the parties to a proceeding to correct a survey, are only the
original parties to the suit, viz : the United States and the
claimant. But the solution of the difficulty is by no means so
easy as it might appear. During the long period which has
elapsed since the claims were first filed before the Board, many
changes of interest have occurred. Sivppose, then, that the
original claimant has parted with all his interest, or it has been
sold on execution. He may have no motive to dispute any
location, however erroneous—and he may not be disposed to
allow the use of his name to the present owner. Cannot the
latter be heard to object to the location of what has become
his exclusive property ? Or suppose that the original claimant,
though really entitled to only two leagues to be taken from a
tract the boundaries of which contain four leagues, has, through
error or fraud, sold out four leagues to two purchasers—two
leagues to each. He, therefore, has ceased to have any interest
in the controversy. The real contest is between the purchasers,
each of whom desires that the patent may cover the land con-
veyed to himself. Is neither to be heard ? or only he who has
the good fortune to obtain the use of the name of the original
claimant. The United States may have no objection to the
survey. It will, therefore, be confirmed, unless objected to on
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the part of the claimant. Which of the parties, in the case
supposed, has the right to object? If both have, what limits
can be assigned to the rights of intervention ?—for in some
cases, the grantee may have sold to hundreds of purchasers.
. Again : If the right of both sub-grantees to be heard in the
case supposed be admitted, ought not persons so immediately
interested in the result of the inquiry to be heard, notwith-
standing that the original claimant may not have sold out his
entire interest ? The part retained by him may be so situated
that any possible location of the claim will include it. He has,
therefore, no interest to object—on the contrary, he desires a
patent to issue without delay. But the purchasers under him
have a direct and vital interest in obtaining a location such as
cover the tracts conveyed to them respectively. Is the court
to refuse to hear them ?
Again : Grants, in most instances, have as one or more of
their boundaries the lands of other parties. The court, in fix-
ing the location of rancho "A," necessarily determines one of
the boundaries of rancho "B," by which it is bounded.
Ought not the owner of the latter to be heard to show what
his boundary is ? If he is not, he is excluded on the ground
that the suit as to the boundaries of his neighbor determines
nothing as to his rights. The result might thus be, that when
the second rancho is before the court for location, the evidence
in that case would compel it to adopt a boundary line different
from that fixed in the first case.
If the second location were the correct one, the claimant in
the first case would lose his land. It would then be too late to
extend his lines in another direction so as to give him the
quantity mentioned in his grant.
But the boundaries of rancho " B," in the case supposed,
may involve an inquiry into the true location and boundaries
of rancho "C," and several other circumjacent tracts. How
then can the court, hearing each case separately, unassisted by
topographical maps, and unable, except in rare instances, to
visit the lands, hope to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion.
Again : Two or more grants are often made within the same
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general boundaries—an original, or first grant, and one or
more sobrante grants. Ought not both grantees to be heard,
that the court may give, if possible, such a location to both as
will satisfy the claims of each ?
If all these parties have the right to appear, take testimony,
and to appeal, it may reasonably be apprehended that the liti-
gation upon which we are entering will be far more protracted
than that which has already occurred respecting the validity of
the claims.
If these parties are excluded how can justice be done?
When we consider the immense interests involved in the loca-
tion of grants, the vague and indeterminate character of the
boundaries mentioned in the grants and delineated on the
disenos, the opportunity afforded for plausible objections to any
location which can be made, and how impracticable it is for a
court to learn through depositions the natural features of a
country it has never seen, and of which no topographical map
is exhibited, and therefore how difficult it will be for it to ren-
der any decision in which the parties will acquiesce, or which
will be satisfactory to itself, it may well be doubted whether
the evident anticipation of the Supreme Court that few cases
will re-appear before it on appeal will be realized.
Before dismissing this subject a further observation may be
made. The settlers claiming to hold under the United States
are heard, if at all, through the District Attorney. In many
cases they may have just objections to a location which has
been made so as to improperly include their claims. In many
cases they may object to any location in order that the issue of
a patent may be postponed, and that they may continue to
enjoy the use of the land.
The number of locations to be passed upon may be some
hundreds. The District Attorney, like the court, is unac-
quainted with the topography of the country. How can he
determine, when objections supported by affidavits are pre-
sented to him, which he ought to urge in the name of the
United States, and which he ought to refuse to make as vexa-
tious and intended for delay ? May he not be driven to adopt
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the rule to make objections which seem plausible and are sup-
ported by an appearance of proofs ? In such case it is to be
feared that the jurisdiction the court is about to exercise may
be as often the means of delaying indefinitely the issue of a
patent to a rightful claimant, and of plunging him into a new
and protracted litigation, as of correcting errors of the Sur-
veyor-General in locating claims.
For these reasons I would gladly have declined the jurisdic-
tion I am urged to assume. For, notwithstanding the almost
unanimous opinion of the bar to the contrary, it has appeared
to me that the evil results of its exercise may outweigh the
good.
Under the recent decision of the Supreme Court I have not
felt at liberty to do so.
With regard to the particular case more immediately under
consideration, it follows, from what has been said, that this
court cannot now proceed to examine the survey which has
been made. The court, as already stated, regards the decree
heretofore made asfinal, in a sense to authorize an appeal from
it, or a survey of the lands as finally confirmed. It is not,
however, exhaustive of its power over the case, for that does
not terminate until the issue of a patent. The court does not
therefore proceed, as of course, to enter a decree for the land
as surveyed, which would be necessary if the decree heretofore
made were only interlocutory.
But it will hear objections to the survey. ISTone are made
in this case. The survey originally made is satisfactory to the
parties now moving to bring it before the court. That survey
has been disapproved at Washington by the executive officers
of the government and a new one directed to be made. When
that shall have been done the parties now moving may make
jj
their objections and bring the questions involved betbre the
court.
Oct. 4, 1859.
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Note.—Since the foregoing decision was rendered, Judge
Hoffman has decided (in the case of The United /States v. John
JBidwell, claiming the Eancho "Arroyo Chico,") upon the rights
of settlers with respect to their standing in court. Judge
Hoffman says
:
" In this, as in all other cases, all persons who allege that any of the
land included in a survey of a rancho is public land of the United
States, must urge their objections in the name of the United States
and through the District Attorney. To that officer is committed the
duty of seeing that no public land is improperly embraced within a
survey of a private claim. When he has no objections to interpose,
the settler cannot be permitted to intervene in the proceeding. When
he settled upon that land, and, notwithstanding that it was claimed
under a Mexican title, chose to assume it to be public land, he was
aware that the United States would assert her rights through her pro-
per officers, and that the judgment of the courts, declaring that the i
land was not public but private land, would be final and conclusive on i
the rights of the United States and all claiming under them.
When, therefore, the United States, through her officers, admits that i
the survey is properly made, or declines to make objections to it, then :
no settler can be heard to contest it."
7ARGUMENTS
ON PART OF THE GOVERNMENT
AND
OPINION
IN
LIMANTOUR CASE,
No 548.
5wra of Confirmation in \\z f&eMo Case Ha. 280.
CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, /
vs. >
THE UNITED STATES, i
In this case, on hearing the proofs and allegations, it is adjudged by the Commis-
sion that the claim of the Petitioner is valid, and it is therefore decreed that the same
be confirmed.
The land of which confirmation is made is that known by the name of the Pueblo
Lands of San Francisco, and is bounded as follows : Beginning at the little cove to
the East of the Fort, and running across to the beach so as to leave the Fort and
Casamata to the North ; thence running along the beach to Point Lobos, on its
Southern part; thence, a straight line the summit of the Devisadero—continuing
said line to the East as far as the Punta del Rincon, including the Canutales, and El
Gentil, the said line will terminate within the Bay of the Mission of Dolores, the
estuary of which will form a natural boundary between the Municipal Jurisdiction of
that Pueblo and the said Mission of Dolores. Thence along the shore cf the Bay of
San Francisco, as it existed in the year 1884, to the point of beginning. For a more
particular description, reference to be had to the copy of the Order, from Governor
Jose Figueroa to Gen. Mariano G. Vallejo, dated Monterey, November 4, 1834,
marked " Exhibit No. 18 to the Deposition of M. G. Vallejo, taken in No. 280,
H. I. T." and now on file among the papers in the case.
(Signed) ALPHEUS FELCH,
R. AUG. THOMPSON,
S. B. FARWELL,
Commissioners.
A true and correct copy of the original on file in this office ; which I attest.
GEO FISHER,
Secretary U. S. Land Commission in California.
San Francisco, December 21, 1854.
THE
OFFICIAL ARGUMENT
AGAINST THE
LIMANTOUR CLAIM.
LOUIS BLANDING, U. S. Associate Law Agent.
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THE
OFFICIAL AKGUMENT
AGAINST THE
LIMANTOUR CLAIM.
The following is the Brief of Louis Blanding,
Associate Law Agent of the United States in the
case No. 548 of Jose Y. Limantour vs. the United
States, for certain lands in and near the city of San
Francisco
:
On the part of the Government it is maintained,
in the first place, that this Gra?it is not genuine.
We are aware of the strength of a title whose mu-
niments are produced, apparently perfect in all their
parts, and bearing the signatures of superior officers,
which have been proved on the record of the case,
we are aware of the strong presumption in favor
of such a title ; but we are equally aware of the legal
truth that this presumption is not conclusive, but
open to rebuttal. If the chain of circumstances in
this case is perfect in its links, and these are connect-
ed by the proofs, if, in support of this, it is shown
that the action of these superior officers (Micheltorrena
and Bocanegra,) admitting their signatures to be gen-
uine for the sake of the argument, does not necessa-
rily fix the genuineness of the grant, but is consis-
tent with the fraud of the case, or the presumption of
fraud, as shown by the circumstances ; then we in-
sist that the better case has been made out for the
Government.
The circumstantial evidence for the claimant is
negative in its character, and conflicting in its detail.
On the part of the Government this evidence is posi-
tive and harmonious with itself. The evidence for
the claim has been impeached in material points by
witnesses whose character has not and cannot be
successfully assailed. The evidence for the U. S.
stands without impeachment, and being to matter of
vital bearing upon the ease, as we shall hereafter
show, we have entire confidence in its weight.
"We trust that we shall show that the evidence of
the claimant can apply to any other case as well as
to this, that his chain of circumstances does not and
cannot be made to compass about this particular case
;
but that the case stands solely upon the presumption
derived from these signatures of Bocanegra and Mi-
cheltorrena, which we will meet by presumptions of
as high if not higher a nature.
We will first consider the evidence of the com-
plaint.
On the 8th of January, 1843, Governor Michel-
torrena wrote to the claimant requesting his aid by
advances of money and merchandise, which he then
had on board his vessel, lying then no doubt, at San
Pedro, the port of Los Angeles, distant about twenty-
five or thirty miles.
The next date in the transaction is the 10th of Jan-
uary, on which Limantour formally petitions the
Governor for two tracts of land, stating first, the
consideration and inducement to the same, that he
will give a receipt for $4,000, on account of a
larger sum due him by the Government.
He then describes the land sought, with great ac »
curacy by the points of the compass, and mentions
in the most familiar manner certain localities and
natural boundaries. It has not been shown that
prior to this time Limautour had held any intercourse
or had any dealings with the Governor, and the let-
ter of the Governor shows that the suggestion of ob-
taining land for money and merchandise came from
himself, for the first time at this date, the 8 th Janua-
ry, 1843. The parties were, therefore, at this time,
strangers to each other, and had transacted no busi-
ness of this kind. Thus, in two days time, the 9th
and 10th Jan., we find Limantour acceding to the
proposition of the Governor, a stranger to him, and
in difficulty,—advancing money and goods at a dis-
tance of twenty-five or thirty miles, and for this pur-
pose he must have, in this time, transported and de-
livered them ; negotiated and completed his nego-
tiations with Micheltorrena, and received drafts onMa-
zatlan for some considerable but uncertain amount,
for the testimory of Abrego is far from being defi-
nite, being based upon his memory alone, and is
open to formal objection which is made at this time,
on the ground that the accounts of which he speaks
)
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were hot produced, nor any reason given to excuse
the failure to produce them or a certified copy at
least.
Not only this, but in this same contracted period
of two days, we find Limantour estimating the bal-
ance due him, and then framing a petition for land,
with the most accurate description of two distinct
tracts. We say that from the nature of the case and
the conditions of things, at this time and place, the
transaction, as shown upon the papers, is in the high-
est degree improbable, and is not explained by say-
ing that Governor Micheltorrena had been delayed
three months on his march for want of these sup-
plies. It does not excuse or explain this unusual,
unnatural haste—and the witness Jimeno himself
answers ihis by informing us that Micheltorrena did
not reach Monterey till August, 1843, about six
months after this hurried transaction, to resume his
march.
On the 11th of January Micheltorrena refers the
petition to the " competent Justice" for a report, and
entitles this reference " Jurisdiction of San Francis-
co," and on the 14th January Jimeno, the Secretary
of State, refers it to Richardson as Captain of the
Port of San Francisco. The report of a competent
Justice on this matter has not been shown in any
way. Jimeno does not know what lands were peti-
tioned for—does not know that any grant was ever
made—does not know of what authority or officer he
asked information, or about what lands information
was asked. Now we insist that the conflict here is
entitled to weight. Jimeno refers the matter to a
Captain of the Port, who says himself that he was
only engaged in freighting and piloting vessels. He
was not the Justice. The testimony for the Govern-
ment shows that he was not even Captain of the Port
at that time, but that the Ensign Prado was then
Captain.
Micheltorrena entitled the reference, " Jurisdiction
of San Francisco," and on the 25th February,
at Los Angeles, ordered the title made out " the com-
petent justice," having taken all necessary steps, &c.
Now, who were these competent justices of the ju-
risdiction of San Francisco ? The Captain of the
Port ? whit had he to do with this matter, or what
could he know about it ? It may raise a presump-
tion where a paper is produced bearing the Govern-
or's signature, but we apprehend that when testimo-
ny unimpeached directly meets this presumption, it
must give way and yield to a conclusive positive
statement. Francisco Sanchez and Jesus Noe show
by their testimony that they were the Judges of the
" Jurisdiction of San Francisco" in 1842 and 1843
;
the public records show the same, and they both tes-
tify that they know nothing of this grant, and were
" never called upon to report or give information "
concerning it. Micheltorrena is made to say that the
matter was referred to the competent Justice, and that
this Justice reported in the matter. The competent
Justice appears in person, and under oath says that
the matter never was referred to him, and that he
never reported on it. This statement of the Govern-
or is the only positive evidence on the part of the
claimant on this point ; no witness knows anything
about it—Jimeno himself knows nothing. This point
is effectually met, and either discredits Micheltorrena
—or proves that his signatures of which many were
attached to blank documents, as the evidence shows,
"were used for fraudulent purposes, and that this is
one of them. It strikes us that this is just such an
error
—
just such an oversight as would be committed
by parties not experienced, but who were fully alive
to the necessity of having all the important steps and
formal parts of the documents in exact order and
place, when about to commit a fraud. It is true that
Richardson testifies that he made a report to the Gov-
ernor ; it is also true that the expediente, containing
all the other proceedings, does not contain this, nor
does the Secretary, Jimeno, or his clerk Arce, recol-
lect anything of it. And we observe here that the
testimony of Richardson is not entitled to the credit
or weight which the counsel for the claimant gives it.
On a close examination the witness is seen by his
own deposition, to have stood, both prior to and sub-
sequent to 1846, as late as 1852, in the relation of
debtor to Limantour, owing him a considerable sum
of money, and which was only paid in 1852, in Mex-
ico. This, standing by itself, might amount to little,
but observe the conflict in Richardson's testimony.
Limantour told him that " his documents were sub-
stantiated by the proof of signatures by the United
States Consul in the city of Mexico, or the United
States Minister." This was in Mexico, in June or
July, 1852. Now examine the date of this certificate
of the U. S. Consul in Mexico, and we find it to be
the 2d November, 1852, some three or four months
after Richardson had departed from the city of Mex-
ico. This is a distinct, positive statement of the wit-
ness, and discredits his entire story. It is no answer
to say that it is a mere mistake of time. This wit-
ness has been so accurate in his dated, md so ready
in his narrative that he cannot be charged with a
mistake ; his very accuracy now tells against him,
and the claimant's counsel cannot make him assume
one character at one time, then drop it and put on
another at will.
We can now see why it was necessary to make
Richardson a party in this matter of the report to the
Governor. It was necessary to have some competent
report as to the character and condition of the land, so
the reference is pretended to have been made to the
Captain of the Port, and Jimeno is made to order him
to join the Judge of the Jurisdiction with himself, in
the report (See Jimeno's order.) If he was so ac-
curate and regular in all his proceedings, why was
the omission to join the proper officer, and in fact,
the only proper officer in the report made ? These
officers, (Sanchez and Noe,) say they never heard,
even by report or reputation, ot the grant till 1852,
and moreover in commmon with Domingo Feliz, an-
other witness for the Government, testify that Li-
mantour told them that he asked for a grant of a lot
in 1844, a year subsequent to this pretended claim,
and that this lot was situated at the place called "Los
Canutales," about where Thomas Hayes lives, about
half way between this city and the Mission Dolores,
and which is clearly within the limits of the tract
claimed.
Thus they attempt to save appearances by referring
to the competent Justice, jointly with Richardson, the
Captain of the Port, as they claim. But when the
report is made, Richardson acts solely, and the Jus-
tice swears he knows nothing of it. If this act, as it
stands on the record, at the date it bears, was a gen-
uine act, of the importance attached to it—the action
of the proper officer would have been secured to it,
or at least he would have known of it, and in the ab-
sence of this, a presumption of bad faith arises, that
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Iras not been met and stands "unexplained. If this
report was made in good faith—was really made at
the date it bears, the officer who reported in all such
cases, we must conclude, would have reported in this
—if made fraudulently at a later time, this officer,
(the Justice,) would not have so reported, for Liman-
tour knew well that in 1844 lie confessed and ac-
knowledged to these officers that he had no such claim
—that he was glad that he had no land here, and that
his application for a lot had been refused. Recollect-
ing this, and knowing that these officers could not be
improperly controlled—and they are as yet unim-
peached—and we reach the strong presumption, if
not conclusion, that their omission to appear in the
proceeding on the report, was intentionally made
—
and this in fraud— else why fail to appear in a matter
properly and exclusively within their sphere of duty.
We next notice the alleged approval of the Su-
preme Government to this grant ; and on this point,
at the same sime that we assert that these signatures,
proved though they be, are not conclusive, we
maintain that too much has been done for the truth
of the case. The work has been overdone. The Su-
preme Government, not satisfied with the appro-
val made on the 18th April, 1843, in answer to the
memorial and petition for a particular tract, pro-
ceeds, on the 7th Get. 1843, to give, in advance, a
general approval and sanction to any and all future
grants. This is directed to the Governor of the Cal-
ifornias, and comes from the " Ministry of Foreign
Relations," &c. ; and yet no record is found of any of
these repeated approvals either in Mexico or Califor-
nia. This raises a presumption which, taken in con-
nection with the fact, that such paper as these pre-
tended approvals are written en, were in circulation
in California and in San Francisco at the time Li-
mantour was here, and was actually seen in the pos-
session of Limantour by the witness, Bowman,
takes away all force from this point as a conclusion,
and renders it, at most, merely presumptive and
open to inquiry and rebuttal.
It is strange how mysteriously and utterly all
record of this claim has disappeared, if it is genuine.
Even the certificate of Micheltorrena, made on the
25th December, 1843, to the second general approval
«f the Government, and countersigned by Jimeno,
and the
-original of which Micheltorrena says remains
in the archives, does not appear there.
Again, this last approval speaks of the property he
(Limantour) had acquired, and which had been re-
cognised by the Government. This appears certified
by Micheltorrena, and countersigned by Jimeno, and
yet in his testimony he knows nothing of it. He
takes part on paper in the transaction, his proceed-
ings are a material part of the res gestce, and yet
when sworn he knows nothing of it, not even from
Limantour himself.
Jimeno says he understood Limantour was apply-
ing or had petitioned for land—this was said in 18-53,
at which time Limantour had filed some six or seven
petitions before this Board. This is amply sufficient
to cast suspicion over the whole transaction, and we
leave it with the remark that having shown the grant
on its face to be merely presumptive ; that this pre-
sumption is directly met and overcome by the best
possible testimony, that cannot and has not been as-
sailed, and that is the testimony of the witnesses-
Green, Feliz, Francisco Sanchez, &c—who testify to
the admissions of the claimant himself, that he had
no land here, wanted none, and, subsequently, after
the claim had been made up, to his admission made
in confidence, that the claim was bad, but that it
could be carried through.
And here, in allusion to the testimony of Green, it
appears that Limantour himself apprehended the very
danger to his claim vhich has now arisen. He could
control all the points except the record, and, in con-
fidential communication with the witness, seems to
have feared the absence of this link, but intimated
that it could be supplied. How does the matter
stand on this point now, in connection with Gomez ?
He is made to find the expediente, by accident in
Monterey subsequent to this conversation of Green
with Limantour, and evidently with the purpose of
curing this defect.
Now, this document must have been either in the
possession of the claimant or in the charge of the offi-
cers who kept the archives prior to its pretended dis-
covery, for its loss has never been pretended.
That the claimant did not have it is evident, for he
would have produced it. The officers in charge of
these archives swore most positively it was not there
prior to this time, nor do they know when or how it
came there. The certified copy of the Index of all
Expedientes on file in the archives at Monterey, made
officially in 1851, by virtue of an act of the Legisla-
ture of the State of California, shows that this expe-
diente was not there at that time.
These archives were in the charge of officers whose
character has not been attempted to be assailed, and
yet Serrano, a witness for the claimant, remembers
that he saw this expediente in the archives in 184S
or 1S49.
If this is true, it is presumable that it remained
there.; but it did not remain there, for these officers
swear it never was there, until found.
This witness, who saw it only once, who had no
intimacy with Limantour, who considered the matter
of insignificant character, who had several papers in
his charge as well as this, but cannot describe them,
undertakes to give, after seven or eight years, a most
minute description of this expediente, the number of
leaves of paper, &c.
The testimony and character of Gomez can get no
support from this witness and we apprehend that the'
conclusion is fairly reached that the expediente was
placed in the archives by Gomez at the time he pre-
tends to have found it ; for if not, the testimony of
the officers who had charge of the archives must be
rejected. But if this conclusion is reached all the
force of this pretended discovery is gone, and the
presumption against the case for want of record
stands unimpaired.
Gomez says himself that it should have been ori-
ginally in the Secretary's office, yet Jimeno, the Sec-
retary, knows nothing of it.
Having now reviewed the evidence upon which the
claimant mainly relies, we will now briefly state the
grounds of presumption on the part of the United
States that go to meet and rebut the presumptive
claim of the petitioner, for we insist that he has
shown no stronger support than a mere presumption
in favor of his claim.
In the first place the evidence shows positively
that there is no record of this claim in the archives
of the General Government, nor in those of the Cap-
ital of California at the time of the alleged grant, nor
in those of the Jurisdiction of San Francisco where
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the land is situated, and in which the grants of lands
there situated, whether made by Governors, Prefects
or Alcaldes, were recorded.
Again, it is shown positively that Limantour, in
1844, denied that he had any land here, and asked
for a grant of a lot within the boundaries now
claimed.
Again, it is shown positively that he admitted to
one, whom he desired to make an accomplice, that his
claim was fraudulent but could be maintained.
Again, it is shown that he was connected with Au-
guste Jouan as his agent for the management of his
land affairs in California ; that while in this capacity
he had altered the dates of one of his grants, or that
Jouan had told him to alter the date to conform to
the other dates, and that Limantour had made or
caused to be made the suitable alteration, and this
alteration in the case of 549 has been identified and
thus sustains the statement of Jouan to Halleck and
Davidson.
It has also been positively shown that Limantour
was in possession of many blank copies of stamped
paper, with the signatures of Micheltorrena and Bo-
canegra upon them.
It has also been shown that there was no paper ha-
bilitated for the year 1843 in February of that year, at
which date the grant bears date, and upon which pa-
per it purports to have been made at this date, and
riiatthe archives of this Commission, although show-
ing grants for the year 1843, shows none upon paper
habilitated provisionally by the Maritime Custom
House of the port of Monterey prior to April of this
year, and thus is the testimony of Larkin and Diaz
on this point sustained.
This point is also sustained by an examination of
the archives ofthe Surveyor General's Office, and the
testimony of the witness Hopkins.
There is also a strong conclusive presumption ari-
sing against this claim from the confirmation of this
Board of the two claims No. 280 and 81. The claim
81 has the same northern boundary with this claim,
viz : the southern line of Yerba Buena, and if the
grant in 81 is good, and the Board have so held, then
.this land was vacant in 1846—that is, held b}r no
grant nor occupied in 1843, the date of this pretended
grant.
Again the tract here claimed cannot be the tract in-
tended to be granted, even if the grant is genuine.
The description in the petition of Limantour to the
Governor, in the order of reference by Jimeno, and
in the title as issued by the Governor, distinctly in-
tends a grant of land not Avithin the Pueblo of Yer-
ba Buena, but "comprised" "contained from the
line of the Pueblo," of land as Jimeno says, "that Li-
mantour represented to the Government did not ap-
pertain to the Pueblo of Yerba Buena." If, therefore,
a confirmation is made of this claim, this description
must govern. It is true that natural points are men-
tioned, but the Board will take that description which
will give effect to the grant, and which will not in-
volve a violation of the intention of the grantor, or a
violation of the law of the land, that had expressly
exempted corporate property from grant. The de-
cree in the city case has given the line of the Pueblo,
and upon this line this claim can alone be confirmed
it' entitled to confirmation at all.
2. The grant if genuine is not valid.
1. The land claimed in this case is largely em-
braced within the lines of the Pueblo of San Francis-
co as established in 1834, and which the Board in its
decree in the City case of San Francisco, has recog-
nized. Thus vested in the City, by grant or dedica-
tion, no act of the Governor could divest the title of
the City to these lands. If the title could be divested
by any act of power, that power must be the highest
known to the law—and must be exercised, not in ac-
cordance with law, but in contravention of law, and
only for a special purpose in some great and public
emergency.
Now do we find this state of things existing at the
date of this grant? We find Gov. Micheltorrena
acting under instructions from the President of the
Republic, conveyed to him through Tornel, the Min-
ister of War, on the 11th February, 1842. The pow-
er conferred by these instructions upon Micheltorre-
na, extended to all branches of administration which
might " conduce to the welfare of the country," and
among them was the branch of colonization. It is
true that by these instructions, the Governor's power
was extended to certain specified subjects—but no
greater power was given than the President ad inte-
rim himself possessed over the same subjects. Now,
it has not been shown that at the date of these in-
structions, the President was invested by express
law, or by the necessities of any existing public emer-
gency, with the extraordinary power that would
warrant him, even in the attempt to divest vested
rights, and hence none such could have been delega-
ted to an inferior officer. To attempt such an act
would have beeen in direct contravention of law ;
—
whereas the marginal decree of the Minister Bocane-
gra, states that the grant as made, has been ratified
and approved, " based upon pre-existing lawful pro-
visions, and granted to the local authorit}' of Califor-
nia." We are aware of no Mexican law that per-
mits confiscation under any circumstances, these law-
ful previsions therefore, could not have gone to this
extent, and the ratification of the government could
give no legality to an act whose effect was confisca-
tion ; for the Government of Mexico at that time was
bound by express written law, and the powers confer-
red upon it, whether ordinary or extraordinary, were
defined and did not extend to confiscation of individ-
ual or corporate rights.
But grant that the powers conferred upon Michel-
torrena, were extraordinary in their character and
extent, that they were legally delegated, and that
they g ve the power to grant the lands of Pueblos.
As an act intending to confer extraordinary power, it
was insufficient and of no effect, and all acts under it
were conditional, until the approval of the Mexican
Congress was given to it, and this was never secured
to legalize this act of Santa Anna, who was bound
by the Basis of Tacubaya and the Convention of Es-
tanzuela, to submit all his acts for approval to the
Congress. Up to the 7th July, 1S46, this had not
been done—the time for the performance of this sub-
sequent condition of submission and approval, was
limited to the first Constitutional Congress that met
after the act. So far from submitting his acts for
approval, Santa Anna attempted to throw off this
burden by a decree dated the 3rd of October, 1843
;
only six months subsequent to the date of this grant,
and has thus proved his own failure to comply with
the provisions of the law under which he came into
power and by which he then held the Presidency.
This decree of Santa Anna was annulled by the
Mexican Congress on the 1st of April, 1845, which
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shows the construction put upon the law by the Con-
gress, and the necessity that existed both prior and
subsequent to this date, for an approval by the Con-
gress of the President's acts. Among these acts were
the instructions or communication, delegating to an
inferior officer, to a local authority, whose powers
and duties had been clearly defined and limited by
previous general laws, the attributes of the President
of the Republic, which are claimed for him to have
been extraordinary. As such must surely, under
the law, the act required approval, which we have
shown was never given.
Again, take the case that no extraordinary power
was conferred upon Micheltorrena, empowering him
to grant lands in or belonging to towns, that the
claim here is based upon the ordinary executive
power of the Governor under the Colonization laws,
and as such we insist that it was invalid and void for
want of power in the Governor under these laws.
We would refer the Board to our Brief in the case of
Leese & Yallejo vs. United States, No. 74, on the
Docket of the Commission, for our argument and
authorities upon this point. It is needless to repeat
them here, as they have been collected and elabora-
ted in that case.
2. This grant was approved by the Supreme Gov-
ernment on the ISth of April, 1843, by virtue of the
extraordinary powers conferred upon Santa Anna.
The words of the marginal decree signed by Boca-
negra are to this effect in express terms. We think it
unnecessary here to state our argument to show that
under the colonization laws the President had no
power to grant or to approve a grant of lands in the
Departments, nor are we aware of any other laws
that conferred the power.
If Micheltorrena had power to make this grant to
a French subject, it was needless to refer the matter
to the President for approval. The decree of the 11th
of March, 1842, Art. 9th, rendered this reference to
the President for approval necessary, for it provides
that foreigners could not acquire land in the frontier
Departments without the express license of the Su-
preme Government. On this reference the Supreme
Government ratified and approved the grant, and the
question here arises, was this act of ratification suffi-
cient ? Was it final without further action ? We
think not ; and that it was ineffectual to vest any es-
tate until this act of ratification was approved by the
first Constitutional Congress.
By the Basis of Tacubaya, Art. 6, and the Conven-
tion of Estanzuela, Art. 2, the acts of the Provi-
sional Executive were required to be submitted to
the first Constitutional Congress for approval, and
failing to secure this, the ratification remained incom-
plete, and all titles dependent thereon remained in-
valid. We would refer here to the case of the Garay
Grant, which we have fully discussed in the case of
New Almaden, No. 366, and would call the attention
of the Board again to the " statement" published in
the city of Mexico by authority of the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, as bearing directly upon this sub-
ject, and affording the necessary light to a clear un-
derstanding of its merits. The two cases of Garay
and Limantour stand upon the same ground—they
both claim to have been made under extraordinary
powers, they both failed to obtain the approval of the
Mexican Congress, and the Garay grant, which came
before the Mexican Government for settlement, was
rejected and declared invalid. We deem the Liman-
tour grant as one of even more extraordinary charac-
ter than the Garay grant, and hence for a stronger
reason requiring the action of the Congress to give it
validity. Limantour petitions for an absolute sale of
the land to himself. Micheltorrena, obviously aware
that he possessed no power to sell, grants to him, and
the grant is based upon pre-existing lawful provi-
sions, yet no conditions are annexed as required by
the existing colonization laws. This grant without
conditions, made to a foreigner, claiming to be made
by the Governor under extraordinary power but sel-
dom conferred upon this officer, surely possesses a
character that requires the claimant to show the
strictest compliance with the law, through all its
steps. In this he has failed, and upon this we think
the validity of the grant depended. But if it is held
that the act of the Governor was one of sale and not
of grant under the colonization law, then we insist,
a fortiori, that the approval of the Mexican Congress
was necessary to this sale of the public domain.
The Governor of California and the President of
the Republic both undertook to act in contormity to
existing laws. Did they so act when they failed to
annex any conditions to the grant,, or could they le-
gally release the grantee from the effect of the condi-
tions invariably required and imposed by law ? If
they could, is not the act releasing the grantee from
these conditions, and the power under which they
acted, of such an extraordinary character as to re^-
quire the sanction of that body to which the law has
given the highest authority in such cases, with the
power to approve or disapprove the acts of the high-
est officer in the Republic ?
But we maintain that no act of these officers could
release the grantee from the legal effect of the condi-
tions required by the colonization laws to be annexed
to all grants, and that on the failure to perform the
conditions the grantee would lose any right he may
have had to perfect the title, and which by the failure
of the grantee and by the change of sovereignties and
circumstances, it was impossible could now be ma-
tured or ripened into a title by the performance of
conditions.
Under the Mexican Government and law, the
grantee has failed to secure the title. Ample tirne
was allowed for a compliance with the conditions of
occupation, cultivation and possession, between the
date of the grant in 1843 and the 7th July, 1846.
No sufficient excuse or reason is given for the failure,
none whatever is attempted, and the evidence in the
case shows the failure on the part of the grantee, and
an actual abandonment of his claim during the ex-
istence of the Mexican power in California. During
this time nothing had been done by the grantee bind-
ing upon the justice or conscience of the Mexican
Government. The case is entirely similar to the
cases of Boisdore, Glenn, and de Villemont, where the
Spanish Government had parted with the territories
of Louisiana and Florida before any interest or title
had vested in the grantees. This case differs from
the Fremont case. The Supreme Court hold that, in
view of the circumstances, the distant position of the
Mariposa valley, and the hostility of the Indians, to-
gether with the revolutionary condition of the coun-
try, there was not an unreasonable delay or want of
effort on the part of Alvarado to fulfil the conditions.
In the case before the Board none of these circum-
stances existed, and the Supreme Court in the Fre-
mont case say that in such a case " it might justly
/ A
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be presumed, as in the Louisiana and Florida conces-
sions, that the party had abandoned his claim before
the Mexican power ceased to exist, and was now en-
deavoring to resume it, from the enhanced value un-
der the Government of the United States."
The court held that the grant to Alvarado vested a
present and immediate interest, but subject to condi-
tions subsequent ; that there was a failure to fulfil
these conditions, but a sufficient excuse for the fail-
ure. Thus the court intimate that had there been no
reasonable and sufficient excuse for the failure to
perform these conditions during the existence of the
Mexican Government in California, the land would
have been subject to forfeiture on the action of the
Government, or on denouncement by a third person.
It is true that no action was taken by the Mexican
Government to- forfeit this title, or whatever right
the grantee might have had ; but we apprehend that
it is competent for the United States, the successor in
interest, to institute this action, and to ascertain what
rights were perfect and what imperfect at the date of
the cession or conquest of California.
"We apprehend that the U. S. Government is as
competent as the Mexican Government to institute
proceedings to ascertain the validity or invalidity of
the grantee's claim, and to pronounce it good or bad.
The United States has the same rights against the
grantee that Mexico would have if her power existed
in California at this date. Mexico would have pro-
ceeded to forfeit the right or title of the grantee if
bad, and if the question had been raised. The United
States has seen fit to raise the question between the
grantee and herself, and has lost none of her rights
against the grantee because Mexico neglected to do- so.
The United States has the same right to reject this
title now, that Mexico had to forfeit the land on or
before the 7th of July, 1846, if the grantee had failed
in his obligations.
It is true that Mexico, up to the 7th July, 1846,
took no action in the matter ; but the grantee's right
was not thereby matured into a title ; he stood in the
same position—has lost no right, has surely gained
none, by the lapse of time. The United States, not
proceeding by forfeiture in such cases, has resorted to
the course known to her law, and whose effect is the
same, she has established this Commission, and the
grantee has submitted his claim.
The Government did not create this Board solely
for the benefit of the claimants, but more especially
for Government purposes and interests, to ascertain
and secure her own landed interests by a separation
from private property. Thus, and for this purpose,
she has raised the question, and has adopted her
usual legal proceeding, as the Mexican Government
would have acted by proceedings in forfeiture. As
the Government of Mexico would not have been
barred or estopped, so the United States is not now
barred or estopped from inquiry into the legality of
this title, by the acts of officers who had approved the
title, or who might have certified to the legality and
formality of the proceedings in the same ; and this
however high the position of these officers. This-
may have raised a presumption in its favor, which
was open to rebuttal, however ; and this, we trust?
has been accomplished.
It is true that no express conditions are answered
to this grant, but there were conditions and limita-
tions imposed by law, precedent in time—and
amounting to a prohibition upon the Governor to'
grant, and upon the grantee to take.- To enable
Limantour to acquire land in the Republie of Mexi->
co in 1843, even though he had obtained the approv-
al of the Supremo Executive—it wag' neeessary that
he should remain in and be an actual resident of the
Republic. The words of the first Act of the law of
the 11th March, 1842, (Rockwell, p. 11) are : " Los
estrangeros avecindados y residentes," &o, foreigners
who remain, are established and resident, &c. The
verb avecindarse is defined in Escriche thus, "to
become an inhabitant of any town establishing one's
domicil and habitation with intent of remaining per-
manently therein. This is proved by the lapse of ten
years." To acquire a domicil under Spanish law,
there must be an actual residence or abode in a place
with the intention of remaining permanently in the
same. (See Escriche, verb, domicilio.)- Thus an act-
ual and permanent residence of ten years was neces-
sary, under this- decree, to acquire real estate in
Mexico.
Actual presence is necessary to residence—2 Bur-
rell's Law Diet., verbum " Resident ;" 2 Kent 430
n.—and thus an actual presence of ten years was
necessary before the grant could be made. In a
legal sense, domicil is the place of a person's dwelling
where he has fixed his permanent home.—Story's
Conflict of laws, section 41.—Bouvier's Law Diet.,
verb. "Domicil."
Thus we see that a foreigner who desired to acquire
property in Mexico must have qualified himself by
an actual dwelling and personal residence of ten
years. Now we ask, had the claimant here these
qualifications at the date of this grant in Feb., 1843 ?
As a mariner, the subject of a foreign power at this
time, and but lately arrived on the coast of Mexico,
can he be said to have acquired this right to take by
grant ? We think it bold assurance in the claimant
to stand on this ground ; he had shown at this date
no intention of remaining permanently in the Re-
public ; he had been but a year and a half on this
coast, although he had spent some seven years in the
Pacific ; he was moving from place to place with no
fixed abode, and was trading on the Pacific coast of
North and South America. This surely wonld show
no intention of a permanent residence in Mexico, but
clearly the contrary, that his visit to the coast was
made solely for the purpose of trade and commerce.
With these remarks, we submit the claim to the
Board.
U. S. LAND COMMISSION.
Irgratteitf ai Cjwnto, Wallmms $ %\mim
ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT.
LIMANTOUR vs. UNITED STATES.
[No. 548.]
The documentary evidence upon which the claim-
int relies is the letter of Micheltorena of the 8th of
January, 1843, the Espediente discovered by Go-
nez, the letter of Jimeno to Richardson of the 14th
if January, and to claimant of the 2d February,
843, and finally the grant of Micheltorena and the
pproval of the Supreme Government endorsed
hereon, dated respectively the 27th of February
rad 11th of April, 1843. On close examination of
hese documents, the quick succession in which
one follows the other in order of time, the locality
md magnitude of the claim, the profound igno-
rance of its existence on the part of the public men
md chief officials of the Government, the date of its
mentation to this Board, and mode in which the
iroofs have been conducted, are all calculated to
xcite the strong suspicions of fraud which have
ittached to this claim, and demand the most criti-
cal examination of the whole evidence offered in
support. The three letters above referred to
urnish no foundation of title, and are offered as
"onfirmatory evidence showing the origin of a train
circumstances which might have resulted in the
grant. The letter of the 8th of January, even if it
'ere a genuine document, without the assertion of
the power to grant lands, would afford little sup-
Port to this claim, but the assertion of this power,
a the manner in which it is proposed to be exer-
ted, is, as we shall hereafter show, convincing
evidence that the letter is a forgery. But even if it
*ere genuine, it is incredible that this letter could
iave been the opening of a negotiation resulting in
he grant of the 27th February.
According to the evidence, Limantour was at San
D
edro on the 8th of January, a distance of some
flirty miles from Los Angelos. It is hardly to be
credited, that this letter should have been written,
dispatched to San Pedro, that Limantour should
have received it, accepted its invitation, traveled to
Los Angelos in the rainy season, entered upon and
completed large and important negotiations, drafted
his proposal for lands, particularly describing them
by metes and bounds, making maps of them, hav-
ing his petition translated from French into Span-
ish, transcribed in his own handwriting, and pre-
sented to the Governor for his action, and all be-
tween the 8th and 10th of January, 1843. It is dis-
patch, especially considering the nature of this
pretended transaction, altogether incredible, and
inconsistent with the known habits of these people
The letters of Jimeno are more to the point, and
might furnish some support to this grant were they
brought before the Board under less suspicious cir-
cumstances. Why were not these letters exhibited
to Jimeno when he testified in this case? At all
times he would have been the most competent wit-
ness to prove them, and especially so when fraud
and forgery are charged. But they are thrown
chiefly upon the evidence of Richardson and Arce.
The latter is positive that the letter of the 14th Jan-
uary is in his own handwriting. This is contrary
to the known habits of Jimeno, who generally con-
ducted, as the archives show, his own correspond-
ence ; nor is it probable that a letter of this charac-
ter could have been written by a mere youthful as-
sistant in the office, such as Arce was at its date. Yet
this witness is confident that the letter is in his own
handwriting. We have no doubt of it. But when
was it written? Upon this point he is silent. Nor
does he say that the signature is the genuine signa-
ture of Jimeno, but it is in his handwriting—that is,
it resembles the signature of Jimeno—a signature
easily forged. Every word of this may be literally
true, and the document have been written, as we
believe is the fact, in the year 1852. This letter
will he further noticed hereafter. The next link in
this chain of evidence, is the Espediente found by
Gomez in Monterey. To substantiate the genuine-
ness of this document, and that it was properly ar-
chived in accordance with the certificate of Michel-
torena, dated 20th of May, 1852, is all important to
the claimant, and the evidence of the witnesses has
been more prominently directed to it than to any
other paper filed in the cause. The result of this
inquiry has been to discredit the testimony of Go-
mez, and produce the moral certainty that this do-
cument was not in the archives previously to 1853,
but about the middle of this year, was fraudulently
and clandestinely introduced into the archives,
either through the direct agency of Gomez or others
in collusion with him. Soon after this pretended
discovery—to wit, on the 6th of July, 1853, the evi-
dence of Gomez is taken, in which the circumstan-
ces attending this discovery are detailed with mi-
nuteness. The signatures are proved, and the two
prominent facts elicited, that the witness saw these
same papers in the archives at Monterey in 1843,
and was at that time acquainted with the party Li-
mantour. So far, his testimony is consistent and
apparently fair and honest, but unfortunately for
this witness and for the claimant, he is recalled
after the lapse of eighteen months to testify further
in regard to these facts. Forgetful of his former
testimony, he now involves himself in a mass of
contradiction, which, taken in connection with the
evidence introduced to discredit him, shows con-
clusively that a fraud has been attempted, in which
this witness has participated for a consideration
paid, or promised by the claimant. In this cross-
examination he states that Arce wrote these titles,
and that he recorded them; that the transaction
was particularly impressed on his mind, because he
received his pay out of the advances made by Mr.
Limantour. This is in direct contradiction with his
former testimony; true, he afterwards explains it,
and applies his answers to subsequent grants, not
involved in this case, and as to which he was not
questioned ; and to relieve himself from this and
other difficulties, he swears he did not allude to this
grant, that he was not an officer of the Government
at its date, that he knew nothing of it but hearsay,
and that he never in his life saw the Espediente till
he accidentally discovered it in the archives at Mon-
terey, (122 cross interrogatory.) Here is a still
more palpable contradiction than the other. But
this is also subsequently explained, after a lapse of
fourteen days ; but so explained as to involve him
if possible in a grosser contradiction. At the end of
the 146th cross interrogatory and answer, as ap-
pears by the note of the Commissioner, the witness
requested that his deposition might be read to him,
in order to "satisfy himself of its correctness,"
which was accordingly done. He seems at that
time to be satisfied with its correctness. He does
not discover the gross contradiction, nor seek to
11
change it, but "now again appearing," after
lapse of fourteen days, he desires to strike out t
whole of his answer to cross-question 122, and
:
sert in its place an answer directly opposite ; a
excuses himself for this bold request, upon t
ground that he was sick when he gave the first a
swer, and did not know what he said. How th
did he remember, after fourteen days, that he h
said it, without having read his first deposition,
been prompted, or informed by any one of it?
possible.
This wretched excuse but involves him deep*
Yet this is not all. In his first evidence he proT
the handwriting of Limantour, and swears that
was acquainted with him in 1843. In his last dep!
sition, under the searching cross-examination
'
the Law Agent, in order to acquit himself of coll
sion with Limantour, he swears that he never kn^
this person until the Summer of 1852; a contrad
tion which he has not attempted to explain. Is vl
all this sufficient to destroy his testimony? B'
not only has he proved himself unentitled to cred
but is contradicted in many important particula*
by the evidence of other witnesses. He pretends
have seen this Espediente in 1843, in the presen
of Jimeno. Jimeno is dead, but he has left behil
him the record of his evidence, in which he deni
all knowledge of this grant. He pretends to ha1
discovered this Espediente after a search of ti
hours, in the presence of Mr. Gleason, among son
loose papers lender the table in the office of the E
corder. Mr. Gleason, the County Becorder, swea
that Gomez discovered this paper after a search i
two days and a half, not under the table, but on t]
dresser ; not in a loose bundle of miscellaneous paper
but in a package tied up, and labeled. This becomi
important in connection with the testimony of M
Johnson, (the predecessor of Mr. Gleason,) wl
successively as Syndico, Deputy County Clerl
County Clerk, and Recorder of Monterey, ha
possession of those papers ; who, according to h
own testimony, frequently examined, and was fi
miliar with them. In 1851, under an act of the L
gislature of this State, he assorted, arranged, an
tied up, and labeled the papers of the archives, an
placed them, so arranged and labeled, upon th
dresser in the Recorder's office, where they so rt
mained under his successor in office.
He tells us it was impossible that this Espediente coul
have been among those papers without his discoverin
it, and positively it was not among the papers which h
examined and arranged. And yet in the face of a'
this, it is pretended that this Espediente was discovere
by Gomez, in a bundle which Johnson, as is showr
had examined, arranged and labelled. The thing is at
surd. Upon such evidence no impartial mind can dout|"
that this document was secretly placed in the archive! ft
at Monterey by Gomez himself, in June, 1853. A shoi I
time previous to this pretended discovery, he reveals tl \
Mr. Johnson the existence of this claim, and declarei I
it from his own knowledge all fraudulent, which led tl i
another unsuccessful search by Johnson. Shortly aftei 1
lis, Mr. Limantour arrived in San Francisco ; Gomez
jconies active in his interest, and suddenly, as if by
agic, convinced of the justice of his claim. Why
ins changed ? There is but one solution of this mys-
ry. His love of money is stronger than his virtue,
ne further remark, and we are done with Senor Go-
He informs us in his testimony that he came
am Mexico to Los Angeles with Gov. Micheltorena,
id remained as a private citizen in this latter place
r three months, at the expiration of which time, he
ft for his father's Eancho, and there awaited the arri-
il of Micheltorena at Monterey till August, 1843. Ac-
rding to this, he must have left Los Angeles pre-
ausly to the 8th of January, the date of Micheltorena :s
;ter to Limantour inviting an interview. Yet he heard
dversal complaints among the officers at Los Angeles
at their General had granted to a Frenchman the best
Tt in California : heard it more than two months he-
re the grant was made and even before the pretended
terview was had which led to this result. All this is
monstrous for human credulity. But the counsel
| the claimant relies upon the evidence of Manuel Ji-
;no as sustaining that of Gomez. In what respects
is confirmatory, it is difficult to perceive. He denies
knowledge of this grant. He neither heard of it
»m Micheltorena, with whom he was in daily inter-
nrse, nor from Limantour, with whom he was ac-
ainted. Though Secretary of the Governor, and bav-
in his charge the Archives of the Government, he
ver saw in those Archives any evidences of this title,
heard of it from any source whatever. In the ninth
d last direct interrogatory this witness is asked,
lave you ever known from the Archives of the Gov-
iment of California of the grants of land by Gover-
r Micheltorena to Limantour, adjoining the Pueblo
Yerba Buena, and near the Presidio ?" He answer-
I understand that Limantour petitioned for land,
! I do not knoio that the grant was made. I recol-
t that information was asked for some lands that Li-
ntour petitioned for. I, as Secretary, asked for this
ormation, but of what authority I asked this infor-
tion, I do not recellect" Can this have any reference
the present grant, or to the letter written by Arce
1 addressed to Eichardson ? None whatever, but
nishes in our opinion the strongest evidence that the
ter is a forgery, and this claim a fraud. The iufor-
tion was asked by him as Secretary. "Was Jimeno
kretary on the fourteenth of January, 1843, the date
pis letter ? He answers for himself that Arce was
Secretary at Los Angeles, (3d cross-interrogatory,)
I Victor Prudon denies expressly that Jimeno acted
this capacity until after Micheltorena arrived in
aterey
; in fact, he says that in Los Angeles there
is no Secretary at all. The allusion is evidently to
nts subsequently made in Monterey while Jimeno
i Secretary, two of which are filed in this case
Iped by himself) on the part of the Government.
U could not have alluded to any grant prior to the
Hi August, 1843, for he asked the information as Sec-
Wiry, and he never acted as Secretary until after that
Ip. If such is the fact, this is conclusive proof that
lit the letter is a forgery, written and signed by Arce.
I admit, as Sanchez testifies, that Jimeno acted for
a few days in January, 1853, as Secretary of Michelto-
rena ; the argument is not weakened, for if such was
the case, it had evidently escaped the memory of Jime-
no, and he testified as to " information asked " by him,
when he kneiv that he was acting as Secretary. He
cannot, therefore, have referred to any transactions had
at Los Angeles, but to the subsequent proceedings at
Monterey, as shown by the copies of grants filed in this
case, two of which are signed by Jimeno as Secretary.
The only other witness who ever saw the Espediente
discovered by Gomez, is Victor Prudon, a witness who
in conversation with Mr.Larkin, repeatedly pronounced
this claim a fraud, and whose general character is such
as to render him unworthy of credit or belief. We
shall have occasion again to refer to his testimony.
The next and final document is Exhibit No. 4, to the
Deposition of Hartnell. purporting to be a grant in fee,
without conditions, of a large and most valuable por-
tion of the city of San Francisco and of adjacent lands,
in consideration, not of four thousand dollars—not of
meritorious services—but differing both from the peti-
tion and decree of concession, in consideration of loans
made to the Government, and on this paper is the mar-
ginal decree signed by Boncanegra, purporting to be
the approval of the supreme Government. Several
witnesses swear that the signatures to all these docu
ments are genuine, and even Mr. Hartnell is of the same
opinion. Rarely, if ever, in a case of such importance,
has the validity of a elaim been rested wholly upon
proof of signatures, without proof of other circum-
stances, such as notorious claim of ownership, posses-
sion, knowledge in the community, or at least among
public men and high officials, of the existence of the
grant
—
ye^upon this weak foundation alone, this claim
must rest. Surely, such evidence is insufficient. The
history of our own country, and especially of its crimi-
nal jurisprudence, shows how easily counterfeits are
made and forgeries perpetrated, with such skill as to
defy detection, unless recourse is had to other evidence
than the mere proof of signatures. The history of this
very city within the last two years, even within the last
few months, justifies the truth of this assertion. Were
the counterfeit warrants upon the treasury of San
Francisco, which but a short time since deluged the
city, distinguished from genuine warrants by signatures
or by comparisons of hand-writing? The writers'
themselves, the Mayor of the city, could not by such
means know his own signature, and distinguish the
true from the false, the genuine from the counterfeit.
But if the validity of this claim is to rest upon such
proofs as these, surely it should have been the best evi-
dence of this class which was in the power of the claim-
ant. Why did he not produce it ? Suppose that these
papers are proved to be false, and this claim demon-
strated to be a fraud, could the most material of these
witnesses, could Arce be convicted upon his evidence
of perjury ?
In such manner have these proofs been conducted,
and such the character of the testimony, based alone
upon opinion, that not one of them could be convicted.
Why is it that these papers are not proved by Michel-
torena, Jimeno and Boncanegra ? They were all living-
long after the presentation of this claim, and the two
4former appear in this case. Jimeno is the most com-
petent witness to prove his own acts, and where fraud
is charged and the only issue the genuineness of his sig-
nature, to him is the only safe and reliable resort.
That neither of the documents bearing his signature
were exhibited to him, and that his answers, elicited
by timid and cautious interrogatories, are sought to be
extended to them only by implication, are facts preg-
nant with meaning. (Vide 1st Starkie's Ev., 489.)
The certificate of Micheltorena is in the most general
terms. It has no direct or necessary application to
this grant. It may every word be true, and yet refer
solely to subsequent grants, copies of which are filed.
This transaction, if it existed, commenced with the
earliest acts of his administration. His sore embar-
rassments and " wretched condition," must have deeply
impressed his mind, and in so short a time could never
have been forgotten. Why then, did he not mention
this particular grant, in a certificate prepared for this
particular case ? The grant must have been in Mexico,
according to Eichardson's deposition, at the date of
this certificate. Why did not Mr. Limantour show it
to Micheltorena, and why did not Micheltorena certify
that it was genuine ? Why did he not acknowledge it
before Mr. Black, the American Consul ? This officer
was as competent to take such acknowledgment, as to
make the certificate appearing on the record. It may
have been necessary io deceive him, and ingenious
knavery devised a plan in the general terms of this
certificate. This evidence, incompetent as it is, is in
keeping with the whole testimony on the part of the
claimant. The certificate of Black, of Micheltorena,
and Arista, all throw suspicion on the claim.
It is most remarkable, that neither Alvarado or Cas-
tro, or Jimeno, or Sanchez, or even Arce, or the inhabi-
tants of Terba Buena, knew anything of this grant
;
and passing strange, in a transaction of this import-
ance, that the act of the Governor (as was usual in
even ordinary cases) was not attested by the Secretary,
particularly as the document was to be transmitted
immediately to the capital of the nation for the ratifi-
cation of the Supreme Government.
The evidence of Eichardson and Frudon is taken for
the purpose of denying the existence of the Fueblo of
Yerba Buena, or of contracting its limits, for the pur-
poses of this grant. Eichardson's testimony lends lit-
tle aid to this claim. Upon all other points than the
one above mentioned, it is loose and uncertain. He
had heard of this grant prior to the change of Govern-
ment, but only from De Haro and Eidley, both of whom
were dead when he testified. He saw in Mexico, in
1852, in the latter part of June, what Limantour told
him was the grant, with the certificate of the Ameri-
can Consul. It is a singular fact that this certificate,
as shown by its date, was not obtained for four months
after Mr. Eichardson left Mexico for his farm at Sau-
celito. Comment is unnecessary. Prudon is relied on,
in support of the last witness, to prove that there was
no such Pueblo as Yerba Buena. He " never knew
that there was any thing here, but a little hamlet."
There was no Municipal Hall, or Parochial Church-
essentials to a, Pueblo. He never heard this place
called otherwi&e than Yerba Buena, or Loma Alto,
whilst it was always customary to say the Pueblo o
Son Jose, the Pueblo of Los Angelos, &c. Briefly, tu
never heard of the Pueblo of Yerba Buena, and yet h(
translated the petition of Mr. Limantour from Frenct
into Spanish, in which, the Pueblo of Yerba Buena is
prominently set forth as one of the boundaries of the
tract solicited. And again, he professes to have seen
this same document afterwards in the archives at Mon-
terey. This is a palpable contradiction, and indepen-
dent of other facts, is sufficient to discredit his testi-
mony. " Falsus inuno, falsus in omnibus," is an appro-
priate maxim.
Since the above was written, other evidence has been
taken in this case, under the permission of the Board
But it does not vary the issues which have already been
made. The deposition of Serrano, on the part of the
claimant, is offered in support of Gomez. He swears
to the existence of the Espediente, exhibited in the
deposition of Hartnell, in his own office, in the years
1848 and '49, and from memory, without having seen
it since, repeats its contents and proves a copy. Con-j
sidering the time that has elapsed, and the fact that he)
only read it once, and inattentively as a document of
no importance, this is a most remarkable instance ol
the power of memory—and the more so, when nothing 1
else is recollected. There were other Espedientes in;
his possession, important as affecting interests of mag-l
nitude, bearing directly upon the rights of native Cali- ;
fornians; yet he recollects nothing of their dates oi
contents ; but only remembers this single Espediente,,
which he regarded as an "insignificant affair," and
with such distinctness that he almost repeats it and
proves the accuracy of the copy filed in this case. The
improbability of this testimony ; the reluctance with
which this witness testified when interrogated by the
counsel for the Government ; the evasions and subter-
fuges to which he resorted ; the ready shelter found
from detection in pretended forgetfulness of all circum-
stances connected with the fact that this paper had
been in his possession ; and the contradictions in which',
he involved himself under cross-examination strip him
of any title to credit or belief. The case is not strength-
1
ened by his testimony.
This Espediente, so seen by the witness in 1848 and;
'49, purports to be based in part on the " investigations;'
and steps," taken by the competent justice. Who is:
this competent justice ? The marginal order of refer-
ence signed by Micheltorena, is to the competent jus-.
tice of the jurisdiction of San Francisco. It is not W.
A. Eichardson, because in the letter of the 14th of|
January, addressed to him as the Captain of the Port,t
(which office he did not hold at that time,) he is di-,i
rected to associate this competent justice with him. It I
is not Francisco de Haro, as intimated by Eichardson,:
because at that time, de Haro was acting in the subor-^
dinate capacity of clerk to Francisco Sanchez and Jose
de Jesus Noe, who were the only competent judges of,
this jurisdiction ; and they both swear that no such
1
steps and investigations were ever had by them. The,
very fact that the report of the justices is not, as in all.
other cases, found on the record excites a suspicion |
which is ripened into a certainty of fraud by the oaths
of the only competent justices that no such report was
ever made by them, and so far from it, that until 1852
or '53, they never heard of the existence of this claim.
The petition is for vacant land. The marginal decree
directs the inquiry, whether or not the lands mentioned
" belong to private persons, corporation or communi-
ty "—and the result is announced that they are vacant
;
that the ' 'first tract is situated one league, a little more or
less, from the line of the Pueblo of Yerba Buena," &c.
Here, if any such report was ever made, is a direct
falsehood, a fraud attempted upon the Government, by
which a grant is sought of lands which would not and
could not be granted. It is apparent in every line of
the Espediente that it was not the intention of the
Governor (supposing that the papers are genuine) to
grant one foot of land within the limits of the Pueblo.
Yet by this false report, he is led to grant to a foreigner
one half of the Pueblo lands. In a Court of Equity,
if such fraud did not vitiate the whole transaction, the
most that could be done would be to cany out the bona
fide intentions of the grantor, and the parties at least
would derive no benefit from the attempted fraud.
This Espediente is dated 10th of January, and is
written on paper habiliated by the maritime Custom
House of the Port of Monterey, for the year 1843.
Benito Dias, an officer of the Custom House for that
and the preceeding years, testifies that no such paper
was in existence as early as any day in the month of
January, 1813. If this be true, there is an end of this
case. Such fraud would throw a fatal suspicion upon
the whole case. The proof that this Espediente was
forged, and that witnesses were suborned and corrupt-
ed in its support so taints the whole evideuce on the
part of the claimant, that unexplained to the satisfac-
tion of the court, it is as fatal to the gi~ant itself as
though it bore directly on that instrument. " As the
destruction or withholding of evidence creates a pre-
sumption against the party who has had recourse to
such practice, so a fortiori does the actual fabrication
or corruption of evidence" (1 Starkie Evidence,
490.)
And again, " when it appeared that on the one side
there was forgery and fraud in some of the material
parts of the evidence, and especially when that forgery
could be traced up to its source, and discovered to be
the contrivance of the very person whose guilt or inno-
cence was the object of inquiry, in such a case I have
always understood it to be an established rule that the
whole of the evidence on that side of the question
must be deeply affected by a deliberate falsehood of
this nature."
" The natural and necessary effect of such a prac-
tice upon the minds of judges possessed of discern-
ment and candor, is to make them extremely suspi-
cious of all evidence tending to the same conclusion
with the forged evidence, parole testimony in support
of it will be little regarded ; the forgery of the writ-
ten evidence contaminates the testimony of witnesses
in favor of the party who has made use of that for-
gery ; and nothing will gain credit on that side but
either clear and conclusive written evidence, free from
suspicion, or the testimony of such a number of respec-
table, disinterested and consistent witnesses, speak to
decisive and circumstantial facts as leaves no room to
doubt of the certainty of their knowledge, and the
truth of their assertions." (lb. 490, note, §.)
But should it be said that so important a fact, as that
no such paper existed as that upon which this Espe-
diente was written, at the date upon which it purports
t") have been written, should not rest upon the evidence
of a single witness, however honest or unhnpeached ;
we answer that his testimony is so corroborated by
circumstances as to repel the idea of mistake, or ig-
norance of the fact, on the part of the witness. Thom-
as 0. LarMn, who resided at the time in Monterey, and
whose business it was under the Government to show
samples and instruct the citizens as to what class of
paper was suitable to their various purposes, was com-
pelled on the loth day of February, 1843, to use the
paper of 1841 and '42, " made good" for 1843, because,
he thinks, no paper at that date had been issued for
1843 alone, and is confident, had it been issued, he
never would have used the old and rehabilated sheet
exhibited in his deposition and proved to be genuine.
The evidence of Flemming and of Hopkins, that the
archives of this Commission and those of the State in
the possession of the Surveyor General of California,
contain no document written upon such paper at dates
earlier than March, 1843, is strongly corroborative of
the testimony of Dias, and entitles his confident state-
ment that no such paper existed in January, 1843, to
full credit and belief.
The petition, beginning this Espediente, accord-
ing to the evidence of Victor Prudon, (before re-
ferred to,) was written in French by Limantour,
translated into Spanish by Prudon, and then tran-
scribed in the handwriting of the claimant. The
orthography and style of this document, independ-
ent of the direct evidence on the point, would trace
its authorship to one whose mother's tongue was
not the Spanish language. The words " Estacado "
and "fundadero," used in this paper, are not prop-
er, and hardly idem sonans with the words intended.
In the letter of the 14th of January, written by Arce,
the words "Estacada " and "fondeadero," for which
the former quoted words were intended, occur cor-
rectly used. But when we come to the grant, we
find the same peculiarities and blunders that char-
acterize the petition.
How could this occur, if the grant had been writ-
ten by Capt. Marcel, an educated and accomplished
Spaniard? He could not have fallen into the same
identical errors of Prudon and Limantour—nothing
could be more improbable. Even Arce could not
commit such blunders. This fact, taken in conec-
tion with the evidence of Diaz and Francisco San-
chez shows that Marcel could not have written the
grant, and is equally conclusive to show that it al-
so was written by Limantour and Victor Prudon.
Other similar instances are to be observed in this
grant, such as "podro" for podra, "Linea" forLinea,
and " Vali'dero " for Yaledero. This last follows
the Frerch spelling of Valide. But in other respects
this claim is also shown to be a fraud. It is shown
by the direct admission of Limantour to Alfred
Green, and by the fact, as proved by various wit-
nesses, that many grants were made by the officials
of the Mexican Government, within the limits of
this claim, as of vacant land, both before and after
the date of this pretended grant; and that Liman-
tour himself, as late as the year 1844, was a peti-
tioner to Alcalde Hinckley for a lot within the heart
of this claim. All this is totally inconsistent with
the genuineness of this grant, or any claim of ow-
nership by Limantour till after the change of gov-
ernment.
The evidence of Halleck, Davidson, Bolton and
Parrot, proving the admission of Jouan, as the
agent and accomplice of Limantour, supported as
they are by incontrovertible facts, as the existence
of the note for $20,000, and the alteration of the
grant in No. 549, apparent on its face, furnish us
with a true history of this bold and audacious fraud
;
and if considered by the Court as admissible testi-
mony, is sufficient in itself to defeat the pretentions
of the claimant.
We hold that the note itself is evidence of Jouan's
interest in this land, and establishes his complicity
with Limantour. It is true, that the transcript
from the Recorder's office, purporting to be a copy
of this note, is not admissable in evidence, to prove
the contents of the note, as there is no law requiring
such an instrument to be recorded ; bu t it is evidence
of the fact, that such a note once existed, and was
spread upon the records of that office. (Beall vs.
Dearing, 7 Ala. Eep., 127 and 128); and Parrott
proves that the record in that office was a true copy
of the identical note placed in his hands by Jouan,
and acknowledged by Limantour in conversation
with him . Should the Court be of the opinion that
this note is properly proved, and that it has the ef-
fect contended for, and establishes the agency and
complicity of Jouan, then the admissibility of his
admissions in evidence is based upon such well-
established principles of law, that a reference to
authority is hardly necessary. The cases cf the
American Fur Company vs. the United States, (2
Peters, 364 and 365,) and Harriman vs. Brown, (8
Leigh, 697,) are sufficient.
Before closing this review of the evidence, it may
be proper to notice the deposition of Gonzales. We
did not at first think it at all necessary to do so,
because its weight is entirely destroyed by its own
contradictions, and the conflict between it and all
the other evidence in the case. He states that upon
his own application for a grant of land, near the
northwestern corner of what is now known as the
Plaza or Portsmouth Square, it was refused, because
as Micheltorena told him he had already granted
it to Limantour.
It is difficult to ascertain from this deposition at
what time this conversation took place ; in one part
of it the witness says it was shortly after Michel-
torena went to Monterey, and in another, that it
was just before he went out of office. Between
these two periods there is a space of more than a
year. Again he represents Jimeno as reporting
upon his petition, and as delivering him the refusal
of the Governor, based upon the fact that the land
had been previously granted to Limantour. This
is in direct conflict with the testimony of Jimeno,
who never, either from the Governor or the records
of his office, or from any source whatever, heard of
this pretended grant to Limantour.
The whole story of this witness is badly con-
cocted. It was necessary to show some induce-
ment to this conversation, and nothing is more
difficult than to lay a solid basis for an untruth,
and harmonize a false statement in all its parts.
The inducement in this case (which was the rejec-
tion of witness's petition) and the reason assigned
for the refusal by the Governor, were most unfor-
tunately selected. By reference to Whitcomb's
map, and other evidence in this case, it is apparent
that the land sought by Gonzales is not within the
limits of this claim, and the ownership of it has
never been pretended to by Limantour. The Gov-
ernor therefore, could never have refused the peti-
tion, on any such ground. This deposition, inde-
pendent of the above objection, is rendered suspic-
ious by the fact that the documentary evidence of
this proceeding, the witness glibly tells us, he him-
self destroyed, and that too without any apparent
reason, unless it be to destroy the surest means of
his detection.
No intelligent and candid mind can read the evi-
dence in this case without perceiving that it rests
mainly upon the support of Gomez, Prudon, Rich-
ardson and Abrego ; and without inquiring what
Richardson and Abrego were doing in Mexico,
where Limantour resided in 1852, the time at which
this title is supposed to have been fabricated? The
fact that they were there, the nature of their evi-
dence, in connection with the admissions of Jouan,
arouse more than a suspicion that they are secretly
interested in this claim, and are deeply implicated
with Limantour in this whole transaction. If the
evidence of Halleck and Davidson is admissible, it
convicts them of this complicity; and the admis-
sions ofJouan are entitled to the more credit be-
cause under all the circumstances detailed they are
the best evidence the nature of the case will admit.
Were Jouan here, under the evidence in this case,
he could not be compelled to testify ; no man
can be required to prove his own guilt, or to
subject himself, on his own testimony, to a criminal
prosecution. His complicity in this fraud renders
his admission not only the best, but the only, evi-
dence that could be had.
Such is the view that we have taken of the evi-
nence in this case, and we cannot think that this
honorable Board can ever find in it the basis of a
favorable decree.
There is a further view, which we now proceed
to present, tending as we think to the same con-
clusion.
There exists in the whole transaction, from its very
inception, intrinsic evidence of its fraudulent concoc-
tion, long after Micheltorena had left California, and
long after both he and Bocanegra had gone into retire-
ment. The foundation stone of this transaction, i. e.,
the letter of the 8th of January, 1843, from Michelto-
rena to Limantour, is laid, in the assertion of a power
of Micheltorena, which he never possessed, and which
he never would have dared to assert, whilst he was a
subordinate officer of the Government under Santa
Anna. Whatever he may have done since, in his old
age, and in his poverty and obscurity in Mexico, his
whole course of conduct as Governor, and that of all
the Governors of California who succeeded him, prove
that he did not have this power to sell the public do-
main to a foreigner. His own construction of his power
in this regard, appears in the case of Pedro Sainsevain,
No. 283, in the commission. This assumed right of
Micheltorena lies at the foundation of the claim. An
Espediente of it has no existence in the archives of
Mexico, where alone it could have been originated, and
completed, as an act of the power representing the sove-
reignty or the nation. It was impracticable to have
foisted, at the late date of the concoction of this grant,
any such proceedings into their proper place, the ar-
chives of Mexico. It became necessary, then, to estab-
lish such a power in Micheltorena. Hence, the letter
purporting to be written by him, dated the 8th of Janu-
ary, 1843, is made to assert the ample power in him, to
sell the public domain to a foreigner. Now we will en-
quire, where did he obtain that power? Not in his in-
structions' of the 11th of February, 1842. They did,
we admit, give him some extraordinary powers, as the
removal of public officers and the appointment of
others in their place, of which he is required to give a
full account. As to the supply of his troops, which is
the feigned pretext of this grant, those instructions
provide the mode of such supply, which he, in fact,
adopted, by drawing drafts in payment therefor, upon
the treasury of the nation. As to the exercise of the
high prerogative of sovereignty, a sale of the public
domain of Mexico to a foreigner, it cannot be deduced
by the most constrained interpretation, from those cele-
brated instructions. But, if it could, it is expressly
taken away and committed by Santa Anna's decree of
the 11th of March, 1842, promulgated before Michelto-
rena left Mexico for this department, to the exclusive
action of the Supreme Government. In direct repug-
nance to this law, by this letter of the 8th of January,
1843 , Micheltorena is not only made to assert this p ower
in himself, but a license from Bocanegra, dated the 7th
of Oct., 1843, is introduced, purporting to be made in
accordance with the 9th article of the decree of the
11th of March, 1842, which is relied upon, and express-
ly made the basis of a batch of grants, filed by the
present claimant before this Board, as made by Michel-
torena ; in which grants he recites this license, as giv-
ing him the authority to dispose of the public domain
to this foreigner. Now, this attempt to sustain the
grant by force of the letter above mentioned, and of
the license to Limantour to purchase and hold lands in
the Department, is a blundering device, founded in such
a misconception of the true meaning of the instructions
of the law, as to stamp the transaction with fraud and
forgery. Who can believe that Micheltorena, acting as
Governor under Santa Anna, would have been so igno-
rant as to make a mistake in the construction of the
decree of Santa Anna in regard to the disposition of
the public domain to foreigners. By an examination of
the decree, on the 9th section of which this license is
founded, it wilL.be manifest that the section itself has
reference only to the acquisition of private property,
by purchase of private individuals, and has no relation
to the public domain. Not one section in that decree,
but the 12th, makes any mention of the public domain,
and that expressly forbids its distribution, except by
the Supreme Government, as the representative of the
sovereignty of the nation. The law would be wholly in-
consistent with itself, if any other construction were
put upon it. As an authority to a foreigner to purchase
and sell real estate in this Department, bordering on
foreign nations, the 9th section is a sensible restriction
upon the general authority, given in the 1st section
;
bat if construed to authorize a grant by the Depart-
mental Government of the public domain, it would be
wholly inconsistent with the 12th section, which re-
serves the power to grant it to a foreigner, to the Su-
preme Government, in all the Departments of the
Bepublic, whether bordering on foreign nations, or on
the sea-coast, or not in either predicament. By exam-
ining all the sections of this act of the 11th of March,
1842, it will bear no other construction than this, that
all its sections from 1 to 12 relate to the purchase of
private property, and that the 12th alone refers to the
public domain.
It must be borne in mind that, prior to that Decree,
foreigners could not acquire, except as " Colonizadores,"
under the various Colonization Laws, any real estate in
Mexico. This is expressly declared by the 13th section
of the "Ley Constitutional," quoted on the 668th page
of Escriche, title, " Estranjeros." In the same author,
same page, that very law is declared to be repealed,
and by reference to the title there referred to, it will be
seen that the repealing law is that of the 11th of March,
1842. (See Escriche, title " Natural," page 1279, and
paragraph commencing " Los estranjeros gozan en la
republica," &c, and ending " En estas reglas no estan
comprendidos los colonizadores.") If the law first
above quoted from Escriche relates only to private pro-
perty, that which repeals it can refer only, of course,
to the same. The conditions and limitations of the
property named in the various sections of the law of
the 11th of March, 1842, as in the 3d and 4th, show
conclusively that reference is only made therein to pri-
vate property ; and the 9th section, whatever it may
have promised as to the future colonization laws, de-
clares that nothing shall ever permit such acquisition
of property by a foreigner, within the Departments
therein mentioned, unless he be expressly licensed by
the Supreme Government. At all events, the 12th sec-
tion of said law, as it has always been understood and
acted upon, prevents any foreigner from acquiring the
Public Domain, except by direct application to and
contract with the Supreme Government at Mexico.
This bungling and forced construction was never put
upon the instructions nor the law of 1842, by Bocane-
gra and Micheltorena, nor would Micheltorena, whilst
he was Governor of California, have ever ventured upon
the disposition of the public domain of Mexico, under
a license issued under the 9th section of the act of the
11th of March, 1842. But as much is done by the par-
ticipators in this scheme, as could be done at the late
period of its concoction, to avoid the difficulties in the
way. This celebrated letter of license from Bocanegra
to Limantour, of which no trace is found in the archives
of California or Mexico, attempts to reach back and to
go beyond its proper subject (which was a mere license
to Limantour to buy private property) , and to embrace
the present claim now under consideration. This may
have been considered a master-stroke in the concoction
of this fraud. All, however, will not do. If the De-
partmental Governor had no power to grant or sell the
public domain to a foreigner ; then the contract for the
disposition of it, by the sovereign power, should be
monumented among the archives of the Supreme Gov-
ernment at Mexico. The grant to Austin in Texas is
there found. The grant to Garay , under the Provisional
Government of Santa Anna, which is similar to this, is
also there found, as the history of the country will
show ; but this transaction has no trace of its existence
in those Archives. If there was, it surely would have
been, as it ought to have been, produced by the party
whose rights depended upon it.
If the proceedings of Micheltorena, which are in-
sisted upon as conferring a full and perfect title, as in
form of language they do, were in truth ever adopted
by the Supreme Government, as its contract with Li-
mantour, still that contract, when so adopted, belonged
to the archives of the Supreme Government, which
alone could make the grant.
The document called the ratification of the grant of
Micheltorena, which ratification or marginal decree, is
dated the 18th of April, 1843, as I understand it, reaf-
firms the power of Micheltorena to make this grant,
" as based upon pre-existing lawful provisions, and
granted to the local authority of California." Now,
Bocanegra, as he valued his political existence, nay, his
nataral life, would never during his official position,
have made such an assertion. Indeed, it may be re-
garded as a kind of semi-official decree, as it wants the
universal caption of its official execution. He may
have asserted power in Santa Anna to do such an act,
but never, that it existed in his subordinate officers.
The power in this case to grant by Micheltorena, is
claimed as a power derived to him, from Santa Anna.
The futility of such a pretension we think is fully ex-
posed. But we think that even Santa Anna himself
could not have disposed, at the date of this pretended
grant, of the public domain to a foreigner. Every
Constitution of the Mexican Government, as that of the
United States of America, ^prohibits any disposition of
the public domain except by Congress, or, which is the
same thing, in accordance with laws enacted by it.
Congress in Mexico, is the representatives of sove-
reignty. The laws of nations alway attribute to that
sovereignty the right of disposing of the public do-
main. See Vattel, 226* where the same language is
used which is adopted in the 12th section of the Act of
the 11th of March, 1842. That section declares that as
to the public laud of the whole Republic, it shall only
be disposed of to foreigners by contract with the Su-
preme Government, as the representative of the Nation.
So far as relates to the disposition of the public domain
to foreigners, Santa Anna himself has thus limited that
power to the Supreme Government.
"We are warranted in declaring, that by the basis of
Tacubaya of the 28th of September, 1841, Articles 6
and 7, and by the Convention of Estanzuela of the 6th
of October, 1841, this grant should be now held void,
even if made and signed as the grant made by Santa
Anna was, in a case perfectly parallel with this, to wit,
the grant to Garay. The interpretation of those funda-
mental laws of the Mexican Government, as made by
themselves, ought to be regarded as the best exponent
of this meaning. In the statement made by the Mexi-
can Government with regard to the Garay grant, which
was the subject of a National controversy between the
United States and Mexico, that Government announced
two propositions
; first, that the acts of the Provisional
Government in force during the suspension of the Con-
stitutional rule, although legitimate in their origin,
were subject to the approval of Congress. Second,
that those acts were void, at least those which disposed
of the public domain without the ratification of Con-
gress. See for the basis of Tacubaya, and Convention
of Estanzuella, volume of Decrees and Orders of the
Provisional Government for the years 1841 and 1842,
pages 4 and 5. For the Decree of the 11th of March,
1843, see the same volume, page 374-6 ; also Rockwell,
611, for the translation of said Decree. (Instructions
to Micheltorena, Wheeler's Land Titles in San Fran-
cisco, 118.)
This claim is relied upon as being a full and perfect
grant by Micheltorena, under ample power to make it
;
and also that it has been properly confirmed, by ths Su-
preme Government of Mexico. Now, as a grant by
Micheltorena, without any other intervention, it is' a
perfect nullity, being a grant of public domain (not
under any colonization laws) to a foreigner. As to its
confirmation by the marginal decree written upon it,
as is pretended by Bocanegra, if Micheltorena had any
power to make such a grant, it might be admitted that
its proper ratifications would be good ; but in this case,
as the law then stood, he could not take even the initia-
tive of a grant, much less make a perfect one. The
12th section of thr above recited Act of the 11th of
March, 1842, declares that the whole procedure in such
a case is by contract with the Supreme Government.
As remarked above, the archives of that Government
is the proper depository of its own contracts. It has
no place in the archives of'the Departmental Govern-
ment, because its subject is expressly withdrawn from
its jurisdiction ; and if found there, has been foisted
into them. As a contract between the Supreme Gov-
ernment and Limantour, its constituent part should,
and would appear in the archives at Mexico. That
marginal decree, if it be considered as connecting it-
self with the acts of Micheltorena, and thus forming
a contract, ought, together with the entire negotiation,
which are parts of one whole, to be found in the ar-
chives at Mexico, just as if it had been such a formal
contract as is required by the 12th section of the Act
of the 11th March, 1842.
We will notice, in conclusion, the general objection
to the testimony taken on the part of the Goverment
by the claimant, made at the taking of the depositions,
9and called to the attention of the Board at the submis-
sion of the case. We understand this objection to em-
brace the following enumerated heads of evidence
:
The statement of many of the old inhabitants of the
Pueblo, that they never heard of this pretended claim
until its submission to the Board in February. 1853
;
the acts of Limantour in not claiming the property for
the space of ten years, whilst valuable improvements
were being made upon it, under public grants to indi-
viduals, which improvements were made under his
eyes ; his application to an authorized public officer for
a lot of ground within the bounds now claimed by him
;
his attempting to prove documents signed by Michel-
torena, Bocanegra, and Jimeno, by other persons, in-
stead of showing them to those parties, who were
equally accessible as those to whom he resorted,
especially in the case of Jimeno, who was examined
as a witness. Now, the broad proposition that nega-
tive evidence cannot prevail over positive, is not tena-
able
;
(see 1 Starkie, 518 ; but furthermore, there is a
wide distinction between what is commonly called neg-
ative, as opposed to positive evidence, and circumstan-
tial evidence of positive facts, which conduce to estab-
lish the negative of a given proposition. The proposition
alleged on the part of the claimant is, that his grant is
a genuine one, made at the time and by the persons, as
lit purports. Our proposition is, on the contrary, that
it is not genuine, but is either forged out and out, or
written upon paper abstracted from the archives over
genuine signatures and ante-dated, or concocted by a
joint conspiracy in fraud of the Government. All the
proofs of this character, which we rely upon to support
pur proposition, are proper, according to the rules of
vidence as laid down and recognized in the following
mthorities : 12 Wheat., 585-6, particularly in the last
paragraph of the opinion of the Court ; 1 Starkie, 484,
L86, 489, 490, and note. As to the statements and ad-
nissions made by Jouan, we have endeavored to lay the
bundation for their introduction, by proving his com-
)lieity with the claimant. If that preliminary be es-
tablished, then his admissions are competent, for he
fould not be compelled to testify if he were here, to his
>wn infamy. 8 Leigh, 679, cited in 1st Supt. U. S. Digest,
>age 705, section 1124. The evidence of Parrott and
ithers has already been commented upon, as laying
he foundation for the introduction of Jouan's admis-
sions. The principle of law authorizing the introduc-
ion of Jouan's admissions, is the same upon which
Jmantour's are received. That principle is, that con-
federates in an unlawful act constitute one individual,
>ody or person, and his being an agent, is not at all in-
compatible with his being a conspirator. If he acted
rith the mind, in conjunction with Limantour, to ac-
lOmplish the same end, which he was as here, interested
i accomplishing, he is an accomplice to all intents and
urposes, as well as an agent or tool of the chief bene-
ciary in the unlawful project. See 3d Greenleaf Evi,.
age 82, paragraph 89, for the definition of conspira-
cy
; as also 2 Peters, 365. The admissions are part of
ie res gestae in this case ; because the purpose was
ot the mere forgery, but through that as a means, to
rocure a confirmation of the claim ; and the time,
"om the inception to that consummation, is the scope
of the transaction, and embraced by the term res gestce.
But even if the claim should be held to be valid, two
questions arise in this case which will next be consid-
ered in connection, touching the construction of the
grant, and the extent of its confirmation by this Board.
First. Is not the grant in this case by a just con-
struction, clearly of property outside of what was call-
ed in this petition and grant the Pueblo of Yerba
Bnena, since called San Francisco. And, secondly,
whether this Board will take jurisdiction, so as to con-
firm to the claimant in this case any parcel of land
within the limits of San Francisco, as it has held them
to have been established by the public acts of the for-
mer government.
On the first question, the claim as presented shows
that there was a regularly established Pueblo of Yerba
Buena at the commencement of the pretended Espedi-
ente on the 10th of January, 1843 ; and that the pre-
tended grant is of nothing inside of that Pueblo. There
must be conceded, according to the petition, concession,
grant and authentication of it by Bocanegra, to have
been at that time a well known established and recog-
nized Pueblo of Yerba Buena ; so known and recogniz-
ed by the claimant, and by both governments, Supreme
and Departmental. If such Pueblo existed, which must
be considered as true, (if this whole matter is not a for-
gery,) then its southern boundary line constitues the
northern line of this grant ; and this Board, if it should
declare the claim to be valid, must limit and confine
the same in their confirmation, to such land as lies out-
side of and to the south of such Pueblo boundary. It
cannot be a just and proper determination of the limits
of the Pueblo, to measure four hundred varas from
Bichardson's old house, in any direction, and fix the
Pueblo Line east and west, or northeast and southwest
from the end of said four hundred varas. For the Pueblo
line is the controlling call in this grant, and the dis-
tance of it, from Richardson's house, is a mere matter
of subordinate description. If the said four hundred
varas fall short of the Pueblo line, or overgo it, still
the Pueblo line must be the line of the grant. Is the
line of the Pneblo to be considered as located by the
call of four hundred varas from Richardson's house, or
is the land granted to be located by the Pueblo bound-
ary? The Pueblo boundary is supposed in the grant
to have an independent existence, already created and
established by such public decrees and action of public
functionaries, theretofore put into requisition, according
to the laws of the country ; and the call of distance
from Richardson's house must yield to that established
Pueblo boundary wherever it may be. [7 Wheaton, 7.
Peters, 218.]
The Pueblo of Yerba Buena (as all legal Pueblos)
was laid off, if the nature of the ground would permit,
so many leagues in each direction towards the cardinal
points, from some actual
i
oint, as a plaza or custom-
house, or chapel, or presidio ; and the petition and
grant in this case describe the northern line of the
grant, as extending along the southern boundary line
from northeast to southwest, the distance of two
leagues.
But it may be asked, where is that boundary of the
Pueblo ? This I admit is an all important inquiry in
2
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considering the second question above stated ; for if
this Board cannot confirm to a private claimant any
land within the city limits, as established by the Mexi-
can Government prior to the 7th of July, 1846 ; then
the jurisdiction of the Board, which must be determin-
ed by and for itself, must be settled by considering the
public acts and decrees of a former government, regu-
lating the matter. 1 Greenl. Ev. 8. 1 Strange, 469.
A Pueblo is a public, political, territorial demarka-
tion, which must be judicially noticed by the Board,
whenever the decrees and documents establishing it,
are brought to its knowledge
;
just as a Common Law
principal, found in books of recognized authority on
the English Law ; and once known, are not to be
proved in every case where it may arise, like private
facts, or matter in pais. The effect of the 14th section
of the act of 1851, is to require the Board to fix the
boundaries of towns in such manner as is satisfactory
to themselves, upon the best lights of decrees, and au-
thentic acts of the former government, which they will
notice judicially, when brought to their knowledge ; so
that the question of jurisdiction, may not be fluctua-
ting in each case aud cause them to exclude from their
consideration a claim to land in one case, as being
within the Pueblo, and take cognizance of a claim for
land adjoining it, although in fact in the same predica-
ment with regard to the Pueblo limits. It is apparent
that a large portion of the grant in this case is within
the limits of the Pueblo, as establish d by the public
decrees and records of the country, brought to the
knowledge of this Board, and recognized as authentic
in the claim filed by the city of San Francisco ; the de-
cree for which is filed in this case.
If however it should be considered by the Board that
the true construction of the grant is not to embrace
lands only outside of the Pueblo limits, but that it em-
braces land within its boundaries as above recognized,
we think it can be demonstrated that this Board has
no jurisdiction as to that portion of the land claimed,
lying within the Pueblo limits, as thus recognized by
this Board. This depends upon the construction of the
14th section of the act of 3d March, 1851. We will en-
deavor to maintain that the fact of the land being
claimed by a grant from the government, and not from
the corporation, does not alter the matter ; but that
all lands lying within the Pueblo, as established by the
Mexican Government, are excluded from presentation
to this Board, by the individual owner for a portion
thereof.
It is enacted in the first part of said section 14th,
that if a town be constituted in California with the
powers and rights, and in the mode knomi to the for-
mer laws of the country prior to the 7th of July, 1846,
no claim to lots derived from such corporation shall be
presented to the Board. But it is apparent, if that
were the extent of the enactment, it would leave a ne-
cessity to present by the individual owners, all claims
to such lots within the limits of such town, which
claims were not derived from the corporation, but
from the government directly, either before or af-
ter the legal establishment of the city. This would
lead to the inconvenience which was intended to be
avoided, of incumbering the Board with such a vast
multitude of claims. To obviate that great inconveni-
ence in the same sentence of the section the necessity of
the presentation of such claim is removed, by extending
the exemption in the following words : " Nor to any
city, or town, or village lot, which city, town or village
existed on the 7th of July, 1846 ; but the claim for the
same shall be presented by the corporate authorities of
the said town." And here it may be remarked that the
word same must mean the same city, &c; for the con-
struction that the word same relates to its more remote
antecedent " lot," would let in all the inconvenience
intended to be avoided, and only change the name of
the claimant, without diminishing the number of cases.
This presentation by the corporate authorities was
never intended to have the effect of taking away a
right of property from a lot holder, derived to him from
any competent authority, other than the city ; but the
presentation by the city, and proof of its existence as
such, shall be prima facie evidence as against the
United States of America, of all right ; upon which
she will release all claim within the city limits, leaving
j
the rights of all persons claiming property within those
established limits, to be tested and tried before the reg-
ular tribunals of justice. Not that a title to any lot
within the city derived immediately from the Gov-
ernment of Spain or Mexico, is to be held void, or
transferred to the corporation ; but only that so far as
the United States is concerned, the matter of individual
right, is to be held, just as if the act of 1851 had never
been enacted. It takes away the jurisdiction of the
Board without taking away the rights of any parties.
This view of Section 14 of the Act of 1851 is clearly
manifested (as is humbly conceived,) by the provision
made for the class of towns, situated on land original-
ly granted to private individuals; in which case, the
claim for the whole city is to be presented by the origi-
nal grantee ; though in this class all the lot holders
may claim by deeds directly from the owner of the
land, who is the founder of the town, and none of them
from the corporation. Here, in this class, as far as
the city extends, the United States requires no proof of
the grant ; it is to be taken prima facie as valid.
Outside of the city limits the claim mnst be held by
the Board to be valid or not, according to the princi-
ples of decision laid down in Section 11th of the Act.
The claim of Limantour so far as any portion of it is
within the city, is not within jurisdiction of the Board.
But if his claim is valid for any property in the city, he
may bring suit in the ordinary tribunals of the county
for lots within the city, just as if the Act of 3d March,
1851, nor any law like it had ever been passed. It
surely never was intended to defeat any private right
which existed to any property which lay within the
limits of the city, but only to declare, that to that ex-
tent the United States would assert no claim ; and to
simplify the action of the Board by preventing the in-
finite number of town lots being presented. As re-
gards the last class of towns mentioned in the 14th I
Section, which embraces only towns coming into exis-i
tence after the 6th of July, 1846, and before the pas||
sage of the Act of 1851, no matter whether on public;
land or covering land, contained in one or more grants,)
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the claim for all within the city limits is to be present-
ed by the corporate authorities.
The 14th Section of this Act is not based upon the
idea that all the lots in the towns of California were,
at the date of the Act or at any time before, the prop-
erty of the corporation. The object of that Section
was : First, to prevent the presentation (as required
by the 8th Section of that Act,) by every person
claiming any, even the smallest town lot, as it would
greatly encumber the proceedings of the Board and
increase the costs of the claimants ; Secondly, to de-
clare that so far as the United States was concerned,
she would presume a grant of the land at least to those
towns which existed prior to 7th July, 1846. This libe-
ral provision in favor of all her citizens thus congre-
gated into a town is one familiar with our Government.
It is for the benefit of the whole country that towns
should be encouraged, as they make the public domain
in their vicinity more valuable, and advance the inter-
ests of manufacfcues, and of agriculture, by furnishing
a certain and regular market for their productions.
If the limits of the Pueblo have not been satisfac-
torily established as a matter of law, which the Board
will judicially notice in every case by a distinct and
precise location, at least, enough is established to see
that a large portion of this claim is within what they
have considered without doubt to be its limits ; and the
decree if they should consider the claim valid at all,
should only confirm that portion of it, if any, which is
outside of those limits.
Here is another legal point applicable to the facts of
this case, which will now be considered. This preten-
ded grant was made on the 27th of February 1843
—
The neglect to take possession of, or even to make
known to the community, the existance of a claim to
land, which may well have been selected for its great
prospective value, until within one month of its bar,
for non presentation, viz : 3rd March 1853, is not only
morrally incompatible with its genuiness ; but even if
genuine in its origin, ought to defeat the claim, on ac-
count of its abaadvnment. The abandonment of any-
thing, so as to authorize the belief of third parties that
it has no owner ; and being so derelict, may justify
them^in acquiring it, is a distinctive ground of law af-
fecting property in all countries. The length of the
time of disusage, necessary to lose a right once exist-
ng, is prescribed by the laws of some countries, and
differs in extent ; as there is also a differance in the
manner of acquiring such property by third persons'
The Supreme Court ofthe United States in many cases
decided under acts of Congress carrying out former
treaties for territory acquired from foreign governments
and in the case of Fremont, have established the doc-
trine of abandonment. Their decisions related to the
neglect in performing conditions precedent to the pas-
sing of the legal title, except in the case of Fremont,
where it is recognized, as applying to property held by
a full legal title. The length of time necessary in the
opinion of the Supreme Court to constitute such aban-
donment, has no*, been definitely settled. Perhaps,
length of time, ought not to be of itself,the sole criterion,
but other attending circumstances ought to:,be taken
into the account ; and in many cases, those circum-
stances are more indicative of abandonment, than the
lapse of time itself. It is not like the statute of lim-
itation, where a specific time is prescribed, and made
to bar aright. But its essence consists, in the inten-
tion
,
as deduced from the facts of the case, not to count
the property, or care for it any longer ,as his own. The
definition of abandonment, as given in Leys 49 and 59
title 28 part id.3, is, as translated, in the following
words : "Ha proprietor abandon voluntarily anything
whether real or personal property, with the mind of
counting it no longer in the number of his goods, on
account of its being useless, or troublesome, or from
mere caprice, he shall lose his right,and it shall become
the property of the first one, who may occupy it."
—
The circumstances in this case, the pretended grantee
being, as the grant shows, a resident, furnish as strong
grounds to declare the property abandoned, as exist in
most of the decided cases, Tbe proof shows every op-
portunity of exercising acts of ownership and declaring
his right of property. He was on the ground at differ-
ent times, in 1844 and 1847, andif ever he made known
any claim, it was done in secret, and to two persons
only, both of whom are long since dead, viz : Dr. Haro
and Ridley, whose statements must be repudiated as
mere jrhear-say now detailed by Richardson, who
strange to say, was himself mute upon the matter, tho'
residing all the while in the midst of those who were
buying, and building on the very property, as they de-
rived it from the City of San Francisco.
There is one matter connected with this grant, which
ought not to be overlooked, that is, the want of the at-
testation of the Secretary of the State. By the law of
1837, it is required that the official acts of the Govern-
or in this regard, should be attested by Secretary of
State. Under this act, it is just as necessary for the
Secretary to attest, as for the Govorner to sign. In the
absence of that attestation, the grant is insufficient to
transfer the legal title. The pretended ratification of
Bocanegra, nor his license to Limantour (if it had any
legal bearing upon this grant,) nor the celebrated in-
structions of Micheltorena did not create any new gran-
tingpower, nor dispense with the prescribed mode of
making a grant of the public domain. Under the colo-
nization law or Ordinance of 1828, such omission might
be sustained, by the letter of that Ordinance, which
required the signature of the Govorner alone. But
this grant is not pretended to be made under the colo-
nization laws ; and falls under the general law of 1837,
prescribing the duties in this regard, of the Govorner
and Secretary. If the grant is a nullity, as a transfer
of the legal title, where will we look for those Equities,
which would still, under the act of 3rd March, 1851,
authorize its confirmation. As to Limantour's advan-
ces of money and goods to Micheltorena, if not paid for
in the mode indicated in the instructions to him, nor in
some other way by the Mexican government, which has
been done long ago—the equity of such debt, may be
good against Mexico ; but does not attach to this land,
transferred without any notice, to the U. S. and to her
citizens, who long before this claim ever saw the light,
purchased and improved it.
\
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Jose Y. Limantour vs. the United States.—For four
square leagues of land in San Francisco county.
—
The petitioner claims two parcels of land situated in
San Francisco county, each containing two square
leagues, and described by rnetes and bounds.
In support of bis claim he has given in evidence a
document purporting to be a grant made to himself
in consideration of money and goods furnished for
the use of the Government, by Governor Michael
Micheltorena, on the 27th day ofFebruary, 1843. On
this docement, in the margin, is a written approval,
by the Supreme Provincial Government, and of a
confirmation to said Limantour of the granted pre-
mises. This decree or certificate is dated April 18,
1843, and is signed by Bocanegra, at that time Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs of the Government.
The genuineness of the signature of Micheltorena
is sworn to by W. E. P. Hartnell, Isaac D. Marks,
Francisco Acre and Victor Prudon; that of Bocane-
gra is substantiated by the testimony of said Marks,
Jose B. Gozales and Jose Abrigo.
In further support of his claim, and to show the
making of the grant at the time it bears date, and for
the consideration therein expressed, the petitioner has
presented the following evidence
:
First—Proof that Governor Micheltorena arrived
at Los Angeles to assume the Government of Califor-
nia, with a force of some five hundred men, in Au-
gust or September, 1842; that he continued there un-
til the month of August following, when he went to
Monterey,where he remained exercising the functions
of Governor until he left the country, on the 26th day
of March, 1845; that while at Los Angeles he was
in want of means to support himself and his fol-
lowers, and that he made many grants of public lands
while he remained at Los Angeles. These facts are
substantiated by the depositions of several witnesses.
Second—A letter from Governor Micheltorena to Jose
Y. Limantour, dated Los Angeles, January^ 1S$S, stat
inghis want of resources, and that he has been informed
of his arrival, and that he has in bis possession money
and merchandise, and he proposes to make an arrange-
ment with him for a suppiy of such as he needed. " I
will give," be writes, " in payment sight drafts payable
at Mazatlan, by the house of Becher & Co. I further
promise to secure to you the contracts of all that which
the Department may require, and also that which you
may want for your vessel to carry a profitable trade. I
will use my best endeavors so that you may realize great
advantage; shouid you prefer lands in this country, I
can give you such as you may select, and which are va-
cant, as I have full powers to that effect in both the Cali-
fornias; and that above all, it is necessary for my troops
and myself to live and to extricate ourselves from this
wretched condition." The signature of Micheltorena
to the document is proved to be genuine by the testimo-
ny of W. E. P. Hartnell and Thomas O. Larkin , and Vic-
tor Prudon swears that he took the letter from Los An-
geles and delivered it to Limantour at San Pedro, where
his Vessel was, at or about the time of its date; that Lim-
antour understood the Spanish language but imperfectly,
and at his request the witness read the letter to him,
and Limantour returned with him to Los Angeles, and
there completed arrangements with the Governor to
furnish supplies.
Third—A certified copy of a communication from Bo-
canegra, Minister of Exterior Belations and Government
at Mexico to Governor Micheltorena, stating that an
official note of Micheltorena, inclosing the memorial of
Don Jose P. Limantour, soliciting permission to acquire
property in the Department of California, had been laid
before the President, and the latter, " in consideration
of the good deportment and services which this foreign
individual has rendered to that very Department, and
conformably with article 9th of the Decree of the 11th
March of the year last past, whereby the Government
reserved to itself the power of granting to foreigners
that sort of permission, has been pleased to grant to him,
the said Limantour, sufficient leave, that he may acquire,
besides the property which he has already acquired and
has been recognized by the Supreme Government, fur-
ther country, town, or any other kind of property, con-
formably with the said Decree and the laws of Coloniza-
tion." This order bears date October 7, 1343, and the
copy thereof which is here produced prepared for the pe-
titioner as evidence of his rights, (the original being re-
tained in the archives,) is signed by the Governor Mi-
cheltorena, and by Jimino the Secretary, and bears the
date of December 25, 1843. The genuineness of the_sig-
nature to this certificate is proved by W. E . P. Hart-
nell.
Fourth—A copy of an Expediente, the original of
which is proved to be in the office of the Becorder of
Monterey county, consisting of a petition to the Gover-
nor by said Limantour, for a grant of the land claimed
in this case, dated January 10, 1843, a marginal decree
by Gov. Micheltorena, made on the next day, referring
it for information to the competent Justice, and a de-
cree reciting that, by the proper investigation by the
Judge, the land appears to be vacant, and directing
title for the same to be issued to the petitioner. This
decree of concession is dated February 25, 1843, two
days before the date of the grant to Limantour, which
is given in evidence. In his petition to the Governor,
Limantour proposes to purchase the land described, and
offers as a consideration therefor, to deliver to the De-
partmental Treasury a receipt for the sum of four thou-
sand dollars, on account of " a larger amount due to me
from the Public Hacienda ;" and the grant is accordingly
made "in consideration of the good services which he
has rendered to the Department."
The original Espediente in the Becorders Office, was
examined by the witness Hartnell, who testifies to the
genuineness of the signatures thereto, and further says
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that the body of the two decrees, as well as the signa-
tures thereto, are without doubt in the proper hand-
writing of Gov. Micheltorena.
Fifth—An official communication from Manuel Jimeno
Written by order of the Governor, to William A. Bich-
ardson, Captain of the Port of San Francisco, dated
.Tan. 14th, 1843, requiring information relative to the
lands bordering on the Bay of San Francisco and those
pertaining to the Pueblo of Terba Buena, and request-
ing that he furnish a map thereof. This document pro-
ceeds as follows: " Capt. Don Jose Y. Limantour has
asked by way of payment to be granted a tract of two
leagues long by one wide, a little more or less, in the
lands that he says do not appertain to the Pueblo de la
Yerba Buena, its boundaries commencing about four
hundred varas from your house, beginning from the side
of the same beach, where it turns the whole side to two
hundred varas distant from the Mission; and besides,
Capt. Limantour asks one league of land wide and one
and a half long, commenoiug from ' La Estacada' or
'Fondcadero Antique;' taking alone: the beach to the
northwest, turning to the ' Punta de Lobos,' and fol-
lowing to the northeast along the beach of the Castle,
leaving the tract which said Castle occupies distant two
hundred varas, and following the beach to the ' Estaca-
da,' where it began." The genuineness of Jimeno's sig-
nature to this document is testified to by said Bichard-
Bon, who also testifies that he received it in the same
month in which it is dated, that Francisco de Haro re-
ceived one of the same tenor at the same time; that he
(Eichardson) wrote the Governor in answer to the com-
munication, and forwarded to him therewith a map of
the place, which was a copy of an original map here
presented and made evidence.
Sixth—Jose Abrigo sweats that all the accounts of
receipts and disbursements by Governor Micheltorena,
passed through his hands, as the Commissary of the
Department in 1845; that a list of such receipts and
disbursements was put into his hands and examined by
him, and among them was the account with Limantour;
that by it, it appeared that Limantour had advanced to
the Government some sixty or seventy thousand dollars,
and had received in drafts on Mazatlan either $56,009 or
$66,000; that there was an item of credit in Limantour's
account for a certificate for lands in Upper and Lower
California, for upwards of $6000. The witness further
states that, on the written order of the Governor, he
gave to Limantour a certificate that he (Limantour) had
received a specified sum, upwards of six thousand dol-
lars, in money, for certain lands which had been granted
to Limantour, and for which titles had been issued by
the Departmental Government. This certificate was
given about a year before Micheltorena left the country.
The witness further states it was given to enable Li-
mantour, who was about to leave for Mexico, to obtain
the approval of his grants by the Supreme Government.
Seventh—Testimony tending to show that Limantour
in fact did advance to Governor Micheltorena money and
goods at Los Angeles, at or about the time the grant
bears date, as indicated by the documents and evidence
above mentioned. Victor Prudon and Vicente Perfecto
Gomez swear to the delivery of money and goods by the
claimant for the use of the troops, in the latter part of
1842 or beginning of 1843. Eafael Sanchez, who was
Clerk to the Military Secretary at the time, testifies
that the money and goods Were so furnished in January,
February, March and April, of 1843, and that Liman-
tour himself came to Los Angeles when these supplies
were furnished. Manuel Jimeno states that Michelto-
rena and Limantour were at Los Angeles, negotiating
together, in the last of the year 1842 and the beginning
of 1843; that Limantour sold goods on credit to Michel-
torena, for which he received drafts on the Custom
House at Mazatlan, and on the Government of Mexico;
that he understood that he was also soliciting from
Micheltorena grants of land, but that he (witness) left-
Los Angeles before the negotiation closed, and does not
know whether the grants were made or not. This wit-
ness also states that as secretary he asked for informa-
tion relative to the lands petitioned for by Limantour,
but does not recollect to what authority the order for a
report was addressed. Francisco Arce testifies that Li-
mantour was at Los Angeles at th'J time More men-
tioned, and that he furnished goods, provisions, and
money for the use of the troops.
Eighth—Testimony tending to show that the grant
now presented was known at or about the time it bears
date to have been made, and that it cannot therefore be
a recent fabrication.
Jose Eafael Gonzales testifies that on his arrival in
the country Micheltorena proposed to give the witness a
grant of lands at Yerba Buena, which he declined to re-
ceive; that subsequently the Custom House, of which
he was the chief officer, was ordered to be removed to
Yerba Buena, and that he made an application in writing
for a grant of land at that place, and that Micheltorena
answered in a letter "that he could not grant to me the
lands at Yerba Buena because he had already granted
thorn to Jose Y. Limantour." This was a short time
before Micheltorena left the country, which occurred in
March, 1845; and he says further, that Micheltorena
subsequently told him that the "grant of the lands at
Yerba Buena had been made to Limantour by him in
virtue of the Government's indebtedness to said Liman-
tour and for the purpose of paying that indebtedness,
and that said grant or sale had been approved by the
Supreme Government at Mexico." Jose Castro swears-
that Limantour told him in 1845 that he had a grant of
land near San Francisco by purchase of Governor Michel-
torena. Juan B. Alvarado says that he heard at Mon-*
terey, previous to the conquest of the country by the
Americans, that Limantour had lands granted or sold to
him at the North, without naming the place. William
A. Eichardson testifies that he was informed ofthe grant
to Limantour in 1844 by Eobert Eidley and Francisco de
Hare. Prudon swears that Limantour told him at the
time of the negotiation at Los Angeles that he intended
to apply for all the vacant . land between Yerba Buena
and the Mission Dolores; that after that, at the request
of Limantour, he translated into Spanish a petition for
the land which he had written in the French language;
that it was then prescribed by Limantour and so pre-
sented to Micheltorena, and that he saw it some time
afterwards in the Secretary's office, with a decree of
Micheltorena granting the land and ordering the title to
be issued written thereon. He says, moreover, that it
was known at the time to the principal men that the
grant was made. Gomez says that it was a subject of
conversation at the time at Los Angeles among the offi-
cers, and that he heard Micheltorena say that he was
going to raise revenues or procure resources by granting
lands at Yerba Buena to said Limantour.
There is also filed a letter from Manuel Jimino to Li-
mantour, dated Angeles, February 2, 1843, stating that
his letter has been laid before the Governor, and recom-
mending that he call on the Governor after a few days
—
the delay being necessary because the Governor had
asked certain information on the subject-matter of the
communication. This letter does not specify the subject
on which the information had been ordered, but the date
and general tenor of it are such as to connect it with the
negotiation at Los Angeles developed in the testimony
above cited.
The genuineness of the signatures to all the documents
above mentioned seems to be proved beyond cavil, each
being substantiated by the testimony of persons well ac-
quainted with the handwriting of the signer, and no
witness has-been called on either side who expresses
even a doubt to siny of them.
In regard to the creditably of the witnesses who have
testified on behalf of the claimant, an impeachment has
been made, except in relation to two of them, Victor
Prudon and Vicente Perfecto Gomez.
The effort to impeach Prudon is found in the state-
ment of the witness Larkin, who swears that Prudon
told him in 1853 that the grant under which Limantour
claims was a manufactured paper.
It is a legitimate method of impeaching the credibili-
ty of a witness to show that he has made statements out
of Court, in relation to the subject-matter of the contro-
versy, different from his statements as a witness under
oath, but in order to give evidence of the former the rule
is well settled that the witness sought to be impeached
must himself be first asked whether he did or did not
make such previous statement. This rule is founded on
the plainest principles of justice to the witness, and &
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disregard of it would, in the words of Abbott, C. J., in
the Queen's case, [2 Brod. and Bing, 313,] have "an
unfair effect upon him and his credit, and would deprive
him of that reasonable protection which it is the duty of
•every Court to afford to every person who appears as a
•witness on one side or the other." Mr. Greenleaf adds
also as the reason of the rule [General Ev. §462] that
"' common justice requires that by first calling his atten-
tion to the subject he should have an apportunity to re-
collect the facts, and, if necessary, to correct the state-
ment already given, as well as by re-examination to ex-
plain the nature and design of what he is proved else-
where to have said." And the rule in this respect is the
same where depositions are used as where the witness
appears before the Court on the hearing of the case.
Unless the foundation be first laid by asking the witness
whether he made such statements, proof that he did
makethem out of Court cannot be admitted to impeach
him.
In the examination of Prudon as a witness, the coun-
sel for the Government did not see fit to interrogate him
in regard to such statements. They were not, therefore,
entitled to the evidence which is presented on the sub-
ject, and it cannot be available for the purpose of im-
peachment. The proof of the declaration of Prudon is
also subject to another objection. It is given by the wit-
ness Larkin, who is shown by his own testimony to be
largely interested in defeating this claim.
The witness Gomez is sought to be impeached by the
testimony of Larkin and Johnson. Johnson swears that
in 1852 Gomez told him that this was a fraudulent claim,
&c, and Gomez denies that he ever told him so. Larkin
swears that Gomez told him that he expected to derive
great benefit from finding the papers (expediente) in
this case; that Limantour had promised to give him a
two hundred vara lot on his claim in San Francisco, and
desired witness to select it for him; that he afterwards
said that Limantour would not give him the land, but
had given him money. This statement is denied by Go-
mez. The testimony of Larkin on this point is subject
to the same objection above mentioned, but that of John-
son seems entitled to its full weight.
We will now refer to some of the points and proof re
lied on by the government as stamping this claim with
the character of a gross fraud.
1. It is claimed that the expediente proved in the
case is fraudulent in its character, and the testimony of
Gomez of its being found in the County Recorder's office
in Monterey, a fabrication.
Gomez testified that he found the document, of which
that presented is a certified and sworn copy, among
some old documents, chiefly relating to Mexican land
I titles, in the Recorders office, in June, 1843. Gleason,
the Recorder, testifies that he was present when Gomez
took it from among these papers. There appears to
have been a large quantity of these ancient Spanish doc-
uments belonging to the archives of the former govern-
.
ment, which after various changes had finally come into
the Recorder's office. They seem to have been miscel-
laneous in their character, and were evidently in a state
of great irregularity and confusion. Gomez says he dis-
covered the document accidentally, while searching
among them for another document ; that he returned it
Immediately to its place, and took advice of Jose Abrigo
about it before he made known to the Recorder that he
had discovered it; that he returned again to the office
with a friend, and disclosed it to the Recorder, and pro-
cured a certified copy, which is filed in the case. Evid
ence is given, on the part of the government, tending to
show that these papers had been repeatedly examined,
and no such paper found among them. This testimony,
negative although it is in its character, certainly tends
to establish a presumption that it came recently among
the papers, but the confused state of these documents,
the want of filing their miscellaneous character, and
the evident carelessness with which they had been
treated, detracts greatly from the strength of such a pre-
sumption.
In regard to the Expediente, it should be observed
that it was not a paper belonging to the Recorder's Of-
fice, and therefore would derive no additional weight as
evidence, from the circumstance of its being found there.
That it was not untimely, however, to be there at the
time referred to, is clear from the fact developed in the
proof that the Mexican archives were, at the time of the
conquest, scattered abroad, and that many of them, from
the same office to which the Expediente belonged, came
into the possession of the Recorder.
The production or proof of the Expediente has never
been deemed necessary in order to sustain a claim sub-
stantiated by the production and proof of the grant it-
self. It is, however, a document exhibiting the proceed-
ings preliminary to the grant, and when produced from
the archives to which it belongs, affords the most con-
vincing evidence that the grant was made. The distri-
bution of many of the old archives and the dispersion of
many others, sufficiently accounts for their absence from
the present official depository of such papers as have es-
caped the misfortune. If the expediente presented be
a genuine document, we have no difficulty in accounting
for its l>eing found in the Recorder's Office. Even if it
were found in the hands of Gomez or any other indi-
vidual, it would not be surprising from what we know
of the dispersion of these papers, nor even if it were re-
cently and surreptitiously placed by him among the do-
cuments in the Recorder's Office, provided it were
proved to be a genuine orig nal Expediente, would this
circumstance so stamp it with the character of fraud as
to destroy its effect as evidence.
The genuineness of this Expediente does not rest on
the testimony of Gomez alone. Mr. Hartnell, who ex-
amined the original at the Recorder's office, and whose
testimony is entitled to the most explicit reliance, states
that he believes the body and the signature to the peti-
tion, which constitutes a part of the Expediente, is in
the handwriting of said Limantour, and as to both the
body and the signature to the two decrees therein writ-
ten, he knows them to be iu the handwriting of Governor-
Micheltorena ; and the witness Plorencio Serrano testi-
fies that he was Judge of the First Instance of Monterey,
in 1848, and until April, 1849, under Col. Mason, and had
in his charge papers from the archives of the former
Government, and among them was an Expediente an*
swering precisely the description of this, and of which
the document filed in the case he believes to be a copy
The papers spoken of by the other witnesses, a part or
the whole of which were in the Recorder's office when
this Expediente was found, were evidently the same
spoken of by Serrano, and if his testimony is not utterly
false, the original Expediente was among them in the
latter part of 1S48, or the early part of 1849.
2. In the expediente, a reference is made hy mar-
ginal decree to the "proper Judge" for information,
and in the decree of concession it is stated that the
proper Judge had taken the necessary information,
and it resulted that the land was vacant; and in the
grant it is stated that, having instituted suitable pro-
ceedings and investigations, it resulted that the land
was vacant. The law agent for the Government
claims that he has proved that no reference was in
tact made to such Judge, or information given by
him, and the depositions of Francisco Sanchez and
Jose de Jesus Noe, who swear that they were at the
time First and Second Alcalde of San Francisco, are
relied on to sustain the proposition. Both deny any
knowledge of the matter.
The manner of obtaining information on applica-
tion for a grant of land alleged to be vacant, was con-
fided very much to the discretion of the Governor.
He did not ussually designate the particular person
by name to whom the reference for a report should
be made; and if he had done so, it would have been
fully competent for the Governor at any time to have
received the requisite information from another
source, and to have made the confession without
waiting for the report. This was within his discre-
tionary powers, and the recital in the decree of con-
cession and in the grant, if these be established as
genuine, are conclusive evidence that the proper re-
ports were received. Its truth could not be success-
fully controverted or the grant defeated by the ne-
gative testimony of the Judge, given years after-
wards, that he did not recollect being applied to for
confirmation on the subject. But there is other evi-
dence in the case tending to show that the Governor
did in fact seek and obtain information from another i
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; source besides the Alcalde. A letter from Jimeno,
,
^Secretary of the Government, to W. A. Eichardson,
(then, or shortly before, Captain of the Port of San
[Francisco,is given in evidence, requiring information
relative to the vacant lands on the Bay of San Fran-
cisco,and stating expressly that Limantour had made
I application for a grant of the premises now claimed
in payment for advances made, and describing the
lands fully by metes and bounds. He is required to
send a map of the place, and to act in the matter in
conjunction with the Judge of that jurisdiction.
This communication from Jimeno is dated Jan. 14th,
1843, and its genuineness seems unquestionable. It is
probably the same referred to by Jimeno in his deposi-
tion, where he states that he, as Secretary, asked for in-
formation as to some lands for which Limantour had
petitioned, although he does not recollect of what au-
thority it was asked. Eichardson also testifies that the
communication from Jimeno was received by him about
the latter part of January, 1843, by the hand of Franco
de Haro who was the former magistrate, and who is
proved by other witnesses to Lave been at that time
Clerk of the two Alcaldes, Sanchez and Noe. Eichard-
son further swears that he replied to this communica-
tion, giving to Gov. Micheltorena the required informa-
tion, and forwarding therewith a copy of a map which
is here presented. If this testimony be true, the Gover-
nor was in possession of the knowledge sought by him
in reference to these lands through this channel.
But the testimony of Eichardson shows that de Haro
had a similar communication on the subject when he
handed Jimeno's letter to him. If the information was
sought of de Haro, the former magistrate, and who was
one of the most competent business men of the country,
it is probable that he made a report which was received
by the Governor before the grant was made.
If the information was in fact sought of Sanchez or
Noe, the Alcaldes, as de Haro was their clerk, and as
such the proper person to prepare, under their direction,
the necessary reports, it is easy to perceive why the
communication on the subject should be in his hands.
Whether this paper was ever laid before either of them,
or, if so, whether the corresponding report was made,
does not appear by direct proof; they recollect nothing
of it; but if a report was made the records of the Al-
calde's office ought to show it. The proof shows no
search among these records where better evidence should
be found than in the negative proof of the Alcalde that
he does not recollect making such report.
The proof above referred to thus directly shows that
a reference for information was made to Eichardson,
and a report forwarded by him to the Governor before
the date of the grant; and, secondly, it raises a strong
presumption that a similar reference was made either to
De Haro individually, or to the Jusgado of which he
was clerk, and the papers requiring a report received
by him. If it was addressed to De Haro, the proof that
Sanchez and Noedo not recollect it, does not impair the
presumption that DeHaro made the proper report, as
stated in the Governor's decree of concession; and if
directed to Sanchez or Noe, their negative evidence of
the want of recollection on the subject, without a re-
course to the archives of the Jusgado, cannot be suffi-
cient to overthrow the official certificate of the Govern-
or, or to outweigh the presumption raised by the other
proofs in the case of the receipt by the Governor of the
information required by him from a satisfactory source.
3. It is claimed that the approval written on the grant
signed by Bocanegra, and the document recited in the
certificate of Micheltorena, purporting to have received
from the Supreme Government at Mexico, in the fall of
1843, authorising Limantour to receive grants of land,
cannot be genuine, because no record or other evidence
of them is found in the archives of Mexico. From the
depositions of the witnesses who testify relative to the
course of business in the public offices of the Supreme
Governrnent, it will be seen that the entry on the grant
being a mere marginal decree, is not of such a character
as under the practice would be recorded or note made of
it at those departments. The absence of a record or
note would consequently raise no presumption against
the genuineness of the document. But as to the document
purporting to be issued October 7, 1843, the witnesses
agree that if genuine, there should be evidenoe of it in
the archives of Mexico. The L?.w Agent claims that he
has proved that it does not exist there, and consequently
that the document is false and fabricated. The proof
offered consists of two letters purporting to be written
by the Minister of Foreign Eelations in Mexico, to J. S.
Cripps, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, of the United
States, enclosing to him three documents purporting to
be copies of letters, one from the Minister of Agricul-
ture, etc., the second from the Minister of War and Ma-
rine, and the third from the General and Public Archives
of the Nation. In the three last mentioned letters it is
stated that on search in the respective archives, nothing
is found relative to the grants of land to Limantour.
The letters from the Minister of Foreign Eelations to
Mr. Cripps, transmitting the copies last mentioned,
communicate no information of value on the subject, un-
less, indeed, his statement that these were the proper
departments for evidence of the character sought to be
obtained, be so regarded ; and as to this fact, I appre
hend the letter of this officer is not the proper evidence
It is a fact to be proved like any other, by legal evidence
which, if documentary, must be verified by the authen-
tication ; and if parol, must be given under the sanction
of an oath.
The copies of the letters from the three departments
addressed to the Minister of Eelations, two of which
are dated in March, and the other in April, 1854, which
are offered in evidence, are objected to by the claimant,
who insists upon their inadmissibility as proof, and
their legal insufficiency to establish the fact sought to be
established by them. We must therefore decide this
preliminary question.
The documents offered do not purport to be the origi-
nal letters written by the persons having charge, re-
spectively of the three Departments mentioned, but co-
pies of them, the originals being of course in the De-
partment of the Minister of Eelations, to whom they
were addressed. As a portion of the archives of that
Department of the Government, they must, in order to
be available as evidence, be proved like any other docu-
ment belonging to a public office. The usual manner of
making such proof from a foreign office is either by
sworn copies, or by exemplifications |under the great
seal of the State or Nation. These papers are not so au-
thenticated. The attestation is the brief certificate.
" Es copia," signed J. Miguel Arroyo. To this is at-
tached the certificate of John Black, the United States
Consul for the City of Mexico, verifying the signature of
Arroyo, aud stating that he is chief Clerk of the De-
partment of Foreign Eelations. This certificate of the
Consul adds nothing in the authentication of this docu-
ment. It is not within the scope of his Consular func-
tions. If ^e is conversant of facts pertinent to the issue
he must giv% his testimony in the same manner as other-
witnesses; his mere certificate is not evidence. [Church
v. Hubbard, 2 Cratich 187; Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet.E.
200.] Prefixed to the signature of Arroyo is the im-
pression of a seal, perhaps that of the particular branch
of service to which the signee was attached, but it
is clearly not the great seal of the Mexican Eepublic.
In the case above cited from 2d Cranch,a certificate was
given by a person describing himself as "the Secretary
of State of the Foregn Affairs and War Department,;'
etc., of Portugal, and authenticated with the seal of his
arms; but the Court held that this could authenticate
nothing, and was not therefore competent evidence.
The seal of a subordinate Department could be of no
more avail than this, and could prove nothing. The
document offered rests, then, entirely on the more cer-
tificate that it is a copy, to which the name of Arroyo is
attached, with no legal proof of the genuineness of the
signature, or evidence that he held any official posi'ion,
or had any charge or custody of the originals of which
the papers pretended are copies.
But if no objection were made to this proof of the ori-
ginal documents in the office of the Minister of Eelations
in Mexico, the evidence would still be insufficient. The
originals are but letters from the Departments of Agri-
cult ..re, of Wur, and from the general and public ar-
chives of the Nation, unaccompanied by evidenee of the
official character of the signers, and having none of those
solemn guarantees of truth which make them evidence
[ 5 ]
in'a conrt. Moreover, the facta stated in them arc not
of that character which are the subject of certificate by
any mere certifying officer, having the highest kaowu
authority as such, in charge of archives of a public offi
cer. The power of such an officer is confined to the au-
thentification of copies of the records of documents un-
der his charge, and unless some statutory or other spe-
cial prevision of law makes a different disposstion in the
case, he can certify nothing else. As to independent
facta, his certificate is no evidence. Thus the iact that
a certain grant had not been recorded in his office, al-
though certified by the officer having legal charge of the
records, was held in Tennessee not to be proved by his
certificnte. [Ayres v. Stewart, 1 Overton Teun.B., 291,
and the same principle has been recognized in nume
rous cases in other courts. Barry's Lessee vs. Ehea, ib.,
345; Wilcox vs. Bay, 1 Hayn B., 410; Robinson vs. Clif-
ford, 1 Wash. C. C. E., 1; Coit vs. Wells, 1 Varm. E.,
318; Governor vs. McAffee, 2 Dev., 75; Oakes vs. Hill,
14 Pick. E., 442; Wolfe vs. Wasnburn, 6 Cow. R., 261;
1 Wright's Ohio E., 51.] Neither courtesy among na-
tions nor any rule of practice adopted here have gone
further than to recognize as evidence the due and for-
mal exemplifications or copy of such public writing duly
certified by the proper officer in charge of the originate,
As to inpependent facts, such as the unsuccessful search
among the archives for papers not found, the unsworn
certificate of the officer is not evidence. He may be call-
ed like any other witness, and under the solemuity of an
oath and subject to coss-examination, may give his testi-
mony to the facts.
The papers offered in evidence are, therefore, unavail-
able as proof, and the Government has consequently
failed to show au examination of the archives, or to es-
tablish the proposition that they do not contain evidence
of the issuing of these papers to Limantour.
4. It is claimed that Limantour, after the alleged
grant purports to be made to him, applied to the local
authorities here for the grant of a small lot within the
limits of the land now claimed by him. The claimant
objects to the admission of the testimony by which this
is sought to be proved. Pour witnesses are called to
speak on this subject. Two of them testify to what was
told them by third persons, which of course is mere
hearsay and not evidence. Of the other two, one testi
fi.es that Limantour asked or petitioned for the grant of
a lot at the place ealled "Los Canulales " while Hinck-
ley was Alcalde, and that it was refused because he was
not a Mexican citizen; and the other states that Liman-
tour told him that he had petitioned the Justice of the
Peace, Hinckley, foi a lot at the place called "Canutal
Grande," and it was refused him. The first witness does
not state the source of his knowledge. The last witness
says that the conversation with Limantour took place at
the building then occupied by Limantour for a store, and
where he was then selling goods. The testimony shows
that he (Limantour) was at Yerba Bnena in 1841, 1844,
and again in 1847; that in 1841 his ves.-el was wrecked at
Punta de Eeyes, and the goods which were saved from
the wreck were taken to the place described by witness
and there sold, but that he closed his business and left
in 1842. If the conversation mentioned by the witness
was in fact had at Limantour's store, it must have been
in 1841 or 1842, and consequently before the date of the
grant here presented, and of course before Limantour
pretended to have a grant to the land. The witness,
however, states the date of the conversation to be in the
year 1844. In one or the other of these particulars it is
clear that the witness is at least mistaken.
If Limantour had in fact a giant of the land claimed
in the case, his right to it could not be defeated by show-
ing that he made application subsequently to the local
authorities for the possession or concession of a building
lot which constituted a part of it. A good title would
not be defeated by the grantees' mere admission, express
or implied, adverse to its validity. But the testimony
here ofiered is presented for a different purpose. It is
offered not to defeat a grant then existing, but as evi
dence of an act so inconsistent with the possession of a
title at that time, as to show that the claimant then pre-
tended to no interest in the property, and to establish a
presumption that the grant under which he now claims
is either a sheer fabricatfon or bears a false and fraudu-
lent date. The act proposed to be proved would be in
the nature of an admission by Limantour that at that
time he had no title to the land.
I greatly doubt whether the proof here offered is legal
evidence to estal lish the fact that Limantour did apply
to Hinckley for a grant of land within the limits now.
claimed by him. The act of Limantour was the present-
1
ing of his petition to the Alcalde for the grant, and as
the witnesses state the application was refused, this '
was the only act of his so far as it is developed in the
testimony which raises any presumption against the
claim. One of the witnesses states that Limantour pre-
sented such a petition, but he does not state where the
document is, or that he ever saw it, nor does he or any
one else state its contents. The best evidence of what
he asked and what he admitted as to the title, is the pe-
tition itself, which must Vie presumed to be in the ar-
chives of the Justice's office, or if that cannot be pro-
duced, then proof of its loss or destruction and evidence
of its contents. Without this the statement of the wit-
ness was incompetent evidence. The other witness
swears that Limantour told him that he had petitioned
for the lot. Parol admissions of a party, made en pals,
are competent evidence only of those facts which may
lawfully be established by parol evidence, and it is not
competent to prove the contents of a record or a docu-
ment, unless the foundation be first laid forgiving secon-
dary evidence thereof. But this rule does not go to the
utter exclusion of proof of admission of this nartire, but
only to their effect. [Greenl. Ev. §96, 97, 203.] On this
principle the evidence of the admissions was properly
received, but it is greatly weakened in its effect by the
absence of the petition itself, and still more by the vague
terms in which the admission is stated, and the want of
an effort to obtain the written document, which must be
presumed, to disclose the character of his application—
and tc show whether it implies an admission inconsistent
with the claim no 7v set up under his grant.
But did such an application, if proved, necessarily im-
ply that Limantour had no claim to the larger tract of
land at the time it was made ? Was such an application
so inconsistent with the existence of a prior grant, so ir-
recoucileable with that fact, as to prove that he claimed-,
no such rights ? The Justices of the Peace did not pre-
tend to have authority to do more than assign to persons
desiring to make themselves residences, small lots of
fifty or one hundred varas square, and these grants were
always accompanied with the condition that the lot
should be enclosed and a house built upon it within one
year, and that the grantee should subject himself to the
police regulations of the place. The distribution of.
these lots by the justices, and the authority exerciser
by them over the subject, seemed to partake very rnue'J .
of the character of a police arrangement, having for its
object regularity in bringing up the new settlement, and
a supervision over its welfare. Hence it is not improb-
able that for the purpose of erecting buildings, it wa3
the general, if not uniform custom to make application
to the local justice, and receive his sanction. Such con-
cessions were made as a matter of course, and Liman-
tour might have regarded it as a matter of safety ai
least, to obtain the sanction of the authorities before
erecting buildings on the land. It seems, moreover,
always to have been supposed that a municipal organi-
zation, formed or to be formed at Yerba Buena or the
Mission Dolores, would eventually have some rights in
the land in the immediate vicinity, and many of the
grants by the Governor were made subject to such tax
(canon) as might subsequently be imposed by the local
authorities. The justices could concede land only in
small lots: he could assign them for building purposes
only, and if Limantour made such application it must
have been for the purpose of erecting buildings thereon;
and as the value of buildings might be very large, the
shrewdness of the business man might have suggested
the expediency of obtaining the additional sanction of
thu local authorities to the premises on which he pro-
posed to make his investment, and thus by a double
sanction place his title beyond controversy. Whether
this was his motive or not, the very vague statement of
the character of his petition does not enable us to know.
A party is never precluded from strengthening his title
by acquiring a conveyance of any outstanding pretended
interest in the premises. Such acquisition cannot des-
troy rights previously acquired, nor does an effort to ob-
tain such a title necessarily imply that the applicant has
no title by prior acquisition. I will not say that the tes-
timony adduced on this subject could have no weight a.s
evidence, but the presumption raised by it, if any^is of
so slight a character as to need corroborative evidence to
make it of value in the case.
5. It is claimed that Limantotsr admitted to the witness,
Alfred A. Green, that this claim was a fraudulent one
The witness swears that he was engaged in procuring
proofs in support of the claim of the city ftf San Francisco
to lands supposed to cover a part or the whole of the pre-
mises in question, when the present claimant solicited him
to aid in support of his pretensions to it, adversely to ihe
city. The witness proceeds in his statement as follows :
—
"1 told him his claim was fraudulent, which li" admitted,
but remarked that it was so well executed and supported
that he had no doubt of it. I asked him why it was that
he had not done something with it previous to that time;
he remarked that he had been deceived by his agent.
Jouan, who should have attended to it. When A first told
him about its being fraudulent, he put on airs and wauted
to know my reason for thinking so." The witness staled
as his reason that the land belonged 10 the Fuefclo, and,
besides, that wherever a genuine grant existed, evidence
would be found in the record (borrador) kept by the loci
authorities, showing a reference for information, and a
report thereon to the Governor. The witness proceeds:
"He intimated to me that by .joining with him we could
prevent the Pueblo claim from being established, by keep
ing back documents that would establish the claim ; and as
for the connecting link of his own, if it was necessary, (but
he did not think it was) it would be very easy to have it
on the borrador. He was under the impression that I would
join with him, but when he ascertnincd that 1 would not, he
swore considerable about his title being the most perfect in
the country, and was in a great passion He said he knew
all aboui the archives, and there was nothing there that could
hurt him."
All the authorities I'oncur in faying that the verbal ad-
missions of a party ought to be received with great caution
BeiDg the mere repetition of oral statement;, surh testimony
is subjei't to much imperfection and mistake ; tho party him-
self ei'her being misinformed, or not having clearly express
ed his meaning, or the witness having misunderstood him.
It frequently happens also that the witness, by unintention-
ally altering a few of the expressions really used, gives an
effect to the statement completely at variance with what
I the party did say. [I Greenl. i<v §200.] To give force to
it as evidence, the admission should be deliberately made
and the conversation accurately narrated, so thut ihe Court
may know what was and what was not intended by tie party
(speaking.
Two remarks are at once suggested upon the statement of
the conversation as given by Green. The first is, that the
witness does not pretend to narrate what Limamour said
in admitting vhe fraudulent chara' ter of the claim He ad-
mitted the charge that it was fraudulent; he Intimated a
method of giving it appearance of honesty which it did not
possess. The witness fails to state what the admissions of
the party reRlly were, and, substituting inferences of his
own, gives his construction of the language in place of ihe
statement of the party. It is for the tribunal adju icating
the case, and not the witness, to weigh the purport of
what the witness said, and to give a construction to hi*
language. In a case reported in 3d Scrgt. and Rawle, 267,
similar language was used by a witness in relating a
conversation with a party, and the Court very properly
held that it did not amount to the proof of an admission
of anything material or relevant. The deductions of an
ignorant, an excited, a prejudiced or a rorrupt hearer
might otherwise be substituted for the statement of the
party in the first place, and in the second tor the calm
and dispassionate judgment of the court in giving its legal
effect.
It is observab'e, secondly, that so far as the witness does
state the declarations made by Liman our in the conversa-
tion, he appears to have repudiated, in his words, at lea-t,
the idea that the claim was not a valid one. From the nar
rative it is evident that when Green first stated that it was
fraudulent, he indignantly rept lied the imputation, aod at
the close of the conversation, he again warmlv asserted the
validity of his title. Whin in the intermediate portion of
this conversation the admission was made, under what cir-
cumstances of remark or reply, in what term--, with what
qualifications, and under what hypothesis, tho witness does
not delare. Under the rule which requires the whole of a
conversation to be taken together, it is difficult to infer from
the imperfect statement here given, that a deliberate admis-
sion of fraud in the claim was made. If such was the char-
acter of it, the duty devolved on the Government, in taking
the testimony, to elicit the details of the conversation, so
that we might know what, it was, and be able to judge of its
character as an admission.
6. The petition which const itutes a part of the expediente
dated January it', 1^43, and the grant bearing date Febru-
ary 29th, of the same year, are written on the paper bearing
the ceuificato of hahitauon for the year 1843, with the
names ard rubrics of Micheltorena, and Cartanares who was
then the Administrator to the Customhouse at Monterey, It
is alleged that no paper with this certificate of habilitation
was used so early in that year, and therefore these docn-
ments must be fraudulent. In order to judge correctly of the
form of this objeciion, we must advert to the posture of
things re atiug to the Departmental Government at that
time.
Micheltorena, appointed Govsrnor of Califonia to succeed
Alvarado, arrived at Los Angeles in August or September,
1842. Alvarado was at Monterey, the capital de facto of the
Department, where he continued to officiate as Governor
until the end of the year. Micheltorena assumed and exer-
ci-e-i the duties of that office at Los Angeles from the firstof
the year 1843 until about the month of August following,
when he removed to Monterey. The paper in question, ha-
bilitated for 1843, was u-ed, according to the date of the in-
strument, during the time white Micheltorena was at Los
An 'flea, and before he had ever been to Monterey. During
that entire space of time the archieves were kept at Monte-
rey, the Secretary of the Government resided there, and the
printing press belonging to the Government, the only one in
California, was kept there.
It is certain that during the entire period while Governor
Micheltorena remained at Los Angeles, pap' r habilitated for
1843 was not in commou use Both at Monterey and Los
Angeles, the paper then chiefly used was neither stamped
nor habilitated. A small quan.ity of paper habilitated for
previous years and rehabilitated by Governor Alvarado be-
fore he went out of office, was used, but none was rehabili-
tated by Governor Micheltorena. The reason why the
country was not supplied with habilitated paper during the
time that elapsed betweeu Micheltorena's induction into
office at Los Angeles and his removal to Monterey, is ob-
vious The habitation of paperconsisied of a printed cer-
tificate at the head of each sheet, with the signamre of the
Governor and the Administrator of the Customs, either in
writing or priuted, and having underneath the name the
genuine rubric of the party, and authenticated by the offi-
cial seal of the Customhouse. In order to procure such pa-
per at the time referred to, it must have been prepared at
Monteroy, so far as the printing, the impress of the seal,
and the signature of Castaneroi' was concerned, and roust
have received the signature or rubric of the Governor at
Los Angeles. Thus, paper duly habilitated could not be had
at Mon>erey until it had fir t been prepared at that place
and sentt.o the Governor at Los Angeles, and again returned
to Monterey; nor could it be supplied at any other place un-
til it had been prepaced both at Los Angeles and Monterey.
The great inconvenience of this transportation, a distance
many hundred miles, where no convenient orpafe means of
conveyance existed, rendered it almost impossible to pre-
pare and supply the quantity necessary for common use,
and U was nor. supplied. But while no such paper was
brought into common use, it is also evident from an examin-
ation of the paper in the archives, which are referred to
by the witnesses, that occasionally a fheet duly habilitated
uy Micheltorena and Castaneros, is found to have been used
during that time.
It is thus apparent that before Michcltorens went to Mon-
terey, paper was habilitated so fir as the printing, impress-
ing ihe Custom Houso seal, and adding the signature of
Castaneros was concerned ; and it is also certain that occa-
sionally a sheet of this paper received the Governor's ru-
bric, and was used. We have no means of knowing the
precise time when this paper was prepared at Monterey.
It was probably early enough to be ready for use at the
commencement of 1843, the year for which it was habilitat-
ed. The law as to the value of stamps had just been chang-
ed, and this required a corresponding modification of the
certificate of habilitation. The new law appears by the
documents in the case to have been recrived at the Custom
House on the 3d day of December, 1842, and as this habili-
tation is in accordance with the new law, the printing could
not have been done prior to that time, but probably it was
done very soon afier. That soma of these sheets leceived
the rubric of Micheltorena at Los Angeles, is certain, but it
is a'so true that the quantity forwarded to him was small,
and probably it was sent rather as a specimen than for use.
For a transaction likn that now under consideration, pur-
porting to have taken place with Micheltorena in person,
a d where the papers were probably prepared at the Gov-
ernor' « office, it might well happen that a sheet of this pa-
per should be used at an early period after the habilitation
t T ]
#as printed. If the Government had shown that no such
paper was printed or sealed at Monterey until after the date
of these documents, the necessary implication would arise
of their want of genuineness, at least in the dates. But
none of the witnesses state tnis, and none appear to know
the time when such paper was first prepared ; and, as we
know that some sheets of the same habilitation were used
for documents unquestionably genuine not far from the
time these bear date, and long belore it came into common
use, (which was not until after Micheltorena removed to
Monterey,) we can see no necessary implication that these
sheets were not then in existence, duly habilitated, or that
the documents written upon them must have been executed
after their date. The tew sheets of paper habilitated for
1843, which were used between the first of January and the
removal of Micheltqjena to Monterey, all stand upon the
same state Cf facts, and their use a few days earlier or later,
duricg that time, raises no necessary implication against
the genuineness of the document written thereon. We know
that some such paper was used while this state of facts ex-
isted, and having no proof of the time when it was prepare 1
at Monterey, I see no reason to infer that it was not done an
early as the dates of these instruments.
7. It i« claimed, further, that the archives in the Survey-
or General's office, show no evidence ot such grant. The
proof on this subject is from Mr Jones and Mr Halleck,
both of whom testify that they have examined the arehives
and found neither the! grent nor the espediente, nor any
memorandum of them. These examinations were all made
aft r the disturbance and dispersion of the archives at
the time of the conquest. The grant itself, if made, would
of course be in the hands of the grantee, and did not there-
fore belong ts the archives. The Espediente should have
remained there, but the dispersion of these documents, and
the fact that a large portion of them were never recovered,
or if preserved, never came to their proper place of depos-
it, renders the loss of such documents not surprising. So
numerous are the cases of this kind, that the absence of an
Espediente cannot be regarded as raising a strong presump-
tion against the genuineness of a grant. Besides, if the
document found at Monterey be genuine, the absence of the
original from the archives is fully explained
There is another portion of this testimony which deserves
a word of remark. The wiiaess, Capt. Halleck, states that
there was a book ir» sthe arehives containing an index or
memorandum of grants issued for some years, closing at the
end of December, 1843, which book was accidentally de-
stroyed by fire in May, 1851. The witness examined it
often, and does not recollect seeing any note of grants to
Limantour. There is no proof tending to show how com-
plete or incomplete this book was as a record of grants is
sued during the time when it was used for that purpose, but
from the testimony of B.C. Hopkins, it appoars that the
book used next in order of lime for the same purpose con-
tains but a small portion of the grants actually issued. The
presumption against the grant arising from this proof is
greatly diminished by the probable defect of the book in
not containing memoranda of all the gran's which were in
fact issued, and from the negative character of the proof,
showing only that the witness does not recollect that it con-
tained such a memorandum.
8. The Government has presented certain letters and doe-
umants signed by Auguste Jouan, and has proved his recent
declarations tending to stamp this claim as a fraud, and to
implicate the claimant in its connection. Jouan is proved
to have once acted as Limantour's agent, but ceased to be
such in 1853, and the most hostile feelings are shown to
exist between them. There is o principle of law which
makes sayings of an agriit, uttered long after his agency
ceased, evidence against his principal. The declarations
of a participator in a conspiracy to def aud may be evidence
against his co-conspirator, but independent prool of the ex-
istence of said conspiracy must first be established, before
such declarations are competent proof. No testimony is
here given to establish such conspii acy, so as to admit Jouan's
statement or writings.
Besides, if such conspiracy were proved, the declarations
and writingof Jouan here ofte'ed would not be admi-sable
as evidence. Thoruleis that the declarations and writingof
a co-conspirator which are a part of the res-gertce is evidence
against all ; but a subsequent relation, verbal or written, of
one is not evidence against the others. Such a statement de-
pends on the mere credit of the narrator, and his mere decla-
ration cannot be evidence. He must be called to testify to
the facts, and cannot affect the rights of others. [1 Phil. Ev.
201 ; Hardy, Case 24 : Howell St. Tr. 452 : I Greenleaf Ev.,
§111.]
The above embraces the chief points, both of evidence
and argument, urged against the genuineness of the grant.
Some other matters ofminor importance are presented to our
comideraiion, but on examination they do not change the is-
pect of the case, and it is not necessary to discuss them at
length.
Reviewing the testimony in support of this c.aim, we
think this ptoof fully establishes the fact, in the first place,
that the grant which is given in evidence, and other oocu-
menta presented by the claimants, were signed by the seve-
ral persons whese names appear thereto, The 3'gnatures
are all proved in the usual manner by competent and unim-
peached witnesses, whose statements are contradicted,
doubted or impeached by no one. Thus established, these
papers must have the full effect of a genuine title, unless
it can be shown that they are a recent fabrication, exe-
cuted since the several signers retired from office, and
fraudulently antedated.
And secondly, the collateral evidence in Bupport of the
grant, establishes it so directly and positively by concurrent
facts and circumstances, that it leaves scarcely a doubt that
it was made at or about the time it bears date.
The arrival of Limantour at San Pedro with merchandise;
the needy condition of Micheltorena at Los Angeles ; the
application of the latter to the former for goods and money;
the negotiations between them, including the proposition to
grant and receive lands in payment; the advance of the
goods and money immediately after, and the contempo-
raneous understanding at Los Angeles among Michel-
torena's officers that such a concession had been made, are
proved by the direct statement of witnesses whom no at-
tempt is made to impeach. It entered into the account of
Micheltorena, where the government was credited by Li-
mantour for lands granted The Governor at the time spoke
both of the negotiation aud the grant, and afterward t re-
fused to Gonzales a concession of land at Yerba Buena,
becau-e he had granted it to Limantour. The evidence of
the documents proved in the case is equally pertinent in the
establishment of the grant. It is not possible, without v o-
latingevey rule of evidence, to pronounce all these to be
forgeries ; nor can we gratuitously be lieve that such men as
Micheltorena,; Bocsnegra, and Jimeno—men who have held
the most important offices in the government—could be in-
duced to i ign these documents long after they retired from
office, with the intent to aid in gross fraud. We cannot pre-
sume such an act, and there is no proof in the case to sub-
stantiate such a charge. And if these documents be not of
this false and fradulent character, the grant is sustained by
evidence the most conclusive.
We have already referred to the main features of the
proofs adduced to impeach those title papers. It is at most
testimony of a negative character, and not sufficient to
counterbalance the mass of concurring proofs by which the
title papers are sustained. If the testimony of Gomez, and
even the expediente found by him at Monterey were thrown
out of the case, the weight of evidence would still, in our
opinion, be in favor of the grant.
These title papers issued by the Governor, and approved
by the Supreme Government, we have no doubt were effect-
ive under the Mexican law to convey a right to the land to
Limantour, and the proof does not show any forfeiture or
abandonment of his titles. The description is shown to be
sufficiently definite to enable a survey to be made according
to its terms. The northern limits of the parcel of land
which is situated nearest the heart of the present city, was
unquestionably fixed in reference to Richardson's map, and
at the distance of four hundrsd varas from the original set-
tlement house of W. A. Richardson. We do not think that
anything connected with tho rights of the city to thefe pre-
mises is i-hown to invalidate the grant, nor is ihere anything
in the 14th section of the act of March 3, 1851, which pre-
vents an adjudicalion by this Commission on the claim.
On the contrary, if a town, previous to the conquest, had
grown up on the laud, then tighcfully held by Limantour
under a previous srant, by express ptovi.-ion of the section
referred to, the claim must be presented in his name, and not
in the name of the lot holders.
We have examined this case with that patience and care-
ful attention which its importance demands. We are not at
liberty substi.ute conjecture for proof, or to posipone ditect
evidence, both written and oral, to that which is of a neg8'
tive and inconclusive character. The weight of evidence
in our opinion, is decidedly with the claimant ; and as w
find upon the whole proofs in the ci2se, so it is our duty t
declare the result.
A decree will consequently be issued in favor of t)8
Petitioner.
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f
The following Decisions of the Supreme Court of this State will, in all proba-
bility, settle forever the title to Eeal Estate in the City and County of San Fran-
cisco. There may, and probably will be litigation between individuals, respecting
the validity of deeds of transfer from the original grantees under the Pueblo and
City—such disputes being common in every city and town in the world—but there
will be no further dispute, so long as these decisions stand, respecting the source of
title. A basis is now established, upon which every intelligent man may determine
whether or not he has a valid title to the land which he occupies, having first ascer-
tained the genuineness of the original grant under which he holds.
This is a consummation which has long been most devoutly prayed for by all
citizens of San Francisco. It is true, that these decisions change no rule of prop-
erty heretofore established, except in the matter of Sheriffs' sales to uplands ; but
they go the foundation of all City titles, and put them upon such a basis that they
can never hereafter be disturbed. Many of the former decisions on the questions
here involved, were entirely contradictory and unsatisfactory in their reasoning, and
therefore failed to receive the confidence of community, or the acquiescence of the
bar. One Court and one set of Judges based the Pueblo and City title upon a
Mexican grant, while another Court and another set of Judges based it upon the
Act of 1851
;
some presumed title under Mexican law, while others presumed it
under the Act of Congress : some contended that the old Pueblo had a title in fee
simple absolute, while others contended that the title to the Pueblo lands remained
in the Mexican government till it was transferred to the government of the United
States, and by it to the City : some claimed only to the Vallejo line, while others
contended for the full extent of four square leagues. In fine, while the Courts have
generally sustained the City's title, there has been no agreement as to the source or
character of that title, nor have any good and satisfactory reasons been given for
the decisions rendered. The Mexican laws relating to this matter have not hereto-
fore been thoroughly examined and considered by the Courts, and consequently, the
iv publishers' preface.
conclusions arrived at did not satisfy the bar ; especially as the Judges have always
been divided in opinion as to the source and character of the title. But in this
case the subject seems to have been thoroughly and carefully investigated, and, so
far as the question of original title is concerned, the Judges are unanimous in their
decision upon its character and validity: for, although Justice Cope sustains the
Sheriffs' sales, on the ground of stare decisis, he agrees in all other respects with the
reasoning and conclusions of the other Judges.
From the importance of these decisions, and the great interest taken in them by
the community, and the fact that a long time will probably elapse before they will
be published officially among the judicial reports, we have determined to give them
to the public in a more readable form than that in which they have appeared in the
newspapers.
As that portion of Judge Baldwin's opinion which relates to the origin and char-
acter of Pueblo titles under Spanish and Mexican law, refers to some important
matters connected with the jurisprudence and history of California, not fully set
forth in the opinion itself, we have deemed it advisable to add some Notes, illustrat-
ive and explanatory of these points. For this purpose, we have procured the ser-
vices of a member of the bar, who is familiar with the subject ; and we think the
reader will find these Notes, not only of interest, but valuable for future reference.
It is hoped that the public will duly appreciate the efforts of the Publishers to
supply them with these Decisions in a permanent form, and at the earliest possible
moment.
San Francisco, June 30th, 1860.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
npreme Court JJpril Ctrm, IMd
WILLIAM HART, Appellee,
vs.
BURNETT, BEIDEMAN Et Al., Appellants.
Opinion of tne Court "by Justice Baldwin.
The immense interests involved in the decision of this case have
drawn to it a laborious and careful examination by numerous and able
counsel, of the various points and considerations connected with the
controversy. Probably no cause ever submitted to this Court has been
more thoroughly and learnedly discussed, both at the bar and in writ-
ten and printed arguments. We have postponed the decision from
time to time for further examination and argument ; for we were unwill-
ing to pass upon the question until all attainable sources of correct
and reliable information had been exhausted. To that end we have
extended a latitude to the debates which we have not allowed in any
other case ; and we have postponed attention to much important and
pressing business, that we might fully consider this record, unembar-
rassed by other engagements.
This is an appeal from the late Superior Court of the city of San
Francisco. It involves the title to a number of fifty vara lots, levied
upon and sold by the Sheriff of San Francisco county, under judgment
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and execution in a suit of Jesse D. Carr v. The City. Although the
property actually involved in this case is not very large, the question
really to be decided affects property of immense value, and the right
and title of the city of San Francisco to what is termed its municipal
lands, the construction of the Act of Congress, approved March 3d,
1851, and the liability of such lands to forced sale under execution.
I. In discussing this case, the first question to which we shall
direct our attention is this : Was there any law authorizing the estab-
lishment of Si pueblo at San Francisco, and was any such pueblo ever
established ?
It appears from the history of Spanish jurisprudence that special
attention was given in very early times to the establishment of cities,
(ciudades) towns, (pueblos) and villages, (villas) and that partic-
ular laws were enacted for their foundation and government. Title
VII, Book IV of the Recopilacion de Indias, refers especially to this
subject, and contains numerous laws and provisions relating to the
different classes of land belonging to such municipalities. Some of
these laws will be more particularly referred to hereafter. Title V
of the same book relates especially to the formation of settlements of
a municipal character, and their subsequent organization into munici-
pal bodies. Law six of this title authorizes contracts to be made for
the founding of towns, and prescribes the conditions to be imposed
upon the contractors. Law ten authorizes the founding of towns by
the voluntary union of families, without contract with any poblador
particular. These laws constitute a part of the system of Spain for
the settlement of Spanish America. They contemplate two modes of
founding towns or municipal settlements : one by contract with a par-
ticular individual or poblador, who undertook to bring together a cer-
tain number of families or settlers, and build a town ; the other by the
voluntary union of a certain number of families or settlers, who were
to act in concert for the same object. [1.]
We find among the printed Mexican laws and orders, and the numer-
ous documents made evidence in this case, and referred to in the
briefs of counsel, various official documents relating to this same sys-
tem, and illustrative of the policy of the Spanish Government with
respect to the establishment of such municipal settlements in Califor-
nia. We refer more particularly to the " Regulations of Presidios,"
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of September 10, 1772 ; the " Instructions " of August 17, 1773
;
the " Regulations " of June 1, 1779 ; the " Opinion" of October 27,
1785; and the "Order" of June 21, 1786. (Cong. Doc, 31st
Cong., 1st Sess., H. of R., Ex. Doc. No. 17, pp. 133 et seq.; Arril-
laga's Recopilacion de Leyes, 1828, p. 121 ; Limantour Land Com.
Ex. " 0.") [2.]
The opinion of the Fiscal, dated October 27, 1785, and the order
of the Commandant General, dated June 21, 1786, fully recognize the
right of the Governor of California to form and mark out pueblos, and
the right of such pueblos to four leagues of land. (Lim. Land Com.,
Ex. " 0," p. 60.) In 1789, November 14th, a plan was formed for
the town of Pitic, in Sonora, which by the direction of the King was
to be taken as a model for all other towns formed in that commandancy,
which commandancy then included California. This plan is of record
in the archives of California now under the charge of the United States
Surveyor General. It dedicates four square leagues to the town for
various municipal purposes, and directs that if they cannot be had in
a square, they may be taken in some other form. This plan will be
again referred to hereafter.
In an order from the Commandant General of this commandancy
to the Governor of California, dated October 22, 1791, authority is
given to form pueblos out of the existing presidios, and an extent of
four square leagues of land is designated for each of such new pueblos.
(Ex. Doc. No. 17, p. 139 ; Limantour Land Com., Ex. " 0," pp. QQ
et seq.)
A decree of the Spanish Cortes, May 23, 1812, provides for the
municipal organization of pueblos, and the election of Ayuntamientos,
consisting of Alcaldes, Regidores and Syndicos. Another decree, of
August 9th of the same year, confers upon the Alcaldes of pueblos
certain political and judicial powers. These decrees continued in
force in Mexico after its separation from Spain. (Leyes Vigentes,
pp. 28, 50.) [3.]
Such is a brief outline of the laws relating to pueblos in California
prior to the Colonization Law of 1824, and the Executive Ordinance
or Regulation of 1828.
The first of these—the law of August 18, 1824—makes no new
provisions for pueblos, but in section two it recognizes the fact that
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pueblos have a right of property in land. The Executive Regulation
of November 21, 1828, section ten, provides for the formation of new
pueblos of at least twelve families each, by capitulantes or contractors.
No change, however, is made in the laws respecting pueblos formed
in the usual way, by the union of families or settlers for that purpose,
or by the conversion of presidios into pueblos.
It was also stated in these Regulations that the Missions of Califor-
nia were not " for the present " to be colonized. Although the Span-
ish Cortes, by decree of September 13, 1813, had claimed the Catho-
lic Missions as Government property, and exercised the right to secu-
larize them and convert them into secular and municipal organizations
under the name of pueblos, the Executive of Mexico, in forming the
Regulations of 1828, seemed to prefer reserving this subject for the
further action of the Mexican Congress. That body, on the seven-
teenth of August, 1833, passed a law secularizing all the Missions of
Upper and Lower California, thus bringing them within the general
operation of the laws, and especially of the Colonization Law of 1824,
and the Regulation of 1828. A number of departmental laws and
regulations were subsequently issued by the Governor and Legisla-
ture of California, for converting these Missions into pueblos, for the
government of such pueblos, and for the use and disposition of the
lands and other property pertaining to them. (Ex. Doc. No. IT, pp.
148 et seq., Gov. Figueroa's Manifesto ; U. S. Printed Mission Exhib-
its ; Leyes Vigentes, p. 106.) [4.]
This brings us to the period when it is claimed that the pueblo of
San Francisco was first founded. We will now consider the evidence
adduced to show the fact of the establishment of a pueblo, without
reference to its boundaries or to its title or right to any lands. We
shall make no reference to the Zamorano document, or to what is called
the Valiejo line, but only to documents whose genuineness is entirely
undisputed.
On the third of November, 1834, the Territorial Deputation author-
ized the election of an Ayuntamiento to reside at the presidio of San
Francisco, to be composed of an Alcalde, two Regidores or Council-
men, and a Sindico-Procurador. This Ayuntamiento, when organ-
ized, was to exercise the political functions pertaining to such office,
and the Alcalde was also to perform the judicial functions which the
LAND TITLES IN SAN FRANCISCO.
Hart vs. Burnett, et
laws conferred upon him. This decree was communicated to the Mili-
tary Commandant by the Governor, on the fourth of November, 1834.
An election was accordingly held on the seventh of December, 1834,
at the presidio of San Francisco, and the Ayuntamiento duly installed.
A similar election was held on the thirteenth of December of the fol-
lowing year, (1835) at the same place, which was then officially desig-
nated as the pueblo of San Francisco. Other elections of the same
character were subsequently held; and there are numerous official
documents of undisputed authenticity, which refer to the "Ayunta-
miento of San Francisco," the "Alcalde of San Francisco," and to
the " Pueblo of San Francisco," proving, as we think, beyond a doubt,
that there was at that place, in 1834, 1835, 1836, and subsequently,
a pueblo of some kind, with an Ayuntamiento composed of Alcaldes,
Regidores and other municipal officers. What were the rights of this
municipality, and what the powers of its officers, and the extent of its
territory and jurisdiction, we shall not now inquire. We here refer
merely to the fact of the existence, at that time, and at that place, of
such an organization, whether corporate or incorporate. And that fact
is proved by the official returns of elections, by the official acts of the
Governor and of the Territorial or Departmental Legislature, by the
official correspondence of government officers, and by the acts, pro-
ceedings, records, and correspondence of the officers of the pueblo
itself. As a part of the evidence of this fact, we refer to the election
returns of December 7th, 1834, December 13th, 1835, December 3d,
1837, and December 8th, 1838 ; to the Governor's letters of January
31st, 1835, October 26th, 1835, January 19th, 1836, January 17th,
1839, and November 14th, 1843 ; to the expediente of proceedings
between May and November, 1835, with respect to certain persons
obliged to serve as municipal officers of that pueblo ; and to the
official correspondence between the Alcaldes of that pueblo and the
various officers of the Territorial or Departmental Government of Cal-
ifornia. [5.]
II. Had this pueblo a right or title to any lands ? and if so, to
what lands ?
In examining these questions, it will be necessary to recur to the
laws and authorities already referred to. All the old Spanish laws
relating to the foundation and government of pueblos in the Indies,
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seem to admit the fact that such municipal organizations possess some
right to, and some control over the lands upon which they are estab-
lished, and which are included within their limits. In this respect
there does not seem to be any essential difference between pueblos
founded by an individual poblador or eapitulante, and those founded
by the actual settlement of a number of families, voluntarily uniting
together without any contract or capitulation. A pueblo, when once
established, (no matter how or by whom composed) and officially and
legally recognized as such, came immediately within the provisions of
the general laws relating to pueblos, and was entitled to all the rights
and privileges, whether political, municipal, or of property, which the
laws conferred upon such organizations or corporations. Sometimes,
however, special laws and regulations were made for particular places.
Such seems to have been done in very early times, with respect to the
infant establishments of Monterey and San Diego, and the pueblos of
San Jose and Los Angeles, and the villa of Branceforte in California.
(Recop. de Indies, B. 4, Tits. 5 and 7 ; Regulations of Presidios of
1772 ; Bucareli's Instructions of 1773 ; Neve's Regulations of 1779,
etc.; Ex. Doc. No. 17, pp. 134 et seq.; Navarro's Opinion, October
27th, 1785; Ugarte y Loyola's Order, June 21st, 1786; Nava's
Order, October 22d, 1791 ; Limantour Land Com., Ex. " 0.")
By Law 6, Title 5, of Book IV, of the Recopilacion, a new town,
containing at least thirty inhabitants and the other requisites for a
municipal organization, was entitled to four square leagues of land, to
be laid off in a square or prolonged form, as the nature or circum-
stances of the land might require. This right of a town, when duly
organized, to this extent of land, is particularly referred to and repeated
in the Royal Instruction of 1789 for the plan of Pitic, which plan was
made applicable to all new towns that should thereafter be established
in California, as a part of that General Commandancia. The partic-
ular municipal organization of such new towns was to depend, under
the laws, upon the name or title given to them, as ciudad, pueblo,
villa, etc, It will be noticed that the town of Pitic was organized out
of the Presidio of San Miguel, which was removed to that locality for
the purpose of forming, guarding and protecting the new settlement.
In the order of 1791, by the Commandant General to the Governor of
California, for the formation of pueblos out of presidios, it is also
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specially directed that the extent of land for each of these pueblos
should be four common leagues, measured from the center of the pre-
sidio plaza, or square, viz : two leagues in each direction.
Of course, under the law and royal instruction above referred to,
and upon which this order was based, this form and these dimensions
were to be changed according to the nature and circumstances of the
land ; as when the presidio was adjacent to the sea, or on a bay, or
where any portion of the land within such general limits had become
private property, or had been devoted to some other special object.
It does not appear that any formal grants of land were made to
the new pueblos in such cases ; but their right or title, whatever it
was, to land, to the extent of four square leagues or less, as the case
might be, seems to have vested, ipso facto, on the formation or official
recognition of such town, and that -the powers of the municipal offi-
cers over such land resulted from the general laws, immediately on
the municipal organization, and their election and entry upon the duties
of their respective offices, and that these powers might be restricted
or enlarged by the political authority of the State.
It is true, that in the case of Pitic, and in some other towns, an offi-
cer was appointed to mark off the boundaries of the four square
leagues, and to designate the particular kinds of land, and the uses to
which they were to be applied, within such limits ; but the right or
title, whatever that might be, " to the land so marked out," could not
result from the act of measurement or survey. And as no subsequent
grant was made, or seems to have been contemplated, the title, if any
passed at all, must have vested ipso facto upon the organization of
the pueblo. Such seems to have been the intention of the laws them-
selves, and the construction put upon them by the officers by whom
they were administered.
It follows, from what has been already stated, that when near the
close of 1834 a municipality was erected at the presidio of San Fran-
cisco, by the orders of the Governor and Territorial Deputation of
California, and that place was officially recognized as a pueblo, and its
organization completed by the election of the municipal officers pro-
vided for by law, such pueblo became, ipso facto, vested with some
right or title to four square leagues of land, measured either in a
square or prolonged form, from the presidio square as a general cen-
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tral point ; excepting so much of the space within such general limits
as might not be susceptible of grant, on account of its being water,
the private property of individuals or corporations, or lands dedicated
to, or reserved for other purposes.
Before proceeding to investigate the character of this right or title,
we will premise a few remarks upon the character of the land em-
braced within the limits described, in order to give a general idea of
the claim of the new pueblo and its boundaries.
It appears from official maps made under the direction of the United
States Surveyor-General and the Superintendent of the United States
Coast Survey, that the old presidio of San Francisco was situated near
the middle of the northern extremity of the peninsula formed by the
ocean and the bay of that name ; that the width of this peninsula, as
far south as the Mission creek, is- less than two leagues, and that still
further south, to the Buri-Buri or Sanchez Rancho, the average width
is just about two leagues ; although two or three points, as Lobos and
Avisadero, project somewhat beyond these points very nearly corres-
ponding with indentations, as Mission bay and Merced lake, on the oppo-
site sides. Of course, the pueblo could acquire no right or title to the
ocean or bay ; and, consequently, according to the law of its founda-
tion, the four square or common leagues would be taken in a prolonged
instead of a square form.
Again, it appears from the documentary evidence and from other
authentic sources, that at the time of the formation of this pueblo,
there was a fort or battery, with its buildings and appendages, at the
entrance of the bay of San Francisco ; it would seem that the fort and
the land pertaining thereto and necessary for its service, would be ex-
cepted out of the pueblo claim, for it is understood that such estab-
lishments were not, under the Spanish laws, susceptible of acquisition
by town settlements or by colonization. (Mitchell et al. v. the
United States, 15 Peter's Rep., pp. 88, et seq.) [6.]
Again, it also appears that long prior to the organization of this pueblo,
there existed within the limits of the four square leagues, an estab-
lishment called the " Mission of San Francisco " or " of Dolores," with
some sort of claim or right to the lands in that immediate vicinity.
Perhaps some of these lands were also so dedicated or reserved as to
exempt them from any right or title which the pueblo acquired by its
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organization. If so, what was the extent of the land so reserved or
excepted ? It appears that, in very early times, some disputes arose
with respect to the lands which the inhabitants of the presidio and
Mission were respectively entitled to occupy and use, and that some
line of division was established between them corresponding to, or near
to Mission creek, and to what is now called the Vallejo line. The
lands north of that line, wherever it may have been, were generally
called " presidio lands," and those on the south, as far as San Mateo
creek or the northern boundary of the Pulgas rancho, were called
" Mission lands." It also appears that the ordinance or regulation of
1828 exempted the lands actually occupied by the Mission from colo-
nization " at present," and until it was determined what right the
Mission establishments had in these lands. The secularization law
passed in 1833, and various measures were subsequently taken by
the authorities of California to organize the Missions into pueblos, and
to reduce their lands to colonization. It further appears that, on the
3d of November, 1834, a curacy was authorized for the Mission of
Dolores, which was one step in the operation of secularization ; but
that, at a later period, it still retained some of the characteristics of a
" Mission," although portions of the land which it had formerly occu-
pied in the direction of San Mateo and across the bay had already
been disposed of by grants to private individuals. The Land Com-
mission and the United States Supreme Court have decided that these
titles were valid, and that the lands previously occupied by the Mis-
sion establishments were subject to grant in colonization. More-
over, the Commissioners and the law officers of the Government have
decided that the Mission church, cemetery, buildings occupied by the
priest, and a small piece of land pertaining to these as curtileges,
were dedicated to the use of the Catholic church, and consequently
were not susceptible of grant in private ownership.
It would seem, from these facts, that in December, 1834, when the
pueblo was organized, this pueblo could not acquire any title to these
" church lands," which were occupied by that establishment, although
lying within the general limits of the four square leagues designated
by the laws. Perhaps, however, when the occupation by the Mission
ceased, such of these lands as had not been granted in private owner-
ship, or dedicated to pious uses, became subject to the general right
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of the pueblo as pueblo lands. There are certain facts shown by the
evidence in this case which confirm this view. At first, the municipal
authorities of the pueblo made no grants at the Mission, but subse-
quently, under the orders of the Governor, the same Alcalde granted
solares alike at the place called " Yerba Buena " and at the old
" establishment of Dolores," the latter being limited to fifty varas
square. [7.]
But it is unnecessary to investigate or decide this question here, for
it is admitted that the land now in dispute is north of Mission creek
and within the tract confirmed to the city of San Francisco under the
act of March 3, 1851.
We have thus far considered the question of the establishment of
the pueblo of San Francisco, and its limits, without any reference to
what is commonly called the " Zamorano document," the genuineness
of which has been strongly contested in the arguments of counsel.
The only tribunal which has judicially investigated the character of
that document, seems to have considered its genuineness sufficiently
established. But, even admitting its genuineness to be beyond all
doubt, we attach to it very little importance for the purposes of this
investigation. The more important facts mentioned in it—the order
of the Governor and Territorial Deputation of 1834, for the election,
at the presidio of San Francisco, of an Ayuntamiento, and the offi-
cial recognition of the change of that presidio into the pueblo of San
Francisco—are also abundantly proved by other documentary evi-
dence, the genuineness of which has never been called in question.
The only effect of the Zamorano document would be to restrict at that
particular time the possession of the pueblo to a space less than the
four square leagues to which it was entitled under the law. And
there is much evidence outside of the document to show that such was
the fact. But, as already stated, it is unnecessary, for the purposes
of this case, to determine that question, and we therefore have left
that document entirely out of consideration. [8.]
Nor do we deem it necessary to follow counsel through their elabo-
rate discussion respecting the history of the Missions, and the numer-
ous acts and regulations of the Governors and Legislatures of Cali-
fornia, under the law of 1833, respecting the secularization and con-
version of the establishments themselves into pueblos, and the coloni-
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zation of the land which they had previously occupied. According
to our view, the pueblo of San Francisco was first formed out of the
Presidio of that name, and not out of the Mission ; and consequently,
the question of its original formation was in no way dependent upon
the law of secularization. There are, however, some things connected
with the execution of that law, which serve to explain certain facts
in the subsequent history of this pueblo. It would be very natural,
upon the partial or entire secularization of the Mission, considering
its advantageous position, and the superior quality of the land at that
establishment, the location of the church, the residence of the parish
curate, etc., that a portion of the pueblo settlers and of its municipal
officers would establish themselves in that place. We accordingly
find that, in the infancy of the pueblo, or, in 1837, according to the
testimony of Sanchez, the Secretary of the Ayuntamiento, most
of the inhabitants, not engaged in commerce, did reside there, and
also that several of such residents at the old Mission were, at differ-
ent times, members of the Ayuntamiento. There is, too, some evi-
dence to show that in 1837 or 1838, permission was asked of the
Governor to hold the sessions of that body at the old Mission, and, as
they were so held, it is to be presumed that the request was granted.
A few of the inhabitants who were engaged in commerce located
themselves at the place called " Yerba Buena," on account of the ad-
vantageous anchorage for shipping in the cove of that name. And,
as commerce increased, that little settlement, notwithstanding the na-
ture of the soil, but with the larger element of foreign population
which is shown to have been introduced there, very soon outstripped
the settlement at the old Mission, which was mostly composed of a
less enterprising population of Mexicans. Moreover, it was natural
that foreigners, who were mostly engaged in trade, should call that
place the " pueblo of Yerba Buena," while the old inhabitants of the
country should apply to it, and to the old Mission, the general terms
" pueblo of San Francisco," or " pueblo of Dolores," as is testified to
by various witnesses. It was also very natural that, in the course of time,
the names " pueblo of San Francisco, " Yerba Buena," " port of San
Francisco," " Mission of Dolores," " pueblo of Dolores," etc., should
by different persons be applied indiscriminately, either to the entire
northern portion of the peninsula, or to particular parts thereof. This,
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it seems to us, fully explains and reconciles some apparent contradic-
tions in the parol and documentary evidence. Again, it should be
observed that the term " de Assis," which is sometimes affixed to
the name " San Francisco," although, perhaps, more usually applied
to the Mission, was a part of the appellation of the saint whose name
was given to the bay when it was first discovered, which appellation
belonged alike to the bay, the fort, the presidio, the Mission, and the
pueblo—all of which took their name from the same saint. That
these words should be more often added in speaking of the Mission is
very natural, because there were other Missions in California called after
other saints by the name of Francis, as the Mission at Sonoma, which
took its name from " San Francisco de Solano ;" the Mission below
San Diego, which took its name from " San Francisco de Borja," and
the Mission further south, which took its name from " San Francisco
Xavier." (Butler's Lives of the Saints, verbo Saint Francis ; Life
of Padre Ugarte ; Vanega's History of California ; Life of Padre
Junipero Serra ; Garcia y Cubas' Carta de Baja California.) [9.]
It may be proper in this connection to allude to some of the objec-
tions made by counsel to the view we have taken respecting the or-
ganization and character of the pueblo of San Francisco.
It is said that the first order calling for the election of an Ayunta-
miento at the presidio, was for the " partido of San Francisco ;" that
many of the voters and some of the persons elected to office, in 1834
and subsequently, did not then reside at that place ; that the military
commandant of San Francisco, who was superseded in authority by the
Ayuntamiento so elected, exercised jurisdiction as far south as the
Pulgas rancho ; that the Ayuntamientos and Alcaldes of San Fran-
cisco exercised authority, both political and judicial, not only over the
four leagues claimed as constituting the pueblo, but also south to San
Mateo or Francisquito creek, and across the bay to the north and east,
in fine, over the whole " partido " of that name.
It was very natural that in founding the new pueblo, the inhabi-
tants of the adjacent country should be called upon to assist in com-
mencing the new settlement, and forming its municipal organization.
Where else were settlers to be looked for or obtained ? We hear of
no recent arrival of emigrants or colonists who were to build up the
new town. Nor was it for such persons, or for the purpose of coToniz-
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ation, that this pueblo was established. It was rather for the purpose
of carrying out the general policy which had been pursued by Spain
in her American dominions, and which is often alluded to in the in-
structions issued to the Governors of California, of inducing the scat-
tered inhabitants of the country to unite and build up towns, as being
more conducive to civilization, and as forming a better protection
against the incursions of hostile Indians. [10.] Moreover, the per-
sons entitled to elect Ayuntamientos of pueblos, were not merely
those who actually resided within the limits of the lands which per-
tained to such pueblos. The Alcaldes, who were the principal officers
of the Ayuntamientos of pueblos, sometimes exercised political and
judicial authority over much larger geographical districts, and the in-
habitants of such districts were entitled to vote at the primary elec-
tions which were held to fill such offices. It is shown in official docu-
ments, that the Alcaldes of San Jose at one time exercised political
and judicial jurisdiction upon the Contra Costa, and over the whole
extent of country from the Pulgas Rancho to San Juan Bautista, and
that the officers of the pueblo of Los Angeles at one time exercised
such jurisdiction from the Conejo Rancho to San Juan Capistrano.
Are we to infer from these circumstances that no pueblos had been
founded at either of the above named places ? Such an inference
would not only be unauthorized, but would be entirely contradicted by
well established and indisputable facts. [11-]
Again, it is said that the Governors of California made grants of
land to private persons within the limits of the four square leagues of
the so called pueblo of San Francisco, which fact precludes the idea
that this pueblo had any title to the land within such limits. Admit-
ting the fact to be as stated, we do not think the inference logical.
Suppose the municipal officers of the pueblo had been precluded from
exercising any authority whatever over such lands, and that the right
to distribute or grant . them to the settlers had been retained by the
Governor in his own hands, or had been conferred upon a commissioner
or some other officer in no way connected with the Ayuntamiento
;
would that fact constitute any argument against the supposition that
the pueblo or its inhabitants had a vested right or interest in such
lands ? We think not. As will be more particularly stated hereafter,
the inhabitants of the pueblo may have had a vested right, interest, or
2
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use in such lands, and they may have been set apart and dedicated
to some special object and purpose, and yet the legal title, subject
to such purposes and uses, may have been vested for the purpose of
grant in some one else, and the trust may have been executed by the
Governor himself, or by some other person duly appointed for that
purpose. The ownership of property may be in the sovereign, and the
use private or public ; or the ownership may be public and the use
private. This depends upon the character of the ownership and dedi-
cation, and the circumstances of the use. (Bouvier, Law Dictionary,
verb Dedication; Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch Rep., p. 292;
McConnell v. Town of Lexington, 12 Wheaton Rep., p. 582 ; Haw-
kins v. Arthur, 2 Bay's Rep., p. 195; Barclay v. Howell, 6 Peters'
Rep., p. 498; City of Cincinnati v. White, 6 Peters' Rep., p. 431;
New Orleans v. The United States, 10 Peters, p. 712.)
If Governors of California have granted lands within the general
limits of pueblos, it will be presumed, unless the contrary be shown,
that such grants were made in accordance with the objects and uses
for which such lands had been assigned and dedicated by the laws to
the pueblos. The whole matter was subject to the control and direc-
tion of the Governor and Territorial Deputation, and the official acts
of such officers within the general scope of their powers are presumed
to have been done by lawful authority. (United States v. Perchman,
7 Peters R., p. 95.)
So far as we have examined the grants made by the different Gov-
ernors within pueblo limits, they seem to have been in conformity with
such general object of building up a town by encouraging settlement
and cultivation, and with the uses to which such lands had been dedi-
cated. If the tract granted was of a larger size than that usually
given for a building lot or for gardening purposes, the Governor gen-
erally first consulted the Ayuntamiento or Alcalde, to ascertain whether
there was any objection to the grant, or sent the grant to them for
their action prior to its being delivered to the grantee. Moreover, the
tracts so granted were usually at a considerable distance from the
principal settlement, or upon the very outskirts of the pueblo lands,
and a special clause was generally introduced making the lands so
granted subject to the regulations and tax or canon of the respective
pueblo. [We shall hereafter examine more particularly the meaning
of this word canon.]
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These facts are highly significant, and tend to confirm the view we
have taken of the Spanish and Mexican laws relating to pueblos. The
power of the Political Chief and Territorial Deputation, as well as that
of the Ayuntamiento and Alcaldes, over the lands assigned to pueblos
as pueblo lands, existed prior to the Colonization Law of 1824, and
did not result from that law, nor from the Executive Regulation of
1828, which was based upon it. In fact, the law of 1824 expressly
excludes from its provisions all lands pertaining to pueblos. And this
view, we think, is fully sustained by the very able and interesting
reports of the Junta appointed by the Supreme Government of Mex-
ico to propose measures for the settlement and colonization of Upper
and Lower California. These reports were printed in a collective form
in 1827, and gave rise to the Executive Regulation of November 21st,
1828. This Junta or commission was composed of the most distin-
guished statesmen and lawyers of Mexico, and among them was Don
Pablo Vicente de Sola, who had for some years been Governor of Cali-
fornia. The opinions of these men are well worthy of consideration.
(Dictamen y Planes de la Junta, pp. 11, etc.; Navarro's Opinion, cited
above.) [12.]
But it is said that regular grants in colonization and of undoubted
authenticity were made by the Governor, after 1834, to lands south of
Mission creek, and within or partly within the general limits of the
four leagues claimed to have been assigned by law to the pueblo of
San Francisco ; and it is contended that we must adopt one of two
alternatives—either that the pueblo had no title to any lands within
the four square leagues, or that such grants in colonization are utterly
null and void. We do not feel compelled to adopt either of these
conclusions, nor do we see any reasons to justify us in doing so. That
the pueblo had a right or interest in some of the lands within the gen-
eral limits, we believe to be beyond a reasonable doubt, and we think
the circumstances we have already alluded to as connected with the
secularization of the Mission may fully account for the grants in coloni-
zation, which are alleged to have been made by the Governors, of
lands which were occupied by the Mission in 1834, whan the pueblo
of San Francisco was first founded. [13.]
Again, we have been referred to the proceedings of juridical posses-
sion in October, 1835, of the Buri-Buri, or Sanchez Rancho, in which
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the " Pueblo of Dolores " was represented as a colindante, or adjacent
landholder, as showing that the pueblo there referred to must have
been the unorganized town intended by the secularization laws and regu-
lations to be formed out of the Mission, and not to that which is claimed
to have been formed in 1834 at the presidio ; because the distance
between the presidio square and the northern boundary of the Buri-
Buri rancho is greater than the limits which the law assigned to that
pretended pueblo, and because there is no evidence whatever that any-
additional land was ever assigned or dedicated to it. In the first
place, we do not think the fact that the pueblo was represented as a
colindante, shows that such municipality had any claim to the land next
to the northern boundary which ayas, in that juridical act of possession,
assigned to the Buri-Buri rancho. It seems to have been customary
in such proceedings to summon all the neighboring landholders, in
order that they might witness the act of possession, and see that their
own claims were not infringed. We are told that there are cases
among the records of the Surveyor General's office where landholders
were summoned as colindantes, although their lands were many miles
distant from the tract to which the juridical possession was to be given.
Moreover, there is no evidence to show that a separate pueblo was ever
founded at the Mission. There could have been no object in forming
one within the general or natural limits which had already been, by
law, assigned to another. As already stated, it is much more reason,
able to suppose, in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary,
that on the final extinction of the Mission, its ungranted lands, which
were susceptible of becoming town lands, were regarded as pertaining
to the municipality which had been previously established. Moreover,
there is abundant evidence to show that the municipal organization at
the Mission was the same as that which had previously been estab-
lished at the presidio, and that both constituted one and the same
pueblo. While, therefore, we regard the Buri-Buri documents as in no
way conflicting with our view of this case, we find in them strong evi-
dence that a pueblo was at that time in existence, and that it was offi-
cially recognized as having some right or title to land. [14.]
But it is objected, that if such pueblo had existed since 1884, and
it had any title to land, there ought to be found in the archives of the
city, or of the Surveyor General, the strongest possible evidence of
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these facts. Considering that nearly all the old pueblo archives,
where such evidence would naturally be looked for, were burned or
lost in 1851, and the very imperfect condition of the archives in
charge of the Surveyor General, we are only surprised that so much
evidence of these facts is still preserved. [15.] Of course, those
who have sought for a special grant, with boundaries particularly
designated by natural or artificial objects, have been disappointed.
We think there was no good reason to look for such a grant, as none
was required ; nor, so far as we can learn, was it usual to issue one.
Moreover, the law so expressly designates the manner in which the
four leagues were to be laid off, that there could have been no partic-
ular necessity of marking them out upon the ground in order to seg-
regate the land from the public domain. If a larger tract had been
assigned or granted, some act of grant ought to be shown ; or if the
four leagues had been located in a manner different from the usual
form, we might expect to find some special designation of boundaries.
Again, if a part of the four leagues had been private property, or
otherwise exempted from becoming pueblo lands, it may have been
desirable to mark out the dividing line between such lands, although
such marking out of boundaries was by no means necessary in order
to vest a right or title in the pueblo. And again, although not requi-
site to vest title, it may have been considered important in making
other grants, that the exact boundaries of the four square leagues
should be marked out as stated in the Report of 1840. The Mexican
laws relating to the survey of the four square leagues which the laws
assigned to the pueblo (found in Chap. 11, p. 96, of the " Ordenan-
zas de Tierras y Aguas ") are so very plain and specific that there
could have been no possible difficulty in determining the exact bound-
aries. They are precisely fixed by the law itself. [16.]
But it is urged that the " statement " or report to the Departmen-
tal Junta on the 16th of January, signed by Jimeno and Arguello,
negatives the idea that any lands had been assigned or granted to
this or any other pueblo in California. Upon a careful examination of
the original " statement," we find that the only part of it relating to
pueblo lands is a single paragraph, under the head of ejidos, or com-
mons, in which it is stated that none of the pueblos, except Monterey,
have their ejidos and 'pro'pios marked out, (" tienen demarcadas los
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ejidos j tierras de propios," etc). These words are susceptible of
several interpretations. They may mean that the two classes of
pueblo lands there mentioned had never been specially designated, as
they ought to have been, in order to separate them from the other
lands of such municipalities and to dedicate them to the objects
implied by the names ejidos and propios, which are used ; or they
may mean that the four square leagues which properly belonged to
such pueblo had never been actually marked out on the ground, and
" that, therefore, the Governor, in making concessions of land, in the
vicinity thereof, had granted the same temporarily, waiting for such
regulation, or definitive designation, of town boundaries, before issuing
definitive titles." Again, they may refer to lands outside of the four
leagues, and which the old laws say may also be assigned to pueblos,
in case it should be deemed advantageous and proper. But neither
of these interpretations conflicts, in the slightest degree, with the
view which we have taken. On the contrary, they are most strongly
confirmatory of that view. If none of the pueblos, except Monterey,
had any right or title to land, why mark out their boundaries, or why
separate the ejidos and propios ? Moreover, if they had none, why
was it not proposed to grant lands to such pueblos ? But nothing of
that kind is recommended, and the only grants spoken of were those
already made to individuals in the vicinity of the lands of such munic-
ipalities, and which were made as mere temporary concessions in
order to avoid any infringement of the rights or limits of the pueb-
los. [17.]
Again, it is said that the very terms of the Acts of the Governor
and Territorial Deputation, in August and November, 1834, giving to
Ayuntamientos a right to grant (dar) lands pertaining to pueblos,
and the forming of such municipality at the presidio of San Francisco,
show that they had no authority so to do, because article twenty of
the former requires report of it to be made for the approbation of the
General Congress, and article second of the latter requires it to be
reported for the approbation of the Supreme Executive. We do not
so understand these articles. That the Act for the election of the
Ayuntamiento was immediately carried into effect, there can be no
question. It seems that the Governor did not think any precedent
approval of the Supreme Executive requisite to give it validity. But
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this, as well as many other Acts of the Governor and Deputation,
was, by the laws, required to be submitted to the President for such
measures as he might see fit to take thereon. If approved, it
remained as it was ; but if disapproved, orders would have been
issued to annul and revoke the Act. The same remark applies to so
much of the Act of August 6th as relates to pueblo lands. But
article twelve of that Act contemplated a change of the revenue laws,
which could be made only with the sanction of Congress. Hence the
references of the Act to that body for approval. So far as the estab-
lishment of the pueblo of San Francisco and its organization and pow-
ers were concerned, we think that the existing laws conferred abund-
ant authority upon the Governor and Deputation. But if the appro-
val of the Supreme Executive were really necessary to give validity
to that part of these Acts, it will presumed. (The United States vs.
Clarke, 8 Peters' Rep., pp. 452, 463 ; Delassus vs. The United
States, 9 Peters' Rep., p. 134 ; Patterson vs. Jenks et al., 2 Peters'
Rep., pp. 225, 237 ; Polk's Lessee vs. Wendell, 5 Wheat. Rep., p.
295 ; The United States vs. Perchman, 7 Peters' Rep., pp. 95, 96 ;
Strother vs. Lucas, 12 Peters' Rep., p. 437.) [18.]
Counsel have raised various other objections, which we think may
be readily answered, and the facts upon which they are founded may
be easily reconciled with the view which we have taken ; but our
limits will prevent us from discussing them, and even from referring
to all the laws and authorities from which our opinion has been formed.
III. We will next consider the general character of the right or
title which a pueblo acquired to the lands, which, within the limits of
four square leagues, were susceptible of such acquisition.
In doing this, we will refer very briefly to the different kinds or
classes of pueblo lands, and to the powers of the municipal officers
over them. The right or title by which the pueblos held these lands
was, of course, in no way dependent upon the powers which the polit-
ical authority of the State might at any time confer upon the officers
of such municipalities. If counsel had observed this distinction, they
might probably have been saved much time and labor in their argu-
ments and voluminous briefs. Nevertheless, as the character of the
powers which such officers were authorized to exercise over such lands
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may tend to throw some light upon the nature of the title by which
they were held, we briefly notice the authorities on this point.
The Spanish laws give different names to different portions of land
within the limits of a city, pueblo or town, according to the various
uses to which they are applied. Thus, there are solares or house lots
of a small size, upon which dwellings, shops, stores, etc., are to be
built. There are suertes or sowing grounds, of a larger size, for cul-
tivation or planting, as gardens, vineyards, orchards, etc. There are
ejidos, which are quite well described by our word commons, and are
lands used in common by the inhabitants of the place for pasture,
wood, threshing ground, etc. ; and particular names are assigned to
each, according to its particular use. Sometimes additional ejidos
were allowed to be taken outside of the town limits. There are also
propios or municipal lands, from which revenues are derived to defray
the expenses of the municipal administration. There were also other
names, such as terminos, concejiles, tierras communes, tierras de labor
,
tierras de regadio, abrevaderos, dehesas, pastos, monies, plazas, etc.,
etc.
Such were the principal divisions of the land included within the
limits of a town and devoted to the use of its inhabitants. And
these divisions, when once made, were not merely nominal, for there
were numerous laws relating to each, and having respect to the man-
agement, disposition and use of each ; and the provisions which were
made for one class were usually very different from those relating to
another class. (Escriche Die, verbo Ejidos, propios, etc. Febrero
Mexicano ; Sala Mexicano ; Recopilacion de Indias, book 4, tit. 7.)
The right of the municipal authorities of pueblos to make grants or
distributions, in solares and suertes, to individuals and settlers of lands
within the limits of such pueblos, seems to have been conferred in
very early times, and is very often referred to in the more recent laws
and orders as a subsisting right. But certain classes of such lands,
as ejidos, etc., could not, in general, be so granted or distributed to
individuals for their exclusive use or occupation. Sometimes munici-
pal officers were prohibited from making grants or distributions of any
town lands of any class or description without the royal license ; and
at others, special officers were appointed by the Crown for that pur-
pose.
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It has been doubted by some if the grants or distributions of the
pueblo lands to individuals, made under the earlier Spanish laws, were
intended to be grants in full ownership. But we think this question
was definitively settled by the law of January 4th, 1813, which makes
numerous provisions for distributing or granting in suertes the lands of
the pueblos which were not required for ejiclos or commons, and
declares that, in whatever mode such lands are distributed or granted,
it shall be in full ownership
—
en plena propiedad. (Leyes Vigentes,
pp. 57, 59.)
There seems to be some difference in the various laws and orders
which were issued at different periods with respect to what particular
officers were to make such distributions of lots for building and other
purposes. In the cities and larger towns this duty, at least in early
times, devolved upon the cabildos and corrigedores of such cities and
towns. By Neve's Regulations of 1775, for the establishment of the
new pueblos of San Jose and Los Angeles, the right of distributing
the lots was, at least in the beginning, to be exercised by the Governor
himself, or by a person commissioned by him for that purpose. But
these pueblos were not, for the first two years, to elect any municipal
officers, and even after that time, only for such offices as should in the
meantime be established. The ordinary Alcaldes, for judicial and
police purposes, were to be furnished by the Governor. By the plan
of Pitic in 1789, the lands were to be divided up, and the first distri-
bution made by the Engineer and Commissioner, who were also to issue
the certificates of title. By Nava's order of 1791, for changing pre-
sidios into pueblos, the first distribution of house lots and lands within
the limits of the four square leagues, was to be made by the com-
mandants of the presidios ; but when a sufficient settlement was made
to authorize the municipal organization in place of the military, it is
presumed that these duties were to devolve upon the Ayuntamientos,
as in other cases. By the law of 1813, the expedientes of titles were
to be made by the Ayuntamientos and referred to the Provincial Dep-
utations for approval. By the law, act or decree of August 6th, 1834,
relating to pueblos in California, the Ayuntamientos were to ask that
there be marked out or assigned propios and ejidos for each town
;
and provision was made for granting, en censo enfiteutico, building lots
for the erection of houses or dwellings at a fixed ranee, and for the
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leasing of the propios from which the towns were to derive revenues
for the support of the municipal administration. The granting of such
house lots and the leasing of such propios were evidently to be made
by the Ayuntamientos. The meaning of the phrase en censo enfiteu-
tico and of el canon which, by the order of October 26th, 1835, the
grantees of such house lots were to pay to the Ayuntamiento of San
Francisco for such grants, will be alluded to and explained hereafter.
Concessions of house lots were made by the several Alcaldes of San
Francisco soon after the formation of that Ayuntamiento ; these grants
were either fifty or one hundred varas square. In the year 1835,
Jose Joaquin Estudillo applied to the Governor for a grant of two
hundred varas square. This petition was referred to the Territorial
Deputation, and the Committee of that body on Municipal Lands
reported, that grants of house lots ought to be limited to one hundred
varas square. Accordingly, the Governor, on the 26th of October,
1835, wrote to the Alcalde, " that the Ayuntamiento of that pueblo
(ese pueblo) may grant lots which do not exceed one hundred varas,
for the building of houses in the place called Yerba Buena ; " and
" that you may make it known to the inhabitants of that pueblo, in order
that they may not apply with their memorials to this political Govern-
ment, as it is one of the favors which the Ayuntamiento can grant.
This order of the Governor leads us immediately back to the law or
plan of Propios y Arbitrios, of August 6th, 1834. Now, if accord-
ing to this order the Ayuntamiento of that pueblo (ese pueblo) could
grant lots of land to settlers, and the law of August 6th authorized
such Ayuntamiento to impose, at its discretion, a ground rent or canon
on such grantees, the right of such pueblo to such lands must have
been something more than that of mere temporary occupation and use.
According to Escriche, " El canon " means " the annual charge or
rent which is paid in recognition of the dominium directum by the
person who holds the dominium utile. (Vide Escriche, verba canon
and pension. And for the meaning of the phrase u perteneciente a
los propios" vide Escriche, verba propios and pertinencia.) The
meaning of the former has already been explained, and the latter,
according to that authority, is " that which is necessary to, or conse-
quent upon the principal, and enters with it into the ownership ; as
when it is said that any one purchased such an estate with all its ap-
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purtenances." Here, the lands which the Ayuntamientos had a right
to grant in lots constituted the principal, and the " canon perteneciente
a los propios" of" ese pueblo" which the Ayuntamiento was author-
ized to require to be paid as a consideration for such concessions or
grants, or an annual rent therefor, was an acknowledgment of the
direct dominion which the pueblo, as the owner of such propios, had
in the land which was conceded, granted or rented.
Again, article two of the law of August 6th, says that these propios,
which may be designated to each pueblo, may be rented or granted
en censo enfiteutico. Escriche says , that " censo enfiteutico " is the
right which we retain to require of another a certain annual charge
or rent, by reason of having transferred to him forever, or for a great
length of time, the useful ownership of some real estate, reserving to
ourself the direct dominion. Again, the same author says : " the
direct owner or imposer of the censo is he who transfers the useful
dominion of the real estate ; while the grantee or enfiteutico is he who
acquires the useful ownership of the thing charged." Moreover, it is
said that such owner of the dominio utile cannot be ejected from such
real estate by the dominio directo, except in case of neglect for several
consecutive years to pay the ground tax according to the terms of the
grant ; that he may impose upon it, without notice to or consent of the
dueno directo, any servitude, rent or other charge, and pledge, mort-
gage or sell it.
It would seem from these definitions that pueblos held the direct do-
minion of these lands, subject to certain trusts and uses, and that the
moderate and small portions which they were authorized to grant to
individuals, were to be held by the latter as subject to such municipal
tax, but in all other respects, in absolute ownership with full right of
disposition. These inferences would seem to result from the very
words used in these documents.
But be this as it may, the right of such municipal officers of this
particular pueblo to make such concessions or grants in lots of one
hundred varas square was, in 1885, fully recognized by the highest
authority in California— the Governor and Territorial Deputation.
It appears that the Mexican law of March 20th, 1837, provided
that in pueblos having a population under a certain specified standard,
Jueces de Paz were to be elected, and were to exercise the powers of
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Ayuntamientos. But it also appears from the archives that this law
was not carried into effect in California until some time in 1839, and
that the system was again changed at the end of 1843. By the Gov-
ernor's proclamation of November 14th, 1843, which in some respects
modifies this organization, Monterey and Los Angeles were to elect
Ayuntamientos, composed each of two Alcaldes, four Regidores and
one Syndico, and that in the other pueblos, among which San Fran-
cisco is named, elections were to be held for the appointment of " two
Alcaldes of first and second nomination." These new " Alcaldes de
nominacion," or Jueces, were to enter upon their duties the first of
the following January, and in addition to the judicial powers of the
ordinary Alcaldes and the political powers of the Prefects, they were
to exercise " the powers and obligations which the Ayuntamientos
have." (Limantour Land Com., Ex. " 0," pp. 45, et seq. ; Wheeler's
Land Titles; Int. and Schedules.) [19.]
We think that the documents and authorities to which we have
referred are sufficient to show that pueblos had such a right and inter-
est in the lands within their limits that they could distribute, concede,
or grant them in lots to individual settlers, subject in this as in all
other matters to the instructions and orders which might be given
them by the superior authorities, and that the lots so distributed, con-
ceded or granted, were, at least after the law of 1813, passed to the
grantees and their heirs and successors in full property and ownership,
subject only to the municipal tax, or censo.
It is said that this Court, in the case of Woodworth v. Fulton, (1
Cal. Rep., p. 295) virtually decided : First, that San Francisco never
was a pueblo. Second, that it had no right or title to land which
it could transfer or convey to others. Third, that if it had any
title, Alcaldes, acting under American authority after the military
occupation and conquest of the country, could not convey without
authority from the American Government.
It is also said that the first two of these grounds were virtually
abandoned and overruled by the same Judges in the subsequent case
of Reynolds v. West, (1 Cal. Rep., p. 323) in which they sustained
the validity of a grant in San Francisco made by a Mexican Alcalde
before the war ; and that in Cohas v. Raisin (3 Cal. Rep., p. 443)
this Court overruled the third ground of the decision of Woodworth
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v. Fulton, by sustaining a grant made by an American Alcalde during
the war with Mexico, and while California was in the military occupa-
tion of the United States.
Without examining here the opinions of the individual Judges in
the last case, with respect to the character of the right or title which
the pueblo of San Francisco held to the lands within its limits, we will
suppose the question which the Court undertook to decide was simply
this : Conceding that the pueblo had such a right or title to the lands
within its limits that, as held in Reynolds v. West, its Alcalde or
municipal officer could convey such land to others in full property, did
such power of conveyance continue in such municipal officers during
the military occupation of California by the United States, without
special authority from the conquering power ? Supposing this to be
the only question which was actually passed upon by the Court in that
case, we will now proceed to examine the correctness of the conclu-
sions to which the Court arrived.
It is a well established principle of international law, that the mili-
tary occupation of a conquered territory does not, in general, effect
any change in the laws of that territory. The political connection
between its inhabitants and their former sovereign or State is interrupted
or suspended so long as the occupation continues, and is entirely sev-
ered on the completion or confirmation of the conquest, whether by
treaty of cession or otherwise. The right of the conqueror to govern
the enemy's territory which he may occupy, is not derived from the
Constitution or political institutions of his own State, but flows directly
from the laws of war, as established by the usage of the world, and
confirmed by the writing of publicists and the decisions of Courts ; in
fine, from the law of nations. It is held by the same code, that,
although the conqueror may suspend the laws and entirely displace the
former local and civil authorities, or limit or change their powers, this
is not usually done ; and consequently, that such changes are not to be
presumed, but must be proved. Even where the conquest is completed
by cession or treaty of peace, although the laws political which
bound the country and its inhabitants to the former sovereign are
thereby completely abrogated, the municipal laws of the country con-
tinue in force until changed by the proper authority ; and the exist-
ing government and its officers continue to exercise the powers and
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authority conferred by such laws, so far as they are not inconsistent
with the will, expressed or necessarily implied, of the new sovereign.
Neither military occupation or complete conquest produces, as a gen-
eral rule, any change in private property, no matter whether belong-
ing to individuals or municipalities, or by what kind of title it may be
held. These veiws are sustained by the best authorities. ( Fleming
v. Page, 9 How. Rep., p. 603 ; Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. Rep., p.
164 ; Heffter, Droit International, sees. 131, 186 ; Isambert, Annales
Pol. et Dip. Int., p. 115 ; Schwartz, De Jure Victoria, ch. 27 ; Vat-
tel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 13, sec. 197, et seq ; Wildman, Inter-
national Law, vol. 1, pp. 163 et seq.; Ortolan, Diplomatie delaMer.,
liv. 2, ch. 13 ; Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowper's Rep., p. 204 ; Kent,
Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 92 ; Wheaton Elem. Int. Law, p. 4, ch.
2, sees. 5, 6 ; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 12 ;
Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters' Rep., p. 542 ; Burge, Commenta-
ries, vol. 1, pp. 31, 32.) [20.]
Again, suppose it to be admitted that pueblos had no absolute right
of property in any part of the four leagues of land within their gen-
eral limits, and that the legal title still remained in the Mexican Gov-
ernment, subject only to the uses of the towns for the purposes and
under the restrictions imposed by the laws and regulations ; it by no
means follows, that, upon the complete conquest and cession of Cali-
fornia, this land became a part of the public domain of the United
States.
In the case of the City of New Orleans v. the United States, it
was held by the United States Supreme Court, that property may be
dedicated to the public use without vesting the legal title, and that,
when such use had once been created, it could be destroyed only by
an exercise of the right of eminent domain. In that case, France
had permitted a certain part of the city of New Orleans to be used
as a quay. The same use had been continued under the Spanish
sovereignty, and after its retrocession by Spain to France, and its
cession by the latter to the United States. Neither of these Gov-
ernments had ever conveyed any legal title to these lands, either to
the city of New Orleans or to the public ; it was therefore contended
that, by the last cession, the title or right of property in this land had
passed, with all other public rights, to the United States. But the
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Court said that, admitting the legal title to have been in the King of
Spain, if he held the land in trust for the use of the public, the title
in him was subject to such uses, and the act of cession could not
destroy them ; that the United States acquired no right to dispose of
such land as other public lands of the United States ; moreover, that
the right to regulate this use and to carry out the trust belonged to
the State of Louisiana and the people, such a right never having been
delegated to the Federal Government. (10 Peters' Rep., pp. 736,
737.)
If such a rule was applicable to the lands of this quay, so held, a
fortiori must it apply to the pueblo lands of San Francisco, which,
as already shown, were held by that pueblo by a much stronger right
or title. (See 7 Texas R. 288.)
It has been stated by counsel for plaintiffs, and the correctness of
the statement was not denied, but has been virtually admitted in some
of the briefs of defendants' counsel on file in this case, that there are
very few, if any, royal charters, for the incorporation of cities or
towns, since the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, in Spain or the
Indies ; and that not a single instance of such a charter can be found
in any of the collections of the Mexican laws and decrees. Cadiz has
a royal charter of nobility, with the title of " Noble and Heroic ;" and
the same may be said of Saragosa and some other cities. But these
are very different from charters of incorporation, and contain no titles,
grants or rights to land, or control over land. The cities themselves
had existed hundreds of years before these royal charters were issued.
The royal order of August 19th, 1833, cited by counsel, changing the
pueblo of Port Royal, of Manzanillo, into the villa of that name, forms
no exception to this view. This is no charter of incorporation, nor
does it contain any grant of land. It provides for the demarcation
and designation of propios, ejidos and dehesas, and the assignment of
jurisdictional limits (terreno jurisdictional
;
) but we have searched
it in vain for any grant, or any intention to subsequently make a
grant of any land to that municipality. Probably here, as in most
other cases, the only charter of incorporation or grant of land made
or contemplated, was the license to establish an Ayuntamiento in such
pueblo or villa, and the pueblo, villa and Ayuntamiento, when estab-
lished and organized, immediately became invested with all the rights
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and powers which were conferred by the general laws or particular
act. Again, it is said that the city of Lima, in Peru, never had a
royal charter of incorporation, or a grant of land ; and yet that city
and its inhabitants have enjoyed the lands within its municipal limits
for more than three hundred years. Suppose that city should be ceded
to the United States ; would all such lands not held by royal grant
become a part of the domain of the United States ? Suppose it be
true, as admitted in the briefs of counsel, that but few, if any, of the
cities or towns of Mexico have ever received any special grant, and
that, as here contended, the laws gave them no title, without special
grant, to the lands which they have distributed to the inhabitants and
settlers ; does it follow that if the United States should acquire that
country, by conquest or cession, such lands would become a part of
the public domain, and consequently, that the holders thereof could
have no title except by an Act of the political power of the new
State ? [21.]
If this be really the law, we think that such a change of sov-
ereignty would be infinitely more disastrous to the United States
than to the land-holders, who might thereby be despoiled and ruined.
The power which the Federal Government would acquire over the
property of individuals would be greater than that held by any mon-
arch of modern days ; and very soon it would utterly corrupt our
Federal Administration and destroy our Federal organization.
But we cannot think that this is a correct view of the law in these
cases. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that Spanish and
Mexican towns had, under the general laws, such a right or title to
lands within their limits as will enable and require the courts to pro-
tect them and those holding under them, in the enjoyment of those
lands ; that the determination and regulation of these rights belong to
the States and not to the Federal Government, for the reason that
neither conquest nor cession could confer upon that Government any
such power, and because, as held by the United States Supreme
Court, the Constitution prohibits it from exercising any such power in
the States.
But counsel have referred us to the fueros (franchises) and cartas
pueblas y forales (town charters and franchises) granted by the sov-
ereigns and lords in Biscay, Navarre, etc., in opposition to the view
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we have taken, and as showing the necessity of such grants to confer
any right of property upon towns. It is a sufficient answer to this
argument to remark that these fueros, etc., never extended to Spain
or to the Indies, and form no part of the Spanish law. The King of
Spain was merely Lord of Biscay, and President of the Junta of the
other Lords of Biscay. There were separate and distinct fueros
municipales in Leon, Castile, Navarre, Arragon and Catalona. These
received particular names from the persons or places to which they
were granted ; as the fuero of Najera, the fuero of Sepulveda, the
fuero of Logrono, the fuero of Sahagun, of Toledo, of San Sebas-
tian, of Cuenca, of Caceres, etc., etc. The privileges thus conceded
in early ages to particular cities and towns, or to the Lords of those
places, still subsist, at least to a certain extent, and are therefore
alluded to and discussed by modern commentators of Spanish juris-
prudence ; but they have no relation whatever to the Spanish and
Mexican laws applicable to towns and pueblos in California. ( Esriche,
verbo Fuero Municipal.') [22.]
But suppose an actual allotment or demarcation of land was requis-
ite under Mexican law in order to vest a title in the pueblo, as has
been so strenuously urged by counsel. The mere failure of the Mex-
ican Government to assign these lands, if that was necessary, would
not under the circumstances, destroy the right of the pueblo to them.
We have shown that the pueblo existed, and exercised a certain right
of ownership in these lands, and that it was entitled to do so by the
laws of Mexico. Under the broad and liberal terms of the Act of
Congress of 1851, the claim of the city would be an equitable claim
on the Federal Government, which her officers would be bound to rec-
ognize and perfect, and which, indeed, has been done, so far as her
Courts are concerned, at least with respect to so much of the claim as
has been confirmed.
The evidence in favor of the existence of a pueblo in San Francisco
prior to July 7, 1846, and of its general right, for pueblo purposes, to four
square leagues of land, to be measured, according to the ordinanzas,
from the center of the plaza at the presidio, is, to our minds, irresistible.
1st. We have the general laws of Spain and the Indies authorizing
the formation of pueblos, assigning their general boundaries, direct-
ing how they were to be surveyed out, designating the uses to which
3
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such lands were to be devoted, and defining the character of the right
which the pueblo acquired in them, and the control which its munici-
pal authorities, as well as the King and his officers, were to exercise
over them.
2d. We have the special orders of the King and the highest officers
of his Government with respect to the establishment of pueblos in
California, and more particularly for the conversion of presidios into
pueblos, and the extent of land assigned to the pueblos so formed.
3d. We have documentary evidence showing that at a very early
period, and almost immediately after the discovery of the bay of San
Francisco, the Viceroy and Governor of California contemplated the
establishment of a pueblo at this identical point, and that the founda-
tion of the presidio and Mission of San Francisco, in 1776, was then
considered and so announced as merely preliminary to the organization
of a great town, into which they were to be converted as soon as a
sufficient number of settlers could be procured for that purpose.
4th. We have documentary evidence of unquestionable authentic-
ity, showing that the Governor and Territorial Deputation, in 1834,
ordered an election at the presidio of an Ayuntamiento, consisting of
an Alcalde, two Regidores and a Syndico—officers recognized by law
as belonging only to pueblos ; that this and subsequent elections of
the same kind were held at the same place ; and that such municipal
organization was then, and has been ever since, recognized in numer-
ous official documents signed by the different Governors, Secretaries
of State, and other Government officers, as the " pueblo of San Fran-
cisco," or the " pueblo of San Francisco de Assis."
5th. We have documentary evidence showing that the Political
Chiefs, Deputations and other Government officers recognized, in numer-
ous official papers, that this pueblo had some interest in, and its munic-
ipal authorities some control over, the lands within the general limits
of four square leagues ; and that, at different periods, they were
authorized to grant, in particular localities within such limits, small
parcels of these lands to private persons in full ownership.
And 6th. We have documentary evidence showing that the munic-
ipal officers of this pueblo did, for a long term of years, both before
and since the conquest, exercise this authority by granting small lots
of land to numerous individuals, and that their power was recognized,
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both by the Mexican Government in California and by the Govern-
ment of Military Occupation which succeeded it.
IV. In pursuing this discussion thus far, we have not deemed it
necessary to determine the precise character of the right or title by
which the pueblo of San Francisco held its pueblo lands, nor the pre-
cise boundaries by which such lands were limited and defined. It
was sufficient for our purpose that it had some right or title to lands,
and that these lands were defined by the law, and that their boundaries
could be ascertained and fixed. We now, however, must consider the
question whether the pueblo of San Francisco, or the City of San
Francisco as its successor, had such a title to the lands within its limits
which had not been conceded or granted in the manner we have indi-
cated, as to subject them to be levied upon and sold under execution.
This question has been most elaborately discussed, numerous points
have been raised, and a multitude of authorities have been referred to.
It would be impossible in this opinion, to discuss all of these points
and authorities, nor shall we attempt to do so ; for the view we have
taken of this question renders it unnecessary to consider many of those
upon which counsel have argued with great zeal and ability.
It has been argued with much force, that while cities, pueblos and
towns, under Spanish and Mexican law, had certain uses in the
lands within their limits, the title to such lands, although subject to
such uses, still remained in the Crown or Government, and numer-
ous authorities have been referred to, to sustain this position. Thus,
in Book 4, Tittle 12, Law 8, of the Recopilacion de Indias, it is
said : " Our pleasure is that the Viceroys and President-Governors
shall have power to revoke and annul the gifts (gracias) which the
councils (cabildos) of cities have made, or shall make, of lands in
their districts, if they have not been confirmed by us; and, if they
belonged to Indians, they shall be ordered to be returned to them,
and the vacant lands (yaldios) shall remain such," etc. Again
:
Book 7, Tit. 5, Law 2, Recop., says : " Our will and pleasure is, that
the cities, towns and villages shall retain their rights, revenues and
propios, and that no gifts Qgracias) of them be made ; wherefore, we
command that any gifts or gift which we shall make of the same, or any
part thereof, to any person, shall be of no value." Again : Book 7,
Tit. 7, Law 10 : " The king prohibits any one from making gifts (jpro-
36 LAND TITLES IN SAN FRANCISCO.
Hart vs. Burnett, et al.
das') in the royal name, of any commons and pastures (terminos y
pastes) of the cities, towns and places of the kingdom
;
" and in Law
11, of the same Book and Title, it is commanded that the Justices
and Councilmen (Justicias y Regidores) shall not grant any lands
(dar tierras algunas) without a previous license for that purpose.
Again : Perez, in commenting upon the settlement of the Indies by
Ferdinand and Isabella, says : " Their Majesties esteemed it proper to
cede to the towns of America and to their Councils, en clase de dote
o privilego de problacion, a certain portion of lands, in order that they
might have recourse to them for their support and improvement (usu-
fructandolos) for pastures, cultivation, or in the manner directed in their
municipal ordinances." (Perez, Comp., pp. 334, 335.) Elisondo
says : " The Kings, the fountains of jurisdiction, are the owners (due-
nos) of all the terminos situated in their kingdoms, and as such, can
donate them, divide or restrict them ; the same being true of their
pastos, although the pueblos enjoy them—it being presumed that they
are granted only so far as respects their use and administration, the
dominion remaining in the sovereigns themselves, so that they may
afterwads limit, enlarge or restrict them, and give any new form to the
possession and enjoyment thereof (sus goce y aproveehamiento).
And hence it is that pueblos cannot alienate their terminos and pastos
without precedent royal license and authority. The ancient limits
(terminos) are never presumed to be altered or changed, but, on
the contrary, to remain in their primitive condition ; especially being
assigned by a royal commissioner in whom no power is vested to give
and assign terminos to one town to the prejudice of others, but to mark
out those inclosed and private, to which the letter of the commission
refers, and which must be considered as such after being marked out,
so that each town (poblacion) and its inhabitants may use them, their
pastos and ejidos, as the endowment (dote) of the ciudad, villa or
lugar to which they belong. From the foregoing it is inferred that
any city, village or pueblo has an established right to the lands adja-
cent to it ; consequently, the inhabitants of another lugar cannot pas-
ture in the same, nor enjoy their other uses (aprovechamientos) with-
out showing a legitimate title authorizing them to do so." (Practica
Un. Forense, tomo 3, pp. 107, 108.)
Again, the same author says : " There is assigned (diputada) by
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law, as pertenencia of pueblos, nothing more than that which, by priv-
ilege of the Princes (privilegio de los Principes)
,
by custom, or by
disposition of men one to another, is conceded to them ; so that, although
there is assigned to the towns, at the time of their establishment, a
territorio and pertenencias, which may be common to all the inhab-
itants, without the right to each one separately to .use them exclusively
(por si) there is reserved to the. Princes the prerogative (regalia)
to decide the terminos of their provinces and villas, prescribing to
them the use and enjoyment, but leaving the dominio in the sovereigns
themselves." (Idem, tomo 5, p. 226.)
In order to fully understand the preceding extracts from Elizondo's
Commentaries, it is necessary to examine the technical meaning of the
words used. Thus, dote means dowry, when applied to the patrimony
of the wife, but when applied to towns it means a gift or endowment.
Aprovechamiento, when applied to pueblo lands, has particular refer-
ence to the commons, as the dehesas and montes, and implies not only
the enjoyment, but a right to the enjoyment of them. Dominio does
not necessarily imply ownership ; it may mean simply the dominio
alto, (right of eminent domain, which belongs to every sovereign State
over private property) or the dominio directo, or the dominio utile,
which have already been explained. So of the word propiedad; it
does not necessarily imply a full right of disposition, for the dominio
utile may be in one and the nuda propiedad in another. And again
:
the word regalia may, in Spanish law, simply mean a right which the
sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of prop-
erty or propiedad. (Vide the words indicated in the dictionaries of
Escriche, of Salva, of Velasquez, of the Academy, etc.)
But our limits will not permit us to pursue this critical investiga-
tion ; and we therefore resume our examination of the other more
important authorities referred to by counsel for defendants.
Book IV, Tit. 7, Law 11, of the Recopilacion de Indias, in refer-
ence to laying out new towns, says : " Let solares be distributed by
lot to the settlers (pobladores) continuing from those at the principal
square (plaza mayor) and leave the others for us to give to those who
may afterwards come to settle, (poblar) or what may be our pleasure."
" Propios," says Febrero, " are that species of property which, by
some title, pertains to the commonalty of each pueblo, and the revenues
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whereof are dedicated to the conservation of the civil organization and
municipal establishment of the councils, comprehending likewise under
this name all those things declared to be such in virtue of any legal
dispositions. (Feb. Mex., torn. 1, pp. 304-309.) The law of March
20th, 1837, says : (Art. 8) " On the previous report of the Prefects
and having heard the opinion (dictatem) of the Departmental Junta,
they (the Governors) may grant
4
license to the Ayuntamientos or
authorities charged with the administration and expenditure of the
municipal funds, for the extraordinary expenses which may be directed
to objects of necessity or common utility." And (Art. 9) " In cases
of necessity or for motives of public convenience, they may grant
license to the same authorities, on previous consent (anuencid) of the
Departmental Junta, to alienate (magenar) any of the property
(algunos de los bienes) of the propios and arbitros ; and any cession,
donation or contract, made without this requisite shall be null and of
no value." Col. de Decretos, 1836 y 1837, p. 180. "Among the
attributes of gratuitous administration (administration graciosd) id
est, for making gifts or grants without claim," says Lares, " are
included the acts of 'tutelage (tuteld) which the Executive (Gobiernd)
exercises over corporations and establishments which are considered in
society as moral persons, and with the privileges of minors. This
state of tutelage and protection has been the object of the critical
examination of publicists, who are divided in opinion," etc. * *
"According to the importance and nature of the object which the act
of tutelage has to secure, so will be the different manners in which
this act will be exercised. If it relates to a subject of small interest,
the administration will proceed by orders or decrees, or by means of
its respective agents ; if the matters are of weight, it will issue formal
regulations. But in whatever mode it may be done, the contentious
appeal against these acts of administrative tutelage, whether superior
or inferior, would be repugnant to its nature. * * * The acts of
administrative tutelage are acts of inferior administration which do not
admit of any appeal. This tutelage of administration is applicable to
all acts of alienations, sales, exchanges, rentings, acceptance of trusts
or legacies, compromises and suits of Ayuntamientos and other Corpo-
rations which are under the Executive. The approval or disapproval
of a sale, or of a compromise, are acts of tutelage which, like all acts
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of that nature, do not admit of appeal." (Derecho Admin., pp. 120,
122.) [25.]
The above are the most important authorities referred to by counsel
against the pueblo title. The quotations which they have made are,
in most instances, but brief extracts from long laws which contain
numerous provisions, and sometimes these extracts are not fully ex-
pressive of the sense and object of the law. We have carefully
examined their references to laws and text-books, and it seems to us,
that taken together, they show that, under the old Spanish system,
the lands assigned to towns, whether by general law or special act,
were in the sense of endowments, to be held in trust for the purposes
and objects specified in the laws or in the particular grant ; or, as
expressed by Perez, en clase de dote o privilegio de poblacion, (in class
of endowment or town privilege) but not in absolute ownership, with
full right of disposition. The lands so assigned were for the general
object of building up and sustaining the town and its population, and
were to be applied to that object in the manner which might be directed
by the laws or by royal orders. The Grovernment, or its authorized
agents, were, therefore, to designate the portions of such lands which
were to be used for particular purposes, as those which were to be
given to individuals in solares and suertes ; those which were to remain
common for the use of all alike, as the pastures, woods, public squares,
watering places, etc., and those from which the municipal officers were
to derive revenues for their support and the expenses of the municipal
government. The lands so assigned to these special objects could not
all be used or disposed of in the same manner. Thus, the building
lots were to be given to the settlers for their individual and exclusive
benefit ; but the commons were for the common use of all, and could
not, in general, be reduced to individual ownership except by common
consent, or an exercise of the right of eminent domain. There were
numerous laws enacted at different times which relate to each class of
land belonging to towns, and much misunderstanding has resulted
from not observing to what particular class the provisions of a law
refer. And this conclusion is greatly increased by the ordinary En-
glish translations, where, for the want of corresponding English words,
these various classes are usually translated by the general terms
" municipal lands " or " town lands." [23.]
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It also appears from these authorities that neither the King nor any
of his officers were to grant away to others the lands which had been,
by law or otherwise, assigned to any town, and that, if such grants
should inadvertently be made, they were to be considered as void.
And it further appears that the municipal officers of any town were
not, without superior authority, to alienate any town lands, and if they
did so without previous license or subsequent confirmation their acts
were to be considered as void. [24.]
But we see nothing in these laws opposed to the views we have
already expressed, that the towns had such a right, title and interest
in these lands as to enable them to use and dispose of them in the
manner authorized by law or by special orders, and consonant with the
object of the endowment and trust. Undoubtedly the right of control
remained in the sovereign, who might authorize or forbid any municipal
or other officer to grant or dispose of such lands, even for the purposes
of the endowment or trust. Such general right, with respect to a
public corporation, exists in any sovereign State, and must, of course,
have existed in the absolute monarchy of Spain, where the property
of private corporations and individuals was to a great degree, subject
to the royal will and pleasure. [25.]
In justice to one of our predecessors, it is proper to remark, that
we have here quoted only such laws as were referred to by counsel,
and, for that reason, have not alluded to laws 1 and 2, Title XVI,
Book V, of the Novisima Recopilacion, relied upon by Justice Hey-
denfelt in his opinion in Cohas vs. Basin, 3 Cal. Rep., p. 446. Some
of the counsel have denied that the laws so relied upon were of any
force or authority in Mexico. There seems to be a misunderstanding
or misapprehension in this matter. The laws referred to were, beyond
all question or peradventure, in force in Mexico. It is true that some
Mexican writers have doubted whether the new laws introduced into
that Recopilacion, which had never been transmitted to the Indies
prior to 1811, and which refer particularly to old Spain, are of bind-
ing authority there. But the laws referred to by Justice Heydenfeldt,
are, according to every Mexican writer whom we have consulted, in
force in Mexico. In the first place, these laws are copied verbatim
from laws 1 and 2, Title V, Book 7, of the Recopilacion, which, by
royal decree, was of binding authority in the Indies. In the second
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place they are copied in fall in the " Pandectas Hispano Mexicanas"
or General Code of Laws in force (vivas') in the Republic of Mexico,
published in 1840, by the Licentiate, Juan H. Rodriguez de San
Miguel. Vide Nos. 2430, 2431. Moreover, they are quoted and
referred to as laws in force (leyes vigentes) by numerous Mexican
text writers. With respect to the binding character of the Novisima
Recopilacion generally, in Mexico, we refer to Sala Mexicana, vol. 1,
pp. 140-144 ; Febrero Mexicana, vol. 1, Caps. 3 and 4, pp. 96-160 ;
Schmidt's Civil Law of Spain and Mexico, p. 98 ; Rockwell's Spanish
and Mexican Law, vol. 1, p. 16.
The question has been raised whether the character of this title in
towns was not enlarged and became a title in absolute property, with
full power of disposition under the Constitution of 1812, the laws of
1813, and the Constitution and laws of the Mexican Republic after
its independence.
We have already noticed the law of the Cortez in 1813, with respect
to the nature of the grants by the Ayuntamientos of town lands to
individuals, making them in full property, and explained the meaning
of the words used with respect to such grants by the Governor and
Territorial Deputation in their acts of August 6th, 1834, and October
26th, 1835, but we have not been referred to any law either of the
Cortez, of Mexico, or of California, changing the character of the
right or title by which the towns themselves held these lands. If they
before held them in trust for certain objects and uses, subject, in this
matter, to superior control and authority, we must infer, unless the
contrary be shown, that the same continued, except so far as such
control by superior authorities might be modified by the change from
an absolute monarchy to a government of constitutions and laws.
It has been contended on the one hand, that, inasmuch as the Reg-
ulation of November 21st, 1828, authorized the Governor of Califor-
nia to grant solares of one hundred varas, and as the law of March
20th, 1837, prescribes it as one of the duties of a Prefect to regulate
the distribution of the common lands of the pueblos of his district, it
must follow as a necessary consequence, that the full title to such
pueblo lands remained in the Mexican Government ; while, on the
other hand, it is contended that inasmuch as the law of August 18th,
1824, exempts from colonization the lands of pueblos, and as the Gov-
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ernor and Territorial Deputation in 1835 recognized the right of
Ayuntamientos to grant pueblo lands in lots of one hundred varas, it
must follow as a necessary consequence, that such pueblos were the
owners of an absolute title to such lands. We are of opinion that neither
of these inferences is correct, but that both are opposed to the entire
tenor and purport of the laws and proceedings of the Spanish and
Mexican Governments respecting pueblos, and other municipal organ-
izations.
In the first place, the Executive regulations of 1828, respecting
grants of solares could not have had exclusive reference to lands held
by pueblos ; for these by the law of 1824, which authorized the regu-
lation of 1828, were exempted from such colonization. It was probably
designed, at least in part, to authorize the Governor to grant such
house lots to individual settlers in places where there were no pueblos,
and for the purpose of forming a nucleus from which, when the num-
ber of inhabitants became sufficiently large, a pueblo might be organ-
ized, precisely as seems to have been contemplated by Nava's order
of 1791, respecting the captains and commandants of presidios, pre-
paratory to their change into pueblos. Again, it is not certain that
the law of 1837 has reference to grants of lands ; it is argued that it
authorizes only the forming of regulations for the distribution of the
common lands of pueblos, which it is said were lands dedicated to the
common use of all the inhabitants, and not susceptible of being granted
in private ownership. If Prefects were authorized to grant lands in
private ownership— a point we do not decide— that power is not
expressly given by the Act of March 20th, 1837. [26.]
The Regulation of 1828 authorized the Governor or Political Chief,
subject to certain control by the Territorial Legislature and supreme
Executive, to grant the public domain in colonization ; but no authority
was given to him to delegate that power to another, and such authority
is not implied under any system of laws with which we are acquainted.
It follows, therefore, that if the full and absolute title to pueblo lands
remained in the Mexican Government, and subject only to the law of
1824, and the regulation of 1828, as has been contended, any attempt
of the Governor or Territorial Legislature to confer upon the Ayunta-
mientos and Alcaldes power to grant such national domain, was nuga-
tory, and the grants made by such municipal officers were void, for
the want of legal authority. [27.]
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But we have seen that the Governor and Legislature did author-
ize such officers to grant lots in pueblos to private persons, and it
is shown by the records in this case that these officers did exercise
that power for a long term of years, not only in San Francisco, but
in other pueblos of California, without any doubt being expressed,
or any question raised with respect to it's legality, and many millions
of property are now held under the grants so issued. Can it be that
the highest officers of the Government, for so long a term of years,
entirely misunderstood their duties and powers under their own laws,
and that their acts were mere usurpations and utterly null and void,
as assuredly they must have been, if the lands which they author-
ized such municipal officers to grant away belonged absolutely to
the State as a part of the national domain ? And are we now, with
our imperfect knowledge of their laws, customs and institutions,
called upon to declare, by deciding that such lands were, before the
conquest, wholly vested in the Mexican Government, and since that
time, in the United States— that such grants conferred no right of
property, and thus spread universal dismay and ruin ? As already
stated, such a decision would be opposed, not only to common justice
and common sense, but to the entire tenor and purport of Spanish and
Mexican laws. But conceding, for the sake of the argument, the right
of Prefects and of the Governor to grant these lands, there is no
necessary inconsistency in holding the title of the pueblos, for we
have shown these grants to be in the nature of a public trust, and the
exercise of this power by one agent of the Government or another,
implies nothing decisive as to the general title, any more than the Act
of the Legislature allowing Commissioners to sell lots in San Fran-
cisco prove that city had no title.
On the other hand, if the pueblos held the lands within their limits
by an absolute title of ownership, with full right of disposition, why
were such lands to be divided into classes and dedicated to and used
for special objects, with so many laws and regulations respecting each
class and object ; and why were so many restrictions placed upon their
disposition, the power to alienate being sometimes entirely taken away,
and at others limited only with respect to the size of the lots to be
granted ? And how are we to reconcile the opinions of learned pub-
licists and commentators on the laws, who say that the sovereign
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retained the prerogative of regulating the uses, enjoyment and dispo-
sition of the lands assigned to towns for the use of their inhabitants,
and that without his license the respective Ayuntamientos, Alcaldes,
Regidores, etc., could not alienate or burthen with charges the lands
of the community ? If the pueblos held such lands under an absolute
title of full property, the same as an individual held his solar, what
would it have availed to restrict their power of granting to lots of one
hundred varas square ? Could they not have granted all these lots to
a single person, or have contracted debts, as in this case, and by con-
niving with some creditor, permit him to purchase it all in under an
execution for the payment of such debt, and thus defeat the entire
object had in view in assigning these lands to the pueblo ?
There is but one sensible answer to these questions, and we think
that answer is given in the laws themselves, and in the recorded pro-
ceedings of the officers who administered them, and who must be pre-
sumed to have interpreted them correctly. It is, that the lands
assigned to pueblos, whether by general law regulating their limits to
four square leagues, or by a specific designation of boundaries, were
not given to them in absolute property, with full right of disposition
and alienation, but to be held by them in trust for the benefit of the
entire community, with such powers of use, disposition and alienation
as had been already, or might afterwards be conferred for the due
execution of such trust, upon such pueblos, or upon their officers. And
this view of the question, we think, fully reconciles the apparently
conflicting dispositions of the laws, and the commentaries of public-
ists respecting the relative rights of the crown and of the municipali-
ties, to which the opposing counsel have referred, and the most import-
ant of which we have already noticed. [28.]
V. But it has been most strenuously urged by counsel that, even
admitting that the pueblo of San Francisco held its lands merely in
trust for a specific object, or that its title was inchoate or otherwise
imperfect—that it had a perpetual usufruct only in the four leagues
of land measured from the center of the presidio square—such right
or title was merely a mode of expressing, in the civil law, a right of
perpetual enjoyment of property, or title of ownership by the pueblo
in its lands, and that the change of government and laws converted
such civil law title into a common law title of fee simple absolute ; or,
LAND TITLES IN SAN FRANCISCO. 45
Hart vs. Burnett, et al.
at least, that the Act of March 3d, 1851, conferred such title upon
the city of San Francisco, and that therefore, these lands were sub-
ject to be levied upon and sold to pay the debts of the city.
We have examined the law of 1851 with due care and attention,
but we have not been able to find in it any provision which confers upon
San Francisco any title to land. The fourteenth section of that law
raises the presumption that any city, town or village of California,
which existed on the 7th day of July, 1846, had a grant of land. But
what kind of a grant ?
According to the view which we have taken of the Spanish and
Mexican law relating to pueblos, this presumption existed without this
Act, and we doubt not that Congress was of the same opinion when it
passed the law. That law simply reaffirmed a legal presumption which
already existed, so far as pueblos were concerned, merely requiring
them to prove that they existed on the 7th day of July, 1846, with-
out going back to the period of their first organization as such munic-
ipal corporation. So far as their claim to four square leagues of land
was concerned, they were not required to produce any title, the fact
of their corporate existence being prima facie evidence of such title.
But we have searched the law in vain to find any granting clause, and
we are of opinion that it contains none.
This is the language of the fourteenth section : " The provisions of
this Act shall not extend to any town lot, farm lot or pasture lot, held
under a grant from any corporation or town to which land may have
been granted for the establishment of a town by the Spanish or Mex-
ican Government, or the lawful authorities thereof, nor to any
city, or town, or village lot, which city, town or village existed on the
7th day of July, 1846 ; but the claim for the same shall be presented
by the corporate authorities of the said town ; or, where the land on
which the said city, town or village was originally granted to an indi-
vidual, the claim shall be presented by or in the name of such indi-
vidual, and the fact of the existence of the said city, town or village
on the said 7th of July, shall be prima facie evidence of a grant to
such corporation, or to the individual under whom the said lot-holders
claim ; and where any city, town or village shall be in existence at the
time of passing this Act, the claim for the land embraced within the
limits of the same may be made by the corporate authority of said
city, town or village."
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There are no apt or usual words of grant. No land is described
either by general or particurlar description. The Act was drawn by able
lawyers, who are not to be supposed to use language so inaptly as to
attempt to create a grant by words implying a presumption of its pre-
existence. The words do not import a grant. They have another
and more natural meaning, and imply a different purpose. The Sen-
ate debates show an express disclaimer of an intention to grant lands
;
and there was a rejection of the grant to the towns, when the proposi-
tion in the form of an amendment was directly made after the bill was
reported ; and for the reason given by the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, Mr. Berrien, that it was not expedient to grant lands, and
the bill did not so design.
When was there ever a grant made by giving to the grantee, on
proving a certain fact, prima facie evidence of its having been made
before ; and this embodied, too, in a provision defining the mode of
presenting claims to a tribunal for confirmation f Besides, the con-
text extends the presumption to the grantor of the lot-holders, when
such grantor is a private individual. Can it be supposed that Con-
gress meant to grant land to such grantor ? If so, how much, and
for what reason ?
Moreover, if such lands had been granted, assigned or dedicated to
the pueblo of San Francisco, or if the people of that municipality
had acquired an interest or use in such lands under the Mexican Gov-
ernment, they were withdrawn from commerce, and Mexico could not
have transferred to the United States any title, under and by virtue
of which the latter could change such uses, except, possibly, by an
exercise of the right of eminent domain. And, as held by the
Supreme Court in the case of the City of New Orleans v. the United
States, no right to regulate such uses could be acquired by the Fed-
eral Government, that right being, by the Constitution, given to the
State of California and the people. Congress, therefore, could not
change the trust under which San Francisco held these lands, nor
could it destroy, or in any way modify, the uses to which they had
been dedicated. Such power could be exercised only by the State
sovereignty. If Congress could have changed this trust by a direct
grant to the city, could it not have done so by a grant to any one else ?
That Congress could have granted to the city of San Francisco any
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lands belonging to the public domain, upon any conditions and by any
title it pleased, is not doubted ; nor is it doubted that it could have
surrendered to such municipality any right or title in the United
States to the lands of the pueblo ; but it could neither change an exist-
ing trust, nor destroy existing uses.
While we do not accord to the Act of Congress the force or the
character of a present grant, yet we attach to it, in practical effect,
an operation which confirms the title of the city ; for it cannot be
denied that when the Federal Government makes a prima facie case
against itself of a grant to the city of land, from the fact of the exist-
ence of the town in July, 1846, and when it does this, for the purpose,
or as connected with the object of the city's presenting before its own
tribunals a claim for such land, it is not to be presumed that it meant
to dispute that presumption or to deny effect to it. To say nothing of
the almost absolute impossibility of disproving the negative of the
proposition of fact which the Government thus assumes, and to say
nothing of the bad faith which would be involved in its permitting
numerous claimants of property to present their claims in the name of
such city, as under a primitive source of valid title, and then, after such
presumption, denying such source of title, apart from these thiDgs, we
suppose no candid mind could possibly arrive at the conclusion, that
the case we have made in our statement, when added to the presump-
tion afforded by the law of the actual fact of a grant duly made, could
be so overcome. We know that, in point of fact, the Government
does not mean, and has never designed, to make such a contestation.
On the contrary, the claim has, so far, been recognized by all depart-
ments of the Federal Government, and the only appeal pending from
the decisions of the courts is that made by the city itself.
Now, this presumption of a grant being, as we have seen, equiv-
alent, in practical effect, to a grant, so far as the city is concerned,
let us inquire of what grant is the existence of a pueblo in 1846 a
presumption ? Plainly, not of a grant by the Federal Government,
but of a grant by the Mexican Government ; and of what sort of a
grant ? The answer is, of that species of grant which Mexico, by
her laws, was in the habit of making to pueblos, with all the qualities,
conditions and restrictions which characterized such grants. It is true
there is no practical difference, so far as affects the Federal Govern-
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ment, between furnishing such a presumption against herself, and
making a grant in the usual form of the property ; but there is a very
great difference so far as the pueblo is concerned. It is the difference
between proof of an old title and and a grant of a new one ; between
the Federal Government giving the town a right, and acknowledging
the right as having been given by Mexico ; all the difference, in short,
between proof of title and title itself. By raising this presumption,
the Federal Government affirms the title not to be in the Government,
but just the contrary ; it affirms the title to be against and out of the
Government and in the pueblo, and furnishes proof of this fact to the
pueblo, whereby as against the Government she may maintain the claim.
Similar reasoning is applicable to another phase of this case. If,
as has been contended, the decision of the Board of Land Commis-
sioners and the dismissal of the appeal by the Government be conclu-
sive of the title of the city, the same result follows. The city pre-
sented this title, basing her claim upon a Mexican grant, express or
presumed. That claim is affirmed. It matters not whether this affirm-
ance was upon proof independent of the Act of Congress, or upon
proof given by the Act. In either case the affirmance was of the
pueblo claim, and the effect of it is not at all altered by the kind of
evidence used on the trial, or the source from which the testimony was
obtained. Nor was the effect of the decree of affirmance to create a
title from that date. It took effect upon the title at its inception, or,
at the latest, from the date of the treaty of cession, and the title
became validated and adjudged such a title as was claimed and asserted
in the petition to the Board of Commissioners.
The result of this reasoning is, that upon this hypothesis, independ-
ently of all original claims of the city to the grant of lands to the old
pueblo, her predecessor, she has the title to them, not by a concession
of the lands by the Federal Government, but by a concession by that
Government of such a state of proofs of an anterior title, as estab-
lishes such title against that Government, the only other claimant.
But she stands on this title, not as a title granted by the Federal Gov-
ernment, but as a title acknowledged by that Government.
With respect to the other point mentioned above, viz : that the
change of government and laws from Mexico to the United States
converted the civil law title, by which the pueblo held these lands,
LAND TITLES IN SAN FRANCISCO. 49
Hart vs. Burnett, et al.
into a common law title of fee simple absolute, counsel have referred
us to no authorities to sustain the proposition, and we presume none
could be found.
VI. But reference has been made to the several Acts of the Legis-
lature of California incorporating the city of San Francisco, and regu-
lating the powers and responsibilities of such incorporation, and also
to various decisions under the English common law with respect to the
question, whether property of such towns or municipal corporations is
subject to levy and sale under execution for debts contracted by the
municipal government of such towns or corporations. It remains for
us to examine these laws and authorities.
The first charter of San Francisco, April 15th, 1850, gives to that
city a right to " grant, purchase, hold and receive property, real and
personal, within said city," and to "lease, sell and dispose of the same
for the benefit of the city." But we find nothing in these words
which changes, or is intended to change the tenure by which such
property was then held, or to destroy or alter any existing trust or
use. The same may be said of the corresponding words in the charter
of April 15th, 1851. But article third of that Act provides for fund-
ing the debts of said city, and the payment of such debts from " the
net proceeds of all sales of real estate belonging, or that may here-
after belong to the city," and the Commissioners of said sinking fund
were " prohibited from permanently disposing of any property belong-
ing to the city by sale, lease or otherwise," etc. And by a previous
Act, passed April 1st, 1851, it was declared that " the city of San
Francisco shall not have power either to sell, lease, or in any manner
convey any lands situated within the corporate limits of said city, from
and after the passage of this Act until the tenth day of May next or
thereafter," and that " every sale made by said city, its officers, agents
or Commissioners contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be null
and void." The Act of May 1st, 1851, created the Commissioners
of the Funded Debt, and declared that " all property of the city of
San Francisco which is necessary to be retained for all or any of the
municipal purposes of the city, shall forever be exempt from sale by exe-
cution." The judgment under which the lands involved in this case
were sold was rendered September 18th, 1851 ; the execution was issued
November 1st, 1851, and the sale by the Sheriff was made November
4
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26th, 1851, and the purchase price of four hundred and eighty fifty
vara lots was the sum of fifty dollars.
VII. Having referred to the different Acts of the Legislature with
respect to these municipal lands and the dates of the judgment, execu-
tion and sale in this case, we will proceed to examine the argument of
counsel on the validity of this sale under the laws in force at the time.
In discussing this question, it will be necessary to consider the char-
acter of the title by which these lands were held prior to the cession,
as well as its character under existing laws. It is true that the ques-
tion whether these lands were subject to execution depends upon the
laws of the forum rei sitae in force at the time of the sale ; but while
those laws define what property is so subject, we must look to the
former system to ascertain the nature and qualities of this species of
property, in order to determine whether it be within the definition.
As a general rule, trust property is not subject to the debts of the
trustee. Thus, property held by a guardian as such, though it be in
his own name, is not subject to his debts ; neither is the property held
by an executor as such ; and so with other fiduciaries. Nor, as we
shall show more fully as we proceed, is property held like this by
trustees for the use of the public, subject to forced sale for the debts
they may create. Especially is this true with respect to property held
by a public body by grant made for purposes of Government, or any
branch or department of Government. We suppose if Girard or
McDonough had given to the cities of Philadelphia or New Orleans
large sums of money or valuable real estate, to be held by those cities
for founding and sustaining public schools or supporting the poor, it
would not be contended that this property could be seized or sold for
the debts contracted by those municipalities, even if contracted in con-
nection with the matters of the trust ; and we can see no substantial
difference, so far as the principle of exemption is concerned, between
these cases of grant for these two purposes of Government, and a
grant of the same property for general purposes of Government. The
reason of the rule of exemption is easily seen. A man or a Govern-
ment may, as a general rule, devote his property to any lawful pur-
poses, and courts of justice will usually give effect to the appropria-
tion. The grant made is to be construed according to the intent
of the grantor, and this intent is to be ascertained by the language
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employed, and by surrounding circumstances. The purpose for which
a grant is made, not unfrequently gives construction and limitation to
the grant. The property, in this case, came from the Government
stamped with the will of the Government that it should be used and
disposed of, in a particular way, for public use and benefit ; that use,
and that use alone, being the policy of the Government declared by
its public law. There is no legal obstacle to the carrying out of this
will and this policy. It was no part of the intention of the grantor
that this property should be sacrificed at public forced sale ; the con-
trary was the intent. A trust was given these municipal agents to
keep, preserve and administer, but no power to destroy the estate.
Hence this property was not subject to forced sale, because such was
not the law of the land, the intent of the grantor, or the policy of the
Government. Such was the condition of this land under Mexican
rule. Whether the original trusts were precisely the same after the
Act of incorporation of San Francisco is not material. The general
nature of them was the same. It is true that, by the charter, the
Common Council have the right to sell, lease, etc., this property ; but
the terms upon which this may be done are cautiously and carefully
defined. It is in the nature of an express power clearly defined and
to be strictly pursued ; it is provided that it shall be done as a legis-
lative Act passed in solemn form. As under the old system, there
was no power of sale except for limited purposes and to particular por-
tions of this property, and as this was a public trust, we cannot see
why the Legislature had not the power to prescribe a given and an
exclusive mode of alienation or disposition of the public property to
these public agents.
We have already shown that under the Mexican system, the pueblo
held these lands in trust for the use and benefit of the people thereof.
Let us suppose that, under the Mexican laws, there existed the same
remedial process of enforcing judgments, as exists under our laws
;
would these lands have been subject to levy and sale to satisfy judg-
ments against the pueblo or its municipal officers. The ready answer
to this question would have been, these lands are held for the inhabi-
tants in perpetuity for their use and benefit ; to be used in building
up, sustaining and supporting a town whose interests and rights are
lodged in the hands of certain agents, acting under defined and
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expressly limited powers, given for the carrying out of the objects and
uses prescribed ; but with no power to alienate or change, much less
to destroy the trust. That those agents were clothed with the power
to make grants to settlers, or others, of limited quantities of this land,
or to dispose of portions of it for the support of the municipality,
implies no power to sell it out in gross, or even to mortgage it ; for, if
this were the case, the prosperity, if not the existence of the town,
would depend, not on the laws, but on the will of these agents acting
in violation of their spirit and letter. If it be true, as seems clear
from the citations we have given, that the municipal officers could not
mortgage or sell these lands to pay a debt created by them, we do
not see how it can be contended that they could accomplish the same
result by borrowing money, and then confessing judgment, or suffer-
ing it to be entered, or submitting to suit, and thus indirectly doing
through the Sheriff, what they could not do by their direct action.
Not only is there nothing in the legislation of the State of California
up to the date of this sale, to change this general trust or to enlarge
these powers, but there is much, as we have shown, to limit and
restrain these municipal agents who succeeded the old pueblo in the
control and direction of this property. We see nothing which changes
the substance of the trust. The property remained afterwards as it
had been before, subservient to the public uses and purposes for which
it was given ; the land of the pueblo, now the city of San Francisco,
dedicated by law to its public municipal purposes, to be kept and dis-
posed of for the benefit of all, with no power of disposition except
that given by law, to be exercised by those agents and officers
appointed by law, and in the mode which is prescribed by law. If a
grant had been made in the language which gives the true history and
nature of this trust, all doubt would vanish. Suppose a donor had
thus devised : " All my tract of land A to the city of San Francisco,
the said land to be granted in lots to actual settlers paying a tax
thereon for revenue, except so much to be used as commons for pastur-
age, etc., for the use and benefit of the inhabitants of said city in per-
petuity ; said grant being made that the said city may be built up and
settled, and its government supported." Suppose after this a judg-
ment is obtained against the city, and the whole land sold at a cent a
Jot ; would any man contend that the sale passed the title ? Would not
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the toleration of this be a complete perversion and destruction of the
trust ; the giving to one what was designed to be a benefaction to
many—turning a great public endowment into a private speculation,
and making a monopoly in the hands of a few, of what before was the
right of all ? Would any one make such a donation knowing this to
be the effect of it ? Would the Government do it if it supposed its
own laws so disappointed its own will ? Is the case less strong when
we see expressions in the old ordinances, forbidding expressly these
municipal officers to make other alienations than those before described
and characterized, and declaring such interdicted alienations void ?
And could it be supposed that any Government had such a system as
gave to its subordinate agents the right, at pleasure, to thwart its will
and practically nullify its laws ?
If this trust, thus impressed upon these lands, has ever been
changed, it rests with the respondents to show how, and when, and
where, and in what respect this change has been effected. That this
property came from the Mexican Government stamped with this trust,
we think we have abundantly demonstrated. We do not dispute the
proposition that the Legislature, perhaps without the consent of the
city of San Francisco—certainly with it—could, by virtue of its par-
amount political sovereignty, change the trusts upon which these lands
were held. It might undoubtedly authorize another and different
mode of disposing of them, and by other and different agents. But
we have assumed and will further show that, originally, these lands
were not subject to sale under execution. It rests with respondents
to show that, under California laws,* they became so subject. Under
what laws ? It is said that the Constitution provides that municipal
corporations may be sued as private persons ; but the Constitution
does not say that the lands of a corporation held in trust for public
purposes, and which were not at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution subject to forced sale, shall now be so subject. The Consti-
tution never meant to provide that property before exempt from forced
sale, because such forced sale would be in violation of the trust under
which it was held, should now be liable to forced sale, and to be sacri-
ficed at such sale, in utter destruction of the purposes for which it was
granted. We do not seek an exemption of property from the gen-
eral law making it subject to execution ; but we deny that property
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never before subject to execution has been made so subject by the
Constitution. Nor is there anything in the original charter of the
city which gives countenance to this pretension. On the contrary,
we have shown by it a publicly declared policy opposed to this
notion.
We see no reasons of policy for such a doctrine as that contended
for. If the corporation owes money, undoubtedly it ought to pay it
;
and if itself unwilling, it ought to be forced to pay it. A city is
entitled to no more immunity in respect to its honest engagements,
than a private person. But the creditor was not without remedy.
He had the same means of redress which existed against all other
municipalities—the compulsory process of mandamus to compel the
levy of a tax if no money was voluntarily provided, or an appeal to the
Legislature. The history of the litigation, of which this case, volu-
minous as it is, is only one chapter, sufficiently attests the impolicy of
granting this forced process of sale as to this property—a process
which has led to a sacrifice unparalleled in the annals of judicature.
It is impossible for us to see why these municipal lands should be
any more subject to sale than the quay of New Orleans, or the com-
mons of Cincinnati, or the levees and fronts of other cities, dedicated
as easements to the public use. All these lands were of great pecu-
niary value ; they were held and used for profit, oV upon the same
general trusts and uses as were these municipal lands. If the crite-
rion of the question of their leviable character was the trust for the
public
—
their necessity or utility for the growth of the municipality or
the comfort, or advantage or support of the inhabitants, we cannot
perceive that the same reasons do not exist for holding these lands of
the city exempt from legal process.
Nor can we see that the principle, always recognized, that the rev-
enues of a municipal corporation, necessary for its government, such
as taxes, etc., cannot be seized by execution, does not apply to the
sources expressly provided for that revenue ; why it should apply
to the money and not to the land out of which the money is to pro-
ceed.
But even if we are mistaken in this suggestion, we think we cannot
be mistaken in these propositions—that property, whether of a corpo-
ration or natural person, is only subject to forced sale, because the law
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so provides
;
that the agents of a corporation have only the powers
given them by law ; that those of this corporation had no power to
sell these lands in gross either under the old system or the new, nor
did they ever attempt to exercise such power ; that they could not give
any authority to sell them, either by their action or non-action, by con-
tracting debts whereby they might be sold, or by direct contract with
these purchasers to sell, but that they could act only in the mode pre-
scribed and in pursuance of the trust created by the law ; that the
Sheriff pretending to act for the city had no higher power than these
agents, and could not, any more than they, sell these lands in this way
at public sale to pay the debt of the city ; that the property was the
property of the city for the use of its inhabitants for all time, subject
only to the alienation by such agents and in such mode as given by
law ; and that a sale of it by the Sheriff has never been authorized
by law, and is an act utterly void, because directly destructive of the
trust upon which, and for which alone, the property was given.
The argument which opposes this view proceeds upon the assump-
tion, that when property is shown in a municipal body, that property is
shown to be subject to execution for its debts. But this is a mere
begging of the question. It is subject, not from the fact that it is
property, but from the law which gives the creditor this power over it.
There may be a peculiarity, but there is no inconsistency in holding
that the same law which gives property may define its tenure, limit its
use, and control its disposition, or may deny any power, or prescribe
an exclusive mode of alienation. So far as these lands are concerned,
they were given for purposes of common benefit to the inhabitants of
the pueblo, and for the support of Government, not for a temporary
purpose, but for all time ; they were given that the lots might be par-
celed out and enjoyed by those who would settle on and improve them,
and that those lots and parcels not needed for actual occupation as
homesteads and appurtenances thereto, and as places of business and
the like, might be used as easements or commons by the residents.
To hold, therefore, that this purpose and this whole policy might be
defeated through the medium of forced sales, and that this magnificent
domain might be made the subject of individual aggrandizement and
speculation, is to change the whole spirit of the grant and the whole
policy of the Government. If the Government saw fit to change that
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policy, it might do so, or if it chose it might alter the terms of the
trust ; but its intention to do this must be shown by clear and affirm-
ative acts. It cannot be presumed, and there is nothing shown us
from which such presumption can arise.
If, therefore, we concede that the agents of this corporation had a
right to contract this debt, and the debt became the proper debt of
the corporation, and that the corporation owns these lands, it still does
not follow that the law which devoted this property to this permanent
purpose must be defeated to give place to the law under which the
debt was created. Both can stand. The creditor retains his debt
and has all the remedies he had to enforce it at the time it was con-
tracted ; the city retains the lands given to it for certan purposes, and
those trusts and uses, annexed by the law to the tenure, continue. The
object of the Government and the spirit of the grant are preserved
without injury or injustice to any one. There is nothing inconsistent
in the title in the pueblo, and the use, partial or total, in the public.
What are these pueblos but a collection of people at a particular point
—
like the hundreds in England, or like the inhabitants of townships who
are grantees, for school purposes, imder acts of Congress ? They may
be regarded as corporations, or quasi corporations, for governmental
purposes ; as a local public organized as a district or township, hold-
ing lands, to be granted and used for settlement, and to support the
government of the local jurisdiction, and for the comfort, maintenance
and convenience of the inhabitants.
If Congress gave to the inhabitants of each township lands in fee
for school purposes, and these were organized by the State into corpo-
rations, with powers of government as to school objects, with the
right to contract debts in this matter, would any one contend that the
lands could be seized and sold under execution against the corporation ?
Would not the answer be, the grant was to the inhabitants for per-
petual use, and cannot be divested by the agents so as to disappoint
and exclude that use ? And what is the difference in principle between
the two cases ?
Having stated these general views, we proceed to examine the
authorities to see how far we are sustained by them. And here we
may remark that the nature of this property is so peculiar that it
could scarcely be expected that adjudged cases bearing directly upon
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the facts can be found. The learned counsel for the respondents, with
all their research, have not been able to find a single case in the United
States in which the lands of a municipal corporation, dedicated to
special purposes like these, have been held subject to execution. The
cases in our own State we will presently review.
Doe ex dem Parr v. Doe, 1 Adolp. and Ellis, N. S., 700, (41 E.
C. L., 736) is the first case cited to sustain the doctrine that munici-
pal lands may be sold. But that case merely holds that the defend-
ant's motion to be allowed to defend without entering into the consent
rule should be denied.
One of the Judges states the question as to the validity of an extent
upon the town hall of the borough, but waives the expression of any
decisive opinion. But this is no decision; and if such property had,
in England, been held expressly to be liable to extent, yet we know
that no such doctrine obtains in the United States. Court houses,
town halls, jails, etc., are not subject to levy and forced sale. Nor
do we apprehend that plazas, parks, public squares, etc., dedicated to
the public use would be so held. And yet the distinction which would
exclude these, and admit the municipal lands must be very nice.
We see nothing in the case of Mayor of Poole v. White, 15 Meeson
and Welsby, which goes to sustain the respondent's doctrine. In
Harvey v. East India Company, 2 Vernon, 395, a distringas was
issued on a decree against that corporation. Nothing appears to be
decided in that case by the Lord Keeper, but that a decree having
gone against defendant, a distringas should issue at once, and that the
corporation was not entitled to be further heard as to matters in avoid-
ance of the writ. Lyell v. The Board of Supervisors of St. Clair
county, 3 McLean, 580, was a suit in the United States Circuit Court
against the county named. By the law of Michigan, a county was
subject to suit. This was a proceeding by creditors' bill to subject
certain bonds or mortgages to the plaintiff's debts. The Judge says:
" Suits against counties are placed on the same footing as against
individuals, by the statute, so that it would seem a creditor's bill may
be filed against the Supervisors of a county. The objection that a
fierifacias cannot be issued against a county is technical, and is by
no means conclusive of the objection founded upon it. The statute
which regulates a creditor's bill, requires a fieri facias to be returned
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nulla bona before the bill is filed. In other words, this evidence of
the inadequacy of remedy at law is required. But this has been done
in the present case, and the objection is, that the writ could not be
issued against a county. This is not admitted. A judgment having
been legally obtained, it is not perceived why the property of the
county may not be levied on. The power given to the Supervisors to
levy the amount by a tax on the county is cumulative, and does not
necessarily prohibit the ordinary course of the execution, as in case
of an individual.
" In Massachusetts the doctrine is established, that on a judgment
against a county or town, the property of any citizen may be taken in
satisfaction. (6 Metcalf, 552.) But this doctrine is not sustainable
in this State. The imposition of a tax by the Supervisors, they being
subject to a mandamus, is a more reasonable and just mode. The
county being made subject to a suit, no serious objection is perceived
against reaching the rights in question by the ordinary exercise of
chancery powers, independently of statutory provisions." (See 10
Cal. 404.) It is not denied that ordinary debts and choses in action
held by a corporation may be attached, and it may be true that some
species of property may be levied on and sold to pay the debt. But
the question is not touched by this decision, for the burthen of our
argument is to show that this property, characterized and conditioned
as we have shown, is not so subject.
We come now to review the decisions of our own Courts, though we
shall have occasion to notice them briefly under another head, in con-
nection with the rule of stare decisis invoked by the respondents.
Smith v. Morse (2 Cal. 524) is a leading case. The main points
made and argued by the Court, related to the validity of a conveyance
by the city to certain commissioners, and the effect of the Funding
Act. The only portion of the opinion which touches the question of
title is this short extract, which refers only to a water lot : " It was
contended, upon the argument of this case, that the city of San Fran-
cisco had no title to a portion of the property in question. It is
admitted, in the agreed case, that the title was in the city, so far as
the question of the right to sell the water property of the city is con-
cerned. The city is estopped from setting up any right in the State.
She cannot take advantage of her own wrong by showing an indebt-
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ediiess to the State. The Sheriff merely sold the right, title and
interest of the city. And whenever the State chooses to assert her
right in the premises, it -will be time enough for this Court to deter-
mine the character of the title which the plaintiff acquired." It
appears that so far as this upland property was concerned, (which was,
we presume, a part of the .old municipal lands) the case expressly
admitted the title of the city, and so the record shows ; the point to
which the Court directs its attention in this brief extract is, as to a
portion of the property derived from the State by grant, and this is
summarily disposed of, without affirming or denying the right of the
city, upon the ground of estoppel. No question was made as to the
leviable character of the upland property. It is evident, therefore,
that the questions presented in that case and the facts of the record
were different from those here, and it is not necessary to disturb that
case for any purpose of this decision. In the case of the People ex
rel. Thorne v. Hays, 4 Cal. 130, the only question was as to the right
of redemption. The Court was divided. The able dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Heydenfeldt leaves great doubt of the correctness of
the judgment ; but we do not disturb it. No question of property
was or could have been raised. The mere right of redemption was
passed on, which was irrespective of the value or title of the property.
Wood v. San Francisco, 4 Cal. 193, is as remote from the point here
involved. That was ejectment against the corporation to recover a
wharf at the end of a street, the plaintiff claiming through a sale under
judgment. But the Court only held that the property was not leviable.
The validity of the sale or title of the city did not arise. If anything,
this case makes against respondent, and does not seem entirely con-
sistent with the case of Smith v. Morse, for the city was allowed to
set up her own want of title, which seems to be denied by the first
case.
Seale v. Mitchell, 5 Cal., is badly reported. As reported, it would
seem on close inspection to be no authority upon the point of the city's
title. Upon looking into the record, we find no error assigned by the
appellants. But in the transcript is the statement on appeal, from
which it appears that the grounds for the motion of nonsuit were
these ; 1. The Sheriff's deed was void. 2. On the ground that the
plaintiff had proved no title in the city of San Francisco, under
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which the plaintiff claimed. The respondents filed a brief of points,
in which they contended that the plaintiff was bound to prove against
them, who claimed under an Alcalde grant, that the city had title at
the time of the judgment ; that this must be shown by paper title, or
by possession of the city at the date of the judgment, and that the
mere fact that the lot was within the boundaries of the pueblo, created
no presumption of title in the city at the date of the judgment
and the execution sale. But no sort of question was raised or
considered as to the character or quality of the title, or whether it
was subject to levy and sale. The point, therefore, was neither made
nor decided as to the matter here—whether this property was subject
to sale—but the judgment of nonsuit upon these points, so made, was
reversed and cause remanded, the Court passing upon and deciding
nothing more than the propositions submitted and argued, though in
doing so some general expressions are employed, which, however, are
in nowise binding upon succeeding Judges.
Welsh v. Sullivan, 8 Cal. 166, deserves particular notice. That
case was first decided at the July term, 1857. It was argued with
great learning and ability upon the first point—the city's title to the
land—and is the first case in which that important question was thor-
oughly discussed. But in the elaborate and learned brief of Judge
Bennett, leading counsel for appellant, we find nothing but the bare
statement of the proposition as to the leviable quality of the estate.
Mr. Chief Justice Murray delivered an extended and able opinion,
in which he discussed the first question here made at considerable
length. But the question as to the effect of the Sheriff's sale was
not discussed by the learned Chief Justice in any of the aspects in
which that question has been argued here at the bar, or in this opinion.
The Chief Justice seems to have taken it for granted that if he main-
tained the proposition that the title was in the pueblo, the validity of
the Sheriff's sale followed as a necessary consequence. The opinion
appears to be a little inconsistent in claiming title upon the grounds
taken in Cohas v. Raisin, and then attributing to the Act of Congress
of 1851 the effect of creating a new tenure, and operating a confirm-
ation in fee to the city. We have seen that no such effect can be given
to the Act of Congress. It created only a presumption of that which
existed before, and conferred no new faculty or quality on the former
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title. We do not see how the mere acknowledgment by the Federal
Government of the claim of the pueblo or of the city makes that claim
any different from that which the pueblo asserts, and which the
.
Gov-
ernment confesses. The acknowledgment of the Government, it being
the only adverse claimant, may be conclusive, but it is conclusive only
of the title asserted, and in manner and form as asserted. But this
opinion was that of the Chief Justice alone. Mr. Justice Burnett
concurred in the judgment in this guarded language : " I concur in
affirming the judgment of the Court below on two grounds : First,
that the title to the property in question vested in the city of San
Francisco by virtue of the Act of Congress. Second, that the title of
the city passed to the purchaser under the Sheriff's sale. Neither of
these grounds is discussed by the learned counsel of defendant. And
as to the questions decided in the two cases of Woodworth v. Fulton
and Cohas v. Raisin, they are not necessarily involved in this case,
and I express no opinion in respect to them." Justice Terry specially
concurred upon the ground that the question was decided in Cohas v.
Raisin, (3 Cal.) and he thought the doctrine of stare decisis applica-
ble. A reconsideration was had, and the case was again reviewed at
the October term, 1857. Mr. Justice Burnett delivered an opinion,
in which some of the views of the former Chief Justice, then dead,
were corrected, and also the judgment rendered at the former term
modified. The opinion was concurred in by Judge Terry, then C. J.
The opinion rests upon the effect of the Act of Congress ; Mr. Jus-
tice Burnett sustaining the judgment below upon the ground, if we
rightly apprehend him, that the instruction of the Court " that if the
jury found the Limantour claim fraudulent they should find for the
plaintiff," was right, because the Act of Congress vested the title in
the city necessarily if Limantour did not have it. This was the only
ground upon which that ruling could be maintained. The only author-
itative opinion in this case, then, appears to be that the Act of Con-
gress operated as a grant to the city of San Francisco, which gave to
the vendee, at Sheriff's sale under the execution, a title to the prem-
ises. This ground, we feel confident, for reasons already given—and
many more might be added—is not tenable. The Act of Congress,
as we have shown, has not a single feature of a grant ; at most, it
only creates a presumption of an anterior and adverse title in the city,
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and probably neither the United States nor the city, in the face of this
acknowledgment, could claim that there was no such pre-existing title.
If the United States could disprove this presumption, then it would be
no grant at all ; if it could not, then the presumption stands as a con-
clusion of a title, existing at least in 1846, before the United States
had a pretense of claim.
It is useless to comment at large upon Cohas v. Raisin. It is
unnecessary to call in question the views expressed by Mr. Justice
Heydenfeldt on the main propositions assumed by him as involved in
the case. The Alcalde's grants considered by him may be good titles,
and there is nothing inconsistent in holding this, and holding the inva-
lidity of the Sheriff's sale. It does not follow, because the title was
in the pueblo, or in the city as its successor, that it was such a title,
or so held as that it might be disposed of by forced sale.
We are not without authority in support of the views we have taken.
A somewhat analagous principle was held in the case of Edgerton v.
The Third Municipality of New Orleans. (1 La. Annual Rep., p.
435.) In that case the question was made whether the taxes, levied
for the support of the corporation could be seized. The Court decided
they could not. This language is employed in the opinion : " The
power to create the corporation of the city of New Orleans for pur-
poses of local government, involves the power to preserve and protect
it ; but that protection would be unavailing if it could be deprived of
the regular supply of means, without which it cannot work its task.
For all useful and practical purposes, the exercise of the right claimed
would, in the present embarrassed condition of the municipalities, as
effectually abrogate their charters as if they had been repealed by
law. We conceive such a state of things to be repugnant to the let-
ter and spirit of the Constitution.
" It is urged that the defendants cannot avail themselves of the
privileges of public power, because they may be sued, and that sueing
them would be doing a vain thing, if in default of any other property
their taxes cannot be seized under the judgment obtained against
them. We all know that Judges and Governors may also be sued, not-
withstanding the political powers they exercise, and although their sal-
aries may be their only means of paying their debts, those salaries are
not liable to seizure. It is true that out of superabundant caution our
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codes make special provision in relation to salaries of office, but the
same rule prevailed before upon general principles."
A stronger case, and one going far beyond the necessities of this,
is found in the 9th vol. of Watts & Sergt., p. 28. It is the case of
the Susquehanna Company v. Bonham. The opinion of the Court
was delivered by Sergeant J., who said : " The spirit of the decision
in Ammant v. New Alexandria and Pittsburg Transportation Com-
pany, ( 13 Sergt & Rawle, 210) seems to be, that privileges granted
to corporations to construct turnpike roads, canals, etc., are conferred
with a view to the public use and accommodation, and that they can-
not voluntarily deprive themselves of the lands and real estate and
franchises which are necessary for that purpose ; nor can they be taken
from them by execution and sold by a creditor, because to permit it
would tend to defeat the whole object of the charter, by taking the
improvements out of the hands of the corporation, and destroying
their use and benefit. It has therefore always been held, and our Acts
of Assembly are constructed on that idea, that the franchises and cor-
porate rights of the Company and the means vested in them which are
necessary to the existence and maintenance of the great object for
which they were created, are incapable of being granted away and
transferred by any act of the corporation itself, or by process of
another against it in invitum. By the second section of the Act of
15th of April, authorizing the incorporation of defendants, they are
made capable, among other things, of purchasing, taking and holding
such lands, tenements and estates, real and personal, as are necessary
in the prosecution of their business as a canal company. And by sec-
tion eight they are empowered to enter upon and occupy for the pur-
pose, all the land necessary and suitable for constructing the canal.
It is admitted by the court below, and the evidence proves beyond a
doubt, that the property levied on here is essentially necessary to the
enjoyment of the corporate rights and privileges of the defendants,
the house being necessarily occupied by the collector of tolls on the
canal for himself and his family, and as a collector, in which he per-
forms the duties of his office. That being the case, what dhTerence
can there be whether it is on the site of the canal or on ground adja-
cent ? Especially where it may happen, and, indeed, such appears to
be the case here, that if confined to the former, the site would be
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inconvenient, unsafe and unfit for a dwelling place for the collector's
family. Nor would the company have expended their money in pro-
curing another building, if they could have been accommodated with-
out it, in the office built on ground already taken as part of the line
of the canal. The remedy for creditors in such case by sequestration
was suggested in the opinion of Chief Justice Tilghman, (13 Sergt.
& Rawle, 210) and has since been carried into effect by the pro-
visions of the Act of 16th June, 1836, and it gives to the creditor all
the redress the Legislature thought he could have against the property
necessary to the company, consistently with the preservation of the
public interests."
The case of Ammant v. New Alexandria and Pittsburg Transpor-
tation Company, (13 Sergt. & Rawle, 210) is still more direct to the
point we have been discussing. That was the case of a levy of an
execution upon the land upon which the company were permitted to
enter near by and contiguous to their turnpike road. It was held that
their right of way and the privileges connected with it were not sub-
ject to levy. The Court draw the distinction between the property
which the company held as such, and that property or interest in it
which they held as subservient and indispensable incidents to the pub-
lic use for which it was given. The stress of the opinion is to show
that, when a public trust is so directly connected with property as
that taking the property destroyes the trust, the property cannot be
sold under execution. The principle applies directly to this case
where the land was originally given to the quasi corporation, not as so
much property to enrich it, but as a general fund to support the town,
and to be granted for its use and settlement. It cannot be sold under
execution any more than the trust could be sold, or repudiated by the
grantees. The trust is directly and indissolubly associated with the
property, and a coercive sale of the last is equivalent to a destruction
of the first. It might as well be contended that medicines and meat
furnished to a town to feed and minister to the sick in the hospitals,
could be sold to pay the debts of the town. Or, if a league of land
were given to be laid off into town lots and donated to the settlers, in
order to build up a town, that it could be all sold out at once under
an execution for debts contracted by the trustees, who were to lay off
the lots and distribute them. The very purpose of the gift would be
destroyed by this use of it.
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And in these Pennsylvania cases we find the true solution of this
question, and the broad and satisfactory reason which solves it. It is
a solecism to suppose a system of laws which creates a trust for the
public, the constitution and preservation of which is a leading feature
of State policy, and yet the same system allow a right on the part of
individuals to destroy that trust, and deprive Government of its power
to regulate and administer it. The Mexican Government had provided
its own means for the administration of its laws. Those means are of
the attributes and faculties of sovereignty, and were or might have
been essential to the existence of the State. The sole power of select-
ing and determining these agencies of administration is in the Gov-
ernment. Nor were the pueblos alone interested in this government
or in the fact or means of preserving it. It was alike the interest and
duty of the State to provide for its people this government and the
means of maintaining it ; and it did not rest with the pueblos, repre-
senting a portion of those people, to decline or to waive the benefits
to themselves and to the State of this government ; and especially
did it not rest with a portion of the inhabitants of such pueblos to
waive or decline these benefits. The Government had a right to
rule its own people in its own way ; it did provide this means of local
government by the constitution of pueblos, which were political
departments, and a provision for their support, by means of grants of
land, and, coupled with this, as a part of their powers of local admin-
istration, a right to grant lots for settlement and to hold lands neces-
sary and useful to the inhabitants. This was their title and this the
trust ; a public trust connected with the title ; and this title and this
trust were the means of civil government provided by the sovereign
authority for its own benefit and that of these people. This being so,
it would be a radical error to imagine that these appointed means of
government are not as inalienable, save by the Government or its
express authority, as are the powers of government themselves. A
destruction of either the power or the means to execute it, invades
the same principle and causes the same evil ; it denies to Government
the right to execute its own laws in its own way, and places it in
dependence upon the will of a citizen. The giving of these lands for
this purpose, therefore, was a denial of all other use whereby the end
designed by the grant could be defeated. The title of the land was
5
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a part of this very trust, -without which the trust became worthless
and must fail. These observations apply with nearly, if not quite,
the same force to the title of these lands after the cession.
If the cases cited from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania go too
far, in holding that the property of railroads, etc., is so connected
with the public trusts for which those corporations were created as that
no forced sale can be made of such property, yet the error, if any
there be, is not in the principle, but in the application of it to the facts
of the cases decided by that enlightened tribunal.
It is no answer to say that the policy of the Mexican Government,
in respect to its pueblo lands, and the tenure by which they were held,
are not a portion of our system of laws. We do not see that if a par-
ticular or general trust were created under that system, and the exe-
cution of such a trust be not incompatible with our own policy and
laws, why it is less effectual because it had its origin in another and
different Government. But if the trust became changed as to the
mode of administration and the particular agents, the lands remained
for the same general purpose for which they were given, namely : for
the support and settlement of the city ; and if there was power to sell,
lease, etc., on different terms from those prescribed or followed under
Mexican law, this makes no substantial difference in the character of
the tenure as a trust estate exempt from seizure. No authority was
given by the new government to sell these lands at forced sale to pay
the debts of the city, the effect of which authority might be to pre-
vent the settlement of the town, and to destroy this source of munic-
ipal revenue ; but when the power of sale was given at all, it was
given to particular agents, who were limited and restrained by specific
and guarded regulations, having the force of powers of attorney with
special authority. If, therefore, we have shown that this land came
to the city impressed with this character, it became a fund for the
support of the local government with a trust to be administered for
that object, and could not be subjected to seizure any more than the
revenues arising from the taxes ; and if it also came impressed with
the trust so to be disposed of as to promote the growth of the city and
the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants, this purpose cannot
be thwarted by a forced sale, transferring the title to a few persons who
might use it or refuse to use it, so as to prevent any settlement at all,
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or to greatly embarrass and delay such settlement. The trust being
that the agents and officers of the town should exercise control for this
purpose over this property, and not that one or more purchasers at
execution sale should exercise the power or defeat it at pleasure, should
prevent the formation or settlement of a town, or destroy it afterwards
by denying all means, or these means of support.
In the Heirs of Yillars v. Kennedy, 5 La. Ann'l R., 725, is found
some curious learning in regard to cities and their common lands, which
bears some relation to this subject. We extract from the opinion of
the Court, delivered by Mr. Justice Preston : " It will be seen by the
thirty-fifth chapter of the Book of Numbers, and the twenty-first of the
Book of Joshua, that the children of Israel were commanded with
great particularity, in founding cities for emigrating tribes, to lay off
extensive suburbs outside of the walls, for the common use of the
inhabitants. The Christian sovereigns of Europe, either from a rev-
erence for the example or the intrinsic utility of the custom, incorpor-
ated it into their laws for the government of their colonies in the Indies.
By the term city, in Spanish jurisprudence, was understood a place
surrounded by walls. (7 Part., Title 33, Law 6.) And by the laws
of the Indies it was expressly provided that no houses should be erected
within the distance of three hundred paces from the walls or breast-
works of the town, this being necessary for the good of our service
and for the safety and defense of the towns. (See the Laws of the
Indies, Book 4, Title 7, Law 12 ; or White's new Recopilacion, Vol.
2, P . 47.)
"In Merlin, verbo Fortification, Yol 12, Brussel's edition of 1826,
it will be seen that by an ordinance of the King of France, dated the
24th of September, 1678, ramparts, ditches and other places which
had served for the fortifications of the cities of the kingdom could not
be alienated by his officers, because they were things out of commerce
and belonged to the King. It will be seen further, under the word
communaux, that cities could not alienate their commons, and in the
collection of the laws and ordinances of the colonies by Moreau de
Saint Mercy, he gives some very striking cases in which even public
officers had attempted to locate themselves permanently on places des-
tined to public purposes in which their pretensions were rejected, hav-
ing, as expressed in one decree, the shame of having speculated withr
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out profit upon an object the destination of which rendered it -worthy
of the protection of the colonial laws." (See his work, p. 262 and
309.)
In Municipality No. 3 v. Hart, (6 La. Ann'l, 572) the Supreme
Court of Louisana reaffirm the decision of Edgerton v. the Munici-
pality, that taxes or judgments for them cannot be seized ; but hold
that ordinary debts due the corporation may lie.
In Police Jury v. Mitchel, (4 La. Ann'l, 84) the question of the
liability to seizure of the public buildings, jails, etc., under execution
was before the Court. The decision was, that being provided for pub-
lic purposes, they were not liable upon the principles of Edgerton and
the Municipality before cited. The case of New Orleans v. the
United States (10 Peters, 738) is an able exposition of the rights of
cities in their public lands. That case involved the title of the city to
the quay, which, it was claimed, had been dedicated to public purposes.
The Court says : " The land having been dedicated to public use was
withdrawn from commerce, and so long as it continued to be thus used
could not become the property of any individual ;" and again, at page
736 : " That this common having been dedicated to public use was
withdrawn from commerce and from the power of the King rightfully
to alien it has already been shown, and also that he had a limited power
over it for certain purposes." The opinion proceeds then to show
that the Federal Government did not succeed to this power, but that
it was in the State Government.
Lewis v. San Antonio (7 Texas, 288) is a very strong case on sev-
eral points. This case holds that the town lots were commons like the
commons in New Orleans, treated of in 10 Peters, and withdrawn
from commerce and individual appropriation. It holds, further, that
the authorities of the pueblo could not, by estoppel or otherwise, defeat
the grant. It was claimed that the authorities had adopted a subse-
quent grant of two leagues and laid out the town accordingly, and in
consequence of this, locations by third persons had been made on the
land now claimed. But the Court answered the point in the language
of the Supreme Court of the United States in 10 Peters, which case
has already been commented on : " It may safely be assumed that they
(the authorities) had not the power by the Acts referred to, to divest
the city of a vested interest in the commons." And this was held in
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connection with the declaration that the property was dedicated to
public use, and that it was the policy of Spain not to permit land so
dedicated to be thus alienated. It would seem that this is conclusive
of any right to subject it by execution ; and in 10 Peters, 734, cited
before, the United States Supreme Court evidently consider that the
commons, or ejidos, retained the same character under the new gov-
ernment which they had under the old, and therefore, were unaffected
by these acts of the city authorities.
To show the character of these lands and the relation of the pueb-
los to them, it is only necessary to refer to the Spanish authorities,
many of which have already been given. These lands may, for illus-
tration, be comprised within the two general titles of ejidos and pro-
pios ; the latter term designates that property whose revenue is
assigned to the support of the Government, and which was given in
order to furnish the means of such support ; and ejidos are common
lands, not very different from those which exist in the older States by
the name of commons, on the outskirts of towns and villages. That
such property was not subject to execution by the civil law is ex-
pressly held. (Vide Escriche, verb Juicio Executivo, p. 980 ; Partida
5, Law 15, tit. 5 and note 2.) This being the use of the propios,
they would be protected like arbitrios or imposts, a twin source of
municipal revenue within the terms of the reasoning in the Louisiana
cases ; for to hold that they could be sold by execution, would be to
hold the power of a creditor to destroy the government ; or, as the
civil law authorities express it in the reason given for the grant
—
" as an individual cannot live without food, neither can a town exist
without its rents."
VIII. But it is earnestly insisted by the counsel for the respondents,
that whether these views be correct or not, we are precluded from
giving effect to them, because the question has been definitely settled
by the adjudications of this Court ; that the rule of stare decisis has
closed the controversy, whatever its original merits. We acknowl-
edge the force of the general argument of the counsel, but feel com-
pelled to dissent from its application to the case at bar. The review
we have made of the authorities strips the proposition of the imposing
character it assumed upon its first presentation. Really, the whole
argument rests upon a single decision of two Justices of this Court,
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rendered so late as October, 1857, during, we believe, the pendency
of this suit ; for we have shown that no single binding judgment touch-
ing the point now in controversy was made before, and that single
decision is made finally to rest, not on the original right of the pueblo
or on the previous decisions, but upon a new assumption, namely : the
grant by Congress—a point which was never before taken in this Court,
and which is, as we think, manifestly indefensible. The counsel then,
must maintain that a single decision of this Court upon the construc-
tion of an Act of Congress, by which, too, the Federal judiciary are
not bound, is conclusive of all rights of property in the same category,
although that decision is of recent date, and there is no showing that
extensive rights of property have vested in consequence of it or under
it. Nay, more—that this decision, so made, can destroy the rights of
the city of San Francisco, not a party to that judgment, to many acres
of city land ; can destroy the rights of all the old pueblos in the State
to all their immense possessions ; can abrogate and repeal, practically,
the laws of the Legislature, regularly passed, giving title to the act-
ual possessors of thousands of acres of city property, and those laws
which, if we are right, forbade the sale, the validity of which is thus
confirmed.
This is a startling proposition. If it be true, a singular anomaly is
shown. The very decision which is relied upon, though without author-
ity, to sustain this pretension—that of Cohas v. Raisin—ignores the
ground now assumed to give validity to the principle it is invoked to
sustain. That decision overruled Woodworth v. Fulton, which held
the city lands to be the property of the United States, upon which
settlers could go, protected by the general law in reference to cities or
towns on the public domain ; and if this effect be given to a single
decision, the consequence would be that we must return to that doc-
trine, as probably many settlements have been made and much money
expended on the faith of it ; and Woodworth v. Fulton was re-affirmed
in Reynolds v. West (1 Cal. 322).
The great importance of the question, and the zeal with which a
contrary view is pressed, have induced us to go into a full examina-
tion of this question of stare decisis, though at the expense of some
repetition. We have shown our construction of the case of Seale v.
Mitchell, in 5 Cal.; but we will suppose that this last is to be consid-
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ered as an authority on that point equal in dignity and force to the
case of Welsh v. Sullivan ; then it must be argued that these two
decisions—for there are none others to this point—are enough to con-
stitute the " rule of property " involved. This singular result, then,
is before us—that Woodworth v. Fulton, and Reynolds v. West, affirm-
ing the doctrine that the city had no title, were held to be insufficient,
while these other two are held sufficient to establish the law that she
had a title, and that it was leviable ; and Vanderslice v. Hanks, and
Leese and Vallejo v. Clark, were insufficient to establish a rule of
property, while more modern decisions have that effect. But we pro-
ceed to consider the point on this gratuitous concession that Seale v.
Mitchell is an authority for the respondent.
It is important to ascertain with precision of what description of
adjudications this doctrine is predicated. A decision is not even
authority except upon the point actually passed upon by the Court and
directly involved in the case. But even then, the mere reasoning of
the Court is not authority. The point decided by the Court, and
which the reasoning illustrates and explains, constitutes a judicial pre-
cedent. The books are full of cases in which learned Judges have
earnestly deprecated the attempt to urge the mere dicta, or the
arguments of Judges, as authoritative expositions of the law. Chief
Justice Marshall, in the case of Cohens v. The State of Virginia, 6
Wheat., 399, thus defines the rule : " It is a maxim not to be disre-
garded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in
connection with the case in which these expressions are used ; if they
go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control
the judgment in a subsequent suit where the very point is presented
for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question
actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in
its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are
considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible
bearing on all other cases is seldom investigated." Chief Justice
Best in Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bingham, 248, says : " The expres-
sions of every Judge must be taken with reference to the case on
which he decides, otherwise the law will get into extreme confusion.
That is what we are to look to in all cases. The manner in which he
is arguing is not the thing—it is the principle he is deciding."
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We attach but little weight, then, to the cases of Cohas v. Raisin
and its successors affirming the same general principle. No point was
involved as to the character of the tenure—whether leviable or not
—
of the pueblo lands. That question was neither argued nor consid-
ered. There was no necessity for any limitation of the general pro-
prietary right therein asserted. The proposition therein announced
may be true for all the purposes for which it was used ; and even if
that proposition be the thing decided—and not the minor point, the
right of American Alcaldes to grant lots
—
yet this proposition, as
Chief Justice Marshall says, is to receive its definition, sanction and
limitation as authority, from the particular facts which show its appli-
cation. The proposition in Cohas v. Raisin, thus limited, would be,
at most, that the pueblo of San Francisco had a grant of lands, and
could convey lots by her officers after the conquest. If a Court, in
construing a lease in a case in which the term only is involved, affirm
that a plaintiff has a fee in the land, and is, therefore, entitled to
recover, the case is only a precedent establishing the validity of the
title for the term, not for the fee ; for the facts do not call for any
larger proposition. Touchard v. Touchard, 5 Cal., follows the same
course of observation taken by its predecessor, Cohas v. Raisin. The
only question in that case was, whether the pueblo making a grant
with conditions subsequent, the conditions not complied with, could
re-grant so as by the new deed to vest title in the last grantee. The
Court held she could. The appellant's argument was, that the land
must be denounced by or to the Government before it could be
re-granted ; and the Court answered this argument by the propositions
as to the character of the pueblo title ; in other words, the Court said
the land need not be denounced, because it did not belong to the Gov-
ernment, but to the pueblo. But it was not necessary to give all the
terms and conditions of the title. This reasoning was neither neces-
sary nor conclusive ; for the same result, if truly deduced, in either
case, would follow, whether the land was clothed with a public trust or
not. It had passed from the Government, and that was enough to
show that this process of denouncement—a process peculiar to govern-
mental lands—did not apply. But Touchard v. Touchard was subse-
quently overruled as to the only point—the power or effect of the
re-grant—really involved or decided by the case, and from that time
ceased to be authority for anything.
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Originally the obligation of the Courts is to declare the law as it
exists. They have no right to substitute their own dogmas or assump-
tions for the law. It would seem, therefore, that the mere fact that
an error has been committed is no reason or even apology for repeat-
ing it, much less for perpetuating it. But even in the correction or
removal of such errors the law is reasonable, and looks to the welfare
and repose of society and the protection of the public interests.
Accordingly it sometimes happens that the reversal of an erroneous
ruling would prove of greater evil consequence than to suffer it to
remain. It becomes then a matter of policy to refuse to overrule it.
Among the more general reasons for this refusal are the importance
of consistency and stability in the decisions, and the uneasiness and
uncertainty which changes of them produce in the public mind ; but
this consideration is not alone of overruling weight, for it applies to
all decisions, especially of Courts of last resort, whether they create
or do not create rules of property ; and it is not pretended that, as to
these last, it is not the duty of the Court to reform clear and admitted
error in a previous decision. The reason given for this rule of stare
decisis is, that rights vest by decisions which affirm a title under a
given state of facts, and therefore, it would be unjust to deprive a
party of property acquired under such circumstances. This rule,
unquestionably, applies to cases where particular modes have been
declared effectual for passing property, and where technical or formal
objections to such modes are interposed, the effect of which objections
would be to make a mere legal claim prevail over justice and right.
But it is not so clear if two men claim property—one under a statute,
and the other under a decision, that the man claiming under a wrong
decision, which destroyed the good title under the statute, is entitled,
as a matter of justice, to the property as against the first. Again,
that this matter—the vesting of a right—is not the conclusive thing
which gives effect to the principle, is seen in the fact that a single
decision is not necessarily or usually held protected by this rule. The
rule itself is stated in vaguer terms than almost any other principle of
law. It is thus stated by Kent : (1 Com. 476) "A solemn decision
upon a point of law, arising in any given case, becomes an authority
in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which we can have of
the law applicable to the subject, and the Judges are bound to follow
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that decision so long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown
that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case.
If a decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature delib-
eration, the presumption is in favor of its correctness, and the com-
munity have a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of
the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts bj it. It would,
therefore, be extremely inconvenient to the public if precedents were
not duly regarded and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and
stability of such rules that the professional men can give safe advice
to those who consult them ; and people in general can venture with
confidence to buy and trust, and to deal with each other. If judicial
decisions were to be lightly disregarded we should disturb and unset-
tle the great landmarks of property. When a rule has been once
deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed, unless
by a Court of appeal or review, and never by the same Court, except
for very cogent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error ; and
if the practice were otherwise, it would be leaving us in a state of
perplexing uncertainty as to the law."
The language of Sir William Jones is given, which reflects the
rigid rule of the old English Judges, who held, with the utmost strict-
ness, to the sacredness of precedents. But it may be doubted whether
this doctrine is ever professed now in England. The Lord Chancel-
lor, in the case reported in 12 E. L. and E., p. 1, says: "At the
same time, I should venture to state to your Lordships as my opinion,
that although you are bound by your own decisions as much as any
Court would be bound, so that you could not reverse your own decis-
ion in a particular case, yet you are not bound by any rule of law
which you could lay down, if, upon a subsequent occasion you find
reason to differ from that rule. That is like every Court of justice,
and I regard this as a Court of justice ; it is inherent in the nature of
every Court of justice that it should have liberty to correct any error
into which it may have fallen." The strict rule was certainly not
very closely followed by Lord Mansfield, the founder of the Commer-
cial Law of England ; indeed, the splendid eulogy of Burke ascribes
to him rather the quality and successes of a lawgiver than those of a
judge.
Chancellor Kent proceeds to qualify this doctrine as follows : " But
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I do not wish to be understood to press too strongly the doctrine of stare
decisis, when I recollect that there are more than one thousand cases
to be pointed out in the English and American books of reports, which
have been overruled, doubted or limited in theirapplication. It is prob-
able that the records of many of the Courts in this country are
replete with hasty and crude decisions ; and such cases ought to be
examined without fear, and revised without reluctance, rather than to
have the character of our law impaired, and the beauty and harmony
of the system destroyed by the perpetuity of error."
Then comes this significant language : " Even a series of decisions
are not always conclusive evidence of what is law ; and the revision
of a decision very often resolves itself into a mere question of expedi-
ency, depending upon the consideration of the importance of certainty
in the rule and the extent of property to be affected by a change of
it. Lord Mansfield frequently observed that the certainty of a rule
was often of much more importance in mercantile cases than the
reason of it, and that a settled rule ought to be observed for the sake
of property ; and yet, perhaps, no English Judge ever made greater
innovations and improvements in the law, or felt himself less" embar-
rassed with the disposition of the elder cases when they came in his
way to impede the operation of his cultivated judgment." Lord Ken-
yon, his successor, was quite as unreserved in his treatment of Lord
Mansfield's judgments as the latter was of those of his predecessors.
He overruled several of Lord Mansfield's decisions on the ground
that they disturbed the land-marks of property, saying : " I cannot
legislate, but by my industry I can discover what my predecessors
have done, and I will tread in their footsteps." This learned and
accomplished jurist evidently did not consider that stare decisis meant
an adherence to the last decision, when so to adhere was to desert
the ancient law.
The High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi, in 2 Smedes
and Marshall R., overruled a former decision of the Supreme Court
of that State. The decision was of long standing, being one of the
earliest cases in that Court after its organization. The question was
that of the rule of distribution of estates of deceased persons in cer-
tain cases—a matter affecting the title to property. The Court says :
" We are fully sensible that the stability of jurisprudence requires an
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adherence to the decisions of our Courts. If solemn judgments once
made are lightly departed from, it shakes the public confidence in the
law and throws doubt and distrust on its administration. Yet even
this backwardness to interfere with previous adjudications does not
require us to shut our eyes upon all improvements in the science of
the law, or require us to be stationary while all around is in progres-
sion. * * Perhaps no general rule can be laid down on the sub-
ject. The circumstances of each particular case, the extent of influ-
ence upon contracts, and interests which the decisions may have had
;
whether it may be only doubtful or clearly against principle, whether
sustained by some authority or opposed to all ; these are all matters
to be judged of whenever the Court is called on to depart from a
prior determination." It is just to remark, that no Court in the
United States was more distinguished than this for conservatism and
impartiality.
The rule as laid down by Chancellor Kent, in the first extract given
from the Commentaries, is almost literally taken from 16 Johns., 402.
In 25 Ala., 210, the Supreme Court of that State hold that a series
of decisions made and followed up from the earliest judicial times are
binding upon the Judges, but say that if those decisions be opposed to
the State or Federal Constitutions, they would take pleasure in dis-
carding them.
Foxcroft v. Mallett, 4 How. U. S. R., 353, was a case affecting the
construction of a grant and a mortgage under it. The general ques-
tion of the title had been passed upon, as Mr. Webster contended, and
rightly, we think, in a series of cases in the Supreme Court of
Maine, in which the title was affirmed. The • case was thoroughly
argued, the appellant contending that these decisions were final and
conclusive upon the Supreme Court. But the Supreme Court denied
the conclusion urged, not upon the ground that the objection insisted
on—the effect of the mortgage in question—was not involved in these
previous decisions, but that the question " did not appear to have been
agitated." Mr. Justice Woodbury, delivering the opinion, used this
language : " In conclusion, it has been urged against the judgment
we have formed in favor of the right of the demandant, that several
actions have been tried in Maine, where his interests have been brought
in question as to the premises, and decisions had against him ; and
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that such local adjudications in respect to the titles to real estate
should control the opinions of this Court. (9 Cranch, 87 ; 2 Wheat.,
316 ; 10 Wheat., 152 ; 12 Wheat., 153 ; 2 Gallis, 105.) But on
examining the particulars of the cases cited to govern this, (3 Fair-
field, 398 ; 4 Shepley, 84, 88 ; 14 Maine R., 51) it will be seen
that the construction of the mortgage to the college, in respect to
this reservation or condition, never appears to have been agitated. If
it had been, the decision would be entitled to high respect ; though it
should not be regarded as conclusive on the mere construction of a
deed as to matters and language belonging to the common law, and
not to any local statute. (3 Summer's R., 136, 277.)"
This last sentence is certainly very suggestive of the idea that the
Supreme Court did not consider the doctrine of stare decisis neces-
sarily to arise from even a series of decisions affecting the very titles
in controversy.
Equally significant is the case in the same Court—Lane v. Vick, et
al. This case involved the title to a large tract of land in the city of
Vicksburg, including a great portion of the city in extent and value.
The case was decided at the January term, 1845, of the Supreme
Court of the United States. The case involved and went off upon
the construction of the will of one N. Vick; the plaintiff claiming
that, by the will, the daughters of the testator were entitled equally
with the sons to the land. The case of Vick v. The Mayor and Alder-
men of Vicksburg, 1 How. Miss. R., 420, involved the construction
of this will, not as the leading object of the bill, but incidentally, and
that question was fully argued by the counsel. The Judge delivering
the opinion, in noticing a substantive ground of the complainant's
claims, says : " It becomes important to notice and construe the
will." * * " The whole proceeding was based upon a wrong con-
struction of the will. The daughters of Vick acquired no right by
device to this land of their father ;" and then go on and decide that
the claim of the bill, on the ground affected by this supposed miscon-
struction of the will, cannot be maintained. This decision was made
in 1837. The case in 3 How. U. S. R., rested entirely upon the con-
struction of this will ; and the plaintiff contended that this construc-
tion by the Supreme Court of Mississippi was erroneous. For the
defendants, the Vicks, it was argued that the construction of the Mis-
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sissippi Court should be received as the final adjudication of the mat-
ter. Mr. Justice McLean delivered tho opinion of the Court. He
said : " It is insisted that the construction of the will has been con-
clusively settled by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the case of
Vicks et al., v. The Mayor and Aldermen of Vicksburg, 1 How.,
3T9.
" The parties in that case were not the same as those now before
this Court ; and that decision does not affect the interests of the com-
plainants here. The question before the Mississippi Court was,
whether certain grounds, within the town plot, had been dedicated to
public use. The construction of the will was incidental to the main
object of the suit, and of course was not binding on any one claiming
under the will. With the greatest respect, it may be proper to say,
that this Court do not follow the State Courts in their construction of
a will or any other instrument, as they do in the construction of
statutes.
" Where, as in the case of Jackson v. Chew, (12 Wheat. 167) the
construction of a will had been settled by the highest Courts of the
State, and long been acquiesced in as a rule of property, this Court
would follow it, because it had become a rule of property. The con-
struction of a statute by the Supreme Court of a State is followed,
without reference to interests it may affect, or the parties to the suit
in which its construction was involved. But the mere construction of
a will by a State Court does not, as the construction of a statute of
the State, constitute a rule of decision for the Courts of the United
States." Here, for seven or eight years, the decision of the highest
Court of Mississippi had remained undisputed, and affected the title
to many hundreds of city lots ; and yet the Supreme Court of the
United States did not consider the decision as constituting a rule of
property within the principle of stare decisis.
In Lion v. Bertiss, (20 Johns. 483) Spencer, C. J., says: " Stare
decisis is a maxim essential to the security of property. The decisions
of Courts of law become a rule for the regulation of the alienation
and descent of real estate ; and when that rule has been sanctioned
and adopted in our Courts it ought to be adhered to, unless manifestly
wrong and unjust."
In the case of Jackson v. Chew, (12 Wheaton, p. 168) the Supreme
LAND TITLES IN SAN FKANCISCO. 79
Hart vs. Burnett, et al.
Court of the United States illustrate what they mean by a settled
course of adjudication, at least as applied to the facts there. The
Court says : "In the case now under consideration, there have been
two decisions in the highest Courts of law in the State upon the iden-
tical question now in judgment, and which were in conformity to a
settled course of adjudication for twenty years past."
But we might take bolder ground. We might admit that the gen-
eral doctrine, as contended for, that a single decision or two decisions
on a question of property are decisive and conclusive, as a general
rule, however flagrantly erroneous those decisions were ; and yet hold
that this principle, like all general rules, has and must have its excep-
tions. It would devolve upon us then to show that to this rule there
were exceptions, and next, that this case constitutes one of them ; and
we should feel no distrust of our ability to maintain this ground. Let
us suppose a case by way of illustrating the first of these propositions
:
Suppose this Court had decided on its first organization that the public
lands belonged to this State ; and that, therefore, the patents of the
General Government were void. The United States Courts, of course,
hold a contrary doctrine. Suppose this decision had been consistently
maintained ever since the existence of the State until the present time,
when the question came up for review again. Would we be bound,
and would any Court be bound, its predecessors to the contrary notwith-
standing, to hold to this doctrine as the permanent, unalterable law of
this tribunal ? If so, it must be held to be the true doctrine for all
time ; and then, it not being recognized by the Federal tribunals, we
should have a perpetual conflict of opinions and jurisdictions, and
practical revolution or civil war ; or at least, two irreconcilable sys-
tems of law and sets of rights prevailing in the State. It may be
said that this is an extreme case ; but so, as we shall show in the sequel,
is the case before us. But the purpose of this view is answered by
the establishment of the point that there may he an exception to the
general rule ; though we are very far from conceding that this case is
within the general principle. On the contrary, we think we have
shown that it is clearly excluded from its operation.
Nor is this Court without example in this very respect. Early in
its judicial history it held (Leese et al. v. Clark, 3 Cal. 18 ; Vander-
slice v. Hanks, ibid, 18) that a Mexican grant without the approval
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of the Departmental Assembly, or segregation of the land by the
grantor, passed no title to the grantee upon which ejectment could be
maintained. This doctrine did not merely touch the remedy. It
related to the character of the title. The early cases held that this
title was a mere inchoate claim upon the bounty or favor or justice of
the Government, requiring its action before a legal interest in the land
vested in the grantee. The decision remained as the doctrine of the
Court for several years, until it was abandoned in 1857, by Chief Jus-
tice Murray, who had announced it ; and it was afterwards directly over-
ruled by this Court in 1858. Thus for a series of years was a prin-
ciple of law of real estate going to the very foundation of titles held
and maintained, and afterwards reversed and abandoned. We need
say nothing of the case of Woodworth v. Fulton, expressly reaffirmed
in Reynolds v. West, and the subsequent cases overruling the doctrine
in that case. But enough to maintain this proposition results from the
language used in announcing the rule by all judges and authors, for
they state the rule, as has been seen, with a qualification which implies
of itself an exception.
And apart from all express authority, reason must convince us that
no such inexorable rule could exist. The rule itself implies that the
doctrine protected by stare decisis cannot stand of itself. But it is a
solecism to say that causes should be tried upon wrong principles—be
decided against the law—whether it be for the purposes of justice or
not, so to decide them. The law is not so false to itself as to require
its own permanent overthrow, unless the subversion be necessary to the
public interests ; and whether it be so necessary in a given case or
not, is for the Court to decide as a matter of legal discretion, when-
ever the rule is invoked. For, as this rule of stare decisis is avow-
edly put upon the ground of policy, we cannot conceive that the appli-
cation of the rule could be rightly so made as to overthrow the para-
mount public policy of deciding causes by the rules of the law, when
those rules work justice and do equity in the major part of the cases
to which they apply, and protect the rights of the many against the
claim of a few.
This would be practically the working of wholesale injustice and the
destruction of legally acquired rights of property under cover of a
conservative policy formed to protect such rights, and to enforce justice.
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This case, however, is not within the rule of stare decisis. This
will be seen from the review we have made of the cases in this Court.
It is only necesary to refer to the citations we have made at such
length, to show that tlie 'point of the title to this property under Sher-
iff's sale has not been so definitively settled as to have ivorhed itself
into the body of the law of real estate in California. The question of
the conclusiveness of adjudications is not necessarily dependent upon
the number of them. It is true that some of the authorities use the
terms " a series of decisions ".—an " uninterrupted series," " a long
established rule," and the like expressions ; but we apprehend that
the language was designed to imply not solely the age of the rule, but
its permanent, settled, stable character. A single decision, never
called in question, but consistently acted on and generally acquiesced
in for a great many years, would probably fall within the rule ; while
several decisions, like those of Leese and Vallejo v. Clark, and Wood-
worth v. Fulton would not. We must give force to these qualifica-
tions expressed in the words " settled," " acquiesced in," and the like.
They cannot mean " settled," by the mere fact or force of the adjudi-
cations, for then there would be no use for these terms; they would
be without meaning, for every judgment upon a title would upon this
construction settle the law ; nor is the " acquiesence " that of the
parties to the case, for they are bound to acquiesce, at least to submit.
The meaning is, that the sense of the profession and of the public has
recognized the rule as fixed and established—as being closed to fur-
ther debate, and that conveyancers and intelligent men dealing in such
titles, pass them as good and marketable ; that the property is consid-
ered and treated as owned under the title in question, with the inci-
dents of ownership, and the benefit of such claim to the owner. If
it be not the meaning of these qualifying terms to convey an idea of
this condition and stability and repose, it is difficult to assign a mean-
ing to them. But there has been no acquiesence, no repose to these
titles. The question has not been " settled" if " settled " means put
to rest, nor has it been recognized as settled. On the contrary, the
whole matter has been in perpetual dispute, controversy and discus-
sion. Bar and Bench have been divided ; suits brought and litigated
at every step and in all Courts ; adverse possessions held and main-
tained by those who contest the title ; controversies pending, involving
6
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the same principle in the Federal Courts, and those Courts (as in the
case involving the title to land in the old pueblo of San Jose) decided
against the Sheriff's title, the title of the city herself to the lands
disputed, and this question still pending in the Supreme Court of the
United States ; the grounds taken in the Circuit Court of the United
States and before the Land Commission, and those assumed here as to
the general title, variant and clashing, and the doctrines pronounced
by our own Judges, when affirming the title, inharmonious and shift-
ing. Besides all this, the city of San Francisco, bj ordinance, prac-
tically ignores the title here, and the Legislature validates, so far as it
can, the act which ignores it. And then, the decisions of this Court
have been conflicting—" interrupted "—in which event, the subse-
quent decision has diminished weight. For, as observed by an eminent
Judge : " The decisions of Courts are not the law ; they are only the
evidence of the law ; and this evidence is stronger or weaker accord-
ing to the number and uniformity of adjudications, the unanimity or
dissension of the Judges, the solidity of the reasons on which the
decisions are founded, and the perspicuity and precision with which
those reasons are expressed." Add to this, that these are public and
notorious facts, and that the original Sheriff's deed, as held in Argenti
v. The City, contained upon its face, in the paltry sum paid for the
land, a caveat to a purchaser of all defects in the title thus deraigned.
Moreover, the cases relied on were not decided, so far as the point
we have been discussing goes—the leviable character of this title
—
upon " solemn argument and mature deliberation ;" and this seems to
be one of the conditions by which Chancellor Kent qualifies the con-
clusive effect of the adjudication. This consideration becomes the
more important, when we reflect that the interests of many parties and
of other communities than San Francisco are involved ; and their
rights ought not in such a case, to be concluded without an opportu-
nity to be heard, or when argument had not been made by others.
It may be remarked that, in this particular case, the real plaintiff
was the original purchaser at the Sheriff's sale, in 1851, and there-
fore, no equity of the rule of stare decisis would apply to him, what-
ever his technical legal right to claim it.
" The rule of property" then, is not necessarily created or shown
by the mere decision, or two or three decisions of a court. It is the
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settled, fixed, stable principle regulating titles and the estimate of their
validity and value in the minds of practical men, who draw their con-
clusions from judgments which have been commonly acquisced in as
settled law, or the general titles affirmed, by which they have passed
beyond contention and dispute.
Nor is the loose expression " that rights have vested " under such
decisions, to be construed in the sense supposed, if by this phrase be
meant that the vesting of any rights under a judgment—however
limited in extent or the number of persons claiming—makes the prin-
ciple therein asserted irreversible ; for, probably, no judgment such
as this is ever without some effect on the transfer of property ; and
therefore, if this were the criterion, every judgment affirming a title
would be protected. Nor is there either principle or justice in giving
to the smaller right or interest of one, however acquired, a protection
at the expense of the larger interest of another, or of many others,
acquired as honestly. It is not seen how, as a matter of abstract jus-
tice, it can be held that many men claiming under a statute regularly
passed, homesteads which they have improved at large expense, confid-
ing in the validity of the statute, should, when it is admitted—for
that is the case we are supposing—that their claims were originally
good, be forced to surrender them to enrich a purchaser, who bought
relying upon a wrong decision of the Courts, and who, therefore,
claims to be protected in his purchase. Why, in other words, the
claimant, under an erroneous decision, affirming incorrectly a title,
should be any better protected than many claimants under a statute
which correctly affirmed the title ; especially when the latter was for
years in possession of the premises, and so held at the time the pur-
chaser bought, the purchaser buying, therefore, with notice that his
claim would be contested ? The rule of stare decisis is for the benefit
of bona fide purchasers buying since the establishment of the doc-
trine or rule ; and to give the benefit of the rule to them, it is urged
that we must establish a principle which protects the present plaintiff,
and those like him, representing, probably, no inconsiderable propor^
tion of this city property. These last claimants, it is not pretended,
are protected by any equities of the rule of stare decisis; for they
bought before these decisions, and their case on its real intrinsic
merits presents the naked question of title. The question, then, on
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this claim of justice—and the justice here is not far from the law of
the case—is this : Is it just to protect all claimants of this property
under execution sales—those claimants resting for title upon an errone-
ous decision—that protection to be afforded by taking the property
from the possession of hundreds who rightly claim it under statute,
and this to give effect to a rule of policy which, in this way, is to pro-
tect those who bought portions of this property since the decision in
Welsh v. Sullivan ; the number of whom and the extent of whose
purchases are unknown ? Is not the answer that it is not policy to do
injustice to the majority that justice may be done to the smaller num-
ber, and this though the equities of the smaller number were equal
per capita to those of the adverse side ? But how is this question, as
it affects the city, thus summarily deprived of her magnificent endow-
ment in favor of these original vendees, who have invested in the
speculation but a trifling proportion of the value of the property
bought ? And how would, it be with other pueblos who have never
yet had an opportunity to be heard upon the question, whether their
lands have passed under such sales ?
We are here led to the observation that it is not pretended, at least,
it cannot be reasonably contended, that this doctrine of stare decisis
was perfected—supposing it ever was—until after the case of Welsh
v. Sullivan, in July or October, 1857. The Van Ness ordinance was
passed in 1855, and the statute confirming it in March, 1858. The
statute confirmed the ordinance from its passage, and the ordinance
gave effect to a possession in January, 1855. Thus the claim under
the Van Ness ordinance had its inception, and so far as the city and
county could convey the property, was made good in 1855. If, how-
ever, it needed the legislative confirmation, and could only take effect
as a title from that fact, it received it in 1858, but a few months after
Welsh v. Sullivan was decided. So this title by stare decisis, and the
title by statute seems to have been nearly contemporaneous, unless,
indeed, the statutory title was, by relation, anterior. [But when
Welsh v. Sullivan settled the question, in the sense of the books, if it
ever has done so, is a curious inquiry into which we do not propose to
enter.] The cases cited seem to hold, we may add in illustration of
some of these views, that the principle of the doctrine of stare decisis
applies as well to the words of a statute as to a decision. (Dwarris
on Statutes, p. 704.)
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We cannot appreciate the force of the argument -which ascribes a
destructive or revolutionary tendency to the view just presented. We
have endeavored to show that it has the sanction of authority and the
support of reason. A true conservatism does not consist in the main-
tenance of innovations upon established law, when the general effect of
a restoration of the law is wise and just. We only destroy the inno-
vation, and in doing so we conserve the law. And we cannot see,
that under the circumstances of this case, we should not be violating
our duty in giving perpetuity to an error, as much as if, in the first
instance, we consciously committed it.
Again, the views which we have expressed respecting the rule of
stare decisis are particularly applicable to cases decided in this Court
involving questions of Spanish and Mexican law. The Bench and the
Bar in California, generally, have not been familiar with these laws
;
it has been exceedingly difficult to procure copies of the Mexican
statutes, and sometimes impossible to procure the works of the most
distinguished commentators on the Spanish civil code. And even
when procured, it was equally difficult to obtain correct translations
of such laws and of the works of such law writers. Add to this the
fact that nearly all the Mexican orders, laws, decrees, etc., respecting
California, are still in manuscript, scattered through immense masses
of unarranged archives, almost inaccessible, and known, even imper-
fectly, to scarcely half a dozen persons, and will it appear surprising
that errors have been committed by our judiciary ? Must we per-
severe in these errors, no matter how great or how much opposed to
justice they may be, even after new lights, new authorities and new
laws are brought to our notice, proving these mistakes beyond a doubt ?
We cannot believe that any Court' would sustain such a doctrine
respecting its decisions.
In illustration of these views we need only refer to the fact that
this same embarrassment has been felt by other Courts coming to pass
upon the laws and usages of a foreign Government, which they have
been suddenly called to administer. The Supreme Courts of the
United States, and of Texas especially, have experienced this diffi-
culty ; and have felt bound to modify their first rulings and decisions
upon important questions arising under Spanish laAv, by the knowledge
obtained after further investigation and research.
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We are not insensible to the eloquent admonition of counsel that we
do nothing to disturb the titles to real estate in San Francisco. We
have no disposition to disturb them. So far as is consistent with the
law, we are anxious to protect and preserve all rights of property in
that large and growing city. But titles must rest upon some better
and more stable basis than upon an erroneous judgment of this Court.
We uphold everything decided in the past jurisprudence which we
think not plainly erroneous.
Nor do we see that we, directly or indirectly, disturb any title here-
tofore recognized, unless that of the plaintiff and those in the same cat-
egory with him be an exception. But in ignoring this claim, we settle
and quiet the titles of the larger number now in possession adversely.
The last remark brings us to consider the effect of the Act called the
Van Ness Ordinance, and the Acts of the Legislature in connection
therewith.
IX. We have seen that the title of this property, before the treaty,
was in the pueblo, and that the city succeeded to the same title,
clothed substantially with the same trusts or similar trusts. But these
trusts and this property are under the political dominion and control
of the sovereign. The property and trusts and corporation were
municipal, and therefore, subject as political institutions, trusts and
property, to the superior political authority. This principle has been
asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the celebrated
Dartmouth College case, (4 Wheat., 660) and afterwards confirmed
in 10 How., 534 ; also, so held in 13 Wendell, 9 Cranch ; see, also, 1
Tucker's Com., 454. This ordinance was not only the Act of the city
;
by its confirmation by the Legislature it became the Act of the State.
Its purpose was to quiet titles in San Francisco, and it seems justified
by a policy, which, if too generous, yet bears some analogy to the laws
and purposes which gave existence to the rights of the pueblo. The
ordinance was passed by the Common Council on the 20th of June,
1855, and was confirmed by that body on the 27th of September fol-
lowing, and was also confirmed by the Legislature on the 11th of
March, 1858. The first section is in these words: " It shall be the
duty of the Mayor to enter, at the proper land ofiice of the United
States, at the minimum price, all the lands above the natural high
water mark of the bay of San Francisco, at the time of the admission
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of California into the Union as a State, situated -within the corporate
limits of the city of San Francisco, as defined in the Act to incorpo-
rate said city, passed April 15th, 1851, in trust for the general use,
benefit and behoof of the occupants or possessors thereof, according
to their respective interests.
" Section 2d. The city of San Francisco hereby relinquishes and
grants all the right and claim of the city to the lands within the cor-
porate limits to the parties in the actual possession thereof, by them-
selves or tenants, on or before the first day of January, A. D. 1855,
and to their heirs and assigns forever ; excepting the property known
as the slip property, and bounded on the north by Clay street, on the
•west by Davis street, on the south by Sacramento street, and on the
east by the water lot front ; and excepting also any piece or parcel of
land situated south, east, or north of the w7ater lot front of the city of
San Francisco, as established by an Act of the Legislature of March
26th, A. D. 1851
;
provided such possession has been continued up to
the time of the introduction of this ordinance in the Common Council
;
or, if interrupted by an intruder, or trespasser, has been, or may be,
recovered by legal process ; and it is hereby declared to be the true
intent and meaning of this ordinance, that when any of the said lands
have been occupied and possessed under and by virtue of a lease or
demise, they shall be deemed to have been in the possession of the
landlord or lessor under whom they were so occupied or possessed
provided, that all persons who hold title to lands within said limits by
virtue of any grant made by any Ayuntamiento, Town Council, Alcalde,
or Justice of the Peace of the former pueblo of San Francisco, -before
the seventh day of July, 1846 ; or grants to lots of land lying east
of Larkin street and northeast of Johnson street, made by any Ayun-
tamiento, Town Council, or Alcalde of said pueblo since that date, and
before the incorporation of the city of San Francisco, by the State of
California, and which grant, or the material portion thereof, was regis-
tered or recorded in a proper book of record deposited in the office or
custody or control of the Recorder of the county of San Francisco,
on or before the third day of April, A. D. 1850, or by virtue of any
conveyance duly made by the Commissioners of the Funded Debt of
the city of San Francisco and recorded on or before the first day of
January, 1855, shall, for all the purposes contemplated by this Ordi-
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nance, be deemed to be the possessors of the land so granted, although
the said lands may be in the actual occupancy of persons holding the
same adverse to the said grantees.
" Section 3. The patent issued, or any grant made by the United
States to the city, shall inure to the several use, benefit and behoof of
the said possessors, their heirs and assigns, mentioned in the preceding
section, as fully and effectually, to all intents and purposes, as if it
were issued or made directly to them individually and by name."
The second section of the Act of 1858 following, is in these words:
" That the grant or relinquishment of title made by the said city in
favor of the several possessors, by sections two and three of the Ordi-
nance first above recited, shall take effect as fully and completely, for
the purpose of transferring the city's interest, and for all other pur-
poses whatsoever, as if deeds of release and quit claim had been duly
executed and delivered to and in favor of them individually and by
name ; and no further conveyance or other act shall be necessary to
invest the said possessors with all the interest, title, rights, benefits
advantages which the said order and ordinances intend or purport to
transfer or convey, according to the true intent and meaning thereof
;
provided, that nothing in this Act shall be so construed as to release the
city of San Francisco, or city and county of San Francisco, from the pay-
ment of any claim or claims due or to become due this State against said
city and county, nor affect or release to said city and county any title
this State has or may have to any lands in said city and county of San
Francisco."
We think this Act valid and effectual for the purposes therein men-
tioned. The effect of it, and of this decision, is to declare valid
Alcalde grants made before and after the cession of California ; also
the title to all lots held under sales by Commissioners of the Funded
Debt ; and it releases to parties in actual possession, by themselves or
tenants, on the first of January, 1855, the lots so held by them respect-
ively, giving to the release the effect of a perfect title. The lots
within the limits of the old pueblo not so granted or occupied or other-
wise disposed of, of course remain the property of the city. This is,
in general terms, the effect of this legislation, and it is not necessary
for any purpose of this explanation to be more particular or definite
in the statement. Nor is it necessary to express any opinion as to
the effect of the sale of the property granted by the State to the city
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and sold tinder judgment. Those titles do not rest upon the same
facts as those passed upon, and the question of their validity is now
before us in other cases and will soon be decided. Most of those lots,
we believe, are and have long been in possession of the claimants
under those sales ; and therefore, such possession would seem to be
protected by the ordinance and Act of the Legislature. .
X. Lastly, the counsel for respondents contend that the defendants
cannot set up the want of leviable title in the city, or as they express
it, the exemption of this property from forced sale ; and they cite
several authorities to show that if a debtor does not object to the sale
of property exempt by law, a third person cannot. But these cases
do not apply. Undoubtedly the owner has a right to assent to have
property sold, though exempt by law from sale. He can do what he
pleases with his own ; he may waive a privilege personal to himself.
But the corporation had no right to assent to the sale of this property,
since, for this purpose, it was not its own, nor was the exemption its
privilege. It could not, by its silence or otherwise, dispose of the
trust property in this way. The plaintiff must show his title before
he can dispossess any tenant on the strengh of it. He has attempted
to do this by deraignment from the city, and has failed ; and, as held
in Wood v. The City, he cannot recover. A similar decision in prin-
ciple was made by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky (1 Dana, 359).
We have extended this opinion to a length which is only to be jus-
tified by the great importance of the case, the public interest in the
questions, and the long and bitter controversies, which, for years, have
divided the Bar and the Bench. We cannot hope to give satisfaction
to all of the many parties, who, in one way or another, are interested
adversely to the decision ; but we feel a natural desire to show that
we have given the subject a careful consideration in all of its material
bearings and aspects, and to prevent any misapprehension which might
result in injury to public or individual rights. We close by affirming
these propositions
:
First—That San Francisco was, at the date of the conquest and
cession of California, and long prior to that time, a pueblo, entitled to
and possessing all the rights which the law conferred upon such munic-
ipal organizations.
Second—That such pueblo had a certain right or title to the lands
90 LAND TITLES IN SAN FRANCISCO.
Hart vs. Burnett, et al.
within its general limits, and that the portions of such lands "which had
not been set apart or dedicated to common use, or to special purposes
could be granted in lots, by its municipal officers, to private persons,
in full ownership.
Third—That the authority to grant such lands was vested in the
Ayuntamiento, and in the Alcaldes or other officers who at the time
represented it, or who had succeeded to its " powers and obligations."
Fourth—That the official acts of such officers, in the course of their
ordinary and accustomed duties, and within the general scope of their
powers, as here denned and explained, will be presumed to have been
done by lawful authority. [39.]
Fifth—That these municipal lands, to which the city of San Fran-
cisco succeeded, were held in trust for the public use of that city, and
were not, either under the old government or the new, the subject of
seizure and sale under execution.
Sixth—That this property and these trusts were public and munici-
pal in their nature, and were within the control and supervision of the
State sovereignty, and that the Federal Government had no such con-
trol or supervision.
Seventh—That the Act of the State Legislature of March, 1858,
confirming the so-called Van Ness Ordinance, was a legal and proper
exercise of this sovereign power ; and that this Act gave full effect to
the provisions of that Ordinance, and vests in the possessors therein
described, as against said city and State, a title to the lands in said
Ordinance mentioned. [40.]
Eighth—That the city of San Francisco holds the municipal lands
of the pueblo, not legally disposed of as hereinbefore explained ; and
that her title is wholly unaffected by Sheriff's sales under execution
against her, so far as those sales touch or affect the aforesaid pueblo
lands.
Ninth—That a defendant in ejectment, holding such lands merely
by possession, may set up the invalidity of such sales, or the plaint-
iff's title derived therefrom, to defeat the plaintiff's action.
It becomes unimportant to notice any other points, for those already
decided determine the merits of this controversy.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Baldwin, J.
I concur
:
Field, C. J.
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Hart vs. Burnett et als.—I regret that I am unable to agree with
my associates in the conclusion at which they have arrived in this case.
The questions affecting the merits of the controversy were long since
settled by this Court, and whatever may be our opinion of the correct-
ness of that settlement, I think that a due regard for the doctrine of
stare decisis requires that it be strictly adhered to. I shall never
hesitate in a proper case to co-operate with my associates in correcting
the errors of this tribunal, but I. am unwilling to interfere where the
effect may be to create confusion in titles, and destroy rights acquired
and held upon the faith of the most solemn adjudications. We cannot
suppose that the people of San Francisco have been so unmindful of
their interests as to disregard the former decisions of this Court, and
rely for the protection of their rights upon a change in the opinion of
the Judges, or in the organization of the Court. It is safe to assume
that these decisions have been generally acquiesced in, and have been
accepted and acted upon by the people of that city as the paramount
law and rule of property. Titles emanating from the city must have
become the subject of trade and commerce, and under the influence
and upon the faith of these decisions large sums of money must have
been expended in the acquisition of these titles. In point of fact, we
know that these expenditures have been made not only as investments,
and for purposes of speculation, but whenever it could be done, by the
actual possessors of property for the purpose of protecting their pos-
sessions. If under these circumstances the doctrine of stare decisis
has no application, I think it would be difficult to state a case in which
that doctrine could be properly invoked.
To show precisely what I understand to have been decided by this
Court, it is necessary to refer to the decisions themselves.
In Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524, certain property had been levied
upon and sold as the property of the city, and one of the points made
was that the city had no title to a portion of this property. The
Court did not consider it necessary to determine the question of title,
but held that if the property belonged to the city it was subject to
levy and sale.
In Cohas v. Raisin, (3 Cal. 443) the Court passed upon the char-
acter of the title of the former Pueblo of San Francisco to the land
lying within the limits of the pueblo, and held that under the laws of
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Mexico the pueblo was invested with a valid legal title to such land.
The conclusion of the Court, as announced in the opinion of Mr. Jus-
tice Heydenfeldt, was : " That before the military occupation of Cali-
fornia by the army of the United States, San Francisco was a Mexican
pueblo or municipal corporation, and was invested with title to the land
within her boundaries." The opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Murray
was never published, and the consequence has been that the opinion
of Mr. Justice Heydenfeldt has always been regarded as the unani-
mous opinion of the Court. There is, however, no conflict in the two
opinions, and the substantial grounds of the decision were concurred
in by the whole Court. The absolute title of the pueblo is the leading
idea of both opinions and the controlling principle of the case. The
decision was placed expressly upon the ground that the grant to the
pueblo was in full property, and carried with it and vested in the
pueblo all the rights and incidents of absolute ownership.
The case of the People ex rel. Thorne v. Hays, (4 Cal. 127) was
an application for a mandamus to compel the Sheriff of San Francisco
county to execute deeds to certain lots held by the city under the
pueblo title, which lots had been sold under an execution against the
city and purchased by the relator. The right of the city to redeem
the property from this sale was the only question decided by the Court,
and the decision was adverse to this right and a peremptory manda-
mus was awarded. No question was raised as to the title of the city
or the leviable character of the property, though it would have been a
sufficient answer to the application to have shown that the property
was not subject to execution. This point seems to have been con-
ceded, or at least was not brought to the attention of the Court, and
the case can only be regarded as an authority upon the particular
question passed upon by the Court.
In Touchard v. Touchard, (5 Cal. 306) the case of Cohas v. Raisin
was referred to and approved. In speaking of that case, Mr. Justice
Heydenfeldt, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said : " We had
occasion to examine the power and authority of towns under the
Spanish and Mexican systems, to acquire and dispose of lands, and
the conclusion there attained, after a careful examination of the Span-
ish and Mexican decrees, places their right upon as high ground as
that of natural persons—a right of property beyond even the reach
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of royal interference." This language, as well as the language in
Cohas v. Raisin, necessarily excludes the idea of a trust. An exami-
nation, of this case will show that the reference to Cohas v. Raisin,
though incidental, was entirely pertinent, and it must therefore be
regarded as an authoritative exposition of the principle of that case.
In Seale v. Mitchell, (5 Cal. 401) the Court passed upon and sus-
tained the very title in controversy in this suit. The action was eject-
ment, and on the trial of the case the plaintiff, to prove his title, gave
in evidence a judgment obtained in the Superior Court of the city of
San Francisco, by Peter Smith, against the city. Upon the judgment
an execution had been issued, and the plaintiff had purchased the
property in dispute at Sheriff's sale. The execution and a deed from
the Sheriff were also given in evidence. It was admitted that the
property was situated within the limits of the former pueblo of San
Francisco. Upon this evidence the plaintiff was nonsuited, but the
published report of the case does not show upon what particular
grounds the nonsuit was asked. It appears from the record, however,
that it was asked, first, upon the ground that the deed from the
Sheriff was void ; and second, upon the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to establish any title in the city. It was granted upon the first
of these grounds, but as the second went directly to the right of the
plaintiff to recover, it was relied upon in the argument before this
Court. In response to the argument upon this point, the Court said :
" In the case of Cohas v. Raisin, we decided that before the military
occupation of California by the army of the United States, San Fran-
cisco was a Mexican pueblo, or municipal corporation, and was invested
with title to the land within her boundaries. It results from this that
when a plaintiff sues for a lot in the former pueblo of San Francisco,
and deraigns his title from the city, it is prima facie evidence of title."
The conclusion was that the nonsuit had been improperly granted, and
the judgment was reversed. I do not see how this case can be dis-
tinguished upon principle from the case at bar. It affirmed the same
title upon which the plaintiff seeks to recover in this suit, and it must
be conceded that upon the principal questions now before the Court, it
is directly in point.
In Welsh v. Sullivan, (8 Cal. 165) the question of the validity of
this title was again brought before the Court; and after full argument
94 LAND TITLES IN SAN FRANCISCO.
Hart vs. Burnett, et al.
was again decided in the same way. Mr. Chief Justice Murray
delivered an elaborate opinion, in which he maintained the authority
of Cohas v. Raisin, and the cases subsequently decided ; both upon
principle and upon the doctrine of stare decisis. The Associate Jus-
tices concurred in the decision. Mr. Justice Terry held that upon
the principle of stare decisis, the Court was bound by its former
decisions ; and Mr. Justice Burnett placed his concurrence upon the
ground that the title vested in the city under the Act of Congress of
1851. It is contended that the authority of this case is impaired by
the difference in the reasons assigned by the Judges for their decision.
I do not think so. They arrived at the same conclusion, and two of
them agreed as to the effect of the previous decisions of the Court.
This was certainly a legitimate reason for the decision, and I do not
think that the concurrence of Mr. Justice Terry in the opinion subse-
quently delivered on the petition for a rehearing, can be regarded as
an abandonment of his opinion upon this subject. If this case is to be
regarded as law, it is conclusive of the questions involved in the con-
troversy now before the Court. >
I have not alluded to the case of Woodworth v. Fulton, for the rea-
son that it is not proposed to return to the doctrines of that case, and
the fact that it was overruled in Cohas v. Raisin furnishes no argument
against the authority of the latter case or the other cases to which I
have referred.
I have now examined, so far as is necessary for my present purpose,
the several decisions of this Court bearing upon the questions in con-
troversy in this suit. If these decisions were permitted to stand, the
controversy upon the merits would of course be at an end. I cannot
avoid the conclusion that their overthrow is against public policy and
in violation of the rights of individuals. I regard it as a dangerous
experiment, the consequences of which cannot be foreseen. Any
change in the rules and principles regulating the administration of jus-
tice should be introduced with great caution. In matters of property
every such change, the tendency of which is to disturb titles and
impair the security of vested rights, is in contravention of the spirit
and policy of the law. A steady and uniform rule of property is of
much more importance than the mere legal reasons upon which the
rule was originally founded, and no Court can be justified in disturbing
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such a rule upon the ground that it originated in an erroneous concep-
tion of the law. However gross the error, if it has taken root and
become a rule of property, it is sacred and inviolable.
Where a rule has become settled law, says Mr. Broom, it is to be
followed, although some possible inconvenience may arise from a strict
observance of it, or although a satisfactory reason for it is wanted, or
although the principle and policy of the rule may be questioned. Mis-
era est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum is a maxim which
applies with peculiar force to questions respecting real property.
(Broom's Leg. Max., 111.) When a doctrine is once fixed, says
another learned author, as if it be so fixed by a decision, and subse-
quent practice grounded on it, it is to be adhered to. One ground of
such adherence is the inconvenience of uncertainty in the law, an
inconvenience which, with regard to property, may affect every man
by the circumstance that the ablest conveyancers may not be able to
direct him. Another reason for adhering to a rule of property is, that
many estates may depend upon the rule, and the danger that the new
determination may have a retrospect and shake many questions
already settled. (Ram. on Leg., Judg. 126, 127.) " When a rule,"
says Chancellor Kent, " has been once deliberately adopted and
declared, it ought not to be disturbed, unless by a Court of appeal or
review, and never by the same Court, except for very cogent reasons
and upon a clear manifestation of error ; and if the practice were
otherwise, it would be leaving us in a state of perplexing uncertainty
as to the law." (1 Kent's Com., 476.) " No man," says Sir Wil-
liam Jones, " who is not a lawyer, would ever know how to act, and
no man who is a lawyer would, in many instances, know how to advise,
unless Courts were bound by authority as firmly as the Pagan deities
were supposed to be bound by the decrees of fate." (Jones on Bail,
46.) " Stare decisis" says Chief Justice Wilmot, " is a first princi-
ple in the administration of justice ; and this, not from any fear of
bringing appeals or writs of error in particular cases, but because
these cases have furnished the light, by which conveyances have been
directed in settling and transferring property from one man to another.
Upon the faith of an established rule, and the acquiescence of judges
and of the whole nation in it, property to the amount of millions may
depend. The Judges now, as their predecessors have always done,
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bow down to the rule pro salute populi, which, is the supreme law of
everj community." (Wilm. Notes, 312.) " It is for such reasons,"
says Mr. Greenleaf, " that judges have deemed themselves bound to
adhere to the rules of the law of real property, with a closeness some-
times bordering upon servility, but in truth dictated by sound wis-
dom." (Grreenl. Cruise on Real Property, 543.) "The altering
settled rules concerning property is the most dangerous way of remov-
ing land-marks." (Parker, C. J., in Goodright v. Wright, 1 P. Wm.,
399.) " My opinion is," says Lord Chancellor Macclesfield, in Wag-
staff v. Wagstaff, 2 P. Wm., 288, "never to shake any settled reso-
lutions touching property or the title to land, it being for the common
good that these should be certain and known, however ill grounded the
first resolution might be." The same view was expressed by Mr. Jus-
tice Wilmot, in Robinson v. Bland (1 W. Bl. 264). "There is no
mischief," said Lord Mansfield, in Rice v. Shute, (2 W. BL, 696)
" that attends setting aside rules of practice, when erroneous, though
in rules of property it is otherwise." And again, in Hodgson v.
Ambrose, 1 Doug., 341, he said : " The great object, in questions of
property, is certainty ; and if an erroneous or hasty determination has
got into practice, there is more benefit to be derived from adhering to
it than if it were to be overturned." Lord Camden, in Morecock v.
Dickens, (Ambl., 678) speaking of the English rule, that the regis-
tration of a deed is not notice of its contents, said, that if it were a
new case, he should have his doubts ; but that the point was settled
by previous decisions, and much property had been settled, and many
conveyances made upon the strength of it. " A thousand neglects to
search," added he, " have been occasioned by that determination, and
I cannot therefore take upon me to alter it." In Doe v. Manning,
(9 East., 71) Lord Ellenborough expressed a similar opinion, saying :
" It is no new thing for the Court to hold itself concluded, in matters
of real property, by former decisions, upon questions, in respect of
which, if they were res Integra it probably would have come to very
different conclusions."
Authorities in support of this doctrine might be multiplied to an
indefinite extent, but those already cited would seem to be amply suf-
ficient. I propose, however, to refer to a few cases emanating from
the Courts of this country. In Towle v. Forney, (4 Kernan, 423) the
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Court of Appeals of New York, per Denio, C. J., said: "Theoreti-
cally the judgments of Courts are only evidence, more or less
authentic, of the law, and not the law itself ; and it is unhappily true
that cases sometimes occur where a prior judgment upon the same
legal question cannot be conscientiously followed after the principle
has received a further and more deliberate examination. The cases,
however, are extremely rare in which the determination of the high-
est appellate Court can be properly departed from, when the same
legal question again arises before a Court of the same government. If
it shall be thought that an erroneous rule has been established by the
adjudication relied on as a precedent, it is better that it should be
changed by the Legislature, by an Act which cannot retrospect, than
that the Courts should overturn what they have themselves established,
and thus disappoint all who have acted upon the rule which had been
considered settled. If this is so where an abstract rule of law,
determined in a prior case, is sought to be applied to new facts, the
reason is stronger where, as in this case, a series of particular acts
has been passed upon and held to produce a given result, and the
same identical facts are again before the Court between other parties.
In such a case, there being no pretense of collusion, and no reason to
impute carelessness or inattention to the Judges, the determination
should be considered final and conclusive upon all persons in interest,
or who may become interested in the question, as well as upon the
parties to the particular action. The present case affords a forcible
illustration of the importance of this doctrine." The same Court, in
Curtis v. Leavitt, (1 Smith, 188) said : " It is quite clear that this
question has never been fully considered by this Court ; but inasmuch
as it has been expressly determined by the Court in two cases, I do
not feel at liberty to disregard the determination, although I believe it
to be erroneous ; for I do not think that the correction of the error
will compensate for the mischief of shaking the stability of the decis-
ions of the Court." The Court adopted the opinion of Sir William
Grant, (18 Ves., 110) that " It is essential to the security of prop-
erty that a rule should be adhered to when settled, whatever doubt
there may be as to the grounds on which it originally stood." The
Supreme Court of Alabama, in Rawls v. Kennedy, (23 Ala., 240)
said : " We have elaborated our views as to the operation of these
7
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statutes more than we should have done, for the reason that it has heen
urged that the question we have discussed is not an open one in this
Court ; that a different construction was given to the Act of 1843, in
the case of Henry v. Thorpe, (14 Ala., 103) and the construction
there given was recognized and affirmed in the later cases of Doe v.
Haskins (15 Ala., 619) and Coxe v. Davis (17 Ala., 716). If this
be so, and the construction thus given was made under such circum-
stances as to give to these cases the force of adjudications upon the
questions here presented, whatever may be our own views as to their
correctness, we should feel bound, from a just regard to the rights of
others who may be supposed to have acquired titles under them, to
adhere to the rules which they have established. The evils arising
from a wrong decision, great as they may be, would, in our opinion,
weigh but little in comparison with the consequences which might ensue
to the community from the establishment of a precedent under which
the most solemn adjudications of this Court, in relation to the titles of
real property, might be questioned and abrogated."
If there is anything in the facts of this case to exempt it from the
operation of the rule laid down by these authorities, I am unable to
see it. It is true, so far as Cohas v. Raisin is concerned, it is admit-
ted that the decision was correct, and upon the mere question of the
validity of a grant made by an American Alcalde, during the military
occupation of the country by the army of the United States, its
authority is not disputed. But the theory of that case was that the
pueblo was the absolute owner of the property, and it cannot be
denied that this theory is entirely subverted and overthrown. It was
this theory which was approved in Touchard v. Touchard, and subse-
quently adopted in Seale v. Mitchell and Welsh v. Sullivan ; and it
is this theory, thus approved and thus adopted, which I think should
not now be overturned. The last two named cases affirmed the iden-
tical title in controversy in this suit, and the public had a right to con-
sider that all questions in relation to its validity were finally and con-
clusively determined. Upon the decision of this case depends the
most important property interests of the wealthiest and most flourish-
ing community in the State, and I am unwilling to do anything, the
effect of which may be to render these interests less secure or less
valuable. No doubt any decision that we could make would be pro-
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ductive of hardship to individuals, but we have reason to apprehend a
less serious result in this respect from adhering to former adjudica-
tions, than from any other course. But, however this maybe, the
stability and uniformity of our decisions, in matters of property, are
of much greater importance than any consideration connected with
the preservation of individual rights.
I will say in conclusion, that if the questions presented in this case
were res Integra, I should have no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion
in accordance with the opinion of my associates ; and as it is import-
ant that some settled rules should exist on these subjects, in any
future case involving the same questions, I shall consider myself
bound by the present determination of the Court.
In my opinion, the judgment of the Court below should be affirmed.
Cope, J.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
inprane fart, %px\ fat, ISM*
S, H. HOLLIDAY, Appellant,
vs.
W. B, FBISBIE, AppeUee.
Opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Field.
This is an action of ejectment to recover possession of certain prem-
ises situated within the city of San Francisco. The premises consti-
tute a portion of the property known as the beach and water lot prop-
erty, granted to the city by the Act of March 26th, 1851. The case
is presented upon an agreed statement of facts, and appears to be an
amicable suit for the purpose of determining the respective rights of
the parties.
The plaintiff claims title to the premises by virtue of a conveyance
executed to him by the President and two members of the Board of
Land Commissioners, created by the Act of May 18th, 1853, provid-
ing for the sale of the interest of the State in the property within the
water line front, as defined by the Act of March 26th, 1851. The
conveyance bears date of the twenty-third of April, 1853, and it is
admitted that, whatever right, title or interest the State possessed in
the premises at that date passed by the conveyance to the plaintiff.
(Laws of 1853, chap. 160, sees. 6 and 8.)
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The defendant claims title to the premises. First—By virtue of a
grant from a Justice of the Peace of the city of San Francisco, bear-
ing date on the nineteenth of December, 1849, and the Act of the
Legislature of May 1st, 1851, confirmatory thereof. Second—By
virtue of a conveyance from the Sheriff of the county of San Fran-
cisco, bearing date on the twenty-third of October, 1851, executed
upon a purchase of the premises at a sale under a judgment and execu-
tion against the city. And third—By virtue of the Ordinance of the
Common Council of the city of San Francisco, for the settlement and
quieting of land titles in the city, passed on the twentieth of June,
1855, commonly known as the Van Ness Ordinance, and the Act of
the Legislature of March 11th, 1858, confirmatory thereof, he being
in possession of the premises on the first of January, 1855.
We shall pass over the defendant's first alleged 'source of title with-
out consideration, as there is no evidence before us that the city ever
complied with the conditions upon which the right of the State to the
beach and water lot property was to be relinquished by the Act of
May 1st, 1851 ; and it is unnecessary, for the determination of the
present case, to express any opinion upon the question whether the
clause in the Act, confirmatory of the grants made by any Justice of
the Peace of the city, is independent of these conditions, and operat-
ive without reference to their performance. Whatever may be the
effect of the clause referred to, its provisions could not, of course,
divest the leasehold interest previously passed to the city.
By the Act of March 26th, 1851, a grant is made to the city of
the use and occupation of the beach and water lots therein described,
with certain specified exceptions, for the period of ninety-nine years,
with a proviso that the city shall pay into the State Treasury, within
twenty days after their receipt, twenty-five per cent, of all moneys
arising in any way from the sale or other disposition of the property.
There has been much discussion as to this proviso and its effect upon
the estate granted. It has been regarded by some members of the
profession as a condition annexed to the grant, and by others as
creating a trust in the city in favor of the State. The plaintiff takes
the latter position ; and as a consequence flowing from it, that the
interest which passed to the city was not subject to sale under execu-
tion.
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The proviso is in no sense a condition annexed to the grant, either
precedent or subsequent. It is not, of course, a condition precedent,
for its requirement presupposes the estate to have vested, and the
right to sell or otherwise dispose of the same to have been exercised.
It is not a conditon subsequent, for the non-performance of which the
estate can be defeated, for by its terms the right of the State to the
per centage, and the obligation of the city to pay the same, can only
arise after the city has parted with the estate and received the consid-
eration.
Nor does the proviso create a trust in the city in favor of the State,
so far as the property itself is concerned ; that is to say, the estate
granted is not, by force of the proviso, held in trust partly for the
benefit of the State. If there be a trust, it is, of course, an express
one, of which grantees and purchasers will be deemed to have notice
;
and in cases of this kind, the rule is settled that the interest of the
cestui que trust cannot be defeated. It is an interest in the property
distinct, it is true, from the legal ownership, but one which can be
enforced in equity. It accompanies the property in all its changes
and transfers until the trust is executed. The trust asserted is to pay
over a certain portion of the proceeds. If this provision does in fact
create a trust, so far as the property itself is concerned, in favor of
the State, then the property is charged with the payment of the per
centage in the hands of the purchaser. Yet it will not be pretended
that the premises, when once sold or disposed of by the city, remain
thus charged. It is not for the grantee or purchaser to see to the
payment of the per centage to the State. That is a duty devolving
upon the city, with the performance of which the grantee or purchaser
has no concern. There is no such interest in the property remaining
in the State, as the existence of the supposed trust would necessarily
imply. The possession of any interest in the property is negatived
by the express terms of the grant ; which terms are absolute, confer-
ring the unconditional right to the use and occupation for ninety-
nine years. The interest which the State reserved is to a portion of
the proceeds arising upon the sale or other disposition of the property,
if any proceeds were received by the city. To a portion of such pro-
ceeds alone could the State ever assert any claim. The obligation
rests upon the city to pay over the per centage, and that is all. If
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there be any trust, then, created by the proviso, it is only a trust in
the one-fourth of the proceeds which the city may receive, amounting,
in fact, only to a covenant on the part of the city, which in no wise
qualifies the grant or affects the legal estate of the city in the prem-
ises.
" Words of proviso and condition," says Parsons, " will be con-
strued into words of covenant, when such is the apparent intention
and meaning of the parties." (Law of Contracts, 2 vol., 23.) In
Clapham v. Moyle, (1 Levinz, 155) a proviso to pay was held to be a
covenant. Clapham conveyed an office to Moyle, provided that Moyle
should pay to Clapham five hundred pounds out of the first profits of the
office. The action was brought in debt for the five hundred pounds,
the plaintiff alleging the conveyance of the office, the receipt by the
defendant of the amount of the profits, and its non-payment. The
defendant demurred, but the Court adjudged that the action was prop-
erly brought on the proviso ; "for this proviso is not by way of condi-
tion or defeasance, but by way of agreement to pay the five hundred
pounds."
The interest of the city in the beach and water lot property is a
legal estate for ninety-nine years. The property is not devoted by
the grant of the State to any specific public purposes, or made subject
to the performance of any trusts by the city. It is held by a very
different tenure from that by which the city holds the lands of the
old pueblo, and which was the subject of elaborate consideration in
Hart v. Burnett, et als., recently decided. Those lands were given
upon express trusts, and are now held, if not upon precisely the same
trusts, yet upon trusts equally effectual to protect them from forced
sale under execution. As to the beach and water lot property, the
case is different. In that property the interest of the city is absolute,
qualified by no conditions and subject to no specific uses. It is, there-
fore, a leviable interest, subject to sale under execution, and such
interest in the premises in controversy passed to the defendant upon
the sale and conveyance under his judgment and execution.
The objection that, if the sale of the city's interest under execu-
tion be sustained, the proviso in the legislative grant will be entirely
defeated, is without force. In Smith v. Morse, (2 Cal. 524) a por-
tion of the property in controversy consisted of a water lot, covered
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by the grant of March 26th, 1851, and whilst it was admitted that
the title to the lot was in the city, so far as the right to sell the prop-
erty was concerned, it was insisted by counsel, as appears from their
briefs on file, (not published in the report of the case) that the inter-
est of the city was not liable to sale under execution, as such sale
would defeat the proviso ; but the Court answered that " the city is
estopped from setting up any rights in the State ; " and that " the
Sheriff merely sold the right, title and interest of the city. And
when the State chooses to assert her right in the premises, it will be
time enough for this Court to determine the character of the title
which the plaintiff acquired." We do not, however, meet the objec-
tion in this way, but rest the answer to it upon the language of the
proviso itself. The proviso does not indicate the manner or time in
which the property shall be disposed of, nor require that any sale or
other disposition shall be made at all. The city may have retained
the whole property, or have leased it for the full term upon the con-
dition of improvement, or parted with its interest in a variety of other
ways without the receipt therefrom of any moneys of which the State
could have claimed a portion. The proviso operates, in fact, only as
a covenant on the part of the city, that if she makes any sale or other
disposition of the property, and realizes from such sale or other dispo-
sition any moneys, twenty-five per cent, of the same shall be paid into
the State Treasury. On the other hand, if the property is disposed
of without the receipt of any moneys by the city, no obligation arises
in favor of the State. Any other construction is not required by the
language or purposes of the Act, and would be accompanied with insur-
mountable difficulties. The legal estate being vested in the city—not
qualified or affected by her covenant—was subject, as we have already
stated, to sale under execution ; and if by reason of such sale a volun-
tary disposition by the city and consequent receipt of moneys, of which
the State could have claimed a portion, became impossible, it was a
result against which the language of the proviso does not protect the
State, and she cannot complain.
Perhaps the per centage upon the sum for which the property sold
under execution might have been claimed by the State, considering
the application of such sum to pay the debt of the city as amounting
virtually to a receipt of the same by the city. It is unnecessary to
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express any opinion upon the point, and we only allude to it because it
is admitted in the present case that an amount equal to the per centage
of the sum for which the premises in controversy were sold was
actually paid by the city to the State, though not until the year 1853.
But were we less clear than we are, as to the liability of the city
in the beach and water lot property to sale under execution, we should
not depart from the decision made in Smith v. Morse, which expressly
asserts the right of a judgment creditor to subject this interest to sale,
after full and elaborate argument upon the point. Upon the faith of
that decision, improvements have been made by the purchasers, or
parties claiming under them, to the value of millions, and by no act
of ours will the title of such purchasers and parties ever be disturbed.
It is true, that the case of Smith v. Morse was a controversy between
a purchaser at Sheriff's sale and the Commissioners under the Act of
May 1st, 1851, authorizing the funding of the floating debt of the city,
the latter claiming that the interest of the city had passed to them by
a conveyance from the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. Our
decision, therefore, in the present case, is made without reference to
any rights which those Commissioners may pass. They are not parties
to this suit, and their rights are not involved, and it would, therefore,
be improper to express or intimate any opinion in relation to them.
But independent of all considerations of the title derived from the
sale and conveyance of the Sheriff, the defendant can successfully
resist a recovery by the plaintiff by force of the title vested in him
under the Van Ness Ordinance. That ordinance was passed by the
Common Council of the city on the 20th of June, 1855, and was rati-
fied and confirmed by the same body by an ordinance passed on the
27th of September, 1855. On the 11th of March, 1858, these ordi-
nances were ratified and confirmed by an Act of the Legislature.
The first section of the ordinance appears to have been framed upon
the supposition that the land within the corporate limits of the city,
above the natural high water mark of the bay of San Francisco, might
have been public property of the General Government, and provides
for an entry of the same at the proper Land Office of the United States.
The second section of the ordinance, however, is of a very different
character. That section embraces all the lands within the corporate
limits, including the beach and water lot property, and was framed
LAND TITLES IK SAN FRANCISCO. 10T
Holliday vs. Frisbie.
upon the supposition that the city possessed some title or interest in
them, and, by its provisions, she relinquishes and grants all her title
and claim thereto, with certain exceptions, to the parties in the actual
possession thereof, by themselves or tenants, on or before the 1st of
January, 1855, provided such possession was continued up to the time
of the introduction of the ordinance in the Common Council ; or, if
interrupted by an intruder or trespasser, had been or might be recov-
ered by legal process. The ordinance then proceeds to designate cer-
tain parties who shall be deemed to have been in possession. It is
unnecessary to specify the parties thus designated, as the designation
has no bearing upon the position of the defendant. It is admitted
that he was in the possession of the premises in controversy on the 1st
of January, 1855, and has continued in such possession ever since.
If, therefore, the city held at that date any interest in the premises,
such interest was transferred to and vested in the defendant, by the
operation of this ordinance and the legislative confirmation thereof.
Whatever question may be raised as to the liability of her interest to
forced sale, there can be none as to the validity and effect of her vol-
untary grant of the same, after such grant has received the approval
and ratification of the Legislature.
The interest of the plaintiff in the premises derived from the con-
veyance of the Commissioners under the Act of May 18, 1858, is only
to the reversion after the ninety-nine years designated in the Act of
March 26, 1851.
Judgment affirmed. Field, C. J.
I concur
:
Baldwin, J.
I concur in the judgment of affirmance, and in the opinion of the
Chief Justice, except that I do not draw any distinction between the
leviable character of the beach and water lot property and the lands
of the old pueblo, being in this respect, governed by previous decisions
of the Court. Cope, J.
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NOTE 1
EXTRACTS FROM THE LAWS OF THE INDIES, 1680.
BOOK IV, TITLE V.
OF TOWNS.
Law I relates to the character of land to be selected for a town ; Law II requires
that the site shall be easy of approach, and capable of defense ; Law III regulates the
use to be made of the voluntary labor of Indians, in establishing towns ; Law IV pro-
vides for the payment of officers ; and Law V directs that settlers, who are unmarried,
be persuaded to marry.
LAW VI.
"If the character of the land should be suitable for establishing a town of Spaniards,
with a council of ordinary Alcaldes and Regidores, and any person should offer to
contract for founding it, the agreement shall be made on these terms : That within the
time specified, it shall have at least thirty residents ; each one to have a house, ten breed-
ing cows, four oxen, or two oxen and two steers, one breeding mare, one sow, twenty
Spanish ewes, six hens, and a cock. He will also appoint a clerigo, to administer the
Holy Sacrament, who, at first, shall be of his own election, and afterwards to be elected
in conformity with our royal patronasgo ; and he shall provide the church with orna-
ments, and things necessary for Divine worship ; and he shall give security that he
will do so within the time specified ; and if he fail to comply with his obligations, he
shall lose what he may have built, cultivated, or farmed, which we apply to our royal
patrimony ; and besides, he shall incur a penalty of one thousand ounces of gold, for
our treasury ; and if he shall comply with his obligations, let there be given to him
four leagues of boundary and territory, in a square or prolonged form, according to
the quality of the land, so that, when surveyed, there shall be four square leagues ; with
the condition, that the boundaries of said territory be at least five leagues distant from
any city, town, or village of Spaniards, previously established ; and that there be no
injury done to any Pueblo of Indians, nor to any private individual."
LAW VII.
" If any one should propose to contract for founding a new town, in the prescribed
form, for more or less than thirty residents, if not less than ten, let there be granted to
him a proportionate boundary and territory, and upon the same conditions."
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" "Whenever any private individuals shall unite for the purpose of forming a new-
town, and there be a sufficient number of married men for that purpose, let permission
be given to them, provided there be not less than ten married men ; and let there be
granted to them boundary and territory, proportioned as aforesaid ; and we give them
authority to elect, annually, among themselves, ordinary Alcaldes, and officers of the
council."
NOTE 2.
SPECIAL LAWS AND ORDERS, PRIOR TO 1789.
In the instructions of the Viceroy, dated November 12th, 1770; to the commandant
at Monterey, directions are given for the formation of " Mission Towns," (Pueblos de
Mission) and particularly at the Port of San Francisco, " in order that a place so im-
portant may not remain exposed to foreign occupation."
The Royal Regulations of September 10th, 1772, for the frontier Presidios of New
Spain, contain minute instructions for the government of these establishments. Title
XI directs, that individuals and families be induced to settle in the vicinity of each
Presidio, for the purpose of building up a town ; and that captains and commandants
of these military posts, grant to such settlers, building lots, !"and lands for cultivation.
In these grants, preference was to be given to the soldiers who had served out their
enlistment.
The present towns of Altar, Tubac, Fronteras, Janos, Paso del Norte, Goliad, San
Antonio de Bejar, &c, in Texas and New Mexico, and of Loreto, San Diego, Santa
Barbara, Monterey, and San Francisco, in California, were first established in this man-
ner, and are the legitimate results of these regulations.
The following extracts from the Instructions of the Viceroy to the commandant of
the " new establishments of San Diego and Monterey," that is, of Upper California,
dated August 17th, 1773, relate, more particularly, to the organization of Pueblos :
"Article 12. With the desire to establish population more speedily in the new
establishments, I, for the present, grant the commandant the power to designate com-
mon lands ; and also, to distribute lands in private, to such Indians as may most
dedicate themselves to agriculture, and the breeding of cattle ; for, having property of
their own, the love of it will cause them to radicate themselves more firmly ; but the
commandant must bear in mind, that it is very desirable not to allow them to live dis-
persed—each one on the land given to them—but they must, necessarily, have their
house and habitation in the Pueblo or Mission, where they have been established, or
settled.
Article 13. I grant the same power to the commandant, with respect to distribut-
ing lands to the other founders, (pobladores) according to their merit, and means of
labor ; they, also, living in the town, and not dispersed ; declaring that in the practice
of what is prescribed in this article, and the preceding, 12th, he must act in every
respect in conformity with the provisions made in the collection of the laws respecting
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newly acquired countries and towns
;
(reducciones y poblaciones) granting them legal
titles, for the owners' protection, without exacting any remuneration for it, or for the
act of possession.
"Article 14. The commandant must be carefully attentive that the founders who
go to the new establishments, have the requisite arms for their defense, and for assisting
the garrisons of the Presidios or Missions, in case of necessity ; binding them to this
obligation, as a thing necessary for their own safety, and that of all their neighbors.
"Article 15. When it becomes expedient to change any Mission into a Pueblo,
the commandant will proceed to reduce it to the civil and economical government,
which, according to the laws, is observed in the other pueblos of this kingdom
;
giving
it a name, and declaring for its patron, the saint under whose auspices, and venerable
protection, the mission was founded.
"Article 18. The commandant shall, in every thing, proceed with the under-
standing that the object of the new establishments is for the advancement of the
spiritual conquest, hence, the extension of the dominions of the king ; and, in as much
as the Port of San Francisco, already examined, requires further investigation, the
commandant shall, at once, give the necessary orders for that purpose, in order to as-
certain, concurrently with the Father President, whether it is possible to establish any
mission at that place."
It appears from official documents, and from Palou's Life of Junipero Serra, that
measures were soon after taken to explore the bay of San Francisco ; that a reconais-
ance was made by the vessel called " San Carlos," and a most favorable report made
by the commander, respecting its character as a harbor, and its commercial importance.
There are still preserved, a number of letters from the Viceroy to different persons in
California, urging upon them the importance of occupying the Port of San Francisco.
In 1775, a military expedition, under Lieut. Col. Anza, was sent from Sonora, to rein-
force the troops in California, and to conduct a party of pobladores, who were to assist
in forming towns at the several .Presidios, and especially at the Port of San Francisco.
This party was accompanied by Father Pedro Font, who kept a journal of the expedi-
tion. They started on the 29th of September, 1775, and reached the entrance to the
bay of San Francisco, on the 27th day of March, 1776. Father Font gives a glowing
account of the bay, which he calls "the port of ports;" and says they went upon a
clear, table land, near the entrance, about half a league wide, and a little more in length,
with a gradual slope towards the bay. " This table land," he continues, "was desig.
nated, by the commandant, for the site of the new town and fort, which were about to
be established in this port." On the 13th of April, he started on his return to Sonora,
from the Mission of Carmelo, stopping at Monterey, to ascertain " how many of the
people who had come along with us in the expedition, had remained in Monterey, des-
tined for the new town and fort of the Port of San Francisco." Although the list was
not yet completed, he found that the number so remaining, was one hundred and ninety-
three souls.
Various delays occurred in carrying out this intention, and the Presidio of San
Francisco was not founded until the following September, and the Mission of the same
name, in October, 1776.
Governor Neve's Regulations for the Government of the Californias, are dated Jtine
1st, 1779, and were approved by the King, October 24th, 1781. It is stated in the
preamble, that one of its objects was, to encourage settlers
(
pobladores) to come to.
California, for the purpose of establishing settlements, and pueblos, under the protec-
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tion of, and connected with, the Presidios and Missions. Consequently, arrangements
were made for supplying such pobladores, for a time, with money, provisions, and
clothing. These matters are, also, set forth in Titles I and II, and at the end of the
latter, an estimate is made for pobladores, at the Presidio of San Prancisco ; each one
being allowed, for the first two years, pay and rations, and for the next three years,
only a ration. Art. 23, of Title XIII, makes it the duty of the paymaster of the Pre-
sidio in the vicinity, or in the boundaries of which a new pueblo of civilized people
[Pueblo de gente de razon) was to be established, to form a registry, and open an
account with the pobladores, crediting each with the amount of his allowance, and
charging him with the outfit, implements, and cattle, with which he had been supplied
in Sonora, or had received from other Presidios. The subsequent articles of this Title,
direct, with great minuteness, the manner of keeping these registries, and accounts of
supplies issued to such pobladores.
Title XIV relates, exclusively, to the formation and government of new towns, and
consists of eighteen Articles, of which the following is a brief synopsis
:
Article 1 states, that in order to reduce and settle California, it had been determined
to erect pueblos of white people (Pueblos de gente de razon). With this idea, the Pue-
blo of San Jose had been formed, and colonists and their families were expected from
Sinaloa and Sonora, for establishing others.
Articles 2 and 3 provide the pay, rations, agricultural implements, cattle, &c, which
were to be given to the pobladores, as soon as they took possession of the solares y suertes
de tierra, which were to be assigned them in each pueblo.
Article 4 provides for the granting of solares, according to the laws of the Kingdom
;
and that ejidos and propios be designated for each pueblo.
Article 5 provides for the distribution of suertes, for cultivation, to the first founders,
and to those who should afterwards come, to settle.
Articles 6 and 7 provide that the solares and suertes given to the pobladores, shall be
perpetually hereditary to their children; but that they shall not be subject to entail,
mortgage, &c.
Articles 8 to 14 give minute instructions respecting the management and care of the.
stock, &c. ; the amount each was required to possess at the end of five years
;
prohibit-
ing the sale of breeding animals, &e.
Articles 15 and 16 provide that the pobladores shall re-pay the advances made to them,
by supplying grain, at fixed prices, for government purposes ; and that they shall keep
themselves armed and equipped for military service, in the defense of their respective
districts.
"Article 17. The corresponding titles to house-lots, lands, and waters, granted
to the new pobladores, or which may be hereafter granted to other residents, shall be
made out by the Governor, or commissary whom he may appoint for this purpose
records of which, and of the respective branding-irons, must be kept in the general town
book, to be made and kept in the government archives ; as a heading to which, a copy
of these instructions shall be placed.
"Article 18. And whereas, it is expedient for the good government and police of
the pueblos, the administration of justice, the direction of public works, the distribution
of water privileges, and the carrying into effect the orders given in these instructions,
that they should be furnished with ordinary Alcaldes, and other municipal officers, in
proportion to the number of inhabitants ; the Governor shall appoint such, for the first
two years ; and for the following ones, they shall appoint some one from amongst
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themselves, to the municipal offices which may have been established ; which elections
are to be forwarded to the Governor, for his approbation ; who, if he sees fit, may con-
tinue said appointment for the three following years."
The following is the order of the Commandant General, to the Governor of Califor-
nia, June 21st, 1786, and the accompanying opinion of Navarro :
"Honorable Commandant General : In the instructions which treat of the political
government, and population of California, and are found inserted in Title XIV, of the
Regulation for that Peninsula, approved by His Majesty, in a royal order of the 24th
of October, 1781, it is directed by Article 8, that the new settlers shall enjoy, for the
maintenance of their stock, the common advantage of waters and pastures, wood and
timber, of the commons, forests, and pasture-grounds, which, in compliance with the
laws, are to be marked out for every "Pueblo ;" and that, besides, each individual shall
privately enjoy the pastures of his own lands, with the warning, that each settler, here-
after, will not exceed fifty head of cattle of each kind, in his possession ; so that, in
this manner, the usefulness resulting from the stock may be distributed among all, and
the true wealth of the pueblos not confined in a few residents.
"By the 5th law, and the consecutive ones of Title XVII, Lib. 4, of the " Recopi-
lacion " for these territories, it is commanded that the use of the pastures, woods, and
waters of the Provinces of the Indies, be common to all the residents thereof, that they
may enjoy them freely with their cattle ; revoking, when necessary, whatsoever ordi-
nances there might exist ; this provision to apply, not only to the woods, pastures, and
waters of the " Seignories," (Lugares de Senorios) conceded in these territories, but also
to lands and cultivated property, sold and granted, whereon, after the harvest, the pas-
tures remain for common benefit.
"The allotting of tracts of land (sitios) for cattle, which some settlers in California
claim, and the Governor proposes, in his official communication of the 20th of Novem-
ber, 1784, cannot, nor ought not to be made to them, within the boundaries assigned to
each pueblo ; which, in conformity with the Law VI, Title V, Lib. 4, of the " Recopila-
cion," must be four leagues of land, in a square or oblong body, according to the nature of
the ground ; because the petition of the new settlers would tend to make them private
owners of the forests, pastures, water, timber, wood, and other advantages of the lands
which may be assigned, granted, and distributed to them, and to deprive then- neighbors
of these benefits ; it is seen, at once, that their claim is entirely contrary to the directions
of the forementioncd laws, and the express provision in Article 8, of the Instructions for
setltements (Poblaciones) in the Californias ; according to which, all the waters, pastures,
wood, and timber, within the limits which, in conformity to the law, may be allotted to
each pueblo, must be for the common advantage, so that all the new settlers may enjoy
and partake of them ; maintaining thereon their cattle, and participating of the other
benefits that might be produced.
" By the Law 1st, and consecutive ones, to the 13th, Title XII, of the same, Book 4,
the distributing and allotting of Peonias, Cavalerias, and Sitios, for tracts " de Ganados
Mayores y menores," is permitted; provided they be given far from the Indian villages,
and their cultivated fields ; obliging the owners to keep as many shepherds, and cattle-
herds, as shall be sufficient to prevent such damages as the cattle might commit, and to
satisfy for that which they might cause them ; and the concession of the said lands
being very useful for the protection of the population in California, where, owing to the
extent of land, and the abundance of its pastures, there are means of carrying it into
effect, without prejudice to the Indians, or to a third party, and where, through the want
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of active commerce, and of consumption and export of the other produce, the greater
wealth of the pueblos must, necessarily, consist in the rearing and the increase of cattle
;
for these reasons, it seems to me your honor can, if you please, decree and command
that an order be issued to the Governor of the Californias, Don Pedro Pages, to the
effect, that allotting at once, to each new " poblacion," the extent of the four leagues
belonging thereto ; he may measure and mark them out in a square or prolonged body,
as the nature of the ground will admit ; and that he do not concede within it, nor grant,
nor distribute any portion whatsoever for farms, or for the rearing of cattle, to any res-
ident or settler ; the,woods, pastures, waters, and other benefits and advantages to be
left in common for all the residents and settlers, without any of them exercising domin-
ion, or owning private property thereon ; and that in the other lands, outside of the
said limits, and of the district assigned to each pueblo, and at such a distance that there
cannot result any injury to the Missions, Pueblos, or Rancherias, nor to their fields, he do
grant and distribute " sitios " for farms, and tracts for rearing cattle ; with the express
condition, that the residents and settlers to whom he may grant them, shall obligate
themselves to put as many shepherds and cattle-herds as will be sufficient to prevent
damage, and to satisfy the amount which, in any event, may happen ; and ("with the
condition) that no resident or settler shall have more than three "sitios" tracts; and
be obliged to build in each one a stone house ; to have thereon two thousand head of cat-
tle, at least ; and that, notwithstanding his grant and concession, the pasture shall
remain for the common advantage ; and that where there are no herds of cattle, " sitios "
may be given for sugar plantations, and other hereditaments, according as is directed
by the Laws 12, Title XII, as in reference to Hispaniola Island ; and in Law 5, Title
XVII, Lib 4, of the "Recopilacion" for these territories; which conditions and laws
will be inserted in an express clause in the deeds of grants that may be made, that as
evidence for the residents and settlers who may obtain the same, they may comprehend
their obligations, to the fulfillment of which they shall be obliged ; and that they may
not have any just motive, nor pretext, to allege any right against it hereafter; or your
honor will resolve, otherwise, what may suit your pleasure, notwithstanding.
" Chihuahua, 27th October, 1785. Galindo Navarro.
"A copy, according to the original, which I certify.
" Chihuahua, 21st June, 1786. Pedro Garrido y Duran.
" I transmit to you the enclosed opinion of the Attorney of this Commandancy, of
the 27th of October, last year, upon the subject of marking out the lands which some
individuals of that province asked, as you reported in your representation No. 204, of
the 20th of November, '84 ; that you may proceed to grant them, agreeably to the re-
quirements of said officer {ministro)
.
" The Lord preserve you many years.
" Chihuahua, 21st June, 1786. Jacobo Ugarte t Loyola.
" Sr. Don Pedro Pages."
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NOTE 3.
FROM 1789 TO 18 24
The Plan' of Pitic, referred to by the Court, is dated Chihuahua, November 14th,
1789. Its preamble states that it had been approved by His Majesty, and ordered to be
adopted for the other projected new towns in that general commandancy. It consists
of twenty-four Articles, and refers to the Laws of the Partidas, as giving to the new
pueblo, when formed, a right to four square leagues of land ; and to the Laws of the
Recopilacion, as regulating the organization of its Ayuntamiento. Articles 6 and 7 are
as follows :
"Article 6. The tract of four square leagues, granted to the new settlements, be-
ing measured and marked, its pastos, monies, &c, shall be for the common benefit of
the Spaniards and Indians residing therein, and in its suburb, or village of the " Seris,"&c.
"Article 7. The residents and natives shall equally enjoy the woods, pastures,
water-privileges, and other advantages of the royal and vacant lands that may be out-
side of the new town, in common with the residents and natives of the adjoining and
neighboring pueblos : which bounty and privilege shall continue so long as they are not
changed or altered by His Majesty," &c.
An officer is appointed to mark out the boundaries of the town, and to divide up the
land into ejidos, pastos, suertes, &c, and to designate those which were to be used as
propios. Provisions are also made for the government of the town, the manner of
keeping its records, the jurisdiction of the Alcaldes, the election of the Ayuntamiento,
&c. ; but it nowhere contains any special grant of land, nor is any such grant contem-
plated. But the right of the town to four square leagues, is referred to in Articles 1
and 2, as being derived from the Laws of the Indies ; and it seems to have been con-
sidered that that right resulted ipso facto from the foundation of the town, and the
organization of its municipality.
The following is the order of the Commandant General to the Governor of California,
respecting the lands to be assigned in each Presidio, for grant to the settlers of the new
pueblos, which were to be formed under their protection :
" In conformity with the report of the Assessor of this General Commandancy, I
have determined, by decree of this day, that notwithstanding the provisions of the 81st
Article of the Ordinance of Yntendentes, it belongs to the Captains of the Presidios to
grant and distribute building lots, and lands to the soldiers and residents who shall
solicit them, for the establishing thereupon their residences.
" Considering the extent of four common leagues sufficient for the settlements that
are being made under their protection, measured from the center of the plaza of the
Presidio, two leagues in every direction ; I also have determined, for the purpose of
preventing questions and appeals, in future, that the captains henceforth be restricted
in the making of grants of lots and lands, to those which are embraced within the said
four leagues, without exceeding them in any manner whatever ; leaving free and expe-
dita the special jurisdiction which belongs to the Yntendentes of the public treasury, for
the sale, composition, and distribution of the remainder of their respective districts.
" You will transmit this order to the captains and commanders of the Presidio3 of
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this province, for its observance and fulfillment, notifying me ofyour compliance herewith.
" God preserve you many years.
" Chihuahua, 22d October, 1791. Pedro de Nava.
" To Sr. Don Joseph Antonio Bometx."
The law of May 23d, 1812, for the formation of Ayuntamientos of Pueblos, is
composed of thirteen sections. The preamble sets forth the object of the law to be,
the securing of the prosperity of the nation, by the immediate establishment of Ayun-
tamientos in those pueblos which have not heretofore had them.
" Article 1 . Any pueblo which has no Ayuntamiento, and a population of less than
one thousand souls ; and which, by its particular circumstances of agriculture, industry,
or population, considers that it ought to have an Ayuntamiento, will apply to the
Deputation of the Province, in order that, in virtue of its report, the proper measures
may be taken by the Executive."
This law also determines the number of members of the Ayuntamientos, according
to the population, from below two hundred, to ten thousand, and upwards ; it also pro-
vides for the primary and secondary elections for such municipal officers.
The law of July 10th, 1812, provides for the cessation of perpetual Begidores, in
places where such exist, in order that the previous law of May 23d, may be fully car-
ried into effect.
The law of October 9th, 1812, is divided into four chapters, and each chapter into
articles. Chapter second provides for the administration of justice in the several partidos
into which a province might be divided by its Deputation ; each partido to have a Judge
Letrado. Where the population of a partido was small, adjacent pueblos might be
annexed to it, for judicial purposes. The Judges of Partido were to hold their office
for the term of six years, or more. In case of absence, sickness, or death, their place
was to be filled by the First Alcalde of the pueblo of their residence, or of any other
pueblo, if better qualified. The political chief was to fill all vacancies, and report to
the superior authorities.
Chapter third relates to Alcaldes of Pueblos, who were to hold courts of conciliation,
and have certain local jurisdiction in their respective pueblos. They were, also, to ex-
ercise such executive, fiscal, and police powers, in their pueblos, as had previously been
exercised by the Alcaldes ordinarios, subject to the provisions of the constitution. In
these matters, they were to be entirely independent of the Judges of Partido.
Chapter fourth relates to the administration of justice, prior to the formation of
partidos.
This law was evidently intended to provide, fully, for the administration of justice*
civil and criminal, in pueblos and partidos ; but it gives no jurisdiction, whatever, to
Ayuntamientos.
The law of January 4th, 1813, provides for reducing vacant and common lands to
private ownership. Article 1 directs that all the vacant and municipal lands, (terrenos
de propios y arbitrios) except the commons necessary for the pueblos, (escepto los ejidos
necessarios a los pueblos) be reduced to private ownership ; and Article 2 declares that
the lands so distributed, shall be in full ownership (en plena propiedad). In making
these grants, the domiciled residents of the pueblos, (los vecinos de los jmeblos) were to
be preferred. The documents of these grants were to be made by the Ayuntamientos,
and submitted to the Deputations.
The law of June 23d, 1813, defines the general duties of Ayuntamientos of Pueblos,
and makes the First Alcalde the executive officer of that body. The First Alcalde of
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the pueblo, which is the cabeza of a partido, is required to circulate all orders to the
other pueblos of the partido, and is made the medium of communication between them
and the political chief. It defines many of the duties of Ayuntamientos, with respect
to the government of their respective pueblos ; and, finally, provides that they are to
perform such other duties as may be imposed on them by the laws, regulations, and
municipal ordinances.
NOTE 4
FROM 1824 TO THE FOUNDATION OF THE PUEBLO OF
SAN FRANCISCO, 1834.
On the 18th of August, 1824, the Congress of Mexico passed what is called the
General Colonization Law. The second section of that law says, distinctly, that it
does not apply to lands " pertaining to any corporation, or pueblo ;" and the sixteenth
section confers upon the Executive, power to colonize " the Territories of the Republic."
In 1825, a commission, or Junta, was assembled in the City of Mexico, to draw up
plans for the government and colonization of the Territories. Their reports were pub-
lished in 1827, and formed the basis of the Executive Regulation, which was issued on
the 21st of November, 1828. These reports are of the highest interest, and will be
referred to in another Note. The plans of the Junta were not adopted, in toto, because
they required new legislation, by Congress. The seventeenth section of the Regulation
of 1828, is as follows :
" Section 17. In the Territories where there are Missions, the lands which they
occupy cannot be colonized, at present, and until it shall be determined whether they
ought to be considered as property of the settlements of converted Indians, and Mexi-
can residents."
August 17th, 1833, Congress passed a law, directing the secularization of the Mis-
sions of Upper and Lower California. On the 9th of August, 1834, Governor Eigueroa
published the Provisional Regulations, which had, previously, been passed by the
Territorial Deputation. The following extracts from this law, relate to. pueblos :
"Article 1. The Governor, agreeable to the spirit of the law of August 17th,
1833, and to the instructions which he has received from the Supreme Executive, will,
with the co-operation of the prelates of the missionary priests, partially convert into
pueblos the missions of this territory, beginning in the next month of August, and
commencing at first with ten missions, and afterwards with the remainder."
" Article 5. To every individual head of a family, and to all over twenty-one
years of age, although they have no family, a lot of land, irrigable or otherwise, not
exceeding four hundred varas square, nor less than one hundred, shall be given out of
the common lands of the missions, and in community a sufficient quantity of land
shall be allotted to them for watering their cattle. Common lands (ejidos) shall be
assigned to each pueblo, and, when convenient, propios also."
" Article 14." The political government of tfee pueblos shall be organized in per-
fect conformity with the existing laws ; the Governor will give the necessary instruc-
tions to have Ayuntamientos established and elections held."
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"Article 15. The economical government of the pueblos shall be under the
charge of the Ayuntamientos ; but as far as regards the administration of justice in
contentious matters, they will be subject to the primary judges of the nearest towns
constitutionally established."
Various other orders and regulations were subsequently issued for the same object,
and conforming generally to the principles of this act. But, without pursuing this
matter further, let us recur to the proceedings relating to the formation of pueblos from
presidios.
It appears from the archives that the presidios of Monterey and Santa Barbara
were, under an order of the Governor, dated December 15th, 1826, changed into
pueblos in 1827, and that the Ayuntamiento of the former, consisting of one Alcalde,
two Regidores and a Sindico-Procurador, was installed on the nineteenth of April of
that year. A dispute soon afterwards arose between this Alcalde and the Military
Commandant respecting the powers and jurisdiction of the former as judge of the
partido. The Governor's official letter on this dispute, dated April 22d, 1828, recog-
nizes Monterey as a pueblo, and discusses the judicial powers of the Alcalde of that
pueblo over the partido, of which Monterey was then the head. It also appears from
the proceedings of the Deputation on the twenty-fourth of July, 1830, that the demar-
cation of the lands of the pueblo of Monterey, made by Castro, the Alcalde, was
approved. Subsequently, and at the same session, a discussion took place as to the
limits of the partido of which that pueblo was to be the cabecera.
On the 22d of October, 1833, the people of the presidio of San Diego sent to the
Governor a long communication, asking for the organization of an Ayuntamiento in
that place. This communication and others relating to Santa Barbara, Los Angeles
and Monterey, were laid before the Deputation, upon which there were numerous pro-
ceedings and reports, all of which serve to illustrate this question of the organization
of pueblos in California. The power of the Governor and Deputation to organize
such pueblos was discussed, and admitted by all to be amply sufficient. The Governor
was of opinion that the previous organization of Santa Barbara was not effected in
entire conformity with law, and that the number of Alcaldes and Regidores in that
place, and also in Monterey and Los Angeles, ought to be increased, as the law allowed
a larger number ; and inasmuch as these Alcaldes exercised judicial powers over large
sections of country, there ought to be at least two to each pueblo. He says, with
respect to Los Angeles especially, that inasmuch as the " pueblo of San Juan Capis-
trano " had been added to the jurisdiction of that officer, the one Alcalde could not
properly perforin the duties of the office. On the 2d of August, 1834, this matter
was finally settled by organizing an Ayuntamiento at San Diego, to be composed of
one Alcalde, two Regidores and one Sindico-Procurador, and re-organizing the Ayun-
tamiento of Santa Barbara, to consist of one Alcalde, four Regidores and one Sindico-
Procurador : and also by adding one Alcalde and two Regidores to each of the Ayun-
tamientos of Los Angeles and Monterey. The new officers were to enter upon their
duties on the first of January, 1835. Other proceedings were soon after had by the
Deputation with respect to pueblos, and especially with respect to organizing new ones
at Sonoma and other places, and marking out their boundaries. The law of August
4th is referred to elsewhere. On the 3d of November that body passed the following :
" 1st. The Political Chief will direct the partido of San Francisco to proceed to the
election of an Ayuntamiento constitutional, which shall reside in the presidio of that
name, composed of one Alcalde, two Regidores and one Sindico-Procurador, it being
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conducted in all respects according to the existing constitution and law of June 12th,
1830.
"2d. That a report be made, in the usual way, to the Supreme Executive, for the
due approbation."
The next day, November 4th, 1834, Governor Figueroa transmitted a copy of this
Act to M. G. Vallejo, the "Military Commandant of San Francisco," saying: "And
I transcribe it to you, for your information and compliance, recommending that the
election be carried into effect on the day appointed by the said law of June 12th.
" I also notify you that the Ayuntamiento, when installed, will exercise the political
functions with which you have been charged ; and the Alcalde, the judicial functions
which the laws, for want of a Judge Letrado, confer on him
;
you remaining restricted
to the military command, alone ; and receiving, in anticipation, the thanks due for the
prudence and exactness with which you have carried on the political government of
that demarcation."
There is nothing in the particular Act for the organization of the Ayuntamiento of
San Francisco, respecting the demarcation of pueblo boundaries ; but, as that subject
was involved in the proceedings of the Deputation, in relation to Sonoma, and other
places, which preceded these resolutions respecting San Francisco, the Governor might,
very properly, have considered those resolutions as authorizing him to direct the desig-
nation of boundaries to this and other pueblos. He may, therefore, have assumed, and
so stated, that the Deputation had approved, or had ordered, the marking out of the
limits of that municipality, as sworn to by Vallejo, and as stated in Wheeler's Land
Titles ; although Wheeler's quotation is erroneous ; and, except the Zomorano letter,
we have not found anything in the Archives, confirmatory of the alleged fact, that
Figueroa did make such official statement. But, as sworn to by Mr. Clar, keeper of
the Archives, the greater portion of Figueroa's correspondence has been lost ; conse-
quently, there is no means of ascertaining the correctness of Wheeler's statement, and
Vallejo's deposition.
The official returns show that an election was held at the Presidio, in the commandant's
house, on the 7th day of December, 1834, for electors ; and that, on the following Sun-
day, these electors proceeded to choose the members of the Ayuntamiento of the new
pueblo ; who were to enter upon the duties of their respective offices, on the first of
January, 1835.
It is seen by this brief summary of these documents, that they fully sustain the posi-
tion of the court. It will be noticed, that in all these documents, the distinction
between a pueblo and partido, is observed ; and also, between the powers of the Ayun-
tamiento, and the jurisdiction of its Alcalde. Moreover, in organizing these pueblos,
not the slightest allusion is made to the necessity of a special grant of land. Monterey
.
was surveyed out, and its limits defined by metes and bounds, but there was no act of
grant for the lands within such boundaries. The same may be said of other pueblos
in California.
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NOTE 5.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE PUEBLO
OF SAN FRANCISCO, FROM THE END OF 1834,
TO JULY 7th, 1846.
The following synopsis of original papers, of undoubted authenticity, from the
Archives, City Claim, Limantour case, &c, will serve to prove, if further evidence be
required, the correctness of the opinion of the court, on this, and some other points.
January 31st, 1835, Governor Figueroa writes to M. G. Vallejo, Military Command-
ant of San Francisco, acknowledging the receipt of a letter from the latter, dated Jan-
uary 1st, and thanking him for having constitutionally installed "the Ayuntamiento of
that pueblo" [el Ayuntamiento de ese pueblo).
June 22d, 1835, Governor Figueroa sends a circular to the Military Commandant
and Alcalde of San Francisco. This is endorsed by the Alcalde, Francisco de Haro, as
having been received and published by him, in " San Francisco de Asis, July 12th,
1835." It will be seen from this, that even at that early day—the first year of the
formation of the pueblo, and organization of the Ayuntamiento, at the Presidio—it was
called by the official authorities, without distinction, " San Francisco," and " San Fran-
cisco de Asis."
Soon after this, Jose Joaquin Estudillo applied for a grant of two hundred varas, in
the place called Yerba Buena. This application was for a larger amount of land than
that designated for house lots, and, consequently, the matter was referred to the Terri-
torial Deputation. On the 22d of September, that body, on motion of Alvarado,
resolved, generally, that the Ayuntamiento of San Francisco had authority to grant
solares in the place of Yerba Buena, at a distance of two hundred varas from the beach.
September 23d, 1835, Governor Castro transmitted to the "Alcalde Constitutional
of San Francisco," a copy of the foregoing resolution of the Territorial Deputation,
with respect to the power of " the Ayuntamiento of San Francisco " to grant lots two
hundred varas distant from the sea shore, " in the place called Yerba Buena."
October 28th, he addresses another official letter to the " Alcalde of San Fran-
cisco de Asis," containing a brief statement of the substance of the resolution of
September 22d, and directing him to inform the residents of " that pueblo " not to
apply to the political chief for lots, " as it is one of the favors which the Ayuntamiento
can grant." For these grants, a canon was to be paid to the Ayuntamiento.
There is filed in the city claim, a certified copy, from the Archives, of an old expedi-
ente, which contains several important papers. It begins with a petition to the Gefe
Politico, dated May 30th, 1835, and purporting to be signed by residents of the ranchos
of San Pablo, &c, asking to be separated from the "jurisdiction of the Port of San
Francisco," and annexed to that of San Jose. They allege, as reasons for the proposed
change, the distance, the difficulty and danger of crossing the bay, and the want of ac-
commodations for themselves and families, at the Presidio, " for a whole year, when
they shall be called upon to discharge some office in the Ayuntamiento," &c. This
petition was, by the Territorial Deputation, on the 5th of September, 1835, ordered to
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be referred to the " Ayuntamientos of the Pueblos of San Jose and San Francisco," for
reports ; and the Governor so referred it, on the 28th of September. November 4th,
the Ayuntamiento of San Jose reports in favor of the petition, with the remark, that
the petitioners had previously pertained to that jurisdiction. December 20th, the
" Ayuntamiento of San Francisco " reports against the petition, denying the genuineness
of the signatures to it, and the correctness of its statements. With respect to the want of
accommodations at tbe Presidio, it says, " it is a well known and established fact, that
the military commandant of the Presidio furnished houses to the functionaries of the
present Ayuntamiento, as soon as it was installed." This report is dated, " Port of
San Francisco," and is signed by the Alcalde, Francisco de Haro, and the Secretary,
Francisco Sanchez.
1836, January 2d, Governor Castro directs a communication to the "Illustrious
Ayuntamiento of San Francisco de Asis," informing it that he had transferred the
political government of the Territory to General Nicolas Gutierrez. On the same day,
Gutierrez directs a communication to the " Illustrious Ayuntamiento of San Fran-
cisco," informing that body that he had been placed in possession of the political
government of the Territory.
1836, January 22d, the Alcalde, Jose Joaquin Estudillo, directs an official communi-
cation to the Sindico-Procurador, dated at the "Pueblo of San Francisco de Asis."
1836, January 19th, Governor Gutierrez transmits to the "Alcalde of San Francisco
de Asis," a copy of an order received from the Supreme Government of Mexico.
1836, December 13th, Governor Alvarado transmits to the "Very Illustrious Ayun-
tamiento of San Francisco," copies of decrees of the Congress of the " Sovereign State
of Alta California."
1837, January 2d, Alcalde Martinez sends to the Sindico-Procurador, an order for
paper for the use of the " office of this Ayuntamiento." It is dated, "Pueblo of San
Francisco." There are various other official papers, signed by Martinez, which are
dated in the same way. Francisco Sanchez, as Secretary of " this Illustrious Ayunta-
miento," signs various official papers dated, " Pueblo of San Francisco." In one case,
he dates "Presidio," and in some others, " Yerba Buena."
1837, August 4th, Jose Carrillo appeared as the commissioner from the Departmental
Government, to administer the oath to " this municipality," of obedience to the consti-
tution of 1836. The acta states that it was sworn to by the " First Alcalde of the Port
of San Francisco de Asis."
1837, December 3d, the primary election "in the pueblo of San Francisco de Asis,"
is certified to have been held in the "Plaza of said Pueblo." The return is certified
by Francisco de Haro, as President, Francisco Guerero and Francisco Sanchez, as Sec-
retaries, and A. M. Peralta and J. de la C. Sanchez, as Inspectors. The letter trans-
mitting these returns is dated " San Francisco, December 7th, 1837," and directed to
the " Constitutional Alcalde, Ygnacio Martinez." At the secondary election, the
returns of which were transmitted to the Governor on the 23d, William A. Hichard-
son was chosen Alcalde ; but he, having applied to the Governor to be excused from
serving as such, for the ensuing year, Alvarado, on the 30th, directed a letter to the
constitutional Alcalde of San Francisco," ordering a new election, which was held
January 8th, 1838, and Francisco de Haro elected Alcalde in place of Richardson.
Domingo Sais was, at the same time, elected second Regidor, which office, it appears,
was also vacant. It will be observed that the above-mentioned Richardson is the same
man who swore that there was no pueblo or town of San Francisco before July, 1846,
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and that he had no personal knowledge of any elections here prior to 1846. Richard-
son himself received from the Ayuntamiento of San Francisco a grant of a lot of
one hundred varas in Yerba Buena, June 2d, 1836. In one part of his deposition he
says that he received this grant in October, 1835, and that it was made by Francisco
de Haro, " the Alcalde of the Mission of San Francisco de Asis," by order of the
Governor, the same order which reserved two hundred varas all along the beach, and
directed him, Richardson, to survey out the little strip of land assigned to the pueblo of
Yerba Buena. In another part of his testimony he says this lot was regranted to him
in 1 836, by Joaquin Estudillo, Alcalde of the same Mission. The order of the Gov-
ernor, as well as the proceedings of the Deputation i-especting the reserve of two hun-
dred varas along the beach, is found, but it contains no orders respecting any grant to
Richardson, or the survey of any land. The petition of Richardson for the lot referred
to, is dated June 1st, 1836 ; it is directed to the " Illustrious Ayuntamiento," and asks
for a grant of the lot by that body. It refers to no order of the Governor, and nothing
is said about any previous grant or its loss. The grant is made in the name of the
" Corporation," and the land is there stated to be an " ejido de esta poblacion." Rich-
ardson's statements are therefore flatly contradicted by the record of his own title.
1839, January 17th, Governor Alvarado transmits to Alcalde De Haro a proclama-
tion, for putting into effect the constitutional system of 1837, and for holding elections
according to the law of November 30th, 1836, which he says he received from "the
Supreme Government by the last mail !
"
1839, January 18th, Governor Alvai'ado sends another official communication
directed " to the Alcalde of San Francisco," in which he states that inasmuch as many
individuals had asked for solares for building houses in the lands of Yerba Buena,
which had previously been prohibited from being granted, and as he was desirous of
advancing the commerce in that recent congregation of vecinos, he therefore had decreed
(dispuesto) that grants for house-lots may be made of any part of said prohibited lands
;
with the understanding, however, that those asking for such concessions shall present
to the Government their petitions for the favor, with the necessary reports, or informes.
The Alcalde is directed to give notice of this to the vecinos.
1839, January 25th, Governor Alvarado directs a proclamation " to the Alcalde of
San Francisco," and orders him to give it due publication.
1839, February 28th, Governor Alvarado directs " to the Illustrious Ayuntamiento
of San Francisco," his proclamation of the previous day, (27th) dividing all Califor-
nia, from the frontier of the north to Cape St. Lucas, into three districts, the first dis-
trict including all north of the ex-Mission of San Luis Obispo. This district was
divided into two partidos, one extending from the north of Sonoma to the Llagas with
Dolores as the cabecera, and the other from the Llagas to San Luis Obispo with the
pueblo of San Juan de Castro as the cabecera. He also informs that body of the
appointment of Jose Castro as Prefect of that district, and that he must be recognized
and obeyed according to the laws.
1839, March 9th, Governor Alvarado sends "to the Alcalde of San Francisco," a
proclamation, and directing that the notice be given, that all petitions for lands or other
things should be transmitted to the Secretary through the Prefects, for their reports
thereon.
During the early part of this year Francisco de Haro continued to act as " Alcalde,"
but about the middle or a little after, Francisco Guerrero assumed the duties of Juez de
Paz, and continued to act in that capacity till the end of 1841, when he was succeeded
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by Francisco Sanchez, who held that office to the end of 1843, when the election was
held for two " Alcaldes of Nomination," under the new organization made by Michel-
torena.
1843, May 23d, Francisco Sanchez, as " Juez de Paz of the jurisdiction of the Port
of San Francisco," issues an order to the owners of gardens " in the establishment of
Dolores," respecting irrigation. He dates this order in " San Francisco."
1843, November 14. Governor Micheltorena issues a proclamation restoring, in
part, the old system of Ayuntamientos, and discontinuing the Prefects from the begin-
ning of the coming year. The pueblo of San Francisco was to elect, on the following
December, two Alcaldes, of first and second nomination, the first to act as Judge of
First Instance, and to take charge of the Prefecture. At this election, William
Hinckley was elected Alcalde of first nomination, and Francisco de Haro Alcalde
of second nomination. The former resided at Yerba Buena, and the latter at the old
Mission.
1844, January 20th, Secretary Jimeno writes to the " First Alcalde of the Port of
San Francisco," congratulating him, in the name of the Governor, on his election, and
hopes he will devote himself to the public welfare, and the improvement of that town,
and its vicinity.
1844, March 6th, Secretary Jimeno directs two official communications to the "First
Alcalde of San Francisco."
1844, March 14th, Jimeno directs an official communication to "the Alcalde of first
nomination of the Port of San Francisco."
1844, March 30th, the Superior Tribunal addresses an official communication to
" William Hinckley, Alcalde of first nomination of San Francisco." April 29th, the
tribunal addresses him as "first constitutional Alcalde in San Francisco de Asis;" on
June 4th, as " first Alcalde of San Francisco;" and on October 29th, as "first Juez of
San Francisco," &c. There are various official documents extant, addressed to him by
the Governor, the Secretary, the Military Commandant, and other government officers,
as " Alcalde of San Francisco," " Alcalde of San Francisco de Asis," "Alcalde of the
Port of San Francisco," "Alcalde of the Pueblo of San Francisco," "Alcalde of the
Pueblo of San Francisco de Asis," "Alcalde of Yerba Buena," "Juez of first nom-
ination of the Pueblo of San Francisco de Asis," &c, &c. Of the local authorities,
and private persons, some addressed him as " Alcalde of San Francisco," some as
"Alcalde of San Francisco de Asis," some as "Alcalde of Yerba Buena," some as
" Alcalde of the Pueblo of San Francisco," &c, &c. Hinckley dated his official papers,
sometimes, "Pueblo of San Francisco," sometimes, " Court of first nomination of San
Francisco de Asis ," " Yerba Buena," &c, &c. In the official correspondence between
him and the Second Alcalde, the former residing at Yerba Buena, and the latter at the
Mission, their letters are dated, indiscriminately, " San Francisco," " San Francisco de
Asis," " Pueblo of San Francisco," &c. At that time, at least, no distinction was made
in the use of these names. On the 12th of November, an order was issued by the Gov-
ernor, and directed to the " First Alcalde of San Francisco," to hold an election of
Alcaldes, on the first Sunday of December, for the coming year. On the 5th of
December, Hinckley issued a notice, dated " San Francisco de Asis," for an election,
to be held in " Dolores," on Sunday, the 8th, for First and Second Alcaldes, no election,
having been held on the previous Sunday. At the secondary election, held Decem-
ber 15th, Juan Padilla was chosen First Alcalde, and Jose de la C. Sanchez, Second
Alcalde. In the returns, it is described as an election " in the Pueblo of San Francisco
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de Asis ;" and these returns are sent to Hinckley, who resided at Yerba Buena, and is
addressed as "First Alcalde of San Francisco de Asis." Hinckley writes an official
letter dated, " Pueblo of San Francisco de Asis," and sends it to De Haro, at the Mis-
sion, addressed to the "Alcalde of second nomination of San Francisco de Asis."
1845. In the official correspondence of this year, Padilla and Sanchez are addressed
as " First and Second Alcaldes ;" sometimes, " of San Francisco," sometimes, " of San
Francisco de Asis," and sometimes, "of the Pueblo of San Francisco," &c, &c. On
the 12th of October, of this year, Sanchez issued a proclamation, dated at " Yerba
Buena," in which he styles himself " Constitutional Alcalde of the jurisdiction of San
Francisco."
1846. Sanchez continued to act as Alcalde, during the early part of this year ; and,
after him, Jose Jesus Noe seems to have officiated, until July. Noe is called, in the
official documents, "Alcalde of San Francisco," "Jnez of San Francisco," "Alcalde
of first nomination," " Jnez de Paz," &c, &c. The officers appointed and elected after
the military possession by the United States, in July, at first, assumed the title of
" Magistrate," but, very soon afterwards, adopted the Spanish word " Alcalde," which
was continued till 1850.
The foregoing is but a brief synopsis of a very small number of the official papers
and records still existing. They are sufficient, however, to show the correctness of the
reasoning of the Court, on this point ; and to disprove the absurd theories which have
been raised by interested parties, about the different names applied, in old documents*
to the Pueblo, generally, and to particular localities. The attempt of Kichardson, and
other Limantour witnesses, to ignore the Pueblo of San Francisco, which was organ-
ized at the end of 1834, and to erect a new "Pueblo of Yerba Buena," with a little
plat of land, between California and Dupont Streets, and the beach, is so thoroughly
exploded, by the official records, as to deserve not the slightest consideration.
NOTE 6.
SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAWS RELATING TO FORTS.
There have been several judicial decisions upon this question of Spanish law relating
to sites of forts and their pertenencias.
Judge Hoffman, in the case of The United States v. J. C. Palmer et al., with respect
to this same point, says
:
" The fifth article of the law of 1824 provides that the Government of the Federa-
tion may make use of any portion of the lands of the nation to construct warehouses,
arsenals, etc., it may deem expedient, with the consent of Congress. It is to be pre-
sumed, therefore, that the appropriation and occupation of these military sites must
have been made by the Government of the Federation. Until, then, the Federal Gov-
ernment determined to abandon them, no Governor of a department would be at lib-
erty to treat these sites as vacant public land, because through accident, neglect or the
disturbed condition of public affairs their garrisons might have been withdrawn, or the
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fortifications in some degree dismantled. The fort or castle occupied a position unmis-
takably indicated by nature as the site of defensive work for this harbor. It had been
selected as such, perhaps, by the Spanish conquerors, and the United States have since,
at the same point, erected the most extensive fortifications on this coast. It is not
conceivable that under a general power to distribute vacant lands to actual settlers, it
could have been intended to clothe the Governor with discretionary power to give to a
private individual a spot so necessary to the national defense, which had long been used
for the purpose, and on which the cannon of the nation still remained."
The following extracts from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Mitchell et al. v. The United States, 15 Peters' Eep. pp. 86 et seq., seem con-
clusive, not only with respect to the fact that the law reserves such places from grant,
but also with respect to the extent of the pertenencias of a fort.
After giving a history of the grants in that case and confirming them, the Court
goes on to say : "It is here necessary to give that (the history) of the fortress of St.
Marks, as it is to be collected from the evidence in the original case."
"In the record, 123, a dispatch from the Marquis of Casa Calvo shows that during
the possession of Florida by the English, the fort of St. Marks had been a military
post, though it had been abandoned and suffered to go to decay. Shortly after its
retrocession to Spain, the latter extended the jurisdiction of West Florida so as to
include the site of the fort. Rec. 189. In May, 1785, Count Galvas issued an order
to repair the old fort at St. Marks, and a detachment of troops was ordered to it from
Pensacola. Rec. 306. This detachment was cut off, or driven away by the Indians.
Eec. 582. But in the spring of 1787, (Rec. 198, 306) a royal order was issued, direct-
ing the permanent establishment of the fort. " It is notorious and public," (Rec. 233)
says Governor Folch, the principal witness of the claimants, and the person who gave
them possession of their whole purchase, " that at the establishment of the fort of St.
Marks, at Appalachia in the year 1787, all the solemnity and requisites were observed
to obtain from the Indians in sale, the lands necessary to that object." Benigno de
Calderon, who was then an officer of the Spanish Government, twice refers to the fact
that, not merely a military post itself, " but the quantity of land needed to preserve
it;" and what he calls "the circle of jurisdiction of a fortified place," was severed
from the Indian land and vested in the Government of Spain. Rec. 570, 582.
" Immediately after the sale of which Governor Folch speaks, the fort was constructed
by Spain at a heavy expense. So were the public stores. The evidence of the claim-
ants shows at least two hundred thousand dollars were expended upon these works.
Calderon says there was a regular Spanish garrison therefrom 1787 to 1818. Cavo
says the Governor exercised both civil and military jurisdiction. When Florida was
ceded to the United States, St. Marks was given up as a military fortress of the King
of Spain. Such is the history of the fortress of St. Marks, taken from the testimony and
the witnesses of the claimants in the original case. Is it surprising, then, that the Court
in its mandate should have excepted the fort and land directly adjacent to it from its
confirmation of the claimants' title to the lands bought by them from the Indians ? The
King's royal order to establish a fort at St. Marks, the occupancy of the fortress for
more than twenty years before any grant was made to Forbes, twenty-five years before
the grant was made, which includes it, and forty years occupation of it, with the use
of the land adjacent, seemed to the Court to be inconsistent with the idea that it was
intended to be included in the sale by the Indians, or by the confirmation of that sale
by Governor Folch. It must be remembered also, that when Governor Folch gave
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possession of the land to the grantees, that the fort was retained ; and that the land, to
the extent at least of what is termed the circle of military jurisdiction, had been cleared
;
and that the grantees, though living by permission for protection of themselves and
their trade within that circle, never exercised by cultivation or otherwise any acts of
ownership over any part of it. Besides, the Court was advised when the decision in the
original case was made, that, by the laws of the Indies, reservations of lands were made
appurtenant to forts, though the extent of such reservations was not known. It was
then, however, a subject of inquiry, and would no doubt have been fully investigated, if
the counsel for the claimant had not admitted in his argument that the Indian title for
the sale of the fort of St. Marks had been extinguished by a negotiation made by the
Governor of West Florida." ###"* The Court then proceeds to remark, that,
although the fort was within the boundaries of the grant, it cannot be supposed " that
the Intendant General would have ventured to propose a session of land, including
public stores and a fortress ;" or that Governor Folch would have '* sanctioned the
purchase ;" " or that the Captain General of Cuba, to whom Governor Folch reported
his proceedings in this matter, would have approved and declared that the King would
confirm them, if he had supposed he, was permitting the Indians to sell a fortress, then
garrisoned by the troops of Spain, and which had been so for more than twenty years."
The Court, therefore, concludes, that " the fort of St. Marks and so much land appur-
tenant to it as, according to military usage was attached generally to forts," was
reserved from the sale, and by the treaty passed to the United States ; and that mili-
tary usage generally, as well as the royal ordinances of Spain, made such appurtenance
" a radius of one thousand and five hundred Castillian varas, measured from the salient
angles of the covered way, all around the fortification."
It will be seen from these and other authorities which might be adduced, that the
military site of old "Fort Joaquin," at Fort Point, and its appurtenances, were
reserved from the pueblo grant ; and consequently, the United States have no interest
in opposing the confirmation of the city's claim for the full extent of four square
leagues, to which she is entitled, according to Mexican law, as is fully proved in Judge
Baldwin's opinion. Should the Government require a larger extent of ground for the
purposes of constructing military defenses, the city would readily cede for that object
whatever the board of engineers should deem necessary. The extent of the present
military reserve is unquestionably a violation of the just rights of the city as the suc-
cessor of the old pueblo.
NOTE 7.
CHURCH AND MISSION LANDS.
Commissioner Felch, in his opinion upon the claim of Bishop Alemany to " the
church edifices, cemetaries and priests' houses, with the curtilages and appurtenances
at the several Missions, and certain gardens and vineyards at or near the same," says
of these Mission establishments :
" They were not merely church establishments ; their organization had for its object
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something more than the spiritual care of those connected with them. They were
intended not merely to christianize, but also to civilize the Indians ; to instruct them
in the arts, and to guide their labors. In their domestic arrangement it was a com-
munity system, in which all the neophytes, under the temporal as well as the religious
care of the missionary priests, were gathered together ; and in them the Indians, to
the number at one time of, in the aggregate, nearly twenty thousand, laboring in their
newly taught avocations of civilized life, were united, forming one family at each of
the Missions. At an early day, immensely large tracts of land surrounding each Mis-
sion were regarded as within its rightful limits, and were used, as occasion might
require, for grazing or cultivation. While these establishments were in a prosperous
condition, all these lands were treated as lands of the Mission, and were under the charge
of the Missionary Fathers for the benefit of the community. When subsequently the
dissolution of the community was contemplated, they came to be regarded, in theory
at least, as the property of the neophytes, and this theory, with slight modification,
was retained after the Missions began to fall into decay, and even when the community
system was abandoned. Lands were then distributed to the individual neophytes, by
specific grants in small quantities, it is true, but in such parcels as were deemed suffi-
cient for their wants and commensurate with the labor which they were likely to bestow
upon them ; the remainder were granted to other citizens of the Republic. The rapid
breaking up of the establishment, followed by the dispersion and decrease of the neo-
phytes, soon rendered the theory of little practical importance, and grants we're made
to the white inhabitants with little or no regard to it.
" It will not, therefore, do to regard all the property which was occupied by the
Mission communities, under the charge of the missionary priests, as devoted to the
church. Such evidently was not its character ; and yet it is equally certain that
the pi'opagation of the Catholic faith and the establishing of permanent churches,
were among the primary objects, both of the government and the ecclesiastics in the
establishment of the Missions.
" Hence it happens that the property under the control of the missionary priests
was considered to be of two kinds, viz. : Mission property and Church property ; the
former embracing the large tracts of land which were used for the ordinary purposes
of the community, and which were to be divided eventually among the neophytes, to
hold in severalty ; or granted to the white inhabitants in colonization ; the latter, com-
prising such smaller portions as were separated from the mass, were under the more
especial charge of the priests, and devoted to the use of the church, the purpose of
worship, and the support and comfort of the ministers, and like other ecclesiastial
property, designed to be retained for those purposes.
" The distinction was founded in the very nature and design of the establishments.
The missions were intended from the beginning to be temporary in their character.
It was contemplated that in ten years from their first foundation, they should cease.
It was supposed that within that period of time, the Indians would be sufficiently
instructed in Christianity, and the arts of civilized life, to assume the position and
character of citizens ; that their mission settlements would then become pueblos, and
that the Mission churches would become parish churches, organized like the other
establishments of an ecclesiastical character in other portions of the nation where no
Mission has ever existed."
After a full review of all the documents in the case, the Commissioners came to the
conclusion that, while the lands generally occupied by the Mission establishments were
9
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subject to settlement and grant, at least after the law of August 17th, 1833, the church
edifices, priests' houses, &c, with their curtilages and appurtenances, had been dedi-
cated to the church ; because :
" 1st. It was the original design, when the Missions were established, that the Mission
churches should become permanent curacies ; and the property used for purposes inci-
dent to the church, and its services, was, evidently, designed to be permanently devoted
to that purpose, after the Mission priests should give place to the ordinary clergy.
"2. The direct connection of the government with these establishments, erected on
the national domain ; its approval, supervision, and aid of them ; its constant recogni-
tion of them, as most important institutions, in propagating the national faith, and
securing its services for future generations, show a direct assent, by the government, to
the use of the land in question, and give ample evidence of its devotion to those sacred
and ecclesiastical purposes.
"3d. The testimony of numerous witnesses, conversant with the subject, proves that
the property claimed, was always distinguished from other property at the Missions ;
this being known as the "church property," and the other as the "Mission property;"
and this being always recognized, and admitted by the public officers, as well as by the
whole community, as property belonging to the church.
" 4th. Proof is given, of the possession and use of this property, for the purposes
specified, for periods of time, varying at the several Missions, from thirty to eighty-six
years. This possession and use, seems never to have been interrupted by the King, or
the Supreme Government of Mexico ; and by the local authorities, only for the brief
period required to obtain the notice of the Supreme authorities, and to transmit direc-
tions to restore it to its previous use.
"5th. The secularization law of August, 1833, is a direct assignment, by the Mexi-
can Congress, of all the Mission churches, to the use of the parishes ; and as to the
property in question, the decree of the President of the Republic, in answer to the
petition of the bishop, is an express recognition of the ecclesiastical character of it, and
a renewed dedication thereof to the church.
" These concurrent proofs bring us, irresistably, to the conclusion, that before the
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, these possessions were solemnly dedicated to the use of
the church ; and the property withdrawn from commerce. Such an interest is pro-
tected by the provisions of the treaty, and must be held inviolable, under our laws.
" A decree of confirmation will, therefore, be entered in the case."
The decision of the Commissioners, in these cases, met the concurrence of the Exec-
utive department of the government, and all the appeals were dismissed by the Attorney
General; consequently, Patents have been, or will be, issued to the bishop, for these
several buildings, and small tracts of ground, adjacent, or appurtenant thereto.
It would seem, from the foregoing opinion and decision, that these buildings, and
small tracts of land, at the Mission of San Francisco, or Dolores, were, in November,
1834, exempted from becoming pueblo lands ; but that the pueblo then formed, acquired
some right, title, or claim to all other lands within its legal limits ; although such Mis-
sion establishment may have formerly occupied and used them as " Mission Lands."
And such seems to be the result of the reasoning of the Supreme Court, in this case,
although the point is not definitively decided. The Court very properly distinguishes
between the general right, or claim, which the pueblo may have had to these Mission
lands, as lying within its limits, and the immediate right of possession—between the
jus ad rem and the jus in re.
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NOTE 8.
ZAMORANO DOCUMENT.
The following is a translation of this document
:
"Political Government of Alta California. {
Head-Quarters General of Alta California. >
" The Government, satisfied with the zeal and activity which characterizes you, as
well as the patriotism which animates you, sees in your official note of the 24th Oc-
tober last, a new proof of your vehemenent desire for the progress, and of your untir-
ing efforts for the improvement and aggrandisement of your country, and of your
fellow-citizens.
^
" In consequence, it affords me pleasure to inform you, in accordance with its request,
that the E. D. T. has adopted, in its totality, the plan which you presented in your
note, aforesaid, with regard to the Pueblo of San Francisco, declaring the boundaries
to be the same that you delineated, in the said note ; that is, commencing at the little
cove at E. of the Fortaleza, following the line traced by you, as far as the shore, leav-
ing to the north, the Casamata and the Fortaleza ; thence following the border of the
said shore to the Point of Lobos, on its southern side ; thence following a straight line,
as far as the peak of the Devisedero, (Lookout) continuing the said line towards the E.
as far as the Point of the Rincon, embracing the Canutales and the Gentil. Said line
shall terminate within the bay of the Mission Dolores, whose estuary shall serve for a
natural boundary between the municipal jurisdiction of that pueblo, and the aforesaid
Mission de Dolores.
" The Government, in proof of the confidence which your services inspired, has ar-
ranged that you shall be he who will have the honor of installing the first Ayuntamiento
in that Pueblo of San Francisco, for which you have already done so much.
" You will, therefore, proceed, at the time, and in the mode provided by law, to
the election of the municipal authorities, in order that they be installed on the first day
of January, of the coming year, 1835 ; setting apart, for public buildings, those edifices
which to you may seem most appropriate.
" God and Liberty.
"Monterey, Nov. 4th, 1834. (Signed) Jose Figueroa.
"Don Mariano G. Vallejo,
" Military Commander of San Francisco.
" It is a true copy. Zamorano."
General Vallejo, on his first examination, swears, positively, that such a document,
signed by Governor Figueroa, had been in his possession, but he was unable to say
what had become of it. He said, however, that he had, among his private papers, a
copy, certified by Zamorano. On the direction of the Commissioner, he came into
court, a few days after, and produced what purported to be such certified copy, and
swore to the genuineness of the signature of Zamorano.
Governor Alvarado, a witness called by the United States, to impeach the validity
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of this document, says : "I have considered (examined) the words es copia conforms,
and the signature of Zamorano, and cannot justify the words, or the signature, because
I do not find it exactly as he used to write it." W. E. P. Hartnell, another witness
for the government, says : " I think the signature of Zamorano, affixed to the paper, a
very suspicious one, at least, apd I do not believe it to be his handwriting." Jose
Castro, another government witness, says : "According to my judgment, it is not his
(Zamorano's) signature." William A. Richardson, Limantour's principal witness,
says : " The signature at the bottom of the last mentioned paper, is not the signature
of Zamorano." Leaving out the testimony of Richardson, as being, from interest, or
other reasons, of no weight, it seems that the Commissioners considered, either that the
positive testimony of Vallejo established the genuineness of Zamorano's signature,
against the somewhat doubtful expressions of other witnesses, or that the line, as there
described, was sufficiently proved, by evidence outside of that document. And there
was considerable evidence to show that the line separating the lands formerly occupied
hj the Presidio, from those occupied by the old Mission, coincided very nearly with that
described in this document. But, admitting it to be, in every respect, genuine, there is
nothing whatever in it, limiting the right of the pueblo to the full four square leagues.
As suggested by the Court, it is quite probable that at the time the pueblo was estab-
lished, its right of immediate possession, was restricted to the land north of this Zamo-
rano or Vallejo line, which constituted the northern boundary of the lands then occupied
by the Mission establishment. But Governor Figueroa very soon after recognized its
right to lands which now constitute a part of the Bernal Rancho, and which lie at some
distance south of the old dividing line between the Mission and Presidio; which line,
it seems, was nearly the same as that described in the Zamorano document. We think
that any one who examines this question carefully, and without prejudice, or pre-con-
ceived opinions, will admit that the Land Commissioners have given undue importance
to this document, even admitting its genuineness to be entirely above suspicion, and tha*
the true boundaries of the Pueblo of San Francisco were those assigned to it by law»
as pointed out in the opinion of the Court, and as will be more particularly referred to
in a subsequent Note.
NOTE 9.
NAMES OF BAY, MISSION, PUEBLO, &c.
In further illustration of the remarks of the Court on the names of Missions, &c, it
may be added, that there were three Missions in California, called " San Jose," two
called " San Fernando," and two " San Juan," &c.
Those who are interested in the history of the foundation of the Presidio and Mis-
sion of San Francisco, will find a full account in the forty-fourth and forty-fifth chapters
of Palou's Life of Junipero Serra. It is there shown, that they were both named after
the same Saint. The Presidio was founded September 17th, and the Mission, October
9th, 1776. By comparing this account with the orders of the Viceroy, and the Journal
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of Pedro Font, it will be seen that the great object had in view, from the first, was the
establishment of a town on this very site ; and settlers were brought from Sonora, at
government expense, for that express purpose. The Presidio and Mission, were, even
then, considered as only preliminary to the future organization of a pueblo, on the
northern extremity of this peninsula, which was to build up a commerce, and to com-
mand the splendid waters, which were declared by the captain of the San Carlos, who
had been sent to examine them, to be, "not a port, but a case of ports, where many
squadrons might lie, without a knowledge of each other". (" respondio, que no era puerto,
si7io un estuche de puertos que podrian estar en el muchas escuadras sin saber la una de la
otra.")
It should also be remarked, that the official name of the Mission was never " Dolores."
In the report of its foundation, it was said to be located " near the pond called Dolores,"
(circa de la Laguna de Dolores) which term was, in time, occasionally applied to the
Mission itself, and in some instances, to the pueblo, which, in accordance with the origi-
nal design, and early instructions of the Viceroy, was, at the end of 1834, organized in
place of, and intended to supersede both the Presidio and Mission. The Court, in its
opinion, has referred to certain documents, made of evidence in the City claim, in which
various names arc used to designate this/:we&/o, or particular localities, included within its
general limits ; and good and satisfactory reasons are given for the use and application
of these particular terms. There are, as we have shown in Note 5, numerous other
documents, of undoubted authenticity, in which the same terms are used, and applied
in the same waj\ Many persons who used them were, probably, ignorant of their
origin and meaning ; and in giving testimony before the Land Commissioners, and
in the Courts, they have drawn erroneous conclusions from their own imperfect knowl-
edge and recollection of the facts and circumstances upon which they are called to
give evidence. The Supreme Court has indicated a way in which we may not only
vindicate and establish the pueblo title, and reconcile the documentary evidence relating
to it, but may, also, explain the apparently conflicting testimony of respectable witnesses,
such as Vallejo, Rose, Ford, Jose Castro, Alvarado, Vioget, and Francisco Sanchez.
It seems, from the documents already referred to, , that Governors Echandia and
Figueroa hesitated about organizing pueblos and Ayuntamientos, in California, on ac-
count of the impossibility of obtaining suitable persons for Alcaldes and Regidores.
Some of the individuals then deemed hardly competent for these offices, afterwards became
Governors of the Territory. "Without reflecting upon their general capacity and integ-
rity, it is evident, from their testimony, filed in this case, and from the official documents
signed by them, that they were utterly ignorant of the laws under which they acted.
How could it have been otherwise ? There was not to be found in all California, at the
time of the conquest by the United States, a single complete copy of the Statutes of
Mexico, much less, of the great body of the Spanish Jurisprudence, from which, alone,
any information could have been derived of the laws which determine the rights and
powers of pueblos. There was not, most of the time, a single lawyer in the country;
and, consequently, these Governors could have had no legal advisers. They, therefore,
followed in the footsteps of their predecessors ; exercising the same powers which they
had exercised, but ignorant, in most cases, of the source of those powers. They knew
that Governors Neve and Figueroa had established pueblos, and organized Ayuntami-
entos ; they did the same. They knew that their predecessors had recognized a right
in the officers of such municipalities to grant solares and suertes, in individual owner-
ship ; they did the same. They knew that their predecessors had exercised some
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prerogative or control over such grants, by municipal officers ; they did the same.
They knew that former Governors had recognized some right or title in such pueblos ;
to the lands within some general limits ; they did the same ; hut it seems that in many
cases they had a very indefinite idea of the character of this right or title, and of the
extent of land which it embraced. It is, therefore, by no means strange that Governor
Alvarado thought that his power to authorize Alcaldes to grant pueblo lands, was de-
rived directly from the law of 1824—a law which, by express terms, had no application
whatever to such lands. He knew that an Ayuntamiento was organized at the Presidio,
in 1834 ; that this Ayuntamiento was authorized by the Governor, in 1835, and by him-
self, subsequently, to grant lots in Yerba Buena ; that it subsequently removed to the
Mission ; and that its officers were authorized to grant lands at that place also ; but
he confesses that he knows nothing of the source of that power, except it be the law
of 1824, and Regulation of 1828. He knows that the Mission was called a -pueblo,
after 1839, but has no knowledge of its boundaries, or the extent of its land.
Francisco Sanchez says, that the pueblo referred to in some of the official documents,
was at the Presidio, and that the pueblo referred to in others, was at the Mission ; that
the Ayuntamiento organized at the end of 1834, held its sessions at the Presidio till
about the end of 1837, or in 1839, when it removed to the Mission ; that Alcaldes, and
Jueces de Paz, granted lots at Yerba Buena, and at the Mission
; that the pueblo pre-
tended to own the lands immediately about the Mission which did not belong to any
individuals—such being recognized as the lands of the pueblo ; that he does not know
by what right it claimed the lands ; never saw any measurement of boundaries ; &c, &c.
Such is the general purport of the testimony of witnesses brought by the government,
or rather by Limantour, against the pueblo claim. Making due allowance for the ig-
norance and forgetfulness of these witnesses, the evidence of every one, except Rich-
ardson, is perfectly reconcilable with the law and facts of the case, as proved by the
official documents from the Archives.
With respect to the exact date when the Ayuntamiento removed its sessions from
the Presidio to the ex-Mission, there seems to be some confusion in the recollection of
the witnesses. Prancisco Sanchez, the Secretary of the Ayuntamiento, thinks it was
the latter part of 1837, but really fixes it in the early part of 1839. He says he cannot
remember the date, but remembers that it was after Dolores was made the cabecera of
the partido by the order of Governor Alvarado, which order was published, and de-
posited in the Archives. A reference to the order, will show that it was dated Feb-
ruary 28th, 1839.
NOTE lO
SPANISH AND MEXICAN SYSTEM OF SETTLEMENT.
The Court here refers to an important and somewhat peculiar principle of the Span-
ish system of settlement and civilization, which has been extensively commented on by
learned historians and jurisconsults, but which seems to have been often overlooked by
oar own Courts. As this principle forms so prominent a place in the history of land
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titles in California, we have thought it would be of interest to the professional, as well
as the general reader, to discuss, at as much length as the character of these JSotes will
admit, the origin and character of the Spanish municipal system, and its application
to the settlement and civilization of the American dominions of the Spanish crown.
Indeed, without a knowledge of this system, it is impossible to fully understand the
various laws respecting the establishment of pueblos in the Indies, which are referred
to in the opinion of the Court, or the laws which prevailed in California prior to the
cession, respecting land titles in general.
In his second lecture on the history of civilization, Guizot attempts to account for
the "agitated, diversified, and at the same time, prolific character which distinguishes
the civilization of modern Europe," by an historical inquiry into its elements. He
begins by investigating the condition of Europe at the fall of the Roman Empire, to
"discover in its institutions, in its opinions, its ideas, its sentiments, what were the
elements which the ancient world bequeathed to the modern,"
" Home in its origin," he says, " was a mere municipality. The Eoman Govern-
ment was nothing more than an assemblage of institutions suitable to a population
enclosed within the walls of a city; that is to say, thev were municipal institutions
—
this was their distinctive character."
"And what was the case when Rome extended her boundaries "? If we follow her
history we shall find that she conquered or founded a host of cities. It was with cities
she fought ; it was with cities she treated ; it was with cities she sent colonies. In
short, the history of the conquest of the world by Rome is the history of the conquest
and foundation of a vast number of cities."
" Confining ourselves then to the "West, we shall find the fact to be such as I have
described it. In the Gauls, in Spain, we meet with nothing but cities ; at any distance
from these, the country consisted of marshes and forests. Examine the character of
the monuments left us of ancient Rome—the old Roman roads. We find great roads
extending from city to city ; but the thousands of little by-paths, which now intersect
every part of the country, were then unknown. Neither do we find any traces of that
immense number of lesser objects—of churches, castles, country-seats and villages,
which were spread all over the country during the middle ages. Rome has left no
traces of this kind ; her only bequest consists of vast monuments impressed with a
municipal character, destined for a numerous population, crowded into a single spot.
In whatever point of view you consider the Roman world, you meet with almost exclu-
sive preponderance of cities, and an absence of country populations and dwellings."
" Thus the Roman Empire, at its fall, was resolved into the elements of which it
had been composed, and the preponderance of municipal rule and government was
again everywhere visible. The Roman world had been formed of cities, and to cities
it again returned,"
In about the twelfth century the feudal system had, to a great degree, supplanted
the Roman municipal system. The territory of the old Roman Empire had been con-
quered and permanently occupied by new and hardy races, fresh from the forest and
the field, all of whose habits were opposed to city life. Europe was then governed by
castles. Its territory was partitioned among nobles, soldiers and priests of various
degrees and ranks, aRd the ownership of land was the great source of personal influ-
ence and distinction. The castle became the suzerain of the city. The greatest men
in all the nations of Europe were distributed here and there over the surface of the
country, and dwelt upon their lands, They were no longer congregated in cities. They
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were the centers of country population. Country property was the most valued species
of wealth, the greatest source of power, and residence on it the most dignified and
honorable mode of life. It is in the feudal system, therefore, the natural order into
which things settled after the Empire was overrun by the barbarians, that we discover
the first great element in the social and political civilization of modern Europe.
Such was the general course of events in Europe, to which Spain offered a prom-
inent and singular exception, for there the feudal system never obtained.
Mr. Guizot thinks there is no country in Europe, where, after the fall of the Roman
Empire, the barbarian element had so little influence in reconstructing civilization as
in Spain. In that country, he ascribes to the remnants of Roman civilization, and to
the church, which was in truth a most prominent feature in the political government of
the Roman Empire after the days of Constantine, the re-establishment of society and
government. " In Spain," he says, " a different power, that of the church, endeav-
ored to restore the work of civilization. Instead of the ancient assemblies of German
warriors, the assembly that had most influence in Spain was the Council of Toledo ;
and in this Council the Bishops bore sway, although it was attended by the higher order
of the laity. Open the laws of the Visigoths, and you will discover that it is not a lore
compiled by barbarians, but bears convincing marks of having been draAvn up by the
philosophers of the age— by the clergy. It abounds in general views, in theories, and
in theories indeed altogether foreign to barbarian manners." " In short, the code of
the Visigoths bore throughout evident marks of learning, system and polity. In it
we trace the hand of the same clergy that acted in the Council of Toledo, and which
exercised so large and beneficial an influence upon the government of the country.
In Spain then, up to the time of the great invasion of the Saracens, it was the hierar-
chy which made the greatest efforts to advance civilization." Third Led., Civ. Eu.
It was doubtless owing to the large, active, highly cultivated and influential body of
the clergy, that so much of the civilization, and even of the language of Rome, was
preserved in Spain. To the same cause we may attribute the fact that the municipal
system, so universally adopted for the government of the Roman Empire, was con-
tinued in Spain after its conquest by the Visigoths, and was never supplanted by any
other, in the centuries during which they possessed that country. For when we reflect
that long before the final overthrow of the Empire, the government of cities had fallen
almost entirely into the hands of the clergy, the bishop having become the usual politi-
cal head of the municipality, we perceive that the ecclesiastical and municipal systems
were united and served mutually to sustain each other.
In speaking of this union between the two systems, Mr. Guizot says : " I could cite
numerous other laws to the same effect, [that is to prove that the management of the
affairs of municipalities had been placed by the Emperors in the hands of the clergy
and bishops] and in all of them you would see this one fact very strikingly prevail,
namely, that between the Roman municipal system, and that of the free cities of the
middle ages, there intervened an ecclesiastical municipal system ; the preponderance of
the clergy in the management of the affairs of the city corporations succeeded to that
of the ancient Roman municipal magistrates, and paved the way for our modern free
communities."
Comparing the condition of Spain with that of France, during the three centuries
which preceded the Saracen invasion, Hallam says, that the condition of Spain dif-
fered, in several respects, from that of the Franks. The Crown was less hereditary, or
at least, the regular succession was more frequently disturbed. The prelates had a
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still more commanding influence in temporal government. The distinction of Romans
and barbarians, was less marked ; the laws more uniform, and approaching, nearly, the
Imperial code.
We have thus endeavored to account for the fact that the municipal system of gov-
ernment continued to prevail to so great an extent in Spain, while in other parts of
Europe it was almost entirely superseded by the feudal system.
In spite of the obstacles to the progress and development of Spanish civilization,
interposed by the Saracenic conquest, in the eighth century, we note the establishment
of chartered towns in Spain, at an earlier period than in England or Erance. The
earliest instance of the erection of a community, is in 1020, when Alfonso "V", in the
Cortez at Leon, established the privileges of that city, with a regular code of laws, by
which its magistrates should be governed. The citizens of Corrion, Llanes, and other
towns, were incorporated by the same Prince. Sancho the Great, gave a similar
constitution to Navarra. Sepulveda had its code of laws, in 1076, from Alfonso VI;
in the same reign, Logrono and Sahagun acquired their privileges, and Salamanca not
long afterwards.
The Cities of Spain may not only boast an earlier origin than those of Erance and Eng.
land, but it was more honorable, their organization more complete, and their property
and privileges infinitely greater. Instead of purchasing their immunities, and almost
their personal freedom, at the hands of a master, the burgesses of Castillian towns were
invested with civil rights, and extensive property, on the more liberal condition of pro-
tecting their country. The fuero, or original charter of a Spanish community was,
properly, a compact, by which the King or lord granted a town and adjacent district
to the burgesses, with various privileges, and especially that of choosing magistrates
and a common council, who were bound to conform themselves to the laws prescribed
by the founder. The territory held by towns was, frequently, very extensive—far
beyond any comparison with corporations in England or Erance—including the estates
of private land-holders, subject to the jurisdiction and control of the municipality, as
well as its inalienable demesnes, alloted to the maintenance of the magistrates, and
other public expenses.
—
Hallam's Middle Ages—Spain.
The municipal system of government, thus deeply grounded in Spain, was carried
into practice in America, and became one of the most important means for securing
its settlement, unlike our system of settlement, which consists of selling at a minimum
price one hundred and sixty acres of land to the individual who will venture into the
wilderness and build his cabin on the tract he desires to take up, and there plant him-
self permanently ; the Spaniards, true to the habits of their country, conducted their
settlements through the instrumentality of pueblos. Instead of placing each settler
upon a farm half a mile square, they were collected in small towns, for the sake of
mutual protection and civilization. Instead of offering to the individual settler one
hundred and sixty acres of land, the Spanish government provided that the individual
poblador might receive a building lot, and, if necessary, also a tract for cultivation in
some pueblo, with theright of pasture, firewood, building materials, &c, in the ejidos
or town commons. The rule was the same, whether such pueblo was formed by a
single contractor, or by the union of a number of individuals or families.
This municipal system of settlement is carefully provided for in the numerous laws
to be found in the Recopilacion de Indias, and referred to in the opinion of the court. As
these laws are commented upon in other Notes, we will here only remark that they
were general laws, designed to carry out the plan adopted by the king for the settlement
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of the Indies, and that there was no other law or regulation providing the means by
which, for the consideration of occupation and settlement, an individual could procure
from the government a title to a portion of the vacant lands. Settlement by means of
pueblos was the only system of settlement known to the Spanish-American code. It
is true that certain royal officers in America were authorized to grant lands, not per-
taining to towns, to individuals ; but such grants were, at least in early times, either
intended as rewards for services rendered the crown, or as special contracts for forming
settlements in certain places, as particular exigencies might require. Subsequently a
greater extension was given to the practice of making private grants ontside of pueblo
limits, but such grants were usually made to royal favorites, and of very large tracts, in
imitation of the estates of the nobility in Spain.
From this municipal plan of settlement, certain consequences resulted, which we
must not overlook, if we wish to understand the true spirit of the laws on this subject.
The habits of life induced by this system gave rise to certain necessities, and these
again to certain rights ; and it fixed upon a firm basis the relation between the pueblo
and the king, as respects the right of property.
What this relation was, has been a matter of much dispute in California, and is dis-
cussed at some length in the opinion of the Court. Without entering particularly into
that discussion in this place, we will offer a few remarks upon its general character.
In the first place, it must be borne in mind that the Spanish laws providing for the
establishment of pueblos by either of the means we have mentioned, were general laws
;
they defined the circumstances under which such settlements might be made, the quan-
tity of land to be included within the limits of each pueblo, the mode of laying it out,
and of subdividing it according to the various uses which the respective parts were
intended to subserve—such as solares, suertes, propios, ejidos, dehesas, etc.; and com-
pletely regulated all the details of the system with admirable clearness.
These laws in one respect resemble our incorporation laws. They are not special
acts creating particular corporations, denning their powers and liabilities, and granting
to each one a specific tract of land. On the contrary, they contain general provisions
which are intended to apply to the mode of creating pueblos ; they specify the quantity
of land which every pueblo thus created shall receive, and the mode of locating it.
The grant is made by a general law ; it is what we would name a legislative grant
and it contains within itself the means of identifying the pueblo lands with the great-
est accuracy. Consequently, & pueblo being established at any particular place, we can,
*rom these laws, ascertain not only the quantity of land to which it is entitled, but we
can also determine its exact boundaries, as will be more particularly shown in another
note.
The subdivision of this tract, or the assignment of definite parts of it to the various
uses to which lands in pueblos are put, is not made by the general law, and it cannot
be; for that must depend upon the site in each particular case. But for our present
purpose no such subdivision or assignment is necessary. It is.enough for us to know
that the land within the limits of a pueblo is intended and dedicated by the law for the
purposes of the community—for the building up and the support of the town.
Where the laws effect settlement by means of pueblos, and force the inhabitants o
a country to live en poblado—that is, collected together in villages, towns and cities
—
certain necessities are created which are unknown in our country, where towns grow up
under the demands of trade, and are merely places for the manufacture and interchange
of commodities. The Spanish people in America were collected together in towns, not
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for the purpose of trade or manufactures, but by the operation of laws. Indeed, it
may be said that the Spanish Government, not only encouraged its subjects in Amer-
ica to live in towns, but it rendered that mode of life almost a necessity.
Let us see to what necessities this mode of life gave rise, and in what manner they
were provided for.
1 st. The poblador or settler in a town would require a site for his house. A solar
was promised him for this purpose, and he obtained a grant for it in private property.
2d. He not only required a house for shelter, but, if not a meehanic, or engaged in
trade or manufactures, he also required land on which he might raise grain and vege-
tables for the support of himself and family. A snerte was given him for this purpose,
also in private property.
It will be remembered that the great body of pueblo lands, not assigned for special
ohjects, were usually devoted to grants of solares and suertes.
3d. Again, the pueblo expenses, such as the pay of its municipal officers, the sup-
port of the police, etc., were to be provided for ; this was done by the assignment of
propios, which were not to be granted in private property, but to be rented out for the
benefit of the municipality.
4th. And again, land was necessary for the common use of the inhabitants, as parks,
streets, market-places, and wood-land for cutting firewood, and materials for building
and fencing ; and the mechanic or poor laborer, who was not engaged in agriculture,
required a range for his horse and cow, and a few sheep, goats and pigs. To supply
these wants, ejidos, dehesas, monies, etc., were usually assigned.
These were the principal, if not the only purposes to which the pueblo lands were
usually applied ; and in every pueblo, regularly laid out, there was a subdivision of
land, corresponding to each one of these uses. This plan arose, naturally, out of the
wants incident to the pueblo system, and provided for them. It was a necessity result-
ing from the system. It conferred definite rights, which no just mind can fail to
appreciate, and which the Spanish laws jealously guarded and protected.
What we have said respecting the Spanish system of settlement, by means of pue-
blos, is, of course, intended as a general proposition. There were, doubtless, some
exceptions. And it is also true, that the Spanish government was in the habit of
making liberal grants of land to individuals, as a reward for services, a favor to par-
ticular persons, or to promote the convenience of particular localities. But these grants
were special cases. There were no general Spanish laws for the distribution of govern-
ment lands by sale and preemption, such as are embodied in our system for the disposal
of the public lands, while there were very many such laws relating to settlements by
means of pueblos
;
providing the terms upon which they were to be established, and
defining their rights and privileges.
The pueblo system of Spain, while suggested by many considerations of conveni-
ence, had its real foundation in the habitudes of the Spanish people
;
just as our pre-
emption laws find their origin in the country life to which the English people have
always been so much devoted. In both cases, as always happens, the laws and the
national customs have reciprocally acted on, and confirmed each other. The Spaniard
takes, naturally, to town life. The laws favor his predelictions, by affording him the
means of consulting them. They give him a building-lot, and perhaps a larger tract,
for cultivation, and they furnish his town with the means of defraying its expenses,
and ample commons for the ordinary necessities of a crowded population. The Amer-
ican prefers a country life. It is the habit of his race to live in the country, unless
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attracted to the city by business, and the inducements of pecuniary gain. Our land
laws, therefore, carry us to the frontiers, and proffer a farm, at an almost nominal
price, to any person who will agree to live on, and cultivate it. We say, that the hab-
its of the English and Spanish races have influenced the legislation of their descendants
in America, in respect to the mode of taking up, and settling the public lands ; the
system of the Spanish law being, the establishment of towns ; and that of our law, the
establishment of farms. And we say, further, that without noting this difference, and
following it out in its practical consequences, it is impossible for any person, no matter
how familiar he may be with one system only, to adjudicate upon rights which have
grown up under the other, according to the true spirit of the laws applicable to the
case.
Thus, the Spanish and Mexican governments, as we have stated, not only encour-
aged, but sometimes absolutely required, their citizens to live in towns. This was
especially enjoined in frontier departments, and in the sparsely settled portions of the
country. It forms a marked feature of the " Kegulations of Presidios " of 1772, and
the " Instructions " of the Viceroy to the Commandant of Upper California, of 1773.
In Articles 12 and 13 of the latter, the Viceroy directs the Commandant to require,
not only the pobladores, but also persons holding grants outside of pueblos, " to
live in the towns, and not dispersed." Numerous other laws and orders of the same
import might be referred to. Even as late as 1837—long after the Mexican colonization
laws, formed partially in imitation of our system, for the settlement of portions of her
vacant lands, had been in operation, the law of March 20th, for the regulation of the
internal departments, Article 91, directed the Prefect of each district " to cause the
inhabitants of the district who were scattered over the country, to live in towns (en
poblado}." So stringently was this system enforced in the Spanish Americas in early
times, that, as we learn from Spanish writers, the people of some districts were
strongly disposed to dispute the right of the royal officers to thus restrict their liberty.
Even in the case of the city of San Francisco, as is shown in Note 5, some of the
inhabitants of the Contra Costa solemnly protested, in 1835, to the Governor against
being obliged to reside in the new pueblo which had just been formed at the old
Presidio.
And yet, in a claim before the Land Commissioners, of unquestioned genuineness,
where it was proved that the grantee had, for many years, occupied the land with his
mayor-domo, vaqueros and stock, that he had a house on it, in which his sons and ser-
vants had lived, while he lived with the remainder of his family in the pueblo of Santa
Barbara, that Board rejected the claim solely because the grantee had not, in propria
persona, resided on it ! This decision was made in utter ignorance of the habits of
the Spanish people and the policy of the Spanish and Mexican governments, and in
direct conflict with their laws, orders and regulations on the subject of granting
and settling vacant lands. Here, so far as the Board of Commissioners could do it,
Mr. Carrillo was deprived of his property, simply because, like a good citizen, he lived
in a pueblo, precisely where the laws of his country required him to reside. [Vide
opinion of Board of Land Commissioners in claim No. 327.]
In reading this decision of the Commission, and others of a similar character by
our courts on questions of Spanish and Mexican law, and especially on land titles in
California, we are disposed to think that but little heed has been given, in these latter
days, to the solemn injunction of the Psalmist
:
" Be learned, ye that are judges of the earth."
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NOTE 11.
PARTIDO AND PUEBLO LIMITS AND JURISDICTIONS.
The distinction between the limits of partidos and pueblos is too manifest to require
any argument to point them out ; and it seems to us that the court has given to the
argument of counsel on this point as much, if not.more attention than was really
requisite. In the proceedings of the Deputation on the 24th of July, 1830, respecting
the pueblo limits of Monterey and the limits of the jurisdiction of the Alcaldes of that
pueblo over the partido of which Monterey was to be the head or shire-town, already
quoted in Note 4, this distinction is clearly set forth. The same distinction is shown
in the proceedings of the Junta on the 27th day of February, 1839, and in other docu-
ments already referred to. The laws of 1812, 1813, and 1837, provide for the election,
and define the powers and jurisdiction of the Ayuntamientos and Alcaldes of pueblos,
and not of partidos. Moreover the law contemplates and provides for the case of two
or more Ayuntamientos in the same partido. Their powers were usually limited to a
single parish, but might include two or more parishes, according as their comarca
should be established; and such comarca might, or might not, be co-extensive with the
partido, according to the circumstances of the particular case. Thus, by the Act of
July 24th, 1830, the boundaries of the lands of the pueblo of Monterey were fixed
within a circuit of a few miles of the port of that name ; but the partido, in which that
pueblo was included, extended from the Llagas (between San Jose and San Juan) to
below San Luis Obispo. Moreover, February 28th, 1837, the pueblo of San Juan,-
instead of the pueblo of Monterey, was made the head {cabecera) of that partido. By
the same proclamation of Governor Alvarado, the partido of which the establishment
at Dolores was made the cabecera, extended from the Llagas to the extreme northern
frontier, and included the pueblos of Sonoma, San Francisco and San Jose. This par-
tido was a political division including several pueblos. The Alcalde or Juez of each
pueblo exercised judicial jurisdiction over a specified territory, which was a sub-division
of the partido, and much larger than the limits of the pueblo ; but in all municipal mat-
ters, and especially in granting lands, his power was confined to the pueblo limits.
Alcaldes and Ayuntamientos were always properly officers of pueblos, and never of
partidos, although the laws gave the former certain powers over parts, and sometimes
over the whole of a partido. This distinction is clearly defined in the laws, and is
fully explained by Escriche. Some of the laws of Spain give jurisdiction also to
Ayuntamientos ; but these laws were never in force in Mexico, nor have Ayuntamien-
tos there any jurisdiction outside of the terminos of their own cities or pueblos. It is
distinctly so stated by Escriche. Vide verbs Ayuntamientos and Alcaldes.
This fully explains Figueroa's order of November 4th, 1834. According to that
order, the Ayuntamiento, when installed, was to exercise, within the pueblo limits, the
powers which the laws conferred upon it, which powers had previously been exercised
by the military commandant ; but the Alcalde, who was also the chief officer of the
Ayuntamiento, was, for want of a Judge Letrado, to exercise the judicial functions
which the laws conferred on him. The Ayuntamiento was a municipal body, composed
of municipal officers only ; but the Alcalde was both a municipal and a judicial officer
;
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in the latter capacity he had jurisdiction over an extensive territory; but in the former
he had no jurisdiction whatever.
It is strange that the Board of Land Commissioners should, in the face of such plain
laws, and such clear and unmistakeable language as that used by Escriche, have drawn
such absurd inferences from Figueroa's order for forming this Ayuntamiento, and have
so entirely mistaken the character and powers of that body, when organized. Their
whole course of argument respecting this Ayuntamiento, is based upon a false founda-
tion. They assume that it was a political organization, for the government of a partido,
whereas, it was an organization for the municipal government of a pueblo, and the laws
prohibit it from exei-cising any jurisdiction, or any authority, outside of the limits of
such pueblo. But some of the individual members of an Ayuntamiento—not the body
itself—exercised jurisdiction and authority beyond such limits, and over such portions
of the adjacent country as might be designated by the political authoritjr of the State.
Thus, the first Alcalde, who was, also, a member of the Ayuntamiento of the pueblo,
became, ex-officio, Judge of First Instance of a large judicial district. In his absence,
inability, or incapacity to act, the second Alcalde, if there was one, and if not, the first
Regidor, or Councilman, assumed the duties of that office. But such jurisdiction was
not, and could not be, under the laws, exercised by the Ayuntamiento, as a body, nor
by one of its members, as a municipal officer. The laws designated such officer to fill,
in certain cases, another office also, and to perform other duties, as well as those of a
municipal character. There was nothing unusual in this ; but it was very natural that
persons unacquainted with the Mexican laws, and the frequent union of judicial, munic-
ipal, and political powers in the same person, under the Mexican system of govern-
ment, should have mistaken the character and source of the powers exercised by that
person. Hence, some of the witnesses in the City claim speak of the Ayuntamiento
as exercising jurisdiction over a large tract of country, meaning that officers of the
Ayuntamiento exercised such jurisdiction. Putting an erroneous construction upon
this testimony, the Commissioners have drawn inferences entirely opposed to Mexican
law ; and then, taking these inferences as a basis, they have argued that the pueblo had
no title, quoting, in support of that argument, incorrect translations of the commentaries
of Spanish law writers !
NOTE 12
COLLECTION OF REPORTS OF THE JUNTA OF 1827.
In their report on the instructions which should be given to Political chiefs of the
Territories of Upper and Lower California, after discussing the old Spanish Regula-
tions and the new Colonization Law of 1824, the members of this Junta say:
"Although, then, the same law directs that the Government, conformably to the prin-
ciples established in it, shall proceed to the colonization of the Territories of the Repub-
lic, it appears that to put it in execution in whatever of the Territories, there ought to
precede, and it is absolutely necessary there should precede, some regulation formed
with a knowledge of the particular circumstances of each Territory, which shall deter-
LAND TITLES IN SAN FRANCISCO. 143
Hart vs. Burnett, et al.—Note 12.
mine the conditions and obligations on which the lands shall be distributed, so that by
these means the desired end of settlement and cultivation may be obtained, and so that
the introduction of the colonies shall not be burdensome to the natives. In California
there are very especial circumstances which make this regulation more necessary, on
account of the existence of a prior one, whose effects will be perpetuated if some pro-
vision do not alter them and make uniform the new distribution ; also, that in both
Californias the width of the land occupied by the Mexican Eepublic is very unequal,
stretching from nine to ten leagues in Upper California, which is the land held as most
fertile, beautiful and picturesque, unless it be at the upper missions, where it may
extend to fifteen leagues ; under which supposition, there is no room there for foreign
colonization ; and moreover, in those interior parts of Lower California, in which there
might be room, it might be necessary to provide against the spirit of invasion upon the
lands occupied by the native tribes, since the inquietude caused by dislodging them
from their lands would bring no advantage either to the said Indians or to the Repub-
lic, as social communication and friendship ought to be directly desired ; and because
it ought not to be forgotten, that occupation having been made of all the land ; since
the existing missions have, in forming themselves, taken possession before the conver-
sion and reduction of the Gentiles, according to the rigorous law of discoveries, and
planted at the same time the cross and the standard ; that regularly they have chosen
for the missions the rancherias themselves of the Gentiles, or those places which they,
as acquainted with and owners of the land, had destined for the greater convenience
and vicinity to the rivers or springs for their gatherings and campings ; that although
the California Gentiles have not known the right of the division of landed property, it
cannot, therefore, be denied that they have it in the soil where they were born, accord-
ing to the principles of the law of nations, it being the first and inexcusable step toward
their civilization, to cause them to know and recommend to them how appreciable is
that right ; and in this view, the said ancient Christian Indians, neophytes and cate-
chumens, ought to be considered with a right of preference in the distribution, which
ought to be arranged between them and the settlers, in the proportion which their cir-
cumstances respectively admit, since, for the catechumens and strictly neophytes, it
may be necessary that they shall be directed in the cultivation, or that they remain in
community; and lastly, because the distribution of estates being so interesting a work,
and any mistake once made is not easily repaired, care ought to be taken in each instance
in giving to those who have the disposition and necessary means for cultivating it ; for
there never will be a society of cultivators, supposing each man who wishes land has
nothing to do but to come and ask it, and scratch it over in order that it shall at once
produce immediately and daily what is necessary for the subsistence of themselves and
family.
" The Junta think, therefore, that the instructions which are given to the new chief, on
this point, ought to be reduced to this : that he inform himself of what has been done,
in pursuance of the said provisions in the Spanish Regulations ; in what State he finds
the distributions of lands ; which are those occupied by the Missions ; if there be any
vacant lands, and their quality and extent; what number of persons, of the settlers,
or Indians, have the capacity of cultivating for themselves ; and in case there are some
of them who undoubtedly have it, that they provide that of the common lands of the
respective Missions to which they are attached, and taking care that there remain enough
for the maintenance of the neophytes and catechumens ; they shall assign to them, that
which appears proportionate for their cultivation ; with the reservation of rendering an
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account to the Supreme Government, for its approbation ; and saving the provisions of
the regulations, which shall be formed to prescribe the conditions and obligations to
which the divisions of land shall be subject."
This Junta was, evidently, of the opinion that the law of 1824 did not repeal the
existing laws relating to the powers of Governors of Territories to grant lands, but was
simply intended to extend those powers to foreign colonization.
NOTE 13.
GRANTS OF LAND BY GOVERNORS, WITHIN THE LIMITS
OF PUEBLOS.
The following is a list of the grants, and pretended grants, made by Governors, with-
in, or partly within, the limits of the Pueblo of San Francisco :
November 30th, 1836. Governor Gutierrez to F. Guerrero; 400 varas north of the
Mission, and on the Yerba Buena road. This does not purport to be anything more
than a provisional grant, and further proceedings were intended to be taken in the mat.
ter. It has been confirmed as an equitable claim.
May 21st, 1839. Governor Alvarado to S. Vallejo and J. P. Leese ; 200 by 100
varas on the point of the " disembarcadero de Yerba Buena. We think that no well-
informed person, acquainted with the forms and language of grants in this country,
would imagine this a grant of land in full ownership. Perhaps, however, it was such
an equitable claim as ought to have been confirmed. Upon that question, we have no
opinion to express.
October 10th,. 1839. Governor Jimeno to J. C. Bernal; one square league, being
"Rincon de Salinas y Potrero Viejo." It will be seen, by an examination of the Ar-
chives, that Bernal applied for a grant of this land, and " La Visitacion," on the 2d of
November, 1834, two days before the order was issued, by the Governor, for organizing
the Pueblo of San Francisco. On the 2d of January, 1835, Governor Figueroa
decreed on this petition as follows :
" As it appears, from the preceding reports, that the land asked for by Jose Cornelio
Bernal, is of the property of the Pueblo of San Francisco de Asis, to which it serves
as ejidos for the common cattle, the petition is not granted, as it cannot be given in
ownership, (en propiedad) but the party interested may keep his cattle there, the same as
other citizens do," &c.
When the same party again applied, in 1839, for this grant, the authorities of the
pueblo, and the person in charge of the Mission, were consulted, and both gave their
written consent to the grant. Only a small portion of the grant falls within the pueblo
limits.
January 25th, 1840. Governor Alvarado to J. J. Noe; 300 varas, called " Comari-
tos," " at the estero and embarcadero of the ex-Mission of San Francisco." It appears
from the expediente in this case, that the consent of the municipal authority of San
Francisco, and of the person in charge of the ex-Mission, was asked and given, before
the grant, and that it was made subject to the rules of police which the town (poblucion)
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might afterwards establish ; thus showing that it was" considered to be within the pue-
blo limits.
February 27th, 1843. Governor Micheltorena to J. Y. Limantour ; four square
leagues, covering the largest portion of the lands of the Pueblo of San Francisco.
This claim has been rejected on the ground of fraud, and under such circumstances as
to remove all chances of its ever being again galvanized into life. Had the papers all
been genuine, the very fact of the attempt on the part of the Governor to grant, to a
single individual, nearly all the lands of the pueblo, without the knowledge or con-
sent of that municipality, was sufficient evidence of illegality, if not of fraudulent intent.
May 1st, 1844. Governor Micheltorena to F. and R. Haro; one-half league, cal-
led " Potrero de San Francisco." The provisional title in this case is undoubtedly
genuine, but it was made subject to the measurement of the ejidos of San Francisco.
The subsequent title in full property is now generally considered to be spurious. At
the time the provisional grant was made, the Governor and Secretary were evidently
aware of the existence of this pueblo, and its right to lands ; but they did not know
the exact boundaries of the four square leagues, and hence the condition was inserted,
and the grant made provisional. Perhaps this provisional grant, with occupation, con-
stitutes a good equitable claim for the land, and if so, it ought to be confirmed. Upon
that question we shall express no opinion.
December 23d, 1845. Governor Pico, to J. J. Noe ; one square league. The
petition in this case was referred to the municipal officer of San Francisco for report,
and the grant made on his recommendation. Nearly one-half is within the pueblo
limits.
February 10th, 1846. Governor Pico to Santillan ; three square leagues. This
grant is bounded on the north by Yerba Buena ; northeast by the Presidio of San
Francisco ; west by the lands of Francisco Haro ; south by a part of the rancho of the
Sanchez, and east by the bay of San Francisco. It therefore includes nearly the whole
of the pueblo claim, all grants to private individuals north of the rancho of Sanchez
and De Haro, and probably a portion pertenencias of the fort. There was no expedi-
ente, and no reports of local authorities ; nor was the consent of the municipal authorities
of San Francisco ever asked or given. These facts, outside and independent of all
other testimony, were, we think, sufficient to show great irregularity if not fraudulent
intent on the part of the Governor, if he really made the grant at the time it bears
date. But there are circumstances which prove that it could not have been made at
that time. Moreover, the style and words of the grant itself, so different from the
usual form, are sufficient, without any other evidence, to raise doubts of its genuineness.
May 6th, 1846. Governor Pico, to Jose Andrade ; six hundred varas in front of
ex Mission of San Francisco. The expediente in this case is found in the Archives,
entirely complete, and there can be no question of the genuineness of the grant.
There was no map, nor any definite description of the land in the petition or grant
;
the grantee was to have furnished a map, but neglected to do so. The claim was
therefore rejected for want of any definite boundaries. It however was in front of the
Mission, included the Mission garden, and was near the old Mission tannery. It was
consequently included within the tract of land which it is pretended that the same
Governor had previously granted to Santillan.
July 24th, 1846. Governor Pico, to Fitch & Guerrero ; one-half a league, called
" Parage del Arroyo." The expediente of this title is found in the archives, and its
10
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genuineness is beyond dispute. The petition bears date May 13th, 1846, and admits
that the land asked for pertains to the ejidos of San Francisco ; the consent of the
municipal authorities was therefore asked and obtained. But the grant itself was not
issued till July 24th, and approved July 30th, 1846, long after Governor Pico's author-
ity in this part of California had been replaced by the conquering power. Although
the title is, on that account, utterly null and void as against the conqueror, yet its gen-
uineness is indisputable, and, together with the Andrade expediente, it furnishes the
best possible evidence that Pico had not, at that time, made the Santillan grant ; for
otherwise, how could he have made these ^ibsequent grants for lands almost in the
middle of the tract which he had already granted to Santillan ? There could have
been no mistake by the Governor about localities. The Santillan grant included all
the land formerly occupied by the Mission which had not previously been granted,
being bounded by Yerba Buena, the Presidio, the Bay, and the Eanchos of De
Haro and Sanchez. The lands granted to Andrade, Fitch & Guerrero were unques-
tionably within the limits of the tract which purports to have been granted to Santil-
lan, and this fact must have been known, at the time, to the Governor, if he really
had made the Santillan grant. It was impossible for him to have been ignorant of
that fact. If the latter are genuine, and no one doubts their genuineness, the former
must be a forgery or ante-dated. And yet this evidence and other official documents
of equal importance, to be found in the archives, were never made of record in the
Santillan case. It is said that the agent sent by the government to examine the
archives with reference to this and the Limantour claim, reported that the archives
contained nothing whatever against the genuineness of the Santillan grant ! If this
be so, why were these documents overlooked 1 Everybody at all acquainted with the
records knew of their existence ; copies of them were filed in the Land Commission, in
the United States District Court, and in the office of the United States Attorney Gen-
eral ! and yet it is said the government agent and government attorney knew nothing
of their existence—could not find anything against the genuineness of the grant
!
All the records in California and Mexico could be searched for evidence to defeat a
genuine grant to a poor Mexican, in some remote corner of California, where the land,
even now, is not worth twelve and a half cents per acre, and thousands of dollars
could be expended to accomplish this object for the benefit of some squatter whose
only merit consisted in his controlling a dozen votes at an election ; and yet, in this great
Santillan claim, the fraudulent character of which has been proclaimed in all the
newspapers for the last ten years, covering millions and millions of property held by
thousands of people under titles derived from the municipal authorities of San Fran-
cisco, not a particle of documentary evidence could be found in the archives against
its genuineness ! Surely, in this matter of land titles in California, there has been, on
the part of government officials, much straining at gnats and a most extensive swal-
lowing of camels ! This claim was confirmed by the Land Commissioners, and the
United States Circuit and District Judges ; but, notwithstanding the want of proper
evidence against it, it has been finally rejected by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Even if that tribunal had confirmed it, and a patent had been issued, no
ejectment suit could have been sustained in the State Courts, with the evidence in the
archives proving its fraudulent character, against any one holding under the pueblo or
city of San Francisco. The Supreme Court of this State has plainly foreshadowed
this result in the foregoing opinion.
It is to be hoped, that hereafter our citizens will learn wisdom from experience, and
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pay no more blaek-mail to speculators in such claims as these of Limantour, Santillan
and Sherback. If they hold valid titles under the pueblo or city of San Francisco,
they may rest secure in their possessions. Patents issued by the Federal Government
to others will be of no avail against them. The Federal authorities have no more
power to dispose of these lands than they have to deed away the lands of Astor, in
New York, or Girard, in Philadelphia.
There are some half dozen grants of solares made within the pueblo by Governors,
between 1835 and 1846. The reason of this is very obvious. One of these was to an
Alcalde who, of course, could not grant to himself; two or three were on the beach, at
the place where the Governor had prohibited the Ayuntamiento from making grants, at
that particular time, and those at the Mission were of larger size than the Alcalde or
Juez de Paz had been authorized to make. But not one of these is in the shape of a
colonization grant, nor were they made of record in the Governor's office. They were
signed by the Governor and sent to the municipal officers with directions to mark out
the lot and put the grantee in possession. They therefore become of record in the
pueblo, and were, to every intent and purpose, pueblo titles.
It is seen from this examination that there is nothing in the records of the proceed-
ings of the former Government which is opposed to the view of the Supreme Court in
this case, but very much to confirm and establish its correctness.
We had intended to refer to grants by Governors within, or partially within, the
limits of other pueblos in California ; but to do so would make this Note much longer
than our space will allow. It may, however, be stated in general terms, that the records
of other pueblos fully sustain the opinion of the Supreme Court on this point. Although
the Governors and Deputations exercised the powers which unquestionably belonged to
them, to grant lands within^the limits of pueblos jor pueblo purposes, they did so with
the consent and approval of the municipal authorities, and the land so granted was
made subject to the canon of the pueblo. "We know of no attempt to dispose of such
lands in violation of the object of their original assignment—the building up and sup-
port of the town. Grants for farming purposes on the outskirts of a town, and distant
from the population, were probably at that time deemed as advantageous to the town
settlements, as were grants of solares where the population was principally located.
The former were probably at that time regarded in the light of suerte grants, which
were always considered as one of the essential means of building up a pueblo, and pro-
viding for the support of its population. The Governor and Deputation or Junta were
the proper judges of the propriety of making such grants and of their extent, provided
they were not made in violation of the objects for which such land had previously been
assigned and dedicated. If they violated their duty in this respect, they were subject
to punishment, and the laws provided a mode by which their acts might have been
declared null and void.
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NOTE 14
THE BURI-BURI EANCHO PAPERS.
The following is the substance of the papers connected with the juridical possession
of the Sanchez or Buri-Buri Rancho. The meaning and effect of these documents are
clearly set forth and explained in the opinion of the Court.
Jose Sanchez had petitioned for this Rancho in 1833, and Governor Figueroa
referred the petition to the Commandant of San Francisco and the priests in charge of
the neighboring Missions. The reports were favorable, and the land was subsequently
granted. Sanchez, having received his grant, applied in November, 1835, to the
Alcalde, Francisco de Haro, for the juridical possession. A notice was accordingly
issued to Gumercindo Flores, Superintendent of Dolores, to appear at the Rancho of
Buri-Buri in order that, representing the boundary rights of the pueblo, he might wit-
ness the measurement. Flores complied with this order, and in the proceedings of
juridical possession, he is mentioned as appearing for that pueblo, as the only colindante
or coterminous neighbor. This would make the extent of the pueblo lands consider-
ably more than the four square leagues to which it was entitled by law, and would seem
to require, in order to give the claim to the surplus any validity, a distinct grant from
the Governor and Territorial Deputation. It does not appear that any such grant was
ever made. Flores very probably then regarded the Buri-Buri Rancho and the Laguaa
de Merced as the southern boundary of the pueblo, and possibly may, as he has sworn,
have so reported on the 4th of November, 1835, to the Governor, who was Jose Castro ;
but Castro himself swears that he never knew of any marking out of the pueblo bound-
aries. Moreover, if there had been any official action taken upon Flores' report, it
would undoubtedly have been known to Jimeno when he reported on the petition of
De Haro's sons for the Potrero in 1844. The probability is, therefore, that if Flores'
report reached the Governor, it was never acted upon, and was afterwards forgotten
even by the Governor himself.
While, therefore, it is possible that the copy sworn to by Flores may be a correct
transcript of an original signed by him, yet, in the absence of any trace of such original
and the positive testimony of Governor Castro, there is reason to doubt its genuineness.
Moreover, the circumstantial evidence deduced from the archives is strongly opposed to
the correctness of Flores' recollection of the real facts of the case. On the fifteenth
of August, 1835, Jose Antonio Galindo petitioned to the Governor for a tract of land
north of Sanchez's Rancho and adjacent to the Laguna de Merced. This petition was,
on the fifth of September, referred by Governor Castro to the "Ayuntamiento of San
Francisco," and also to Flores, as the person in charge of the Mission, for reports.
The former reported that the land had previously pertained to the Mission, but made
no objection to the grant, nor did that body say anything of its being within the pueblo
limits ; and on the thirteenth of September, Flores reported that he could not say if
the land asked for could be granted, because the ejidos and jiropios of the pueblo had
not been marked out. The records show that the place so asked for was granted to
Galindo on the twenty-seventh of September, 1835. It is hardly probable that Flores
was ignorant of this grant on the fourth of November following, at which time, he
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says, he reported to the Governor that he had established " as the boundary of this
pueblo, the Rancho of Buri-Buri, from the port of San Francisco up to the Laguna of
San Bruno, and thence to the Laguna of Merced, it being notorious that this lake
reaches the sea." This boundary includes the tract just granted to Galindo by the
same Governor to whom Flores pretends to have made this report, on the recommeda-
tion of De Haro, the Alcalde, who, with Flores, established this boundary on the south,
and yet neither seems to have taken any notice of this report, if it was really made.
It certainly was a somewhat strange and unusual proceeding to authorize Flores to fix
these boundaries, without consulting the Ayuntamiento or Alcalde, his superiors in
authority. The story of Flores about an order from the Supreme Government of Mex-
ico, communicated to him by the Governor, respecting these boundaries, is evidently a
fiction or an old man's dream ; there is no trace of any such order. That read to him
by De Haro was probably the condition about juridical possession contained in San-
chez's grant.
NOTE 15.
CONDITION OF ARCHIVES.
It is a notorious fact that since the evidence was taken in the claim of San Francisco
to its pueblo lands, a very large number of documents belonging to the old Govern-
ment Archives, have been discovered at Benicia, and restored to their proper place.
The documents so found and restored, contained the most important evidence against
the Limantour claim. Possibly an examination of these papers might bring to light
something new connected with the City claim. But after all these recent restorations,
the Archives, in charge of the Surveyor General, are exceedingly defective. Portions
of some important public papers are wanting, and of others which are referred to in
those now in the Archives, no trace can be found. There is no record of the corres-
pondence of the various Governors, from 1832 to 1837, inclusive, except loose scraps
of paper. Either the correspondence during this period was never recorded, or else the
books of record are lost. But the greatest loss to San Francisco, is the disappearance
of nearly all the old pueblo Archives. Those who were familiar with the Alcalde's
office, on the plaza, in 1849, will remember the great mass of old papers which were
stored away in a back room of that building. Of all these, only some books of record,
and a few bundles of miscellaneous papers, now remain. What became of the others,
no one seems to know. The probability is that they were destroyed by one of the
numerous fires that swept over that part of the city. Possibly, however, more have
been saved than we yet have any knowledge of; for some old papers which must form-
erly have belonged to the pueblo Archives, have since been found in the hands of
private persons. It appears that the law of 1850, which abolished the office of Alcalde,
made no provision for the custody of the miscellaneous papers which the Alcaldes then
had under their charge. At San Jose they fell into the hands of the Mayor of that
city, and at Monterey they were turned over to the County Recorder. But in San
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Francisco, probably none of the new officers deemed it their duty to look after such
papers. Each took out what he supposed to be assigned to him by law, and the re-
mainder were forgotten or neglected at the time, and subsequently were either plunder-
ed, or destroyed by fire.
Fortunately, enough have been preserved to place beyond reasonable doubt the fact
that a pueblo was organized here in 1834, and that it subsequently claimed and exercised
some right in, and some authority over land. In the absence of positive testimony to
show that this was a special exception, we must resort to the general laws to determine
the character of such right and authority, and the extent and boundaries of such land.
That they do so determine these matters, is, we think, most conclusively established
by the decision of the Court in this case.
NOTE 16
BOUNDARIES OF THE PUEBLO OF SAN FRANCISCO.
Judge Baldwin has proved, beyond any question, that the Pueblo of San Francisco
was entitled by law, at the time of its organization at the end of 1834, to four square
or common leagues of land, to be measured from the center of the Presidio square, as
a starting point. He has also shown that the fort and its appurtenances, and the church,
burying-ground, gardens, and priest's house, and the curtileges at the Mission, were
reserved from the operation of the general rights of that municipality, and that although
the " Mission lands " might, at the time, have been exempted from its right of posses-
sion, yet, when that establishment was secularized, such lands within the limits of the
four square leagues, became subject to the ordinary rules governing pueblo lands. He
has also indicated the mode of determining the boundaries of these four square leagues,
according to the provisions of Spanish law. Let us examine the provisions of that
law, applicable to this case, and see how these boundaries are to be determined.
The Ordinanzas de Tierras y Aguas contain instructions for surveying lands, both
under municipal claims, and grants to private persons. In chapters eleven and twelve,
referred to by the Court, we have directions for surveying out town plats. The exam-
ple taken is that of the Fundo legal of a Pueblo de Indios, which was usually twelve
hundred varas in each direction, although much larger dimensions were sometimes
given. The directions for surveying out such a town or pueblo, are to be found on
page ninety-six, of these Ordinances. It says that after giving the usual notices to the
neighboring pueblos, and other near residents, and appointing the proper measurers,
viewing the locality, &c, the Judge of the place, (la Justicia del lugar) is to determine
the center, or starting point, conformably to the law which was in force at the time of
the first foundation of each pueblo (conforme a la leg que rigiese al tiempo de la fundacion
primitiva de cada pueblo) ; and having so fixed the central point, he is to measure six
hundred varas to each wind, that is, east, west, north, and south, and at these points
draw perpendiculars, so as to enclose the required area; vide fig. 11, p. 81, of same
work. But the instruction goes on to say, that when the full six hundred varas can-
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not be taken in one direction, the deficiency must be made up in another, so that the
amount of land included shall be equivalent to a square of twelve hundred varas on
each side, or one million, four hundred and forty thousand square varas, the same as in
measuring sitios de ganado y caballcrias (
'
' con advertencia de que los que les faltaren para
un viento o rumbo, se les ha de compensar en otro ; de manera que siempre queden
reintegradas los seis cientos varas correspondientes a cada rumbo, en la parte donde
tuvieren cabimento
; y la practica de estas medidas, es en la misma forma, en cuanto
a lo judicial, que los de sitios o caballerias, a la cual se arreglara, daduole al fundo la
forma cuadrada, segun queda explicado en el capitulo anterior a este").
By referring to the modes designated for surveying such tracts or grants, (sitios y
caballerias) we see that the general outline must be modified to suit the particular cir-
cumstances of each case, as where the lines so run meet the sea, a lake, the private
lands of others, etc., always approximating, as nearly as the nature of the ground will
admit to a square or rectangle. Ordenanzas de Tierras y Aguas, cap. 10.
It will be noticed that these instructions for marking out the fundo legal of a pueblo
are not based upon the supposition of a special grant to such pueblo, but that the
starting point and boundaries are to be determined according to the law which was in
force at the time the pueblo was firstfounded.
It will also be noticed that, although the particular case of a Pueblo de Indios of
twelve hundred varas square is here taken, by way of example, the instruction is
intended to be general for all fundos legales of pueblos, and applies equally to those
Pueblos de Indios which were entitled by law to a square league or more of land, and to
Pueblos de Espanales, or of Gente de razon, which by law were entitled to four square
or common leagues.
Let us now apply these rules to the measurement of the four square leagues which
the Supreme Court has here decided to have been assigned to the pueblo of San Fran-
cisco by the law of its foundation. According to the order of the Commandant Gen-
eral to the Governor, directing the conversion of Presidios into Pueblos, the point from
which the survey must be made, is the center of the old Presidio plaza. Beginning at
that point, (which can readily be found) let us first run west; at a distance of say
about one mile, we meet the ocean. According to the instructions, we now return to
the point of beginning, and run in another direction, say to the east, so as to make up,
wholly or in part, what was wanting of one league on the first line; but at the distance
of say about a league and a quarter, we strike the bay of San Francisco. Again, run-
ning north we also strike the bay at a distance of less than a mile. We now run south
a distance, say to the point marked A, (on the map facing title page) such that an east
and west line drawn at that point from the ocean to the bay shall include just four
square leagues of land, exclusive of the military reserve at Fort Point, and the church
buildings, etc., at the Mission.
It is thus shown that the law itself fixed the boundaries of the fundo legal to which
the pueblo of San Francisco was entitled at the time of its foundation, near the end of
1834; there was no need of a survey or actual designation of boundaries in order to
"segregate" this quantity of land from the public domain, nor was there any "idefi-
niteness of boundaries," those twin phantoms which, like horrible nightmares, have, at
periodical intervals, weighed so heavily upon the consciences of Land Commissioners
and Courts.
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NOTE 17.
STATEMENT TO THE JUNTA, FEBKUARY 16th, 1840.
The following paragraph is the only one referring to pueblo lands to be found in this
statement. We give the original as well as a translation.
"Ejidos.—Ninguna de los indicadas poblaciones, a excepcion de Monterey tienen
demarcardas los ejidos y terrenos de propios que a cada una de los municipalidades
debe fijarseles para que reconoscan su fundo legal, y por cuyo razon el Gobierno, al
hacer los concessiones de terrenos en las immediaciones los ha adjudicada muy provis-
ionalmente, a'la espero de dicho arreglo, y sobre este particular se han pedido repeti-
damente los informes convenientes V. E. a la vista de todo y haciendo uso de la
facultad que le es concedida en la parte 1 del Art. 45, de la mencionada ley y do
acuerdo con el Gobierno arreglara lo conveniente."
[translation.]
" Commons.—No one of said towns, except Monterey, have surveyed out the ejidoa
and lands of propios which ought to be settled for each one of the municipalities in
order that they may know theirfundo legal, and for that reason the Executive, in mak-
ing grants of lands in their vicinity, has made them merely provisional, waiting such
settlement, and on this matter the suitable reports have been repeatedly asked for, so
that your Excellency, in view of all, and using the power which is given in the first
part of Art. 45 of said law, ("of March 20th, 1837) and in concert with the Executive,
will determine what is proper."
It will be readily seen that there is nothing in this statement respecting the granting
or assigning of lands to pueblos, nor is there a word in it to authorize the inference
that pueblos had no right or title to lands. It merely refers to the survey or marking
out of lands of pueblos. If they then had no lands or right to lands, what lands were
to be surveyed ? If, as held by the Court, they were entitled by law to four square
leagues, to be surveyed out according to ordinance, the language of this statement is
sensible and proper ; but if they had no right or title to land, it has no meaning
whatever.
NOTE 18
APPROVAL OF FIGUEROAS ACT IN ESTABLISHING
THE PUEBLO.
A number of authorities are referred to by Judge Baldwin, to sustain his position
that, even supposing the approval of Governor Figueroa's act, in establishing a pueblo
at San Francisco, by the Supreme Executive of Mexico was necessary, such approval
must be presumed. We give some of these authorities.
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In delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court, in the case of the
United States vs. Clarke, 8 Peters' Eep. p. 452, Chief Justice Marshall says :
" It has been already stated that the acts of an officer, to whom a public duty is as-
signed by his King, within the sphere of that duty, are, prima facie, taken to be within
his power. This point was fully considered, and clearly stated by this Court, in the
case of Arredondo, and the principles on which the opinion rests are believed to be too
deeply founded in law and reason, ever to be successfully assailed. He who would
controvert a grant executed by the lawful authority, with all the solemnities required
by law, takes upon himself the burthen of showing that the officer has transcended the
powers conferred upon him, or that the transaction is tainted with fraud." * * * *
" The Viceroys of New Spain and Peru, who were also Governors, possessed almost
unlimited powers on this and other subjects ; but in distant provinces, or where sea
intervenes, the right of giving title to lands was invested in their Governors, with
the advice of the King's fiscal ministers, and of the Lieutenant-General, where he may
be stationed. No public restraint appears to have been imposed on the exercise of this
power. The officer and his conduct were of course under the supervision and control
of the King and his ministers, and especially of his Council of the Indies."
Again, in Delassus vs. the United States, 9 Peters' Eep., p. 134, the Chief Justice
says :
" A grant or a concession made by an officer who is by law authorized to make it,
carries with it prima facie evidence that it is within his powers. No excess of them,
or departure from them, is to be presumed. He violates his duty by such excess, and
is responsible for it. He who alleges that an officer intrusted with an important duty,
has violated his instructions, must show it."
And again, in Strother vs. Lucas, 12 Peters' Eep., p. 437, the Court says:
" No principle can be better established by the authority of this Court, than that the
acts of an officer to whom a public duty is assigned by his King, within the sphere of
that duty, are prima facie taken to be within his powers." * * * * " Where the act
is done contrary to the written order of the King, produced on the trial, without any
explanation, it shall be presumed that the power has not been exceeded ; that the act
was done on the motives set out therein, and according to some order known to the
King and his officers, though not to his subjects."
Moreover, the same tribunal has decided that where a law of Congress conferred
upon the President only, power to do a particular act, and that act was performed by
a subordinate officer, as the Secretary of War, it must be presumed that it was done by
the orders of the President.
Suppose it be admitted that Governor Pigueroa's act in establishing a pueblo in San
Francisco, required the approval of the Executive of Mexico, it must be presumed,
until the contrary is shown, that this act was so approved ; such approval was very
different from the passage of a law ; it was simply an executive act, and might have
been communicated verbally, or by a letter which never became a matter of record.
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NOTE 19
GRANTS BY MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES OF SAN FRAN-
CISCO, PRIOR TO JULY 7th, 1846,
In order to show by whom, and in what manner, the power conferred upon the munic-
ipal authorities to grant lands in the pueblo of San Francisco was exercised, we sub-
join a list of such grants made between 1835 and the date of the conquest of the United
States. This schedule is taken in part from Wheeler's land tiltes, and in part from
official records. It may not be entirely complete, but it is sufficiently accurate for our
purpose. The figures in the column under the head of " quantity," represent Castillian
varas.
It may be proper to remark that although the Ayuntamiento was organized at the end
of 1834, and assumed the functions of its office in the beginning of 1835, it did not
immediately begin to grant lots in private ownership to settlers. In fact, there were
very few settlers who required grants. The pueblo was then formed mostly of the
neighboring rancheros who lived a large portion of the year upon their farms, and who
found sufficient accommodation in the vacant buildings of the old Presidio, when, as
members of the Ayuntamiento, they were required to reside in the newly established
pueblo. As shown in another place, some of them strongly objected to being required
to remove here with their families. Some of the discharged soldiers had already
received small grants near the Presidio, and some few lots in that vicinity were assigned
to others by the Ayuntamiento, soon after its organization. But the latter were not
granted in full property, but by a kind of provisional title, or permission to occupy, as
the Ayuntamiento was then in correspondence with Governor Pigueroa respecting their
authority to make grants, and the manner of forming the town. The Governor post-
poned giving any instructions till he could consult the Deputation. That body acted
upon this matter the 22d of September, 1835, and Castro, acting in Pigueroa's place,
who was then upon his death bed, transmitted that action to the Ayuntamiento on the
23d of September.
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SCHEDULE OF GRANTS BY MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES
OF SAN FRANCISCO, BETWEEN THE YEAR
1835, AND JULY 7th, 1846.
Date of
Grant.
BY WHOM SIGNED. GRANTEE. Quan itv DESCRIPTION, &C.
1836
June 2, Estudillo, Alcalde W. A. Richardson 100 No. In Yerba Buena
July 8, " " J. P. Leese 100 No. 56 "
1837
Mar. 14, Martinez, Alcalde J. Fuller 100 No. 24
Nov. 8, a
a F. Sanchez 100 No. 76
Dee. 7,
CC it
J. Feil 200 x 50 No. 1
1838
Mar. 30, De Haro, Alcalde F. Casares 100 No. 49 "
Dec. 1, a
tt W. Gulnac 200 x 50 a a
1839
Jan. 18, tt
tt
S. Vallejo No. ?
April 18, a it J. Pena No. %
Dec. 1, Guerrero, J. de P. W. Hinckley 100 x 50 No. 19 "
Dec. 9, " " J. C. Davis 100 No. 18
1840
Jan. 15, a
a
J. P. Leese 100 No. 7
" a it J. A. Vallejo 50 No. 3
" it tt J. B. Cooper 100 No. 50
a it tt J, Vioget 100 x 50 No. 23
Jan. 16,
it tt " 100 x 50 Back Leese house "
Aug. 4, tt a G. Escolante In Yerba Buena
Nov. 18,
tt
it tt
tt tt
L. Galindo
C. Valencia
F. Gomez
50
50
50
At Dolores
tt
1842
Mar. 8, Sanchez, J. de P. W. Hinckley 50 "
" a a G. Allen 50 No. 21 Yerba Buena
May 1, tt a P. Sherback 50 No. 20 "
Oct. 12,
it it C. Moreno 50 M. Dolores
1843
April tt a V. Miramontes 50 No. 55 In Yerba Buena
" n a F. DeHaro 50 No. 31 "
April 14, a it J. Noe 50 No. 51
" 15, tt tt D. Felis 50 No. 32 "
" 15, a tt J. Bautista 50 No. 33 "
July 3, a tt W. A. Leisdesdorff 100 x 50 Nos. 49, 30 "
Aug. 15, a a B. Valencia 50 No. 16 "
Aug. 20, tt tt D. Felis 200 In Dolores
Oct. 15, tt tt G. Escolante 50 No. 15 In Yerba Buena
Nov. 15, it a F. Guerrero 50 No. 4
Dec. 15, tC tt T. Malla 50 No. 154 "
156 LAND TITLES IN SAN FRANCISCO.
Hart vs. Burnett, et al.
Date of
Grant.
BY WHOM SIGNED. GRANTEE. Quantity DESCRIPTION &c.
1843
Dec. 15, Sanchez, J. de P. H.Bee 50 No. In Yerba Buena
« " " J. Castaneda 50 No. 53
n tt a T. Maya 50 No. 54 "
Dec. 27, " " J. Martin 50 No. 35 "
1844
Mar. 10, Hinckley, Alcalde C. W. Fluge 100 No. 26 "
April 1, " " J. Briones 50
"
July 12, a
tc R. Ridley 50 No. 139 "
i( it tt J. R. Berry 50 No. 138 "
July 19, it <c B. Dias & J.P. Mesa 50 No. 17
Nov. 13, tc
CI C. Glien 50 No. 7
Dec. 1, it
a E. T. Bale 50 No. 136 "
" 15,
a a J. Rose 50 No. 83 "
" 15,
a a A. A. Andrews 50 No. 104 "
" 17,
a a G. Reynolds 50 No. 84 "
" 17, " " E. S. Bernal 50 No. 37
" 21, «
cc
J. P. Dedmund 50 No. 58
" 24, a
a W. Johnson 50 No. 134
" 24, " " W. Richardson 50 No. 59
1845
April 9, Padilla, Alcalde R. Haro 50 No. 174 "
" 18, " " T. Smith 50 No. 66
May 3, a it J. Pena 50 No. 161
" 10, a
tt E. Sota 50 No. 44
" 10, tt
a L. Pena 50 No. 86
Aug. 10, C. Sanchez, Alcalde F. Sanchez 50 No. 25
" 22, a a F. Le Page 50 No.
Oct. 20, cc
cc W. Fisher 50 No. 61
Nov. 25, " " P. Estrada 50 No.
" 30, cc
cc M. Pedrorena 50 No. 74
Dec. 4, cc
cc
S. Smith 100 x 50 No.
" 7,
cc cc G. Briones 50 No. 5
1846
April 2, " " R. T. Ridley 100 In San Francisco
" 22, Noe, J. de P. W. Leidesdorff 50 No. In Yerba Buena
" 22, Sanchez, " J. A. Forbes 50 Nos. 183, 184 "
May 14, Noe, H. Fitch 50 No. 22 "
" 15,
CC tt F.Haen&G.Dopling 50 No. 189 "
" 20,
CC CC W. Hinckley 50 No. 27
" 22, CC
CC E. Grimes 50 No. 140 "
" 22', cc
cc M; Fernandez 50 No. 195 "
" 25, " " Hensley 50 No. 191
" 28, CC
CI Reading 50 No. 8
" 29, CC a W. Hinckley 100 x 50 No.
" 30, it it L. Galindo 50 No. 190
June 3, it tt S. Smith 50 No. 52
" 6,
a a
J. M. S. Maria 50 No. 6 '
" 18, tt a M. E, Mcintosh No. 196 '
"„
19
'
it
a ti D. Garcia
F. Hoen
J. Allig^
No. 273
No. 62
No. 63
June 20,
tt tt
J. Yuvain No. 60
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It appears from this schedule, that from 1835 to 1839, grants of lots, or solares, with-
in the pueblo limits, were signed by the Alcaldes ; that from 1839 to 1843 such grants
were signed by the Jneces de Paz; that from 1843 to 1846 they were signed by the Al-
caldes; and again, near the beginning of 1846, by Jueces de Paz. Immediately after
the conquest, the name of Alcalde was resumed, and continued till the change of the
law, in 1850.
This corresponds, precisely, with the Mexican laws, and the decrees and orders of
the Governors of California. So long as the Ayuntamiento existed, the Alcalde, as
the head officer of the municipality, signed the grants made in the name, and by the
authority of that body. When it was re-placed, under the law of 1837, by the Jueces
de Paz, the latter assumed and exercised the powers of the Ayuntamiento. Again,
in 1843, under the proclamation of Micheltorena, these were superseded by the Alcal-
des of first and second nomination. And again, in 1846, the Juez de Paz officiated for a
few months, till the new government restored the Alcaldes and Ayuntamientos. It is
true that Mr. Justice Colton, at the end of 1849 and beginning of 1850, under the ad-
vice and direction of the Prefect, and during the existence of the Ayuntamiento,
attempted to sell, or grant away the pueblo lands, until the one was enjoined by the
courts, and the other suspended from office by the Governor. Of course, a Justice of
the Peace had no power to make such grants during the existence of Alcaldes and
Ayuntamientos. Not a cent of the money paid for these grants ever found its way
into the municipal treasury. Neither the grantor nor the grantees had any faith or
confidence in their validity. It was simply one of those schemes of plunder which
have given such an unenviable reputation to office-holders in California generally, and
more particularly in San Francisco.
NOTE 20.
RIGHTS OF MILITARY OCCUPATION AND CONQUEST.
The principles of international law applicable to the question here discussed, are so
briefly announced in the opinion of the Court, that perhaps, without explanation, they
are liable to be misunderstood.
Of course, the Court does not mean that the general public domain which had never
been dedicated to particular purposes, or granted in private ownership, is subject to
distribution by the local authorities, during military occupation, and without the license
of the conqueror. To make disposition of such lands, is an act of sovereignty, and
results from political, not municipal, law. But lands assigned to municipalities, cor-
porations, or individuals, in trust, for certain uses and purposes, may be used and dis-
posed of for such purposes during military occupation, or after complete conquest,
precisely the same as before, unless there be an expressed or implied will of the con-
queror, or new sovereign, forbidding or prohibiting the trustee from any longer exer-
cising his trust in the manner originally authorized.
With this explanation, which may, by some, appear unnecessary, the opinion of the
Court is fully sustained by the authorities there referred to.
158 LAND TITLES IN SAN FRANCISCO.
Hart vs. Burnett, et al.—Note 21.
NOTE 21
CITY CHARTERS AND GRANTS IN MEXICO.
Perhaps the City of Mexico furnishes one of the strongest illustrations of the views
of the Court, on this question of special charters and grants. The Spanish and Mexi-
can laws, orders, &c, relating to that city, have been collected and published at differ-
ent times, with commentaries by the various compilers. These works refer to the
charter of nobility which was conferred upon that city July 24th, 154-8, declaring it " The
very noble, notable, and very loyal and imperial City of Mexico," and contain numer-
ous orders and ordinances relating to the powers of the Ayuntamiento over piropios,
pastos, &c. ; and also to the decree of the Emperor, of October 3d, 1539, declaring the
extent of its terminos to be fifteen leagues ; but none of them make allusion to unyfuero,
or charter of incorporation, or grant of land to that city. If there had been any such
charter or grant, would it not be quoted or referred to in these works, or in some of the
collections of Spanish and Mexican laws 1 If any such special charter or grant had
been requisite, would not that city have applied for one centuries ago ? Moreover, if
none but the sovereign power could have made legal grants of lands (solares and suertes)
within such limits, would we not expect to find some orders, delegating that power to sub-
ordinate officers ? If the United States had retained that city, in 1848, as they did San
Francisco, would that municipality, and those holding under it, have been required, by the
law of 1851, to produce a direct grant from the King of Spain, or the Congress of Mexico,
under the penalty of having their lands preempted, and sold as the public domain of
the United States ? Or would it have been sufficient to show that the city existed, and
was recognized as such, with a termino of fifteen leagues, measured from the center of
the great plaza ? But one answer can be given to these questions.
Manual de Providential, tipc, 1834.
Memoria de la Hacienda Municipal, 1830.
NOTE 22
FUEROS.
Schmidt, in his " Civil Law of Spain and Mexico," pp. 64, 65, says :
" The term Fuero, which frequently occurs both in the ancient and modern legisla-
tion of Spain, has various significations, which ought to be understood in order to avoid
confusion. In its most general acceptation, the word Fuero means a law, a code, and
in this sense we say Fuero Juzgo, Fuero Real, etc. 2. It is applied to the general usages
and customs of a province, etc., and in this sense it is used in the phrases, ir contra
fuero, quebrantar el fuero, which means to violate received customs. 3. Grants of priv-
ileges and immunities, as conceder fueros, to grant exemptions. 4. Charters granted
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cities or towns, also designated by the term cartas pueblos. 5. Acts of donation made
to individuals, churches, or convents on certain conditions. 6. Declarations of magis-
trates in relation to taxations, fines, etc. 7. Charters granted by the sovereign, or
those having authority from him, establishing the franchises of towns, cities, etc., and
in this acceptation it is synonymous with Fuero Municipal. It has, moreover, other
significations, and is applied to the place where justice is administered, to the peculiar
forum before which a party is amenable, as well as to the jurisdiction of the tribunal
which is entitled to take cognizance of a cause. This latter distinction it is important
to understand, because no country has so many special or privileged tribunals as Spain.
Among these we need only advert to the fuero ecclesiastico,fueromilitar, faero de marina,
fuero de hacienda,fuero academico or escolaslico, faero de casa de real, fuero de correos,fuero
de comercio, fuero de mineria, etc., or the ecclesiastical, military, naval, fiscal, academ-
ical, etc., forum."
For a full understanding of the different uses of this word, we refer the reader to
Escriche, and especially to his remarks on Fueros Municipales. The absurdity of
attempting to apply the commentaries of Elizondo and othei-s, on these ancient munici-
pal fueros, to Mexican pueblos will then be plainly perceived. "We have alluded in
Note 10 to the origin of these grants of municipal franchises, called Fueros.
NOTE 23
TRANSLATION OF LAWS AND LEGAL DOCUMENTS.
Every lawyer knows how difficult it sometimes is to correctly interpret our own stat-
utes, even with all our knowledge of the language in which they are written, their
intended operation, and the circumstances of their enactment. Courts themselves often
disagree in such interpretation. How much more difficult the interpretation of for-
eign laws, written in a foreign language, and framed with reference to facts, customs
and habits with which Ave are entirely unacquainted. It is frequently impossible
to understand even the purport and object of such statutes, without a knowledge of the
pre-existing laws which they are intended to change or to carry into execution. Add
to these difficulties the impossibility of correctly translating the technical terms of one
system of laws into the exactly corresponding terms of another system which is radi-
cally different, and we see abundant reasons for the greatest caution and the largest
and most liberal views in interpreting and applying such foreign statutes.
The same remarks are applicable to foreign legal instruments and official documents.
On this subject the Supreme Court of the United States very justly remarks : "Papers
translated from a foreign language, respecting the transactions of foreign officers, with
whose powers and authorities we are not well acquainted, containing uncertain and
incomplete references to things well understood by the parties, but not understood by
the Court, should be carefully examined before we pronounce that an officer, holding a
high place of trust and confidence, has exceeded his authority." U. S. v. Perchman,
7 Peters' Rep., p. 95.
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An examination of the numerous Spanish documents and laws filed in the Land
Commission and the United States Courts, with reference to land titles in California,
will satisfy any one who is familiar with the technical and local terms in which they are
written, that not one in ten is correctly translated. Some of these pretended transla-
tions no more resemble the originals than they do the adventures of Gil Bias or of Don
Quixote. Add to this the fact, that not one of the Land Commissioners, and only a
single one of the Judges, who have been appointed to decide upon these titles, under-
stood the language in which they were written, or the system of laws under which they
were issued. And yet, under these circumstances, they have been required to measure
the rights and determine the fortunes of individuals, families and entire communities in
California
!
Judge Story, in his Miscellaneous Writings, p. 586, has given us a striking instance
of a wrong decision resulting from imperfect and incorrect translations. The Com-
missioners for the settlement of claims under the Treaty of February 2d, 1832, with
France, decided that neutral vessels recaptured from privateers after twenty-four hours
possession, belonged wholly to recaptors, relying upon* an American translation of
Azuni on Maritime Law, in which reference is made to the French Ordinance of 1779.
A correct translation of this Ordinance shows that this rule applied only to vessels of
subjects, and that a very different one governed in the case of neutral vessels ! The
Commissioners had therefore adopted a new rule of capture not recognized in interna-
national jurisprudence, and resting only upon a mistranslation of an Ordinance of
Louis XIV.
And yet that translation was more correct than many of those embodied in the
opinions of the Land Commissioners on the claim of the city of San Francisco.
NOTE 24.
POWER OF THE KING OVER LANDS WITHIN THE
LIMITS OF PUEBLOS.
The Land Commissioners, in deciding that the pueblo had no title to land, seem to
have relied mainly on the fact, as shown in the old laws and decrees, that the King re-
tained a prerogative or control over such lands ; and that without his license or authority,
such municipality could not alienate them. The fact itself is not disputed; but the
inference drawn by the Commissioners is by no means a logical conclusion from the
premises. Lands granted to Indians could not be alienated by them, under the laws of
the Indies, except by permission of certain royal officers. Does it follow that Indians
had no title to such lands ? It is true that it was so held by the author of the decision
of Woodworth vs. Fulton ; but the position was too absurd to be sustained by any other
Court. The Legislature of this State has passed laws regulating the powers of the
municipal officers of San Francisco, with respect to city lands, even prohibiting them
from alienating such lands ; would the Commissioners infer from this fact that the title
to these lands was vested in the State of California 2 If the title remained entirely in
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the King, and the pueblos had no vested interest in the lands within their limits, or ter-
minos, why was it declared that even the King himself could not, by grant, divert them
from the object of their assignment or dedication ? That the King could grant, or
authorize others to grant them, in accordance with that object, cannot, we think, be dis-
puted. This is the only sensible construction which can be put upon Law 2, Title V,
Boot VI, of the Recopilacion, which is copied in Law 1, Title XVI, Book VII, of
the Novisima Recopilacion.
NOTE 2 5.
LAWS RELATING TO PUEBLOS AND PUEBLO LANDS.
Great errors have been sometimes committed by the Courts, respecting land titles in
California, not only by applying laws which relate to one class of pueblo lands, to a
class entirely different in its character, as alluded to in this opinion of the Court, on page
,
but also in determining the validity of M xican titles by old Spanish laws which
have not the slightest application to the agrarian system adopted in New Spain soon
after the conquest, and continued in force after Mexico became an independent sover-
eignty. For example, the old laws relating to municipal fueros, alluded to in a preceding
Note, have no more relation to land titles in Mexico, than to land titles in Massachusetts.
It would be as difficult to fully understand the titles by which land is, or has been,
held in England, without going back to the history of the origin of these titles, of which
we have an account in Book 2, Chapter V, of Blackstone's Commentaries, as it is to
understand the exact nature of land titles in Mexico, without reference to the agrarian
system of the Indians, upon which the old Spanish system was engrafted, and by which
it was modified and changed in many essential particulars. This is more particularly
true with respect to lands within the limits of cities, pueblos, and villages. Without
some knowledge of the ancient Mexican laws relating to lands, it is utterly impossible
to understand the purport of many laws found in the Recopilacion de Indias respecting
pueblos, poblaciones, reducciones, &c. The limits of these Notes will admit but a brief
allusion to this subject.
At the time of the conquest of Mexico by the Spaniards, that country was divided
into three independent monarchies, each monarchy being subdivided into separate lord-
ships, afterwards called cacicazgos, and the lands of each cacicazgo^ was divided into six
different classes :
1st. Lands assigned for the support of religious worship, which were cultivated by
the Indians en comun, under the directions of the priests, who also had entire control
of the products.
2d. Lands assigned for the support of the government or administration. These
were not grantable, but went with the lordship, or what the Spaniards called the
senorio ; they were called Tlatacamilli.
3d. Lands called Tecpantlalli, the income from which was devoted to the support of
the cacique, but could not be alienated by him.
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4th. This class of lands was considered as the patrimony of the caciques, and was
g -anted by them to the subaltern chiefs called Tecallec, who could transfer them to each
other, but could not alienate them to individuals of the common class, called Macehualli.
5th. Lands called Pil-lalli, which were rented or contracted out by the owners, to the
lower classes, for cultivation, and other purposes.
6th. Lands called Altepe-tlalli, which were held by certain families, or communities,
forming a kind of parish, town, or municipality, called calpulli. The lands of each
calpulli were divided up into lots, and assigned to individuals for cultivation, and other
uses. There were six classes of such assignments, according to the objects and pur-
poses of their use. The last of these classes was the assignment of lots to individuals
for their own use, each one being considered the owner of the lot which was so assigned
to him. He could transmit it to his heirs, or exchange it for any other lot in the same
calpulli, but he could not sell it, and his title was forfeited if he abandoned it for the term
of two years. This class of lands was subsequently denominated by the Spaniards,
tierras de comunidad, or, tierras de Parcialidades, and sometimes tierras comunes.
Such is a brief summary of the land laws of Mexico at the time of the conquest by
the Spaniards. The latter were disposed to pay very little regard to the rights of the
conquered, whether of community or of individuals. But the king soon came to the
rescue of his new subjects, and issued various orders and decrees for the protection of
their rights of property. Of this class are the Ordenanzas de Poblaciones, and other
Pragmaticas and cedulas, afterwards embodied in the Recopilacion de Indias.
But while seeking to protect the rights of the Indians, it was necessary to provide
also for the settlement of the country by the Spaniards, and to reward the early con-
querors by grants of land. Of course, the conquest had conferred upon the news over-
eign all the rights of the ancient Mexican monarchs, and all lands not held by individ-
uals or communities were deemed susceptible of grant by the crown. In order to re-
ward individuals who had engaged in the conquest, or to confer favors upon others
whom the king wished to benefit, large tracts were granted in private ownership, care
being taken in making these grants, not to interfere with the individual or community
rights of the natives.
Again, to carry out the general policy of settling the conquered country described in
Note 10, dispositions were made for establishing towns, in which the Spaniards, whether
holding rural grants or not, were to be collected for mutual security and defense.
These towns were usually denominated Pueblos de Espanoles.
And again, another part of the general plan of civilizing the Indians was to collect
together those who, driven by the conquerors from their ancient homes and means of
subsistence, had taken refuge in the woods and mountains, and were forced to resort to
predatory incursions upon the new settlements, in order to obtain the means of sustain-
ing their precarious existence. These Indian settlements were called Pueblos de Indios,
or simply Poblaciones.
Hence the two different systems of pueblos referred to in the laws of the Indies,
—
systems totally distinct in their nature and character, and well understood by Spanish
and Mexican legislators and lawyers, but too often confounded, and too generally mis-
understood by our own courts.
In carrying out both of these systems of town-settlements, great care was taken that no
intrusion should be made upon the existing rights of the Indians, whether individuals or
communities. Hence it was especially ordered, that, in establishing new towns, they
must be founded in vacant lands, " sin perjuioio de los Indios y naturales, o sin su libre
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consentimiento." Vide Recopilaeion de Indios, Lib. 4, Tit. VII, leys 1 and 23 ; Lib.
6, Tit. 3, ley 9, &c.
Having described the two classes of towns which were recognized in the Hispano-
Mexican system of settlement, viz :
—
Pueblos de Indios and Pueblos de Espanoles—we
will now refer to the various classes of land recognized by that new system of jurispru-
dence, including those within, as well as outside of the town limits.
Lands, as a general rule, were classed as realevgas, concejiles, de comunidad, de Indios
and de dominio particular.
Realengas were lands of the king, that is, lands of the crown or royal patrimony
;
concejiles were lands which belonged to towns, and were subdivided into classes accord-
ing to the character of such towns and the purposes for which they will be used ; tier-
ras de comunidad were the lands granted to, or considered as belonging to the Reduc-
ciones or Pueblos de Indios ; Tierras de Indios were those granted to Indians ; and tierras
de dominio particular were those which had been granted in individual ownership.
Each Pueblo de Espanoles was entitled to have for its administration a municipal
organization or corporation, called an Ayuntamiento, which exercised a certain authoritv
over the territory included within the limits of such pueblo. The land included within
such limits was called concejile, and was usually divided into three different classes, as
stated in the opinion of the Court, viz : Ejidos, which were lands for the common use
of all the inhabitants, as streets, public squares, etc.; Propios, or lands, the products of
which were for defraying the expenses of the municipal administration. These, says
llamirez, were "de dominio comun, pero no publico." And lastly, the great body of the
tierras concejiles, which were intended for division and assignment to the pobladores Or
vecinos, in lots called solares and suertes, and which, when so assigned or granted, become
of private ownership, de dominio particular. There were other subdivisions which it is
unnecessary to mention in this place. They are briefly referred to in the opinion and
in Note 10.
These Pueblos de Espanoles were established under the orders of the Viceroys, and
Presidents, and Governors of Provinces, and their boundaries were such as had been
given by the general laws, or had been assigned by these officers, or by the municipal
authorities themselves, and the expedientes of such demarcation submitted to such
officers for confirmation, subject, of course, as were all such acts, to the approval or
disapproval of the king. The assignment, distribution or grant of the lots
—
solares
and suertes—in such pueblos was made by the Ayuntamientos, in conformity with the
custom which had prevailed in Spanish towns, where no special charters or fueros had
been granted to the lords who ruled over them. Perhaps there was at first no positive
direct written authority for this, but it was exercised for so long a time that the usage
acquired the force of law. But the abuse of this power finally called for remedial
measures, and various orders and decrees were issued restricting its exercise. It was
found that influential persons had contrived to obtain from Ayuntamientos large tracts
of ungranted lands in pueblos which they reduced to tierras de labor, thus depriving
other vecinos of their just rights and preventing the increase of population, as there
were no lands to be granted in solares and suertes to new pobladores who might wish to
establish themselves in such towns. This abuse induced the king in 1618 to declare
the Ley de Toledo, first enacted in 1480, to be in force in America (vigente para Amer-
ica). Vide Recopilaeion de Indios, lib. 4, tit. 12, ley 21 ; Nueva Recop. lib. 7, tit. 7,
ley 3; Novis. Recop. lib. 7, tit. 21, ley 5. This law provides for the restoration of
tierras concejiles which had been appropriated to themselves by individuals, or had been
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granted to them without proper authority and contrary to the object for which they had
been assigned to such towns. Other laws, orders and decrees were subsequently issued
for the same purpose.
In order to understand these laws and orders, it is necessary to know the circum-
stances under which they were issued and the object they were designed to accomplish.
They were not intended to confer powers, but to restrict powers which already existed,
or which at least had been long exercised with the tacit consent of the crown and royal
officers.
Again, it sometimes happened that in organizing these pueblos, no lands were
assigned for ejidos, dehesas and propios, and that the want of such lands was subse-
quently felt by the citizens and municipal authorities to be of serious inconvenience
;
consequently, special laws were issued, positively requiring that such assignment or
designation be made.
And again, it not unfrequently happened that designing persons procured, by a mis-
representation or concealment of the facts, from the Viceroys or direct from the Crown,
special grants of lands within the limits of pueblos already organized, against their
consent and contrary to the interests of said towns and to the objects of their formation.
To remedy these abuses, orders were issued declaring such grants to be null and void.
Without attempting to refer to all the laws upon this subject, we will merely desig-
nate a few which will tend to confirm much that we have here said.
Law 13, Title VII, Book IV, Hecopilacion de Indias, directs that commons (ejidos)
be designated for each town.
Law 14 directs that dehesas be designated next to the ejidos for common pasturage,
etc., and also propios.
Law 1, Title XII of same Book, says : "It is our will that there be divided up and
distributed houses, solares, lands, caballerias and peonias, to all those who shall settle
(pablor) new lands in the pueblos and villages, etc." At the end of four years, the
lands so distributed to persons living in the pueblos, were to be considered as in full
ownership, and thereafter to be freely sold and transferred.
Laws 4, 5 and 8, provide that Viceroys may, by advice of the councils of cities and
towns, grant lots and lands in such towns to pobladores; but that the petitions for such
grants must be made to such town councils, who are to report thereon to the Viceroy
or President and Deputies.
Law 1, Title XVI, Book VII, of the Novisima Recopilacion, says : " Our will and
pleasure is, that our cities, towns and villages preserve their rights, rents and propios,
and that no gift be made of anything of them ; wherefore we command that all gifts of
them, or of any part of them, which we may make to any person, be of no value."
The gifts here referred to, are evidently such as are contrary to the object of the origi-
nal dedication or assignment to cities, towns and villages ; for not only the King, but
also the Viceroys, Presidents, Governors, Deputies, councils and contractors, were
authorized to grant and distribute solares and sowing grounds to the pobladores and
vecinos of towns. The very next law so explains it, for the King there orders property
and lands, pertaining to towns given away by him or his ancestors,—that is, given con-
trary to the object of their original assignment—to be restored. Solares and sowing
grounds, as caballerias and peonias, given to the settlers, and which, by the laws, be-
come in four years theirs in full ownership with right of disposition, were not of course
to be restored.
With this brief notice of the Pueblos de Espanoles, let us now turn to those municipal
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establishments called Pueblos de Indios. The organization of the municipal administra-
tion of the latter did not differ very essentially from that of the former, but the rules
which governed the disposition, and regulated the tenure of lands within their limits,
were entirely dissimilar.
These Pueblos de Indios mostly originated in those regulations or providencias which
were issued immediately subsequent to the conquest for the direction of the operations
carried on, under Eoyal auspices, for the Christianization and civilization of the na-
tives, known and designated in the laws as reducciones. Only a very limited quantity
of lands was usually assigned to such pueblos. This, at one period, was limited to
1200 varas in every direction, and subsequently was extended to one square league,
and in some special cases, a still larger extent was allowed.
The lands assigned to such Pueblos de Indios, partook somewhat of the legal character
of the ejidos of the other class of Pueblos, and were sometimes so denominated in the
laws. No part was set aside as propios, nor were any solares and suertes granted to
individuals in full ownership. Those assigned to individuals for cultivation, &c, were
called tierras de comunidad, and in their legal character, were closely assimilated to
the ancient calpulli, already described. The title of the Indians to the lands of the
pueblo, was regarded as in full property, but pro indiviso, and no individual could alien-
ate the part which might be assigned to him for his use. Portions of this land were
assigned to individuals, and families, for their separate use, while other portions were
cultivated in common, for the common benefit. The latter were sometimes called cornu-
nales, and sometimes tierras comunes, the latter term being also applied to the tierras de
comunidad, or general body of land within the limits of such Pueblo de Indios.
It may be proper to remark that Spaniards were sometimes permitted to settle in the
Pueblos de Indios, but they could acquire no other title to the lands which they might
occupy or cultivate, than that which was accorded to the Indians in like cases.
It was to these Pueblos de Indios, and their lands, called comunales, de comunidad,
and tierras comunes, that many of the laws and ordinances were specially and exclu-
sively directed, and not to the lands of pueblos established by Spaniards. Of this
character are the ordinances of February 23d, 1781, found in chapter twelve of the
Ordinanzas de Tierras y Aguas ; Article thirty-three of the Ordinanzas de Intendentes ;
the decree of the Consejo de Regencia of May 26th, 1810 ; the decree of the Cortez, March
13th, 1811 ; that of November 9th, 1812 ; and many subsequent decrees and orders, as
well as very many of the laws found in the Recopilacion de Indias, especially all those
relating to reducciones and poblaciones. But the law of January 4th, 1813, according to
commentators, refers exclusively to Pueblos de Espanoles. This is manifested by the
terms used, as propios, which class of lands were unknown in Indian pueblos. But the
decrees of April 15th, 1820, and November 24th, 1824, refer to the community lands of
Indian towns ; vide the decree and regulations respecting the Parcialidades de San Juan
y Santiago. And it is to this same class of lands that Article seventy-seven of the law
of March 20th, 1837, refers. The tierras comunes mentioned in that Article, are neither
the tierras concejiles, nor the ejidos of Pueblos of Spaniards, or gente de razon, but the
tierras comunes, or de comunidad, of the Indian Pueblos, which were held by a tenure
entirely different from the other classes of pueblo lands. This is the construction al-
ways put upon it by jurisconsults in Mexico, and we think it is obvious from the terms
of the law itself. But this matter will be considered in the next Note.
We have deemed it necessary to give this sketch of the different kinds of pueblos,
and their lands, even at the risk of repeating what has been said in other Notes, because
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the distinction is not clearly pointed out in the opinion of the Court, and consequently
some of the references there made to laws, might mislead the reader, without this ex-
planation.
NOTE 26.
POWER OF PREFECTS TO GRANT PUEBLO LANDS.
Although the Supreme Court declines to express any opinion with respect to the
power of a Prefect to grant pueblo lands in individual ownership, yet it distinctly as-
serts "that such power is not expressly given by the Act of March 20th, 1837."
As this is the only law referred to by Judge Hoffman in his decision confirming a
Prefect grant, in the claim of Sherbaek, it follows that the opinion of the Supreme
Court of this State, with respect to the meaning and effect of that law, is directly in
conflict with that of the United States District Judge. "Which of these opinions is
correct 1
We have discussed, in the preceding Note, the two kinds of pueblos recognized in
Mexican law, and the division or classification of the lands of each. "We have also
shown that the seventy-seventh Article of the law of March 20th, 1837, refers exclu-
sively to Pueblos de Indios, and not to Pueblos de Espanoles ; that the ejidos and dehesas
of the latter were of dominio publico, and that the jjropios were of dominio comun, but
not publico; while the lands of the former, called de comunidad, and sometimes tierras
comunes, were almost precisely of the nature of the ancient calpulli, and were held pro
indiviso; and that neither of the foregoing classes were grantable in special ownership,
without special license from the crown, or supreme authority ; in fine, that the authority
to dispose of those particular classes of lands, was not included in the ordinary powers
of Ayuntamientos and Alcaldes to grant tierras concejiles in private ownership.
Moreover, it is also snown in the opinion, that by Article eight of the same law, the
Prefects were to report to the Governor with respect to the necessity or public conveni-
ence of allowing Ayuntamientos to alienate pueblo lands ; and that Article nine author-
izes the Governors of Departments to grant such permission, on the previous consent
of the Junta, specifying at the same time, that any cession, donation, or contract made
without such license, should be null and void (nirfo y de ninguna valor). "Would it not
be a very strange thing, if a subsequent Article of that same law conferred upon the
Prefect a power which the Governor himself could not exercise, except in subordina-
tion to the will of the Junta ?
In order to fully understand this Article, we will copy, in full, both the original and
the translation :
"Art. 77. Arreglaran gobernativamente y conforme a las leyes el repartimiento de
tierras comunes en los Pueblos del distrito, siempre que sobre ellas no haya litigio
pendiente en los tribunales, quedando a los interestados su derecho a salvo para ocur-
rir al gobernador, quicn sin ulterior rCcurso decidira lo mas conveniente, de acuerdo
con la junta departmental."
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[translation.]
" They (the Prefects) will regulate, executively and conformably to the laws, the dis-
tribution of tierras comunes in the pueblos of the district, provided there be no litigation
respecting them pending in the tribunals ; reserving to the parties interested their right
to appeal to the Governor, who, without further appeal, will, in concurrence with the
Departmental Junta, decide what is most proper."
Let us examine this Article critically : "They will regulate" (arreglaran) ; that is,
they will prescribe rules. Chief Justice Marshall, in commenting upon the clause of
the Constitution which empowers Congress to " regulate commerce," says, " the power
to regulate, that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed." Gib-
bons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. Rep., p. 196. But the power to regulate is very different
from the power to make. Will any one contend that because Congress may regulate
commerce, it may also itself engage in trade, or monopolize it ?
Again : " They will regulate executively (gobernativamente) and conformably to the
laws, the distribution of common lands in the pueblos (el repartimiento de tiaras com-
unes en los pueblos) of the district." They are, therefore, "to prescribe the rule by
which this repartimiento is to be governed." They are not to make it themselves ; but
they are to prescribe the rule by which it is to be made by others. And in what man-
ner are they to prescribe this rule ? As legislators who make laws ? Not at all. They
are merely to act in an executive capacity, and must, in this matter, conform to the laws
which the general Congress or Departmental Junta may enact. They have no other
powers than such as the laws had, at that time, or might, thereafter, confer upon them.
If no power had been, or should thereafter be conferred upon any one to make a repar-
timiento, there would be no one for whom the Prefects were to " prescribe rules." They
had no legislative power to authorize any repartimiento. Repartir, according to the
dictionaries, means to divide, to distribute, to apportion, to assess, to levy a tax. But
what was the subject of this division, distribution, apportionment, assessment, or taxa-
tion? Common lands (tierras comunes). What common lands? The lands which
were enjoyed by all the inhabitants of the district ? Not at all. Only the common
lands in the pueblos ; that is, within the limits of, or appertaining to, pueblos in their dis-
trict. We have already shown that a district, or even a partido, might, and often did
contain a number of pueblos, each separated from the other by a great distance. The
lands, then, which were the subject of this repartimiento, were simply those which had
been devoted or assigned to pueblos, and were included in their respective boundaries^
But the question here arises, of what kind of pueblos ? We have already shown
that the Spanish and Mexican law recognized two classes of pueblos, essentially differ-
ent in their character, and in their rights to the lands within their limits. And again :
what are the lands here referred to, and called tierras comunes ? '
The pueblos here mentioned are, in our opinion, unquestionably Pueblos de Indios,
and tierras comunes are the lands of such municipal establishments known in the
ancient laws as calpulli, and in modern Mexican jurisprudence as parcialidades, tierras
de comunidad, and tierras comunes de Indios.
This Article of the law of 1837 has been critically examined by a learned Mexican
jurisconsult, the Licenciado Jose Z. Ramirez. We quote as follows from his remarks-
In commenting upon this Article, he says :
" 1st. What were the lands which are denominated comunes ?
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"2d. In what proportion were they to be distributed (debian repartirse) 1"
In answer to the first question he says :
" Unquestionably this cannot refer to lierras concejiles o del comun of towns, because
only that common thing is partible, the dominion or property of which pertains to a
certain and determinate number of persons who possess it pro indiviso. None of these
qualities are found in tierras concejiles ; nor in ejidos or dehesas, because our civil law
declares them to be of dominio publico, and not for the use or enjoyment of any particu-
lar class or certain number of persons, but for all the residents of the towns, without
distinction of classes or persons. (Part. 3, Tit. 28, ley 9.) Nor are these qualities
found in the lands called Propios, because, even when they remain common, individuals
cannot exercise over them any right of dominion or possession for their exclusive en-
joyment, as is also declared by our civil law. (Lei 10 Cod.) The Mexican municipal
authority is only that of an administrator who has the care and government of these
lands in the name of the Pueblo, employing their products and rents for the benefit of
the poblacion. I conclude from what is before stated, that the tierras comunes, which Art.
77 of the Reglamiento of March 20th orders to be divided, are not tierras concejiles, for
they were not partible. From this conclusion it is also deducible that those referred to
are the tierras comunes de los Indios, known in common and legal language under the
same of tierras de comunidad."
The second question, Ramirez says, is answered by the terms of the law itself; that
is, the division is to be made "conformably to the laws," (conforme a las leyes). He
then proceeds to examine what were the laws in force at that time respecting the divid-
ing up of the community lands of Indian Pueblos, and says, that according to the fed-
eral constitution of 1824, the disposition of such matters in the States, belonged to the
States respectively, while in the Federal District and the Territories it pertained to the
federal government ; consequently, in the Departments formed out of States, we must
look for this matter in the laws and dispositions of the State governments, and in those
formed out of Territories we must look in the acts of congress of the federal executive,
and the consequent acts of the Territorial governments.
The Department of the Californias was formed out of the Territories of Upper and
Lower California. In examining the decrees of the Spanish government and the acts
of the Federal Congress prior to 1837, we find nothing to authorize the distribution of
the community lands of Indian Pueblos in these Territories. The act of November
27th, 1824, refers only to the Parcialidades of San Juan and Santiago, and the distribu-
tion of even these community lands ceased under the Regulation of September 20th,
1835, which forbid any further repartimientos without the further action of Congress,
(sin queprimero lo resolviera el congreso general). As Congress never did pass any sub-
sequent law on this subject, either before or after the 20th of March, 1837, Ramirezl
concludes that Article 77 of the law of that date, was wholly inoperative in the Federal
District and in Departments formed out of Territories.
But let us suppose that the construction put upon this Article by Mexican lawyers is
incorrect, and that it refers to Pueblos de Espanoles as well as Indian Pueblos. The
same question arises : what tierras comunes of such pueblos were subject to distribution,
and in what manner did the laws permit them to be distributed 1
"We have already shown that the only lands of such pueblos in Mexico, to which the
name comunes could possibly apply, were the propios, ejidos and dehesas. The former
could be rented out for the benefi and support of the administration of the pueblo, but
they could not be reduced to individual ownerships. The latter were, in no legal sense
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of the word, distributable, for they were not only common but also public, and the public
use of these lands was under the direction of the municipal authorities. Thus the
Ayuntamiento took care of the roads, parks, recreation grounds, threshing and watering
places, and the public woods and pastures. With respect to the latter, they determined
how many cattle each vecino could put in the common pastos, and how much fire-wood
each one might cut in the common montes. In this sense, perhaps, these lands might
be considered distributable, although the word repartir would scarcely be applied to such
regulation or apportionment of their use. If such be the repartimiento referred to in
the law of 1837, it gave to the Prefect power to form regulations by which the Ayunta-
mientos were to be governed in their apportionment or distribution of this use of the
commons of Pueblos. And this is the full extent of the powers conferred upon Pre-
fects by that law over the lands of Pueblos de Espanoles, even supposing it to refer to
such pueblos.
To apply this Article to the general lands of a pueblo, not assigned for special pur-
poses, as ejidos and propios, would be diverting it from its object, for according to its
terms, its only object is tierras comunes ; but the general lands of a pueblo are, in no
sense of the term, comunes. Moreover, the laws confided the disposition of such lands
to the Ayuntamientos aDd Alcaldes, under such authority as might be given to them
by the Governors and Deputations. Here, then, was a direct conflict of powers ; a
limited authority to grant, in the Governors and Ayuntamientos, and an unlimited
authority to grant the same thing, in the Prefect ! As the latter was not a municipal
officer, how were the Ayuntamientos to know what lands were granted by the Prefects,
and what were left for disposition by them ?
How incongruous and conflicting are the Spanish and Mexican laws made to appear
by such interpretations ; whereas, by a proper and reasonable construction, they ar
found to form as complete and as well-adjusted a system as that of any other civilized
people. Indeed, the Spanish civil code has always been held in high estimation by the
ablest jurisconsults of the world.
But it is said that the authorities of California construed that law as authorizing
Prefects to grant lands belonging to all kinds of pueblos. We are of the opinion that
the Archives prove that such authority was never claimed or exercised by the Prefects
themselves. Of the eight hundred and odd claims presented to the Board of Land
Commissioners, only four grants purport to be signed by Prefects. Not one of these
is recorded or noted in the Archives, or is preceded by the ordinary expediente ; not
one is in the usual form of California grants, or is made upon the kind of paper used
for such purposes at the time they bear date ; and only one of these was confirmed by
the Commissioners, and that purports to be made by the Governor, and to be signed
and issued by the Prefect under the Governor's orders. Admitting the papers in that
case to be genuine, and not similated, they are no proof that the Prefect himself claim-
ed or exercised the power to grant land. The second grant purports to be made by the
same Prefect ; but it was rejected by the Commission, and we think an examination of
the original papers will convince any one acquainted with genuine California grants,
that it ought to have been rejected. Its further prosecution was abandoned. The third
one was also rejected by the Board. It does not even purport to be a grant in owner-
ship, but is merely a permission to cultivate a tract of land not within twenty miles of
any pueblo ! The fourth and only remaining case, is the celebrated Sherback claim for
some two hundred and fifty-six fifty-vara lots in the City of San Francisco, under a
pretended grant from Manuel Castro, dated December 5th, 1845—not by order of the
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Governor, but by Castro himself, in virtue of the seventy-seventh Article of the law of
March 20th, 1837 ! This claim was also rejected by the Commission, but it has re-
cently been galvanized into apparent vitality by a decision of the United States District
Court.
"We believe this claim utterly spurious, and that there is not a disinterested person in
California, acquainted with genuine grants, who would not, at first sight, pronounce the
Sherback papers fraudulent ; the fraud is patent upon their face—so plain, that " he
that runs may read."
But admitting, for the sake of the argument, that these papers are genuine, and en-
tirely above suspicion: the construction of the law of 1837 in favor of the power of
Prefects to grant pueblo lands in private ownership, and in unlimited quantities, as de-
rived from usage and custom in California, is based, so far as the records of the Land
Commission and the United States District Court show, upon this single grant, and
upon this only ! One single grant in all California, during nearly ten years from the
passage of the law to the American conquest ! Were all the different Prefects of the
several Districts of California asleep during this long period of ten years, that they did
not discover their rights and powers to grant lands ? Was Manuel Castro alone awake,
and possessed of sufficient sense to understand and correctly construe this law 1 It
seems so. Fortunately, however, as soon as he had signed this paper for his friend
Peter, he relapsed into the same Rip Van Winkle slumber as his brother Prefects
;
otherwise the whole Pueblo of San Francisco would now be plastered over with Prefect
grants. This great effort seems to have exhausted nearly all the sovereign powers with
which the law of 1837 had clothed him
!
Another view of this case, which seems to have been entirely overlooked by the Dis-
trict Court, is, that if this was pueblo land, and as such was granted to Sherback under
the law of 1837, the Court had no jurisdiction under the law of 1851. The words of
that law are too plain to require comment.
But it may be said, will not the same rule hold with respect to grants by the Gov-
ernor within pueblo limits ? If such grants were made prior to the formation of the
pueblo, the lands so granted did not become pueblo property, and the law of 1851 gave
to the Commissioners and United States Court, jurisdiction over them. The same
may be said of grants made by the Governor of land partly within and partly without
pueblo limits, after its formation. The act requires their presentation to the Commis-
sion
; and if finally confirmed, patents were to issue ; but we think such patents for any
land within the pueblo limits, will be of no avail against the pueblo, if illegally made,
that is, made without the consent of the pueblo authorities, and contrary to the objects
of their original dedication. We are of opinion that grants by the Governor, entirely
within the pueblo limits, were not, by the law of 1851, within the jurisdiction of the
Commission and Courts.
Again, it may be said, that inasmuch as the Prefect was an officer of the Mexican
government, his acts must be presumed to have been by competent authority, till the
contrary is shown. But the rule of presumption does not apply to this case, for the
granting of pueblo lands in private ownership, was not assigned by law to the Prefect,
nor was it within the sphere of his accustomed duties. The fact of his making the grant
was, therefore, no more prima facie evidence of his power to make it, than if an Al-
calde of San Francisco had granted a rancho of eleven leagues on the Sacramento
river. In order to give any foundation for the doctrine of presumption, it was neces-
sary to first show that the law had made it his duty to issue such grants, and this was
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attempted to be deduced from the law of 1837 ; with what success, we have already
shown.
"We must not be understood as denying any power in the Prefect over Ayuntami-
entos, or over the granting of pueblo lands by the Ayuntamiento. The laws gave him
a certain supervisory control over all the acts of that body, and he was the organ of
communication between it and the Governor. But he was not an officer of the munic-
ipality, and had no power himself to grant either municipal or other lands. The laws
gave him none. Nor in point of fact, did any Prefect in California ever claim or ex-
ercise such powers.
The idea that Prefects were empowered by the law of 1837 to grant, or to authorize
others to grant, in private ownership, the lands of a pueblo, originated in the great
" Colton Grant project " of 1850, of which the early residents of San Francisco have
a pretty distinct recollection ! It is said that Colton, in his flight, left behind him a
sufficient number of deeds, executed in blank, to cover every ungranted lot in this city
!
How desirable, then, to establish a principle of law which would give vitality to what
are called " Colton Grants !
"
The foregoing remarks on the Sherback claim are based entirely upon the case as
decided by the Court ; and no allusion is made to the new evidence of its fraudulent
character, set forth in the application for a rehearing. Supposing that none of the
statements there made should be established, we are certain that the claim ought to be,
and we believe that in the Supreme Court it will be, rejected, for the want of power in
the Perfect to make such a grant.
NOTE 2 7.
POWERS CONFERRED BY THE REGULATION OF 1828
COULD NOT BE DELEGATED.
In order to fully understand the reasoning of the Court on this point, it will be well
to recur to fundamental principles. It is a general rule of law, so universally received
as to have grown into a maxim, that a delegated authority to one, does not authorize
him to delegate it to another. Delegata potestas non potest delegari.—Broom's Legal
Maxims.
The sixteenth section of the law of August 18th, 1824, is as follows :
" Section 16. The executive, conformably with the principles established in this
law, will proceed to the colonization of the Territories of the Kepublic."
This conferred upon the President of Mexico full power over colonization in Cali-
fornia, under and conformably to the principles of that law. He, therefore, could
himself grant in colonization, or make such regulations, and appoint such agents as he
might deem proper for that purpose. Hence the regulation of 1828, the power to make
which has never been doubted, appointing the political chief the agent for making grants
of a certain kind, giving the Territorial Deputation a sort of supervisory power over
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this agent, and reserving certain cases for the immediate action of the President him-
self, such as empresario grants, and concessions made by the Governor to individuals,
but disapproved by the Deputation. There was nothing in the law of 1824 which re-
quired the President to select any agent, or, if he did appoint an agent, to appoint the
political chief. He might have appointed any one else, or any number of persons ; or,
having appointed one, he might have revoked that appointment, and delegated the
power to others, or have exercised it himself. The law of 1824 conferred upon the
Governor or political chief of territories no power to grant in colonization. They de-
rived that power from the Executive of the Republic, and they were his agents for that
purpose. But the instrument by which that power was conferred—the Regulation of
1828—contains no power of substitution. It therefore could not be, by such agent,
delegated to another.
It is plain, then, that if the power of the Governor and Territorial Deputation of
California over pueblo lands was derived solely from the law of 1824, and regulation
of 1828, all authority conferred by them upon Alcaldes and Ayuntamientos to grant
such lands in private ownership, would be void. But, as stated by the Court, and more
particularly referred to in Note 14, this power existed prior to, and independent of, that
law and regulation. Moreover, the law of 1824 was, from its very terms, inapplicable
to pueblo lands. The old laws relating to such lands, recognized them as being dedi-
cated to pueblos, for pueblo purposes, but the control over these pueblos was vested in
the Governor, subject to a sort of supervision by the Deputation. The municipal offi-
cers of pueblos generally were authorized to grant certain portions of these lands in
lots to private individuals. But this authority might have been restricted or abrogated
by the Governor, as representing the political power of the State, or he may have ex-
ercised it himself, provided he did not destroy the uses and trust to which this land
had been dedicated or assigned—the building up and support of a pueblo.
NOTE 28.
CHARACTER OF PUEBLO TITLES.
In order to fully understand the gi'ounds of this part of the decision of the Court
and its legal effects, we must refer back to other parts of the opinion, and to the laws
which are there quoted.
According to the old laws, the municipal officers of pueblos could not, without the
license or approval of the King, grant to individuals any lands within the pueblo lim-
its ; but with such license or approval, such grants vested in the grantee a full owner-
ship with right of alienation. On the other hand, neither the King nor his officers
could grant such pueblo lands to others not vecinos, and contrary to the object for which
the pueblo was formed, and any such grant made by him was declared void and with-
out effect.
Again, on page 28 of the opinion of the Court, it is decided that the pueblo had a
certain right or title to the lands within its general limits, which lands could, under the
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authority shown to have been given to its municipal officers, be granted by them to
individuals in private ownership. And the Court now says, that the title of the pueblo
to these lands was in trust for the benefit of the entire community, or, in other words;
for the special objects for which the pueblo was established.
We do not find anything contradictory in these conclusions.
It is very clear that all the land within the limits of the four square leagues to which
each Spanish pueblo was entitled, was donated to some pueblo purpose, and was appro-
priated by the operation of general laws to such use exclusively. Whether this gen-
eral tract of four square leagues was, in any particular pueblo, divided up into propios,
ejidos, etc., and each portion singled out for its appropriate purpose, presents a question
which has no bearing upon the property relation between the pueblo and the King, in
any practical point of view. For these subdivisions and special assignments were mat-
ters of internal and domestic concern to the pueblo only, and touched the public inter-
est only so far as that should be promoted by the prosperity and convenience of the
pueblo itself. It was certainly for the interest of the townspeople that their commons
and municipal reserves should be respectively marked and separated from that portion
which was to be divided up and granted in solares and sitertes, for building lots and cul-
tivation ; and, as regards the internal economy of the pueblo, such an arrangement
was very desirable. But this subdivision was designed solely for setting apart a cer-
tain portion of the pueblo land for a special pueblo purpose. It was the allotment to
a particular use of particular parts of the tract, the whole of which was appropriated
by law to the general purposes of the pueblo. Sometimes no such subdivision and al-
lotment was made. We have the authority of Jimeno and Arguello, that none had
been made in 1840 for any pueblo in California, except Monterey. And if none was
subsequently made for the Pueblo of San Francisco, and we have heard of none, then
all its pueblo land was subject to be granted in solares and sitertes.
But, as before remarked, such subdivision or allotment to special purposes of partic-
ular portions of the general tract, had nothing to do with the title of the pueblo to that
tract of land. The appropriation or dedication which the law made, was sufficient to
establish title in the pueblo or community to the entire tract of four square leagues ;
and it matters not whether the legal title passed from the King or government to the
corporation known as the pueblo, or remained in him or it, suhject to the uses and
trusts to which the land had been appropriated by law. In either case the right of
property in the pueblo is clearly shown.
But while the right of property was in the pueblo, it by no means followed that the
control and disposition of that property was vested in the pueblo or its officers. It
was not a corporation sole, but a political organization for municipal purposes, and
the powers of this organization and of its officers were subject to the political sover-
eignty of the State. That might give or withhold the disposition of this property ; it
might confer this power upon others, or it might exercise it in any way it deemed
proper, subject always to the uses and objects to which the laws had appropriated this
land. It seems difficult for some to understand this distinction between the right of
property in the pueblo, and the right of the pueblo to dispose of such property. And
yet the two are entirely different.
We, therefore, can perceive nothing contradictory in the opinion of the Court, that
while these lands belonged to the pueblo, the disposition of them was not exclusively
in the pueblo or its officers, but was in certain respects subject to the will of the sov-
ereign power of the State.
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Nor, in our opinion, does it matter, so far as the general right of property in the
pueblo is concerned, whether the title of the pueblo to this land was absolute with
respect to its disposition, or whether it was hurthened with a charge or trust, and
devoted to certain pueblo uses. The title in the one case is as valid and perfect as in
the other.
But was the title of a pueblo, under Spanish and Mexican law, to the lands within
its legal boundaries of such a character that it could maintain its possession against
others and eject intruders 1 It was so construed by Spanish and Mexican jurisconsults
and courts. Even Elizondo, who was one of the strongest advocates of royal power
and royal prerogative, holds that towns may sustain suit against all intruders within
their terminos, and that the Courts must maintain such municipalities in all the rights
which the laws have conferred upon them ; and moreover, that the king himself can
issue no valid grant or license which conflicts with these rights.
The same view of the law was taken by the Supreme Court of Texas with respect
to the ejidos of the town of San Antonio. Lewis v. San Antonio, 7 Texas Reports,
p. 288.
We are aware that some of our Courts in California have expressed the opinion that
pueblos had only a' use or usufruct in pueblo lands, and that it had no such title as
would enable it to eject intruders under the license or authority of the Government, the
legal title being still in the Government and not in the pueblo. Perhaps those opinions
resulted from the character or defect of evidence in the particular cases decided, or
from a misapprehension of the exact nature of the rights of pueblos under the Spanish
and Mexican system of jurisprudence. But be that as it may, we are satisfied, after a
careful and thorough examination of the laws and authorities on this subject, that our
Supreme Court is right in its decision that the right of a pueblo to the land within its
limits was not a mere use or usufruct, but was a right of property—a good, valid and
perfect title to the land—although such land was held in trust by the pueblo for certain
pueblo purposes ; and that the fact that the sovereign power of the State might regu-
late and control these uses and the execution of this trust, is no argument against the
legal position that the right of property in this land was vested exclusively in the
pueblo.
jN" OTE 29.
CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT RESPECTING TITLES
HELD BY INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE
PUEBLO LIMITS.
The foregoing conclusions of the Court have been made the subject of much com-
ment in the newspapers. It is very natural that a decision upon questions involving
title to a large portion of the real estate in San Francisco, should not only cause dis-
satisfaction in some quarters, but should be made the subject of unfavorable criticism.
So far as such criticism is confined to legitimate argument, we do not find it objection-
able. Some think that newspaper discussions of judicial questions.are not only wrong
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but injurious, as they are calculated to affect the independence of the bench, and sub-
ject the judges to the influence of popular opinion and popular prejudice. We are not
of that opinion. On the contrary, we think that such discussions, when properly con-
ducted, are beneficial, for they not only tend to elucidate the questions examined, but
also to make our courts more careful in their decisions, knowing that if such decisions
are clearly erroneous, their errors will be pointed out and exposed to public view.
Truth suffers no injury from argument. A judicial decision which will not bear just
criticism, ought never to be delivered.
But some of the newspaper criticisms upon the decision of the Court in this case
have not been of that character, for they have misstated and misrepresented its con-
clusions. This is more especially true of those which discussed the opinion before it
was published. Pretending to have obtained a knowledge of its contents, they boldly
attempted to set forth its conclusions and to discuss its consequences, with the evident
purpose of effecting some change in the result, or at least of producing a disagreement
among the judges. But the published opinion showed that nearly all these statements
with respect to its contents, were utterly untrue, and that the writers of the articles
either knew nothing of the decision, or willfully misrepresented its purport. The most
charitable, as well as natural, inference is that these writers knew nothing of the opin-
ion or its contents, except perhaps the fact that there was some point of disagreement
between the judges, and that two of them were writing out separate opinions, or that
one of them had been exclusively engaged for months in examining this particular
case. That fact alone was a sufficient clue to what the decision would be, for there is
scarcely a member of the bar in San Francisco who did not believe that the Court, if
not precluded by the decisions of its predecessors from examining into the merits of
the case, would adjudge these sheriff's sales to be invalid. Such was the almost uni-
versal opinion. If precluded from this examination by the principle of stare decisis, the
case might be disposed of in a few hours ; but the examination being entered into, and
months being spent in investigating Spanish and Mexican law books, the natural and
almost necessary inference was that the Peter Smith titles were to be declared invalid.
This we think accounts for all the pretended knowledge of the contents of the decision
before it was rendered, especially as the statements in nearly every other respect were
incorrect. But many of the erroneous statements then made have been repeated again
and again since the opinion of the Court was published. A large portion of these
newspaper articles are evidently written by the same hand as those which appeared be-
fore the decision was made. What is the object of this studied and continuous mis-
representation of the contents and purport of a judicial decision 1 We can see no other
than that of creating alarm among property holders, and of destroying public confi-
dence in the correctness and stability of the decision. There may be some hidden pur-
pose to be subserved which is not known to the public. Such studied misrepresenta-
tions, coupled with personal attacks, would indicate something of this kind. In com-
menting upon these newspaper criticisms, we shall refer only to their statements with
respect to the legal effects of this decision. So much of them as reflects upon the char-
acter of the individual judges, and charges political or mercenary motives, we leave
entirely out of consideration. Such assertions and insinuations, whether true or false,
are mere personal libels, and are utterly excluded from any forum of discussion into
which gentlemen will consent to enter.
One point urged in nearly all these criticisms, is, that this decision virtually destroys
the city's title, and makes all the land, not granted by Mexican Alcaldes, within the
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limits of the old pueblo, government land, or what we call public domain; in fine, that
it overrules the doctrine of Judge Heydenfeldt's opinion in Cohas vs. Raisin.
We do not think so. Ou the contrary, we think this decision sustains every impor-
tant point in Judge Heydenfeldt's opinion. Let us see what were the points decided in
Cohas vs. Raisin, and in what respect they differ from the conclusions in Hart vs. Bur-
nett, et al.
In the former, the Court concludes with the following propositions :
" 1st. That, by the laws of Mexico, towns were invested with the ownership of lands.
"2d. That, by the law, usage, and custom of Mexico, the Alcaldes were the heads
of the Ayuntamientos, or town councils, were the executive officers of the towns, and
rightfully exercised the power of granting lots within the towns, which were the prop-
erty of the towns.
"3d. That before the military occupation of California by the army of the United
States, San Francisco was a Mexican Pueblo, or municipal corporation, and was in-
vested with title to the lands within her boundaries.
"4th. That a grant of a lot in San Francisco, made by the Alcalde, whether a Mex-
ican or any other nation, raises the presumption that the Alcalde was a properly quali-
fied ofneer, that he had authority to make the grant, and that the land was within the
boundaries of the pueblo."
In the latter, the Court concludes as follows :
" First. That San Francisco was, at the date of the conquest and cession of Cali-
fornia, and long prior to that time, a pueblo, entitled to and possessing all the rights
which the law conferred upon such organizations.
" Second. That such pueblo had a certain right or title to the lands within its gen-
eral limits, and that the portions of such lands which had not been set apart, or dedi-
cated to common use, or to special purposes, could be granted in lots by its municipal
officers to private persons in full ownership.
" Third. That the authority to grant such lands was vested in the Ayuntamiento,
and in the Alcaldes or other officers who at the time represented it, or had succeeded
to its " powers and obligations."
"Fourth. That the official acts of such officers, in the course of their ordinary and
accustomed duties, and within the general scope of their powers, as here defined and
explained, will be presumed to have been done by lawful authority.
"Fifth. That these municipal lands to which the City of San Francisco succeeded,
were held in trust for the public use of that city, and were not, either under the old
government or new, the subject of seizure and sale under execution.
" Sixth. That this property, and these trusts were public and municipal in their
nature, and were within the control and supervision of the State sovereignty, and that
the Federal Goverement had no such control or supervision."
By comparing these two sets of conclusions, it will be seen that every proposition in
the former is reaffirmed in the latter, except the statement, at the end of the fourth con-
clusion, of a presumption of law, viz: "that the land (granted by an Alcalde) was
within the boundaries of the pueblo;" and upon this proposition we think the Court, in
Hart v. Burnett, et al., had no occasion to express any opinion, as it says the land in
dispute was admitted to be within the pueblo boundaries, even as confirmed by the
Commission and United States District Court, under the law of 1851.
This last decision affirms that San Francisco was a Mexican pueblo, and it proves
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tSiis by arguments and authorities infinitely more satisfactory and conclusive than those
given in Cohas v. Raisin.
It affirms that this pueblo was invested with title to the lands within its boundaries ;
and moreover, it shows what these boundaries were, and the origin and nature of the
title. This, Cohas v. Raisin failed to do, at least in a full and satisfactory manner.
It affirms that the Alcaldes and other officers, representing the Ayuntamiento or
Town Council, had authority to grant these pueblo lands in private ownership, except
so much of them as had been set apart and dedicated to common use or to special pur-
poses. Certainly no one will deny the correctness of this exception.
It affirms the validity of grants made by the municipal authorities of the pueblo
during military occupation and after complete conquest. This is plainly implied in the
words, "those who had succeeded to its (the Ayuntamicnto's) powers and obligations."
If there be any doubt on this point it will be removed by reference to the body of the
opinion where the Court discusses and distinctly sustains the proposition, said to be the
only point really raised in Cohas v. Raisin, that " such power of conveyance continued
in such municipal officers during the military occupation of California by the United
States." Again, near the close, the Court says, the effect of its decision is " to declare
valid Alcalde grants made before and after the cession of California ; also the title to
all lots held under sale by Commissioners of the Funded Debt."
It also affirms the rule that the official acts of Ayuntamientos and Alcaldes in grant-
ing pueblo lands, within the general scope of their powers, " will be presumed to have
been done by lawful authority."
We thus see that every proposition of Cohas v. Raisin, with the single exception
which we have mentioned, and which had no connection with the case of Hart v. Bur-
nett et al., has been reaffirmed in the latter decision.
It is true that some have inferred from certain expressions used in Judge Heyden-
feldt's opinion, that the pueblo of San Francisco had such a title to the land within its
limits that its municipal officers could dispose of them according to their own will, and
entirely independent of the supreme power of the State. We do not think that opin-
ion sustains such an inference ; and even if it did, we must remember that Judge Hey-
denfeldt's opinion was not concurred in by the majority of the Court. The other two
Judges concurred in the decision, but for reasons which are given in their opinion, which
differs from that of Judge Heydenfeldt in almost every essential particular. The
decision of the Court in that case is stated in the conclusions, not one of which, as we
have shown, is overruled in Hart v. Burnett et al.
In Cohas vs. Raisin it is decided that a Mexican pueblo was invested with title to
lands within her boundaries, but no attempt is made to define the character of that title.
In Hart vs. Burnett, et al., it was necessary to ascertain the character of the title, in
order to determine whether the lands so held were subject to levy and sale under exe-
cution, for debts contracted by municipal officers, and it is decided that these lands were
held by the pueblo in trust for certain pueblo purposes. So far from overruling, or even
questioning the views expressed by Judge Heydenfeldt in Cohas vs. Raisin, the Court
says, expressly, that it sees nothing in those views inconsistent with " holding the in-
validity of the sheriff's sale. It does not follow, because the title was in the pueblo, or
in the city, as its successor, that it was such a title, or so held that it might be disposed
of by forced sale." We think, therefore, that the attempt on the part of the advocates
of the Peter Smith titles to array these two decisions against each other, has proved
utterly futile.
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But it has been strenuously urged that the present decision has so reduced and limited
the title or ownership of San Francisco in and to these lands, and so restricted the
powers of its municipal officers with respect to their disposition, as to destroy the valid-
ity of all titles under sales of lots by the Ayuntamientos and Alcaldes.
We think these inferences are utterly unfounded, and that the suggestions are made
merely to create alarm. Such sales are as fully sustained by this decision as they were
by that of Cohas vs. Raisin. The prices paid for these lots have nothing to do with
the validity of the titles issued by the Alcalde. So far as the validity of title is con-
cerned, it matters not whether the grantee paid thirty dollars or three thousand dollars
for his lot. Suppose an officer is appointed by law to issue grants or patents, and that
the same law authorizes him to collect a fee of one dollar for each grant or patent, but
he collects a fee of one hundred dollars : does this fact invalidate the patent or title
which is issued in due conformity with law ? The extra charge may be recovered, and
the officer punished ; but the title or patent is valid, at least in the hands of innocent
parties. At any rate, the Court has decided in this case, that the official acts of the
Ayuntamiento and Alcalde, in issuing these titles, "will be presumed to have been
done by lawful authority," and it will rest upon those who impeach their validity, to
prove that these officers exceeded their powers.
Again : attempts have been made to create alarm in the minds of those who hold
lands granted by Governors, on the outskirts of the pueblo, in quantities greater than
the ordinary size of town-lots. A reference to the opinion of the Court will show that
all such fears are utterly groundless. The Court says : "If Governors of California
have granted lands within the general limits of pueblos, it will be presumed, unless the
contrary be shown, that such grants were made in accordance with the objects and uses
for which such lands had been assigned and dedicated, by the laws, to. the pueblos.
The whole matter was subject to the control and direction of the Governor and Terri-
torial Deputation, and the official acts of such officers, within the general scope of their
powers, are presumed to have been done by lawful authority." Could plainer language
be used?
But let us suppose that the construction which Judge Cope and those who sustain
the validity of the Peter Smith sales put upon the decision of Cohas v. Baisin, had
been sustained by the Court in Hart v. Burnett, et al., what would have become of all
grants by Governors and Territorial Deputations within the limits of the old pueblo ?
We have already stated, that in our opinion there is nothing in the decision of Cohas
v. Raisin to sustain the position that the Pueblo of San Francisco had an absolute and
unconditional title to the land within the pueblo limits, with full and unrestricted power
of disposition in its municipal authorities. It is there merely decided that the pueblo
had title to these lands ; but the character of that title was not in any manner consid-
ered in the conclusions arrived at by the Court in that case. It is true that in Touch-
ard v. Touchard (5 Cal. B., p. 306) it was said, in reference to Cohas v. Baisin, that
by that decision the right of towns to acquire and dispose of land, was placed " upon
as high ground as that of natural persons—a right of property beyond even the reach
of royal interference." A reference to the decision in Cohas v. Baisin will show that
such a conclusion was never arrived at, or if arrived at, it was not announced. More-
over, such a conclusion was so entirely foreign from the question to be decided by the
Court in that case, and so directly opposed to the authorities referred to in the opinions
of the Judges, as well as to the spirit and purport of the whole system of Spanish and
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Mexican jurisprudence relating to pueblos, that it would have been regarded in no
other light than a mere obiter dictum of the particular Judge.
But let us suppose that the theory of that decision was as announced in Touchard v.
Touchard, (an overruled case) and as contended for by Judge Cope; and then notice
its effects upon titles in San Francisco, as compared with the decision in Hart v. Bur-
nett, et al., and see which theory tends most to settle titles and to conserve existing
rights.
If the lands within the limits of this pueblo were vested in its municipal authorities,
the same as in natural persons, and placed beyond any control or interference, even by
the sovereign power of the State, of course such title must have so vested at the time
the pueblo was organized near the end of 1834 ; consequently every act of the sover-
eignty, as represented by the Governor and Deputation or Junta, respecting these
lands, or their disposition, was utterly null and void. What then becomes of all grants
made by Governors within these limits subsequent to 1834? What becomes of the
Suerte of four hundred varas granted by Governor Gutierrez to Guerrero in 1836 ; of
the Solare of one hundred varas by Governor Alvarado to Vallejo in 1839 ; of the Su-
erte of three hundred varas by Alvarado to Noe in 1840, and of two hundred varas to
Felis in 1843 ; of the two fifty vara4ots granted by Pico to Smith in 1845, of one fifty
vara lot to Leidesdorff, and two fifty vara lots to Hinckley in 1846? And what be-
comes of such portions of the Bernal and Noe ranchos, granted in 1839 and 1845, as
fall within the pueblo limits ?- All must go by the board, if the theory, incorrectly at-
tributed to the Cohas v. Raisin decision, is established. And yet these grants may all
have been made and received in good faith. Many of them have been occupied for
years by the grantees and their successors ; those presented to the commission have
been confirmed and patented; some of them lie in the most improved parts of the city,
and are covered with buildings worth millions of dollars, erected by such grantees and
their successors. Indeed such titles have heretofore been regarded as the very best in
San Francisco, and no one has supposed for a moment that they were declared invalid
by the Cohas v. Raisin decision. And yet such would have been the necessary conse-
quence of that decision, had it been as is stated in Touchard v. Touchard, and as is
now claimed by Judge Cope.
How then can it be charged against the decision of Hart v. Burnett, et al., that it
unsettles titles in San Francisco ? It of course unsettles the Peter Smith claimants, but
it settles their claims now and forever. Outside of their sheriff deeds, (in which no
one had full confidence, for the land so held could never be sold for one-tenth its
real valuej every bona fide grant and title is virtually recognized and confirmed. The
Court is particularly careful, in its opinion, to give no cause for alarm. It declares
valid all grants by Governors or Alcaldes within the pueblo limits, made for the gen-
eral purposes of settling and building up a town, and that the official acts of such offi-
cers will be presumed to have been done by lawful authority.
Considering it in all its bearings and consequences, we regard this as the most con-
servative decision which has been made by our Courts for years, and we are confident
that such will become the settled conviction of all who will give it a careful and dis-
passionate examination.
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NOTE 30.
THE VAN NESS ORDINANCE.
The decision of the Court in this case has also been strongly objected to, because it
confirms the Van Ness Ordinance ; and it is alleged that, while the holders under the
Peter Smith sales did pay something for their titles, those holding under that Ordinance
really pay nothing for large tracts of valuable land ; that that Ordinance was designed
to enrich a few individuals at the expense of all the tax-payers of San Francisco ; and
moreover, that its passage and ratification was obtained by fraud and corrupt means.
We do not see how the Court could have decided otherwise than it has on this matter,
nor do we perceive what the justice of a law, or the means used to procure its passage,
has to do with its constitutionality when passed, especially in a collateral proceeding
like this. If the members of the Common Council which first passed this Ordinance
were bribed, or acted from corrupt motives, why were not the proper legal proceed-
ings instituted to restrain their action ; and why was not this fraud exposed to the
Legislature when that body made this Ordinance a law? "With respect to the policy
or justice of a law, the Court has nothing to do. It merely decides upon its constitu-
tionality and the legal effect of its provisions.
The writer of these Notes opposed that Ordinance from its inception, because he
believed its effects would be "to enrich a few individuals, at the expense of the whole
city "—individuals who had squatted, without any right and contrary to law, upon
land which belonged, not to the United States, but to San Francisco. But after that
Ordinance has been passed by the municipal authorities of San Francisco, and made a
law by the Legislature, he can perceive no reason why the titles of the grantees under
it are not valid. Perhaps the Common Council and people of San Francisco acted
unwisely and without due consideration ; but that fact has nothing to do with the con-
stitutionality of the law, or the validity of titles acquired under it. Suppose they did
exhibit a want of wisdom in passing an ordinance " which enriched a few at the expense
of the many ;" this is not the only foolish act which they have committed within the
last ten years, nor, in all probability, will it be the last one of the same character.
CONCLUSION.
The very short time allowed for the preparation of the foregoing Notes has not per-
mitted any careful revision of the manuscript before placing it in the hands of the
printer; consequently, some of the contents of one Note, may have been repeated in
another, and the same question have been discussed in several different places.
The object has been simply to furnish additional facts and authorities in support of
so much of the decision of the Court in Hart v. Burnett, et al., as affects the title of the
city of San Francisco to its municipal lands, and the validity of what are commonly
called Alcalde titles. It is a matter of great importance to every one that litigation on
on this matter should cease, and that full confidence should be felt in that class of titles
under which the most valuable portion of real estate in this city is held. The author
of these Notes has here offered his mite towards the accomplishment of this result.
LAND TITLES IN SAN FRANCISCO. 181
Hart vs. Burnett, et al.—Note 30.
With respect to the question more particularly involved in these two cases—the lev-
iable character of these lands under execution for debts contracted by municipal
officers, and the validity of sales by the Sheriff under such execution—the author will
merely remark that he never had any interest in any Peter Smith title, or against it,
and that he never had any occasion to investigate these titles or to form an opinion
upon their validity. He therefore has made no comments upon that part of the opin-
ion of the Court. Indeed, the question is there so elaborately discussed as to leave
little or no room for comment; and certainly nothing which he could add in the way of
Notes would give any additional force to the arguments and reasoning of the Court.
This remark is equally applicable to the question of stare decisis. The opinions of
the Judges seem to us to have completely exhausted the legal learning upon that sub-
ject. Wc therefore leave the reader to form his own conclusions; and if these should
differ from those of the Court, we think he will admit that the reasoning of Judge
Baldwin's opinion is exceedingly able and well worthy of a careful perusal.
As the Van Ness Ordinance has become a matter of very general interest, the Act is
copied in full.
CHAPTER LXVI
An Act concerning the City of San Francisco, and to ratify and
confirm certain Ordinances of the Common Council of said City.
[Approved March 11, 1858.]
The People of the State of California, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as
follows
:
'
Section 1. Whereas, The common council of the city of San Francisco passed an
ordinance approved by the mayor on the twentieth day of June, a. d. one thousand
eight hnndred and fifty-five, which ordinance is in the words and figures following,
to wit
:
Number eight hundred and twenty-two—Ordinance for the settlement and quieting of
the land titles in the city of San Francisco.
The People of the City of San Francisco do ordain as follows :
Section 1. It shall be the duty of the mayor to enter, at the proper land office of
the United States, at the minimum price, all the lands above the natural high-water
mark of the Bay of San Francisco, at the time of the admission of California into the
Union as a State, situated within the corporate limits of the city of San Francisco, as
defined in the act to incorporate said city, passed April fifteenth, one thousand eight
hundred and fifty-one, in trust for the several use, benefit, and behoof of the occupants
or possessors thereof, according to their respective interests.
Sec. 2. The city of San Francisco hereby relinquishes and grants all the right and
claim of the city to the lands within the corporate limits, to the parties in the actual
possession thereof, by themselves or tenants, on or before the first day of January, a.
d. one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, and to their heirs and assigns forever; ex-
cepting the property known as the slip property, and bounded on the north by Clay
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street, on the west by Davis street, on the south by Sacramento street, and on the east
by the water-lot front. And excepting, also, any piece or parcel of land situated south,
east, or north of the water-lot front of the city of San Francisco, as established by an
act of the Legislature of March twenty-sixth, a. d. one thousand eight hundred and
fifty-one ; Provided, such possession has been continued up to the time of the introduc-
tion of this ordinance in the common council ; or, if interrupted by an intruder, or
trespasser, has been, or may be, recovered by legal process ; and it is hereby declared
to bo the true intent and meaning of this ordinance, that when any of the said lands
have been occupied and possessed under and by virtue of a lease or demise, they shall
be deemed to have been in the possession of the landlord or lessor under whom they
were so occupied or possessed ; Provided, that all persons who hold title to lands with-
in said limits by virtue of any grant made by any ayuntamiento, town council, alcalde,
or justice of the peace of the former pueblo of San Francisco, before the seventh day
of July, one thousand eight hundred and forty-six ; or grants to lots of land lying
east of Larkin street and north-east of Johnston street, made by any ayuntamiento,
town council, or alcalde of said pueblo, since that date, and before the incorporation of
the city of San Francisco by the State of California; and which grant, or the material
portion thereof, was registered or recorded in a proper book of record deposited in the
office, or custody, or control of the recorder of the county of San Francisco, on or be-
fore the third day of April, a. d. one thousand eight hundred and fifty; or by virtue of
any conveyance duly made by the commissioners of the funded debt of the city of
San Francisco, and recorded on or before the first day of January, one thousand eight
hundred and fifty-five, shall, for all the purposes contemplated by this ordinance, be
deemed to be the possessors of the land so granted, although the said lands may be in
the actual occupancy of persons holding the same adverse to the said grantees.
Sec. 3. The patent issued, or any grant made by the United States to the city*
shall inure to the several use, benefit, and behoof, of the said possessors, their heirs
and assigns, mentioned in the preceding section, as fully and effectually, to all intents
and purposes, as if it were issued or made directly to them individually and by name.
Sec. 4. The city, however, as a consideration annexed to the next two preceding
sections, reserves to itself all the lots which it now occupies, or has already set apart
for public squares, streets, and sites for school-houses, city-hall, and other buildings be-
longing to the corporation ; and also such lots and lands as may be selected and
reserved for streets and other public purposes, under the provisions of the next suc-
ceeding sections.
Sec. 5. The city shall have the right to proceed to layout and open streets, as soon
as the corporation may deem it expedient, in that part of the city west of Larkin street
and south-west of Johnston street, and reserves the right to take possession of such
lands as it may be necessary to occupy for that purpose, without compensation ; and
to assess, in the manner provided by the present or any existing charter of the city,
upon the lands bounded on such streets, the whole expense of laying out, opening, grad-
ing, and constructing the same ; and payment of the costs of said improvements shall
be deemed a charge upon the lands mentioned in this section, to which the city of San
Francisco relinquishes her right and title by the second and third sections of this ordi-
nance.
Sec. 6. The city shall also have the right to select and set apart, from the lands
west of Larkin street and south-west of Johnston street, as many lots, not exceeding
one hundred and thirty-seven and a half feet square each, as the mayor and common
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council may, by ordinance, determine to be necessary for sites for school-houses, hos-
pitals, fire-engine-houses, and other public establishments necessary and proper for the
use of the corporation ; and may lay out and reserve upon the said lands, at conveni-
ent and suitable points and distances, public squares, which shall not embrace more
than one block, corresponding in size to the adjoining blocks ; Provided, that the
selection shall be made within sis months from the time of the passage of this ordi-
nance ; and that the city shall not, without due compensation, occupy, for the purposes
mentioned in this section, after the laying out of the streets aforesaid, more than one-
twentieth part of the land in possession of any one pei-son ; and that such possessor
shall voluntarily assent thereto ; or, refusing to do so, shall not be entitled to the ben-
efit of any concession contained in the second and third sections of this ordinance.
Sec. 7. The lots and lands reserved for the use of the corporation, under the pro-
visions of the next preceding section, shall be selected in localities likely to be most
convenient and suitable for their respective uses, and in such proportion to the quantity
in the possession of the respective occupants as to make the apportionment as nearly
equal as circumstances will admit.
Sec. 8. The selection of said lands and lots shall be made by a commission, to con-
sist of three persons, who shall be chosen by the common council, in joint convention,
who shall report the same to the common council for its approval ; and, upon such ap-
proval, deeds of release to the corporation for the lands thus selected shall be executed,
acknowledged and recorded, in which deeds shall be specified the uses for which they
are granted, reserved and set apart, respectively.
Sec. 9. Although the city hereby renounces in favor of the actual possessors, in
accordance with the provisions of section second, any right or claim of its own, noth-
ing in this ordinance is intended to prejudice any other outstanding title to the said
lands adverse to the said possessors.
Sec. 10. Application shall be made to the Legislature to confirm and ratify this
ordinance, and to Congress to relinquish all the right and title of the United States to
the said lands, for the uses and purposes hereinbefore specified.
Sec. 11. Nothing contained in this ordinance shall be construed to prevent the city
from continuing to prosecute, to a final determination, her claim now pending before the
United States Land Commission, for pueblo lands, for the several use, benefit, and be-
hoof, of the said, possessors mentioned in section two, as to the lands by them so pos-
sessed, and for the proper use, benefit and behoof of the corporation as to all other
lands not hereinbefore released and confirmed to the said possessors.
Sec. 12. That all ordinances, or parts of ordinances, conflicting with this ordi-
nance, or any of its provisions, be and the same are hereby repealed.
[Approved, June twentieth, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five.
S. P. Webb, Mayor.]
And whereas, the said common council passed another ordinance, approved by the
mayor of said city, September twenty-seventh, a. d. one thousand eight hundred and
fifty-five, which last mentioned ordinance is in the words and figures following, to wit
:
Number eight hundred and forty-five.—Ordinance providing for selecting and designat-
ing public squares and reservations for hospitals, fire-engines and school purposes,
and for adopting the plan of streets in the western and south-western portion of the
city, according to the provisions of ordinance number eight hundred and twenty-two,
and confirmatory of said ordinance number eight hundred and twenty-two.
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The People of the City of San Francisco do ordain as follows :
Section 1. Under and by virtue of the provisions of the ordinance of the com-
mon council, number eight hundred and twenty-two, entitled " an ordinance for the
settlement and quieting of land titles in the city of San Francisco, approved June
twentieth, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five," the board of aldermen and board
of assistant aldermen shall meet in joint convention, at their next regular meeting after
the passage of this ordinance, and proceed to elect three commissioners, who shall
have the powers, and proceed to discharge the duties specified in section eight of said
ordinance number eight hundred and twenty-two.
Sec. 2. It shall be the duty of the city surveyor, acting in conjunction with the
said commissioners, and with their concurrence, to furnish, by way of recommendation
to the common council, within one month from the date of their appointment, a plan
for the location and dimensions of the streets to be laid out within the city limits, west
of Larkin and south-west of Johnston streets, upon which plan shall also be designated
the lots and grounds selected by the said commissioners for the use of the city under
the provisions of the aforesaid ordinance number eight hundred and twenty-two ; Pro-
vided, that the compensation of said commissioners shall not exceed the sum of one
hundred dollars each, payable when the common council may legally make an appro-
priation therefor.
Sec. 3. The said ordinance number eight hundred and twenty-two, referred to in the
preceding section one, is hereby re-ordained, ratified and confirmed in all its parts.
[Approved, September twenty-seventh, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five.
James Van Ness, Mayor.]
And whereas, in pursuance of the aforesaid ordinances, commissioners were appoint-
ed by the common council, who, in conjunction with the city surveyor of said city,
agreed upon and reported, for the approval of the common council, a plan for the loca-
tion of streets, public squares, and lots for public uses, to be laid out west of Larkin
and south-west of Johnston streets, in said city, accompanied by a map of the same,
which said plan and map was, by the justices of the peace exercising the powers of a
board of supervisors of the city and county of San Franeisco, adopted, approved and
ratified by an order bearing date the sixteenth day of October, a. d. one thousand eight
hundred and fifty-six, which is in the words and figures following, to wit
:
The Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco, do ordain asfollows
:
Section 1. That the plan or map of the Western Addition, reported by the com-
mission created under an ordinance of the last common council of the city of San
Francisco, be adopted by this board, and be declared to be the plan of the city, in re-
spect to the location and establishment of streets and avenues, and the reservation of
squares and lots for public purposes in that portion of the then incorporated limits of
said city, lying west of Larkin, and south-west of Johnston streets.
Be it therefore enacted, that the within and before-recited order and ordinances be, and
the same are hereby ratified and confirmed; and all the land entered, or to be entered,
in the United States Land Office, in pursuance of section one of the first recited of
said ordinances, in trust, shall pass and inure to, and be deemed to have immediately
vested in the occupants thereof, for their several use and benefit, according to their
respective interests, in execution of the trust designated in an act of Congress, entitled
an act for the relief of citizens of towns upon the public lands of the United States,
under certain circumstances, approved May twenty-third, one thousand eight hundred
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and forty-four, as extended and applied by an act of Congress, entitled an act to pro-
vide for the survey of the public lands in California, the granting of pre-emption rights
therein, and for others purposes, approved March third, one thousand eight hundred and
fifty-three ; and it shall be the duty of all courts and officers to take judicial notice of
the said order and ordinances, as hereinbefore recited, without further proof, as fully
and effectually, to all intents and purposes, as if they were public acts of the State Leg-
islature.
Sec. 2. That the grant of relinquishment of title made by the said city in favor of
the several possessors, by sections two and three of the ordinance first above recited,
shall take effect as fully and completely, for the purpose of transferring the city's inter-
est, and for all other purposes whatsoever, as if deeds of release and quit-claim had
been duly executed and delivered to and in favor of them individually and by name ;
and no further conveyance or other act shall be necessary to invest the said possessors
with all the interest, title, rights, benefits and advantages, which the said order and or-
dinances intend or purport to transferor convey, according to the true intent and mean-
ing thereof; Provided, that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to release the
city of San Francisco, or city and county of San Francisco, from the payment of any
claim or claims due or to become due this state against said city, or city and county,
nor to effect or release to said city and county any title this state has or may have to
any lands in said city and county of San Francisco.
13
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DEFENDANT'S BRIEF.
SUPREME COURT—JANUARY TERM.
JOHN NOB1LI, Pastor of the Catholic Church of Santa Clara, Appellant,
versus
JOSHUA W. REDMAN, Respondent.
L The Plaintiff brought suit in ejectment to recover a lot of land known ae
the Orchard of Santa Clara, which formerly constituted a part of the cultivated lands
pertaining to the Mission of that name. He exhibited no grant, conveyance or oth-
er paper title and pretended to no other right to recover except the fact that the lane
in question had always been occupied and cultivated by the Mission, and that he wag
now the regularly constituted Pastor of the Catholic Church at that place. On this
[state of facts, he was non-suited, and appeals. It is scarcely necessary to look into
the record, for all the facts which the Plaintiff attempted to prove, are known in history,
and the Vicar General's legal opinions, however correct they may be, are superceded
y the numerous works of authority which the Court have at their command. That
he plaintiff has shown no right to recover seems to me to be too plain to admit of
argument. But yet a brief examination into the character and origin of the estab-
ishments called Missions, and the legal rights of the Spanish and Mexican Churches;
seems to be called for, as this is the first case that has come before this Court in
which such an investigation would be pertinent.
II. I propose to put the plaintiff's pretensions to the test of those laws alone un-
der which the rights of the Catholic Church, such as they may be, originated, and by
which they were governed in this country previous to the change of sovereignty, so
that she may have no occasion to complain of the change, but may rest satisfied.
III. The authorities referred to will tend to establish the following
POINTS:
1. That the Church was originally incapable of acquiring, holding, or conveying:
landed property.
2. That subsequently, when this power to acquire and hold (not to alienate) worldly
goods, so variant from the divine purposes of its establishment, was conferred upon
the Church, it was under great restrictions, and could never be lawfully exercised
without the express sanction of the sovereign power of the State to each acquisition.
3. That the modes by which the Church acquires property, or the titles and docu-
ments requisite to confer the right, are the same as those which are necessary in the
case of individuals or other corporations, with the sovereign license superadded.
4. That unlike the case of individuals, however, the right of the Church to ac-
quire property is not inherent, or of Divine origin, but is purely civil, created by the
civil laws,, and subject to the limitations which they may impose.
5. That although the Church as a mystic body restricted to the spiritual objects of
its divine institution, exists independently of, and beyond the control of the state,
yet considered as a corporation, and the possessor of temporal goods, it is a political
community merely, a constituent part of the political organization of society, with
only the rights of those of its class, and subject to all the changes and modifications
that may be introduced.
6. That the acquisitions of the Church, like those of other political communities,
and unlike those of corporations founded for commercial purposes, _ are never the
property of its members in whole or in part, nor are destined to their individual ben-
efit, but to fulfil the objects of public utility which the corporation is created to pro-
mote.
.
."
'' '-
7. That the Church therefore, considered under the aspect given to it in the preceding
propositions, is, strictly speaking, the simple administrator of public property placed
under its charge for political ends, which, in case of a dissolution of its corporate or
political existence, ordinarily returns to the general mass of public property, subject
to any rights of reversion that may exist in favor of those who represent the donors.
8. That although the Church may acquire property by private donation under the
restrictions alluded: to, and by express grant, from the sovereign or legislative power,
of that which pertains to the dominion of the state, yet there never has existed any
general license to make or accept such donations, nor any authority given to govern-
ors, Territorial Deputations or other executive functionaries to grant public lands to
the Church—and no general or special power to make such grants Was ever possessed
by any authority in California.
m
9. That the members of religious orders, called the regular clergy, who alone were
employed as missionaries in the Indies, are considered m law as civilly dead, (" dead
to the world,") and incapable of acquiring and holding property by any title.
10. That the Missions were not corporations, but establishments founded by the gov-
ernment for the advancement of population, civilization, and Christianity. The eccle-
siastical power had no control over them, nor any possession of lands or other prop-
erty appurtenant to them, nor was such possession in the Padres or religious Mis-
sionaries. The only possession distinct from that of the members of the community,
was the possession of the government, the Missions themselves, and the Padres, the
military escorts and the administradores being mere instrumentalities and agents ofthe
government. Secularization consisted in removing the religious missionaries, and al-
lowing the Church to appoint Pastors of the secular clergy to administer to the spir-
itual wants of the community, when the natives had been so far enlightened in the
mysteries of the Catholic faith as to be fit subjects for the ordinary ecclesiastical gov-
ernment. This change had nothing to do with rights of property.
AUTHORITIES.
4. Cavallario, Professor of Civil and Canon Law, in his " Institutes of Canon
Law,", book 4, treats of the origin of ecclesiastical property. " Previous to the reign
of Constantine, the goods of the Church were derived solely from the voluntary offer-
ings of the faithful, and consisted in moveables. Then the Church was regarded by
the civil law as an unlawful assembly, incapable of taking by gift or devise. The
Church itself also placed but little value on immovables, because Christians then be-
lieved that the consummation of all things was at hand. Neither could Christians
institute Christ as heir, because, according to Ulp%ian the gods could not be insti-
tuted heirs, excepting those whom the laws authorized to be instituted. But the
Romans did not receive Christ as one of the gods so as to allow property to be devised
to him (p. 67-8.) But after Christians came to enjoy peace, the Church made large
acquisitions by means of testamentary dispositions, inheritance, and various titles.
As respects acquisitions by testament, Constantine the Great first recognized the
Church as a lawful Congregation, and conferred upon her the power to take by will,
(p. 68.) This privilege, which was given to the Catholic Church only, did not extend
to conventicles of heretics, and by a law of Honorious the property which heretics
had donated to their conventicles was., transferred to the Catholic Church, (ib.,) be-
cause these conventicles not being recognized by the civil power, were incapable of
holding.
5. " For a long course of time the Church retained the liberty of acquiring fixed
property, but at length, by the edicts of many Princes this liberty was restricted, and
it was enacted that the Church or religious establishments should not acquire immov-
able property without the consent of the civil power. This consent of the civil power,
by which the Church was indulged in its acquisition of landed property, was called
amortizatio—amortization, which expression seems to be derived from the Grallic
word amortir, that is, to extinguish. Because ecclesiastical property being wholly
exempted from tributes and civil burdens, it would seem to be extinguished to
the state and public uses ; for which reason also the Church and religious so-
cieties are called manus mortuae, {manos muertQs mortmain.) Assuredly it
was the public good that induced the edicts of Princes prohibiting the transfer of
immovables in mortmain. The Church is a corporation which never makes distribu-
tion, so that what it once receives it returns not, but holds perpetually, inasmuch as
[6]
the alienation of ecclesiastical property is prohibited, (p. 79.) In France, Spain, th
republic of Venice, and other Christian countries generally, it is provided by statufr
that property in the soil can not be transferred to the Church or other religious es|
tablishments either by donation or contract inter vivos, or by last will, without thij
assent of the civil authority, (ib. p. 80.) Where this law of amortization prevails, th<J
license, if granted, is paid for with a certain amount paid in money in compensatioiS
to the public treasury for the advantages and revenues thence withdrawn, which
amount is by law arbitrary, although in many countries, as in France and Spain, tW
amount to be paid is fixed by law or custom. But these statutes, by which the Churcr
and religious places are prohibited to acquire property in the soil, have been enactec
by the civil power in defence of its own right. Those who hold that the necessity o:
this assent of the sovereign authority to the acquisition of immovables by the churcl
is repugnant to ecclesiastical liberty and immunity, are certainly unjust towards th(
civil power which has been instituted by God. Most clearly has the civil authority
power over all temporal things, and the commerce therein is for the good of the state
rightfully restricted or extended by princes. It is by virtue of the laws of Christian
princes, that the church herself enjoys the right of acquiring immovables : and so.
when the excessive acquisitions of the church prove pernicious to the State, the pow-
er of acquiring, conceded to the Church, has been rightfully restricted by princes
within certain bounds, (ib.) Escriche Die. de Leg. Tit. "Amortizacion Ecclesiastical
definition, " The acquisition of real property by Churches, Monasteries, and other
pious places," remarks : " Churches, monasteries and other pious places are corpora-
tions which have a perpetual existence by means of the successive subrogation of the
persons who compose or administer them ; and the property which they once acquire
never again returns to the commerce and circulation of the State, but it is en-
chained forever to their possession, depriving every citizen of the right or hope of as-
piring thereto. These corporations therefore, are with reason denominated cuerpos
immortales, because they never die, and in a species of contrary sense (contrasentido)
memos muertas, because they are destitute of movement and action to give or alien-
ate what they have received, although they might more properly be called memos
mortiferas, because by the act of withdrawing from commerce the property that is
transferred to them, they extinguish it in a certain mode and amortize it as to the
State, which therein suffers the greatest injury. In effect, ecclesiastical amortization
withdrawing from the hands of laymen the fixed or real property and monopolizing it
in the hands of the clergy, is an abyss that is swallowing up the landed wealth ; dis-
poils in consequence secular families of the most secure means of subsistence, pro-
duces poverty, mendicancy, and emigration, diminishes the number of citizens, and
weakens the power of the State. For this reason God in the ancient law upon mak-
ing distribution of property, left to the secular State, composed of the eleven tribes,
the possession of all the real property, and forbade the acquisition thereof by memos
muerias, reduced then to the Levites ; so that it may be said that ecclesiastical amor-
tization is contrary to the will and designs of God himself—the founder and preserver
of societies. " And the Lord spake unto Aaron, thou shalt have no inheritance in
their land, neither shalt thou have any part among them. I am thy part and thine
inheritance among the children of Israel.
"And behold, I have given the children of Levi all the tenth in Israel for an inher-
itance for their service, which they serve, even the service of the tabernacle of the
congregation.
" Neither must the children of Israel henceforth come nigh the tabernacle of the
congregation, lest they hear sin and die.
m
"But the Levites shall do the service of the tabernacle of the congregation, and
aey shall bear their iniquity. It shall be a statute forever throughout your gene-
itions that among the children of Israel they have no inheritance. Numbers, cap.
;, v. 20, 21, 22, 23.
I The Priests, the Levites and all the tribe\ of Levi shall have no part nor inheri-
tnce "with Israel. They shall eat the offerings of the Lord, made by fire and his in-
eritance.
I
Therefore shall they have no inheritance among their brethren. The Lord is
leir inheritance, as he hath said unto them." Deut., cap. 18, v. 1 and 2.
I For this reason also it has been the general practice in Catholic nations to pro-
ibit the transfer of real property to churches, monasteries and other immortal eccle-
astical bodies, which began in each country in proportion as the necessity was dis-
vered of putting limits to the unmeasured acquisitions of the clergy. Among us
lis practice ruled already in time of the Groths, for the tax payers could not alienate
leir possessions in favor of the churches, nor even build them without precedent
eense of the king, or letters of amortization, which the Bishop must solicit occurring
i the sovereign, as provided by canon 15 of the third Council of Toledo, held du-
ng the reign of Ricardo in the year 589.
I The maxim that the churches and monasteries could not aspire to the acquisition
' landed property was always preserved in subsequent times, and was adopted
iccessively, as well in the general code, as in the municipal charters (fueros) not
'
ily in order to avoid the diminution of the royal revenues, but also to prevent the
i icumulation and monopoly of property ; so that there was not a king who did
nfirm and re-establish it.
1
In effect Alonzo I of Castile and VI of Leon, not content with having previous to the
|ar 1080, sanctioned the charter of Sepulveda, which incapacitates maiios muertas for
ery acquisition of hereditaments, established in the year 1102 a general law (at the
nfirmation and promulgation of which there assisted, beside the Primate, the
ishops of Palencia, Burgos, Osma, Avila, Cuenca, Calahorra, and the Abbot of
alladolid, with many other secular persons) providing that no one should have power
ffier by contract or free donation, to give or leave real property to the churches,
ujer pain of forfeiting them.
" This law was afterwards solemnly sanctioned for the kingdom of Castile, in the
ortes of Najara, convoked by Don Alonzo VII, in the year 1138, and for the king-
1
>m of Leon, in the Cortes of Benavente, convoked by Don Alonzo IX, in the year
'102.
''The law of the Cortes of Najara is law 75 of the Fuero Viejo, and declares as
Hows : ' This is the law of Castile, which was adopted in the Cortes of Najara, that
hereditament of the king's jurisdiction (de realengo) shall pass to any Hidalgo or
onastery.' The law of the Cortes of Benavente is referred to in law 231 del
soothe which declares: ' It was ordained in the Cortes convened in Castile, in
ajara, and in the land of Leon, in Benavente, that th.ereale)igo should not pass to
.
)ade7igo.'> By the name realengo was designated the real property of secular tax
yers, and by the name Abadengo, the manos muertas. This disposition was
;erwards extended to the countries which were successively conquered, as may be
;3il in the codes (or charters) which were given them, and especially in those of
pledo, Cuenca, Caceres and Cordoba, 'Attending,' says Alonzo VIII, of Castile, in
eI ' 02, 'to the damage suffered by Toledo, and the grievances which came upon the land,
Established, with the aid of the good men of Toledo, that no inhabitant of Toledo,
,
m or woman, should have power to give or sell his estate to any order, unless he
should choose to give or sell it to Santa Maria of Toledo, because it is the Cathedra
of the City ; but of his movables he may give as much as he pleases accordin;
to the charter. And the order that shall receive any estate, given or sold, an
he who may have sold it, shall forfeit the same and it shall pass to the neares,
relations of the vendor.' And the same Alonzo VIII, in the celebrated Charte'
which he gave to Cuenca, at the end of the year 1190 or that of 1191, declares in I
2 of Tit. 2 : ' No man hath power to give or sell real property to hooded Friai
(cucullatis et seculo renuntiantibus) ; for the order itself prohibits your giving c
selling to these any real estate, and so do the law and the custom equally prohib:|
it.' Alonzo IX, of Leon, before referred to, in the Charter which in the year 1229 \
gave to the Villa of Caceres and its territory, provided, among other things, that
within its district any domiciled citizen should give, sell, hypothecate or by ar
mode whatsoever transfer any estate, land, vineyard, field, houses, plazas, garclain
mills, to any friars, the municipal council thall take all that he hath, and from tl
friars all that hath been delivered to them, and the whole shall be applied to Q
proper use and benefit of the Council.' San Fernando III, on the 21st of Januar
1222 confirmed the Charters of Toledo, on the 12th of March, 1231, that of Cacer<
and on the 8th of April, in the same year, 81, he established for the government
Cordoba the same law in the terms following. [This being in the words of the law
Toledo, above given, is here omitted.]
_
Pope Gregory IX. used great exertion to induce San Fernando to revoke the h',
of Amortization ; but the pious king was unwilling to sacrifice the interests of t
State to the Church, The king who unfortunately opened to her the liberal hai
was his son and successor, Alonzo X.. called the Wise. This king permitted t
compilers of the Partidas to substitute the ultramontane maxims of Gracian for t
laws and customs of Castile ; and thus it is that in the Alfonso Code* are found d
seminated provisions contrary to the law that is now occupying our attention, whi
are the following : ' Every one may leave as much of his property to the Church
he pleases, unless the king have prohibited it,' (L. 55, T. 6, P. 1). 'If it should
happen that the clergyman have no relations within the 4th degree, the church
which he was beneficiatecl shall be his heir,' (L. 4, T. 31, P. 1.) ' The demand (
suit) for a debt due to one who has entered a religious order, shall be made by
Prelate or Superior of the order, because his property passes to the monastery
which the latter is the Superior, (L. 10, T. 2, P. 3). ' May be instituted the heii
another the church, and every respectable place that may have been founded for
service of God and works of piety, and any clergyman either secular or regular, (L
T. 3, P. 6). ' Any man having entered upon a religious life can not make a will,
all the property which he may have shall belong to that monastery or place
which he may have entered, unless he have children or other relations descending
the direct line, who may inherit his property,' (L. 17, T. 1, P. 6).
But as the Partidas, although concluded in the year 1263, were not published
the year 1348, the Pueblos adnered to their municipal charters, and the Fuero Vi
of Castile, in which, as has been above stated, the law of amortization was consec
ted. Thus it is that law 231 del Estilo, which, like all the rest, does no more £
explain the practice of those times, explicitly manifests that real estate could nol
sold or transferred to Abadengo (in mortmain), neither could the Abadengo (ma
muertas) purchase the same without having privilege from the kings therefor,
onzo X. himself could not refrain from making this declaration, and moreover <
firmed in 1255 the charter of Toledo, in 1255 the Fuero Viejo of Castile, in
"*
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the charter of Cuenca, and in 1279 that of Sepulveda. The mode in which he
9yplains the confirmation of the charter of Cuenca is very explicit and decisive.
* says: We command and prohibit that no~rea?era§io'vpas-5to Abadengo,"nor to me
bers of orcleTs,~or religion by purchase, nor by will, nor by exchange, nor in any p
sible mode, without our mandate.' Moreover, on the 27th of Sept. 1269, he impos
upon the Pobladores (settlers) of Baeza the same prohibition : ' and that they sha
not have power to sell or give the same to any church, or men of orders or religion
without our mandate-' Here then may be seen the appreciation in which the will
king held the laws intioducedinto his Partidas respecting the acquisition of propert
by the churches and monasteries. The ting, Don Sancho IV., commanded to male j
inquisition (pesquisa) of the real property which, contrary to the dispositions of th |
law, had passed to Ecclesiastical hands, in order that the lands in the villas whiq
had been alienated should be returned to them.
Don Fernando IV., in the ordinance of the Cortes of Valladolid of 129!
.£. declares : ' We command to seize the estates which have passed from the recdengo t
-- the abadengo, as it was ordained in the Cortes of Haro, and that henceforth no trans
fer be_made from rcalengo to Abadengo, nor from Abadengo to rcalengo, unless :
be in the manner ordained in the aforesaid Cortes.' And in the Ordinance of thj
Cortes of Burgos of 1301 : 'I have thought meet and do command that the secula < ;
„_, tax-paying property pass not to Abadengo, neither be purchased by Hidalgos, no
/ clergymen, nor by Pueblos nor by communities ; and as for the passed since the oi
ordinance of Haro hitherto, those"who have purchased, or acquired by any other mod;
f whatsoever shall pay taxes therefor ; and henceforth they shall not have power t
purchase nor acquire by donation, and if they do "they shall forfeit the same and i
shall be be seized by the Alcaldes and judiciary of the Place.'
Don Alonzo XL, informed of the inobservance of this disposition, annulled all th
acquisitions of real property made by the Clergy, although he afterwards confirme<
such as were founded upon royal privilege. He prohibited the prelates to purchase
others : he revoked acquisitions made with the object of founding Chaplaincies
;
an<
he commanded to make general inquisition, in order to return to secular families thos*
which had been transferred to the Church without royal authorization. See the Or 1 '
denamiento of Medina del Campo of 1326, and the petition 23 of the Cortes of Valla-
dolid of 1345 and its response. It is true that this king sanctioned and published ii
the Cortes of Alcala of 1348 the seven Partidas, in which are found in favor of the
Church the laws which we have above extracted ; but he only invested it with thj
character of a supplctive code, leaving in their full vigor the laws of the country til
then in use, and giving the firstgrade of authority to the ordinance made in the same
Cortes of Alcala, (now constituting the code entitled " Ordenamiento de Alcala,") ir
which it was provided that real estate could not pass to Abadeiigo from realengo, nor
solariego, (1) nor Behetria, (2.)
But if such repeated and decisive dispositions never entirely closed the door against
the acquisitions of the clergy, they were yet more impotent against the irruptions oil
cupidity and devotion, during the terrible mortality which Castile experienced in the!
years 1349, 1350 and 1351. The faithful then, in order to appease the wrath oi
Heaven and merit the favor and protection of the saints, divested themselves freely
of their property, making excessive donations to the churches, monasteries and,
sanctuaries, whereby the law of Amortization was again subverted. The kingdom (
assembled in the Cortes of Valladolid, 1351, complained energetically to the king,
Don Pedro, of the conduct of the manos muertas, supplicating him that he would be|
(1.) ^states of flidaJgoeB cultivated by ft ir v;esal&
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leased to give vigor to that which relative to this subject had been ordained by his
iredecessors, and to command that the property acquired by the clergy in fraud of*
he fundamental laws of the monarchy, should be returned to its former condition.
)on Pedro readily acceded to the petition, renewing the law of the Cortes of Najara,
,nd adopting measures to repair the injury caused to the state by the memos muef-
as ; but the events of his reign left him no time nor repose to carry into complete
ffectthe desires of the nation, and his brother and successor, Henry II. , did not find
limself in a condition to think of reforms, but, on the contrary, was under the neces-
•ity of alienating the greater part of his patrimony.
The salutary dike which the laws had thrown up against ecclesiastical amortization
)eing broken in, the wealth of the secular and regular clergy went on increasing to
mch a degree that in the beginning of the sixteenth century, it was calculated to
unount to one third part of that of the whole Peninsula. 'The revenues of all Spain,'
said Lucius Marineus Siculo, a writer who flourished in the time of the Catholic
Sovereigns (Ferdinand and Isabella) ' according to my judgment and that of others,
is divided into three parts nearly equal ; of which one is of the kings ; the other of
the Grandees and Cahalleros : and the third of the Prelates and Priests.' (-De las
Cosas Memorables de JEspana, 1 .Lib. 4.)
In this state of things the Cortes considered themselves obliged to elevate their
clamors to the Throne, for the remedy of this evil ; and upon petition of the Cortes of
Valladolid of 1523, the sovereigns Dona Juanna and her son Don Carlos enacted,
'that estates and patrimonies and real property should not be alienated in favor of
churches and monastries, and that no one shall have power to sell the same to them,
for at the rate that the churches and monastries are purchasing, and that donations
and legacies are being made to them, the greater part of the property of the kingdom
would come to be theirs.'
The Cortes of Toledo, held in the year 1525, solicited that the king would appoint
two Visitors, the one an ecclesiastical and the other a layman, to reconnoitre the mon-
asteries and churches, and the property which they might be found to possess, over
and above what might, by the Visitors, be deemed necessary for their expenditures,
according to the district where they are situated, might be ordered to be sold, and that
the Visitors designate how much shall be left for building and expenses of the said
churches and monasteries and the persons belonging to them. The Cortes of Sego-
via of the year 1532, petitioned "that they might be prohibited the acquisition of any
more real property, and that whatsoever should be sold or donated to them, the rela-
tions of the vendor or donor should have power to retract for an equivalent price
within four years." To the same effect were the representations of the Cortes of
Madrid of 1534, those of Valladolid of 1537, those of Toledo of 1539, all clamorous
for the law of amortization, which they were enabled to re-establish, though in vain,
because the laws are always less powerful than the efforts of cupidity and devotion
concentrated in one and the same point, to contravene them.
"The Spanish statesmen who flourished from the 16th to the 18th century likewise
manifested the necessity of putting bounds to the acquisitions of real property which
the churches and monasteries were making; for, said they, if the abuse be allowed to
prooeed, all the houses, vineyards, landed estates and annuities, will belong to the ec-
clesiastics. * * * * and if a ship may at length be sunk by a single drop of wa-
ter entering day by day, and a city may be involved in a conflagration by a single
spark ; so the abundance of temporal property, entering daily under ecclesiastical
dominion, and being withdrawn from the temporal, weakens and destroys the mon-
archy.
[11.
Fortunately an institution which, on the one hand has caused the greatest injur
. to the State, has served on the other as a counterpoise to ecclesiastical amortizatioi
hindering from falling into this abyss, as it inevitably would have fallen, the greate
part of the landed property of the peninsula. 1 speak of the Mayorazgos (entaile
estates) which suggested by vanity or the desire to perpetuate in families the hone
t and lustre of the ancestors, put a rein upon indiscreet and unenlightened piety, an
(
freed a great amount of real property from being engrossed in the churches anil
convents.
,
" It is certainly a very painful spectacle which is presented by this perpetual strifl
between the policy of the government and the cupidity of the ecclesiastics ; and th .
faithful cannot have been much edified by that pernicious disregard of a national lai
j
which had its origin almost with the monarchy, of a law so many times solicited, s |
o many times re-established and never abrogated, of a law given, as observes Jove! \
llanos, not in hatred of the Church, but in favor of the State ; not so much to hinde
the enrichment of the clergy, as to prevent the impoverishment of the people who hat
so generously endowed them. It will perhaps be said' that the disposition taken bj
£.. Bon Juan II, in Valladolid on the 13th of April, 1452, (1. 12, T. 5, Lib. 1, N. R.J
providing that property alienated in mortmain should be subjected to the payment o -,
the fifth part of its true value, over and above the Alcabala, supposes the revocatioi |
or suspension of the general law of amortization. But it must be observed that thi]
imposition is not necessarily a condition under which the power to alienate in mort-
main is conceded, but rather an inducement for the observance of the prohibitory law'
and a penalty for its infraction. This interpretation is not arbitrary, since it is de'
duced from the petition of the Cortes of Madrid of 1534. The Procuradores (depu
ties of the towns) made strong application for the punctual observance of the law 6\
amortization, according to what had been accorded in the Cortes of Valladolid
;
anc
and thus ' that orders should be given,' they said, ' that the churches and monasteries
shall not purchase real property, and that your Majesty command to be observed tin
law 7th, made by Don Juan of glorious memory, which is the ordinance entitled, oi
donations and raercedes ; and forasmuch as the penalty expressed in the said law
being light, has been occasion for its inobservance, they supplicate your Majesty that]
instead of the fifth, the penalty may be made the third part.
"The royal Council, in consultations of the years 1677, 1678 and 1691, (note 3 tc
1. 12, T. 5, Lib. 1, N. 11.,) manifested their conviction of the value and importance o:-
the national law of amortization
;
of its continued observance for the space of one
hundred and thirty years, in view and with the knowledge of eighteen Pontiffs, whe
never opposed it ; and of the necessity to re-establish and copy it.
"Notwithstanding as they were then treating of reforms in the secular and regulai
State, they were of opinion that it would be convenient to reserve this matter foi
some period in which it could be agitated with greater hopes of success.
" This period effectively arrived—for afterwards various orders were issued direct-
ing that privileges of amortization should not be conceded, which presupposes thej
existence and vigor of the general law which prohibits it. ' It having come to my
notice,' says Charles III, in the resolution of 10th March, 1763, (1. 17, T. 5, lib. 1, N.
U.,) 'that for the non-observance of all the repeated orders which have formerly been
given, providing that privileges solicited by communities and other manos muertas,
for the acquisition of real property, should be absolutely denied, the injury to my vas-
sals has been considerably augmented ; and wishing at once to attack this mischief.
I have resolved that in no case shall applications be acceded to of manos muertas for
the acquisition of property, even though they come invested with the greatest piety
[12.
iid necessity; and that the council of Hacienda, always whenever they see appllea-
ons of this sort, or information on the subject is sought from them, before complying'
,; informing, represent all the orders given to the contrary, and the intolerable mis-
-viiefs that result to the public interest, from which, under the name of piety miscon^-
3ived, the patrimony of laymen is likely to be swallowed up. ~~
' Ferdinand VI had already by a royal order of 20 Aug., 1757, commanded that the
.puses of Aranjuez, fabricated with the royal permission and other requisites therein
^pressed, ' can not be sold, granted, exchanged, nor transferred by any title whatso-
*
rer, to communities—ecclesiastical, secular nor regular, nor shall there be founded
' pon them, chaplaincies, anniversaries nor other perpetual charges, even though they
3 destined for the royal court Itself or the persons who there inhabit, or for its hos-
pital, so that they can in no case fall into manos muertas ; and any disposition what-
ever that may be made to the contrary hereof, be it gratuitous, or onerous, inter
ivos, or ex testamento, for pious use, or whatever end or destination, is hereby de-* •-
glared null, nunc -pro tunc, (de^cle ahora para entoncesjand the said house or edifice
"mil, ipso facto, and Without any further declaration, be forfeited,—falling into con-*
'scation, and remaining incorporated in the royal hereditaments.' (Note 5, tit. 17,
\b. 10, N. R.)-
.
Charles III, upon advice of the Royal council in cedula of 18th Aug,, 1771,.. (1.' 21,
t. 5, lib. 1, N. B-.j) renewed and sanctioned the law of the Fuero of Cordoba, which
prohibits the alienation of real property in mortmain,- as has been said above, adding
<) the penalties contained in the Fuero, privation of office on the part of the notaries
fficiating in the premises, and nullity of the instruments, and the alienations. The
.ame Charles III, disposed likewise in the instruction of 25th June, 1771, (1. 21, tit.
,', lib'. 1, N. R.,) that in the new settlements of Sierra Morena, the lands cannot be
Alienated in mortmain, either by contract inter vivos, nor by last will, under pain of
onfiscation. (1. 3, tit. 22, lib. 7, N. R.)" So also by a law of Charles the Emperor,
f 1535, which is incorporated in the Code of the Indies, (1. 10, tit. 12, lib. 4,) it is
.irovided that "Lands shall be distributed without excess among the discoverers and
Id settlers, and their descendants- who shall remain in the country, and those most
it shall be preferred, and they shall have no power to sell them to any church or mon-
astery, or other ecclesiastical person, under the penalty that they may and' shall forfeit
hem, and they may be [then] distributed to others."
The Mexican law of colonization of 18th Aug. 1824, provides (Art. 13) that "the new
ettlers (Pobladores) shall not have power to transfer their property in mortmain,"
manos muertas.)
The Decree of the Cortes of 4th January 1813, provides (Art. 18} that the conces-
iions of land made pursuant to Articles 9, 10, 12, 13 and 15, shall be in full property
fee. ; "but the owners of these allotments shall have no power to alienate them before
,he expiration of four years from the time of the concession, nor ever to subject them
;o entailment, nor to transfer them in mortmain, at any time nor by any title what-
soever." To bring these general prohibitions particularly to the notice of individuals
md public functionaries, not to give them more binding force, they are renewed in
.many special acts respecting the concession, conveyance, or distribution of lands, which
it would be tedious to refer to in this place.
It would be a singular inconsistency, if while the legislative power was employing
such stringent and repeated prohibitory measures to prevent the transfer of landed
property to the church, and thus, as far as possible, to repair the greatest damage
which the State was suffering, it should have been left in the power of executive
functionary te transfer the public domain in mortmain ad libitum, and an incon-
[13.J
sistency still more monstrous, if the church retained the power to make these acqui-
sitions without an express' concession of any kind, and by the pure force of
presumption utterly repugnant to the most fundamental laws of the country.
In the Decree of the Spanish Cortes of 27th Sept., 1820, re-enacted in Spain 30th
Aug., 1836, it is ordained, that 'the churches, monasteries, convents, and ecclesiasti-
cal communities of any kind whatsoever, as well secular as regular, hospitals, houses
of refuge, houses of mercy and of instruction, associations, fraternities, commandrics,
and other permanent establishments, be they ecclesiastical orjaical, known by the
name of manos muertas, shall henceforth have no power to acquire any real or im-
movable property in any province of the monarchy, neither by testament, nor by
donation, purchase, exchange, forfeiture in enfiteutic rents, adjudication or Mortgage,,
or in payment of arrears of rents, nor by any other title whatsoever, be the same
lucrative or onerous." (Ark. 15.) The next Article provides that they cannot acquire
any interest in monies loaned or secured upon real estate, nor in any incumbrance
thereon, whether consisting in money loaned, or a part^f^the fruits, or any service,,
^rgwhi^ out of the same. (Decretos Vigentes p. — .) Nor were these measures of
the civil power in Spain to overcome what was deemed a great public evil, made the
subject of opposition on the part of the Roman See. Arguilles, in his "Diccionario
de Hacienda" Art. "ventas" indicates with reference to the memorials of Owvrard,
printed in Paris in 1806, that in November, 1804, Pope Pius VII approved a royal
cedula, signed by Charles IV, in which all the ecclesiastical property of Spain and
the Indies was ordered to be sold.
—
(Escriche.)
It will of course be observed that the disposition of the Partidas in favor of the
church and monasteries already cited in the extract given from Escriche, if they ever
had any force, (as in truth they did not,) were abrogated by the subsequent and
repeated legislative provisions to the contrary. But as this Code may be cited on
other points, and relied upon in support of ecclesiastical privileges and immunities,
it will be pertinent to inquire into the real motive of the enormous concessions which
the author of it made in favor of the clergy, and the grade which has been given it in
the scale of legal authority.
Alonzo the Wise, about the time he commenced this great work, was an aspirant to
the imperial crown of Germany, in competition with Richard of England, brother of
King Henry. The electors were divided between the aspirants. Both of them as-
sumed the title, and the contest was referred to the court of Borne, where it remained
pending for eighteen years. It was during the first seven years of this period that
the Code of the "Siete Partidas" was framed. The Popes abhorred the family of
Richard, because they had not been as compliant to the assumptions of the successors
of St. Peter as some other christian Princes. On the other hand, the great powrer,
erudition and sagacity of Alonzo X., his late conquests in Spain of the countries occu-
pied by the Moors, his title to the two Sicilies and other States of Italy, inspired in
the Popes the apprehension that the combination of so great strength in a single person
might be unfavorable to the maintainence and increase of their preponderance in the
political system of Europe. This apprehension, however, vas concealed, and having
attracted to that court the decision of this great contest, they amused Don Alonzo
for eighteen years with the hope of success, until, after the death of Richard, and
when there could remain no further doubt of Alonzo's right to the imperial crown,
Gregory X. declared openly against him, and determined in favor of the election of
another aspirant. (Sempere, Iiistoria del Derecho Espanol, lib. 3, cap. III. Mariana
Historia general de Espana, lib. XIII, cap. XXIL]
If human nature in the middle of the 13th centurv had some of the weaknesses
[14,
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that belong to it still, the obsequiousness to the clergy exhibited in the laws of the
Partidas, so repugnant to the dispositions of other Spanish codes, may be readily ac-
counted for. But however this may be, and whatever may have been the motive that
influenced the Wise Legislator to introduce in his most famous code, the laws or max-
ims referred to, and to repudiate them in the ordinances and municipal charters sanc-
tioned by him afterwards, it is certain that they never bad the force of laws and were
never observed as such. It is indeed doubted whether the Partidas was intended to
have the force of a legal code, or is entitled to any higher authority than a mere doc-
trinal work. On this point the author of the History of the Spanish Law, before ci-
ted, Sempere, remarks : (p. 300-3,) " As I was meditating upon the improbability
that a king as wise as Don Alonzo X, while he experienced the strongest opposition
of his people to the admission of the little code of the Fuero Real, should attempt to
give them another more voluminous and mere opposed to their ancient uses and
customs, 1 became satisfied that his intention in the compilation of the Partidas was,
not to publish them as a new general code, but to carry forward the project of his
father, of enlightening the nation with a doctrinal work which should instruct,
prepare, and place it in a condition to admit the convenient reforms in their govern-
ment and laws.
"I am not ignorant that the imperative style in which many articles of the Partidas
entitled laws are written is opposed to my opinion. But, notwithstanding this, I
encountered and still encounter very strong reasons for adhering to it. In the pro-
logue of that work we are given t» understand that it was made more for the instruc-
tion of kings than for publication as a legislative code. 'And we make this book,' lie
says, 'to aid ourselves thereby, and those who shall succeed us,' &c. The context
itself of the Partidas very clearly manifests that it is rather a doctrinal work than a;
legislative code. Very many of its so styled laws are nothing more than allusions to!
what was being and what had been practiced in various kingdoms
;
others are vain et-i
ymologies, a,nd impertinent definitions of certain words ; others a disconnected sericsi
of references to various authors, sacred and profane. And how can it be thought thatj
a Catholic king should believe himself authorized to dictate and sanction religious:
laws not only upon matters of pure external discipline, but also upon matters of faith
and the holy sacraments which is the character of many of the laws of Partida 11
After noticing the severe censures of Marina upon some of the ultramontane doc-
trines of the Partidas, he continues : " Is it credible that a wise king should attempt
to sanction and promulgate as a legislative code, a work so monstrous, and a confused
heap of erudition for the most part frivolous and inopportune, and an infinite number
of foreign and contradictory laws heaped together, against the intention of the legis-
lator and many of them opposed to his rights and prerogatives.
How much more probable are my new observations ? I think that the real inte
tion of Don Alonzo X was not to overthrow at a single blow all the ancient Spanish
,
legislation, but to instruct and prepare the nation to receive with less repugnance the
convenient reforms in their government and in their laws, placing before them the
best models from other nations, and particularly the Roman, which were commonl}
believed, and not without reason, to have been the most excellent in the universe
" The author may also have been greatly influenced in that grand enterprise by the
well founded hope which he entertained when he commenced it, of seeing himsel:
crowned Emperor of Germany, which affair was then being litigated in Rome ; froir
those circumstances may have originated the exhorbitant amplification of ecclesias
tical rights in order to secure the favor of the Pontifical Court.
"All these conjectures are less improbable than the four propositions set down hj
my censor [Marina]; and those that the Partidas were not promulgated in the time
of their author, (nor for 100 years afterwards,] and that the work now knoAvn as such
is not entirely conformable to that which was written by his order, far from deserving
to be considered paradoxes are truths very clearly demonstrated in the Ordenamien-
to ds Alcald, of 1348. In this last code, which was promulgated by Alonzo XI at the
ame time with the Partidas, and to which he expressly assigns the^rs^ grade of au-
thority, is found the explicit provision against ecclesiastical amortization before cited,
which has been followed up by similar prohibitions in all subsequent codes. In con-
firmation of the opinion advanced by the learned jurist just cited, that the Partidas
was not invested with the character of a legislative code, or if its doctrines have at
length come to be regarded as iust rules of decision where the authentic codes are
silent, they can never have any other force than that of suppletory dispositions, it will
only be necessary to refer to the fact that all accredited authors place it last in the
scale of authority.
The following is the scale as given in the work entitled " Sala Mexicana," publish-
ed in 1845, [vol. 1, pp. 158-159 :]
l 1st grade. National [Mexican] laws subsequent to the Independence, including
those of the States of the Confederation given while the federal sj^stem ruled, which
are not opposed to the system adopted in the Constitution of 1836, nor have besn ab-
rogated by subsequent general laws.
2nd. Spanish laAvs promulgated as well during the absolute as during the repre-
sentative government, including the special ordinances of the different branches, with
the cedulas and extraordinary orders Communicate to America, the Recopilation of
the Indies and Recopilation of Castile, [nueva,] giving preference, among all these
laws, to those of latest date.
3d. Ordenamiento Real.
4th. Ordenamiento de Alcala.
5th. Fuero Real.
(5th. Fuero Juzgo.
7th. Siete Partidas.
The same gradation is given by Alvarez, [Derecho Real, vol. 1, p. 58-60,] which
is referred to in my brief in the case of Citv of San Francisco vs. The United States,
[p. 7, §7.]
'•The Roman laws are not, and must not be denominated laics, but mere opinions of
wise men which can only be followed in defect of law, and in as far as they come in
lid of the law of nature and are in affirmance of the Royal law, which latter is prop-
erly the common law, and not that of the Romans, whose laAvs or any others foreign
must not be used or observed." [L. 8, tit. 1, lib. 2, Fuero Juzgo.]
:i The Supreme Pontiff, as visible head of the Church and Vicar of Jesus Christ,
as well as the Assemblies [general councils] of the Church universal, are competent
eigislators in all that pertains to matters of faith, sacraments, and discipline : in the
latter case provided they do not offend the rights and prerogatives of the nation.
The State imparts to them its aid in all that is not offensive to the temporal jurisdic-
tion. Beyond these limits of their authority they may be disobeyed with impunity.
HL Sala Mex., 159.]
All the provisions of the Popes and Councils, therefore, respecting the acquisition,
bontrol, or management of ecclesiastical property, which are subjects of temporal
jurisdiction, are without force, unless they can be shown to have been recognized and
i Adopted by the legislative power in Mexico. Hence the objection that Avas made to
1 the testimony of the Vicar General, as to what the -councils of the church had decreed
[1(5.]
on these subjects. All papal bulls, briefs and rescripts, and decrees of general
councils, or other ecclesiastical provisions, even though they relate to subjects of faith
and discipline, must be presented to and receive the pase of the government before
they can be promulgated, and if they are found to contain encroachments upon the
prerogatives of the civil authority they will be interdict 3d. It would be dangerous
in the extreme to admit the right of the church to legislate about property in any
way whatever. [See Const, of 1824 Art. 50, 4 Const'l law (of 1836) N. it attribu-
tion 24. Bases Organicas, Art. 66, attribution 10 and Art. 87, at. 18, 19. Spanish
Const. (1812) Art. 171, at. 14, 1 1, 2 and 3, tit. 9, lib. 1 R. I.]
Even the building of a church, the founding of a convent or other religious estab-
lishment, the appointment of Bishops, pastors, or dignitaries in the church, could not
take place without a license or nomination of the civil power, which is called the
sovereign right of patronage. This right always belonged to the Spanish crown, but
is expressly recognized in the famous Bull of Julius It. [See Parras Gobiemo de
los Regulares de la America v. 1 p. 4 n. 2—7, 1, 1 and 2 tit. 3, 1. 2 and 43 tit. 6 lib. lj
R. I. Instituciones del Derecho Publico general de Espana [Dou.] p. 273.
286, 292—297, and the Spanish and Mexican Constitutions above cited, 2 Cavallario
162, 170—173 L. 1 tit. 15 lib. 1 R. I.]
Returning now to this great question of ecclesiastical amortization, we shall see
that it was not regarded with so much favor by the constitution, the laws, and the
political and the law writers, of the Mexican Republic, that the church or the clergy
would be permitted to make available claim to real property upon any vague pre-
sumption or other doubtful title.
In the political works of Don Jose Luis Mora, published in 1837, who certainly
occupies the first rank among the literary, political, and legal Avriters of the Mexican
Republic, will be found, vol. 1, p. 177, a very learned dissertation upon the subject ol
"Ecclesiastical Property."
" Every Mexican," he says, [p. 179.] " who truly loves the religion of Jesus Chrisl
and the prosperity of his country, must feel deeply interested in sustaining the one
and the other. Without religion and religious worship there can be no society, nc
public morality in any civilized nation ; but neither can religion exist and be respect-
ed when it is pretended to confound it with the abuses of superstition, with the ambi
tion and cupidity of the ministers of the altar. Thus it is that a service is done tc
religion itself in separating it from all this, thus presenting it in its native brilliancy
and splendor. As that which has principally afforded a pretext to the impious foi
discrediting it, has been the enormous abuse that has been made of ecclesiastical rev
enues, and the exorbitant pretensions of the clergy about this matter, whoever make!
it clearly to appear that religion is no accomplice in this, leaves its enemies almos
wholly disarmed ; and at the same time firmly establishes the civil rights of nations
and governments, and with them the public prosperity."
He observes that property of every kind, whether destined to religious and piouf
uses or other objects, is in its very nature temporal, and subject to the legislativ<
control of the imperial power exclusively, and that all the most celebrated fathers o
the church are perfectly agreed on this point
—
p. 180-185.
"The church may be considered under tAvo aspects : either as a mystic body, or a!
a political association; under the first aspect it is the work of Jesus Christ, eterna
and infallible, eternally independent of the temporal power: under the the second
"
is the work of civil governments, may be altered and modified, and even the privilege;
for which it is indebted to the social order, may be abolished like those of any othe]
political community."
til
[17.}
[If this political community, part and parcel, as it were, of the social organization
under the Mexican government necessarily ceased t^ exist as such when that govern-
ment ceased, when was it re-established and re-invested with that character in Cali-
fornia ?]
The correctness of these notions will be made evident to every one who considers
and knows how to distinguish the two epochs of the Church, which are distinctly
characterized in its history; the first, before Constantine, and the second, after that
prince made public profession of Christianity. In the first, the Church only existed as a
mystic body ; the divine word was preached, the sacraments were administered, ques-
tions of faith and morals were decided, the incorrigible heretic was separated from
the communion of the Church, and every thing was regulated relative to the form and
mode in which worship ought to be rendered to the Supreme Being. This and this
alone, was what the Church did in the epoch in which it existed only as a mystic
body. When Constantine became converted to Christianity, the Church now appear-
ed as a political community. Then began its ministers to acquire property, to have
an external forum, and coactive jurisdiction; to enjoy the right to impose upon its
subjects certain temporal penalties, and compel them by force to submit to them
;
then in fine they acquired the conveniences, honors and civil distinctions which they
now enjoy.
" From what has been shown it is deduced that the only rights which belonged to
the ministers of the Church, essentially are those which they enjoyed in the first
epoch in which the Church existed only as a mystic body, and that those which it
acquired afterwards in the class of a political community may be lost without any
detriment to religion. For when Jesus Christ promised that his Church should be
eternal and infallible, this was with the assurance at the same time that his kingdom
was not of this world, that he had not come to found a civil empire, and that all his prom-
ises ended with the mystic body, which was the work of his heavenly father, and ex-
tended not to the political community created by civil governments, kings and em-
perors." (P. 184)
He then proceeds to show that the only right of property that exists in the Church
is purely civil in its origin, subject wholly to the dispositions of the temporal author-
ity, and that this maxim has been recognized by all the ancient fathers, who admit
that the ecclesiastical power has no right to intermeddle or legislate on the subject.
(P. 185-200.)
" The most decisive proof of the incompetency of the ecclesiastical authority in the
matter of which we are treating, is the low estimation that has been given to the con-
ciliar dispositions, and the Bulls of the Popes which treat of external discipline, and
ecclesiastical property in Catholic countries themselves, which regard the Church as
a political community and coneede to it the rights which belong to those of its class.
The Council of Trent has never been received in France, and most of its dispositions
in matters of discipline are not, and never have been in force in Spain, nor in most
Catholic kingdoms. The Bull of the Cena has been generally repudiated in all of
them : their governments do not permit that any rescript of Rome shall have any
force or be admitted in them until after it has been examined, and the corresponding
pase has been given to it ; and in use of this power, they have frequently refused to
receive the Bulls of the Popes, with the circumstance that the Popes themselves in
the concordatos celebrated with Catholic sovereigns have recognized this right to re-
tain and suppress them," (p. 201.)
*****
" The Ecclesiastics put in prac-
tice every species of intrigues to seduce widows, and other weak and timid persons to
institute them heirs : from which it came to pass, that they acquired the epithet of
[18.]
solicitors of inheritances, with which the abuses that were practised to procure them
by testamentary legatees of the faithful without regard to the means, were ridiculed
and censured. This furnished occasion for the laws of which we have made mention,
issued by Valentiniano, Valente, and Graciano, numbers 20, 22 and 27 of the Theo-
disian code, by which that of Constantine was revoked, and they were prohibited from
making the acquisitions which they had been empowered to make by the law of Con-
stantine. This law revoking the power of the churches to acquire real property, is
that which was considered by Saint Geronimo to be just as we have before said.
Nevertheless the chinches, with more or less opposition, with greater or less difficulty,
remained empowered to acquire real property
;
but not without great opposition from
the most celebrated Fathers and Doctors of the Church, who always regarded her en-
richment with sorrow, and considered it as the origin of her decadence and relaxation.
So true is it that the Church, far from losing, is a great gainer by the privation of
temporal goods.
" St. Chrysostom in the 86th homily upon St. Matthew asks : ' Why did not the
Church possess lands in the times of the Apostles ? Because she was then more per-
fect. * * * By what principle of reason, of justice, and of equity, ought it to be
allowed, that the founders, benefactors, (of the State) and principally their heirs, who
should be found in a condition to serve the Republic, are seen obliged to suffer the
want of everything necessary, or to beg? And why, on the contrary, have the ben-
eficiaries (ecclesiastics) opulent, enriched by an excessive and improvident liberality,
the ability to present themselves with coaches and horses, to eat excessively, and to
array themselves in silk 1 In this, all order has been inverted ; things demand mod-
eration, and limits which ought to be established with prudence. The state requires
it, and the necessity is urgent.' [He then proceeds with extracts from the writings
of St. .Geronimo, Sulpicius Severus, a Father of the fifth century, St. Bernard, and
St. Ambrose, all of whom, with many other early Fathers whom he cites elsewhere,
manifested their aversion to the acquisition of property by the Church and the clergy.
"The wealth of the Church," says St. Ambrose, "is the faith, and she possesses none
other," (p. 208-205.) "And he saith unto them, whose is this image and superscription.
They say unto him Caesar's. Then saith he unto them, render therefore unto Caesar the
things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's," Math. XXII, 20,
21. " It is clear that Jesus Christ in a lesson, the only object of which was to dis-
tinguish temporal from spiritual things, reckoned among the first, money, which rep-
resents all goods which are material in their nature ; and as those which are destined
for the support of religious worship are of this class, it is likewise clear, according to
the doctrine of the divine Author of the Evangelist, that these are in their essence
and nature temporal. All the Fathers and Doctors of the Church are agreed in giv-
ing to this text of the Evangelist the same application." Cites particularly St. Chris-
ostom, (p. 180-1.)]
"It has been proved that the property which bears the name of ecclesiastical is by
its nature and essence temporal, the same after as well as before it has passed under
the dominion of the Church ; that it cannot be spiritualized ; that the Church con-
sidered as a mystic body can have no title thereto, nor can governments or individuals
be under any obligation to concede it ; that the same Church, the mystic body of
Jesus Christ, may take, and in fact has taken the character of a political community,
and that in reason thereof it has had the power to acquire, and has acquired the prop-
erty which the laws permit to those of its class, but under the civil law and with
total subjection to the temporal authority ; finally, that in the nature, administration,
and appropriation of its property there exists abuses that demand a remedy, and that.
[19- J
It is absolutely necessary to apply it. Once prove that the Church which possesses
temporal property is a political community, with the actions and rights of those of its
class, it only remains for us to examine into the power which the civil authority pos-
sesses over the corporations which it has created and over their property. That this
power, be it whatever it may, is exclusive, or what is the same thing, may be exercised
without the intervention of any authority foreign to itself, is a thing very clear. If
the temporal authority has power over the property of political bodies, and if the
Church is one of these, there is no doubt that it may be exercised over the Church
without any necessity of the concurrence of its Pastors, who by their spiritual mission,
are entirely foreign and incompetent in civil subjects, and consequently in those
which belong to the Church itself under the aspect of a political community, which
is that under which we are going to consider it. It is necessary, however, not to con-
found communities or moral corporations with associations of individuals for enter-
prises of industry or commerce. The acquisitions which the former make are never \\
the property of their members in whole nor in part, nor are destined to benefit them
individually, but to fulfil the ends of public utility, which the corporation ought to
accomplish. These corporations then are, rigorously speaking, mere administrators
of the property under their charge, which belongs to the public, and is consequently
found submitted to the authority which represents the public. It is not so with
respect to industrial and commercial societies ; in them there exists a common fund,
the component parts of which preserve the character of private property, which the
share-holders recover upon the dissolution of the company, dividing the profits and
sharing the losses in proportion to the amounts which they have introduced. The
funds of these companies, as has been said, preserve the character of private property,
and have no qualities in common with those of hospitals, houses of refuge, colleges,
benevolent associations, regular institutes, ecclesiastical cabildos, Ayuntamientos
}
6ic.,
&c. Such institutions, which nobody will confound with the others, are called moral
bodies, (cnerpos, or corporations,) and to them must be understood to be applicable
what we shall say in regard to the rights of communities.
" There is no doubt that the Church has a civil right of property over its posses-
sions (bienes ;) but this right is that of a community, wholly distinct from that of an
individual in its nature, origin and extent. The laws have always distinguished the
property of the person from that of the corporation ; and while to the former they
have given an unlimited amplitude, they have much restricted the latter. The right
of acquiring property in individuals has never had any limits ; it has always been
lawful to increase it by new acquisitions, even though these should be added to a
fortune already too great. With corporations, a contrary procedure has always been
taken, for limits have constantly been fixed to their acquisitions, with the prohibi-
tion to transcend them. Sometimes the amount has been designated to which their
property might be extended ; sometimes they have been declared incapable of acqui-
ring certain kinds of property, and not unfrequently, the usufruct only has been
conceded them. The reason for this difference is very clear, and is deduced as well
from the origin of property as from its consequences and results. The right which
an individual has to acquire it is natural, anterior to society, belongs to him as a mati,
and society does no more than to secure it ; on the contrary the right of a community
to acquire is purely civil, posterior to society, created by it, ancLconsequently subject
to the limitations which society may think proper to impose. There are, moreover,
other reasons of sufficient weight for placing limits to the acquisitions of communities
or corporations, and not to those of individuals.
All are agreed that a large fortune which has been excessively augmented is a
\ very great evil to society ; for as property is limited, if one only absorbs the whole
j the rest remain destitute of any. But this very grave evil has a natural limit in the
;
individual who necessarily must die some day, but it has none in a corporation or
(
community which is essentially immortal. An individual, however large an amount
3 of property he may have accumulated, within the term of a hundred years, the utmost
< to which his life can extend, must necessarily distribute his property among his heirs,
j and in this way a fortune remains destroyed which can never become colossal ; a com-
munity, on the contrary, as it never dies, if it is permitted to acquire without limits
I ad infinitum, may go on successively accumulating property until it shall have ac-
quired all, or so considerable a part as to produce a state of public misery. The civil
authority then has proceeded legally and justly, when it has assigned limits to the
acquisitions made by corporations or communities
; legally, because being itself thatv
has created them and conceded the right of property, it may amplify or limit that
right as it may deem meet
;
justly, because as it ought to take eare that the property
destined to the subsistence or comfort of man be distributed, if not with the equality
that could be desired, at least without a monstrous disproportion ; it ought to prevent
the existence of this, as it infallibly would exist if any community or corporation, I
which however great it may be supposed, is but a fraction of society, might go on ac-
cumulating property upon property, without term or measure."
[We have seen frequent examples of the dangerous influence of corporations which
have been able to control an unlimited amount of money, extend their agencies through
all parts of the country, and bring their power to bear upon all classes. Such an in-
stitution was the United States Bank, to the "ignoble domination" of which the
American government and people might have been subjected for ages, had not God
raised up another Sampson to beard the lion in his den. How much more dangerous
would be a religious corporation, with unrestricted license to accumulate lands, mo-
ney, and every species of property, extending its agencies throughout the State, and
exerting the tremendous power of unlimited wealth, combined with the religious mo-
tives and influences which a degenerate and crafty priesthood has employed with such
efficacy in all countries, Christian and pagan.]
"All these rules are applicable to the Church, which, as has been said, can make
no acquisitions but in its character of a political community ; thus it is that civil gov-
ernments without the necessity of consulting her in any thing, not only has the power
but ought to fix limits to her acquisitions, and the more so, inasmuch as the clergy
are under a law or an inviolable maxim never to alienate the property that has once
entered under their dominion. If the simple capacity to acquire ad infinitum, and
not be under the necessity to alienate, would present a sufficient motive to apprehend
that any community would monopolize sill, or a very considerable portion of social
property, it is altogether evident that a corporation such as the Church is, which
holds to the principle to acquire all, and the obligation to alienate nothing, would in-
fallibly, in the end, bring all under its dominion. * * But if it is very proper to
fix limits to the amount of property applicable to communities, or political corporations,
it is not less so to prohibit their acquiring certain kinds of property, which can never
be administered but by individuals, nor render all the products it is capable of, and
which the public prosperity exacts, but under the powerful resort of individual inter-
est. Of this class is real property, which consists in landed estates, rural or urban.
" When the territory is distributed among many proprietors, it receives all the cul-
tivation of which it is susceptible. Then the plantations of trees, the copious supplies
of water, the rearing of cattle and domestic animals, the building of habitations spread
joy and vitality through all points of the country ; the products of agriculture are aug
[31.]
merited, and with it the population flows out through all parts, which is the basis of
the power of nations and public wealth. Just the contrary succeeds, when the terri*
tory is divided among few and powerful proprietors ; then the lands are seen sterile
and uncultivated, habitations are scarce, as is likewise the population itself, and the
miserable day laborer, slave of the soil and of the lordly proprietor, being able scarce-
ly to snatch a miserable subsistence, thinks of nothing less than marrying and multi-
plying his species, and employs no other labor for the cultivation of the land upon
which he lives, and regards not as his own, but what he is forcibly compelled to per- '
fpr_im..--W^li-iWW, if the accumulation of lands by one rich and powerful individual is
'an evil so great with respect to population and public wealth, in spite of the fact that
it can not exceed one hundred years, what ought we to say of a community or corpo- J
ration, which has it in its power to go on adding to those it already possesses, others
' without limit or measure ? Capitals may be created and multiplied unto a degree of
.
which' the human understanding can yet form no conception, and however great those
existing may be supposed, others may yet be formed ; but lands are not susceptible
of augmentation, and must forever remain the same in extent ; from which it results
that if a powerful and respected community, as the Church is, be capacitated to ac-
quire them, the time will arrive in which she will make herself owner of all, and give
a mortal blow to population and public wealth. If then, there is reason to fix the
amount of capitals to which her property may be extended, there is greater and stronger
reason to prohibit her acquiring lands and real property.
" The force of these reasons and many others which are omitted, have obliged the
most Catholic and Christian Princes, among which there Is /wanting a canonized saint, .
to prohibit the Church from the remotest antiquity from/acquiring lands and real
property, without having consulted her in this matter, since they have proceeded
against the positive repugnance of her ministers. In Spain especially her kings have
repeated this prohibition many times, under the gravest penalties. The Canon, Ma-
rina, assures us that it was a fundamental constitution of the ancient Spanish law,
" that no one could at his decease dispose of his property in favor of the Church, nor
give for pious uses, or as it was then expressed, mandar por el alma, (bequeath for
the soul,) more than the fifth of his movables. The king Recisvinito permitted to
leave only movable property to the Churches, because the real property, according to
the fundamental law," must remain in the possession of the tax payers." Law 231, del
Estilo, an ancient Spanish code decreed the confiscation of property left to the church-
es. In the 12th century, Alonzo II, in the charter given to Baeza inserted the fol-
lowing law ; " No person shall have power to sell or give to monks or men of orders
any real property." The sainted king Don Fernando, in the charter given to Cordo-
va, conquered from the Moors, and the date of which is March 12th, 1241, says thus :
u I establish and confirm that no inhabitant of Cordova, man or woman, shall have
power to sell his estate to any order," &c, (the same as heretofore cited,)
" The complaints of the Spaniards about the accumulation of real property m
mortmain, (ma?ios muertas) were continual and frequent; the Procaradores of the
Cortes (representatives of the towns and cities,) and the writers of this nation from
the remotest antiquity, solicited earnestly from the kings the prohibition against the
acquisition of real property by the Churches. In the year 1351, the Cortes of Val-
ladolid made application to Don Pedro, surnamed the Cruel, to renew the laws of
amortization which incapacitated the Church to acquire real property. The Cortes
of Toledo and Segovia convened in the years 1525 and 1532, made representations
upon the accumulation of real property, praying that limits might be put to the ac-
quisitions of the clergy, and that Visitors might be appointed to examine into their
[22.]
,
property, and that whatever it might appear to the Visitors that they had in excess
should be ordered to be sold, and that the Visitors should signify how much should
be left for the Church buildings ; that they should be prohibited from acquiring any
more real property, providing by law that whatsoever should be sold or donated to them
might be retracted for the equivalent price by the relations of the donor or vendor
within four years.
" As respects America, the Kings of Spain, in the laws of the Indies dictated for
the Spanish Colonies, prohibited the acquisition of real property by the Churches.
' Let the lands be distributed, ' (says law 10, tit. 12, lib. 4, of the Recopilacion de
Indias,) ' without excess, among the discoverers and old settlers and their descend-
ants who are to remain in the country, and let the most fit be preferred, and they
shall have no power to sell them to any Church, Monastery, or other ecclesiastical
person, under pain that they may and shall forfeit them, and they may be distrib-
uted to others.
'
" After the independence, the civil governments of Mexico established in conse-
quence thereof, have prohibited acquisitions in mortmain, (pianos muertas.) without
consulting the ecclesiastical authority or regarding it in any thing.
" Article 13 of the general law of Colinization says, " The new P obladores shall'
have no power to transfer their property in mortmain. " The 9th Article of the
Constitution of the State of Mexico provides: "The acquisitions in mortmain remain
prohibited in the State for the future, and in the greater portion of the States the /;
same or similar laws have been dictated. " (p. 222-229.)
[We have already seen that the Decree of the Cortes of 4th January, 1813, which
provides for the reduction to private property of all the public lands in Spain and the
Indies, contains the explicit provision that they can never be transferred in mortmain.
If then the legislature was so careful to prohibit the acquisition of lands by the Church
and the clergy, under express title, is it conceivable that it was left in their power to
acquire them without any title, to acquire by presumption of title, to acquire all
whereon the imprints of a friar's footsteps could be traced? Was the contiguity of
a Church or Cemetery sufficient to sanctity and legalize what the law abhorred
—
ecclesiastical amortization? But one response can be given to these queries. Eccle-
siastical amortization was the giant evil that had reduced both Spain and Mexico to
the lowest depth of social misery. It had paralized the government, and impover-
ished the people. With the conviction of this truth alV their statesmen were deeply
impressed. It was intended effectually to arrest its progress, and if possible, to bring
about the alienation and distribution among the industrial classes of the laity, the
immense landed possessions which the Church and religious orders had already ac-
quired, and in most cases, in contravention of the laws. One thing, however, must
be admitted—and it shows how dangerous are the consequences of allowing a corpo-
ration, body, or community, such as the Church is recognized in Catholic countries,
to acquire property without limit—-that the immense religious and pecuniary power of
clergy, and the imbecility and venality of those who were intrusted with the applica-
tion and execution of the laws, paralized, in many cases, the provisions of the legisla-
ture. Here, however, we may safely trust, neither the one nor the other will produce
this result. The law will be applied as it is found written in the Codes and Statute
books of Mexico, to all cases, yet undetermined, arising under them.]
But let us pass to the right of administration which the Church has over its
property.
It being proved that she can only acquire it by virtue of the civil law, and in the
character of a political community, it now remains to demonstrate, that neither can
she administer it upon any other principle, nor in any other aspect. The word to
administer property imports to maintain or advance it. Nothing of this can be done
but by acts essentially civil, which suppose rights of the same class, from whence
they must necessarily emanate. One cannot conceive the administration of anything
without contracts, without mutual obligations, nor without action upon persons or
things. And all the^rights, and actions, are they not purely civil? Have they not
been exclusively regulated by the temporal authority in all times and countries ?
Nobody can doubt it, and consequently, neither can any body refuse to confess that
if the Church administers its property, it must of necessity do it by virtue of the civil
law, and in the character of a political corporation or community. We have already
said that the rights of communities, unlike those which pertain to individuals, maybe
amplified or restricted by the authority which conceded them, without the interven-
tion of any other ; and as the Church is only a community, its right of administration
is subject to the authority to which it is indebted for that right, which is no other
than the civil.
" In exercise of this authority which belongs to the Supreme power, the laws of
the Indies determined that in America, the mayordomos or administrators of the
property pertaining to church buildings should indispensably be laymen ; and Charles
III, by his Cedula of 11 Sept. 1764, ordered that the regular clergy should retire to
their cloisters, and committed the administration of their estates to laymen, Charles
IV, by his cedula for the consolidation of exchequer bills, deprives the ecclesiastics of
the administration of all property belonging to pious establishments (obraspias),
which it was provided should enter into the consolidation fund. His words are as
follows: "My authority being indisputable to direct public establishments to the
advancement of these and other objects of State, I have resolved after a mature
examination, to order the alienation of all the real property pertaining to hospitals,
houses of refuge, alms houses, houses of reclusion, and foundling hospitals, anniver-
saries, cofradias, [certain associations formed generally for benevolent objects, under
the patronage of some saint] pious establishments, and advowsons of laymen." This
proceeding was justly censured as ruinous and impolitic, but nobody has dared to
impeach it on the ground of illegality', but all have recognized the authority of the
government as competent in the ease, without there having been one who would
venture to censure it as a usurper of the rights of the church. On the contrary, the
estates which were sold in order that the value thereof should enter into the consoli-
dation fund, have remained with the purchasers without any one having disputed their
right; which would not have been the case had he by whose order they were alienated
really been a usurper, for then, they would have been revindicated by those who had
lost «them. Kings and governments, in permitting or denying to the church the
authority to administer its property, have never entertained the slightest doubt about
the competency of their authority, and have operated without consulting her on this
point further than they have deemed consistent with convenience and public utility.
And who doubts that the public interest requires that communities, among which the
church must be reejp^ed, shall not administer their property themselves?"
[What has the council of Baltimore or ofTrent, or the Pope of Rome to do with the
>
te (establishment of laws for the State of Mexico or of California, regulating the acqui-
sition, enjoyment, or administration of property? These are purely temporal matters.
The sovereignty and independence of the State is gone, if it suffer in respect thereto,
the intervention of any foreignpower whatever. And upon this principle the Spanish
and Mexican legislation has always proceeded.]
"It is a principle recognized by all economists, and confirmed by the most constant
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experience, that direct and personal interest alone is that which can make estates and
capitals productive, under which name are comprehended every species of property ; but
this direct and personal interest can never exist in any community, from which by its
nature and constitution, the unity of purpose, of action, and will is banished ; if the
estates are rural, the fields are found without cultivation, without population, without
the suitable work-shops, and even without agricultural instruments ; if they are urban
estates, no improvements are made upon them. All is left to the charge of the tenant,
who is often careless, by which in a few years, the edifices are deteriorated, ruined,
and disappear, and there remains only the solar [lot] which is then abandoned, so that
j
it is unknown even to whom it belonged. ********
This proves that the property administered by communities or corporations not only
produces little, but that it is necessarily lost ; and as society can not but feel the ef-
fects of the ruin of fortunes, especially those which consist in great and valuable es-
tates, such as those of corporations, hence it is that the public authority ought, as a
general rule, to refuse them its permission to administer them, and even if necessary,
oblige them to alienate them, providing that they take only the usufruct, reserving
the property in them to individuals who alone are capable of improving and making
them productive."
[The views of this author, as to the baneful effects upon society, of amortization of
property, both ecclesiastical and civil, and the immense advantage to the state of in-
dividual ownership and possession in lands, are in perfect conformity with those ex-
pressed in the elaborate Informe presented to the Spanish government in 1793 by
Don Gaspar De Jovellanos. The uniform policy of the government, the whole
course of legislation, and the legal presumptions being against the right of the church
and the clergy to acquire property, on which side would the judge lean in a contest
between the ecclesiastics out of possession, demanding against an individual in pos-
session, and in whose favor the laws raise the presumption of ownership ? Surely
he would require the clearest evidence of express title with all the legal formalities,
sanctioned by the Sovereign.
" What then, may corporations or communities be deprived of the property which
they possess ? And in case that there exists the right to do so, ought there not to
be an exception in favor of the Church ? We have arrived at the final question in
this matter, and in order to resolve it, it is necessary to consider that all the rights of
a corporation or political community, without excepting that of its own existence are
purely civil, that is to say, they are of value so far as they may be deemed useful to
the entire body of society^ The rights of individuals are of another origin and na-
ture, belong to them as' men, and. are anterior-to, society
;
, hence it is thatjjfre latter,
being established only in order to preserve them, no one can be despoiled thereof without
just cause duly proved, which can be no other than the personal dereliction. Well
now, the Church, as the possessor of temporal goods is nothing else, as has been al-
ready proved, but a political community, it is therefore certain that she maybe de-
prived of the administration and even the property thereof, whenever the public con
' venience requires it. If the civil authority has an indisputable right politically to
;
terminate the existence of corporations or communities, why has it not the lesser
\ power to ^ deprive them of the administration and property of those possessions, which
j
perhaps it might have been convenient that they should have at one time, but which
kjnthe usual course of things is so pernicious to society ? N The difficulty is not in the
principle but in the application which may be made of it ; not in the right, but in theL
convenience of time and mode in exercising it. But this being supposed, the civilj
authority is under no obligation to consult nor secure the concurrence of the commu-
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nity whose property it proposes to occupy, even though it be the Church herself, (p.
230-32.)
[This right has been repeatedly exercised, not only in the instances already cited,
but many others, by the Spanish and Mexican governments. "In Spain, all the Con-
vents, Monasteries, and other religious houses being suppressed, the State took
possession of the property of the regular and secular clergy, destining the product
thereof to the liquidation of the public debt." In 1849 the government assigned to
defray the expenses of religious worship and the subsistence of the clergy, such
property of the secular clergy as hadmM/foeen sold. In the year 1753, the Bishop
I of Segovia obtained license from His-ifigfaiess the Pope, to sell certain possessions,
and build an episcopal palace, and by virtuethereof, octuaFW executed some sales.
—
The proceeding was arrested by the King, and the Bishop was notified that in such
subjects he must apply to the Royal Council and not to the Pope. (See notes to 1.
1
and 2, tit. 5, lib. 1, N. K., in 7 Codigos Espanoles, p. 24.) By a Decree of the
"Sovereign Constituent Congress" of Mexico, of 16th March, 1822, the "temporali-
ties'' of religious orders were directed to be sold, and the product applied to the
maintainance of the troops. By another Decree of the same Congress, of June 30,
1823, it is ordered, "that the estate of San Lorenzo, ancient possession of the Jesuits,
shall be delivered over to the citizens of Chachapalcingo, under a just and useful
mode of distribution ;" that the recipients of the property should severally pay two
and a half per cent annually on the value of their respective shares, which should go
first, to discharge existing incumbrances, and the overplus into the public treasury.
By a Decree of the same Congress, of 18th December, 1821, it was ordered, that the
"temporalities" destined, by the founders, to the support of hospitals, and the
friars who had been employed in their service and management, should be placed
under the administration of the Ayuntamiento of the City of Mexico. By another
Decree of the same Congress, of May 5th, 1823, it is ordered, that the real property
of the extinguished Tribunal of the Inquisition, and of other extinguished communi-
ties, should be disposed of in small parcels. On the 16th of tho same month, the
order is renewed, and extended to all "temporalities." By the general law of 4th
August, 1824, it is declared that the "temporalities" (of the extinguished orders and
ex-Inquisition,) belong to the nation. By a Decree of the Mexican Congress of Dec.
24th, 1833, it is declared, as a principle, that no real property or capitals of manos
muertas should have been, nor can be occupied, sold, or alienated, without the reso-
lution of the general Congress thereon.
The Fondo piadoso de Californias consisted in several valuable estates, urban
and rural, situated in different parts of Mexico, o:igmating in private donations and
testamentary dispositions, the products of which were destined for the propagation of
the Catholic faith in the Californias. By a Decree of the general Congress, of 25th
Muy, 1832, the possession and administration of this "pious fund," was placed exclu-
sively in hands of the government, the products to be placed on deposit in tho
National Mint. Numerous other instances could be cited in which the practice of
I the government has been in conformity with the views expressed by Mora, hitherto
cited. The truth is, the Church, and other communities
—
parts only of the general
public organization—which could at any time, be dissolved politically by the power
which establishes, alters, and abolishes governments, were never regarded as the
owners of property in the sense in which individuals are the owners of what belongs
to them
;
but they were, as Mora expressly says, regarded as the "mere administra-
tors of certain funds placed under their charge, which belong to the public, and
which are consequently subject to the authority which represents it."]
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"But it wiH bo said," continues Mora, (p. 235,) "is not the right of property sacred
and inviolable? Does not social order rest upon it? Is itnotthe broadest and firmest
basis of all society? Do not governments themselves owe their existence to it, being
many times victims of a revolution produced by having made an attack upon.it?
.
All
this is true, and nobody doubts it; but it is not likewise so, that politicadoorpora-
tions have a rightly property distinct from tKatfof society Ttself. IncteeUT^they are
rather usufructuaries than proprietors; that is to say, their right is rather that of
receiving the fruits of the property that has been consigned to them, than that of
disposing of the property itself. The latter right corresponds properly to the entire
body of society, which has the power to transfer it to communities, and recover it
again when it may deem meet. If society, or the public authority which represents
it, dare to violate the right of individuals to their property, it commits an injustice,
and exposes itself to great risks
;
the injustice consists in depriving them of what it
has not given, and the risk irt%larming them against it by this proceeding."
[He then proceeds to show the intimate connection between the Church and the
State, of which the Church, considered as a political community, in which character
alone it can acquire property, is but a constituent part, and the protection and sup-
port due to it from the State.]
"These notions are sufficiently simple, so that nobody can fail to acknowledge the
truth and correctness of them, and they must be applied to the protection which civil
governments dispense to the church, in virtue of which they ought to provide for the
expenses of divine worship. It is then clear that such piotection imports the right-
to fix those expenses, the obligation to pay them, and the exclusive right to designate
the funds therefor. From the days of Constantine to ours, civil governments.—the
protectors of religion,—have discharged these obligations, and exercised the rights
enunciated. They have founded all the principal churches, designating the property
in lands or contributions for the sustentation of ministers, and the expenses of wor-
ship. The Roman law, and the codes in which its dispositions are found recorded,
present in every page decisive proofs of this truth. In the archives of all the churches
are found very many documents, by which it is made to appear that the king or duke
N. commanded to erect such a church, with such a number of minister's, and applied
for their dotation such and such lands, revenues or slaves. The literary history of
France, written by the monks of St. Mauro, and the ' Espana Sagrada,' of Father
Flores, abound with respect to these nations m notices, inscriptions and monuments
that the kings and sovereign Princes have always fixed the expenses of worship in
the erection of the churches, and designated the means of paying them, now in tithes,
now in lands, sometimes in slaves, and other times in seignorial tributes. In Ameri-
ca, as appears from the laws of the Indies, all the foundations of cathedral and paro-
chial churches, and of the principal convents of regulars of both sexes, have been es-
tablished by the government and with its funds, although upon petition of the Bish-
ops, and it has designated the number of ministers, the dotation which they are to
enjoy, the obligations to which they remain subjected, and even the sacred vessels
which are to be procured at the expense of government. The Indian Monarchy of
Torquemada, and the life of the illustrious Prelate, Don Vasco Qmroga, contain lite-
rally very many celulas, and in both, notice is given of other royal dispositions, by
which the government of its own authority has created, suppressed or transferred
churches, has endowed them with commanderies (encomiendas) or with tithes, has de-
prived them of the latter, and the former ; in one word, has fixed the expenses ot wor-
ship and the means of defraying them. The right of patronage which the Popes and
the clergy have recognized in governments, what other origin has it but .t lie erection
and founding of the churches, and the dotation which the kings have assigned
to sus-
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tain them 1 And what else does this recognized right import bat to fix the expenses
of worship and means of defraying them?
"The clergy, however, do not yet acknowledge themselves vanquished by such pal-
pable demonstrations, for they allege that neither have all the churches been endowed
from the revenues of the government, nor has all the ecclesiastical property issued
from the national treasury, since many of the former, and much of the latter have been
establishments founded from the revenues.of individuals. But to this we reply by re-
peating what has been before said, to wit : that without the capacity to acquire conce-
ded to the churches, individuals would not have had the power to establish such found-
ations, and that when they did establish them, either in their life time or by testa-
mentary legacies, it was with the understanding that they should be subjected to the
changes or alterations, which might be made in them in future by the civil authority,
to which they were indebted for the right to make a testameut, or to transfer -their
property to a political corporation, which exists only by the law, and has no other
rights but what the law has conceded to it, (p. 240-241.)
[But this law, to which it owed its rights and its very existence, was repealed, if
not before, on the 22d of April, 1850, by the act which declares that all laws
then in force in California, except those passed or adopted by the Legislature, are
repealed. It provides, it is true, that no rights acquired shall be affected thereby.
And so they were not, in this case ; for if a political community which existed only
by virtue of the law, lost its own existence with the entire abrogation of the law by
which it lived and moved and had its being, it had no longer any rights to be affect-
ed. It became defunct, and left no heir. It censed to be what it before was, a part
of the social organization, a part of the State. When and how has it been re-created ?
And if it has not been re-created, as it certainly has not, what rights can a body or
corporation have which no longer exists ? To suppose that it has any rights of prop-
erty would be " as extravagant as to suppose that a fictitious person whom I shall
figure in my imagination, might be the owner of lands." The Catholic Church is now
presented to us in its primitive aspect, as a mystic body. It is known to and recog-
nized by Christians, but it is not known to or recognized by the State, by the laws.]
"And how shall a corporation or community be able to acquire, sell, exchange (or
recover in law) property, (an orchard, for instance.) whose existence is not recognized
by the laws, or authorized by them ? This pretension would be as extravagant as
that a fictitious person, whom I should picture in my imagination, might be the owner
of capitals or estates," (p. 196.)
"And does the 184th section of the compiled law upon which the plaintiff here relies,
get rid of this difficulty? That confers no right of property. It grants none, and
confers no capacity on anybody to inherit or take by succession what formerly was
administered by an extinguished community. The Bishop, Chief Priest, or Presi-
ding Elder, (the plaintiff is none of these,) may become a sole corporation, that is
where the rules of his denomination require it, not otherwise. What then? All
property held by such Bishop, &c, shall be in trust for his Church. But he must
get the property before it can be "held" by him. It must come to him in some of
the legal modes, gift, grant, or succession. The legislature have said nothing about
a right of succession except as to the future. But if they had, to whose right does
the plaintiff succeed, supposing him to be a Bishop, Chief Priest, or Presiding Elder?
His predecessor was a friar, and could hold no property. Did he succeed to the right
of a former Bishop? Did he succeed to the right of the Church universal, or that of
the local congregation of Santa Clara? The legislature have made, no provision for
succession as to the past. If there was any right of Church property under the
Mexican government, it was not in the Priest, Bishop, or any Minister. It was in the
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Church—the Church universal—the Church recognized by the laws of Mexico, as a
political corporation and community ; and " the rules, regulations, and discipline " of
that Church did not then and do not now require or allow any Bishop or other Min-
ister to become a sole corporation and hold its property in his name, nor regard him
as a corporation in any sense. Sane beneficiarii domini non sunt redituum eccle-
siasticorum, sed nudam habent administratioxem. Cavallario, v. 4, p. 219, and he
likens it to the peculium of the servant, who has the use and administration only, the
dominion remaining in the master. Some canonical writers say, the dominion of
ecclesiastical property is in Christ, but none say that it resides in the Bishop or other
clergy. New additions to Coverrubias, Various Resolutions, note to Num. 2 cap. 16,
lib. III., Molina in Tract. II., Disput. 142 and 143, explains very fully this question.
He shows that the Bishops and clergy have no dominion in ecclesiastical property.
—
That they have respectively only the naked administration even of the rents growing
out of it—that the dominion (such as it is) resides in the universal Church, of which
the Supreme Pontiff is the head. He arrives at this conclusion by considering the
particular congregation of Christians to whose religious use any portion of ecclesias-
tical property may be dedicated, only as component parts of the whole body of the
Church. Cavellario in chap. 40, § 1, explains the matter in a few words. The title
of the chapter expresses his conclusion: "Penes Ecclesiam est dominium rerum
ecclesiasticarumP ( The dominion of ecclesiastical property is in the Church.) and
he gives the conclusive reason. uPorro civiles leges, quarum auctoritate in civitate
dominia continentur, collegio catholicae ecclesiae donari and reliquipermisserunt
:
ut hinc plane constet, penes collegium christianorum esse return relictarum and
donatarum, seu alias quaesitarum, proprietatjfm" (For surely the civil laws by
the authority of which the dominion in things is acquired, have permitted to donate
and devise to the Church. Hence it clearly appears that the property of things so
devised and donated or otherwise acquired, is in the congregation of christians.)
And the "rules and regulations" of the Church, or the canon law, so far from requi-
ring that Bishops or other clergy shall receive in their own names the title to property
belonging to the Church, anathamatize all those who shall be guilty of so doing.
The legislative provision referred to, does not remove the difficulty suggested in the
passage from Mora, last cited. How can property be recovered then by a community
or corporation whose existence is not recognized by the laws?
The trustees, bishop, chief priest, (not the simple parish curate which the plaintiff
is,) or presiding elder may become a corporation (which, however, does not appear by
the evidence to have been done in this case,) and all property held by them shall be
in trust, &c. But the rights of property which once belonged, but which had long
before ceased to belong to their religious denomination by the entire abrogation of the
laws under which that denomination was empowered to hold property, and the extinc-
tion of its political existence, cannot be " held" by such bishop, &c, until the title
has been conveyed to him in the form required by law ; and no such conveyance could
be made, because there was no grantor, or party capable of granting^ in existence.
But if it can be conceived that the Church, as a political community, a part of so-
ciety, a branch of the State, as it was, survived the fundamental changes in govern-
ment and the laws that gave it being, where and which is that church, and who re-
present it now ? There certainly was but one church here formerly. It was a unity.
The laws recognized no sects, no conventicles of heretics, no seceders of any class.
There was but " one Lord, ©ne faith, one baptism." This ecclesiastical unity was the
State church. Which is the State church now ? It is evident that our Constitution
and laws do not recognize the church in any other aspect than as a mystic body, dis-
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connected from all things of a temporal nature, and so far restored to her " native
brilliancy and splendor." Hence the necessity of empowering individuals to incor-
porate themselves and hold property for religious uses, the church being restricted to
subjects purely spiritual, and being subject to the law of Christ alone.
Having clearly shown that under the laws of Mexico the Church could lay no claim
to real property but what she had acquired by express title in some of the ordinary
legal modes, with the sovereign permission, and that the policy and the presumptions
of the law being against ecclesiastical amortization, any asserted title on the part of
the Church or other memos muertas, must be established by the clearest proof, and
having, as it is respectfully submitted, substantiated the first nine points proposed,
the remaining authorities to be adduced, will tend to illustrate and establish the sev-
eral propositions embraced in the tenth, relating to the
MISSIONS.
The character of these establishments is exactly stated in the official report to the
United States government, made by Wm, Carey Jones, Esq.. in 1849, from which the
following extract is made : (p. 11.)
" The right, then, to remodel these establishments at pleasure, and convert them
into towns and villages, subject to the known policy and laws which governed settle-
ments of that description, we see was a principle of their formation. Articles 7 and
10 of the same letter of instructions (of the viceroy to the commandant of the new es-
tablishments of San Diego and Monterey,) show also that it was a part of the plan
of the Missions that their condition should be thus changed
;
that they were regarded
only as the nucleus and bases of communities to be thereafter emancipated, acquire
proprietary rights, and administer their own affairs
;
and that it was the duty of the
Governor to choose their sites, and direct the construction and arrangement of their
edifices, with a view to their convenient expansion into towns and cities. And not
only was this general revolution of the establishments thus early contemplated and
provided for, but meantime the Governor had authority to reduce their possessions
by grants within and without, and to change their condition by detail. The same
series of instructions authorized the Governor to grant lands, either in community or
individually to the Indians of the Missions, in and about their settlements on the Mis-
sion lands
;
and also to make grants to settlements of white persons. * * * * In
brief, every fact, every act of government, and every principle of law applicable to the
case, which I have met with in this investigation, go to show that the Missions of Up-
per California were never, from the first, reckoned other than government establish-
ments; or the founding of them to work any change in the ownership of the soil, which
continued in and at the disposal of the crown or its representatives. This position
was also confirmed—if it had needed any confirmation—by the opinions of high legal
and official authorities in Mexico."
In the case of the United States vs. Ritchie, the Supreme Court say : " Under
these laws the authorities empowered to grant the public lands, have dealt with these
mission establishments the same as with any other portions of the public domain, the
clergy who previously had the charge and control of them, being confined simply to
the ecclesiastical and spiritual direction and government of the missions. We could
refer, had we time, to a body of authority on this point of the case ; but we deem it
unnecessary, and shall close by affirming the decree of the District Court."
The fact that religious instruction, and the members of religious orders were con-
nected with the Missions, has given rise to a very natural mistake respecting their
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real character among dissenting protestants, who can not conceive how the government
cuild have anything to do with religious missionaries and missions. But the ad-
vancement of religion was no less the proper care of the Spanish government, as well
as the Mexican, than the advancement of education or commerce.
" Forasmuch as the principal end which moves us" (says Philip TI, in ordinance 32
and 33 for 'settlements, which is 1. 1, tit. 1, Lib. 4, R. T,) " to make new discoveries
is the preaching and extension of the holy Catholic faith, and that the Indians be
taught and live in peace and good order, we ordain and Command that before conceding
power to make new discoveries, order be given that the parts which are already dis-
covered, pacific, and obedient to our holy mother Catholic Church, be peopled, estab-
lished, and perpetuated for the peace and concord of both republics, (church and state,)
as is disposed in the laws which treat of settlements," <fcc. And in ordinance 27,
in the following law in the Recopilation, it is ordaine t " that the persons cnarged
with making new discoveries be persons of approved Christianity, good conscience,
and zealous for the honor of God, and our service, lovers of peace and desirous for the
conversion of the Indians, so as to give assurance that they will do them no harm in
their persons or property, so that by the exercise of virtue and good faith they shall
satisfy the obligation which we are under to see that this (the enterprise of discovery)
is done with all christian prudence, love and moderation." Ordinance 140 (1. 2. tit. 4,
lib. 4,) provides that when peace has been secured with the Indians, the faith shall
be preached, proceeding at first gently and gradually and not commencing by reprov-
ing their vices or idolatries, nor taking away their women and idols, lest they be scan-
dalized and estranged from the Christian doctrine. Ordinance 29, which is the law
of the Recopilation next following the one last cited, provides that " there being
members of religious orders which are allowed to pass over to the Indies, and who,
with the desire to serve the Lord our God, wish to go out in the discovery of land (or
unexplored regions) and publish the holy gospel, let license be given them, and let
them be encharged with the discovery, and be favored and provided with every thing
necessary for so good and holy a work, at the expense of our royal revenues, (hacien-
da.) observing the order and all that is ordained in the laws of the title which treats
of members of religious orders, (relig'iosos.)
Ordinance 147, which is placed in the Recopilation next following the last men-
tioned, provides, that " where the preachers of the holy gospel are sufficient for the
pacification and conversion of the Indians, consent snail not be given for the entrance
of other persons, who may impede the conversion and pacification."
The monks of that period, (16th century,) by their rigid discipline and self-denial,
and promptness to undergo all dangers and hardships for the propagation of the faith,
were peculiarly well fitted to be pioneers in the reduction of the Indians and the set-
tlement of the newly discovered countries. From the value of their labors God forbid
that we should wish to detract.
" The religious monks in America are as ancient as" its conquest. The first con-
querors knew that without them
;
it was impossible to arrive at the projected end. To
the four orders of Santo Domingo, San Francisco, San Augustin and our Lady de la
Merced, God confided the great work of converting the new world. It is sufficient
for me to say, that first it was proposed to send religious monks, and immediately con-
querors, and all together departed to serve God, the king, the church and religion.
* * * * Here we have in those deserts, the first laborers in the vine-
yard. Behold, if it can be found that any living being prepared for them a hospitable
reception. The conquerors opened roads ; the religious monks advanced to the woods,
caressed the natives, and by their gentle treatment subdued their ferocity. They
[31.
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acquainted themselves with the different idioms, forming then some imperfect diction-
aries with inconceivable labor. They placed elevated crosses upon all the heights,
and this was the only signal which they left for those who followed them with the
same destination. They received the proper orders from the chiefs of the expedi-
tion : by virtue of those they were distributed and detached to different climes and
regions." (Pan-as
—
Gobierno de los Regular es de la America, v. 2, p. 454-55.)
The author just cited treats largely of this whole subject of Missions, in which the
regular clergy, or monks, were employed. As the whole work is divided into distinct
paragraphs or snort sections, numbered consecutively through both volumes, it will be
convenient that the references shall be by numbers.
In Chapter 8, Part II., he points out "the difference which there is between the
curatos (curacies) and conversiones (missions not secularized,) according to the royal
laws." After observing that the two things, which are quite distinct, are too fre-
quently confounded, he observes, (N. 405 :) "Before the sacred Council of Trent,
the essential difference of which we shall here speak, could not be perfectly known.
—
In the times which preceded it, when the missionaries gathered out from the woods,
some families or an entire nation, they delivered them over to the monks, who in the
place where they formed their Pueblo, proceeded to catechise and give them the
needful doctrina- (instruction in religion.) These monks, who had not gone out into
the field, (of new religious conquest) but who upon a footing established were en-
charged with'their education, were commonly called doctrineros, and hence originated
the appellation of doctrinas given to those Pueblos, in which they administered the
cure of souls, independently of the Bishops ; so that although the Pueblo were an-
cient, numerous, and regulated by the laws and customs of police, those Pueblos and
the care of the Indians were under the sole inspection of the regular clergy (or
monks,) in all that related to the administration of the sacraments, and in general,
the administration of temporal affairs was likewise under their control, in the form
which we shall afterwards explain. These were the* doctrinas, and are now so, al-
though with a different form ; and forasmuch as with respect to them, we have to
write the whole of the third part of this work, we omit for that place, the presentstate of
them and their mode ofgovernment ; it being sufficient for the present to premise, that
whatever may be found inthe royal laws and cedulas, under the title of doctrinas, they
are certain Pueblos formed, in which the regular clergy had, or have the cure of souls,
or the ministry of parish Priests ; and the laws declaring that such or such Pueb-
los are aggregations or doctrinas, by virtue of this single declaration, they cease to
be conversiones, [or active missions,] as appears from the clause of a royal cedula,
which says thus : "And forasmuch as hitherto they have administered the doctrinas
with the name of reducciones or misiones without observing the form of my royal
patronazgo, [advowson,] by the present I have resolved to declare, as I do declare,
that from henceforth the said reducciones and misiones must be administered with
the name of doctrinas" &c.
And the difference is so essential and notable, that the government of the doctrinas
must be regulated necessarily by the laws of the royal patronage with total dependence
upon the Bishops, in that which regards the office and quality of parish priests,
from all which those which are only conversiones^active missions) are exempt, as
will be delared." (N. 406.)
" Suppose now that a complaint of a like nature" [as to the right of the Bishop to
interfere in the spiritual government of a mission] " comes directed against certain
religious monks who are in their actual destination of active missions [misiones vivas}.
They have reduced in the year, 70 for example, one hundred and twenty families.—
[32.]
With them they have formed their little Pueblo (Pueblecito) with its chapel, cabins,
school, and other convenient shops, suitable to the straightened condition and poverty
that belong to a settlement, which is directed to protect the Indians provisionally
against the severities of the climate, and make them feel as far as possible the advan-
tages of society. Suppose also that the missionaries have dedicated themselves with
so much pains and activity to the education of those natives, that in four or five years
they have some neophytes, others caTechumens, and all assemble at the instruction and
exercises of the church, some being disposed for baptism, while others already
receive the Holy Sacraments, for which they are fitted."
" Things being in this state, there is a bishop who wishes to visit that field which
promises a prompt and seasonable harvest ; to give his orders regulate its affairs, re-
gister the people (pueblo) form for them their books, and assign them a parish priest,
and, in a word, exercise over them his jurisdiction in the mode that he does, and has
power to do, in the other curacies ; and this, as before said, in four or five years after
their reduction. The missionaries in charge resist his measures ; the diocesan exerts
himself to carry them all into due effect. The former direct their complaint to the
general prelate (of the order.) The bishop usually directs his complaints, likewise
full of bitterness, and if in the meantime the strong hand of the vice patron, to whom
the missionaries ought to direct their first recourse, is not interposed, the Indians are
lost. This case has succeeded many times, and may easily take place with some new
bishops who arrive in those parts, full of theology, canons, laws, and all the good en-
dowments which make them worthy of their dignity, but who have not yet studied the
municipal law of the State of the Indies.
" For such cases as this, the general prelates of all orders must know that
the Missions, reductions and conversions, which are all one, are all subject, .pleno
jure to the regular clergy (the monks) for ten years, which is to be counted
from the day that the formation of their Pueblo was commenced. In these ten years
the kings of Spain have wished to deprive themselves of all cognizance of them, and
have inhibited the viceroys, presidents and governors, bishops and other superior
functionaries of the Indies, to intermeddle in the government of them, and ordered
that they be left entirely to the discretion of their conveiters. So that even the small <
tribute which every vassal ought to pay as an acknowledgment that he is so, the king
wills that it be not demanded, until the above mentioned term being fulfilled, they
commence being governed by the laws, for which condition the missionaries them-
1
selves are going to prepare them beforehand. [N. 110, 111, 112.]
" If yet, in some reductions, within the term of ten years, it has not been possible
to put all equally in a state to receive baptism, neither his majesty nor the supreme
council of the Indies are inexorable, but will easily be persuaded to prorogue the time,
so that they shall continue under the sole direction of the missionaries." ['N. 415.
J
" Our converters and missionaries by virtue of a statute, which will be given literally
in the following chapter, must themselves advise the Bishops and governors, that
their reductions are in a convenient state to be declared Pueblos or doctrinas, and to
have their affairs regulated by the legal dispositions of the royal patronage, supplicat-
ing to be relieved from the charge, in order to attend to the more important business
of conversion; and it is necessary that they do so; for otherwise they would soon find
themselves embarrassed with this work, for which any others are competent, and the
seminary [of propaganda fidc\ would find itself without subjects for the exemplary)
life and labors, and without missionaries for the chief end of carrying forward the i
conversion of the Indians." [N. 416.1
The missionaries were always regular monks, and could not discharge the office of
[S3.]
parish priests, except provisionally, where fit subjects from the secular clergy could
not be procured, (see Chap. 7, pt. 2, same author.) When the conversions or mis-
sions were in a fit s ate to come under the ordinary ecclesiastical and civil govern-
ment, secular priests were appointed to the churches, and the monks returned to their
cloisters, or were transferred to new missions, which were also in their turn to under-
go the same change. So that secularization, which consisted in nothing else but the
erection of parishes and curacies in the place of missions, and installing the regular
pastors under the ordinary or Episcopal jurisdiction, instead of that of the general
pr .dates, was a matter of course. This change did not in all cases take place pre-
cisely in ten years, as the laws contemplated it should, but many of the missions con-
tinued under the charge of the converters or monks for over half a century.
" In the royal " Regulation for the Presidios of the Peninsula of Californias, erec-
tion of new Missions, promotion of population and extension of the establishments of
Monterey," approved by the king October 24, 1781. will be found the most minute pro-
visions relative to the missions then already founded, and others which were to be
founded in Upper California, by consulting which, particularly Title XV, it will be
seen that all the missions in this State were, in the strictest sense, government estab-
lishments, founded, regulated and governed in the minutest details by the civil power,
and supported exclusively from the royal treasury. So by reference to Palo^s Life U
of Father Junipero, (p. 53-55, 63, 64, &c. ) we shall see that the missions erected /
prior to the date of that regulation, of which Santa Clara was one, established 12th
January, 1777, were all founded under express royal orders, and wholly at the expense
of the crown.
In the report of a special commission, appointed by the Mexican government to
present a plan for the regulation of the missions of the Territories of Upper and Low-
er California, dated the 6th of April, 1825, the following extract is made :
" One of the points which the superior order of 17th July, of the year last past, re-
commended to this Junta that it should take into consideration, with all preference,
was that of the regulation of the missions of the Californias in a manner that, pro-
moting the civilization of the Indians by the possession of landed property, they might
be made less expensive.
"The Junta, in the different sessions, shown by the annexed extract of the respect-
ive acts, has heard, meditated and discussed the opinion which upon this grave sub-
ject was presented by its first Committee.
" Following with it the different steps in the history of that Peninsula, the Junta
has acknowledged, that to the missions it owes the beginning of its political existence
;
that the missions constituted its primitive government ; that these have ever been
;, considered as united with the subsequent forms of administration, and that in any
event, the system which in regard to the missions may be adopted, will constitute a
y most essential part of that which will have to be established for the prosperity and
at tdvancement of those territories.
to
j
" In effect the dscoveries were much advanced, which since the year 1532, were
t- nade upon the coast of the Peninsula of Californias ; but until the end of 1697, at
s yhich time Father Juan Maria de Salvatierra, of the Company of Jesus, made his
id irst entrance into it. all the attempts made to occupy it had proved ineffectual. As
ae his entrance and occupation had the denomination of a spiritual conquest, so the gov-
vy srnment which was established in the first reducciones, (missions,) was a government
.'oe mixed, of monastic and military. The missionaries solicited the authority to take
loldiers to escort them, with the pre-eminence that the services performed by this
$ iscort should be considered as if rendered in actual war, to elect the cabo or chief of
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this escort, to remove him, giving advice to the Viceroy, and to appoint judges for
the government of the country ; and all this was conceded them without any other
condition, but that the expenses should be on their account, and that they should take
possession of the country in the name of the king."
[ By ordinance 25 de Poblaciones, which is 1. IT, tit. 1, lib. 4. "R. I , it was pro-
vided that discoveries and settlements should not be made at the king's expense.
That ordinance provided for capitulationes, or contracts with individuals for making
discoveries, and founding towns and settlements. It will be observed that the capi-
tulation of the Jesuits related to Lower California, Upper or NeAV California not hav-
ing been settled till 1769, under the lead of Father Junipero.]
"In consequence of this capitulation, (contract or treaty) the military authority,
the ecclesiastical and regular were combined in fu^h mode that the latter 1 ecame
paramount exercising the superior government. The Captain of the Presidio was
the Superior Judge, with plenitude of jurisdiction, civil and political. He ' ad
power to hear every species ofcauses, and proceed to the definitive sentence and execu-
tion thereof. He Avas in the military department a Captain General, not only in the
interior of the country and on the coasts, but on sea. with complete jurisdiction over
the vessels that might trade in the gulf. In his hands was reunited the superintend!
ence of the pearl fishery; and the judicial authority within certain limits was c ) ; -
municated to each soldier of the missionary escort. But the captain and soldier!
were subordinate to the religious President of the Missions, and nothing could be
done without his direction and mandate.
[In the early system adopted by the King of Spain for the prosecution of disc; r-
eries, and the founding of towns and settlements, the principal contractors ai I
adventurers might, among other stipulations, be empowered to govern the count)
and places discovered or settled by them. [See the laws referred to in my brief, rl
case of the City of San Francisco vs. The United States, § 74. 77.] " The ce u a
of Philip V., of 1744, repeated 4th of December, 1747, confirmed this authority s ill
more, for in it was commanded that in the escorts, as well the soldiers, as tie Cahl
who commanded each, should be subject to the orders of the Jesuit missionaries, so
that they could make no entrance among the Indians, do them any violence, inflict
upon them any castigation, nor do anything else but what the monks themsdves com-
manded, and that in order that this subordination should be more secure, the salaries
of the escorts, which, by this time, were supplied by the treasury, should be delivered
to the missionaries, in order that the same should be distributed from their hands,
|
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and in order that if any soldiers should be riotous or of ev.l habits, the missionaries
might send him away, and demand another in his place.
" Upon the expulsion of the Jesuits, 25th of June, 1762, the Viceroy, Marquis of
Croix, commended twelve of the missionaries who had been already established in
Old or Lower California, to the College of San Fernando, of this Capital, thinking
that the other four missions more advanced might be placed in charge of seculafl
Priests. But the formation of these four curacies not having gone into effect for
want of clergymen who were willing to serve them, and on the other hand the occu
pation of the port of Monterey and establishment of its Presidio having been effected,
the planting of the Capital of Upper or New California was begun, the monks ol
San Fernando (of the order of San Francisco) remaining in the newly established
missions of Upper California, and those of Lower or Old California being put in
charge of the Dominican monks.
"For the new missions the same order and government was prescribed wbi
been observed in those of Sierragorda, which included the notable ciremasluuce iLah
caj
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the administration of the temporalidades (temporal goods, or property) should "be
under the charge of the missionaries ; although in the point of the political and mili-
tary government of the missions (reducciones) and presidios, the system followed by
the Jesuits till their expulsion had been varied ; in all else a similar regimen was
adopted which was ordered to continue as it now exists, by the regulation of the 10th
of September, 1772, for the presidios of the Frontier.
"Afterwards, by a royal order of the 21st of March, 1775, the provisional regula-
tion of California was commanded to be varied, and in effect there was formed that of
the 1st of June, 1779, which was approved by the King on the 24th of October, 1781.
This regulation is the one which has ruled until these last times, and in it are seen
very remarkable provisions, .which deeidedly evince the plan of uniting throughout
the whole extent of the country, the rancherias (hamlets or pueblos) of the gentile
indigines, and occupying them by means of missions and presidios, without varying
in any respect the interior order and regimen of the missions of the Neophytes and
Catechumens dependent upon them.
" The Junta acknowledges that the great progress made by the missions established
by the Jesuits in Old California, and by those established in the New by the Fer-
nandinos, [or Franciscans] is attributable to the Spanish system of discoveries and
spiritual conquests, and is aware of the eulogiums that these establishments have
merited, not only from the Spaniards, but from some enlightened foreigners. * * * *
" The state in which the present missions are found does not correspond to the
great progress which they made in the beginning. This decadence is very notable in
those of Lower California, and would be enough to prove that the system needs vari-
ation and reforms. But among these, in the opinion of the ju?ita. that is indispensable,
which is demanded by the diversion which missionaries have suffered from their essential
ministry, occupying themselves with the temporalities of each mission, and with its ad-
ministration and government, because besides being prejudicial to their principal des-
tination and object,' (which was altogether political and temporal,) this can not be
done without a material relaxation of the vows which the sons of San Francisco have
professed, and without being opposed to the spirit and letter of the Bull of Urban
VIII., of the 22d February, 1633, which ordained that the missionary monks should
abstain from every thing that might have the odor of business, merchandise or
trafic."
[So the general laws contained in the " Recopilacion de Indias, " are equally ad-
verse to clergymen of all denominations intermeddling in any business affairs whit-
ever, and must have been considerably lelaxed, probably from the necessity of the
case, in the system of economy adopted by the government relative to missions.
L. 1, T. 12, Lib. 1, R I., provides that no clergyman shall be alcalde, advocate, or
notary public, which prohibition is likewise contained in the laws of the Recopilation
of Castile.
Law 2dd of the same title provides that clergymen and priests shall not be
capable of being factors of any persons whomsoever, nor contract, nor trafic in any
kind of merchandise by themselves, nor through intermediate persons.
With respect to the regular clergy or monks called religiosos, their utter incapacity
to trade, trafic, acquire, or hold property, without a special dispensation of the laws,
is notorious. The following on this point, from Escreche's Dictionary of Legislation,
title, "Religioso." will suffice
:
" Religioso—He who has taken the habit in any of the regular orders, and made
the three vows of obedience, poverty, and chastity. As the religiosos of both sexes,
dedicating themselves entirely to God, have solemnly renounced temporal goods, ma-
IMA
trimony and their liberty, they are considered as dead to the world, so that the
religious profession is regarded as a species of civil death. (1. 8. T. 7. P. 1.) Hence
it is that the religiosos cannot succeed to their relatives, dying intestate, as results
from the positive provisions of L. 17, T. 20, Lib. 10, Nov. R., which is as follows,"
&c. : "Neither can the religiosos be tutors, nor obtain public employments, nor
enter into contracts, nor mingle in any affairs or dependencies of the world, nor in
temporal suits under any pretext, even though it be of piety, unless it be a thing
affecting their respective religion, and with written license from its Prelate. * *
There are some who hold that religiosos can not be witnesses to testaments or other
acts of last wills, because they are not citizens (vecinos) of any Pueblo, neither are
they regarded as living, for being found in a certain mode out of society ; but others
opine that testaments to which religiosos are witnesses would not cease to be valid,
considering that the laws do not prohibit their being such, especially if care is taken
to express in it, that other persons could not be had." By express provision of the
Constitution of 1836 and that of 1843, the rights of citizenship are lost by taking
the habit in religious orders. (1 Consti. law, Art. 11, frac. 6. Bases Organicas,
Art. 22, fr. 4.
It will be observed, also, that the civil incapacities of religiosos cannot be removed
by any ecclesiastical dispensation merely, inasmuch as they grow out of the civil
laws, without the existence of which, any violation of their vows or the rules of their
order would expose them to ecclesiastical censure, but not to any temporal penalties
or consequences.]
" > otwithstanding, the Junta has given due attention to the fact that the back-
wardness of the neophytes in their civil and religious education, exacts that we pro-
ceed with great care and circumspection. For this reason it has thought it necessary
that the existing Missions remain in the class of new conversions, and that the religi-
osos in whose charge tbey are found remain with the faculties which for the spiritual
administration is conceded by the Bull of Pius V, of 24 th March, 1567, of which men-
tion is made in t ,e municipal law 47 tit. 143 lib. 1, which was confirmed by that of
Gregory XIV, of 16th Sept. 1551, and to which is likewise conformable the Bull al-
ready cited of Urban VIII, of 22d Feb., 1633; all this, meanwhile that these reductions
are put in a state to be formally erected into parishes and delivered over to the diocesan
prelate of Sonora, in compliance with the disposition of Innocent XI, of 8th May, 1682,
by which the seminaries of missionaries are regulated." (This erection into parishes
and delivery over to the jurisdiction of the secular prelate or bishop is precisely what
is meant by secularization, and was in due time a matter of course.)
" For the same reason, although the Junta considers that the government ought to
resume the administration of the temporalities of the Missions, it believes that in order
to this it is indispensable that before putting its hand thereto, itproceedby means
of those rules which may appear most appropriate to establish a good administration
and the greatest advancement of agriculture in the lands of the Missions, and that
the subsistence and government of the neophytes be guarded against all prejudice,
preparing them, so that as soon as they are found in a state to govern themselves,
there may be granted them the possession of a competent landed property."
This Junta was composed of eight individuals, whose names are signed to the re-
port, three or four of whom were Advocates. Among these names are Pablo Vicente
de Sola, who had filled the office of Governor in California, and Juan Jose Espinosa
de los Monteros, who, according to the opinion of Jose Maria Luis Mora, was recog-
nized without dispute as the first jurist of the Mexican Republic.
[37.]
In the report of a committee of this same Junta, dated 13th May, 1827, respecting
the regulations to be adopted for the government of the Oalifornias, it is said :
" Even the order of government with which this delicious country began to be ruled,
was original : the missionaries were at the same time the civilgovernors andspiritua'l
fathers; they established the ascending scale of reductions, Missions and Ptteblos.bttt in
all of them they vjere the governors, and the Superior of the missions under his
bonnet reunited, the civil authority, the ecclesiastical and the military ; the troops
which supported it being subject to his dispositions, so that it would have been noth-
ing strange, if the catastrophe should have been repeated which was experienced in
Paraguay." Such was the position which the Padres occupied in the missions, and
such the -possession which they held They were the governors, and administrators
of the temporalities committed to their charge, under the political system which was
established by law. Their possession ivas that of the government* In the year
1844, Manuel Oastanares was residing in the City of Mexico, in the capacity of dep-
uty elected to the general Congress for the Department of Upper California. Seve-
ral of his speeches and communications addressed to the supreme Government were
published in Mexico. In a very elaborate communication which he presented to the
government, treating of all the various topics which he regarded as most interesting
to his department, dated 13th May, 1844, are found the following observations, treat-
ing of the Missions
:
'• There can be no doubt that to these establishments, that peninsula owes the be-
ginning of its political existence ; that the missions constituted its primitive govern-
ment ; that they have always been considered as united with the posterior forms of
its administration, and that in any event the system which may be adopted with
respect to the missions, will make a most essential part of that which may be estab-
lished for the prosperity and advancement of that country. The greatest evil that
could have been done to my department, was the alienation of the property pertaining
to the piety fund (fondo piacloso) of the Californias by the provisional government.
This fund by itself alone was a lever sufficient to give to that country a general im-
pulse, without neglecting on this account the original object of its institution."
This fondo piadoso, it will be recollected, consisted of old landed estates, which
had been actually cultivated, some of them more than a century, and been adminis-
tered by the religious missionaries. Yet it was thought to be in the power of the
government to administer, control and alienate this property. It was so deemed by
that government which was, more than any other, partial to the religious orders,
which could not be accused of impiety or indifference to the rights of the Church, but
which, on the contrary, as Micheltdra expresses it in his decree of 29th March, 1843,
given in evidence in the case at barV" prided itself in being religious." Nor does • as-
tanares complain of the act of alienation on the ground of injustice to the Church, or
to the religious orders to whose charge the property was originally committed, but on
the ground alone of injustice to his department, and he says: '-the Department of
( alifornia supplicates and hopes from the government to be reinstated in the posses-
sion of this property, which belongs to it exclusively, and from the legislative branch,
the abrogation of Article 6 of the law of 17th Sept., 1836, which subjected the ad-
ministration of the fund to the sole hands of the bishop of that diocese ; conferring, in
consequence, upon the Assembly and Government of said Department a most just in-
tervention in all that concerns the before-mentioned fund."
Again, in the same communication under the head of " Mexican Colonization," the
importance of promoting which he represents in most eloquent terms, he says : " I
will give to your Excellency (the Minister of Relations) another indication of the
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funds which in part may be destined to this measure, which is the salvation of the
national territory : All the temporalities (temporalidades) of the Missions are cer-
tain property which belongs to them in common, and in which the missionaries and
the religious orders upon which they are dependent, have nothing more than the
charge of their administration by commission from the Government. No more
useful inversion can be given to this property than that of promoting the settlement
and cultivation of the lands of the same Missions, and others which form the occupied
portion of the Californias, because, from this will result a positive benefit to the neo-
phytes and catechumens, and the political reduction of the gentile tribes."
Neither the Mexican nor Spanish government ever hesitated to exercise its abso-
lute control in the disposition of the mission lands, whether consisting in those which
had been occupied merely for grazing, cultivated fields, gardens, orchards, or other-
wise, nor was it ever pretended that the church or religious orders had any shadow
of right to any portion of them, although it was sometimes doubted whether those
which were actually occupied by the missions ought not to be considered as the prop-
erty of the Neophytes and Mexican settlers. Hence in the general regulation on the
subject of colonization of Nov. 21st, 1828. Art. 17, it is provided that, "In those
territories where there may be missions, the lands which these occupy shall not be
colonized at present, and until it be resolved whether they ought to be considered as
property of the reducciones (missiotis) of Neophyte, Catechumens, and Mexican
settlers.'' This temporary suspense was removed by the Act of Congress, of 26th
November, 1833, which provides that " The government is empowered to take all the
measures which may secure the colonization, and carry into effect the secularization
of the missions of Upper and Lower California, being authorized to this effect, to use
in the manner most convenient, the estates of obras jnas (the piety fund) of said
territories, in order to furnish resources to the commission and families who are now
in this Capital, with destination thereto."
Under the authority conferred by this law, the government appointed D. Jose
Maria Hijar, Director of Colonization of Upper and Lower California, and Gefe
Politico of Upper California, (his commission in the latter capacity being subse-
quently countermanded,) an! committed to him a series of instructions, consisting of
15 articles, dated 23d of April, 1834, in which (Art. 1.) he is ordered to "make a
beginning by occupying all the improved property [bie?ies] belonging to the missions
of both Californias, and the military commandant, under his responsibility, to lend,
whenever required, the necessary aids for the said occupation." The lands were to
be divided out among Mexican colonists and civilized Indians, mixing both races in
one and the same settlement, and the movable property and cattle were to be dis-
tributed to a certain extent, among settlers, native and Mexican. The half of the
overplus of goods and stock was to be sold, and the remaining half preserved on
account of the government, and to be applied, as occasion might require, to the ex-
penses of divine worship, support of the missionaries, salaries of masters in primary
schools, supply of useful articles to children of both sexes in the schools, and the
purchase of agricultural implements which should be distributed to the colonists
gratis. Hijar arrived here with his instructions, and Figueroa, who then filled the
office of Governor, expressed his readiness to co-operate in carrying them into execu-
tion, but desired to consult the Territorial Deputation which was accordingly con-
voked by his order. In all the heated controversy which followed, chiefly confined to
the question whether the Director of Colonization or the Governor and reputation
had the superior authority in the matter, it is not once insinuated that the church or
the clergy ought to be consulted, or had any rights of property to be affected^
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although all the property (bienes) of the missions, including even the movables,
without any exception whatever, was to be occupied for the purposes specified in the
instructions. It was contended, however, that the rights of the Indians would be
violated by the literal execution of the orders of the Supreme Government, on which
point the Deputation in the elaborate report of their Committee, which was adopted,
" Senor Hijar being invested with the 'double employment of Gefe Politico and
Director of the colony which he has brought along with him, we see that the superior
government withdraws from him the authority annexed to the former office, and takes
no notice of the latter. '* The committee might consider it as inherent in the former,
and that he was divested of both at the same time by virtue of the before-mentioned
order of the supreme government (the order revoking his appointment as Gefe Polit-
ico ;) but attending to its literal tenor, they are of opinion that he has power to con-
tinue in the special commission of Director of the colony which he has brought, as his
appointment expresses, for which purpose the Gefe Politico may extend to him from
the Missions such aids as he can do without prejudice to the Indians, and the other
purposes connected with said establishments ; for the expenses of the colony ought to
be borne either by the fondo piadoso, so called, of Californias, according to the decree
of 26th Nov., 1833," (the law copied above) which authorizes the government there-
for, or by the confederation, according to the decree of 6th April, 1830, which we
pray may be read ; but by no means from the property (bienes) of the Missions, which
is the exclusive fruit of the laborious toil 'of the neophytes of the Missions, and the
only patrimony which they have to expect in remuneration for an age of slavery. * * *
" Having set down these principles, the committee is of opinion that the execution
of the instructions given to Senor Hijar be suspended in that part which commands
to take possession of the property (bienes) of the Missions, to distribute and convert
them into money
;
and that a representation be made to the supreme government, in-
cluding this report, praying that it may be pleased to revoke the order ; that the pro-
perty (bienes) of the Missions may be distributed to the Indians and applied to ob-
jects for their advantage, they bevig the sole owners? (See " Manifiesto" of Figueroa,
published in 1835, p. 11-33 ; and translation, p. 10-22.)
[To avoid any question that might arise in regard to the import of the word bienes,
which is the term employed to designate the property or effects of the Missions, and
which certainly includes gardens, orchards, vineyards, and improved lands only, the
following definition is given from Jose Maria Luis Mora, m his published works, vol.
1, p. 202 : " The word bienes, in its rigorous acceptation, signifies that re-union of
values which constitute the permanent and durable means of supplying and satisfying
human necessities. Lands which produce fruits, capitals which yield income, and the
revenues which consist in perpetual imposts upon the population which those who
compose it have to pay, are all so many species of bienes in the rigorous acceptation
of the word, and these the church did not begin to possess legally, till after the peace
of Constantine."]
The act of Congress of 17th of August, 1833, for the secularization of the Missions
of Upper and Lower California, although it does not recognize the religious missiona-
ries or their order, much less the Church as owning anything attached to the Missions,
very distinctly designates and limits, in articles 4, 5 and 7, what the government was
authorized to—but which, so far as appears, it never did—assign to the newly erected
parishes.
" There are destined for each parish the Churches which have served in each
mission with the sacred vessels, ornaments and other fixtures, (enseres) which each
[40-1
one now has, and besides, the apartments annexed to the same Church, which in the
judgment of the government, may be deemed necessary for the more decent use of
the same parish." (Art. 4.)
11 For each parish the government will order to construct a burial place outside of
the town ( poblacion. ") (Art. 5.)
'•Of the edifices pertaining to each mission, the government shall assign the most suit-
able for the habitation of the curate, annexing thereto (agre&andole) land which shall
nit exceed two hundred varas square, and the remaining edifices shall be specifically
adjudicated for a town hall, (cava de Aynntamiento) primary schools, public estab-
lishments, and workshops " (Art. 7.)
So then the very Churches which had served the missions, the apartments annexed
thereto, and the mission buildings, were all considered as subject to the disposition
of the government, and by its authority .were to be given, some to the use of the
parish, that is to the Church, which now for the first time, makes her appearance in
these matters, and the rest to municipal uses, primary schools, and workshops. But
nemo dat quod non habet.
What then was the condition^ of the vineyards, orchards, and lands which had
been cultivated by the common labor of the Indians? They remainei at the disposi-
tion of the government, as they always had been before. They were not assigned to
the use of the curate, because his occupation was not agriculture, or horticulture, or
the cultivation of vineyards. He was to be employed, not with the cares of busi-
ness, but with the care of souls.
In the provisional regulations adopted by Figueroa, 9th Aug. 1834, for carrying
into effect the law of Congress, it is ordered that the vineyards, orchards, and corn
fields shall be cultivated by the Indians in common, which for the present remained un-
disposed of, till the resolution of the supreme government. (Rockwell's Sp. and viex. law,
v. 1, p. 458. Jones' Report, p. 16.) It is unnecessary to notice specifically ;ill the
acts of the general and departmental governments and of Congress on this subject,
the several regulations of Figueroa, of Alvarado, of Micheltorena and Pio Pico, the
more important of which will be found at length in Rockwell, (p. 455-477,) and referred
to substantially in Jones' Report, (p. 8-22,) proving beyond the slightest doubt, that
neither the missionary Fathers nor the Church ever had any claim to, or possession
of any of the lands of the missions, but that the former administered them, to use the
very words of Oastannares, above cited, "by a commission from the government,"
and as Mr. Jones observes in his Report, (p. 17.) that "all the tracts of land perti-
nent to the missions, but not directly attached to the mission buildings, were, (after
the secularization) granted a3 any other lands of the territory, to the Mexican inhab-
itants and to colonists, for stock farms and tillage."
The decree of Micheltorena, of 29th March, 1843, Avhich is given in evidence in
this case, only goes to confirm these positions. Article 1st provides that the mis-
sions specified in it, among which Santa Clara is included, " shall in future continue
to be administered by the very reverend padres, (the monks,) as tutors to the Indi-
ans, in the same manner as they held them formerly," and that was, " by commission
from the government." It is certain that their commission has now expired ; that
they can no longer administer them ''as tutors to the Indians ;" that the system un-
der which they administered them formerly, is ropugnant to our Constitution and laws
;
that they can no longer, as they did formerly, exercise the functions of governors in
these establishments, nor can the Superior ot the missions as he did formerly, "reu-
nite under his bonnet the civil, ecclesiastical and military authority."
By art. 4, "The Departmental government, in whose possession the missions have
[41.]
been up to this date, by virtue of the most ample powers with which it is invested
authorizes the reverend Padres to provide," &c.
What is there in all this, but an evidence that ivlicheltorena, carrying out the policj
of Santa Anna's government, always partial to the religious orders, wished to contin-
ue them in charge of the temporal authority and administration in the missions, which
they had exercised from their foundation, but which the Junta from whose report
large extracts are given above, say that they " have not been able to reconcile with
the principles of our independence, and political constitution, nor with the true spirit
of the gospel."
It has been asserted that the mission of Santa Clara continued under this regimen
while the Mexican government existed, and that it was never secularized. If so, then
there was no parish, no curate, and of course no rights acquired by the Church, nor
any parish priest. The only rights of property that could have existed would have
been those of the religious order to which the Padres belonged, the monks being
themselves incapable of acquiring or holding property. And to these rights the
Church could not succeed in any legal mode. The Bishop or secular clergy could
acquire no control or jurisdiction over property, or rights of property belonging to
religious orders. They were exempt from this jurisdiction, both spiritually and tem-
porally They were subject only to their own Prelates and Superiors, in all things.
Nor indeed, it these padres or their religious order had been in possession of any
rights of property in or about, or any way appurtenant to the missions which they
served, eould any act of secularization that was ever adopted affect these rights, or
transfer them to the secular clergy or the Church, or invest the Bishop or any parish
curate with any possession of, or control over it whatever? By what process, of
which we have any evidence in this case, could real estate have been transferred from
one distinct religious corporation to another 1 No such transfer did, or could take
place, whether Santa Clara was secularized or not, and in either case there is no pos-
sible mode by which the present Bishop or curate could, so far as regards property,
set up any rights in representation of the religious padres. But by the law of secu-
larization of 17th Aug., 1833, the government was authorized to set apart for the use
of each parish, the church building, convenient apartments adjoining, one of the mis-
sion edifices for the curate's dwelling, with 200 varas square of land annexed, and
land outside the town for a burial place. If Santa Clara was never secularized, this
property could not have been and never was thus set apart to the use of the parish which
was not erected, and in that case the Church has no right even to the ground upon
which the temple of worship stands.
The Document bearing date Nov. 17th, 1840, purporting to be an order of the
President, made on application and representations presented by the Bishop of Cali-
fornia, even if its authenticity had been duly established by legal evidence, is irrele-
vant, and on that ground alone should have been excluded. It will be observed that
this paper bears no signature, nor any seal. The words following it : '• It is a copy,
Mexico, Nov. 21, 1840," signed " J. Yturbides," also without any seal, throw no light
on the subject, and the same may be said of what follows this, signed " Jose Ma. Du-
ran," and the certificate of Arroyo to the genuineness of Duran's signature, which
certificate of Arroyo, although it purports to be on stamped paper, does not bear the
seal of the Department of Relations, nor any other seal. There is nothing connected
with the paper which shows in an authentic form whence it is obtained. There is no
certificate from the proper officer, under the proper official seal, stating or showing
that the paper is an authentic copy of a record or document remaining in the Depart-
ment of Relations, the Department of War, the Department of Justice. Treasury De-
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»artment, the Archivo General, or any other public archives ; and besides, there does
lot appear to have been any signature, either of the President or any minister or
Secretary, to the original of which this purports to be a copy. Under such circum-
itances, it was offered in evidence without any proof to explain it, and was properly
•ejected.
But it is chiefly on the ground of irrevalency to the question of property, that it is
iroposed to consider this Document. Here it is : " Nov. 17, 1840. The Most Ex-
cellent President has been pleased to order in conformity with all that is prayed for
oy the Reverend Bishop of Californias in this note, (letter or memorial) so far as the
ittributions of His Excellency extend, and authority is given by the decree of 7th
Nov., 1835, which ordered to restore the missions to their ancient condition, to which
end a general order shall be issued to the Governor of the Californias, so that through
the medium of the subordinate authorities, there be restored, without delay or hin-
drance, to the Missionary Fathers, the possessions (posesiones) and property (bienes)
which they used to administer for the conversion of the infidels." This extract con-
tains all that is material to the present question, and it will immediately be noticed
that the order does not profess to go beyond the action which was expressly author-
ized by the act of Congress of 7th Nov., 1835, to which it refers, and which act is in
the following words : " Until the Curates, of which article 2d of the law of 17th
Aug., 1833 speaks, shall have taken possession (of their parishes), the government
shall suspend the execution of the other articles, and maintain things in the condition
which they had previous to the said law."
Article 2d, of the law of August 17th, 1833, here referred to, provides, that, " In
each one of the said missions a parish shall be established, served by a parish priest,
of the secular clergy, with the dotation of from two thousand to two thousand five
hundred dollars annually, at the discretion of the government."
The law of 17th August, 1833, requiring the missions to be converted into par-
ishes, and the religious padres to be re-placed by parish priests under the Episcopal
jurisdiction, was in no way disadvantageous to the church, but for want of secular
clergymen who were willing to serve in these new parishes, it was found impracticable
to carry out immediately all the provisions of this law, and therefore Congress, in the
Act of 1835, still adhering to the plan adopted in the law of 1833, authorized the
government temporarily to suspend the execution of the other Articles, until the
secular curates, spoken of in Article 2d, should take possession of their offices. The
law of 1833 was not abolished or modified, but remained in full force, and that of
1835 only prescribed to the government, the order of proceeding under it. It is very
clear that the President did not possess, nor assume to exercise any powers on this
subject but those granted by Congress, or at least that he did not arrogate to him-
self the power to issue any orders in contravention of the law. He decrees "in con-
formity with the Bishop's petition so far as he is authorized to do by the laio of 1th
of November, 1835, which orders that the missions be restored to their former con-
dition;" that is, that they be maintained in that state, till the secular curates shall be
appointed and enter upon their charge, after which the government would be obliged
to carry into complete effect all the provisions of the law of 17th of August, 1833.
It must also be observed that the Act of Nov. 7th, 1835, relates simply to the subject
of secularization, and temporarily suspends, or rather directs the government to sus-
pend the measures to be taken on that subject till it should be found practicable to
supply the places of the religious padres with secular curates. It does not suspend
the Act of Congress of 26th November, 1833, which empowers the government to
take all the necessary measures for the colonization of the missions of Upper Cali-
fornia. In fine, it had nothing to do with the disposition which the governmeij
might think proper to make of the lands of the missions. It related solely to th
ecclesiastical system. In " maintaining things," however, " in the state which existe
previous to the law of 17th August, 1835, the religious padres would still be allowe 1
to administer the temporalities of the missions, " by commission from the govern
ment,"and "as tutors to the Indians" as they had previously done, and these padre
would eat the fruit of the orchards in common with the Indians, and drink of the win<
which the vineyards would produce. They would subsist upon the products of th<
land, because they had now no salary assigned nor other mode of living, as the parisl
priests were to have when they should be installed. The only power which th<
President possessed, or pretends in this order to exercise, is that which is given him ii
the said Act of the 7th of November, 1835—that is to maintain things under the
ancient system of Missions till the secular curates should be appointed and enter upor
their charge. He could neither confer upon nor legally recognize any rights of prop
erty in the padres. The act of Congress did not authorize him to do that, for not only
the acts of Congress, but all the laws and all the rules of their religious order con-
templated that they should be removed and be replaced by the secular clergy, and
therefore no provision of landed property was necessary or could be made for them.
They must retire to their convents* or enter upon a new field of conquest, among the
unconverted gentiles, always strictly adhering to their three solemn vows of obedi-
ence, chastity and poverty. Neither could he, nor does he pretend to recognise, any
right of property which was to vest in, or descend to the Bishop or other secular cler-
gy or the church, or the parishes Avhich were eventually to be erected. On this sub-
ject the legislative will was explicitly declared, and the powers of the government de-
'
fined and limited, setting forth precisely what was to be set apart for religious uses, in
the act of 17th August, 1833, which was never repealed nor modified.
The acts of the Departmental government subsequent to Micheltorena's decree,
among which may be referred to, Decree of the Departmental Assembly of 28th May,
1845, which provides for renting some of the missions. Pio Pico's for the sale and
renting of the missions, Decree of Departmental Assembly of 3d April, 1846, (Rock-
well, 371—376,) and another Decree of the Departmental Assembly, of 24th August,
1844, (which will be found in the Archives.] 'passed on the recommendation of MiA
cheltorena himself, providing for the sale, renting and hypothecation of the real estate,?
and cultivated lands of all the missions, all show that these establishments, with their
vineyards, orchards, gardens, buildings and appurtenances, were regarded as public
property, and in no public act will it be found that the Church, or religious orders,
or the clergy were recognized as having any right of property in any thing appurte-
nant to them, and it is believed that no instance can be found in which any existing i
right of property was asserted on the part of the Church prior to the American occu-
1
pation.
On reference to the decree of 24th Aug., 1844; in the records of the Sessions of
that period, it will be found to be declared in the report of the Committee which
was, as is stated, approved with absolute unanimity, that the missions are the prop-
erty of the nation, and the government is empowered to offer for sale, mortgage, or
lease, zWfincas raices [improved real estate] and terrenos de labor [cultivated lands]
of the missions of Upper California, comprehended in the distance from San Diego
to Sonoma, and dispose of the proceeds for the expenses of the war which was antici-
pated with the United States, paying first the debts of the missions in preference.
This excepts no orchards, vineyards, or gardens, for these were the only improved
real estate and cnltivated lands that belonged to the missions, and comprehended all
[44.]
)hat was valuable on which money could be raised. Article 2nd excepts the mission
if Santa Barbara, for the Episcopal palace, that of St. Ines for a college, and some
?ther one which the government was to reserve as a national farm, for subsistence of
ihe troops. Art. 5 provides that "• the missions sold shall have the character of Pu-
>blos, and those rented, mortgaged or occupied by the government, that of Depart-
aental estates."
3 [The word Jinca, above applied to the property which the government was to sell,
mortgage or to lease, and which it will be seen is also used with the same application
-n the decrees that will presently be referred to, is never employed to designate wild
*nd uncultivated lands, but according to the brief definition given by Escriche which
Is a copy of that given in Salva's dictionary of the Spanish Academy, Jinca is " the
(leredad (estate) or possession whereof some one has a right to receive the income,
(renta) or some determinate amount." In the Spanish and English -dictionary of Ve-
(iazquez, it is defined " any kind of property, but especially land which yields a regu-
lar income ; tenement, building, house, landed property." " In the acquisition of ur-
fo&njincas in the cities, villas and Pueblos, as well as of the lands (terrenos) adjoin-
ing, in which it is desired to construct new Jincas," &c. [Decree of 11th JVIarch,
1842, art. 4.]
By the act of 28th May, 1845, Art. 1, the Departmental government was to call
together the Indians of the missions of San Rafael, Dolores, Soledad, San Miguel,
and La Purisima, which were abandoned by them, by means of a proclamation to be
published, calling upon them to return within one month and cultivate them, and that
if they did not, the said missions would be declared to bcmostrencas. (without owners,
or escheated,) and the assembly and Departmental government will dispose of them as
may best suit the general good of the Department.
Article 2d provides, that the missions of "Los Carmelos, San Juan Bautista, San
Juan Capistrano, and San Francisco Solano, shall be considered as Pueblos, which is
Ithe character they have at present, and the government, after separating a sufficient
//locality for the curate's house, for churches and appurtenances, (suspertinencias,) and
;a municipal hall, [casa municipal,] will proceed to sell the remaining premises,
[lo demas,] at public auction, in order to pay their respective debts, and the overplus,
'if any shall remain, for the benefit and preservation of divine worship. The only
preserve here made for the use of the Church, is precisely what is authorized by the
jact of Congress of 17th August, 1833, and of course the only reserve which could
lawfully be made for any such purpose, that being determined by the supreme law
of the land. Art. 3d provides, that all the rest of the missions, as far as San Diego
inclusive, may be rented out a,t the option of the government. The only exception
made from the renting, is the principal edifice of the mission of Santa Barbarbara,
in which the Bishop was to reside. What is particularly worthy of note in this
Decree is, that the ecclesiastical authorities and Ministers residing in the missions
mentioned in Article 1, or those in the nearest missions were requested by the gov-
ernment to see that the proclamation mentioned in that Article was duly published.
Yet we hear of no complaint or reclamation from that quarter. It will also be noted,
that Article 8th makes mention of and expressly recognizes as being in force, the
Decree of the Assembly of 24th August, 1844, above cited, which does not appear
to have been published in any late works, but which will be found in its place in the
archives.
So by the decree of Pio Pico of 28th Oct., 1845, it is ordered
:
"Ait. 1. There will "be sold in this capital, to the highest bidder, the missions of
San Rafael, Dolores, Solrdad, San Miguel and La Purisima, which are abandoned by
[45.]
their neophytes." [This decree was made after due proclamation, made as provided
in that of May 28, 1845.]
"Art. 2. of the existing improved property (Fincas) on the Pueblos of San Luis
Obispo, Carmelo, San Juan Bautista, and San Juan Capistrano, there shall be sepa-
rated the churches and appurtenances, (sus purtenencias,) one part for the curate's
house, another for a municipal hall, [uasa municipal,] and place for a school, and the
remainder of the said edifices shall be sold at public auction."
The missions of San Fernando, San Buenaventura, Santa Barbara and Santa Ines
"were to be rented out to the highest bidder for nine years. It is expressly declared
[Art. 10] that the renting shall include " all the lands, out door property, [bienes del
campo,] implements of agriculture, vineyards, orchards, workshops, and whatever,
according to the inventories made, belongs to the respective missions, with the mere
exception of those small portions of land which have always been occupied by some
of the Indians of the mission. The buildings and improved lands [las fincas] are
likewise included, excepting the churches and their appurtenances, [sus pertinencias,]
the part destined for the curate's house, municipal hall, and place for a school." The
principal edifice in the mission of Santa Barbara is also excepted.
Art 14. The renting of the missions of San Diego, San Luis Rey, San Gabriel,
San Antonio, Santa Clara, and San Jose, will take place when the difficulties shall
be got over which at present exist with rospect to the debts of those establishments,
and then the government will inform the public, and all shall be done agreeably to
these regulations." The Departmental Assembly again in a decree of 3d Aug., 1846,
which as evidence of the light in which the subject was regarded, is just as valuable
as if made prior to the raising of the American flag, reaffirm the decree of 28th May,
1845, and expressly recognize and sanction what the governor had done on the
subject.
Thus it will be seen that every act of government from the earliest period, not ex-
cepting the decree of Micheltorena and the alleged order of Bustamente's govern-
ment, of 17th November, 1840, and the uniform acquiesence of the clergy, go to
confirm and establish beyond any room for cavil, that the mission lands, of every
kind, improved and unimproved, gardens, orchards, and vineyards, and the buildings
too, were the property of the nation, subject to be administered, rented, sold, dis-
tributed to settlers, or otherwise disposed of by the government, in conformity with
the laws ; and, moreover, that the Padres, or the secular clergy, or the church, not
only never had, nor ever claimed to have, any property in them, but that they never
had any possession of them, or of anything pertaining to them, or, to express this
conclusion still more clearly, in the very words of Castanares, which are only a reit-
eration of those of the learned Junta before cited, that " the missionaries or the
religious orders upon which they depend, had nothing more than the charge of their
administration by commission from the government." [See Collection of his Official
Documents, p. 85.]
But why was this recourse to so many documents necessary in proof of the light
in which the subject was regarded by the government? Is it not a very simple and
almost self-evident proposition that the Plaintiff, or those for or under whom, he
claims, could acquire landed property only by express title, and it is not admitted that
no such title has been adduced or even alleged ? Is it not also abundantly estab-
lished by a long train of authority, reaching back during a period of almost fourteen
hundred years, that the church or the clergy were incompetent to acquire such prop-
erty by any title, without express license of the sovereign or legislative power ? And
in addition to all this, has not the Act of Congress of 17th of August, 1833, b.efore
cited, precisely determand limited the provision which was to be made for the
churches and curates, and fixed the amount of land that was to be set apart for
their use?
The meritorious labor^of the Padres have sometimes been invoked in aid of the
new pretensions of the secular Clergy, who can not be considered as the successors of
the Padres, nor any more like the Padres, "than [, like Hercules." But this attempt
to associate the names of those pure men with the idea of temporal rewards, what is
it but a libel upon the motives which led them to forsake and renounce the world,
and take upon them the solemn vows of their order? What is it but to depreciate and
degrade them from their holy calling? They were not of this world. They had
been chosen out of the world. They had forsaken father, and mother, and
houses, and lands, and' renounced all the treasures of earth, that they might
lay up for themselves treasures in heaven. They came hither, not as squatters
upon the public domain, but to '-'look after the lost sheep of the house of Is-
rael." The only wealth which they esteemed was the faith ; the only fields
which they wanted for cultivation were those in which they might sow the good
seed of the word of God. The only orchards which they coveted, were those in which
they might plant, and water the good trees, which might bear abundantly the choicest
fruits of the holy Grospel. The only house in which they desired to have any interest
or title was, "an house not made with hands eternal in the heavens." Even their own
lives they counted not dear unto themselves, but laid them down joyfully for the
cause of their divine master. They went out into the unbroken wilderness in search
of the wild and savage Indian, in order to bring him into the corral where were gath-
ered the flock of Christ. Heat, thirst, and continual journeyings through intermina-
ble deserts, consumed and reduced them to the mere figures of men, and many of
them, overcome at last by hunger, disease, and the severity of the climate, passed to
a better country and a life without end, to join the martyrs who had gone before
them. "Their dust remains scattered through those frightful solitudes where now
they rest, waiting for the general resurrection of the dead."
The exalted worth of these true soldiers of the cross has justly been the theme of
eulogy on the part of enlightened men in all countries, but never has it been at-
tempted to desecrate their memories by connecting their sacrifices and sufferings
with worldly acquisitions, until the establishment of the United States Land Com-
mission for California.
II
OPINIONS
ERRATA.
Page 5, 23d line from top, for Ulphion, read Ulpian. ;
Page 5, 4th line from bottom, for muertos, read mucrtas.
"'
Page 7, 5th line from top, for tribes, read tribe. )
Page 12, 15th line from top, for derde, read desde.
Page 12, bottom line, for functionaros, read functionaries.
Page 21, 23d line from top, for is wanting, readis not wanting.
Page 23, 6th line from top, for their, read these. ^
Page 23, 8th line from bottom, for recorded, read reckoned.
Page 25, 10th line from top, for His Highness, read His Holiness.
Page 28, 6:h line from top, for administratiorem, read administrationem.
Page 28, 24th line from top, for proprietatum, read proprietatem.
Page 33, 19th line from top, for Palon's, read Palou's.
Page 37, 14th line from bottom, for Micheltora, read Micheltorena. is
Page 40, 17th line from top, for conditions, read condition. J
Page 46, 1 line from top, for determ., read determined.
Page 46, 4th line from top, for labor, read labors. J
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cited, precisely determand limited the provision which was to be made for the
churches and curates, and fixed the amount of land that was to be set apart for
their use?
The meritorious labor^of the Padres have sometimes been invoked in aid of the
new pretensions of the secular Clerg-v, who can not be considered as the successors of
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TO THE PUBLIC.
Having a little interval of leisure at this time, I do not know-
how better to fill it, than by the publication of the opinions which I
have delivered, as one of the Commissioners to ascertain and settle the
Private Land Claims in California. It is due to myself, and may not
be wholly without benefit to those concerned, to make known the prin-
ciples by which I have been governed in the discharge of the office,
from whose duties I have been recently relieved, by the appointment
of the distinguished gentlemen who will hereafter perform its functions.
If the views which I have taken of the duties of this Commission, under
the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, creating the Board, and the con-
clusions to which I have arrived as to the rights of the United States,
and of the claimants of land in this State, under the former govern-
ments of the country, are not correct, they are at least the result of an
honest and earnest effort that they should be so ; and I submit them in
this accessible form to the public judgment.
When the first notice of this work was issued, the intention was,
to have published it in Law form, in which it would have occupied the
number of pages indicated in the prospectus. With a view to greater
dispatch in its publication, the matter has been compressed into a
smaller volume.
HARRY I. THORKTON.

OPINIONS OF COMMISSIONER THORNTON
PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS
IX CALIFORNIA.
Dissent of Commissioner, H. I. Thornton, from the Opinion of the
Board, on the Motion entered by the Counsel of Maria Louisa
Greer and Manuela Coppinger, contestant in No. 2 :
The motion in this case is in the effect to permit the applicant to be-
come a party in a cause now pending before us, between the United
States and the heirs of Louis Arguello, with the view of contesting the
validity of the title of the claimants in that case, and to assert a right
to the same land in himself. The question raised by the motion is one of
considerable moment, as it may affect, if decided in favor of the mover,
most materially the progress and dispatch of the business of this Board.
It may not be amiss, before entering upon the merits of the question, to
bestow a moment's reflection upon the subject matter of the Act of
Congress which we are called upon to construe. That subject matter is
the Private Land Claims in the State of California, and the purpose of
the law, as declared in its first section, is to ascertain, and settle these
claims.
The Government of the United States, by treaty of purchase, or, as
is sometimes said, by conquest; but in which mode is wholly immaterial
as far as regards the determination of the question now submitted, be-
came the sovereign of the country, and thereby the owner, as such, of
all the territory which, at the date of the acquisition, was the eminent
domain of the Mexican Government, as contra-distinguished from the
private property of the Mexican citizens. The sovereign that succeeds
another, no matter in what manner, according to the well settled doc-
trine of the Law of Nations, acquires no right to any property, except
what belonged to the displaced sovereign
; or, in other words, if there
o
were no treaty, or, being one, it were wholly silent on the subject of the
private property of the citizens of the former government, their right of
private property, of whatsoever nature or character, would be equally
sacred and inviolable. The Government of the United States having
become, to the extent above stated, the owner of the domain of Califor-
nia, in accordance with her accustomed usage, and the settled policy of
the nation, desired to appropriate and dispose of the lands thus acquired
in such manner as to convert them to the use of her citizens, by a sale
thereof, on such terms as the people, through their representatives, may
devise. In thus appropriating to the use and enjoyment of her citizens
the territory acquired by their common valor, or treasure, care must be
taken not to trespass upon the private rights of those who had already,
according to the course of proceeding of their former government, become
the proprietors of any part of the Territory. If it had all been disposed
of by the former sovereign to her citizens, everything that the United
States would have acquired, was the political sovereignty of the country,
and no portion of the soil itself, which she could use for national pur"
poses, or grant to her citizens. There was, for example, on the annex-
ation of Texas, no necessity for any laws devising means to ascertain and
settle the extent of private land claims ; because the government had no
other, or further interest in that matter, than as she may derive benefit,
in a national point of view, from the quiet and peaceable condition of
her citizens, according to the maxim, "Interest Reipublicas ut sit finis
litium." But here in California, as in Louisiana and Florida, the land
of the State is, to an unascertained and indefinite extent,, the property in
part of the Federal Government, and in part the private property of
individuals. Hence, ia view of the great policy above adverted to, of
reducing the publie domain to private and indvidual ownership, it has
been deemed wise and proper to hasten that end by the creation of pro-
visional tribunals, as well as by stimulating an appeal to the ordinary
judicatures established by the constitution, for the speedy ascertainment,
and settlement of the question, ©f the extent of the private ownership of
the territory, acquired under the former governments of the country.
But for the interest which the United States has, or believes she has, to
some considerable portion of the lands of California, I suppose that sho
would not @onstitute any peculiar or special tribunals to* decidg upon the
mere private rights of individual proprietors, but would eontent herself
with the forums, State and Federal!, whieh, are* otherwise provided witfe
powers and jurisdiction, ample enough to decide the contested claims of
private persons between themselves. An obligation rests upon every
body politic, to provide tribunals for the adjustment of private Eigbia^,
else the benefit of government would be but partially enjoyed, or, in
other words, one of its chief ends be neglected. But there is no obliga-
tion upon government to do this, in regard to persons claiming property
under one source of title more than another. So far as any obligation
is imposed, by treaty stipulation, on the acquisition of foreign territory,
to do any act, either legislative or judicial in its nature, concerning the
private property of the inhabitants, of course such duty ought to be
most punctiliously performed. In the absence of any such stipulation
by treaty, there is not perceived to be any peculiar duty to provide any
extraordinary means for the settlement of questions of mere rneum et
tuum between private owners of one class, more than any other class.
To be sure, if there be any right of private property derived through the
former governments, which cannot be protected and maintained by an
appeal to the judicial tribunals, Federal or State, either of law or
equity, then the Federal Government, we are bound to presume, would
not be invoked in vain, in behalf of such a right.
We cannot, however, fail to observe that, in the Act of the 3d of
March, 1851, constituting this Board, among other things, no distinction
is noticed between the different classes of claimants, as to the perfect,
or imperfect nature of their titles. Each and every person claiming
lands in California by virtue of any right or title, derived from the
Spanish or Mexican Government, is required to present the same to
the said commissioners, &c.
It is clear to my mind, that the Legislative intension was, that per-
fect titles, as well as incohate titles : those perfected into complete
right, as well as those of an equitable nature, should all be presented : and
the bar of limitation, working a forfeiture to the government, in case of
a failure thus to present, within the prescribed time, is expressed in
terms as comprehensive, as the requirement of presentation. I have
thought it best to premise thus much of the general nature, and pur-
poses of this act, which I considered as bearing, in some measure, upon
the particular matter presented by the motion.
The consideration of this motion, makes it necessary to come to some
definite understanding, as to the character, and extent, of the functions to
be performed by this Board. It does not, in the sense of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, compose a part of the Federal Judiciary. It
wants many essential features of a tribunal of that character. Its
nature is peculiar, and special ; its organization provisional ; and its
jurisdiction limited to a single, and particularly defined subject. So far,
however, as it can go, the principles governing its decisions are the same
which apply to the same cases, if tried, in any other forum. As to the
extent of its functions, it appears to me to have been created as an
initiatory tribunal, in which to ascertain the facts, how much, and what
identical land, in the State of California, is public domain ? That object
is one of high public duty to the citizens of the United States. The
land is destined for the use of the people, and that destination cannot
be accomplished in an equal and just manner, without ascertaining, in
some mode, what is the public land so to be appropriated. At the same
time, that the Government has undertaken, in conformity with her
wonted usage, to accelerate the disposition, and equal enjoyment of the
public domain, by creating a tribunal to ascertain it, which was her first
great aim and duty, she has, in the same act of legislation, provided a
means of settling, to some extent, at hast, the private contests of indi-
viduals about the same matter. How far the means provided by the
act are wise, convenient, well adapted to the end proposed, and in
accordance with the constitution, all of which topics have been mooted
in the argument of the question, we are not called upon to decide ; but
simply to say whether the course of proceeding proposed by the motion?
is one competent to this Board to adopt. The act clearly, is not silent
on the subject of the conflicts between different claimants, but expressly
provides, in a certain degree, if not fully, for their adjudication. The
act expressly refers to contests between individual claimants, in which the
United States is not a party, and expressly provides one tribunal, and
recognizes another, in which they may be conducted. The tribunals
thus designated are others than this Board, and the time of their action
is to be subsequent to the peformance of its prescribed functions. This
contestation between claimants, in which the United States is to be no
party, and which the act provides for, in the 13th section, is,Jirst, where
claims which have been confirmed by this Board, lap over each other, to
use the language of surveyors ; and this contest arises on the ground, or
at the location of the land by the Surveyor General, preparatory to
obtaining a patent, after the action of this Board, and is to be decided
by the Surveyor General. And, secondly, where the title is contested,
so that one of the contesting parties may obtain a decree or judgment
for the
L
whole land, to the exclusion of the other in toto. Tims it
appears that the act contemplates and provides, most explicitly, for these
cases of conflict and contest. In the absence of any provision in the
act, touching the settlement of mere matters of private right, between
parties other than the United States, such as has been made in this act,
I would consider that the doctrine of strict construction, applicable to
the jurisdiction of all inferior, and special tribunals, would limit the
action of this Board, to the trial of the question of the validity of title,
9between the party claimant, and the United States. Neither as to subject,
matter of controversy, nor as to persons,—can a tribunal of special, and
limited jurisdiction, go beyond its prescribed limits. In this act not
only the subject matter, and the persons constituting the parties before
this Board, viz : the claimant, and the United States, are distinctly
_
declared, but the tribunals before whom the conflicts and contests
between other persons are to be conducted, are pointed out, and the
mode of proceeding defined, which, to my mind, of itself, would be con-
clusive against the rule asked for in this behalf. The expression of the
one, I would consider to be exclusive of the other.
But the proposition has been urged, with no little earnestness and
ingenuity, that it is not only competent to this Board, to allow the
amalgamation of claims, as proposed in the rule applied for, but that
the only proper, and just course to be pursued, is to entertain the con-
test between different claimants, going along, pari passu, with the
trial between them, and the United States. I cannot accord to the
arguments by which these propositions are attempted to be sustained,
sufficient force, to remove my objections to the course proposed. It
is true that, by pursuing what I understand to be the intention of the
Legislature, some of the consequences which are objected will ensue.
It is true, for instance, that a decree may be pronounced in favor of
a claim by this Board, when, in truth, there is a better title to the land
claimed, than that of such successful claimant; by which means it
may happen, that a shade may be thrown over the supposed better
title, and the interest of the owner of it, be thus injuriously affected.
This is what may, and does often occur; and no system of jurispru-
dence can be so far perfected, as not to be liable to such objection.
It is what the law terms "damnum absque injuria." A recovery of
property may be had by A from B, and yet A's title may not prevail
against that of C, who may sue and recover it, from A. It may be,
said that a shade was cast upon C's title, because a judicial tribunal
had decreed it to A. But this is an injury that the law cannot con-
sider. Although C could not interfere in the litigation between A
and B, yet his legal rights are not affected by the judgment, and he
may, by his own suit, recover his estate. So, under the operation of
this act, in which it is expressly enacted, in the 15th section, that a
confirmation, nay, even a patent under it, shall not prejudice the
rights of third persons, but only be conclusive between the United
States, and said claimants.
The objection is also urged that, by refusing the ride, the fact may
occur that there may be two or more confirmations, or decrees, for
10
the same land. This may take place, but it cannot be urged in this
argument, because such a consequence is expressly recognized in the
act itself, and provided for. It does not result in anything more than
the estoppel of the United States, leaving the question still open for
contest which of them is entitled, as against the others. This result
of more than one decree against the Government, and in favor of differ-
ent claimants, is recognized explicitly in the 13th section of the act.
When speaking of the location, by the Surveyor General, of the con-
firmed claims, it is declared that the Surveyor General shall have the
same power and authority as are conferred on the Register of the
Land Office, and Receiver of the public moneys of Louisiana, by the
6th section of the act to create the office of Surveyor of the Public
Lands for the State of Louisiana, approved 3d March, 1831. By
referring to that 6th section, it will be seen that the power and autho-
tity conferred on the Register and Receiver, which are the very same,
transferred to the Surveyor General by this act, are in relation to all
such confirmed claims, as may conflict, or in any manner interfei-e with
each other. In such cases they were to decide between the parties, and
in such the Suryeyor General of California can decide under this act.
Even patents of the same land are often granted to different persons.
In 2d Peters' Reports, 235, in the case of Pattersons' lessees, the
Supreme Court of the United States, say, "It is every day's practice to
make grants for lands which have, in part, been granted to others."
The force and effect of such confirmations, or patents, are only to
estop the United States, and not to affect the rights of other persons.
Her grant, or confirmation, has only the effect of a quit claim deed,
from the United States.
The argument in favor of this motion, derived from the supposed
influence, and effect of that portion of this act (the 11th section),
which enacts that the Commissioners, and the District, and Supreme
Courts, in deciding on the valididy of any claim brought before them,
under the provisions of this act, shall be governed by the principles of
equity, would just as well apply to sustain a motion to regulate the
proceedings of this Board by the laws, usages and customs of Spain or
Mexico ; for they are equally required to govern us, as are the principles
of equity. It seems to me very apparent that the principles of equity,
as the other enumerated grounds of adjudication, are only to govern
the decision on the validity of the claims, and have no bearing whatever
upon the mode of instituting, and conducting the proceedings.
If, however, I were at liberty to extend the meaning of those terms
beyond their obvious import, and apply them to the mode of proceeding,
11
my conclusion would be, that they would not warrant the adoption of
the proposed rule. The principles of equity will not authorize a bill
which is multifarious, and embraces distinct matters, affecting distinct
parties, who have no common interest in the distinct matters:—2d
Mason's U. S. C. C. Repts., 181. Now let us see how that principle
of equity would quadrate with the proposed rule. To do this, we must
follow out the matter into practice. A files a statement, claiming to
own one hundred acres of land, by virtue of a Spanish grant, deraigning
his title through many intermediate links in a chain, from the original
grantee, who he states, conveyed the said one hundred acres of land
to B ; that B conveyed to C, that C conveyed to D, that D, by his last
will and testament, devised the same to him: thus completing his state-
ment of title to the said land. C comes, under the rule, and files his
statement of title to the same hundred acres of land, stating the original
Spanish grant as A had done, which he insists upon as against the
United States.
He sets out, his deraignment of title from the grantee, as A had
done. He then proceeds to disclose his grounds of contest with A, by
averring that he is the heir at law of D, from whom A claims as devisee;
that D's will, through which A claims, was void, for some one or more
of the grounds of invalidity of a will, under the Spanish law, and so he
is entitled to the land, as heir, and not A, as devisee.
C then comes before the Board, and makes his statement of title, as
A and B have done, down from the original grantee to himself, but
then contests the claim of them both, by averring that the pretended
conveyance from him to D, the supposed testator, was void, for some
one of the various grounds on which, by the Spanish or Mexican law,
that conveyance may be assailed. This contestation may be extended
"ad infinitum," but, in the limited panorama which I have presented,
there is a busy contest: first, of all the claimants against the United
States; then of two of them, the supposed heti, and devisee, against
each other; then of the claimant C, with the two last, as to the suf-
ficiency of his conveyance to D, the supposed testator. "When would
this Babel of conflicting private rights ever be composed ? Not only
the questions of law and fact, touching the original Spanish or Mexican
title, about which alone the United States, one of the parties in the
ease, is materially concerned, must be solved, but all the nice and
intricate points in the municipal law of Spain, and Mexico, concerning
conveyances, and devises, must be examined into, and decided. Tantas
lites, quis potest componere ? The trouble and inconvenience, and
confusion of this matter would be great enough to startle a man of
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ordinary nerve and legal attainments; if all these claimants would make
their formidable entrance, at once, into our presence; but suppose it
should suit their convenience to come forward, only in time to escape
the statutory bar, or a final decree of this Board, on the claim first
presented, then, there must be an awful pause in the proceeding. All
those depositions, whose taking has cost so much time, trouble and
expense, must be put a,side and taken over again, if needed; for certain
it is, that those "principles of equity, by which we must be governed, will
not allow them to be read against one, who was no party at their
taking, and not bound to have been.
It has been urged, as a reason for adopting the rule, that, unless
this contest is permitted between the claimants before this Board, the
interest of the United States might be injured; because, if a confirma-
tion, and patent afterwards, should be granted to the first claimant,
there may be an older, and better Spanish, or Mexican grant, which
may never be presented by the grantee or his assignees, and thus the
land become the property of the United States, by means of the forfeit-
ure created in such case by the statute.
I do not perceive, perhaps, the entire force of this view, but, as it
strikes my mind, it is too remote an interest, to merit consideration in
this motion. It is founded on two suppositions:^?-^, that there is a
better title, and, secondly, that it never will be asserted, in an available
manner, by those owning it.
In conclusion, I will only say that I do not think the rule ought to
be made, as asked for.
CRUZ CERVANTES, Claimant,
vs.
UNITED STATES, Defendant.
Before I enter upon the consideration of the questions which relate
directly to the validity of the claim in this case, I will give my views
of the subject upon which this Board was intended to act, and of the
foundations upon which any opinion that I feel authorized to give,
must rest under the Act of the 3d March, 1851. A distinct annuncia-
tion of this basis is not only due to those who are to be affected by
the administration of this Act of Congress, but being settled in my own
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mind, will serve as the polar star to guide me through the wide tract
of conflicting opinions, which have been the subject of an anxious and
protracted discussion. The 8th and 11th sections of the Act, taken
together, furnish the chart of our procedure. In the first named, i. e.,
the 8th, it is enacted, "That each and every person claiming lands in
California by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or
Mexican Government, shall present the same to the said Commissioners
when sitting as a Board, together with such documentary evidence and
testimony of witnesses as the said claimant relies upon in support of
such claims : and it shall be the duty of the Commissioners, when the
case is ready for hearing, to proceed promptly to examine the same,
upon such evidence, and upon the evidence produced in behalf of the United
States, and to decide upon the validity of the said claim, and, within
thirty days after such decision is rendered, to certify the same, with the
reasons on which it is founded, to the District Attorney of the United
States, in and for the District in which such decision shall be rendered."
This section declares fully the subject matter upon which we are to de-
cide, that is, the validity of any right or title derived from the source
mentioned
; it declares the evidence upon which alone that decision is to
be rendered,—being that introduced by the claimant on the one side,
and the United States on the other. Having thus stated the subject
matter and the evidence upon which we are to decide it, in the 11th sec-
tion it proceeds, with the same distinctness and precision, to declare the
law by which we shall be governed. That section is in the following
words : "That the Commissioners herein provided for, and the District
and Supreme Courts, in deciding on the validity of any claim brought
before them under the provisions of this Act, shall be governed by the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the law of nations, the laws, usages and
customs of the Government from which the claim is derived, the princi-
ples of equity, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, so far as they are applicable." With respect to the subject mat-
ter of our action, and the evidence upon which that action is to be had,
the line of our duty, as prescribed in the 8th section of the Act, is pal-
pable and easy to be pursued : but in the 11th section, which declares
the law that is to govern us, a broad field is open to our view, and each
landmark demands the most particular regard. The Treaty of Guada-
lupe Hidalgo is the first in the order of enumeration. This treaty con-
tains nothing more, so far as it bears upon this case, than a recognition
of the doctrine which is enforced in the second head, or the law of na-
tions, viz : that in all cases of the acquisition of foreign territory by any
nation, the private property of the former inhabitants shall be held invio-
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late. The next enumerated ground of decision is, the laws, usages and
customs of the former Governments from which the claim is derived.
This embraces all the written laws which authorize and regulate the
disposition of the public domain ; as also all those laws which relate to
the form, the construction, and whatever else may affect the instruments
of conveyance employed for that purpose, and to the conditions which
are annexed or which are authorized to be annexed to the grants in
question. The customs and Usages of the country as they may relate to
the same subject, are also to govern us. There is no great difficulty in
determining the nature and extent of the influence of these laws, cus-
toms and usages upon the subjects to which we are to apply them ; but
I have felt more difficulty on the question, how far we are to notice
them judicially, without their being brought before us, like foreign laws,
duly authenticated, or established by the evidence appropriate to their
respective natures. The correct adjustment of this question is of great
importance to the parties in the causes submitted to this Board, and I
feel bound to advert to it, as it has created some difficulty in my mind
in the consideration of the points arising in them. With regard to the
unwritten customs and usages to which are imparted by the Act con-
stituting this Board, the force and effect of written law, their establish-
ment, as it seems to me, requires the application of the rules governing
the proof of other facts. Those whose rights are to be materially affec-
ted by them, ought to have the opportunity of examining the sources
from which they are derived or the witnesses who communicate them,
and be allowed to show, by other witnesses, that such is not the custom
or usage, or even to discredit the witnesses who testify to them. The
difficulty which I feel on this subject is not removed by the recent de-
cision of the Supreme Court of the United States, reported in xi. How-
ard, 668, United States vs. Turner & Co. The court was not called
upon to do so, nor do I think they did decide this question in that case.
It seems that the counsel for the apellees moved for an issue, to be tried
by the jury, whether the grant in question was perfect and complete or
not, by the laws of Spain in force, in the province of Louisiana, when it
was made. The Supreme Court decide that there was no error in the
refusal of the court below to grant that motion, and proceed to say :
—
"The Spanish laws which formerly prevailed in Louisiana, and upon
which the titles to land in that State depend, must be judicially noticed
and expounded by the court, like the laws affecting titles to real property
in any other State. They are questions of law and not questions of
fact, and are always so regarded and treated in the courts of Louisiana.
And it can never be maintained in the courts of the United States that
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the laws of any State of this Union are to be treated as the laws of a
foreign nation, and ascertained, and determined as a matter offact, by a
jury, upon the testimony of witnesses. And if the Spanish laws pre-
vailing in Louisiana, before the cession to the United States, were to be
regarded as foreign laws, which the courts could not judicially notice,
the titles to lands in that State would become unstable and insecure
;
and their validity or invalidity would in many instances depend upon
the varying opinions of witnesses, and the fluctuating verdicts of juries,
deciding upon questions of law which they could not, from the nature of
their pursuits and studies, be supposed to comprehend." Now, if all
that was intended by the court was, that the construction, the ascer-
tainment and determination of the force and effect of a foreign law
were not matters proper to be referred for the decision of a jury, and
that the proof of such law was not for them, but for the court, then the
decision would be in accordance with the settled doctrine, Consequa vs.
Willing, Peters, C. C. Repts. 225. So also if the court intended to
decide that the courts of the United States would notice judicially the
laws of a State, and that the laws in question were to be regarded as
the laws of Louisiana, by virtue of their recognition as such by the ju-
dicial tribunals of that State, the particular point now mooted would
not be embraced in the decision : for in the absence of any means by
the publication of the decisions of the tribunals of California, I do not
know what those decisions are. But if the Supreme Court in the case
in xi. Howard, above cited, is to be considered as deciding,—that be-
cause the laws of Spain once existed in Louisiana, and continued to
control and even to constitute a part of the titles which were made un-
der them to many citizens, then subjects of Spain, but now of Louisiana,
they were on that account now to be regarded as the laws of Louisiana
and not as foreign laws, then it seems to me that the decision is not in
accordance with, but contrary to, the prior determination of the court,
so explicitly made, that I do not think it would have been overruled
without making the slightest allusion to it. In the case of the United
States, and Wiggins reported in xiv. Peters, 345, brought up from Flor-
ida, and decided under an Act of Congress, requiring, as the Act of 3d
March, 1851, does, the claims to be adjudged and determined, among
other things, by the laws> usages and customs of the former Govern-
ment, the opinion of the court contains the strong language which I
quote : "Much evidence was introduced to prove the practice and rules
in use in the offices of the Spanish Government from which titles to land
issued. We think the evidence was admissable ; the existence of a for-
eign law especially wjien unwritten, is a fact to be proved, like any other
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fact, by appropriate evidence. The Spanish province of Florida was
foreign to this country in 1815, when the transaction referred to pur-
ports to have taken place. The practice of the Government in dispos-
ing of the public domain may be proved by those familiar with the
customs, and there is in the record very satisfactory proof by witnesses,
of the laws and customs governing the provincial authorities." If the
court in this case had merely declared that such evidence was admissible,
and that the admission of such proof, even to establish a matter of law,
—which would be judicially noticed without such proof,—was not
ground of error, being only supererogatory, doing no injury, but perhaps
affording facility to the court in coming to the accurate knowledge of
it, then nothing could be deduced from the decision material to the
question. But the language is strong and emphatic in the declaration
of a positive rule of law upon the subject. It may be that the decision
in the xi. of Howard goes to the extent of settling this question against
the view taken in xiv. Peters, though I am inclined to the opinion that
it was founded (so far as it goes beyond the overruling the allegation of
error in the court below for refusing to submit the question to a jury,)
upon the fact that in Louisiana the former laws of the country were con-
tinued in force after the change of Government ; whereas, in Florida,
as in California, the English common law is adopted by the Legislature
as the fundamental rule of jurisprudence. It cannot fail to be observed
that the remarks made by the Chief Justice in delivering the opinion in
xi. Howard, as to the consequences of a different course from that pur-
sued by the court below, have no application, unless they relate to the
determination of the force, and effect, and construction of those laws by
a jury, instead of by the court ; because, whether they are noticed judi-
cially, or introduced and proved to the court, the result would be the
same as to the stability and security of title ; for in either case, the court
and not the, jury, would ascertain and expound them, and the same sta-
bility and security be attained in the one case as in the other.
The next legal ground to govern us in our decisions is the principles
of equity. What meaning is to be attached to the terms "principles of
equity," whenever they occur in any Act of Congress of the United
States, I apprehend admits of no doubt. They are those principles
which form that venerable fabric known to the American people as the
system of Equity Jurisprudence. It is a monument whose chief corner
stone was laid by Lord Hardwick, but whose superstructure has been
gradually erected by the co-operation of men of the brightest intellects
and the purest characters, who have ever adorned the ermine. Many
of its proudest contributions have been furnished by illustrious citizens
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of our own country, " who have left their works behind them." In this de-
partment of human excellence the tribute of grateful recollection should
always be paid to the names of Marshall, and Kent, and Story. It will
be our humble duty to make the application of those principles to the
cases as they arise ;—taking care, in doing so, not to forget that Equi-
ty—illustrious as she is—is still but a handmaid to the law, and that
•one of her cardinal maxims is, Equitas, sequittir legem.
The last ground of law enumerated in the section of the Act men-
tioned above to govern us in determining on the validity of claims, is
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, so far as ap-
plicable. In entering upon the consideration of this ground of adjudi-
cation I will remark, that the opinions of that honored tribunal ought to
command the respect of all inferior jurisdictions ; and not only is that
general obedience enjoined upon us, but especial reference is had to that
body of learning which has, through years of patient investigation, been
amassing in their reports upon the various questions of public law and
private rights arising under the treaties by which we acquired foreign
territory, and upon Acts of Congress passed in reference to them, and
especially to those decisions which have been made upon laws passed
after, and with reference to the treaties of Paris and Washington, by
which we acquired Louisiana and Florida. To determine the applica-
bility of those decisions to questions arising under the Treaty of G-uada-
lupe Hidalgo, by which we acquired California, and the Act of the 3d
of March, 1851, it is proper to compare those treaties and laws with this
last treaty and Act of Congress. The stipulations of those treaties, so
far as involved in this matter, I will briefly state. In the 2d article of
the Treaty of Paris, the terms of cession of public domain are as fol-
lows : "The islands belonging to Louisiana, all public lots and squares,
vacant lands, &c, which are not private property ;"—excluding, by the
strongest implication, a cession to the United States of any private pro-
perty. In the 3d article, after the stipulation to incorporate the inhab-
itants in the Union, with the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages
and immunities of citizens of the United States, it concludes with the
words : "And in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected
in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and the religion which
they profess. By the Treaty of Washington, in the 2d article, as in the
Treaty with France, a cession is made of all islands, vacant lands, etc.,
which are not private property. And a special article is introduced, be-
ing the 8th, that all grants of land made before the 24th day of Janu-
ary, 1818, by his Catholic Majesty, or by his lawful authorities in the
eaid territories, ceded by his Majesty to the United States, shall be
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ratified, or (as now understood,) stand ratified and confirmed to the per-
sons in possession, &c, to the same extent that the same grants would
be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of his Cath-
olic Majesty. By the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the right of pri-
vate property of the former inhabitants is protected, at least as far as
the law of nations would have protected it, without any provisions in
the treaty. The stipulations of the ninth article, which is the only one
applicable to the case of persons occupying the attitude of the claimant
in this case, has been interpreted to mean a stipulation of maintenance
and protection in their property, as well after the admission of the State
into the Union, as before. The Acts of Congress passed with reference
to the lands acquired under those treaties, and which have been the-
subject of judicial construction in the cases specially referred to in the
Act of the 3d of March, 1851, as being one of the governing rules of
our decisions, are, First—The Act of the 26th of May, 1824, entitled
" An Act enabling the claimants to lands within the limits of the State
of Missouri and Territory of Arkansas, to institute proceedings to try
the validity of their claims ;" by which the courts were opened to de-
cide on claims under the Treaty of Paris of 1803, of a certain class,
which were not perfect, but which might have been perfected into a com-
plete title under and in conformity to the laws, usages and customs of
the Government under which the same originated, had not the sover-
eignty of the country been transferred to the United States. Second—
An Act of the 23d of May, 1828, extending, with some modifications
unnecessary here to mention,, the Act of the 26th of May, 1824, over
Florida. And Third—The Act of June the 17th, 1844, extending
over Arkansas, Missouri, Louisiana, and those parts of Mississippi and
Alabama south of the 31st degree of north latitude, and between the
Mississippi and Perdido rivers. By the provisions of these laws, any
grant, concession, warrant or order of survey legally made, granted or
issued, and which might have been perfected into a complete title but
for the change of ^'sovereignty, under and in conformity to the laws,
usages and customs of the Government under which they originated, could
be presented to the United States District Court, &c. The Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo and the law of nations must be conceded to impart
the same sanctity to private property in California as is conferred upon
it by the Treaty either of Washington or of Paris. The Act of the 3d
of March, 1851, authorizes the presentment before this Board of any
.right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican Governments. It u
necessary, before we are anthorized to adopt any decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, relating to the validity of titles, to
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gee to their applicability. What is there in the Acts above adverted
to, which gives a more enlarged scope of adjudication under them, than
is given under the Act of the 3d of March, 1851 ? The terms any
grant, concession, warrant or order of survey, are not more comprehen-
sive, if as much so, as those adopted in this Act under which we ar&
now acting, viz : any right or title. If no property of any kind were
conferred by the laws, usages and customs in the case of grants, con-
cessions, warrants or orders of survey, neither the treaties nor the law
of nations would require them to be regarded ; nor does Congress, by
her Acts, profess that she would be authorized to maintain and protect
any thing less than an inceptive or imperfect right. Those terms, then,
in those different Acts, are of equivalent signification. In xi. Howard,
580, the court say, " The word title, in our statutes, on this subject,
expressly means equitable rights, short of complete grants and perfect
titles. It means equity emphatically." In the Act of 3d of March,
1851, it means that much, beyond all doubt ; and not being qualified
by the controlling terms which those Acts contain, it means more than
mere equity, that is full and perfect titles, also. The want of applica-
bility of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States to the
questions arising before this Board, cannot be founded on any difference
in the cases arising from the law of nations, the Treaties or the Acts
of Congress under which they were made. All these concur in one
point, which is, that all property of the former inhabitants shall be
maintained and protected to the extent that it existed under the former
Governments. It is true, as was to be expected in a new field of legis-
lation, that there was in some instances inconsiderate, not to say harsh
and oppressive, legislation
;
but its general tenor, whilst it sustained the
rights of the nation, has preserved good faith towards the former in-
habitants of the acquired country. In the general, there has been a
magnanimous liberality extended, both as it regards political privileges
and the property of those who were thus about to become adopted
children of our great Republic. The condition of the natives of Cali-
fornia was one peculiarly calculated to demand not only the best faith r
uberrima fides, but the sympathy and fostering care of the new Govern-
ment. They were first conquered and then transferred in violation of
their feelings, of their prejudices, of their native habitudes, from a Gov-
ernment whose pressure they had never felt ; under which,, they were-
at least enjoying the homes of their birth. They were driven into-
stranger hands, of whose laws, of whose language, and of whose dispo-
sition towards them, they were wholly ignorant ; trembling with anxiety
at their new position, and looking forward with fearful apprehension for
further chances and changea in their fortunes..
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Not unmindful of the obligations of humanity, and of the law of na-
tions, which has ever been respected as the common arbiter by all civ-
ilized communities, the course of the Congress of the United States,
commencing with the legislation on the subject of the Territory em-
braced by the cession of the State of Georgia to the United States, in
1802, down to the acquisition of this country, has been marked by a
spirit of progressive liberality and relaxation, in favor of the claimants
or grantees of land, under their former Governments. This favorable
consideration of all bona fide claimants manifests itself by embracing in
subsequent Acts, descriptions of claims not recognized by former Acts,
by extending the time within which notices of claims, and the produc-
tion of evidence, were required ; by giving authority to the judicial tri-
bunals, and Boards of Commissioners, not only to decide upon such
claims, but to revise and confirm such as had been rejected. Nor is
this last Act of the 3d of March, 1851, under which we are now sit-
ting, an exception to this general rule of liberal legislation. It ex-
pressly recognizes in the broadest terms any right, or title, which terms,
I have shewn, are at least as comprehensive as those used in any former
Act. Nothing more could be done than this, except to say that claim-
ants should be confirmed in their claims without any right or title. To
have exercised more liberality on this head would have been what
neither the Law of Nations nor the treaty required, and what, justice
to the people of the United States at large, would have utterly forbid-
den. Neither the law of nations, nor the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidal-
go, which last is indeed exceedingly meagre on the subject of the pro-
perty of those who should remain in the country, and become American
citizens, can act like alchemy, and convert everything, even a permissive
occupancy, into a full, perfect and complete title in fee simple. What-
ever scintilla of title there was, under the former Government, is to be
protected and maintained. But it is necessary that this right should
be made known, and not rest upon the ipse dixit of a claimant. Some
mode must be adopted to ascertain what is to be protected and main-
tained
; and, to my mind, that which the Act of the 3d of March, 1851,
provides, is an easy and simple and equal way of ascertaining the ex-
istence of any right or title : the ascertainment of which was of much
more pressing importance to the former inhabitants, as every day's ex-
perience demonstrates, than to the Government of the United States.
Having taken this cursory view of former treaties and laws, and com-
pared them with that of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the Act of the 3d of
March, 1851, with the view of deciding upon the applicability of the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, to the claims
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before this Board, I will here state, generally, the two great leading prin-
ciples resulting from those decisions, leaving the particular points estab-
lished in them to be applied to the several propositions or questions, as
they may come under consideration in the further view of the case.
The first of those great leading principles was announced by the
Court, as early as the year 1836, in the case of Smith vs. the United
States, x. Peters, 330, 331 ; and is re-affirmed xi. Howard, 88. In the
last case the Court say, in reference to this principle, " This was the
rule laid down for our Government in 1836, in the case of Smith vs. the
United States, x. Peters, 330, 331, and which has been uniformly fol-
lowed since," As the language of the Court introductory of the rule,
as well as in laying down the rule itself, varies slightly, I will quote it
as it is laid down in both instances. In x. Peters it is thus : " In every
case arising under the law, one general question was presented for the
consideration of the Court : whether, in the given case, a Court of
Equity could, according to its rules and the laws of Spain, consider the
conscience of the King to be so affected by his own, or the acts of the
lawful authorities of the Province, that he had become a trustee for the
claimant, and held the land claimed by an equity upon it, amounting to
a severance of so much from his dominion," &c. In xi. Howard, 88, it
is laid down in the following words : " By the Act of 1824 we are re-
quired to exercise the power of a Court of Equity, and to adjudge in
the given case, whether a Court of Equity could, according to the rules
and laws of Spain, consider the conscience of the King so affected by the
the acts of his- lawful authorities in the Province that he became a trus-
trustee for the claimant, and held the land claimed, by an equity upon
it amounting to a severance of so much from the public domain, before, and
at the time, the country was ceded to the United States."
The second general riole is that which is adopted by the Court in
many cases, as in ii. Wheat, 359 ; iv. Concl. Kept. 681 ; in. Peters,
92 ; xv. Peters, 215, and which, although not in the least departed
from, may have the supplemental addition contained in xi. Howard,
127, I will give the general rule as laid down in xv. Peters, 225,
in the words of the Court. "We apply to the case the laws and
ordinances of the Government under which the claim originated
; and
that rule, which is of universal application in the construction of grants,
which is essential to their validity, that the thing granted should be so
described as to be capable of being distinguished from other things of the
same kind, or be capable of being ascertained by extraneous testimony?
The supplement to which I referred above is furnished in xi. Howard,
127, in which case the concession, being wholly indefinite in itself,
3
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needed, if sustained at all, something more to constitute such a sever-
ance from the public domain, as is always required. Those additional
requisites are said to be supplied either by actual survey or by some as-
certained limits, or mode of separation recognized by a competent authority.
Having stated with as much brevity as was consistent with perspicu-
ity, the grounds upon which the Board is required to act, both as to the
evidence and to the law, in deciding on the validity of the claim, I will
now proceed to consider whether, in the view of those principles, the
claim of the present claimant is valid or not. It is founded upon a
grant bearing date the 1st of April, 1836, signed by Nicolas Gutierrez,
as political chief, or governor, at the time, of the Territory of Upper
California. There is no question of the genuineness of the grant, what-
ever may be its legal effect ; nor of the fact that Gutierrez was the po-
litical chief, or acting Governor at the time. The evidence on file, from
the public archives, proves all those facts. Whatever decrees of the
Spanish Monarchy, of the Spanish Cortes, of the Empire of Mexico, under
the domination of Yturbide, under the name and style of Augustin the 1st,
or of the Mexican Republic, may have been in force prior to the 18th of
August, 1824, there is no d@ubt that at the date of this grant the decree of
the Mexican Republic of the last mentioned date, and the ordinance of the
21st of November, 1828, issued by the Federal Executive of the Re-
public, in pursuance of the 16th article of the said decree of the 18th of
August, 1824, were in full force ; that the grant in this case was made
with especial reference to that decree and ordinance ; and just as little
doubt, that it rests on that decree and ordinance for its only support.
Other decrees concerning the disposition of the public domain, and the
settlement or colonization of this country, we know existed prior to the
last named decree and ordinance ; and so far as they have not been ex-
pressly repealed by subsequent legislation, or by necessary implication,
from their total incongruity, or conflict with those, they certainly still
remained in force. However, this decree and ordinance, as to rural
grants, like the one now under consideration, cover the whole subject so
completely, as to leave little else for any prior decrees to operate upon
;
their chief efficacy consisting in the light which they afford in the con-
struction of that decree and ordinance.
As constant reference must necessarily be made to the decree and
ordinance under which this grant was executed, to decide its validity,
for greater convenience, and out of abundant caution, in view of their
having once been foreign laws, however they may now be regarded, they
have been introduced into the record by the Law Agent of the United
States, duly authenticated from the archives in the legal custody of the
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Surveyor General of California, and constitute a part of the evidence in
this case. The decree of the Mexican Congress was a general law,
upon the subject of colonization,, which professed as its chief end and aim
the settlement (cultivation of inhabitancy) of the vast public domain of
the nation, by means of grants in full property to her own citizens, and
foreigners, provided tlvey should submit themselves to the law^ of the
country. The second section of that law provides that, " Those lands of
the nation are the object of this law, which, being neither the property
of any individual, nor belonging to any corporation or town, may be
colonized." The third section declares, "For this purpose the (Con-
gresses) Legislatures of the States shall form, with the greatest dis-
patch, laws or rules of colonization, within their respective demarcations,
conforming themselves, in all respects, to the constitutive act, the gen-
eral constitution, and the rules established in this law." The fourth
section is in these words : " The lands comprehended within the twenty
leagues bordering upon any foreign nation, or within ten leagues of the
sea-coast, (diez littorales) shall not be colonized without the previous
approbation of the general supreme executive power" The sixteenth sec-
tion of the decree is in these words : " The Executive, in conformity
with the principles established in this decree, shall proceed to the colo-
nization of the Territories of the Republic? This decree was enacted,
as stated above, on the 18th of August, 1824, after the establishment
of the Acta Constitutiva de la Federacion, which was on the 31st of
January, 1824, and before the establishment of the Constitution Fed-
eral de los Estados Mexicanos, the formation of which, however, was
clearly in the mind of the Congress at the passage of this decree. The
Executive did not proceed to the colonization of the Territories of the
Republic until the 21st of November, 1828, when he promulgated his
general rules, or ordinance, for that purpose. Independently of the di-
rection contained in the 16th section of the decree of the 18th of Au-
gust, 1824, by the 15th article of the Acta Constitutiva, he was required
to " make decrees, or orders, for the better execution of the constitution
and general laws ;" and also by the second article of the 4th title of the
Federal Constitution of the Mexican United States, it was his duty to
make ordinances, decrees and rules, for the more exact fulfilment of the
Constitution, the Acta Constitutiva, and General Decrees. He pre-
faces his ordinance of the 21st of November, 1828, with the following
preamble : " It being provided in the 16th article of the General De-
cree of Colonization, of the 18th of August, 1824, that the Executive,
in conformity with the principles established in said decree, proceed to
the colonization of the Territories of the Republic ; and it being most
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proper, in order to give to said article the most adequate and exact fulfil-
ment, to dictate some general rules, that its execution may be expedited
in the cases that may be occurring, the E. S. President has thought
proper to determine on the following articles." The first article in that
ordinance is in the following words : u Authority is given to the politi-
cal chiefs, that in conformity with the decree of the Supreme Congress
of the 18th of August, 1824, and under the conditions herein expressed,
they may grant vacant lands of their respective territories to empressa-
rios, families, to individual persons, whether Mexicans or foreigners, who
wish it, to cultivate or inhabit them." The last article of this ordinance
relates to Missions, and is as follows : "In the Territories in which
there are Missions, the lands which they occupy cannot be colonized at
present, and until it be determined if they ought to be considered as
the property of the establishments (reducciones) of Neophytes, Catech-
umens, and Mexican settlers.'7 To disembarras this case from any con-
sideration of the objection on the score of this last article, I will observe
here, that the record contains a disclaimer of any right on the part of
the Mission ; and the proof is, that the land solicited and granted was
not occupied by the Mission.
This statement of the decree of the 18th of August, 1824, and ordi-
nance of the 21st of November, 1828, will suffice to give a general out-
line of the scheme or plan of granting the Mexican domain, under which
the claimant derives his title. As other articles of them may require
to be considered in the progress of this opinion, they will be introduced
into it.
The first question which presents itself at the very threshold of our
enquiry into the validity of the title of the claimant, is that which grows
out of the fourth section of the decree of the 18th of August, 1824, and
will be called, for convenience of expression, the littoral league question.
The discussion of this question, (on the solution of which depends such
vital interests) by the counsel in this case, by the Law Agent of the
United States, and by other gentlemen of the bar, who have submitted
cases now in our hands for decision, has been marked by that diligence
of investigation, legal acumen, and forensic ability, which were demanded
by the subject, and fully met in its argument.
Before entering upon the consideration of this first point, I will sug-
gest that it is by no means clear to my mind that the land claimed in
this case lies within the ten littoral leagues. There* does not appear in
the evidence (indeed the contrary is conceded on all hands) that there
ever was any line marked out by the Mexican Government, that would
indicate the region of country embraced within them. It would be very
25
difficult to ascertain with any precision, but by means of an actual
measurement, the tract of such a line along the coast of California ; and
having been never in any manner ascertained, I suppose it will be conce-
ded without controversy, that we cannot judicially know it, except in
those cases where the coast is one of the calls in the grant. The evi-
dence in the cause of the witnesses is such as we might expect, from the
nature of the thing, exceedingly unsatisfactory. The Law Agent of the
United States relies upon a document accompanying the ezpediente, as
found in the archives, being the return of the Ayuntamiento of the City
of Monterey, to whom was referred, by the political chief, the question
of the fitness of the grant to the petition ; which return states that the
land is within ten littoral leagues. The grant was made by the Gov-
ernor, notwithstanding. But it is very apparent that his grant is no
evidence that the return was untrue, for the fact when self-evident, pre-
sented no obstacle to a grant, as the evidence shows, particularly the
document in evidence from the archives, containing the proposition of
Jimeno, and the proceedings had upon it, in the Departmental Junta,
in 1840. It may be that the inquisition of the Ayuntamiento of Mon-
terey, may bind the claimant, as res adjudicata, though I do not think
so. Yet as that impression may be erroneous, and the question has
been treated as though it might arise, and has been fully argued, I will
proceed to give my opinion upon it.
The solution of this question requires that we should examine nar-
rowly both the decree of the 18th of August, 1824, and also the ordi-
nance of the 21st of November, 1828, which in fact are necessarily
connected, the latter merely educing, for practice, all that was involved
in the former, which was its only legitimate office. It has been con-
tended by the counsel for the claimant in this case, that whatever else
might have been the object or motive of the fourth section of the decree
of 1824, it was not intended to embrace a native Mexican citizen, of
which class is the claimant now before the Board. In support of this
propositon, a general review was made of the course pursued by the for-
mer Government of the country, in regard to the discrimination always
made in favor of her native citizens, in granting of the public domain,
and in the colonization of her provinces. It is very apparent, from this
examination, that the policy of the former Governments of the country,
in this regard, has been variant at different periods and conjunctures of
her affairs—sometimes exhibiting the exclusive rigor of Lacedemonia,
in the days of Lycurgus, or of the Celestial Empire, and at others, re-
laxing it so far as almost to abolish all distinctions. There does not
seem to me to have been, at least since the independence of Mexico,
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any such fixed and settled policy in this matter, as to rely upon it with
any confidence as a guide in the interpretation of this decree. It is
safer to determine her policy from laws enacted at the given time, than
to construe her laws by any supposed general policy upon the subject.
An impression might indeed be taken up from the first section of the
decree, that the only object of the bounty of the government was for-
eigners—that they were the chief instruments intended to be used in the
colonization of the vacant lands of the Republic. This would be, how-
ever, a very erroneous deduction. In looking at the decree itself, I can
perceive no distinction between foreigners and Mexican citizens, except
that which is suggested by the ninth section, where, in the distribution
of lands, a preference is required to be given to Mexican citizens, which
involves, as I think, a distinction in their favor, over the foreigners
whose introduction was contemplated.
Whatever doubt may exist as to the intention of the Legislature con-
tained in the Decree, it all vanishes when we look at the provisions of
the ordinance, which is its practical exponent. The first section of the
ordinance is a clear and comprehensive and authoritive exposition of
three prominent and- essential matters, necessary to the execution of the
Decree, whose adequate fulfilment the President had just declared his
intention to accomplish. The first in his order of announcement is, that
the sole and exclusive agent in the function of granting shall be the Po-
litical Chief of the Territory. The second is, that the subject of his
grants are the vacant lands of his Territory ; and the third is, that those
grants are to be made to empressarios, families, and individual persons,
whether Mexicans or foreigners. , Whatever was intended to be granted
by the Decree, I feel bound to believe, was, with the exception of the
preference indicated in the 9th section of it, intended to be granted in-
differently to Mexican citizens and to foreigners. '
The next point which I will consider is, whether the Territories of the
Republic were intended to be embraced in the terms of the 4th section
of the Decree of 1824. Its application to lands within the prescribed
limits situated in the States is evident : but that it was intended to em-
brace those similarly situated in the Territories, is not, I must confess,
^o free from doubt, though such is the inclination of my mind. With
regard to the States, without such a proviso, all power to control the
matter would have been parted with. But that consideration does not
prove that the generality of the terms should be so restricted as to con-
fine them to such lands within the States. This policy of the with-
drawal of her people from contact with, and facility of access to, foreign
nations, the neglect of which might involve the nation in a general war,
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by border feuds ; and, being so involved, might make her more vulner-
able and exposed to maritime incursions along her coasts, would seem
to apply as well to the Territories as the States. . In speculating upon
the policy and motives of this provision it is possible that there might
have entered into it one consideration which was peculiar to the Territo-
ries. The Congress may have supposed that in devoting her whole vacant
domain, by this permanent Decree, to gratuitous distribution, she might
cut off any aid to her fiscal exigencies from the source of her public do-
main ; and may have thought it wise and prudent to submit to her exe-
cutive head the determination of the economical question, whether the
highest interests of the Republic might not be best subserved, by with-
holding that portion of it for the purpose of sale. But whatever may have
operated on the mind of the Mexican Congress, I have come to the con-
clusion, not, however, with the fullest confidence, that they submitted
to the will of their Executive, the future subjection of that portion of
their country, whether in the States or Territories, to the process of colo-
nization.
The next, and, as it occurs to my mind, the most important branch
of this question, is, whether the Federal Executive has exercised the 1
power with which he was invested by Congress, in that section of the
Decree. It is certain that the mode in which he shall give his required
approbation is not prescribed by the law ; and I am not prepared to say
that any mode which he might choose to adopt, however it might differ
from my own view of its comparative efficacy, in accomplishing the end
designed, would not be competent to him to select. In view, however,
of the mode in which he was required, both by the Acta Constitutiva
and the General Constitution, when carrying out a general law of the
Republic, I should think that the one which he pursued would be the
most natural one for him to adopt on this occasion. I have already had
occasion to state that, both by the Acta Constitutiva, and by the Fedr
eral Constitution, it was his duty to make ordinances, decrees, and rules,
for the more exact fulfilment of the general laws of the Republic. It
seems to me that the Federal Executive might well have executed the
trust reposed in him by the Constituent Congress of 1824, by a general
ordinance-. The matter confided to him was to determine whether the re-
gion of the public domain, contained within the described limits,, should
be subjected to colonization.. That determination, which had been doubt-
less confided to him by Congress from the consideration of his high of-
ficial station and responsibility to the Republic,, could not be, by him,
devolved upon another. The power and authority conferred upon him
was a high public trust, which he could not delegate. But in relation to
28
the process of carrying it into execution, by establishing the details of colo-
nization, it was his peculiar duty ; and it was just as competent to him
to do that, in relation to the lands which were devoted by his will to colo-
nization, as to perform the same functions in relation to those so desig-
nated by the will of Congress, as expressed in their Decree of 1824.
The vice in the argument adverse to this consists, as it seems to me, in
coufoundiug the act of the will of the Federal Executive, by which he
could subject that region to settlement with the means which he should
employ to carry that will into execution. The objection to the mode
of carrying out his purpose of settlement, after that purpose had been
formed, is more properly a criticism upon the fitness of the means which
he adopted than an argument against his power to communicate his will
by a general ordinance. We may, in reviewing the transaction, sup-
pose that the policy which dictated his investiture with that power,
would have been better subserved, if he had so exercised it, as that every
individual, before he could be permitted to settle within that tract of
country, should present himself personally to the Executive, and obtain
a special permission. But the Executive of Mexico may have thought
that all which the public interest' required in 1828, could be achieved
by a less onerous and less dilatory process. He may have thought that
the public security would be sufficiently guarded in the case of individ-
ual Mexicans or foreigners, by the ordeal through which he had re-
quired them to pass, from the first presentment of their petition to the
Political Chief, to the ultimate sanction of the Executive
; which last
he had provided in case of a reasonable objection to any pretension. He
may have thought that in the case of an attempt to introduce, through
the medium of empressario stipulations, an excessive proportion of for-
eigners, the check which he had provided of a personal application to
himself, before the issuance of an irrevocable grant, would sufficiently
protect the interests of the Republic from such an inordinate influx.
That the Federal Executive, for aught that I can see in the law of
1824, might have acted in that manner— thus subjecting that region
to settlement, by the promulgation of his will, in a general proclama-
tion— I feel well assured. A much more important question now will
demand our consideration, and that is, admitting his competency to do
so, whether his ordinance of the 21st of November, 1828, contains that
expression of his will. This inquiry we will now proceed to make.
At the threshold of his entrance upon the duty of carrying into exe-
cution the general Decree of August, 1824, the Executive declares, in
the caption or heading of his ordinance, what it is he is about to do.
He entitles it " General Rules, or an ordinance for the Colonization of
29
the Territories of the Republic. This is transmitted to California, and
is found among the archives of the Territory. Now, this is significant
of one fact, that he proposed to extend the benefit of the Decree to
California. And yet it is true, beyond controversy, that the object of
the Decree could not be effected in this Territory, which was settlement
and cultivation, to some extent at least, by families, except within the
ten littoral leagues. If this was the case in 1840, as the record verifies
by reference to the statement of Jimeno, how much more was it so in
1828. At that time, from the wild and savage nature of the interior,
infected by hordes of hostile Indians, it would have been next to im-
possible to have introduced civilization, or habitancy by families, so far
from the free towns, the missionary stations, the settlements already
established in the Territory, and from the protecting military Presidios:
all, and every one of which, we learn, were within that belt of country
which is now supposed to have been withheld from colonization. It
seems to me that such could not have been the intention of the Execu-
tive. The very first article of the ordinance, as well as the last, serves
to satisfy my mind that he did not intend to exclude it. The first article
of the ordinance specifies the object of the proposed colonization, to be the
"vacant lands" of the proposed Territory, and what they were, the Decree,
which he professes to be putting into activity, had particularly defined,
as those lands of the nation, which, not being private property, nor be-
Imging to any corporation or town, could be settled. The last article
leads to the same conclusion as to the intention of the President. That
article declares that the land occupied by the missions should not be -col-
onized. This is a strong negative, pregnant of the affirmative declara-
tion, that such of the lands as were pertinent or adjacent to the missions,
if not actually occupied by them, might be colonized; and, as we have seen,
all such were within the ten leagues. Not the most remote allusion is
made from which an inference can be drawn, to countervail the effect
of this strong language. If he intended to withhold this section of the
country from settlement, which was known to rest in his exclusive will, he
would not, I would think, have been even equivocal in his language,
much less have used such as conveys a contrary intention. Nor can we
suppose that a matter which constituted so material a part of the
Decree which he was carrying out, and of the object of his action,
would have been forgotten by him : and if not forgotten, how easy and
natural to have restrained the general authority to grant, by adding to
the words "vacant lands in your Territories" the words " except within
the littoral and border leagues." He has not distinguished between
the vacant lands which are within and those which are without the sup-
4
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posed lines which divide them. He has used no terms indicating any
intention to make any such distinction, and the rule of construction in
the Spanish law is, " ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemusP
I repeat, then, that vacant lands, in the ordinance, must be understood,
without any words to distinguish them, to signify the same thing that
they do in the decree, which it purports to carry out ; and what they
mean in that decree is declared in the second section to be all those
which are not private property, &c. If, however, there be any doubt as
to the true meaning of the ordinance, it vanishes when we look at those
accompanying facts which are a legitimate ground of interpretation.
The strongest evidence is found in the contemporaneous understanding
and conduct of all concerned in the execution of the decree and ordi-
nance, of the intention to authorize the settlement to proceed within
the littoral leagues. The Political Chiefs and Governors, who were
selected and appointed as agents to carry out his ordinance by the
Executive
; and the Territorial Deputations and Departmental Juntas,
who were also to officiate in the execution of his instructions, with one ac-
cord, have put the same construction upon this ordinance. One Political
Chief or Governor, might have erred in this matter, through ignorance or
from some improper motive ; and so of one body of the Deputation or the
Junta; but that all should have done so, through a long series of years,
and succession of terms, it is difficult to believe. And the evidence of
this construction is heightened to the greatest degree of moral and
legal certainty by the acquiescence of the Executive, after, we must pre-
sume, he had knowledge of this construction of his regulations : and
never intimating, so far as we can learn, that there was any error in this
uniform course of proceeding. His knowledge of all this is a fair pre-
sumption in law, from the requirement of quarterly returns to be made
to him, of all the grants that were made, and the facts relating to them.
It is not often that we find such a body of contemporaneous exposition
of a doubtful law. To countervail this construction of the ordinance of
1828, as deduced from the contemporaneous and continued acts of the
officers of the Government in the Territory, to whom its execution was
especially confided by the Federal Executive ; and, indeed, to estab-
lish by the same kind of evidence the opposite construction, the Law
Agent of the United States has introduced from the archives a record
of proceedings had before the Departmental Junta, on the 18th of
April, 1840, consisting of a proposition submitted to that body : a re-
port of a committee upon it, and their adoption of that report. The
object of the proceedings seems to be to procure the confirmation by
the General Government, of the grants of land within the ten leagues,
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and of mission property, made by the Political Chiefs, and approved
by the successive Deputations and Juntas down to that time, under the
law of 18th of August, 1824, and the ordinance of 1828. This whole
proceeding conduces to prove that there was in the minds of that body,
at that time, to say the least of it, great doubt and anxiety on this sub-
ject. It is fair to presume that such was the state of their minds at
the time, as there is no ground to believe that any thing but honest
apprehensions of the insecurity of the land titles of the Territory in-
duced their action. But at the same time that it discloses this doubt
and feeling of insecurity, it also supplies other facts which outweigh, as
evidence of the construction of the decree and ordinance, the proceedings
themselves. They furnish full proof of the facte that the Political Chiefs,
from the commencement of their action under that decree, and ordi-
nance of 1828, down to that time, had granted lands by definitive titles
within the littoral leagues, and that Territorial Deputations and De-
partmental Juntas had approved of such during the whole of the same
period. It proves further, that there were no vacant lands, except such
as were so situated, which could have been colonized ; because the said
record declares "it is all littoral, and the greatest part thereof is
acknowledged as belonging to the Missions." jSfow, the repeated acts
of .the Political Chiefs, or Governors, and of the Deputations and Jun-
tas, in the execution of their duty under this decree and ordinance, in
the scale of evidence, greatly preponderates this single act of that body :
even if their resolutions and preamble had contained the express aver-
ment that they did not consider the decree and ordinance as furnishing
any authority to make the grants alluded to. But I do not understand
them as expressly declaring that belief, but they are rather argumen-
tative and deprecatory of the evils of such construction. Furthermore,
if what is produced as the answer of the General Government to their
resolutions, is, in fact, a response to them, (which, however, I can
hardly consider as having any connection with them,) it proves one of
two things, either that the Executive of Mexico did not perceive any
reason for the apprehensions of the Departmental Junta, or that they
were supremely indifferent to the feelings and prosperity of the people
of California, and the latter we are not justified in imputing to them.
The views and considerations above suggested, relate to the construc-
tion proper to be placed upon the decree and ordinance, by virtue of
which this grant was made. If I should be wrong in the conclusion to
which my mind has arrived, that the decree and ordinance ought now
to receive the construction which was put upon them at the time, by
all concerned in the subject to which they related, and which was acqui-
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esced in so long by the former Government : it is then worthy of con-
sideration, whether, first, that approbation of the Federal Executive
may not be presumed to have been given : and secondly, whether
even if there were no such approbation or previous consent, either in
fact or in presumption of law, the principles of equity, under all the
circumstances of this case, do not require that the claim should now be
confirmed. As the first of these propositions is founded upon the sup-
position that the Executive ..of Mexico could by a less public, but equally
competent and effectual mode of communication, have imparted the
authority to the Political Chief, that is, by private instructions, which
the Political Chief was not bound to expose, it may not be amiss to be-
stow some further reflection upon his competency to communicate his
consent in that manner. In the argument of the Law Agent ,of the
United States, the_ total invalidity of any private instructions is asserted,,
and the position assumed that even a public antecedent proclamation by
the Federal Executive would not suffice
; but that there must be a
direct application for that consent, in every particular instance of grant.
To sustain this doctrine, we were referred to the decisions of the Su-
preme Court .of the State of Texas, in the third volume of the Reports
of that State. From the fact that the State of Texas composed a part
of the Republic of Mexico, and that her judicial tribunals have had
their minds necessarily turned to the questions arising out of the decree
of the 18th of August, 1824, much consideration is due to their judicial
decision upon that subject. At the time of the enactment of that de-
cree, Coahuila and Texas together, formed a State of that Republic.
In obedience to the 3d section of that decree, that State proceeded to
the. enactment of a law on the 21st of March, 1832, providing for col-
onization within her demarcation. By the 7th article of that law she
provided that no settlements should be made within the twenty border
leagues, nor within the ten littoral, on the Gulf of Mexico, except they
be such as were previously approved by the Federal Executive of
Mexico. And " for that purpose all future petitions on the subject,
whether made by Mexicans or foreigners, shall be passed to the Su-
preme Government, accompanied with a corresponding report." In the
year 1837, that State, by explicit instructions to her Commissioners of
Colonization, forbade them to give possession to any colonist proposing
to establish himself within the twenty border or ten littoral leagues,
unless he shall present him with a special order from the State Govern-
ment, wherein the approbation thereof of the National Government shall
be manifested. The result of this State legislation is a palpable require-
ment that the grantee in each case must produce a document containing
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the previous approbation of the Federal Executive. In that State, be-
yond all doubt, every grant would be void where the consent was not
obtained as the law directed it, and could not be recognized unless
proved by the evidence which the law required. There the consent must
be special in every case, and no presumption of that consent could be in-
dulged, to supply what the law had required to be procured and exhibited.
The judiciary could not dispense with those positive legal requirements,
and hence the decisious in the Supreme Court of Texas upon those two
points, viz : the special application of the Federal Executive in case of
a grant; and upon the doctrine of presumption of that assent by the Exe-
cutive of Mexico. There was no special action required of the Federal
Executive with regard to colonization in the States, as there was in
regard to the Territories by the 1 6th section of the decree. The course
to be pursued by the States was to be one of their own adoption. The
Federal Executive could prescribe no rules for the States as to the mode
of carrying out that decree. The State of Coahuila and Texas adopted
the mode of obtaining the approbation of the Federal Executive to col-
onization within the leagues, by special application in every instance.
If Coahuila and Texas, instead of prescribing that mode of proceeding,
had, by a resolution of her Legislature, requested the Executive of
Mexico to give his approbation to the settlement of that portion of the
State contained within the border and littoral leagues, in the same
manner that she should adopt for the colonization of the residue of her
demarcation, I cannot doubt but that it would have been entirely com-
petent to the Executive to have complied with the request, whether he
did so or not ; and that a general ordinance, if he had complied, would
have been all sufficient to have given the authority, in the meaning of
the fourth section of the Decree of 1824. I presume it will be ad-
mitted that the National Legislature could have at any time repealed
the fourth section of the Decree of 1824. If they had done so, and in-
stead of subjecting the colonization of that portion of the country to
the will of the Executive, they had provided that it should not be colo-
nized without the previous consent of that department of the Government,
I presume that then it would be doubtless competent to Congress, by
a general resolution to that effect, to have given such approbation. It
seems to me that Congress, by transferring their power in the matter
to the Executive, without any restriction upon him as to the manner of
exercising it, gave him the right to exercise his best judgment as to
the whole subject. Coahuila and Texas never applied for any general
authority or approbation, but adopted the course which to her seemed
best. The question never arose in that State whether such mode of
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giving the previous approbation of the Federal Executive was within
the meaning of the Decree of 1824. Nor are the decisions of that
Court applicable to the question upon which I will presently enter, of
the presumption of the previous approbation of the Federal Executive.
No presumption could be indulged of any assent in Texas, because it was
expressly provided by her statute that the evidence of that approbation
should accompany the petition of the colonist before he could obtain
any right whatever. And one of the grounds upon which the presump-
tion rests, if it can be indulged at all, did not exist in Texas : because
the relation between the Federal Executive of Mexico and the authority
of the State of Coahuila and Texas is by no means identical with that
which exists between that Executive and the Political Chief of a Terri-
tory, to whom that Executive has confided the general trust as his, and
the agent of the Government, to convey or grant vacant lands lying
within it.
It must be conceded that the Decree of 1824 required the previous
approbation of the Federal Executive to colonization within the border
and litoral leagues. It is equally true that the officer of a Government
cannot alienate the public domain of that Government without its
authority. The question now to be considered is, admitting that such
authority must exist, whether or not its existence in this instance may
not be presumed. There cannot be any presumption indulged of the
existence of an authority in a public officer to dispose of the public do-
main, where the public law regulates not only the manner of conducting
the procedure, but also the authority and power of the officer. The case
must be brought within the influence of the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Arredondo, Clarke,
Perchmon and others, all of which recognized the same principle.
Those cases rest mainly upon the power of the King of Spain to grant
the public domain as may suit his royal will ; and upon the presumption
that those officers, through whose agency he acts in that matter, will,
from their dependence upon his favor and the fear of punishment, not
venture without authority, to encroach upon the royal prerogative. The
whole doctrine is expressed in the following words, taken from the
decisions above referred to : "A grant made by the Governor, if au-
thorized to grant lands in his province, is prima facie evidence that his
power was not exceeded. The connection between the Crown and the
Governor justifies the presumption that he acts according to his orders
;
should he disobey them, his hopes are blasted, and he exposes himself
to punishment. His orders are known to himself and those from whom
they proceed, but may not be known to the world." And further
—
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• He who would controvert a grant executed by the lawful authority
with all the solemnities required by law, takes upon himself the burthen
of showing that the officer has transcended the powers conferred upon
him, or that the transaction is tainted with fraud." There concurs in
the relation between the Federal Executive of Mexico and the Political
Chief of a Territory, and that between the King of Spain and his Gov-
ernor of a Province, many points of resemblance, so far as this partic-
ular matter is concerned, though they are not alike in all respects. The
point in which they differ most is, perhaps, not the one upon which the
doctrine was mainly founded by the Supreme Court ; and that is, the
utter dependence of the Governor, for all his prospects in life, to the
favor of the Government. The faets are common to them both,—that
during the existence of the decree of 1824, the disposition of the land
granted depended upon the sole will of the Federal Executive, which
was as free, to act as that of the King, on any of his royal domain,—
that the Political Chief of a Territory had the same general authority,
and was the only officer (who did have it) to grant lands, that existed
in the Governor of a King's Province,—that there was the same unre-
strained mode of communication, of the will of the Federal Executive,,
as to the disposition of this land in question, to the Political Chief, as
existed between the King and his Governor. And it may be, that the
power of appointment, or of removal from office of the Political Chief by
the Federal Executive, was unrestrained by the Mexican Constitution
or practice under it. This power seems to be extensive enough to have
formed a strong motive to obey his orders and decrees. The 20th
article of the 4th section of the Constitution confers a sufficiency of
power, to assimilate the relation perhaps nearly enough, to authorize the
application of the doctrine of presumption, so far as it rests on that
ground. The power conferred upon the Federal Executive to carry out
the decree of the 18th of August, 1824, by the 16th section thereof,.,
and his general power, under the Constitution, to make ordinances,
decrees and rules, for the better fulfilment of the general laws of the
Republic, his special unlimited power to subject the land within the
border and littoral leagues, to settlement by his will ; with no law to
regulate and prescribe the manner of communicating that will, or deter-
mination of it, to the agent that he might appoint and did appoint, viz:
the Political Chief of the Territory ; and his power over that officer who
had the sole granting power of the vacant lands of the Territory, in case
of a departure from his orders as given in the Constitution cited above
— all strongly incline my mind to the conclusion that in the case of a
grant made by him, the presumption might well be indulged that he
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was authorized to make it. As it is not necessary, however, in my view
of the case, to decide positively upon that question, I decline to do so.
This conducts me, in the course of inquiry which I proposed, to the con-
sideration of the last matter connected with the question of the littoral
leagues ; and that is, whether, in view of all the matters of fact and of
the Mexican law connected with it, as presented by the record, it would
be consistent with the principles of equity to refuse a confirmation of
this grant, because of its locality in reference to the coast.
The nature of the transaction between the person soliciting land and
the Government, is, in effect, as has been frequently said by the
Supreme Court of the United States,, a contract ; the consideration
being, in the case now before us, the abandonment of his former home,
or residence,, and the cultivation and inhabiting of the land for which
he petitions. And whether, according to strict definition in our law,
it be a technical contract or not
;
yet after the labor and toil bestowed
upon it, and the long and continued residence, preventing necessarily
the occupation, and, it may be, the opportunity of acquiring any other
home, the doctrines governing contracts may be very appropriately
applied. Viewing the claimant in this light, it seeems to me, that he
may, in this case,, invoke to his aid the principles of equity. He de-
sires to avail himself of the laws of his country to procure a home. He
reads that law,, and sees clearly laid down the terms and conditions
upon which his Government will grant it. That law contains a provi-
sion that as to a portion of her public domain, although it is not in all
events, and absolutely withdrawn from settlement, yet it can only be
devoted to : that object by the previous consent or approbation of the
Federal Executive of the Republic. He reads that the Federal Ex-
ecutive is required to carry out that law into practical effect. He is a
native, perhaps, of California -
T
born in the only inhabitable part of the
Territory. After the passage of the decree of 1824, he waits with pa-
tience for the necessary ordinance or regulations of the Executive. At
the end of about four years that ordinance is promulgated. He learns
from that,, who is the officer appointed to grant the vacant lands of the
Territory. He sees distinctly declared what he is required to do, to
obtain a portion of that vacant land. With an honest purpose of mind
to comply with all that he is required to perform on his part, he ap-
proaches the Political Chief of the Territory and submits his application.
Among other things to be considered by the law is the relative position
of the land which he solicits to the coast of the Pacific. The land
which he solicits is in that section of the country which alone has been
reedeemed from the savages, and capable of being used as the law
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requires. He knows that the land is grantable, if tke Federal Execu-
tive shall have willed it to be so. The Political Chief, with all this
before him, and with information that the land is within the ten littoral
leagues, proceeds to make the grant. Is not the grant by the Political
Chief made under such circumstances, in effect an affirmative response
to the question, " Has the approbation of the Federal Executive been
given to the granting of this land ?" That question is asked by th©
petition, and is answered by the grant. I cannot think that this claim-
ant is chargeable with any violation of the law. He must be considered,
in this case, to have acted with good faith at least. The written laws
and published ordinances of the Government, he may be held bound to
know, though the presumption is so far short of the fact, in this particu-
lar, that both law and equity allow an apology sometimes to be urged,
for not having made their acquaintance. However, in this case there
was no violation of any written or published law, so far as I can
perceive. The whole law seems to have been known to him so far
as it was accessible to any one. The law of 1824, and the ordinance
of 1828, he was bound to know, but there was a fact, that is the autho-
rity of the Political Chief, to grant this land which he had no earthly
means of knowing, except from the source to which it would be properly
communicated, if it existed. He relies upon that information, takes
his grant and proceeds, as the ordinance directs him, to the possession
of the land He hears no more about the matter of the littoral leagues.
The Government that granted it to him never molested him. Nor do I
think that she would ever have done so. She was fully advised of this
mistake of her officer, if it was one, I suppose within six months after it
occurred, as there is a requirement for a Special report of the matter
every three months, after it transpired. The knowledge of the fact,
we may suppose, was at any rate communicated by the Departmental
Junta of California in 1840. lean not think that, in good conscience,
the Government of Mexico would, after so many years, have driven him
from his home, for the want of the previous approbation of the Federal
Executive. I feel authorized, in the language of the rule laid down by
the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case above cited in this
opinion—to consider that the conscience of the former Government
ought to be so affected by this conduct of herself and her officers, as to
hold the land (if she held it at all) as a trustee for the claimant. This
rule, by which the Supreme Court touched the conscience of the King,
was established under laws which furnished rather a dimmer light, by
which to hunt for it, than is given to us by the Act of the 3d of March,
5
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1851. The old ancl familiar lamp of the Principles of equity is not held
out, as it were, to one side, for us to see by, but it is put into our hands
to guide and to govern us in the decision of those cases.
Having thus disposed of the littoral league question, and come to
the conclusion that a confirmation ought not to be refused on that
ground, I will pursue my inquiry into other matters affecting the validity
of this claim. If all the objections that have been considered be in-
sufficient to prevent such confirmation, yet, if according to the publicly
promulgated law and ordinance, prescribing the plan and scheme of
disposing of the public domain of the Republic of Mexico, no right or
title of any kind, ever vested in the claimant, then there is no ground
for the application, of any equitable considerations, such as the Su-
preme Court of the United States have applied to the cases of imperfect
titles, under the former laws of Congress which have been referred to
;
nor any ground upon which this Board, upon any of the principles or
grounds of decision enumerated in the 11th section of the Act of the
3d of March, 1851, can confirm this claim. The Law Agent of the
United States contends that such is the condition of this claim when
brought to that test. This makes it proper and necessary to proceed
to the application of the claim, to the ordinance of November, 1828.
—
The argument is, that by the just construction of the ordinance there
was necessary to the existence of any right, or title whatever, in the
petitioner, a previous consent of the Territorial Deputation ; and that
as there is no evidence introduced in the case of an} such previous
consent, that there is no ground upon which the claim can be confirmed.
The same process of reasoning may be pursued in the consideration of
this question, as was adopted in regard to the construction of the de-
cree of 1824, as to the requirement of the previous approbation of the
.Federal Executive to the colonization of the lands within the littoral
leagues. That is, we should endeavor first to arrive at the meaning of
the ordinance, by the provisions themselves which it contains, and if
they are doubtful, then we may recur to the usage and practice which
was adopted and pursued by all the officers of the Government, who
were charged with the execution of the ordinance. In such case it is
the well settled maxim of the Spanish law, " Optima legum interpres
est consuetudo.77 And to this may be added as of great force in the
construction, that the Government whose ordinance it was, was fully
informed that such was the construction and practice of her officers in
its execution ; and that no objection was made, or correction ever at-
tempted, of the supposed error. The proof in this cause is abundant,
that the universal course of practice by all the Political Chiefs, who
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ever granted lands in California, was to execute complete grants, or
titles to the petitioners, and to deliver them to the party before the sub-
mission to the Territorial Deputations, or Departmental Juntas, for
their approval ; and if there are any exceptions to this rule they are so
rare, as that they only serve to prove the general rule. It is also as fully
proved in this case, that the Government was well informed of this
course of practice, by all her officers or Political Chiefs. My own im-
pression is,' that this practice was in conformity with the provisions of
the ordinance in this respect. But there can not be any doubt, I think,
that whether the ordinance contemplated the execution of the full title,
by the Political Chief or not, before he was required to obtain their
approbation, or rather submit it to them for their consentimiento, there
was to be in existence a right or title, though an imperfect one, before
the submission of the matter to that body ; which last would be sufficient
to authorize a confirmation according to the act of 3d March, 1S51 ; if
it were valid, according to the tests to be applied to it by that law.
—
In considering this question of the approval of the Territorial Deputa-
tion or Departmental Junta, it must always be borne in mind, that the
whole undivided power and authority, to make grants, was vested by
the ordinance in the Political Chief. There is no participation with
him in that exercise of power in any body else. " The Political Chiefs
of the Territories are authorized to grant, &c." All the pre-requisites
to the exercise of that function by him, are enumerated in the 3d article
of the ordinance. Immediately after the presentation of the petition,
as required in the 2d article, " He shall proceed directly to obtain the
necessary information, whether there is in the petition the requirements
demanded by the law of the 18th of August, 1824, both as respects the
petitioner, and the land which he solicits ; and for that he may rely upon
his own judgment, and act upon it alone ; or, if he prefer to do so, he
may consult, at the same time with the respective municipal authorities,
as to whether there be any objection to the grant. The next article is:
"That in view of the whole the Political Chief will accede or not to the
prayer of the petitioner, conforming his conduct exactly to the laws ap-
plicable to the matter, and especially to the above named of the 18th
August, 1824." Then follows the section which most particularly refers
to the point under consideration. It reads thus—" The grants made to
private individuals, or to families, shall not be held as definitively binding
(or valid) without the previous consent of the Territorial Deputation,
to which end there shall be passed to it, the respective expedientes."
As we have seen, that no share of the function of granting is de-
volved by the Ordinance upon the Deputation, their consent must ne-
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cessarily be to what has been done in that particular. That he should
have done something, in the contemplation of this section, towards a
grant, must necessarily be conceded, even though it should not have
amounted to the execution of the perfect title. That he should have
acceded to the petition which was for a grant of the land sought, is ex-
pressly required, and that there was at least a concession to that extent,
is a necessary deduction. To limit the word concession to that point in
his action, would result in the same end, for there would then be an in-
ceptive title, whose effect would only be qualified but not defeated by
their refusal ; and that qualification was only to retain it in the con-
dition it then was, until the final action of the Federal Executive, To
say that what the Political Chief had done should not be definitely valid
without the approbation of the deputation, is the admission of a validity,
though it may be short of irrevocability ; and in that construction there
would be an imperfect right or title, which, if never destroyed, under
the former Grovernment, might now, if in all other respects unexception-
able, be the subject of confirmation by this Board. But my impression
is, that after the necessary qualities were ascertained, by the granting
power, to exist in the land sought, and the petitioner, that he might
under the ordinance proceed to the making, signing and delivery of the
title. The 8th article proceeds :—"The concession which is asked for,
being definitely made, there shall be executed a document, signed by the
Political Chief, which shall serve as a title to the party, expressing in
it that it shall be understood to be in conformity with the provisions of
the laws, in virtue of which he may proceed to the possession." This
definitive action of the Political Chief, in consummation of the title, re-
fers to the initiatory steps which, by the preceding or 3d article, he had
been required to take in the same matter ; and does not, as I think, by
any fair construction refer to anything else. That concession, which is
the only document he is ever supposed or required to make, was the
same which was not to be held definitively valid without the previous con>
sent of the Territorial deputation. All the force must be given to the
provision requiring the previous consent of the deputation which the
ordinance imparts to it. If prior to that consent there was no right or
title conferred by the Political Chief, his act afterwards would be merely
a ministerial duty ; the whole purpose of the ordinance would be re'
versed, and the granting power would in effect devolve on the Territo-
rial deputation. But by the construction of the ordinance, which it
seems has always been adopted, the effect of the consent was to place
the concession or grant beyond the supervisal of the Federal Executive,
and its refusal to consent, was not to annul the grant, but to cause its
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submission to the action of the Federal Executive, which might result
or not in its annihilation.
The consent of the deputation did not alter the nature and character
of the grant, nor could their refusal destroy it. It remained as the
granting power had made it. Now every object, which, it seems to me
was intended to be accomplished by the submission of the matter to the
deputation, has been accomplished by the course pursued by the Politi-
cal Chief in this case. He has made the definitive title expressing in its
body that it is made subject to the action of the Territorial deputation
as prescribed by the ordinance. The only question here is whether the
failure of the Political Chief to obtain the consent of the deputation, is
now to be held as destructive of the force and effect of a perfect grant
made subject to it. That this grant, prior to the submission of the mat-
ter to the deputation, was a perfect and complete grant of the fee, there
is no doubt. It conforms exactly with the model of a complete grant,
under the Spanish law, as furnished by the Supreme Court of the Uni-
ted States in the case of Menard's heirs vs. Massey, reported in viii.
Howard, 314. The insertion of conditions are common to them both.
It often occurs that conditions subsequent are imposed, by the terms of
the contract, between the parties ; but they are entirely consistent, with
a full investiture, of the grantee, of the entire estate in fee. In one sense
of the word, those conveyances are not definitively valid, that is they carry
upon their face and bear about them the means by which they may be
destroyed. That an estate'in fee simple may be granted on conditions :
see Greenleaf 's Cruize, i. vol., 59. And further, a condition in deed
may be annexed to every species of estate and interest in real property
;
to an estate in fee, entail, for life, or years, in any lands or tenements
ib. Title 13 Estates on Cond. chap. 13, page 2. The right of the claim-
ant must be tested by this grant, as it is. I do not think it was made
by the Political Chief prematurely, in order of time. Whether made
prematurely or not, is a question of the construction of the ordinance
;
and I think that the construction which has been put upon it is right :
and furthermore, that if it be not right, the consequences must be borne
by the grantor, the Government, and not by the grantee. The grant
is not void, but must stand as it is, although in contemplation of the or-
dinance, the full and complete title was not intended to be made until
after the action of the Territorial deputation. More especially should
it be so held, after the long usage of that mode of granting, under the
ordinance, with the knowledge of the Federal Government, as we are
bound to presume from the evidence on the record in this case. The
fact of the authority, and the sole authority, of making grants being
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Tested in the Political Chiefs, once established, no grant executed by
him can be held void for the irregularity in the manner of executing that
trust, though it may result in making the consent of the Territorial
deputation a quasi condition subsequent, instead of a condition precedent
to the grant. Here was an authority in the grantor to grant, and to
grant the very lands ; or, in other words, the lands were grantable, and
he fully authorized to grant them ; but he has misapprehended, hon-
estly, (if at all,) the course to be pursued in carrying out his conceded
power, in the point whether he could not proceed to make the grant,
after ascertaining the matters entitling the petitioner to it, and then
submit it to the deputation : or, submit it first to the deputation and
then execute the grant. The Political Chief has not usurped any au-
thority conferred on the deputation by his course. He expressly sub-
jects his action to their approbation. It is a case, at most, of irregu-
larity in carrying out an ordinance prescribing his duty ; and a grant
thus made ought not to be avoided, for a departure from its directory
injunctions, even in a case where the consequences resulting from the
departure would be much more serious and important than the total
neglect, under the decree of 1824, to have submitted his action at all
to the review of the Territorial deputation. The Supreme Court of the
United States, in v. Wheat., 239, lay down a rule which I think appli-
cable to this case. They say that as to irregularities committed by
officers ot the Government prior to the grant, they do not doubt but
that the Government and not the individual Tnust bear the consequences.
And in xi. Wheat., 380, they say : " It would be extremely unreason-
able to void a grant for irregularities in the conduct of those who are
appointed by the Government to supervise the progressive course of a
title from its commencement to its consummation in a patent." My
opinion is, that this is a perfect title, subject only to the effect declared
in the ordinance, as consequent upon the failure of the Political Chief to
obtain the consent of the Territorial deputation, and to the conditions
which are lawfully annexed to the grant. The grant being definitively
made and delivered to the claimant as the decree contemplated it should
be, he had nothing to do further than to perform those conditions
lawfully attached to his grant, and which were to be performed by
him. If the grant was not annulled by some action to be had upon
it, according to the ordinance by others than himself, it remained
as it was when delivered to him, a perfect and complete title. No
such action did take place during the existence of the former Govern-
ment. The consequence of the failure of the Governor to obtain the
.approbation or consent of the deputation we have seen, did not annul
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the grant, but was only to be followed by a reference of the matter to
the Federal Executive. No such reference was ever made, nor indeed
was there ever any final action upon it, by the deputation. There was
no time limited for their action, and we have no doubt that they would
finally have approved of it, as the only objection made to the adoption
of a report by their committee, of entire approval, was an evident error
in the form of that report. I can see no reason why the Territorial
deputation should not have approved of the claimant's grant. I believe
it is substantially approved, and as its neglect was no fault of the claim-
ant, I do not think we ought, in equity and good conscience, to refuse
him a confirmation of his title.
Having considered thus far the grounds of objection or difficulties
which presented themselves to a confirmation of this title, and not
having seen any fatal defects, we will proceed to examine, if any objec-
tions affecting its validity can be predicated of the non-performance of
any of the conditions attached to it.
I will remark here, that as to several of these conditions I do not find
any authority for their imposition in the decree of 1824, nor in the or-
dinance of 1828. But as the Political Chief is required in the ordi-
nance to conform to the laws regulating the matter, as well as to the
decree of the 18th of August, 1824, and the ordinance of 1828, I am
not prepared to say that they are imposed without authority. The
presumption is, that he did conform to the laws. The conditions not to
obstruct the highways, crossings, and right of way, and to- build a house
and kve in it, within a year, and to put in the limits of his land, besides
the land marks, some fruit trees or forest trees of some utility, seem to
have been taken from the regulations of Don Felipe de Neve, dated in
June, 1779, and approved by his Catholic Majesty in a royal order of
the 24th of October, 1781. In the 9th section of those regulations, we
find it provided that the new colonist shall be free, and exempt from
paying tithes or any other tax on the fruits and produce of the lands,
and cattle given to them, provided that within a year from the day on
which the house Jots and parcels of lands be designated to them, they
build a house in the best way they can and live therein ; open the
necessary trenches for watering their land, placing at their boundaries,
instead of land marks, some fruit trees or wild ones, of some utility, at
the rate of ten to each suerte of land. App. No. 2, of Capt. Halleck's
report Sen. Doc. No. 17, page 136. If this was the law, by authority
of which these conditions were inserted in this grant, however suitable
to urban grants, they seem to me to be out of place in the large rural
grant to this claimant
;
and instead of the comparatively mild penalty
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of paying tithes and taxes if he failed, the most disproportionate penalty
of losing his whole land, is affixed in this grant ; which, however, we
may safely conclude would never have been enforced by his Govern-
ment. Without questioning any further the power of the Political
Chief to insert the conditions which he has put in the grant, I will pro-
ceed to the more important considerations of the questions which arise
out of this feature of the case. The conditions annexed to the grant
are numbered to the extent of five, though the last so numbered is not
in fact a condition, but a clause of forfeiture, declaring, " should he (the
grantee) violate these conditions, he shall lose his right to the land,
and it may be denounced by another." I have no doubt that the con-
ditions in this grant, under any interpretation which the ordinance of
1828, or the decree of 1824 can bear, are all subsequent conditions, for
it cannot be supposed that the execution and delivery of the definitive
title spoken of in the 8th article of the ordinance, was to be longer de-
layed than the consent of the deputation ; and besides, the conditions
are of matters in their nature subsequent to that time. It will be ob-
served that some of the conditions are negative in their character, and
some active or positive, and one of them at least, a mere recital or des-
criptive allegation of what was already done, which is not strictly a con-
dition, as that must necessarily relate to the future. Of those which
are affirmative and active, some are to be performed by the grantee him-
self; and others by an officer of the Government, at his instance.
"With regard to any failure or imperfection in the performance of
any of them, which the grantee is not required to perform, he ought not,
whatever else he may suffer from that failure or imperfection, to be
subjected, on account thereof, to the forfeiture prescribad in the penal
clause. It could only be by a reversal of the lenient rule applicable
to the construction of penal clauses, that he could be visited with the
defaults of a public officer, whose action the Government had required
him to solicit. The penal clause is, "If he, shall violate these conditions,
he shall lose his right," &c. Surely, he will not be held to the penalty
for the violation of conditions which he was not required to perform,
and the execution of which he could not control. So far as there
appears to be any violation of the conditions which the grantee was to
perform, I have no doubt that the failure is of a nature and character
which ought not to be visited with the penalty of the loss of his title.
The only neglect or violation of a matter material to the grant, relates
to the time of building the house and living in it. The actual occupation,
the judicial possession and measurement, the building of the house, and
his residence in it, all took place many years before the acquisition of
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the country by the United States, and to inflict the penalty now, for
the difference of time between their requirement and actual perform-
ance, would seem to me to be entirely too disproportionate and vindic-
tive to be sanctioned by the laws of Mexico, or by the principles of
equity. The imperfect manner of executing, or departure from the laws
and ordinances regulating the discharge of the duty of measuring this
land, which by the condition of the grant he was required to procure
to be performed, is according to my view of the penal clause, no ground
for inflicting its force upon the grantee, and will not be considered by
me, except in connection with another objection, which is that to the
validity of the claim, for want of a sufficient segregation of the land,
from the remainder of the vacant lands of Mexico. This view of the
question as to the effect of the conditions in this grant upon its validity,
taken in connection with the proof in the record, might suffice perhaps
upon this branch of the case
;
but there are other views which I feel
called upon to take of this matter, of the subsequent conditions in the
grant. This grant in its construction, as to its character, and as to the
effect of the breach of the conditions annexed to it, is to' be tested by
the law of Mexico. We have already seen that it was, in its form and
structure, a complete conveyance of the fee simple title. We are now
to consider what is the effect under the Mexican law, upon the rights
of the party, of a breach of the conditions which are annexed to it. The
entire fee being vested in the grantee, the first question which arises is,
whether upon a failure or breach of an annexed condition, that vested
title was thereupon ipso facto divested out of the grantee, and revested
in the Government, without anything done on the part of the Govern-
ment to manifest her will to take advantage of the forfeiture. This is
a very essential consideration ; for if the land, in this grant, did not re-
vest in the former Government, but required some action or procedure
of some kind to produce that result, which proceeding was never had,
under the former Government, the United States did not acquire the
land, under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, but at most a mere naked
right to enforce a forfeiture which belonged to the former Government.
The distinction must never be lost sight of in considering this question
between conditions which were tobe performed, before the perfect right,
by a grant of the fee, was to be vested in the party, being what we
term,, in our law, conditions precedent—which, not being performed,
would leave the fee in the former Government, and thus, under the
treaty, would devolve upon the United States to be dealt with as she
might direct : and those conditions, which, according to our nomencla-
ture, are called conditions subseqitent, which attach to a complete grant
6
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of the fee, and have such effect, if violated, as the law of Mexico pres-
cribes. I will advert, for. a moment, to the view of this subject as it is
regarded in those Governments with whose principles we are more fa-
miliar than we are with those of Mexico, and by which the Government
of the United States, both in its legislative and judicial departments,
has always manifested a strong inclination to be governed, when ad-
justing questions of private right between herself and her own citizens.
The rule in this country upon the subject is laid down with so much
brevity, and yet with such comprehensiveness, in a note to the Text of
Cruise on Real Property, as edited by Mr. Greenleaf, that I will quote
it at large : " A condition is something inserted for the benefit of the
grantor, giving him the power on default of performance, to destroy the
estate, if he, will, and revest it in himself or his heirs. As the law does
not presume forfeitures, it requires some express act of the grantor as
evidence of the intention to reclaim the estate, viz : an entry "—i. Green-
leaf Cruise, page 46, of Tit. 8. The doctrine of the English Common
Law on this subject, except when varied by special legislation, is adopted
generally in this country. That doctrine, even in grants by the Crown
of England, is thus laid down by Cruise, ib. 40 : "In all cases where
the Crown is entitled to land upon the breach of a condition, an office,
countervails an entry." Citing Plowd. 243. The People vs. Brown, iv.
Caines, 416, 426. In the State of Tennessee, which had a large por-
tion of public lands for distribution, the doctrine with regard to grants
by the State is, that even a grant which is void for fraud, must be ad-
judged so by some process of law before the State can reclaim it :—iv.
Cond., U. S. Repts., 657. And that a grant by breach of conditions
subsequent is not void, but only voidable. U. S. Dig., vol. i., 472 ; i.
Preston's Ten. Repts., 370. I will now advert to the doctrines of the
Civil Law upon that subject, which correspond in a remarkable degree
with those of our Equity. I am of opinion that the doctrines which
are applicable in this particular to private grants or conveyances, ought
to be equally so to public grants ; and that when brought before a
judicial tribunal, where the nature of the grant is the same, and more
especially where its features are identical, the same rules of decision
should apply. There are rules which are peculiar in their application
to grants by a Sovereign, which are not involved in the consideration
of the force and effect of these conditions. -Such
r
for example, as that
in grants by a Sovereign, nothing should be taken by implication ; and
that in their construction they shall be taken most strongly for the sov-
ereign : whereas, in private grants the rule is that they shall be taken
most strongly against the grantor, and in favor of the grantee. But
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where the question is not one as to the meaning and intent, but as to
the effect of unambiguous stipulations, such as conditions whose signifi-
cation is apparent, the same rules should govern, no matter who are the
parties. The Supreme Court of the United States have held, in an
opinion delivered by Judge Marshall, that the King of Spain was bound
by the fundamental laws of his kingdom. It is needless to remark that
the Republic of Mexico is governed by the same municipal laws which
prevailed before her independence, except so far as they are not consist-
ent with the present form of Government and have not been changed
by her own decrees. In the Partidas I find the doctrine asserted, with-
out qualification, that the King is bound by the laws of the Kingdom,
although he made them, just as a subject is bound by them : i. Part,
Tit, i., Law 14. So also in Novisa., Recop., vol. i., Tit. 2, Lib. 3, it is
declared that the laws must be kept, as well by the King as the people.
Those doctrines of the Civil Law to which I shall make reference, are
as follows : " Clauses of nullity and penal clauses are not always ex-
ecuted to the rigor ; and covenants are not dissolved nor penalties in-
curred in the very moment which the condition bears ; even although
it should be agreed on that the contract should be void, by the bare
deed, and without any ministerial act of justice. But these sorts of
claims have their effect regulated by the discretion of the Judge, ac-
cording to the nature of the covenants and the circumstances : i. Stra.
Domat, page 185, Art. 222." If the condition depend either wholly or
in part on the act of one of the contractors, and he has not satisfied it
within the time, it is understood that in the cases where it would be
equitable to grant delay, it ought to be granted according to the cir-
cumstances
; as where the delay has occasioned no damage, or if there
is any, where it may be repaired : ib. page 184, Art, 218. In all cove-
nants in which one of the covenanters is obliged to do or give a thing,
or to accomplish in any other manner that which is agreed on—and
especially in those in which the non-performance is to be attended with
a dissolution of the contract, or with some other penalty, it is equitable
and for the public interest that the covenants be not immediately dis-
solved, nor the penalties incurred for every sort of non-performance in-
differently : ib. page 177, Art. 196. Although a covenant proves to
be null, yet he who complains of it cannot restore himself to his own
right unless the other party consents to it. But he must have recourse
to the authority of justice, whether it be to get the nullity declared by
a sentence and himself reinstated in his right, or to get the sentence of
the court put in execution, in case it should meet with opposition : ib.
page 191, Sec. 240. When a covenant is not dissolved by common
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consent, the party who complains cannot molest the other, but he ought
to have recourse to justice to get the covenant declared void and the
sentence of the Judge put in execution : ib. 196, Art. 14. These ex-
tracts are very explicit
;
and place the whole matter of the effect of
conditions and their breach, and of penal clauses and forfeitures, upon
grounds which recommend themselves to the conscience and sense of
justice of every one ; and, moreover, are the foundations of our equity
system on the same heads. It is laid down explicitly in jSTovisa. Recop.,
Book iii., Tit. 5, Law 1.., that what the King has .once granted to any
one he cannot take away without fault, (Sine culpa). The important
question is, how that fault is to be ascertained, and the sovereign will to
enforce it be manifested. I have no doubt that in different branches of
the administration of public affairs, somewhat different modes were
adopted to enforce penalties and forfeitures. There were public de-
nunciadores, known officers, and there were secret denouncer's, who like
plaintiffs in our qui tarn actions, were the instruments of vindicating the
violated laws and of enforcing the penalties attached to their breach.
The last part of the penal clause in this deed alludes most distinctly to
such process, in case of breach of any of the conditions by the claimant.
It says, in case "he violate the conditions, he shall lose his right to the
land, and it may be denounced by another." Now, if may means must,
which would be the case in a decree of the same sort, there would be no
difficulty in the case. But it is possible that this is a mere privihge to
others, and is a cumulative proceeding ; not exclusive of any on the part
of the Government, or decisive of the question whether the title does
not revert ipso facto, upon the happening of a breach. An interesting
case has lately been decided by the Supreme Court of Texas, Hancock
vs. McKinney, Nov. Term, 1851. That decision was upon a complete
Mexican title or grant like thiSj with conditions annexed, but the terms
in the clause of forfeiture do not expressly refer to the process of de-
nouncement by another
;
yet that mode of ascertaining the fact of breach
of the conditions is referred to in the decision as an established course
of procedure. The case, however, is not conclusive of the qnestion
whether it was or was not the only means by which the title of the
grantee could be impeached, or whether any inquisition of any sort were
necessary to reinvest the title in the Government. The language of the
court upon that subject is : " It is certain that down to the period ot
the commencement of the revolution it would have been competent for
any person entitled to land to have denounced any land that he might
wish to appropriate to himself • and if, in the process of perfecting his
title, it should appear that the land he wished to appropriate had been
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already granted or conceded, the inquiry would be made if it had been for-
feited for the non-performance of conditions, or from any other cause.
And whether the denouncer should have his title or not, depended upon
the result of the inquiry whether such forfeiture had occurred or not."
I have remarked that this is not conclusive of the point, but from the
the general doctrines of the Mexican Law to which I have adverted,
from the mention made of this mode of procedure in the penal clause of
this grant, and from the fact as disclosed in the opinion of the court, in
the case from Texas, that no re-grant would be made upon the mere
allegation of forfeiture, but that it must be established by an inquisition,
I am brought to the conclusion that there was not in fact a reinvest-
iture of the fee simple title in the Mexican Government of the land now
claimed at the time the United States acquired the country, and that
this Government only acquired by the treaty, if anything, a mere right
of the former sovereign to enforce a forfeiture.
There have been no cases brought before the Supreme Court of the
United States under the former Treaties and Acts of Congress, which
furnished occasion or necessity for any express opinion upon the question
I am now considering. In the case of the United States vs. Sibbald, in
x. Peters, 321, the court use this language:—" It is unnecessary to decide
whether the Acts which authorized the Courts of Missouri and Florida
to decide on claims to land therein, Congress intended to assert a right
by forfeiture, for conditions broken, to lands which had been once legally
granted. And it may well be doubted whether it would have been
re-annexed to the Royal domain, had the province remained under the
dominion of the King of Spain ; nor is there any provision of any law
of Congress which specially requires the court to enquire into the per-
formance of conditions on which grants were made." The cases in
which it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that
this Government could, or at least would, take advantage of forfeitures
which had occurred under the former Governments, were such as were
considered by the court to have been of that category in which no title
infee had vested in the claimant, and that by the stringent force of the
ordinances under which they issued, they were utterly void ab initio ; and
to be considered as never having been given at all : that the conditions
were precedent and their performance expressly required, before the con-
cesions were to have any effect. Of that class of cases are the United
States vs. Kingsley, xii. Peters, 476 ; United States vs. Wiggins, xiv.
Peters, 334, &c. In the absence of any express authority of the Su-
preme court, I do not feel at liberty, under the terms of the Act of 3d
March, 1851, to decide that we have no authority to declare a forfeiture
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of complete titles, by the non-performance of conditions subsequent. In
this case the result of that inquiry has been satisfactory to my mind that
the claim ought not to be rejected for the want of any compliance with
those conditions under the Spanish Law, and more especially under the
application to all the facts disclosed by the record of the principles of
equity.
The only remaining question arising in the consideration of the va-
lidity of the claim in this case is, whether the land granted can be
considered as ever having been, or is now capable of being, severed from
the public domain, in virtue of what has been done in regard to it, by
the authority of the Mexican Government. If anything more is intended
by, or embraced in, the requirement of a severance of the land granted,
from the mass of the public domain, than the obvious requirement,
which inheres in every grant, or deed, from the very nature of things,
viz: that there must be something granted which can be distinguished
from other things of the same sort, it mu3t be derived from the
positive laws and ordinances of the Government where the grant is
executed. The general doctrine of universal application is plainly
stated by Judge Marshall in v. Wheat., 359 ; iv. Cond. 682, in the
following words : " It is essential to the validity of a grant that the
thing granted should be so described as to be capable of being dis-
tinguished from other things of the same kind. But it is not necessary
that the grant itself should contain such a description, as, without the
aid of extrinsic testimony to ascertain precisely what is conveyed." In
applying this rule we should ob serve what is the intention of the grantor
as to the thing granted. Where the intention is to grant a specific thing,
as a house, or town lot, the house, or lot, must be so described in the
deed as to identify it, or by reference to something by which it can be
done. But when the grant only intends to be of a certain number or
quantity, of an understood, and defined nature of things, then that number
or quantity, is the matter to which the rule will especially apply ; and
that number or quantity must be so certain as to distinguish it from
another number or quantity. But all the certainty above that is of the
genus or species of the thing, of which that certain number or quantity is
predicated
;
and the further identification or specification of the thing,
is to be determined in a mode to be agreed upon, or it may be establshed
by means provided by law. It may be by the selection ad libitum of
the grantee or grantor
;
or, as is usual in grants of land by a sovereign,
by the public officer called the Surveyor. And where the thing is to be
selected and specified, by a public officer chosen by the Government for
the grantee, to perform that office
—
his omission or fault does not vacate
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the grant.—v. Monroe's Repts., 159. This distinction is palpable, and
cannot be better illustrated than by a case adjudicated in i. Howard,
24. There was a concession upon a petition of the party, stating that
he was ignorant of the public lands that were vacant, and desirous to
avoid interference and dissensions with any person, he further prayed
his Excellency to grant them, at places where the Surveyor General
might survey them, as vacant land. Here was a segregation of nothing,
but the number 8,000, from the iufmite extent of numbers ; any identi-
fication of a specific tract, or parcel of land, being expressly excluded.—
The grant was made accordingly of the 8,000 acres of land, and the
Survoyor General ordered to survey for the grantee that amount of
vacant lands, without injury to other persons. And this claim was
confirmed by the Supreme Court of the "United States. Judge Catron,
in delivering the opinion of the Court, states, as one of the grounds of
objection taken on the part of the United States, to the confirmation,
that, " There is no description whatever in the said pretended grant, of
the lands , alleged to be granted, and no valid survey could be made so
as to sever any lands from the public domain." He proceeded to answer
the objection and says, "Although there is no description of any place
where the land granted shall be located in the Governor's decree, still
it was binding so far as it went. The Surveyor General was ordered
to survey the land solicited, in places vacant, and without injury to
third persons. The acts of the subordinate officer came in aid of the d*
cree," &c. This proves what, indeed, needed no authority to establish,
that a grant may be good, though not of any specific thing, which is
ascertained in the mind at the time of granting. But the thing of which
the quantity or number is predicated, is the object of the grantee to ac-
quire, and of the grantor to give. All else, that is in the grant, is
moonshine, but for that. Now, this primary object of getting the thing
into possession for use and enjoyment is to be attained, in cases of public
grants as I remarked above, usually through the instrumentality of
officers of the Government. This appropriation of the specific thing, or
separation of it, from the mass in which it lies confounded, is, in every
Government, a matter of public policy which relates to herself. The
Government desires to know for her own interest and convenience what
is left to her after that granted quantity is taken out, and where it. is,
so that she may know what she has to give to others, and that others
may know what to solicit. It is the duty, or rather it is wise policy in
every Government having lands to dispose of, to adopt such a mode of
procedure of identification, of what she grants, as will best subserve her
own and the public convenience and interest. But it is a matter which
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concerns herself and her citizens alone. She may regulate it according
to her own views of policy, in which she is generally determined by the
means and conveniences which she may be able to command ; and is
often influenced by the peculiar condition of the country or province,
and the pursuits—whether agricultural or pastoral—of the inhabitants
of it. Whatever plan or course she may adopt, is all-sufficient to bind
her and her citizens, and should also bind those who afterwards suc-
ceed to her rights and obligations. The Supreme Court of the United
States have expressly recognized this view of the subject. In deciding
upon cases where land is granted, or attempted to be granted specifically,
and not a mere number of acres, or quantity of land, to be identified
thereafter—either by the party at his election, or by a public officer
—
they have laid down the rule upon this subject expressly with reference
to the laws and ordinances of the country making the grant. They say,
where the grants, even by a liberal construction, contain no points by
which the lands can be identified, the grants must, for vagueness and
uncertainty, be held void. The Court have not been influenced in this
conclusion by any of the common law rules which make grants void for
uncertainty : such, for example, if the King grant land in a peat waste,
without ascertaining what part, or the special name of the land, or how
bounded—the grant is void for uncertainty ; and yet, if an individual
so grant it would be good. They have only applied the laws and or-
dinances of the Government, under which those claims are derived ; and
required that the thing granted be so described as to be capable of
being distinguished from other things of the same kind, or be capable
of being ascertained by extraneous testimony:—xv. Peters, 215. So in
xi. Howard, 127, the Court say : "These conclusions are in strict ac-
cordance with numerous decisions of this Court, which insist on the
necessity of the severance of the property claimed from the public do-
main, either by actual survey, or by some ascertained limits or mode of
separation recognized by a competent authorityP
In view of these principles, we will examine for a moment the plan
or system of granting, adopted by the Mexican Republic by the ordi-
nance of the 21st of November, 1828, carrying out the general decree
of the 18th of August, 1824, under which the grant in this case was
made. This mode of disposing of the public domain by the Govern-
ment of Mexico, was unlike that which had been pursued by the Span-
ish Government in the Provinces of Louisiana and Florida, and, indeed,
unlike that pursued in most countries with whose practice, in that par-
ticular, we are most familiarly acquainted. In all those countries, the
general course has been, upon the petition being presented by the
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party, or application in some mode made by^any one desiring to obtain
land, for the purpose of furnishing the necessary certainty of descrip-
tion, and of separating the land from that which is not granted
;
to
direct a survey to be made by sworn officers or Surveyors, using the im-
plements and apparatus necessary to do the work upon the ground, and
afterwards to plot it upon paper. This description of the land, being
thus made by a surveyor, is transferred into the grant. It consists of
courses and distances, run by the surveyor, and of stakes or marked
trees, or other natural objects, which ascertain the very land which was
actually surveyed. But in California there was no such means pro-
vided by the Government for that purpose ; and yet, the public policy
and interest of the Republic required the advancement of settlement
and cultivation, in this region of her vast dominion. The Government
proceeded to do this, foregoing the convenience which her more regular
and usual course might have attained, in the matter of segregating the
land granted, from the residue of her public domain. In this unpro-
vided condition of the country, she adopted the plan of granting, re-
quiring the applicant to present to the Political Chief a petition— as
appears in the 4th article of the ordinance of 1828— stating with par-
ticularity all that related to the person of the applicant, " marking, like-
wise, with the distinctness that may be (possible), and describing in a
map or (design), the land which he solicits." That map, or plan,
which was a rude sketch, made with no scale of distances, with no ref-
erence to, or, at least, with no accuracy, as to course, was generally
drawn, as it would seem, with the finger or some blunt instrument, and
the lines colored with the juice of berries, or charcoal or some other
coloring substance. It contained always notable natural objects, with
which the country abounds, and generally, if not invariably, gave a name
to the place or tract solicited, which, if not then notorious, soon became so,
and generally retains it still ; stating the supposed quantity in leagues,
within the natural monuments of rivers, hills, the sea, the Sierra, or
some remarkable ravine or promontory of that coast range of moun-
tains. That description went into the grant instead of a survey, and
designated the locus in quo, the granted leagues were to be contained.
Sometimes the grant was by those metes and bounds, and sometimes of
a number of leagues within them. After the grant was made, the party,
in the language of the ordinance, was to proceed to the possession. This
grant contains conditions also, which relate, as we have seen, to a pos-
session, and to a measurement of the land according to the ordinance,
which measurement was of the nature and kind exhibited in the record
7
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of this case. Such was, aad is, the mode of segregation in this case,
as provided for, authorized, acknowledged and recognized by the Gov-
ernment of Mexico, in California. As to any survey, in the legal sense
of that word, as understood and practiced in the Provinces of Louisiana
and Florida, and generally elsewhere, under the superintendence of a
Surveyor General, such a thing was not contemplated nor exacted. To
have required it would have been like the Egyptian exaction of the
captive Jews, to make brick without straw. There never was that we
can hear of, an officer holding the place of a Surveyor, in California
under its former governments. The neighboring Justice of the Peace,
or Alcalde, who was required to officiate in that capacity, was not qual-
ified to do more than to put the party upon the land, and make an
attempt to measure it, which, with no compass but the sun, and with a
lasso for a chain, was, of course, very far short of the accuracy of the
same process, conducted according to Galvan, or to Gunter. It was
all however that the government had provided means for, and was all
that she required or expected. It was conducted with the observance
of all due forms and ceremony, and in one of its rites, is almost identi-
cal with the livery of seizin of our Saxon ancestors. The grantee was
required to pluck turf, or break twigs from the trees or shrubbery on
the ground, or pick up rocks, and in token of his full ownership, to
throw them to the four winds. The proceedings on the ground, were
all reduced to writing, and deposited by the magistrate in the archives,
where they are now found, with as much care and fidelity as a naviga-
tor would render up the chart of his voyage of discovery, to the Board
of Admiralty, or to the Secretary of the Navy. Nor was all this a mere
idle mockery. The result of this mode of judicial possession, and
measurement, resorted to from necessity, as it would seem, has been to
identify the spot, and lead us to it with almost unerring certainty. In
this case the lines were pursued on three sides of the tract, the record,
stating, with particularity, the progress of the measurement. It
does not appear that they did more, but closed the operation by vista
ojos, or a survey with the eyes. A deposition of a witness referred to
in the case of Bosidore in xi. Howard, who was a regular practical sur-
veyor, states that in all his experience, he had never met with a Span-
ish survey, which inclosed every side of the tract. Even the Surveyor
General of Louisiana seemed to think that the purpose of the Govern-
ment was accomplished by that, and, doubtless, it was a sufficient iden-
tification. I do not think if there are any such monuments in exist-
ence, as the grant calls for, that any surveyor could miss his way to - the
place. The government of Mexico, I feel some assurance, would never
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have turned the claimant out of doors, from off the land where her
officers had put him, on the pretext, that the land could not be ascer-
tained. She could not in good faith have done so, and I think this gov-
ernment ought not to deal more rigorously with him than that.
Her policy was satisfied by what was done in regard to the separa-
tion of the land granted from the residue of her vacant lands, and I
entertain no doubt that in making the survey of this country according
to the perfect system which the government of the United States has
adopted, that there will never be any insurmountable difficulty in locat-
ing the claim of Cruz Cervantes. Guided by the map or design re-
ferred to in the grant, and forming a part of the muniment of title
; by
the possession, which has continued from the day at least on which he
was formally installed in it, to the present time, within the monuments
described in the grant, a surveyor can now, without difficulty, find not
only where the land lies, but by the aid of the recorded measurement of
his less accomplished predecessor, he, may find the beginning, and, at any
rate, he will be furnished with abundant means to make one. In conclu-
sion, I think from a full view of the whole case that the claim of Cer-
vantes is valid.
HARRY I. THORNTON, Commissioner.
August 3d, 1852.
Cruz Cervantes, Claimant, }
vs. >
United States, Defendant. )
Final Opinion upon Rendering the Decree of Confirmation.
This Board having already, by an opinion heretofore pronounced, and
filed on the 3d day of August, 1852, decided upon all the questions
necessary to a final decree of confirmation in this case, except as to the
quantity ; and having now fully considered this point, we proceed to de-
clare the further reasons, on which our determination is founded.
The Decree of the Mexican Government of the 18th of August, 1824,
and the Executive Ordinance of the 21st of November, 1828, regulate
the quantity of every grant made in virtue thereof—the maximum being
eleven square leagues, and the minimum two hundred varas square. The
mquantity then, being an inherent ingredient of the grant, and expressly
prescribed, must be presumed to have constituted the cardinal, or con-
trolling call of the same—the purpose of the map or deseno, being the
segregation of the premises from the residue of the public domain, to
fix its identity, and furnish a guide to its future location and survey.
The conjectural nature of this map or deseno, as to quantity, and the
terms of the grant, which expressly reserve for the use of the nation,
whatever should result, upon actual measurement, over and above, the
named quantity within its bounds, clearly show that the intention of the
grantor was not an irrevocable grant, by metes and bounds, to the ex-
tent thereof
; but that the granted quantity within those metes and
bounds, was to be afterwards identified, by a survey, ascertaining the
the sobrante, if any, and separating it from the private estate of the
grantee. The map or deseno, being the act of the petitioner, designa-
ting that which he sought, we think it just and proper to restrain the
grant to the extent of the limits, or bounds of the said map, though
they should not contain the granted quantity. This construction is in
accordance with the intention, so strongly manifested by the Mexican
Government, not to grant the same land to different individuals. As to
the sobrante within the bounds of the map, if there should be any, a
grant thereof had no effect, until after the ascertainment by the Gov-
ernment, of the precise location of the prior grant, upon whose identifi-
cation indeed, its existence depended.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
JOSE DE JESTJS NOE, Claimamt, 1
vs. \
THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. )
This claim is founded upon a grant made and delivered to the claimant
by Pio Pico, on the 23d of December, 1845. It appears by the duly
cuthenticated transcript of the archives, from the office of the Surveyor
General of California, that Pio Pico was the Governor of the Depart-
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ment of the Califomias, at the date of the grant, duly authorized to
grant the vacant lands of Upper California. The genuineness of this
grant is also fully established, by the proof in the case. The grant was
made, as it recites, in conformity with the decree of the Mexican Con-
gress, of the 18th of August, 1824, and the ordinance of the Federal
Executive of the Republic or Mexico, of the 21st of November, 1828
;
both of which duly authenticated from the archives, are in evidence in
the case. It appears also, from the same character of proof, that after
the signing, and delivering of the said grant, the expediente of the
proceedings, had by the Governor, was submitted to the Departmental
Assembly of California, who, by their resolution of the date of the 3d
of June, 1S46, fully approved of the grant, made, and delivered to the
claimant.
The objections made to the confirmation of this claim are—
First, That the land claimed, lies within ten leagues of the sea coast.
This objection is founded upon the 4th section of the decree of the 18th
of August, 1824, above referred to, by virtue of which the grant was
made. That section of the decree provides, " That the lands compre-
hended within twenty leagues, bordering upon any Foreign Nation, or
within ten leagues of the sea coast, shall not be colonized, without the
previous consent of the Supreme General Executive Power." This
ground of objection is common to this, with most of the grants of land
in California. The subject, has been by this Board fully considered
;
and for the reasons set forth in an opinion delivered in the case of Cruz
Cervantes, and of file in that case we have decided that this objection
is not valid. To save a needless recapitulation of our reasons for the
decision of that point, we now refer to that opinion, as forming a part
of this, so far ts this question as involved, and others arising in the case,
The second objection to the confirmation of the claim, is that the land
was not subject to grant, on account of its relation to the ex-Mission of
Dolores. The 17th article of the Ordinance above mentioned, of the
21st of November, 1828, relates expressly to this subject, and provides,
that, " In those Territories in which there are Missions, the lands which
they occupy shall not be colonized at present, and not until it be resolved,
&c." The prohibition, it will be seen, applies expressly to such lands
as are in the occupation of the Missions. The proof is full, that this
land was not so occupied, and of course, was such vacant land of the
Republic, as could be colonized. The decrees of the Republic, and the
Regulations of the several Governors, and Departmental Assemblies,
from the decree of the Mexican Government of the 17th August, 1833,
known as the Decree for the secularization of the Missions, (which
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itself was suspended on the 17th of November, 1835) and whatever else
was done afterwards, on this subject, down to the last act prior to this
grant, by Governor Micheltorena, on the 29th of March, 1843, never
repealed the provision of the ordinance of 1828 above cited : but in the
last proclamation referred to, and in its 5th article, after declaring, that
what was done in the way of such grants, was irrevocable, merely promises
not to make any new grants without the information, of the authorities,
of the Rev. Padres notorious want of occupancy, or of cultivation, or ne-
cessity. The absence,.or want of occupancy, or cultivation, by the Mission,
was fully established in this case.
The third objection to the confirmation of this claim, is want of segre-
gation of the landfgranted from the public domain of Mexico. The
question which we are called upon to decide in every case, is whether the
grant is so vague and uncertain in itself ; or so incapable of being made
certain, by the aid of those extrinsic facts and circumstances, which may
be legitimately invoked to its aid/ as to be void for want of an identifica-
tion of the land granted. The view which I have taken of this case,
in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
satisfies my mind, that the grant, and the matters referred to in it, all
of which are in the expediente, and of record in the case, and which are
to be presumed to be in existence, do separate the land from the public
domain
;
and can enable the Surveyor General to cause it to be survey-
ed and platted without any difficulty or doubt, identically as it was
granted to the party, and no more needs any measurement, according to
the Ordinance, than if it were an island in the sea. The Government of
Mexico has not, as I think, made an abortive effort in this case, to grant
a specific portion, of her public land. Nor do I think that the decisions
of our Supreme Court, or the principles of equity, by which we are to
be governed, would authorize us to declare the claim invalid for that
defect. The possession under the grant, and coextensive with it, is proved
to have been had, and taken by the party as early as the date of the
grant. It must be borne in mind, that according to the scheme, or plan
of granting the public domain, as adopted by the Mexican Republic in
California, as will fully appear by her Decree of the 18th of August,
1824, and the ordinance, made in pursuance of that decree, on the 21st
of November, 1828, there was no survey required to be made, before the
complete and perfect title was to be executed, and delivered to the
petitioner. The expediente in this case illustrates the law and practice
invariably pursued, almost, in executing the Decree and Ordinance.
—
The deseno, or map required to accompany the petition, supplied the
place of a survey, and went into the grant, as the survey did, in Florida,
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and in Louisiana, and in most of the States or countries with whose
mode of disposing of their public lands we are familiar. The identifica-
tion of the land was by that map and grant ; and in most instances, at
least in this, as I think, they fully accomplished that end. The recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, re-affirm the doc-
trines of the earlier cases on this subject ; and although they seem more
strenuous, do not depart from the principles that, if the instruments
relied on contain such descriptive calls, or bounds, as that the land can
be severed thereby from the public domain, or refer to what may render
the location practicable, in accordance with the maxim, "id certum est
quid reddi potest certum," they will not reject the claim. The extrane-
ous facts of possession and of notorious and long recognized ownership,
may well be invoked as aids against the rejection of a claim for uncer-
tainty, which is often resorted to by ingenious knavery, as a pretext to
annul the obligations of common honesty. In support of the principles
which ought to be applied to test the sufficiency of this severance, I
refer to the following cases : 5th Wheat. 359 ; 4th Cond. 682 ; 1st
Howard 24, Acastas' case ; 16th Peters 159, Mirandas' case ; 5th How-
ard 10, Lanton's case ; 15th Peters 283, O'Harra's case } do. 215,
Byuck's case, 3d Peters, 92 ; 11th Howard 665, Lecompt's case do.
page 127.
The fourth objection urged against the confirmation of this claim,
arises out of the conditions annexed to the grant, which are numerically
four, though in fact, there are but two which can be strictly so called
;
the other matters contained in the clauses, being either mere recital or
directory instructions to the officer, on whom the grantee is required to
call for the delivery of possession. With regard to the obstruction of
highways and crossings, there is no complaint on that head. It is true
that it does not appear from the record, or parol proof, that the claim-
ant ever did solicit any officer to put him in possession ; and that there
does not appear to have been, any measurement of the land granted.
The grant in this case was a complete grant, according to the Mexican
law : 8th Howard, 314. The view which we took in regard to the ef-
fect of the failure of those acts of delivery of possession, and measure-
ment we would refer to, as contained in the opinion which we have
already made a part of this decision. We have regarded them, as not
furnishing a ground, upon the principles of Equity, for a forfeiture, to
be now asserted by this Government : being conditions subsequent, in
their nature, and in fact; and also of a character, rather directory to
another, than intended to be destructive in case of non-compliance, of
the vested right of the grantee. In addition to those reasons, why we
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cannot feel at liberty, to refuse a confirmation for those alleged de-
ficiences, I will suggest that the only purposes, which those require-
ments were intended to accomplish, are satisfactorily effected, without
them. The object of the grant, as is apparent from the Decree, and
Ordinance under which it was made, was the settlement, or occupation
and -cultivation of the land. Now we have seen that the claimant per-
formed that consideration of the grant, just as completely, as if there
had been an Official intervention. Nor was that done, in violation of
any law. He was no trespasser in the act of possession. By the 8th
article of the Ordinance he was directed, or at least authorized, upon
the receipt of his grant, " to proceed to the possession," according to
the Mexican law. Occupation, or taking possession of anything, may
be, by the delivery of the instruments of writing, which convey it, and
also by the use and enjoyment of it, with the knowledge, and without
the opposition of the grantor. Escreche title possession, 341
; Partida
3d, Little 30, Law 8. There needed in this case no Official inter-
ference, further than the grant, to locate the land. It was specifically
defined, as the expediente will show. Equity regards not the circum-
stances, but the substance of the act ; and will relieve against the omis-
sion of formalities, where the end is achieved. Livery of Sizen, a legal
requirement in all conveyances of a freehold at common law, will be re-
lieved against in Chancery : 2nd, Chy. Rep., 216. On this principle
defects of circumstances in conveyances, are frequently supplied in
Equity : Francis Equity, maxims 64. The members of this Board con-
cur unanimously in the conclusion of the validity of the claim.
(Signed) HARRY I. THORNTON.
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JOHN KEYS, Assignee of Pedro Cordero, i
vs. > No. 222.
THE UNITED STATES. )
This claim is presented by the assignee of the original grantee. The
genuineness of the transfer to the present claimant is fully established
;
and the chief objections, or questions raised in the case, relate to the
validity of the original right or title. There was read as evidence,
"without objection, a statement by the Surveyor General of California,
the custodian of the archives of the former governments of the country,
which shews that such a grant as the claimant presents, was made
;
that the papers appear to be fair and genuine, and that he knows of
nothing in the said archives calculated to show suspicion thereon. The
original grant, which purports to have been made by virtue of the De-
cree of the Mexican G-overnment, of the 18th of August, 1824, and of
the Ordinance of the 21st of November, 1828, is introduced, and sus-
tained by full proof of its genuineness, execution, and delivery to the
grantee, by Governor Micheltorena, the Political Chief of the Province,
on the 18th day of May, 1S44. It appears in proof that a house was
built upon the land granted, and that it was occupied by the grantee in
the year 1843, or 1844 : who had upon it cattle and horses ; and that
this occupation has continued down to this time, without interruption,
by the grantee or present claimant. There does not appear to have
been any presentation of the grant by the Governor for its approval, by
the Departmental Assembly
;
nor was there any delivery of possession
and measurement of the land granted, as required in the conditions an-
nexed, by any public functionary, during the existence of the former
Government. Those last mentioned acts were performed in December,
1849
r
after the change of Government
; and if not done in exact ac-
cordance with the conditions requiring them, are facts which tend to
the identification of the land granted, and to render entirely feasible its
present location, or survey, by the Surveyor General, whose duty it is
to perform that act. All the objections above referred to, have been
considered by this Board, and overruled for the reasons given in the
opinion filed in the case of Cruz Cervantes, No. 56, of the docket of
cases.
The condition inserted in this grant, that the grantor may not sell it,
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alienate, or mortgage it, &c, was not violated, and no forfeiture in-
curred on that score whilst the former Government existed, so that the
fee existed in the grantee at the time of the acquisition of the country
by the United States ; and we do not think that in good conscience
the transfer, which was afterwards made, ought to work a forfeiture to
this Government. 'It was held by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Ardondo, that the failure to comply with the sub-
sequent condition, of the introduction of foreign settlers, was not one,
which this Government ought to regard, as detrimental to the title.
By parity of reasoning, the sale made by the grantee to the claimant in
this case, ought not to operate a destruction of the claim. At all
events we have decided, that this condition was nugatory, because it
was repugnant to the established policy of the Mexican Government,
prohibitory of every species of entails ; and to her laws forbidding any
restrictions upon the alienation of estates : Escreche 610, edition of
1851. Collection of Decrees of the Mexican nation, vol. 2, 154.
The land in this case is most distinctly segregated from the public
domain by the grant ; and there can be no difficulty in surveying off to
the claimant, that which has been uninterruptedly possessed, and en-
joyed by him, and his assignor, ever since its date.
There occur in this case, terms of which it is necessary to determine
the force and effect, in order so to settle, and ascertain the claim, by
our decree of final confirmation, as that, its location, and survey, may
be definitely made. It is declared in the fourth condition of the grant
that, " The land of which donation is made is one and a half square
leagues, ' a little more or less,' as shewn by the respective map or dese-
no." The idea of quantity was clearly in the mind of the grantor, when
using these words, " a little more or less," but it is equally clear that
they do not convey an idea of any precise quantity. The question to
which they give rise is one of intention, and as the words to be con-
strued are doubtful, and indefinite in themselves, and have no fixed
meaning appropriated to them by law, they must be subjected to that
reasonable rule, which directs us to seek that intention in the extra-
neous facts, and circumstances, which may be legitimately invoked, to
find out, and fix their meaning. There are but two sensible or possible
constrcutions to be placed on these words, where they occur in Mexican
grants, made under the Decree of the 18th of August, 1824, and the
Ordinance of the 21st of November, 1S28 ; and as we have no warrant
to settle arbitrarily their meaning, we must endeavor to carry out the
intention of the grantor, as far as we can attain it. One of those con-
structions referred to, is that the grant was intended to be made of the
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whole tract described in the map or deseno ; and that the words " a lit-
tle more or less " were used to enforce that intention. The other sup-
poseable construction, is that it was not intended to grant the whole,
tract so marked out, but only the quantity specified, diminished, or in-
creased by that, embraced in the terms "more or less." The first con-
struction cannot be adopted, as the map or deseno, though required by
the Ordinance to be made with all the exactness practicable, could not
from the nature of the ease, do more than furnish a general description
of the place or tract of country, where the land asked for, and granted,
was situated. It was made without any survey, and could not of course
be accurate. It was sketched by persons not professing to be sufficiently
familiar with the locality, even to approximate to certainty, as to its
contents. The land was confessedly not so known to the parties as to
be granted by the map as a whole, merely adding the words " a little
more or less," to carry out that intent irrespective of the quantity it
might contain. Where the public lands have been previously laid off into
divisions, and subdivisions, of a given form and magnitude ; or in a set-
tled country where the parties are acquainted with the different tracts,
or parcels of land by long possession, and acknowledged ownership, that
intention is recognized, and the words "more or less" may have acquired
such a fixed signification. But in this Province at that time, it is man-
ifest that such a construction would not effectuate the true intention of
the parties. A tract of land could not be granted as an entirety, unless
its contents were known to be less than, or rather no more than, eleven
leagues ; for the law prevented a grant of larger extent than that. If
the words more or less, or a little more or less, should occur in a grant,
without any other terms to qualify their sense, it might with more
plausibility be suppposed, that the intention of the grantor was, in sub-
ordination to the legal restriction of eleven leagues, to grant to the ex-
tent of the limits of the deseno
;
that is, to grant the whole tract de-
lineated in the map, with a tacit proviso, that it contain no more than
the legal compliment. But in this case, there are connected with them,
other words, which indicate a different intention. Those supplemental
words being significant, cannot be rejected, according to any just rule
of construction, unless the palpable sense of the writing would be marred,
or an absurdity introduced by their retention. The qualifying words
alluded to, which follow immediately upon a reference to the map or
deseno, are " The magistrate who may give the possession, will cause it
to be measured according to the ordinance, leaving the surplus which may
result, to the nation for its convenient uses." This surplus which may
result, must mean the residue within the bounds of the map or deseno
;
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for it is certain, that the grant cannot extend beyond them, whether
more than eleven leagues, or less, be embraced within them. The ap-
plicant has fixed by his own selection, the limits within which his land
is to be contained ; and the interest of the Nation, as well as that of
other petitioners, would be most injudiciously affected, if he were per-
mitted to transcend them. It is more equitable that he should be dis-
appointed of his supposed quantity, by his own act, than that others
should be injured by his error. Then we can only give a proper effect
to those qualifying terms in the grant, bj supposing it to have been esti-
mated that there might be more within the bounds of the deseno, than
the quantity actually intended to be granted. It might possibly be
urged, that such a construction can be put upon the words, " leaving the
surplus which results," &c, as to give them their full effect, and also to
give the words, " a little more or less," the import which has been sug-
gested. That interpretation is, to construe the words, a little more or less
as extending the grant to the bounds of the map, if there be no more
than eleven leagues, and the words, "surplus which may result" as rela-
ting to the residue of the public domain, outside of those bounds. By
that construction of the grant, the words of reservation would not only
be idle, and supererogatory, since without them such would be the case,
but the strange paradox would be thereby adopted, that a grant of one
league and a half, a little more or less, means, or may be extended to
include eleven leagues, by means of the erroneous, or fraudulent repre-
sentation of the applicant, in the map with which he accompanies his
petition.
The quantity of every grant is limited by the Decree and Ordinance
above recited, to the maximum and minimum therein prescribed, and
the discretion of the Political Chief is to be exercised within those limits.
If there had been no change of Government, and Mexico had provided
(as she had never done in California) sufficient means, through a Public
Surveyor, to ascertain the exact limits of her private grants, it would
have then been necessary to have reduced every claim to absolute cer-
tainty. It is now the object and design of the Government of the
United States to perform that duty ; and this Board is engaged in
furnishing its quota towards that purpose under the Act of the 3d of
March, 1851. As a preliminary to this location, or demarcation of
those private grants, we are required to ascertain their validity. The
validity however, of a claim or grant, involves necessarily a thing
granted ; and where quantity is given, as the characteristic, descriptive
feature of that thing, we must if we can do so, ascertain that quantity.
We must in the case of such a grant, either ascertain it, or declare the
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grant Toid for uncertainty. Nor will it be competent to this Board to
declare the claim valid for one and a half leagues, " a little more or
less ;" for that would leave wholly indefinite what we have seen it was
our duty to ascertain, if we confirm it at all, where the grant is by
quantity
;
and even where the grant is most explicitly by metes and
bounds only, we should still guard against a violation of the law reg-
ulating the quantity, by a provisional confirmation ; as for example,
thus : " To the extent of the bounds, if there be no more than eleven
leagues within them ; and for such quantity only, where the bounds
contain less."
The words poco mas <?' menas, are not only as we have said terms of
quantity, but they are also comparative terms, referring to some number
already expressed. They also evidently mean a fraction of some integer,
or unit. The unit of which they constitute a fraction in this case, is
not the aggregate of the antecedent leagues, but of a unit composing a
part of that aggregate number. The unit of which, a little more or less
is a fraction, is clearly one league ; but at all events, as a sign of
quantity, it is wholly uncertain, and we are not authorized to adopt
arbitrarily any proportionate part of any integral number, as its ex-
ponenent ; nor can we by force of these terms, either add to, or diminish,
in any degree, the specified quantity. The only alternative which we
can adopt, is either to declare the whole grant a nullity for want of
certainty
;
or to reject those terms on account of their uncertainty, and
declare the grant valid to the extent which is clearly expressed. The
quantity of one league and a half in this case is certain, and it is more
consonant with equity, to confirm the claim to that extent, than to de-
clare it void in toto, on account of these expletory terms, which are so
utterly indeterminate. It seems that the reasonable maxim, utile per
inutile non vitiatur, is justly applicable to sustain a grant, which to the
extent of one league and a half at least, was clearly intended.
We are unanimously of the opinion, that according to the principles
laid down for our government in the 11th section of the Act of the 3d
of March, 1851, the claim in this case is valid and ought to be confirmed
to the present claimant, to the extent of one square league and a half.
Commissioner Hall concurs in the result above announced.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
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JOHN B. R. COOPER, Claimant,
^
" El Sur," No. 124.
vs. \ Decision of the Board,
THE UNITED STATES. $ By Harry I. Thornton.
The claimant presents this claim as assignee, by virtue of a deed of
exchange, duly solemnized, and authenticated, from the original gran-
tee, Juan B. Alvarado, bearing date on the 9th of December,, 1840.
The original grant proved by the testimony of David Spence, is in evi-
dence, as also a copy of record among the public archives, which being-
duly certified by the Surveyor General of California, the custodian
thereof, together with the whole expediente relating to the saine, is filed
as part of the evidence in the case. The Grant was executed by virtue
of the Decree of the Mexican Congress of the 18th of August, 1824,
and of the 21st of November, 1828, carrying the said decree into effect,
by Jose Eegueroa, the Political Chief of the Territory of Upper Cali-
fornia, on the 30th of September, 1834. There is no question, or con-
troversy, as to the authority of Fegueroa, nor of the genuineness of the
grant. It appears from the evidence, that Alvarado, the grantee,
occupied the land in 1831, under a provisional title, prior to the grant
in fee, and that it has been occupied and resided continuously, ever
since its first settlement, by the said Alvarado, and the present
claimant, for about twenty years. The grant is a full conveyance of
the fee, in accordance with the decree and ordinance above cited
;
and
by the grant, and the accompanying map, or deseno, which is referred
to therein, the land is identified, and so segregated from the residue of
the publie domain, as to render its location and survey entirely feasible.
The objections urged by the Law Agent of the United States against
the confirmation of this claim, have all been considered by this Board
and overruled, in the case of Cruz Cervantes and the United States,
(the opinion in which case, to save a tedious repetition, is now referred
to as a part of this decision), except one, which has not hitherto been
decided by this Board. This objection is, that the first condition in
the grant, viz., " that the grantee shall abide by the regulations which
may be made for the distribution of vacant lands, and in the mean-
time, neither the grantee nor his heirs, caii divide, nor alien the land,"
has been violated by the transfer to the present claimant, and that, of
course, no right, either legal or equitable, could be acquired by him in
virtue of said transfer. If this condition was lawfully imposed upon
67
the grant to Alvarado, the result would certainly follow which is al-
ledged by the objection. With regard to this condition, I am under
the impression that it was either capriciously inserted ; or in a spirit of
paternal guardianship, to operate in terrorem against improvident alien-
ation
;
or in accordance with the form which was used in the case of
provisional concessions or licenses to occupy, issued prior to the pro-
mulgation of the ordinance of the 21st of November, 1828, in which it
would be very properly inserted. But at all events, our conclusion is,
that in this grant the condition is nugatory. It is clear, that if the
full ownership of the land was granted, as the Decree of August, 1824,
and the Ordinance of November, 1828, evidently contemplated, it no
longer remained vacant land, which could be affected under the Mexi-
can constitution, by any future regulations for the disposition thereof.
By that Decree and Ordinance, a grant in full property, with all the
necessary incidents of ownership in fee, was clearly intended and pro-
vided for. Upon the ascertainment by the Political Chief that all the
prescribed requisites were met by the applicant, both as regarded him-
self, and the land which he solicited, it became his duty to carry out
by his grant, the purpose of the Government, which was the inhabit-
ancy or cultivation of the vacant land of the Republic ; an object
which might have been thought more attainable by means of unre-
stricted grants of the soil in full property, than by such as would with-
draw it from commerce, and would tie the grantee, and all his posterity,
to one spot, like an oyster to the rock.
The conduct of the Political Chief, in performing the function of
granting, devolved upon him by the ordinance of 1828, was regulated
by the laws in force upon that subject ; and he could not impair or de-
feat the policy and object of the Government, by the imposition of
terms and conditions which were at war with that object and policy.
It is certain that no such condition as the one we are considering is
contained in the Decree and Ordinance, in virtue of which, he made this
grant ; and if, as we have concluded, a conveyance in full property was
intended by them, a restriction such as this condition imposes, emascu-
lates the grant of one of its distinctive characteristics, and is in direct
contravention of the provisions of the law. The Ordinance of Novem-
ber, 1828, does, it is true, require the Political Chief to conform, not
only to the said Decree and Ordinance,, but, generally, to the laws
regulating the disposition of the public domain. By reverting to the
laws existing at the time, it appears that they were in conflict, with
this prohibition to alienate.
The decree of the Cortes of Spain of the 4th of January, 1813, for
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the reduction of the vacant, and other common lands to private owner-
ship, and which it would seem was binding in the Republic of Mexico,
being published as such among her laws, provides in the 11th section,
that they shall be distributed " en plena properdad? in full property,
page 56, 5th vol. of Orders and Decrees of the Cortes of Spain consid-
ered of force in the Republic. So, by a provision in the 14th Section
of the Decree of the 27th of September, 1820, "upon the suppression
of every species of entails," ib.', p. 135, it is declared that, " no one can
in future, neither for the purpose of advantage, nor under any other
pretext, establish a mayorazgo, fidei—commissum, advowson, nor any
other entail whatever, in relation to any kind of property, or rights,
nor prevent its alienation, either directly or indirectly." It is said in
Escreche, p. 610, Art. Enajenacion, edition of 1851, " No one can
found entail on any class of property, or rights, nor prohibit, directly
or indirectly their alienation." We conclude that the policy of the
country, and its express legislation, was violated by that condition in
the grant. Collections of Decrees of the Mexican Nation. On En-
tail, Yol. 2d, 154, 7th August, 1823.
In consideration of the whole case, for the reason above given, we
are unanimous in. the opinion, that, in view of the principles prescribed
for our government in the Act of the 3d March, 1851, the claim in this
case presented,, is valid, and ought to be confirmed to the
.
present
claimant.
ANTONIO and FAUSTINO GERMAN, J
vs. > No. 62
THE UNITED STATES. S
The claim in this case presented to this Board, as appears from the
Archives of the former Government, duly authenticated, originated
with a petition addressed to Figueroa, who was the Political Chief at
the time, on the 25th of April, 1833. The petition was for a tract or
parcel of land, by the name of Juristac, near the Brea, describing it by
no very specific limits, and praying for no determinate quantity. Upon
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information taken by the Governor, as appears by Ms decree of the 21st
of November, 1833, it appeared that the place was at the time of the
presentation of the petition, and then, in the occupation of the Mission
of San Juan Baptista
;
that it was in part at least, held by the claim-
ants upon loan, at the will of the Rev. Padre of said Mission ; and that
although the petitioners had as sueh tenants at will,, built houses on it,
lived there, and cultivated the same^ yet that it was so possessed and
occupied by the Mission, as not to be grantable by him. This obstacle
he directed to be made known to the said applicants, so that they might
address a petition for some other place which was vacant. Afterwards,
on the 3d of June, 1835, another petition was addreseed to Figueroa
by the claimants, for a place called the Rancho de la Brea, which it
seems is identical with 'that before petitioned for, as Juristac near la
Brea. This last petition is accompanied with a deseno, or map, and
describes the boundaries of the land sought with more particularity
than before, but solicits no specified quantity of ground. After full
information being obtained by the reports of those to whom he- referred
for the same
r
the Governor by his decree of the 27th of August, 1835,.
ordered the expediente to be passed to the Most Excellent Deputation,
who on the 15th of September, 1835, adopt the proposition, "That the
land solicited by the petitioners the Germans, may be conceded to
them." Then on the 22d of October, 1835r a concession is made by
Jose Castro, he having become the Political Chief in the mean time,
declaring the Germans owners in property of the tract of land known
by the name of Juristac. Of the same date is the complete patent or
conveyance of the fee by said Castro, which is proved by the deposition
of a witness on file, to have been duly executed by him. In this grant
there is a recital of the boundaries, which are "from East to West
those of the Citizens Cas-tros',. and the Arroyo of the Pascadero," and
in the condition numbered 4 in the same, it is declared, " The tract of
land of which mention is made is of one sitio, de ganada mayor, (one
square league) as the map ( or deseno) explains which is annexed to
the expediente ;" and further, " The Magistrate who shall give possession
shall cause it to be measured according to Ordinance, the overplus
(sobrante) which shall result, remaining to the nation, for its convenient
uses." Judicial possession was afterwards given to the parties on the
29th of October,. 1835, and a measurement made, as was the custom,
professing to be in accordance with the grant. A detailed account of
this official act of possession and measurement, is introduced and proved
before us.
All the objections urged against the validity of this claim except one.
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have been heretofore considered and overruled by the Board, in the
case of Cruz Cervantes, the opinion in which case, to save a tedious
repitition, is referred to as part of this. The objection to which I refer
as not hitherto decided upon, is that the land granted in this case was
excluded from grant by the 17th article of the Ordinance of the 21st of
November, 1828, which declares, "That in those Territories where there
are Missions, the lands occupied by them shall not be colonized at pres-
ent," &c. The point raised in the argument was, that by the just
construction of the said article, such of the public domain as was then,
at the date of its promulgation, in the occupancy of the Missions, was
reserved from alienation by the Political Chief. Even if that proposition
were assented to by this Board, there is no proof in the case, that at
the date of the Ordinance, such was the condition of the land now in
controversy. That it was so occupied, is deduced- by the Law Agent,
as a presumption from the fact proved, that it was in that predicament
in the year 1833. We do not think such a presumption can legally
arise. It is true that things which are continuous, will within reason-
able limits, according to their nature, be presumed to continue to exist,
being once established, until the contrary is proved. But there is no
presumption arising from their existence at any given time, that they
did so exist at any anterior period, unless it grow out of their nature :
and we do not consider that the fact of occupancy in the year 1833, is
of such a nature as to authorize the presumption that it existed in 1828.
In accordance with the principles of decision prescribed for our gov-
ernment, in the 11th section of the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, we
have come to the conclusion unanimously, that the claim presented is
valid.
Having decided for the reasons above declared, in favor of the validity
of the claim, in accordance with the grant finally issued to the claimants,
it may be due to the' case, and at all events more satisfactory to the
parties in the cause, to assign the reasons why we declare the claim valid
according to the grant, without regarding the metes and bounds, further
than as descriptive of the locus in quo the land granted lies. The
claimants' counsel have contended that, notwithstanding the grant de-
clares that only one square league is granted, yet as the minute entry
or concession by the Government declares the ownership to the claimants
of the land as solicited
;
and as the previous proceedings without naming
any definite quantity, describe the land sought, as a tract by prescribed
bounds, that the claimants ought not to be restricted to the quantity of
one league named in the grant, but are now entitled to have a decree
of the validity of their claim, to the extent of the metes and bounds of
their map and petition, as recognized in the minute of concession.
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In deciding upon the validity of a claim, in every case of a grant, or
concession made in virtue of the decree of the Mexican Congress of the
18th of August, 1824, and of the ordinance of the 21st of November,
1828, as this was, we must necessarily have regard to its quantity. It
is our province, and duty, to construe the grant, and in doing this, as
the quantity which may be granted to any one person, is limited, the
maximum being eleven leagues, and the minimum two hundred varas,
we would be acting in disregard of the express provision of that decree,
and ordinance, if we declare a claim valid, without ascertaining, and
settling that it is within the lawful limits as to quantity. In this case,
it is urged by the counsel for the claimants, that we should disregard
.
altogether the quantity, which is specified in the final grant, and con-
sider the case, as if no quantity were mentioned in it. To this view of
the matter, we are not prepared to accede. In a case where there is
no mention made of any quantity, but the grant is clearly by metes, and
bounds, it would still be our duty to consider the quantity, and only de-
clare the claim valid, on the ground that the intention of the grantor,
was to grant the quantity allowed by law to be granted, if within the
boundaries mentioned, and no more, no matter how much more there might
be within them. There is a discretion vested in the Political Chief, as
to the amount or quantity, which he may grant in any given instance
;
which discretion ranges between the maximum and minimum, of the
Decree and Ordinance ; and which is regulated by considerations affect-
ing the nature, or character of the land, and of the person applying for it.
Where the grant is thus made by metes, and bounds, we should, ut res
magis valeat quam pereat, construe it in such manner, as that the grant
may prevail, and yet the law, not be violated. Hence the validity, ne-
cessarily involves, as an inherent and essential ingredient, the quantity,
of a elaim made under the Mexican Decree of 1824, and Ordinance of
1828. Not that we must in every case declare how many precise
leagues the claim contains, but, that it shall contain, no more than the
law allows. But the claim now under consideration, is not of the last
mentioned character. The presumption, by which we would sustain
such a claim to the extent of the law, is not to be indulged, when iu
his grant the Governor specifiies the exact quantity, though it were
wholly omitted in the petition, and even in his concession, preliminary
to his final grant. It is competent to him to fix the quantity within the
prescribed limits, and his power is not exhausted, until his grant passes
to the applicant. The quantity, when named by the applicant in his
petition, as supposed to be contained in the accompanying map, or dese-
no, was never ascertained, as in a regular plat of survey, and is known,
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and generally expressed to be, merely conjectural. The concession of
the land as asked, is of course, equally so : but it may be fixed by the
grant. The Governor is not estopped by such concession. In the case
in hand, the intention is manifested, because the concession, is of even
date with the grant
;
the latter being an extension into full title, of the
former, which was a mere minute entry, of the complete conveyance.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
CAMILLO YINTIA, a native Indian, \ •
vs. \ No. 71.
THE UNITED STATES. }
The claim presented to the Board in this case, is founded upon a
grant, or conveyance in full title made to the claimant on the 22d of
October, 1843, by Micheltorena, who was at the time Governor of the
Department of the Californias, and duly authorized by virtue of the
Decree of the 18th of August, 1824, and Ordinance of the 21st of No-
vember, 1828, to grant vacant lands in the Province. The original
grant is in evidence before us, and its genuineness fully established by
the testimony on file. The grant recites that, "The requirements, and
investigations in the matter, have been complied with,, agreeably to the
laws and regulations." There was also read as evidence, without ob-
jection thereto, a statement of the Surveyor General of California, the
legal custodian of the Public Archives of the former Governments of
the country, from which it appears that there is among said archives
evidence of the grant, that the papers relating to it are apparently fair
and genuine, and that he knows nothing among said archives calculated
to throw suspicion thereon. It appears by the proof on file that the
grantee resided in a house, upon the land granted to him, during the
whole time since the year 1841, down to the taking of the proof in the
case ; that the farm was stocked by him, and used for pasturage, and
cultivated also, within enclosures, to the extent of about two hundred
acres in grains and vines, during the whole period above mentioned.
A document is in proof containing the full proceedings of Judicial pos-
session and measurement of the land, according to the usage of the
country, which bears date on the 7th of December, 1843. This pro-
ceeding, though it may not conform rigidly with the Ordinances regu-
lating surveys, yet, as there was no Public Surveyor appointed by the
Government, it was all that could be done, or was required by that
Government. It constitutes, in our opinion, if the grant itself does not
effect that purpose, which I think it does, to the extent of the map, a
sufficient segregation of the land granted from the Public domain, and
will effectually enable the Surveyor General to locate the same.
The objections urged against the validity of the claim, consist, of the
failure to produce any evidence of the submission by the Governor, of
his grant, to the Departmental Assembly, for their approval ; and of
the insufficiency of the performance of the conditions subsequent annexed
to the grant, relative to the measurement of the land. These objections
have all been fully considered by this Board, and overruled for the rea-
sons given in the opinion, delivered and on file, in the case of Cruz Cer-
vantes, No 56, of the docket of the Board.
The grant in this case is for two square leagues, a little more or less.
We declare the claim to be -valid to the extent of two square leagues,
without any increase or diminution thereof by the terms, " a little more
or less." The reasons for this construction of the grant are fully set
forth in a prior opinion of this Board, on file in the case ot John Keys,
Assignee, &c, to the Ranch of Sal si Puedes, No. 222.
For the reasons above given we are of opinion that the claim in this
case is valid, under the rules of decision by which we are required to be
governed in the 11th section of the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, or-
ganizing this Board. In the result above announced Commissioner
Hall concurs.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
Note. The grant in this case recites the fact, that the grantee was an "Indi-
gena," or native Indian. See the case of A. A. Ritchie, " Suisun," No. 3, where
that objection is considered.
FRANCISCO DYE,
^
vs. > No. 122.
THE UNITED STATES. )
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
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ARCHIBALD A. RITCHIE, 1
vs. > No. 12.
THE UNITED STATES. S
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
A. A. RITCHIE and P. S. FORBES,
^
vs. > No. 40.
THE UNITED STATES. )
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
JOSEFA ANTONIO GOMEZ, &c,
^
Heirs of RAFAEL GOMEZ, Deceased,
} No. 195.vs.
THE UNITED STATES.
J
The claim in the case presented is founded upon a grant made on the
18th of December, 1834. under and by virtue of the Decree of the
Mexican Government of the 18th of August, 1824, and of the Execu-
tive Ordinance of the 21st of November, 1828, by Jose Figueroa,
Governor of California, to Rafael Gomez, the ancestor of the claimants,
for six square leagues of land, a little more or less. On the 29th of
August, 1835, the grant was approved by the Territorial Deputation of
California
;
and on the 5th of February, 1836, a measurement according
to the custom of the country was made of the premises, and possession
thereof delivered to the grantee. Continuous and undisturbed posses-
sion and occupation of, and residence on the same, has been had and
enjoyed for upwards of nineteen years, by the grantee, and his heirs, the
present claimants. The genuineness of the grant, and the authority of
the grantor, and all the other facts above stated, are fully established
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by regularly authenticated documentary evidence from the Public Ar-
chives of the former Governments of the country, and by the other
testimony on file in the case. The evidence is not by any means con-
clusive as it relates to the locality of the land with regard to the
sea coast.
There is in this grant, a reservation or condition, of the approval of
the Federal Executive, which not being specially obtained in this case,
is insisted upon as destructive of all right or title, in the claimants.
The grant declares that it is made in conformity with the laws and
regulations
;
and we have always decided that in grants like this, the
special approval of the Federal Executive is not necessary, according
to the said laws and regulations. The effect of this reservation or con-
dition can be nothing more than that the approval of the Federal
Executive must be had, only if, or in the contingency that the other
alternative provided by the Ordinance, viz : the approval of the Ter-
ritorial Deputation, should be refused, to the Governor's grant.
All the grounds of objection urged against the validity of this claim
have been fully considered, and overruled, in the case of Cruz Cervantes,
the opinion in which is now on file, in the office of the Secretary of this
Board.
The effect of the terms, a little more or less, which occur in this
grant, we have already decided not to be destructive of it, for uncer-
tainty, nor to increase nor diminish the specified quantity. This was
so held by us in the opinion delivered and on file, in the case of John
Keys, assignee, No. 222.
In view of all which, we decide the claim in this case to be valid,
and that it be confirmed. In the results above announced Commissioner
Hall concurs.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
CHARLES MEYER, et al. }
vs. > No. 199.
THE UNITED STATES. }
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
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FRANCISCO PEREZ PACHECO, }
vs
- / No. 65.
THE UNITED STATES. V
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
ARCHIBALD A. RITCHIE, Assignee, &c, I
vs. > No. 3.
THE UNITED STATES. S
The claim in this case presented is founded on a grant made on the
28th of January,. 1842,. by virtue of the decree of the Mexican Congress
of the 18th of August, 1842, and of the Executive Ordinance of the
21st of November, 1828, by Juan B. Alvarado, Governor of California,
to Francisco Solano
;
which grant, on the 3d of October, 1845, was
approved by the Departmental Assembly of California. In accordance
with the usual requirement, within the year of the grant, an accurate
measurement of the land was made, and judicial possession thereof de-
livered to the grantee. Prior to the petition for the grant in full prop-
erty, as early as 1837, the grantee was put in possession of the identical
land, under a provisional title by General Vallejo, who was military
commander of the Northern frontier and Director of Colonization.
Whilst thus ; in possession, Solano- built upon the premises a large dwell-
ing house, a number of large storehouses, and smaller ones for his peo-
ple and retainers. He enclosed and cultivated considerable portions
of the land, and occupied other portions with his herds of cattle and
horses. The present claimant derives his interest in the land through
mesne conveyances from the grantee, in whom, and those claiming
under him, the peaceable occupation and uninterrupted enjoyment of
the premises hare been had from the year lS37down to the acquisition
of the country by the Government of the United States. The genu-
ineness of the grant, the authority of the grantor, as well as all the
facts above cited, are fully established by duly authenticated transcripts
from the public archives of the former governments, and by other evi-
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dence on file in the case. The proceedings in this instance, from their
incipient state to the final consummation of the title by the grant of
the full property, and the performance of all the conditions annexed,
are so regular and complete, that the only objections against the con-
firmation of the claim which have been suggested are to the capacity of
the grantee to receive a grant of land, or to dispose of it by alienation,
as was done in this case.
It must be conceded, that a grant made in California in violation of
the public law of Mexico, in virtue of which it purports to be made, is
void ; and that the land thus attempted to be granted will remain a
portion of the public domain. The supposed illegality of this grant
consists in a fact which, if not necessarily inferable from the grant
itself, is abundantly verified by the record ; that is,, that the grantee
was an Indian, born on the spot which he solicited. In the grant he
is declared to be " Indigena," which means a native, or original inhab-
itant, and also to be Chief of the Tribes of the frontiers of Sonoma.
It must be observed that private property, if it be not founded on
natural law, is at least so well established by the common consent of
all mankind, that it is coeval with the history of our race, and has now
all the force of the law of nature. "We may consider it, then, as of the
dignity of a law of nature, that all persons of the human species who
are not idiots,, madmen, or infants, are capable of accepting property
;
and that full property in any subject is the right to use it to any pur-
pose, and to dispose of it as we please. That there is no incompetency
in the grantee in this case, by the general law of nations, there is no
doubt. He is one of the human species ; he is neither an idiot, a mad-
man, nor of such infantile age as not to have attained to the exercise
of a rational volition. On the contrary, the record shews that he was
endowed in more than an ordinary degree, with the attributes of an
elevated, moral and intellectual character. He was a commissioned
officer, of the grade of captain, in the Mexican service. The Governor
of California, who, by the 2d and 3d articles of the ordinance of the
21st of November, 1828, was the person designated to pass upon the
qualifications of the applicants for land, states that he was " a Chief of
the Tribes of the frontiers of Sonoma," and " worthy of reward for the
quietness which he caused to be maintained by that unchristianized
people." It is true, that the general law in this matter is subject to
such municipal modifications as may be made by the legislative author-
ity of different nations
;
and that such modifications have been often
made must also be admitted. The question is, whether any such de-
cree or municipal regulation existed in Mexico, at the date of this grant,
10
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as forbade the grantee in this instance to be the recipient of a donation
of land ; or would forbid its alienation by him any more than by any
other grantee. The learned counsel in this case have extended their
researches, with most commendable industry and discrimination, into
the various sources of Spanish and Mexican law on this interesting
subject. Want of time only prevents me from making that thorough
examination to which the arguments submitted so persuasively invited.
I have,, however, taken a view of the question, which has led my mind
to a satisfactory conclusion ; and I will submit it with as much con-
ciseness and brevity as the pressure of time will allow.
The plan of Iguala, which is the first stable land-mark amid the con-
tinual mutations that agitated the country from 1810 at least to the
27th of September, 1821, is based upon what has always been known
in the history of those, times as " The Three Guarantees"—which were,
the independence of the country, the exclusive maintenance of the
Catholic religion, and the abolition of all distinction between the inhab-
itants founded on race or descent. The last of these guarantees, which
is the only one now to be regarded, is contained in the 12th article of
the said plan, and is in the following words : " That all the inhabitants
of New Spain, without any distinction between Europeans, Africans or
Indians, are citizens of this monarchy, with eligibility alike to every
employment, according to their merit and virtue." By the treaty of
Cordova between the Spanish generalissimo and the revolutionists,
which was adjusted on the 24th of August, 1821, the plan of Iguala
was re-affirmed in all its parts. In the declaration of Independence
solemnly promulgated on the 28th of September, 1821, the plan of
Iguala and the treaty of Cordova are announced as the bases of the
government about to be established. By an express decree of the con-
stituent Congress on the 17th of September, 1822, in the reign of Itur-
bide under the title of Agustin the First, the fulfilment of the 12th
article of the plan of Iguala, above quoted, was enforced by a strong
and pointed enactment. And lastly, on the 8th of April, 1823, on the
overthrow of the empire and the establishment of republican institu-
tions, the constituent Congress re-affirm " The Three Guarantees " of
the plan of Iguala. The Indian, Francisco Solano, is expressly within
the letter of the last enumerated guarantee, so early announced and so
perseveringly recognized and re-affirmed through all the vicissitudes of
her revolution, down to the final establishment of the republic of Mex-
ico. There is no constitutional provision nor decree of the Mexican
republic, which I have been able to find, that destroys the equality of
civil and political rights which is conferred upon all the inhabitants of
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New Spain by the plan of Iguala, in which they are all declared to be
" citizens of this monarchy." All who were citizens of the monarchy,
in the sense of the term citizens as used in the plan of Iguala, I pre-
sume, became successively citizens of the empire and of the republic.
I think it may then be legally predicated of Solano, that he was a citi-
zen of the republic
;
and, in view of all the laws which we have just
adverted to, stood on the same footing with any other citizen with re-
gard to the acquisition and alienation of property. But, notwithstand-
ing the necessary concession that he was a freeman, a native inhabitant
of the territory, a citizen of the republic, and capable generally of ac-
quiring and alienating property, yet it is objected that he is incapable
of becoming a grantee under the decree of 1824 and ordinance of 1828,
because he is not of the description of persons mentioned as the recipi-
ents of land therein. By the 1st section of that ordinance, the political
chiefs of the territories are authorized to grant vacant lands to empres-
arios, to families, to single individuals, Mexicans or foreigners. It is
said that Solano is in neither of these categories. He is clearly not an
empresario, nor a family, nor a foreigner. If embraced in the decree,
then, he must come under the class Mexicans. I think it can be de-
monstrated that Solano is a Mexican. All Indians, by the plan of
Iguala, are declared to be citizens of the monarchy,—all citizens of the
monarchy became citizens of the republic ; so that Solano became a citi-
zen ; and surely there can be nothing more than a mere verbal differ-
ence between the terms Mexicans, in the sense of the ordinance, and
citizens of Mexico. I will only add, in conclusion, that as to the legality
of the grant to the Indian Chief and Mexican Captain, Francisco So-
lano, although the question involves the propriety of the conduct of the
Governor who made it, yet the presumption is in favor of the correctness
of his construction of the ordinance which he was appointed to admin-
ister, and will stand until rebutted by the production of clear evidence
of its error. And as to the right and capacity of Solano to alienate
the land granted to him, the usage, as proved in the case, was for
Indians holding full property to dispose of it in the same manner as
other citizens of the country.
In view of all which, and in accordance with the principles laid down
for our government in the act of the 3d March, 1851, the claim is de-
clared to be valid, and ought to be confirmed.
HARRY L THORNTON.
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WILLIAM GORDON,
^
**• > No. 203.
THE UNITED STATES. )
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
JUAN MIGUEL ANZAR, J
vs. > No. 20.
THE UNITED STATES. )
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
CARMEN SIBRIAN BERNAL, &c, }
vs. > No. 30.
THE UNITED STATES. }
Opinion overruling Motions foe Initiatory Surveys.
In this case, wherein an opinion has long since been filed, declaring
the claim to be valid, and that it ought to be confirmed, a verbal mo-
tion is now made to the Board, for a final confirmation, without any
preliminary survey. In anticipation of a motion in some case, for such
survey, I had prepared an opinion, which I will take this occasion to
file, as it is responsive to the proposition submitted by the counsel for
the claimant.
The object of a motion to obtain an order of this Board, for a survey
to be made by the Surveyor General of California, is, of course, I pre-
sume, to use the same as evidence, in a case pending before us. I will
not now say in advance, whether I would reject a survey with the plat
and field notes, as evidence, when offered as such. But I will say this,
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that the necessity of any such evidence, as it strikes my mind, will very
rarely if ever occur, and would be much to be deplored, especially since
the reduction of force in the clerical department, and the increase of
labor imposed by the recent action of Congress, will make the thrice
repeated drafting and transcribing of this evidence, a very serious ob-
stacle in the dispatch of business. Such a motion does not, however,
involve the question whether a plat of survey is to be admitted in
evidence, if caused to be made by the claimant, of his own mere notion,
and offered by him. But the question is, whether this Board will make
an order for the execution of such survey, even at the request of the
claimant, and at his own cost. I am unwilling to make such an order
;
but leave it to the party, as I would in regard to any other testimony,
to decide whether he will, or not, proceed to the expense of such sur-
vey, and tender it in evidence,
In withholding my assent to such a motion, however, inasmuch as,
heretofore, they have been granted, without any dissent filed by me,
I feel bound to give the views which I have always entertained and
expressed, on the subject of such orders of survey, but which, as the
Board was then organized, I did not feel it incumbent on me fruitlessly
to interpose.
I cannot consider the motion for an order of survey, without deter-
mining the question, whether it be legally proper for this Board to re-
quire one to be made : because it is very apparent to my mind, that as
long as the idea is countenanced, that a decision of this Board awaits,
or is in any manner dependent upon such survey, the claimant is put
under a constraint, to become the mover, and to incur this heavy ex-
pense, rather than be delayed in the final decision of his case. I con-
sider it then fit and proper, to express a definite opinion, as to the duty
of this Board, with regard to the survey, or location of private land
claims, under the Act of the 3d of March, 1851.
How far that duty may fall short of what we may suppose ought to
have been imposed upon us, is not a matter for our consideration. We
should, if we can, ascertain what we have to do, as prescribed by the
law of our creation, and proceed promptly to do it. The doctrine of
our system of Jurisprudence, and the spirit of our Republican Consti-
tution, in regard to the Judiciary of whatever grade or dignity, and to
quasi judicial tribunals, such as this Board, is this, " est boni Judicis
ampliare justiciam, sed non amplificare jurisdictionem."
The eighth section of the Act organizing this Board, which purports
to define our duty, after speaking with regard to the evidence upon
which we shall act, and the parties in the case, declares that we shall
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decide upon the validity of the claim. Now we must determine what is
involved in the terms validity of the, claim. The following matters are
indisputably embraced in them, viz is the claim genuine : does it pro-
ceed from the proper authority : is it in conformity with the decrees
and ordinances, usages and customs of the Government from which it
is derived : and ought it now to be held valid, when tested by those
legal standards laid down for our government in the 1 1th section of the
Act of the 3d of March, 1851. It is my opinion that this Board is not
authorized to take any step towards the location or survey of a claim,
but to decide on its validity, and so to frame our decree of final con-
firmation, as that in the survey which is to be made upon it
; there may
not be included in it, neither more, nor less, than the maximum or min-
imum quantity, prescribed by the law of the Government from which
the claim is derived, where there is such limitation of quantity.
The Act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1851, was certainly de-
signed as its title imports, to ascertain and settle the private land claims
in the State of California. And the first section of that Act declares,
"That for the purpose of ascertaining and settling private land claims in
the State of California, a Commission shall be, and is hereby constitu-
ted." To ascertain, means to be sure, to reduce to precision, by remov-
ing obscurity, or ambiguity. But however broadly the term may be
extended, the quota towards that object to be furnished by this Board,
reaches no farther, than is prescribed in defining our duties. To ascer-
tain, in the fullest extent of the meaning of the word, unqualified by
anything else, would embrace the duty not only of deciding on the va-
lidity of claims, but the mode of their location, the boundaries, the
courses and distances of every line of the plot of survey, and of their
actual demarcation upon the ground. Our duty most certainly stops
short of all that. My opinion is that it extends no farther than to de-
cide on the validity of the claim, but that in doing this, we must neces-
sarily have reference to its quantity. Every grant must contain a grantor,
a grantee, and a thing granted. The thing granted in this case, the land,
is required by the Decree of the Mexican Congress of the 18th of Aug.,
1824, and the Ordinance of the 21st of Nov., 1828, to consist of no more
than eleven square leagues, and no less than two hundred varas square.
Hence, to decide on its validity, necessarily involves, as one of its in-
herent legal properties, the quantity : to see that it neither exceeds, nor
falls short of, the quantity prescribed. It may be genuine, and valid in
all other respects, but be objectionable, pro tanto, for this excess, or
defect. The construction of a grant, embracing all its properties, is to
my mind very different from the projection of a locative survey. The
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duty of the Board is to construe the grant, and to decide upon every
matter touching the validity of the claim, and to reject, or confirm it.
After that is done by the Board, or by the revising tribunals in case of
appeal, and the decision is in favor of its confirmation, then the duty of
the Surveyor General of California, upon that confirmation is declared
;
which consists in doing what the Act prescribes for him to do, towards
the ascertainment of the private land claims in California. The duty of
the Surveyor General is declared very explicitly, in the 13th section of
the Act. After speaking of the effect of a final rejection of claims, it
proceeds, thus, " And for all claims finally confirmed, by the said Com-
missioners, or by the said District, or Supreme Court, a patent shall
issue to the claimant, upon his presenting to the General Land Office
an authentic certificate of such confirmation, and a plat, or survey of
the said land duly certified and approved by the Surveyor General of
California
;
whose, duty it shall be to cause all private claims which shall
be finally confirmed, to be accurately surveyed, and to furnish plats of
the same
; and in the location of said claims, the said Surveyor General
shall have the same power and authority as are conferred on the Reg-
ister of the Land Office, and Receiver of the Public Monies of Louisiana,
by the sixth section of the Act ' To create the office of Surveyor of the
PubMc lands for the State of Louisiana, approved 3d of March, 1831.'"
That sixth section then is to be' considered, as if expressly inserted in,
and making a part of the Act of 1851, and is in the following words,
"That in relation to all such confirmed claims as may conflict, or in any
manner interfere with each other, the Register of the Land Office, and
Receiver of public monies for the proper land district, are hereby author-
ized to decide between the parties ; and shall in their decision be gov-
erned by such conditional lines, or boundaries, as have been, or may
be agreed upon between the parties interested, either verbally, or in
writing'; and in case no lines, or boundaries, be agreed upon between
the parties interested, then the said Register and Receiver, are hereby
authorized to decide between the parties, in such manner as may be con-
sistent with the principles of justice
;
and it shall be the duty of the
Surveyor General in the said State, to have those claims surveyed and
platted in accordance with the decisions of the Register and Receiver :
Provided, that the said decisions, and surveys, and patents which may
be issued in conformity thereto, shall not in any wise, be considered as
precluding a legal investigation, and decision, by the proper Judicial
tribunals between the parties to any such interfering claims, but shall
only operate as a relinquishment, on the part of the United States, of
all title to the land in question." Now, by the provisions of the 13th
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section of the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, it is the duty of the Sur-
veyor General, to cause all private land claims, which shall finally be
confirmed, to be accurately surveyed and platted out, whether there be
any conflicts or not. The introduction of the sixth section of the Act of
1831, provides for what may occur in the discharge of the general duty.
Where there are any conflicts, he shall decide them as provided for in
the sixth section of the Act, above transcribed. This duty he is not re-
quired to perform under our instructions. He, and not this Board, is
substituted for the Register and Receiver, as to this matter. If this
Board should undertake to direct the location or survey of those claims,
which necessarily includes their boundaries, and the courses and dis-
tances of the lines, we certainly usurp his functions, and to that extent
displace him from his office : unless we also hold that his duty in this
matter, only relates to cases where there are conflicts, or interferences
;
and that where there are none in the confirmed claims, it is our duty to
adjust the boundaries, and all else embraced in the terms location and
survey. If we restrict our duties to those cases alone, in which there
are no conflicts, or interferences, there will be not only a divided duty,
between that officer and this Board, he performing it independently of
us where there any contests in the matter, and subject to our instruc-
tions where there are none ; but there arises then, the difficulty of de-
termining before-hand, under whose jurisdiction the given case may fall
;
for the Act of 1851, not anticipating that difficulty, has made no pro-
vision for its solution
;
and after all our instructions on that head, of lo-
cation, boundaries, &c, he may be compelled to peform his functions as
prescribed by the Act, or, to adopt our determination on the subject
;
of which alternatives, I presume that he will not hesitate to take the
former.
The action of the Surveyor General, is not subject to our control, in
any manner. We do not cause the survey to be made. Every thing
required by the Act for us to do, might be performed, without there
being such an officer as Surveyor General in California. Not only is
there no reference in the Act to any duty to be performed by this
Board, of causing any survey, or location of claims, but the duty of the
Surveyor General in that regard is definitely prescribed to him : as an
independent officer, whose labors commence, after ours are terminated
and closed
;
and are founded in fact, upon that determination. I am
the more fully confirmed in this view of our respective duties, by con-
sidering the legislation of Congress, upon this subject, and the decisions
of the Supreme Court upon it. By the 2d section of the Act of the
26th of May, 1824, touching territory formerly acquired, this duty was
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expressly imposed upon the Court, using the same language in conferring
the power, which in this Act is used in reference to the Surveyor Gen-
eral
;
and it was by virtue of that section, that the Courts of the United
States have felt themselves bound to give directions upon that subject,
or to interfere with it in any manner. In 5th How., the Supreme Court,
speaking of this Act, say, " Under the rules prescribed for the govern-
ment of the Courts in the 2d section of that Act, it is their duty, first
to. determine all questions relative to the title of the claimant
; and
second "to ascertain the extent and locality of the claim, and cause it to
be surveyed, and marked by definite boundaries." In a case in 15th
Peters, on page 82, United States vs. Forbes, Judge Catron, in de-
livering the opinion of the Court, says, " First the paper title to such
private property, it is our duty to investigate, and ascertain, and by
our opinion to establish : and secondly, it is our duty to ascertain, and
cause to be surveyed and marked by definite boundaries the land granted."
In the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, when Congress, in view of all
their former legislation on cognate subjects, and the decisions of the
courts, came to act in reference to the same matter in California, they
omit the provision contained in the 2d section of the Act of the 26th of
May, 1824, conferring the power, and dicty to direct, or cause to be
made a survey of the land claimed, upon the tribunals designated, and
confer it explicitly upon the Surveyor General of California. The Sur-
veyor General, and not the Board, or Courts, as directed in the 2d
section of the Act of 1824, is required to cause all private land claims,
which shall be finally confirmed, to be accurately surveyed, and to
furnish plats of the same. This act of the Surveyor General, he may
not be required to perform, until after the expiration of the term for
which the Board is limited to exist. The whole and sole use of any
preliminary survey, before our confirmation of the claim, (and that is
stated in the instructions of the Land Office to this Board) is that it
will facilitate the future settlement of controversy, about the location of the
land claimed, and furnish evidence of the existence and nature of conflicting
claims. All this may do very well, but it relates to matters with which
this Board has nothing to do. It is not necessary to the discharge of
our duty, under the law which we are bound to obey ; nor does it in any
manner contribute towards the discharge of that duty. To encumber,
and clog, and delay the performance of the simple duty pointed out by
Congress for this Board, with the preliminary questions of surveys, and
conflicting, and interfering boundaries, all which belong to other tri-
bunals ; and this too at the expense of the claimant, who has no earthly
benefit from it in this contest, I cannot consent to do. The onerous
11
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imposition upon the claimant, under the Act of the 3d of March, 1851,
of the cost of a survey before he can present, or have a hearing, upon a
claim which may never be confirmed to him, is not right in itself, nor
required by law. The requirement seems to be connected with, and
founded upon a matter ulterior to the action of this Board, that is, the
settlement of the respective rights of parties between themselves, or
the United States, as to a matter, in the adjustment of which this
Board has no agency.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
GUILLERMO DOMINGO FOXOM, }
vs. \ No. 219l
THE UNITED STATES. )
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
GEORGE C YOUNT, 1
vs. > No. 243.
THE UNITED STATES. )
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
DAYID SPENCE, V
vs. \ No. 54.
THE UNITED STATES. J
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
SAMUEL J. HENSLEY, i
vs. > No. 230.
THE UNITED STATES. )
The claim presented in this case is founded upon an Expediente, con-
sisting of a petition accompanied with a* map or deseno of the land
asked for, addressed by the claimant to Micheltorena, Governor of
California, dated on the 25th of July, 1844 : a decree, entered thereon
of the same date, directing the Secretary of Dispatch, Manuel Jemeno,
to take the necessary steps for information : an order of the next day
by the said Secretary, addressed to Senor Augustus Sutter, for such
information
;
the report of that officer, on the 29th of September, 1844,
that the land sought was vacant ; an entry by the said Secretary of
the 11th of November, 1844, suggesting to the Governor, to suspend
all petitions of a similar kind, until he should visit that section of coun-
try, concluding' with the words, " but your Excellency will do in the
premises whatever to you may seem best : " an order without date in
the following words, " Let the same be done according to the infor-
mation." Signed, Micheltorena ; and finally, a copy of a document,
which was executed by Micheltorena, on the 22d of December, 1844.
The land claimed, although, for the reasons assigned by the officer
applied to for that purpose, it was not measured, nor delivered judicially
to the claimant, was occupied, built upon, and cultivated by him in the
year 1845, and afterwards more largely stocked, ditched, and cultivated.
All the documents composing this Expediente, are fully proved to be
genuine ; and the original document called the Title, signed by Michel-
torena on the 22d of December, 1844, was also proved by the testimony
of Capt. Sutter, to whom it was delivered ; who also proved that the
copy attached to the Expediente, was delivered to the claimant about
the 20th of April, 1845.
The important question for our decision in this case is, what is the
force and effect of that document above referred to, concluding the
Expediente, towards the investiture of the claimant with any right or
title,, to the land claimed, which, according to the principles prescribed
for our government, can be recognized and confirmed. That document
commences with a recital by the Governor, that not being able, in con-
sequence of his close occupation with the affairs of the Government to
extend one by one the respective titles to all the citizens who have
petitioned for lands, with a favorable information from Senor Don Au-
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gustus Sutter, Captain and Judge, in charge of the jurisdiction of New
Helvitia and Sacramento, I, in the name of the Mexican nation, by
these letters confer upon them and their families, the lands described
in their applications and maps, to all and each of them, who has solic-
ited and obtained favorable information from said Senor Sutter up to
this day, so that no one can dispute their titles. Senor Sutter will give
them a copy of this, in furtherance of a formal title, with which they
will present themselves to this Government to extend the same title, in
the proper form, and upon corresponding sealed paper. And for the
establishment of which fact for all time, I give this document, which
will be known and acknowledged by all the civil and military authorities
of the Mexican nation in this, and the other departments. Duly
authenticated with the seal of the government, and the military seal in
Monterey, this, 22d of December, 1844. Signed, Micheltorena."
I entertain no doubt, that this document, which was signed by Mi-
cheltorena, and delivered to Capt. Sutter, has the same validity and
effect, as if delivered to each individual, whom it was intended to ben-
efit and embrace
;
in other words, that it is of the same force and effect
as if, instead of being merely descriptive of the grantees, it had been
made to each and every one of them, ncminatim. The object of all
rules of interpretation is to discover the intention of the party ; and
any words which are sufficient to denote the persons meant, and to dis-
tinguish them from all others, operate as a good description. Green-
leafs Evidence, 364, paragraph 287. G.reenleafs Cruse on Real Prop-
erty, 206, title, 38. Devise, ch. 10, sect. 26 and 27. Nor is there
any difference in this particular between public and private grants.
The doctrine is, that, even in grants by the Sovereign, in which noth-
ing passes by implication, a grant in general terms referring to a cer-
tainty, is the same as if the certainty had been expressed in the grant
itself ; though such certainty be not of record, but lie in averment, by
matter in pais, or in fact. 2d Greenleafs Cruse, title 24. King's
Grants, Sect. 15 and 18. In this document, executed by Micheltorena,
he states, that owing to the pressure of his official duties, he cannot ex-
ecute a title in form, one by one, to all those who have petitioned for
land and have a favorable information ; but that there may be no fail-
ure of colonization, which was the cherished policy of the nation ; nor
any injustice to the citizen, he executes* a solemn deed, containing the
strongest words of grant or concession ; describing the thing granted
with sufficient certainty, by express reference to the petition and map
or deseno, in which, in this instance at least, its quantity and bounda-
ries are given : describing the grantees, as those petitioners who have
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obtained favorable reports from Senor Sutter, a high functionary of the
government in the district where the land was situated, in response to
his own order for information addressed to that officer.
The considerations upon which Micheltorena executed and delivered
that document, are precisely those which are prescribed by the Mexican
Decree of the 18th of August, 1824, and by the Ordinance of the 21st
of November, 1828. According to the scheme or plan established by
that Decree and Ordinance, for the disposition, settlement, and coloni-
zation of the public domain, upon the application by any one in writing
to the Political Chief of the Territory, it became his duty to obtain the
necessary information, both as it regarded the land and the applicant,
and where the requirements of the law were met, to sign a document,
in accordance with the 4th and 8th articles of the said Ordinance,
which was to serve as a title. There was no particular form prescribed
in which that document should be framed, which the Governor is there
requested to sign, and in virtue of which the party "may proceed to
the possession."
The object and effect of the document issued in this instance, were
not merely a manifestation on the part of the Governor, that he was
satisfied that the persons therein described, were entitled to grants
;
but to transfer to them, a right and title to the land. That intention is
clearly conveypd by this language, "In the name of the Mexican Nation,
I confer by these letters the land," &c, "so that no one can dispute
their title." And at the same time, that for the reason alleged, a more
formal instrument is not executed in extenso, to each person thus ac-
knowledged to be entitled to the land described in the petition and
map, yet a most solemn assurance is given that such formal title, will be
extended, at any future time, upon the application of the party. Nor
was there any time limited within which this more formal title was to
be applied for. But it was evidently an act for the benefit of the
grantee, and one in which the interest of the Government was not
materially involved. She had substantially, according to the mode
adopted by her, parted with her title to the land ; and this more formal
extension, was for the satisfaction, or better security of the grantee.
The subsequent conditions which the Governor could lawfully impose,
and which were usually inserted in the formal grants, had they been
explicitly introduced, and their strict performance neglected, that neglect
according to the principles heretofore adopted by this Board, would not
without any action had under the former Government, have constituted,
per se, a forfeiture of the title. And where omitted in the grant, they ex-
isted by virtue of the law.
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Even if the document relied upon by the claimant, be not a full,
complete, and perfect title, there can be no doubt, it seems to me, that
it has the force and effect of a bond for the future execution of such a
complete and perfect title ; and upon the principles of equity, ought to
have been, and doubtless would have been specifically performed if the
former Government had continued, and the execution of a more formal
title had been desired by the party concerned.
The fact that this Expediente was not returned by the claimant, and
deposited with the public archives, is not deemed destructive of his right.
It is true that the proceedings of all the Departments in any way con-
cerned with the disposition of the public domain, were required to be
preserved ; and constitute the public archives. The finding an Expediente
among those archives does furnish evidence that it is not a fictitious or
forged proceeding, but it is not conclusive evidence of that fact. And that
one is not to be now found there, is not conclusive against its verity
;
because there is the most incontestibie evidence, that documents once
there, are not now to be found. We all know, as a matter of general
history, that the public archives of California, have been, in those often
repeated seasons of domestic broils, and civil revolution, to which she
has been fated, not only neglected in their original constitution, or form-
ation, but were afterwards exposed to destruction and spoliation. It is
not to be sure, in evidence in this case, but testimony has been taken
by us, establishing the fact that those very archives, were on one occasion
at least of civil feud, used as so much waste paper, by the soldiers, for
the purpose of making cartridges,—that* the doors of the house in which
they were deposited, were open for a long time, without any custodian,
and that they were accessible to any one, for any purpose, either of
alteration, subtraction or addition. I do not therefore think that the
fact of the non-existence of an Expediente, among the public archives,
is conclusive against the right of a claimant, though it certainly throws
upon him an increased burthen of proof. In the case now before us,
from the evidence on file, it appears that the interval of time, between
the completion of the Expediente, and the hoisting of the American
flag, on the 7th of July, 1846, was, to a great extent, a period of revo-
lutionary warfare, in which the Governor, Micheltorena, was himself
expelled from the country : and that a neglect during that period of all
concerned in the making, and preserving the memoranda of proceed-
ings appropriate to the different Departments of the Government, is
reasonably accounted for. Silent leges inter arma.
All the objections to which this claim is obnoxious, not disposed of
by this opinion, have been fully considered, and overruled in the case of
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Cruz Cervantes, and of others heretofore decided. Upon the principles
of decision prescribed for our government, in the 11th section of the Act
af the 3d of March, 1851, we are of the opinion, that the claim is valid,
and we proceed to enter the Decree of final confirmation. Commissioner
Hall concurs in the result.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
GUILLERMO CASTRO,
^
*» > No. 285..
THE UNITED STATES. )
Decided on principles settled in prior cases..
DANIEL WRIGHT, et al. 1
vs. > No. 69,
THE UNITED STATES. )
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
CONCESSION MUNRAS, £
vs. 1 No. 145.
THE UNITED STATES. (
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
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STEPHEN SMITH,
^
vs. \ No. 23.
THE UNITED STATES. J
The claim presented in this case is founded upon a grant made by
Manuel Micheltorena to the claimant on the 14th of September, 1844.
The grant is for eight square leagues of land, or 8 sitios de ganada
mayor • under and in virtue of the Decree of the 18th of August, 1824,
and the Ordinance of the 21st of November, 1828, of the Mexican Gov-
ernment. The approval of the Departmental Assembly was procured
by the Governor on the 22d of April, 1846. There was no judicial
measurement, and delivery of possession subsequent to the grant : but
the map, or deseno, accompanying the petition in this case, is made
with great care, and the land has been constantly possessed by the
claimant, at least from the date of the grant, if not before, who erected
expensive buildings upon it, not only for residence, but for purposes of
manufacture and ingenious machinery : which seems to have constituted,
in part at least, the motive or consideration of the grant. The gen-
uineness of the grant, and the authority of the Governor who made it
are not. controverted. The evidence introduced from the Archives is
satisfactory upon those points. With regard to the objection, founded
on the 12th section of the Decree of the 18th of August, 1824, of the
Mexican Government, raised upon an agreed statement of facts, which
is contended to effect the validity of the grant, because it shews an ex-
cessive ownership above the quantity of eleven leagues allowed to any
one individual, we have only to say, that whatever may have been the
intention of that section, we think that the word propriedad, contem-
plates an interest of a different character from that which was in the
grantee at the date of his grant. The evidence is, of a possession un-
der a contract to purchase six leagues of land from one Berry. Now
possession of itself, in the Spanish law, does not constitute a proprietor.
And the contract to purchase, even if it were assumed, (which the state-
ment does not warrant,) that Berry was himself the owner of the prop-
erty in the land which he had so contracted to convey, does not consti-
tute the claimant a proprietor.
There is a peculiar feature in this case, which though it does not
affect the decision, yet deserves some consideration, as it has been con-
sidered to affect the question of the ten littoral leagues. I allude to
the application to the Federal Government, for its approval of this
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grant, and the prohibition, contained in the favorable response of that
Government, of future grants in like cases. There is no explicit object
disclosed in the Expediente for this application, nor any certainty of the
point to which the prohibition was directed. It is true that a Decree
of Santa Anna in 1 S42, prohibited grants to all Foreigners, without the
approbation of the Federal Government ; repealing to that extent the
Decree of the 18th of August, 1824. But the grantee, Smith, with the
view of obtaining the preference given by the 9th section of the said
Decree of August, 1824, over the other persons who were then seeking
the same place, under the suggestion made by the Prefect Estrada in
his report to the Governor, had become a citizen prior to the grant ; so
that the approval was not needed on account of the alienage of the
grantee. It could not relate to the locality of the land within the ten
littoral leagues, because Micheltorena, both before and after, made
grants within them, without any such application
;
and Alvarado,
upon whose testimony alone this matter rests, as Governor, made many
grants within the littoral leagues, as did all the Governors of California,
without, in a single instance, any reference to the Federal Government,
so far as the Archives shew, having ever been made. If there were not,
in the grant, an express exclusion of the Port of Ross, and its environs,
the supposition would be very reasonable, that this document spoken of
by Alvarado, referred to that Port : and it is possible, that such may
have been the end and aim of that dispatch. But there is one fact in
this case, which it is apparent, would well warrant, if it did not cause,
the application for the approval of the Federal Government, as well as
the inhibition, of any more grants of the like kind, at the date of this
instrument. Bodega was a Russian settlement, made under a contract
between the former Government and the Russian Company, or its Gov-
ernment
;
and upon that account, grants should not have been made of
land thus situated, until an adjustment by the Government of the un-
settled claim of that Company. This view is strongly corroborated, by
the testimony of a very intelligent witness in this case, John J. Yioget,
who testifies, that his application for this identical place, was made be-
fore that of Smith : that his pretention was not rejected, but postponed,
as he was informed by the public authorities, until they could hear from
Mexico, since the claim of the Russian Company to the land had not
been terminated.
According to the principles laid down for our decision in the 11th
section of the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, the claim is valid, and
ought to be confirmed. Commissioner Hall concurs in the result.
12 HARRY I. THORNTON.
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ANTONIO MARIA LUGO, i
vs. > No. 308.
THE UNITED STATES. J
The claim presented in this case would seem to rest, as well upon
ancient grants and assurances, made prior to the establishment of the
Independence of Mexico, as upon a grant by Alvarado, the Governor
of California, made in the year 1837. Prom the most careful examina-
tion, however, which I can make, of the various muniments of title
introduced, I am brought to the conclusion that the only basis upon
which a confirmation of the claim can be sustained, is the proceeding
had under and in virtue of the Decree of the 18th of August, 1824,
and of the Ordinance of the 21st of November, 1828, of the Mexican
Government
;
which resulted in a grant, made to the claimant,, on the
27th of September, 1838.
The claimant on the 26th of April,. 1837, presented to the Governor
his petition, in which he sets forth three documents, pertaining to the
land for which he solicited a title. The first of those documents is a
declaration by Guillermo Corta, made at the request of the claimant,
on the 18th of March, 1837 ; who states that as commissioner of the
city of Los Angeles, in the year 1810, he received orders from Don
Jose Arguello,.then Governor of the Province, to give possession of a
place for raising large cattle, to the claimant ; and that he did so, in
the place called San Antonio. He proceeds to state the boundaries of
the place, of which he so put the claimant in possession. All which he
says was with the understanding that he should not injure any individ-
ual of the city. The second document thus referred to in the petition
to the Governor, of the same date, and made by the same person as the
first, declares thus: "I, Guillermo^ Corta, say that in the year 1827,
being Alcalde of this City, by the order of the Senor Commanding
General, Don Jose Maria de Echandria, the place of Don Antonio
Maria Lugo was enlarged, and it was from the sycamores, which he
has for a boundary, to the point of the Mesa." The third document
relied upon in the said petition, consists of a solicitation by the claimant,
dated September the 6th, 1833, addressed to the Ayuntiemento of the
Pueblo of Los Angeles, for a portion of the common lands of that
Pueblo ; stating that the place on which he is settled, was not sufficient
for the increase of his large stock of cattle, &c. ; and the Decree of
that body in response to his solicitation, by which, for the reasons
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alleged, they resolved to lend to him the land asked, declaring it at the
same time to be " the common lands of the City," &c. These documents
do not amount to satisfactory evidence of a grant of the full property,
nor even of an inceptive title, afterwards to be extended into a perfect
conveyance, of any portion of the lands described in them. They rather
imply a tenancy at will, or a permissive occupancy, than a grant of the
full and perfect property. That portion averred to have been the com-
mon land of the Pueblo, is expressly declared to have been only loaned to
the claimant. There is in addition to those documents, now introduced,
a petition of the claimant preferred on the 21st of March, 1823, in re-
monstrance against an aggressive resolution of the Ayuntiemento of
Los Angeles, to eject him from his possession
;
and an order of Gover-
nor Arguello, to whom it was presented
;
which also fail to satisfy my
mind of the existence of any grant prior to that time, of the full prop-
erty to the claimant. This last petition to Arguello alleges only a grant
of the possession of a small place in the neighborhood of the Pueblo of
his residence
;
and the order of the Governor sustains that possession,
as legitimate, concluding with an injunction upon the authorities of the
Pueblo, not to take a similar course in other like cases, without his
knowledge. The claimant, on the 26th of April, 1837, filed a petition
to the Governor, in which he states, " that having a sufficiency of cattle
and horses to stock the places which I have had provisionally granted
to me, as appears by the three documents contained in the annexed
Expediente, I come to request your Excellency to have the goodness to
grant me the corresponding possession, and documents which may serve
for a title."
It seems to my mind, in the absence of the decrees themselves, and
of any special evidence of their contents, that is of the Decree of Dario
Arguello, in virtue of which, Corta states he put the claimant in pos-
session
;
and of Echandria in augmentation of that possession ; and
from the statement of the claimant, as to the nature of his right in his
petition to Alvarado, that there was only a legitimate possession, under
a grant, or decree of the right to occupy the premises, anterior to the
grant of Alvarado, in the year 1837. In the Spanish law, the doctrine
is, " poseedor. se opone a proprietorio." One can be possessor without
being proprietor, and vice versa. Escreche, titles poseedor and posesion.
The genuineness of the grant, and the authority to make it, are not
controverted. The long possession of the land granted in this case, by
well defined lines and boundaries, its occupation and residence upon it,
in buildings erected by the claimant, all, for years anterior to the grant,
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are fully established by regularly authenticated transcripts from the
archives of the former governments of the country, by documentary and
other evidence on file in the case.
The conclusion that the claim in this case rests upon the grant of
Alvarado, and of course that it must be in accordance with the Decree
and Ordinance of the Mexican Government, above cited, makes it
necessary to advert to the fact of its quantity ; since neither the grant,
nor perhaps any thing else in the Expediente, ascertains expressly the
number of square leagues which were intended to be granted ; and
especially, since by that Decree and Ordinance, the maximum of eleven
square leagues, and the minimum of two hundred varas square, are fixed,
in every grant of the public domain, to be made after that enactment,
and cannot be legally departed from. This Decree and Ordinance do
not require that the granting officer should specify the quantity, but
only that no more nor less than they authorize, shall be granted to one
individual. The grant in this case is clearly one by metes and bounds,
designating no specific quantity ; and there is no alternative left for this
Board but to declare it void, for that omission, which would be a most
harsh construction, or to confirm it in such manner, ut res magis valeat,
quam pereat, that the grant may not fail, nor yet the law be violated.
We must presume that the Governor neither intended to do a vain and
idle thing, nor to violate the law by granting more than that law
would allow. To carry out those fair presumptions, we ought to con-
firm the claim, if it be otherwise unexceptionable, and at the same time
guard that confirmation, by such restrictive provisos and qualifications
as to prevent any infraction of the law of quantity.
In this case, in one of the clauses of conditions subsequent, attached
to the grant, a requirement is made of the officer who shall measure
the land, that he report to the Governor the number of square leagues
that the grant contains. This officer did make an elaborate measure-
ment, which it would seem has ever since been recognized in the coun-
try
; and the presumption is, that he reported it to the Governor. At
all events, whether he did so or not, his failure, without any act done
under the former government, to manifest any dissatisfaction with the
grant as made, would not, I humbly conceive, work a forfeiture of the
right of the grantee. The objection that the land lies within the ten
littoral leagues, and all other objections not disposed of in this opinion,
have already been considered and overruled by this Board, in the case
of Cruz Cervantes, and others heretofore decided.
According to the principles of decision prescribed for us in the 11th
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section of the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, we think the claim is
valid, and now proceed to enter a decree of final confirmation. Com-
missioner Hall concurs in the result.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
JUAN B. R. COOPER, 1
vs
- > No. 138.
THE UNITED STATES. )
This claim is founded on a grant made in June, 1822, by Pedro
Yigente Sola, to Jose Joaquin de la Torre. Whatever right or title
was vested in the said grantee has been by apt and proper mesne con-
veyances, transferred to the present claimant. The question of the
existence of any right or title in the original grantee has been raised,
and its non-existence strenuously insisted upon, because, as is contended,
the Governor wTho made the grant had no authority to make it. If this
grant had been made during the existence of the Spanish Government
over this country,, I would not feel the slightest difficulty on the question.
I would not ask the claimant to produce any direct authority emanating
from the King, from the Viceroy, the Commandante of the Internal
Provinces, or from anybody else, to make this grant, more especially as
it was made in reward of long military services. In accordance with
the well settled doctrine of the law, so often affirmed and reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court of the United States, I would presume the existence
of authority. The doctrine of presumption in such cases, has been re-
peated so often in such different forms of language, that it has become
as familiar as a household maxim of that Court. The following summary
announcement of this doctrine, and the few references cited, I consider
amply sufficient on this question.
The Courts presume that every Government has power to dispose of
its land, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it
exists in the officer or tribunal who exercised it by making grants ; and
the acts of public officers in disposing of public land, by color, or claim
of public authority, are to be received as evidence of title until their
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authority to make the grant is disproved by those who oppose the title
set up under it, 6th Peters, 691, 728 ; 8th Peters, 459 ; 9th Peters,
759. The only open question, according to my view, touching the
authority to make this grant, arises out of the fact that it was made
after the independence of Mexico, and before any enactment by the new
Government of any special decree, prescribing any defined mode of
disposing of the public domain. This grant was made by Governor
Sola, by the authority and in the name of his Imperial Majesty, Itur-
bide, then Emperor of Mexico, under the name of Augustin the First.
If the presumption above mentioned is not to be indulged, of the author-
ity of Sola to make a grant, acting as Governor, the highest officer in
the province, under color and claim of authority, and in the name of his
Imperial Majesty, who was then invested with the absolute authority of
a Dictator over the country
;
yet there was, as I humbly conceive, an
express recognition of the authority of all the existing public officers,
to perform all their wonted functions, until new decrees should be made
changing those functions, or requiring their performance by other func-
tionaries. Through all the convulsive stages of that revolution which
terminated in the independence of Mexico, and afterwards, it seems that
great care was taken to preserve and continue the administration of the
Government, in all its departments ; and in point of fact, grants of the
public land were made, at least in this province, by the Governors,
under the old forms, until the enactment of the decree of the ISth of
August, 1824, and the ordinance of the 21st of November, 1828, of
the Mexican Government, Sola, who made the grant, was, according
to the history of the times, Governor of this province under the former
Government of Spain, and having complied with the requirement of
the Plan of Iguala, as to the declaration of allegiance to the new Gov-
ernment, continued after Independence was declared to act as before,
except that his style was changed, from the name of his Catholic Majes-
ty, to that of Imperial Majesty.
I deduce the authority of Sola, from authoritative Public Acts of the
country, whose officer he claimed to be. By the 15th article of the
Plan of Iguala, it is provided, " The junta will take care that every De-
partment of the State remain without any alteration whatsoever, and
all the political, ecclesiastical, civil and military officers continue in the
same state they are this day. Those only who shall not declare for the
Plan shall be removed, substituting in their places those who may best
distinguish themselves by their virtue and merit." This Plau was pro-
mulgated bv Iturbide, on the 24th of February. 1821. Bv the treaty
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at the City of Cordova, on the 24th of August, 1821, between Senores
Don Juan Donoju and Don Augustin de Iturbide, it was provided in
the 12th section, that "the provisional Junta being established, shall
govern in the mean-time conformably to the laws in force in every par-
ticular, which does not oppose the Plan of Iguala, and whilst the Cortes
shall form the constitution of the State." In conformity with this ex-
pression of the national will, in the plan of Iguala,- and treaty of Cor-
dova, on the 5th of October, 1821, the following decree was enacted :
" The Provisional, and Sovereign, and Administrative Junta of the Mex-
ican Empire, considering that from the moment that independence of
Spain was solemnly declared, all the authority necessary for the exer-
cise of the administration of justice and other public functions, must
emanate from the Empire, have thought proper to confirm and legalize
all the authorities in the legitimate exercise of their respective functions,
for the present, in conformity with the Plan of Iguala, and the treaty of
the City of Cordova." I am of the opinion that it was one of the legit-
imate functions of the Governor of California, in which he was confirmed
by the said decree, prior to the establishment of Mexican independence,
to make such grants as this, and that his continuing to make them after
the independence, was well warranted by law. The genuineness of the
grant is not controverted. Although from the statement of the Sur-
veyor General, the keeper of the archives, which statement is admitted
as evidence in the case, there does not appear to be anything therein,
relating to it, but a memorandum of such a grant, in a book containing
a catalogue of titles, &c.
;
yet the original grant is produced and fully
proved. The grant is of the place ly name, which was known prior to the
issuance thereof. Its possession was had and enjoyed by the grantee
under a provisional grant of occupancy before the 23d of June, 1822,
when, upon his petition the full ownership was conferred upon him. It was
occupied also, by one Milligan, the transfer to whom of one moiety of
it, by the grantee, and of the same, by Milligan to the present claim-
ant, was made before an Alcalde of the district, and approved by the
Territorial Deputation. The present claimant has been in possession
ever since his purchase, down to the present time. The land claimed
in this case, is to my mind satisfactorily segregated from the public
domain by the proof of its identity, and of the possession thereof up to
the limits or. bounds described in the map, and also in the deed from
Torre, the grantee, to the claimant, which though not evidence of title
against the Government is competent evidence as to the extent of
possession had and enjoyed under the title.
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In accordance with the principles of decision laid down for our gov-
ernment in the 11th section of the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, we
think that the claim is valid, and proceed to enter the decree of final
confirmation, Commissioner Hall concurs in the result.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
JOSE DEL CARMEN LUGO, )
vs. > No. 316.
THE UNITED STATES. >
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
SALVADOR VALLEJO, )
vs. > No. 194.
THE UNITED STATES. }
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
VICTOR LINARES, }
vs. > No. 39.
THE UNITED STATES. S
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
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ANASTASIO CARRILLO,
^
«* > No>. 328v
THE UNITED STATES. }
This claim is founded upon a grant made by Governor Pio Pico, on
the 18th of October, 1845, to the claimant, for a suerte or lot of ground,
of four hundred varas square, a Utile more or less. The grant recites
that the necessary examinations had been previously made
;
and in the
name of the Mexican Government, declares the ownership in the gran-
tee, of the said ground, in conformity with the Decree of the 18th of
August, 1824, and of the Ordinance of the 21st of November, 1828, of
the Mexican Nation. There does not appear to have been any ap-
proval of the grant obtained by the Governor, from the Departmental
Assembly, nor any official measurement, and judicial possession had dur-
ing the existence of the former Government • which however did not con-
tinue for a year after the making of the grant. But the actual occu-
pation and use of the place are proved to have been enjoyed by the
grantee, from the date of the grant to the present time. The land is
within the ten littoral leagues. All the objections to the confirmation
of this claim have been considered and overruled by this Board, in the
case of Cruz' Cervantes, and of others heretofore decided. The Archives
of the former Government, according to the statement of their custo-
dian, admitted as evidence in this case, shew that such a grant was
made ; and although there has not been found an Expediente of the
title, among them, yet the original grant is introduced, and its genuine-
ness fully established.
The only question of any consideration in this case, is that of the
identification or segregation of the land from the remainder of the pub-
lic domain. The identification must be ascertained, by the grant itself,
or be capable of being ascertained by extraneous testimony : 15th Pe-
ters, 215, &c. The grant describes the land as a suerte, or lot, in the
marshes, contiguous to the Mission of Santa Barbara, which was for-
merly occupied by the deceased Indian, Juan Pablo, of the aforesaid Mis-
sion : and is for the quantity of four hundred varas square, a little more
or less. The facts, if they exist, and be shewn by proof will lead to the
place, so as to enable the Surveyor General to locate it without any
difficulty. It was so designated and plotted off, as appears by the map
in evidence ; and although that was done subsequent to the change of
13
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Government, yet as a means of identifying the land granted, and as evi-
dence in connection with the possession, of its segregation from the
public domain, it may well be considered.
In the confirmation of this claim it is necessary to determine whether
the intention of the grantor was, to convey a specific let or pared of land,
or merely to convey a given quantity, at the place indicated. If a quan-
tity merely, and not a specific, and known piece of land, as a unit, was
the subject of the grant, then the words a little more or less, according
to our previous decisions, are mere redundant expressions or terms, hav-
ing no effect whatever, neither avoiding the grant for uncertainty, nor
increasing or diminishing the quantity, expressly named. In large ru-
ral grants, in a sparsely inhabited and wild country, where the quantity
grantable is limited by law
;
where the map or deseno, referred to in
the grant is made by conjecture without any survey, and more espec-
ially where there is an express reservation of the sobrante, or overplus
within the map, which may result from the survey of the granted quan-
tity, the construction above stated seems altogether reasonable. But
where the grant is of a piece of ground, in language embracing the
whole of it, which is not wild land, but in the midst of a settlement, and
which may be reasonably supposed to be known as containing a grant-
able quantity, then the words more or less, or a little more or less, are
not insignificent, but apt and appropriate terms, implying, as they al-
ways do, except when overcome by circumstances which may be law-
fully regarded, or by countervailing terms, a grant of a specific tract or
parcel of land. In the case now presented, I think the grant is of this
specific character. It is of a small parcel contiguous to the Mission of
Santa Barbara, without the almost universal reservation of a sobrante
;
the place had been occupied in severalty before its grant
;
and above
all, the grant is of a " suerte de tierra," which means a lot of ground al-
ready separated from others, by its own boundaries, being synonymous
with the agellus singularis, ab aliis distinctus, of the Romans. The
question is one of no great interest, if of any at all, to the parties in this
case ; for, if the grant be considered as one for the quantity of four
hundred varas square, it must be of that quantity within the bounds of
the place designated, if it contain so much ; and, since those bounds ap-
pear not to contain the quantity of four hundred varas square, the re-
sult would be the same, no matter how the grant may be construed in
this particular. In accordance with the principles laid down for our
government in the decision of the claims presented, in the 11th section
of the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, this claim is valid, and ought to
be confirmed. Commissioner Hall concurs in the result.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
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ANTONIO CAZARES,
)
vs. \ No. 19.
THE UNITED STATES. )
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
CATALINA MUNRAS, }
vs. > No. 155.
THE UNITED STATES. }
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
JUACHIM CARRILLO, }
vs. V No. 15.
THE UNITED STATES. }
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
CAYETANO JUARES, 1
vs. > No. 126.
THE UNITED STATES. )
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
JOSE MARIA AGUILAR, }
vs. > No. 360.
THE UNITED STATES. J
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
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OPINION
Overruling motion to intervene in the Las Pulgas Claim, No. 2,
under a rule adopted by the board as then constituted. there was
already one intervention in the case.
If the rule adopted by this Board, as it was formerly organized,
allowing the intervention of third persons, were merely a rule of practice,
I would probably raise no objection to the motion now submitted. But
in my view of the matter it is far otherwise. It is at war with the
general scheme and plan of the act creating the Board, besides being a
palpable violation of many of its express requisitions. For instance,
that act among other things makes it our duty, after hearing the evi-
dence of the claimant on the one side, and of the United States on the
other, to decide promptly on the claim. Now to delay, for the purpose
of allowing testimony to be taken by an outsider, which under the act
I cannot consider in the determination of the case, is inconsistent with
the duty of prompt action by the Board. The proposition is now made,
at the trial, to admit a fourth party to come into this case.
Let this Commission do what it may, towards the end of determining
between adverse claimants before it, whether under different grants or
under the same grant, and it will result in nothing but a loss of time,
that is alone an insurmountable objection to the rule. That loss of
time involves so much injury to the claimant, and to the whole country,
by delaying the ascertainment of the public land, that it is of the deep-
est interest to all parties concerned, that the rule should be arrested.
That aDy decree or decision of this Board, or any of the Courts author-
ized to revise its proceedings ; or even a patent procured in virtue of
the same, can have any effect decisive of the conflicting rights or titles
of claimants, is a supposition directly in oppugnance to the express in-
tention manifested and declared in the 15th section of the Act of the
3d of March, 1851. The rule is based upon the intention on the part of
this Board, to settle questions of right between contesting .claimants,
by confirming one of their claims and rejecting that of the other ; and
this, even when it is ascertained beyond doubt, that according to the
test which the United States has prescribed to govern the controversy
before the Board, between a claimant and herself, she has no title. But
it is said to be the duty of the Commissioners to determine between
persons claiming adversely the same land, which of them has the strong-
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est claim on the United States for confirmation
;
and the rule declared
that " when the same tract of land, or a portion of it, is claimed ad-
versely, under Spanish or Mexican titles, by two petitioners, either or
both of them may file a motiou in the case of the other, for leave to
appear and contest the right of the petitioner to a confirmation of his
claim." If anything substantial is to be the result of this contestation,
it is the confirmation of one, and the rejection of the claim of the other,
where the Government has no title to the land. Now the law under
which this Board acts, declares in the section above cited, that a
confirmation—nay, not even a patent, procured by virtue of said con-
firmation, shall affect the interests of third persons
;
and who those third
persons are, can be no others than those who are not parties in the
case, as those, parties are defined in the act, viz : the claimant on the
one side, and the United States on the other. Suppose a claim be
presented, and the Board should come to the conclusion that there is
such equity in it as to warrant its confirmation, and certifiy it acord-
ingly. Afterwards, however, in the course of the existence of the Board,
the case of another claimant comes up, whose claim covers in part, if
not in whole, the land which has been confirmed to the first-named
claimant ; and the Board should become satisfied that this last has the
strongest claim on the United States for confirmation. It would seem
to be a necessary course for the Board to take, under the principle of
the rule, to refuse a confirmation, even to the best claim, on the ground
that they had already made a decree of confirmation of the same land
to another. To be consistent, and carry out the principle on which
alone the rule can rest, the Board ought not to decree a confirmation in
any case, until after the time expires for the presentation of claims, lest
they might confirm to one whose boundaries or title might in some way
conflict with another. It is admitted, however, that where there is no
formal application made to appear and contest, there may be two con-
firmations of the same land to different persons. The rule involves the
proposition that a confirmation and patent to the first, destroys the
right of the other. The law, however, says this shall not be the case.
The terms used in the first section of the Act, " that, for the purpose
of ascertaining and settling private land claims in the State of Cali-
fornia, a Commission shall be, and the same is hereby, constituted,"
etc., are convertible terms with these, "that for the purpose of ascer-
taining and settling the public domain in the State of California, a
Commission shall be, and is hereby, constituted," etc. The settlement
or ascertainment of the one, is necessarily the ascertainment and set-
tlement of the other. The object of the Act, as far as the Board is
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concerned, is to settle and ascertain what is private property, and
not whose it is ; for if it be not public domain, it matters not to the
Government to which one of her citizens it may belong. The whole
time consumed under this rule, and doubtless it would continue to be
the case, so far as the interventions are founded on different original
grants, has been in a mere dispute about boundaries, as to which, if
there be anything more clearly than anything else, provided by the Act
of the 3d of March,1851, it is, that with that subject this Board has
nothing to do. An examination of the 13th section of that Act, and
the 6th section of the 3d of March, 1831, "To create the office of
Surveyor of the Public Lands for the State of Louisiana," which is re-
enacted by the Act of 1851, makes that proposition too clear to need
any discussion. With respect to Private Land Claims in Louisiana and
Florida, it has been . made the duty of the District Court, by the 2d
section of the Act of the 26th of May, 1 824, to decide on their boundaries,
etc. But Congress thought proper, when they came to legislate on the
subject of the private land claims in California, to adopt the 6th section
of the Act of the 3d of March, 1831, above cited, and to require their
location and survey to be made, though not conclusively, by the Sur-
veyor General, and not by this Board ; and perhaps all the contests
between different grants will be mere questions of conflicting boundaries.
Upon this subject of the adjustment of conflicting boundaries, I refer to
the opinion filed by me on the motion in Bernal's case, No. 30, for a
decree of confirmation, without an initiatory survey.
The error in this matter consists in the idea that the United States
intended through the instrumentality of this Board, and of the courts
put in requisition by the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, to grant lands
or confer titles to land, when she declares that she has no such intention,
.
but only to ascertain what lands had already been granted. If the inten-
tion of Congress were to grant land, then there would be good reason
to tax them with the folly of iutending a thing which they have taken
the most special pains to declare shall not be accomplished. There is
so plain and marked a difference between merely authorizing a confirm-
ation and patent, when such confirmation and patent are expressly
declared to be of no force against any third person, but merely to bar
any right which might be supposed to exist in the grantor, and doing
the same thing, for the purpose and intent of creating and conferring a
title by one who claims the absolute ownership of the premises, that it
seems difficult to confound the two things. If land which belongs to
the United States, or which she, in her sovereign political capacity, has
asserted to be public domain, on the ground that the title to it devolved .
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upon her from the former sovereign, is granted by her without qualifica-
tion or reserve, the result would generally be that her officers, judges,
and citizens, too, would acquiesce in her asserted claim. If after a
grant of such land to one of her citizens, she were improvidently to
grant the same land to another, her first grant would be maintained in
a contest between the two grantees. But I presume it is competent to
the United States to declare by law what shall be the effect of her own
future grants ; or that a Government, like an individual, may make a
quitclaim deed. If the competency of the Government to do this is-
admitted, which I presume can hardly be denied, the question is simply
this : has she done so in this case ? If she were to set about doing it
with the fullest purpose, I do not think she could have been more suc-
cessful in the use of language to effect that specific intention, than she
has used in the 15th section of the Act of the 3d of March, 1851.
It is bootless to inquire what will be the condition of the claimants if
this Board does not settle all the questions between them, about their
lines and boundaries, and also all the questions upon which their claims
to landed estate may rest, growing out of the numberless contracts which
they have for years been making with each other, or growing out of
the laws of marriage, of descent, of wills and testaments, which may
bear upon their interests. It does seem to me, that after a tract of
land is decided to be no part of the public domain of the United States,
contests about it, between the citizens, in which the Government has
no concern, might be confided to the courts and juries of the country,
Federal and State. If Congress in the Act of the 3d of March, 1851,
has made none, or a very limited and inadequate provision for this set-
tlement of mere private rights, that is no reason why this Board should
undertake to supply what can be done much more to the satisfaction of
those concerned, in the regularly constituted judicial tribunals, of the
country. But it must be borne in mind that the Government has through
the instrumentality of this act removed all difficulty out of the way of
claimants, in asserting their rights, by clothing them all with patents,
and thus enabling them to stand in any court, their title being imperfect
and purely equitable, non obstante. JSTo one who had obtained the ben-
efit intended for him by the law, can be met with an older patent, which
ex necessitate rei is anterior in date, and be told by the holder of such
patent that it is conclusive against him, and shuts the door of justice
against any assertion of his right. The idea seems to have been enter-
tained by Congress, that there were not a great number of complete
and perfect titles in California ; at all events, they provided that where
there was any right or title, the Government should declare, by her
patent, that she had no interest, and thus enable the parties to assert
their rights, obviating the objection founded on the political announce-
ment which had been previously made by Congress, and sustained by
the Supreme Judiciary of the country, that as to all inchoate or imperfect
titles held by the former inhabitants of newly acquired territory, they
could not be recognized by the judicial tribunals. Through the in-
strumentality of the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, two' highly important
objects are sought to be obtained—First, the extent of the public
domain in California is proposed to be ascertained and settled ; and,
second, the owners of private claims, whether the- original grantees, or
claimants under them, are invested with the panoply of a Government
patent, which will enable them to prosecute and defend these claims,
in those tribunals of the country which, under the Constitution of the
United States, are provided for the protection of the rights of the
citizen. This Board is not such a tribunal as the Constitution guaranties
for the adjustment of contests between the original grantee and those
who claim under him as his vendees, between different vendees for
portions of the same grant, or between persons who claim the same
land by virtue of different grants from the former Governments of the
country.
The Act of the 3d of March, 1851, directs- this Board to decide upon
the validity of the claim. The idea that this requirement involves neces-
sarily the determination of its validity, not only against the United
States, but against everybody else, is surely not in conformity with the
provisions of the Act. If the question be asked, against whom is the
claim to be declared valid, the Act responds to that inquiry by de-
claring, " That the final decrees rendered by the said Commissioners, or
by the District or the Supreme Court of the United States, or any pa-
tent to be issued under this Act, shall be conclusive against the United
States, and the said claimants only, and shall not affect the interests of
third persons." So that a claim may be decreed to be valid against the
United States, and a third person—that is, one not a party as claimant
in the case in which the decree is rendered, may have a just and valid
right to a part, or to the whole of the land. As, where one represent-
ing himself as the sole heir or representative of a deceased grantee pre-
sents the claim, and it is confirmed and patented to him ; or where the
title is confirmed to one who has sold his right, not only in such case
would the confirmation or patent enure to the benefit of the co-heirs or
the vendee, which might be availed by them without ever coming before
this Board, in the judicial tribunals of the country, but they might pre-
seut their claims to this Board, if they thought fit to do so, and obtain
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the confirmation of the same land. But the question to whom the pro-
perty belonged, and in what proportions, as between themselves, would
still have to be settled in a litigation, in which they alone, and not the
United States, in any form, would constitute the parties. This is an
instance merely, put to illustrate the general proposition. So we may
suppose a case of two or more claimants under different grants to the same
land in itsjvhole extent, though such a case will rarely, if ever, occur..
If, however, such should exist, and indeed in any conceivable case of con-
test, I would only feel authorized to inquire whether each separate and
distinct claim, as presented by its holder, was valid as against the Uni-
ted States. I would carry out the object of the Act of the 3d of March,
1851, as I understand it, by confirming each and every claim, where
there was a prima fade showing of right as against others, and in a clear
conviction, that according to the rules and principles prescribed for our
decision, the land was no part of the public domain. In all such cases,,
without undertaking to decide as between the various claimants, I would
put them all in a condition to stand in the Courts, and try between them-
selves the questions of fraud, or accident, or priority, &c, in cases of
different grants ; and of heirship, devise, partition, distribution, succes-
sion, or of purchase, under the same grant. In this way all the questions
of mere private right, will be settled before the judicial tribunals of the
country, to the benefit of which all citizens are equally entitled. In
this way alone can the Government of the United States acquit herself
of the high obligations devolved upon her by the law of nations, and
expressly assumed by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, to admit the
former inhabitants of the country to the enjoyment of all the rights of
citizens of the United States,, and to maintain and protect them in the
enjoyment of their property. There is a class of cases, which may often
occur, though always against very strenuous efforts to the contrary, on
the part of the former Governments ; that is, where the grants of lands,
in the same vicinity, in projecting their surveys, lap over, or interfere in
their boundaries. The whole extent of land thus situated being covered
by valid grants, is no longer a part of the public domain, and each claim
must be decreed to be valid against the United States ; but as to that
portion embraced in the interference,, the question arises—to which of
the grantees does it belong? The Act of 3d of March, 1851, recog-
nizes just such a case, and provides for its adjustment so far as it was
necessary for the purpose of surveying the public land. When such
conflict occurs, the Surveyor General of California, in locating the
claims, will observe and respect such dividing lines, as may be agreed
on between the parties. If, however, they will not, or cannot agree,
i4
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he must not on that account abandon or delay the public work, but
proceed to run the lines as to him may seem just between the parties.
If they are not satisfied with his decision (though it is probable they
generally will be,) they are expressly referred by the Act to the proper
judicial tribunals. I am constrained, from my view of the Act of 3d
of March, 1851, to overrule this, as I shall all motions having the same
object.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
JOSEFA SOTO, Claimant,
f
vs. > No. 157,-
THE UNITED STATES. S
The claim presented in this case is founded upon a grant made by Mi-
cheltorena, Governor of California, in virtue of the' Decree of 18th of
August, 1824, and of the Ordinance of the 21st of November, 1828, of
the Mexican Government. By a regularly authenticated transcript
from the archives of the former governments of the country, by docu-
mentary evidence, and other testimony in the case, it satisfactorily ap-
pears that the grant was duly made, by competent authority, on the
21st of December, 1844, and that it was approved by the Departmental
Assembly, on the 22d of April, 1846. There was not any delivery of
possession to the grantee, nor measurement of the land by a magistrate,
as required by one of the conditions of the grant r nor was there any
house built on it, and occupied, within one year from the date of the
grant. It would seem from the evidence, that from the year 1847,
inclusive, down to this time, it has been occupied and largely cultivated
under the grant.
The objection is urged against the confirmation, that the title was
forfeited for the failure to comply with the requirement to build a house
and inhabit it, within one year after the date of the grant. In accord-
ance with the principles which we have recognized in decisions hereto-
fore made by this Board, in Cruz Cervantes, and in other cases, the
failure of strict compliance with this condition does not, per se, avoid
Ill
the grant, without any act being done to enforce the forfeiture, by de-
nouncement, at the instance of any other applicant ; or by any manifes-
tation of an intention, on the part of the government to reclaim the
land. This condition is neither in the Decree of 1824, nor in the Ordi-
nance of 1828 ; and it is at least doubtful whether the Governor could
properly impose it. In the case of two grants to the same individual,
as might be, and was often the case, it would be impracticable ; though
the grantee might occupy or cultivate, which the law only required him
to do. But at all events, by an express provision in the third condi-
tion, annexed to the grant, the possession in this instance seems to have
been postponed until after its approval by the Departmental Assembly,
should have been obtained by the Governor, which was not done until
the 22d of April, 1846. The delay after that time, and until the Mex-
ican rule of the country had ceased, was clearly not a ground for de-
nouncement, or for any other process of divestiture, of the vested title.
And by analogy to the principles settled by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the case of Arredondo, 6th Peters, 691, and in the
case in 14th Peters, 350, the delay subsequent to that period is an im-
material matter. The want of judicial possession and measurement, we
have already decided not to be fatal to the claim. The grant is for five
leagues in length, and two in breadth, making an area of ten square
leagues. In accordance with the principles laid down for our govern-
ment in the 11th section of the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, the claim
is held to be valid, and we proceed to make the following Decree of
confirmation. Commissioner Hall concurs in the result.
HARRY I. THORNTON.
WILLIAM GORDON, et al. 1
vs. > No. 202.
THE UNITED STATES. }
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
112
JASPER O'EARRELL, 1
Vf
:
' > No. 86.
THE UNITED STATES. S
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
JOHN WILSON, }
w
- > No. 22Q.
THE UNITED STATES. J
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
JACOB P. LEESE, \
VS. V
THE UNITED STATES. }
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
No. 165.
JOSE CARRILLO, at al., )
vs. > No. 49.
THE UNITED STATES. }
Decided on principles settled in prior cases.
In the cases above stated, opinions were delivered by Commissioner Thornton.
At the time of notice of the removal of the late Board, there were opinions
and final decrees entered in seventy-two Claims, embracing cases of grant, both
under the Spanish and Mexican Governments.
APPENDIX.
Entries of two final Decrees of Confirmation, as made in the
respective cases ; one being of a grant for a specified quantity
of Land,—and the other, of a Grant by metes and bounds.
JOSEFA SOTO, Claimant, J
vs.
'
> No. 157.
THE UNITED STATES. S
This Board upon full consideration of the various grounds affecting
the validity of the said claim, having come to the conclusion that the
same is valid
; Therefore now proceeds to make, and does hereby make
the following decree, or report of final confirmation, viz : It is decreed
that the said claim be confirmed to the claimant to the extent and
quantity often (10) square leagues, and for no more: being the same
land described in the Grant and Expediente, referred to therein, and of
which the possession is had, under the same : Provided, that the said
quantity of land granted, and now here confirmed, be contained within
the boundaries called for in the said Grant, and Map to which the
Grant refers : and if there be less, than the said above named quantity,
within the said bounds, then we confirm to the claimant that less quan-
tity ; it being apparent that the said quantity exceeds the minimum of
two hundred varas square, as prescribed by the Ordinance of the 21st
of November, 1828, of the Mexican Government. Witness our hands
this 11th day of April, 1853.
114
ANTONIO MARIA LUGO, Claimant, }
«» > No. 308.
THE UNITED STATES. }
This Board upon full consideration of the various grounds affecting
the validity of the said claim, having come to the conclusion that the
same is valid ; Therefore now proceeds to make, and does hereby make
the following decree or report of final confirmation, viz : It is decreed
that the said claim be confirmed to the claimant, to the extent of the
metes and bounds described in the Grant, and in the Map and Expedi-
ente, to which the Grant refers ; Provided, nevertheless, that there be
no more than eleven square leagues of land within the said bounds : and
that if there be more than eleven square leagues in the said bounds,
then we confirm to him only eleven square leagues within the said
bounds, and no more : and provided further, that if there be less than
eleven square leagues, within the said bounds, then we confirm to him
that less quantity ; being of the same land, in whole, or in part, as the
case may be, described in the Grant of the claimant, in the Map and
Expediente referred to in the. said Grant, and of which the said claim-
ant has been long possessed. Given under our hands this 21st day of
Eebruary, 1853.
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Page. Line.
9 10 for So.lano read Solano.
21 15 from bottom, for denies read decrees.
22 1 for 291, 292, read 32, 33.
22 9 strike n from Gutiernez.
22 13 for rancheras read rancheros.
23 7 for Salano read Solano.
26 16 for anoyo read arroyo.
26 29 insertJirst before elected.
26 39 strike out Review in this case.
27 15 for commoners read commons.
27 45 place ruling after f/ii's in preceding line.
28 1 for was read being.
28 2 for tte foiore read that place.
29 25 place 50 before vara.
32 7 from bottom, read title for fo'ttes.
33 14 for repealing read repeating.
33 29 for Dourmeat read document.
43 21 for quoting read quieting.
44 25 for i&. read 1844.
63 13 from bottom, for county read country.
68 9 for government read governments.
68 10 for source read sources.
76 1 strike out Pari KHZ.
76 18 before regulated insert ftere.
77 22 after already strike out contended, and.
77 32 for And read Though.
80 29 for excludes read includes.
82 16 strike out o/ after except.
86 5 for property read third parties.
87 19 from bottom, read nor evere for not even.
95 28 insert or confirmation after grant.
95 30 insert or confirmation after grant.
101 7 after lands insert Zasi mentioned.
104 31 after Constitution insert (Fitf. Shelford
on Mortmain, 23-4, ef sea.)
112 3 from bottom, read facts forfact.
114 17 from bottom, read Berrien for Barien.
115 17 from bottom, strike out benefit following
same word.
122 15 before These laivs place a colon instead
of a period.
126 14 from bottom, for c. after Dig. read Eze-
cution.
135 15 from bottom, for o/read under.
152 12 for exercise read excuse.
158 15 after suppose insert (7 repeat.)
161 20 for ch. 28 read 29.
161 22 strike out Law before 214.

CONTENTS
Statements of facts, magnitude of the case, etc 1 to 7
Proof of the truth of our own denial that the judgment debtor in this
case was the owner of lands :
1st, History of titles to lands in the old towns of California. 8 to 24
2d, History of land titles in San Francisco. And herein
the legislation of the United States, of the State, and of the
Common Council, to quiet and perfect the title to lands within
said city 25 to 60
Summary of facts established :—Statement of the number of titles
claimed by respondent 60 to 62
THE ARGUMENT.
I.—Suits of ejectment, in the courts of this State, are governed by
" laws of a general nature," which " shall have a uniform opera-
tion." And they cannot be withheld, or applied differently, as
regards lands in the County of San Francisco, without a de-
nial of justice, and a direct violation of the constitution. ... 62 to 64
II.—The laws, to be uniformly administered, are our own laws ; and
not Spanish nor Mexican laws. The latter, so far as they
can affect titles, must be shown by such proof as is required by
the law of evidence of this State, to have created, or to consti-
tute part of the contract (of title,) sued on 64 to 68
ni.—The only evidence admissible in the courts of this State, to prove
a contract (of title) to land, is that required
1st, By the Common Law of England 68 to 76
And herein as to the pretended " rule of property" in favor
of Peter Smith titles, to upland 76 to 80
2d, By the Statute Rule of Evidence (which is confirmatory
of the common law of rule) 80 to 82
IV.—Whether the judgment debtor (corporation of San Francisco,)
had a contract (of title) to land, is not a question of law, but
is a question of fact requiring proof,—the same as in case of
any other judgment debtor. Claiming such a contract (of title,)
under former laws, does not at all change, nor dispense with
the necessity of producing the proof 82 to 92
V.—The Respondent has neither proved nor shown any title whatever
in his judgment debtor ; nor anything in the nature or form of a
title capable of being.examined, or read, or recorded ! or seen ! ! 92 to 94
11 CONTENTS.
VI.—The supposition that the 14th section of the Act of Congress of
March 3d, 1851, has made a grant to said corporation, or has
confirmed a pre-existing right to it, of the locus in quo, or of any
other particular land in this State, is wholly erroneous. It is
impossible to give it any such effect without interpolating words
into the law, which it does not contain ; nor without directly
violating the settled rules of legal construction, the meaning of
the words used, and the plainest corollaries 94 to 102
VII.—The local governments (cities, towns or villages,) of California,
are not permitted by the laws of this State, (nor were they
permitted by the laws of Spain or of Mexico, nor are such
bodies allowed by the laws of England ; nor perhaps by the
laws of any civilized government,) to engage in land speculations,
or to become land owners, except so far as clearly authorized
by the laws of the State. San Francisco was (and still is) in-
hibited from receiving or holding the vast tracts of land
erroneously " confirmed " to it
—
1st, It was inhibited by "the Common Law of England," 102 to 108
2d, It was inhibited by our statute law 108 to 114
And herein further reasons why such ''confirmation " does
not at all assist the respondent in this case, towards show-
ing any valid contract or title for the locus in quo. ... 114 to 121
VIII.—The rights of Mexican town governments in California, (what-
ever they were,) were totally extinguished by the abolishment
of the entire system of Mexican government and Mexican law,
and the introduction of a totally new Nation, new Constitution,
and new system of town or local governments 121 to 124
IX.—There is no law permitting or excusing the issuing of such an
execution against the local government of San Francisco, as is
shown in this case, and hence the same is void 125 to 132
X.—The meaning of "judicial power" in our American constitutions.
How far this Court may constitutionally enforce errors in the
place and stead of the truth and the law.
The absence of authority, the lawlessness, and the iniquity
of deciding suits of ejectment,—any sooner than suits by
indictment,—contrary to truth and the law 132 to the end.
EXPLANATORY OF SOME AUTHORITIES CITED.
" L. Com. Ex.," or "IT. S. Ex."—Land Commission Exhibits published by the
United States.
" Ar.," or " Arch. Ex."—Archive Exhibits published by the United States.
"Miss. Ex.," or " U. S. Ex. Miss."—Mission Exhibits, a pamphlet published by the
United States, containing the laws, regulations, etc., concerning Mission Lands.
Manifesto—Governor Figueroa's Manifesto to the Mexican Nation, 1835. The trans
lation by Edmund Randolph, Esq., 1855.
Evidence City Case—Case of San Francisco vs. the United States, for four leagues o
land; the pamphlet publication of the Evidence therein, published in 1854.
[Owing; to circumstances needless to explain, some few annoying but unimportant typographical error
have occurred in publishing this argument, which must be left for the reader to correct.]
12.
REPORT
OF
^lrg-ttment
MAIUS BY
9
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
STEPHEN J. File, Chief fustic*,
IN THE CASE OF
HART (Jesse D. Carr) vs. BURNETT et al.,
(Iirolrittg the validity of Peter Smith Titles, and the question of Titles
in Ike old missions and Tillages of California,)
DELIVERED AT SACRAMENTO,
ON THE
8th, 0th, 10th and 12th of December, 1359.
REPORTED BY CHAELES A. SUMNER.
PUBLISHED BY APPELLANTS:
SAN FRANCISCO.
•
1859.
J. ANTHONY & CO., PRINTERS, SACRAMENTO.
ARGUMENT.
GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On the 18th of September, 1851, Jesse D. Carr obtained a judgment against
the city of San Francisco, for $4,2*70. In virtue of such a judgment against
one of the local governments of this State, he procured an execution from the
Clerk of the Court, in which it was rendered, and under that execution pro-
cured a Sheriff's sale, to be had on the 26th of November, 1851, whereat was.
sold about 400 acres of land, situated in the old corporate limits of the city of
San Francisco, on a bid of $50, (vide Sheriff's returns.) On the 26th of June,
1852, a Sheriff's deed was made for the lands to Isaac N. Thome—though one
Hill appeared, from the return, to have been the purchaser at the sale. This
suit is an action of ejectment brought on the strength of that Sheriff's deed to
recover 60 vara lots out of the tract described in said deed.
It is matter of public record, and well known to those interested, that a great
number of lots in and around the heart of the city—lots covered by Alcalde
titles and other kinds of titles made by Commissioners' sales, etc.—and vast
quantities of other lands in San Francisco, and elsewhere, are held in opposition1,
to the same class of Sheriff's deeds. We have submitted, on a suggestion and
merely as statement, the affidavits of twenty-four property owners in San Fran-
cisco, entitled to implicit confidence, who have sworn to a knowledge of the
subject ; and that, at least, nine-tenths of the lands covered by such deeds, are
held adversely and in direct opposition to them. And they say that " an under-
taking to subjugate such lands to said Peter Smith titles, could not possibly
result in any public advantage whatever ; whilst it would be well calculated to
produce the most alarming, demoralizing and sweeping injustice of which the
mind can well conceive. Because, in their opinion, the lands and improve-
ments held in said city and county alone, adversely to such deeds, cannot be
reasonably estimated at less than ten millions of dollars."
From said sworn statement, it will be seen there are some 4,000 50 vara lots
held in opposition to such deeds, besides two unbroken tracts of about 12,000
acres of land, to which these Sheriff's deeds have been procured and recorded,
since the said statement was made ; and all of which lands are held adverselj
to such deeds. All such deeds, as the Court is ajware, are known in San Fran-
cisco by the generic name of " Peter Smith."
4 SHAWS ARGUMENT.
It is also matter of public record, and seems to be well known to those inter-
ested, that the same species of speculation has been extended over all the lands
in the old pueblo limits of the city of San Jose ; that the same kind of Sheriffs
deeds are there of record, and now only waiting the further favorable decision
of this Court, when they will be attempted to be enforced against, at least,
150,000 acres of land in and around that city: all of which quantity is held
in opposition to precisely the same species of Sheriff's deeds as that relied on
for title in this case. The greatest portions of those lands are held under
Mexican grants, to some of which patents have been issued by the United
States, and these deeds are now claimed to convey a legal title, which, by rela-
tion, dates anterior to all others ; and it is now actually urged, upon property
owners as superior to all other titles. In the ancient capital of Monterey, pre-
cisely the same schemes are on foot, and the same species of Sheriff deeds, now
on record, cover all the old pueblo limits at that place, and include not less, it
is believed, than 20,000 or 30,000 acres in and about that city. Whether
similar schem-s have yet been undertaken elsewhere, I have no positive know-
ledge.
None of these deeds were, in any instance, procured prior to the time the
lands were settled on by Mexican ol American citizens, or granted by the Mex-
ican or Spanish Government ; on the contrary, all these schemes are of recent
origin. The first Sheriff's sale of the kind was held on the Sth of July, 1851,
and the lasi of which we are advised was held within the last twelve or fifteen
months. The rights of others, the boundaries of their grants, or their posses-
sions, though very numerous, have never been regarded with the leaijt attention
or treated with the slightest respect. On the contrary, streets, houses, enclosed
fields, ranchos, and even whole villages, have been included within arbitrary
boundaries, knocked down at these sweeping sales and covered by these Sheriffs
deeds, in San Francisco and elsewhere, without consideration and without the
remotest resemblance to anything which could be deemed respectable, honor-
able or decent in the lawful transactions of human life.
The persons engaged in these schemes have, it is reasonable to suppose, ex-
erted considerable influence in building up a notion in the public mind that the
old Mexican towns were the owners of all the lands about them. And, as the
towns were known to be older than any grants within them, the creation of a
town title at these old settlements has been also encouraged byman}r respectable
persons, upon the notion that they would assist to defeat adverse Mexican grants
existing against their lands.
In 1853, American Alcalde grants to lots in San Francisco were decided by
this court to b« valid, because all such towns as San Francisco did actually own
the lands within their boundaries.
Finally there was created a firm and dominant moneyed and speculative
interest in San Francisco in favor of what was called "The Pueblo Title."
The imaginary advantages of such a title, were so well presented to the public
that those were regarded as the " enemies of the city" who were not in favor
of making it a title, whether the law really and strictly upheld it or not Afc-
present I do not know of any influence at work, or of any desire entertained by
any body, excepting only speculators out of possession, to have the titles to
lands in San Francisco continued upon any such erroneous and merely opinion-
ated basis, as was attempted hy the "Pueblo Title" advocates.
There is, perhaps, no reasonable doubt that laud titles in San Frapcisco would
MAKT VS. BURNETT ET AE.
long since have been quieted and secure, had it not been for the decision ren-
dered by this court i:i Cohas vs. Eaisin, in 1853, and afterwards insisted upon,
that that corporation owned all the lands within the boundaries of its former
pueblo. The opinion was so extraordinary that the more discerning and. steady
capitalists seem to have lost confidence, where confidence is most indispensable
for the security of property. Be the cause attributed by others to what it may,
the fact seems to be that in less than thirty days from the decision of Cohas vs.
Raisin, in the fall of 1853, lauds in San Francisco sunk in value, and all confi-
dence in titles, pretty much everywhere, was destroyed. The court seemed
determined to inspire confidence by afterwards reiterating its views in subse-
quent cases, and where the question was not involved, with strong words. But
the opinion prevailed that the court was exceeding its authority, and that titles
to lands could not be created nor continued by any effort of this court alone,
and contrary to what might be eventually determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States—to which court it was intended to prepare a case and take
an appeal. But it was not long before this court decided that the United
States Courts could hear no cases brought in the courts of this State, either by
transfer or by appeal. (Johnson vs. Gordon, 4 Cal., 368.)
I think it is due to the profession to say that the great majority of the mem-
bers of this court at bar, have never been willing to declare that such decisions
were sustained by the laws. And I believe that some of its leading member's
expressed, at the outset, the most serious apprehensions that the consequences
would only be injurious to the communities they were intended to benefit, and
would be likely to impair the usefulness of this court by shaking the implicit
confidence of the public in the firmness and strict fidelity of its decisions. It
is needless to disguise, and it would be wrong to forget that such really was the
sad and most injurious result. I am aware that communities, in mental
epidemics of folly, have sometimes thought the law inadequate to their protec-
tion, and have insisted upon their own sudden schemes of relief, as more wise
and just than the wisdom and foresight of the law. But it is rare that courts
of law have adopted and attempted by their judgments and decisions to uphold
and enforce, as better than the laws, the sudden and short-sighted schemes of
uninformed men. And it is equally rare that men who have arrived at a know-
ledge of the settled and fundamental principles of legal evidence, which are the
only secure means to protect the rights of any and every man in a court of
justice, have advised courts to depart from them, and attempt to find means for
quieting titles to property superior to those which the combined learning and
experience of ages have established and perfected. And we have here to-day,
in these very suits, which foreshadow thousands behind them, and in the confu-
sion of titles in all the old towns of the country, a new and severe lesson against
the truly dangerous error of attempting to be wiser than the law.
The opinions by former justices of this court, to which I have referred, are:
Tfe&t, fey the laws of Mexico, all the Mexican towns in California were invested
with the ownership and title to the lands within their boundaries ; and that a
grant of a lot made by an Alcalde, whether a Mexican or an American officer,
raised the presumption that the lands are within the boundaries to which the
town's title extends. The judge who tried this case in the court below charged
the jxuy that these decisions are law, and that the plaintiff in this case need
make no further proof of title than his sheriff's deed, and proof that alcaldes
bad made grants of lots beyond the boundaries expressed in his sheriff's deed !
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Hie jury, having do discretion, were forced to render a verdict for the plaintiff.
These decisions seem, indeed, to have disturbed the very forindatwns of pro-
perty and of the judicial power ; and they seem not merely to justify, but to
render it indispensable, in order that we may hereafter enjoy repose in our titles,
to resort to the familiar principles which they have unsettled.
These decisions seem to have created a new title to large tracts of lands in
ibis State, originating and depending, not on the will of the former owner, but
solely on these decisions. They seem to have created two classes of claims to
real property, opposed to eaeh other, and covering the same lands ; one class
depending on such decisions, and the other class depending on laws opposed to
sach decisions.
The question in this case, underlying all others, is not whether the titles de-
pending on such former decisions can be maintained and continued where they
do not destroy the rights of others, but whether they can be extended against
property which others are holding in opposition to such decisions, and be made
So destroy the legal rights which those now in bona fide possession of the land
have acquired, under the operations of the law of this State and of the United
In consequence of the immense extent and value of the property included in
the speculations depending on such decisions, and the title which they are said
to have established ; and on account of the fact that this is agreed, on all
inands, to be decided on its merits as a test case concerning the validity of titles
acquired by execution ealea against our local governments, it is deemed emi-
nently proper and necessary to examine the whole subject ; and, under all the
circumstances, to evince neither impatience nor haste, nor a want of candor
and sincerity in every view which is taken and in every statement which is
made. And I most respectfully suggest that it is better and more economical in
fcoth money and time to take a week or even a month now, to the full and com-
plete understanding of the entire subject of these titles, than to have both suitors
and court occupied with interminable suits about them fcr years and years to
some.
In point of fact thousands of our people in the oldest settled counties have
Ibeen educated into the belief, and to-day confidently believe, that the towns and
Tillages existing in California at the conquest actually own the lands within
iibeir boundaries. And it has become, at last, a subject of incalculable import-
ance to all that portion of the State that the real truth of the matter should be
Iwlly and positively ascertained, in order that, if such titles do not exist, our
people may be at once saved from longer depending upon them as reliable spee-
alations, or as sufficient to protect them against other titles.
The views to be submitted have caused me so much study and examination,
that I may be excused for saying I have been inspired by a motive much higher,
and to me more sacred even, than that which a counsel always owes to a client.
For these cases have been carried so far that they are beginning to involve our-
selves and the purposes for which our profession and our courts are or ought to
!>e laboring.
It may seem a great tax upon the time of the court to allow me to occupy
the time absolutely required, in order to deliver my argument at ease ; but, in-
asmuch as these cases have been of six years' standing, and have mever before
been orally argued before this court, and inasmuch as property of the value, at
least, of fifteen millions of dollars is actually involved, if not depending on the
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proper understanding and decision of the case ; and inasmuch as it infolves
the constitutional powers of this court—and for the other reasons just sug-
gested
—
great indulgence may, perhaps, be asked with more propriety than in
any case which has yet been presented for adjudication in this court.
I promise to confine myself as closely as possible to direct issues, so that
I may occupy no more time than may be necessary to a complete view ©f the
case in all its parts, as well as my humble abilities wiH allew.
PAET I.
HISTORY OF TEE TITLES TO LANDS IN THE OLD TOWNS OF
Whriever matters of public history and government ought to be generally
known, courts will take notice of ; and wherever the memory of the judge is
at fault he resorts to such documents and histories as may be worthy of confi-
dence. 1 Greenl. Ev., sections 5 and 0, and authorities there cited ; a]so see.
497 ; also Cooper v. Weaver, 6 Cal. R., at p. 556.
Directly after the general peace of Europe in 1 763, Spain seems to have
Biade vigorous efforts to secure the complete possession of the territory now in-
cluded in this State. During the seven years from 1769 to 1776, that Govern-
ment established towns along the whole coast of this State, from San Diego to
San Francisco. In 1802, when visited by Humboldt. Spain had established
eighteen villages or pueblos here, which were defended by her arms and main-
tained at her own expense. (Forbes' His. of Cal., 200, 201.) And Spain had
also established the foundations or plans of two municipalities, San Jose in the
northern, and Los Angeles in the southern portions of this country. Her plan
of possession was, I should suppose, well arranged. She divided this country
into four military districts (corresponding with the principal ports). At San
Diego, Santa Barbara, Monterey and San Francisco, she established, the main
garrisons (presidios) for the defense of the respective Districts, and of all the
settlements to be established within them. The settlements in each District
were protected by the establishment of the garrison. To each garrison (pre-
sidio) was assigned (by the plan) two hundred and fifty mounted Spanish troops.
(Forbes, 203, 204, 205 ; Jones' Rep., 9.) And to each settlement in each Dis-
trict, when established, was immediately assigned a detachment of soldiers from
the garrison. (Forbes, 212.) These government settlements were established
at the most desirable points in reach of the presidios, and all under the name
and pious garb of missions. Indeed, a good supply of devoted priests formed
a part, and a most important part, of the Spanish plan of possession ; for by
their efforts rather than by arms the Indians of the country were intended to
be kept in subjection. To each priest the Government paid a salary of low
hundred dollars a year, and the pious duties of the priests were to persuade the
Indians (then " in immense numbers," Forbes, 91,) to take up on the side of
the Lord and of Spain. (Jones, 58 ; Fig. Manifesto, 31.) The priests, (stimu-
lated by a pious conviction that every Indian they baptised would be saved,
Forbes, 98, 99,) by their amazing devotion, soon had thousands of In-
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dian converts obedient to their will. And they thus acquired such power
throughout this country that, at length, they dictated not merely its religi >us,
but also its civil management. (Forbes, 209.) They became jealous of being
interfered with by new comers. They dictated where, and to whom, gYants of
lands should be made ; and " arrogated to themselves," says Forbes, " almost
all the land in the country, so that free settlers could not settle here, except by
their toleration." (lb., 133, 209.) Spain thus established, in all, nineteen set-
tlements here, which existed at the date of the Mexican Independence. After
the Mexican Independence only two others were established, viz. : San Rafael,
and San Francisco Salano (Sonoma.) Those established by the Spanish Gov-
ernment were all established prior to 1803. Colton asserts, but erroneously,
that twenty were established prior to 1800. (Three years in CaL, p. 439.) It
is quite certain that thirteen were established prior to 1*794. (Report of Vice-
roy, December 27th, 1793 ; Jones' R., 9.) The territory included within the
jurisdiction of each of these (so called) missionary settlements, was never defi-
nitely settled, aod very seldom even defined. Some boundary lines were usxially
recognized- But about all that is certain in this respect seems to be, that the-
lands, or more properly the jurisdiction of the settlements, extended from one-
settlement to another, so that no portion of the country could be said not to be-,
included in some one of them. (Jones' R., 9, 57.) But still, they continued
to form new settlements within the jurisdiction of old ones, wherever they
deemed it advisable. All writers seem to agree, and the orders of the Spanish'
authorities made at that time expressly show and prove conclusively, that from,
the beginning these so-called missionary but properly government settlements,.,
were all intended to be eventually converted into parishes and towns, or pueblos..
(Jones' R., 10, 11, 50, 55 ; Fig. Manifest., 41). The designs of the Govern-
ments of Spain and Mexico were often interfered with (as they are in Mexico-
even to the present day) by the religious power which they fostered.. On the
4th of January, 1813, Spain passed a law expressly requiring that "all" vacant
lands, and all " lands for municipal uses" in her " provinces beyond sea,"
" except commons necessaiy for villages," should be reduced to private prop-
erty. And that in disposing of lands the settlers in the towns should be pre-
ferred over others. (Law of Spanish Cortes, of Jan. 4th, 1813, Titles 1, 2, 3,,
15, 16, 18, 19 ; App. Jones' R., 48, 49, 50.) (" Commons," it will be observed,,
were not to be reduced to private property. They were not to be given to any
• corporation or individual, but were reserved by the Government for the com-
mons.) On the 13th of September, 1813, Spain passed another law, expressly
requiring that all her settlements beyond sea should be taken from the control'
of the priests, wherever they had been for ten years under their charge. That
" the missionary priests shall immediately cease from the government and
administration of the property of those Indians, leaving it to them to dispose
of it through the medium of their Ayuntamieutos ;" and requiring " the supe-
rior political authority" to name " the most intelligent " among the Indians, to
direct the disposition. And also, again requiring that the lands shall be dis-
tributed and reduced to private property conformably to the said law of Janu-
ary 4th, 1813. (Act of Sept. 13th, 1813 ; Titles 1 and 7, Jones, 54, 55.) The
said law of January, 1813, also required the provincial deputations to sig-
nify, through the Viceroys, when it would be best to enforce that law in their
respective provinces. (Title 4.) Nothing seems to have ever been done in Cali-
fornia, under said laws of January and September, 1813, during the Spanish-
1*
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• dominion. Indeed the fact is notorious, and probably will not be questioned
even by the learned counsel for the respondent in this case, that all lands in
California not conveyed by express grants during the dominion of Spain, passed
to and became the property of Mexico, on the 27th day of September, 1821,
the day recognized in law as the date of the independence of that nation.
"When Mexico obtained dominion over this country, there were probably over
twenty thousand pueblo Indians supported by the Government of Spain, and
residing in and about the villages which had been established here by that
Government, And there were probably not then over two thousand human
<beings in this whole country, of any other nation or race excepting Indians and
Mestizos, or children of Indian mothers. By authentic data, it appears that in
1834, all this vast territory with twenty-four towns and villages, did not contain
'five thousand human beings except pure Indians. (Forbes 201, 202, Fig. Man-
" ifesto.) And it was then declared that there were nearly twenty thousand Bi-
-dians still living in aad around these pueblo settlements. (Ibid.)
Mexican independence was promptly followed by aa order t© " liberate" all
these pueblo Indians of " good characters," and grant to them lands for their
maintenance. (Forbes, 135.) All the twenty-one pueblos or Mission settlements
were then treated as the public property of Mexico. (Jones' R. and Manifesto,
passim.) Mexico promptly ordered that the National salaries previously paid
by the Government to the priests, at these Governruent settlements, should be
: stopped—that the settlements should be formed into parishes with a curate for
• eitch—that the country should support its own priests, and that liberal dona-
tions of lands should be made to the pueblo Indians, " who were supposed able
i to maintain themselves." But the Indians for the most part were mere slaves.
(Forbes, 135, 185, 219, 224.) The order of their sudden liberation proved
-disastrous, and was modified in 1827 or 1828. (Ibid, 136.) In the Regulations
for 1828, for the colonization of the Territories, it will be observed, express pro-
vision is made that " In those Territories where there are missions, tlm lands
occupied by the missions cannot be COLONIZED at present. (Sec. 17, Regula-
tions of 1828.) Some provision had to be first made for the Indians, whom the
•Government was supporting in these Government settlements. Forbes, who
wrote in his history from 1833 to 1838, (Preface), speaking of the Mexican
management over the affairs of this country, says : Various contradictory laws
have been passed respecting it, "yet no change of government or system has
*been able to materially alter the original dispensation by the priests, which may
•still (1835 or later) be said to exist in all its primitive purity." (p. 137.)
Colton, who was "Alcalde" in Monterey in 1846 and afterwards, says: the
padres impressed the Indians "with the conviction, that submission to the
priest was obedience to God." And that the " vast (mission) establishments
. absorbed the lands, capital and business of the country ; shut out immigration
;
• suppressed enterprise ; and moulded every interest into an implement of eccle-
siastical sway." (Three Years in Cal., 440.)
On the 17th of August, 1833, Mexico passed a law on the basis of the said
.'Spanish law of January 4th, 1813, (Jones, 14,) to force these settlements from
this control of the priests ; to organize local civil governments or Ayuntamien-
tos over them ; and to grant the lands they occupied to settlers, as had been
• directed by said law of 1813. (App. Jones, 55, 56, U.S. Exhibits, Mission
Lands, pp. 1 to 3.) On the 4th of November of the same year (1833), Mexico
parsed another law to make, the first still raore effective; authorizing the Gov-
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eminent to transport emigrants from Mexico to settle upon these mission lands
in Upper California ; and further authorizing and empowering the Government
to " take all measures," and use as it pleased the funds raised for pious pur-
poses, (Forbes, 132), so as to "assure the colonization" and "make effective"
the secularization of these settlements. It was determined to relieve the Gov-
ernment from their care and management, and to convert them from clerical to
local political rule. (Law is in Jones, 48, and in XL S. Mis. Exh.) To secularize
is to appropriate church property or property under the control of a church, to
secular or common uses ; and to transfer the civil government of a place from
a monastic to a secular or political government. (Webster's Die.) These laws
of 1833, with the view, perhaps, to betray the priests into their support, restored
their salaries, made them again plyable by the Government, and raised them
from $400 a year to $2,000^ $2,500 and $3,000 a year, besides $500 each "for
religious worship and servants," and other sums. (Law, Jones, 55, 56, and in
U. S. Pam. Mission Exhibits.) I believe no colonization grants were made of
lands in these Government missionary settlements, until after the passage ©f the
said laws of 1833. But those laws passed in 1833, expressly provided that all
the lands within any of the said twenty-three Government pueblos, towns, set-
tlements, or missions (whatever they may be called), should be subject to colon-
isation, and expressly commanded that they should be " colonized? And the
Governors of this Territory, always afterwards, deemed themselves authorized to
grant them in lots, in virtue of the Colonization Laws of 1824, and the Regu-
lations of 1829. (Testimony of Gov. Alvarado and others ; Evidence in case of
•City of San Francisco vs. the U. S., p. 40 ; Arch. Exh. U. S. " W.,n p. 6.)
It was the very object of these laws, and the laws themselves declare
their purpose to be, to enable the Government to convert the missions
into towns or pueblos ; to " assure the colonization " of the lands they occupied
;
to grant them in fee to the actual settlers who would locate upon them ; and to
establish local political governments over the missions and the districts (porti-
dos) in which they were situated, and where the priests had held for so long a
period complete and publicly injurious control. And in carrying into effect
these plans of the Mexican Government for granting the land in such towns to
settlers, it would seem that the law of January, 1813, providing for granting
the lots to the settlers, and especially providing for the Indians, was to be res-
pected. (Manifesto, p. 1 ; Evidence City, case sup., p. 35.)
On the 16th of April, 1834, the Mexican Congress passed still another law on
the same subject, requiring that " all the Missions in the Republic shall be sec-
ularized," and " shall be converted into parishes, whose limits shall be fixed by
ithe Governors" etc. (IT. S. Exhibits, "Mission Lands," p. 8 ; Jones, 15.) This
law of April, 1834, was not to take effect until four months after its passage.
Under the laws of the Mexican Congress of 1833 and 1834, Hijar and Padres
were dispatched from Mexico to this country in the Spring of 1834, with hordes
of Mexican emigrants, all forwarded and maintained at the public expense ; and
intended to be given liberal donations of lands in these settlements, and to aid
the Government in establishing local self-sustaining governments over them, and
in relieving itself from their further care and support.
To Hijar was given the offices, and the commission of Governor of this Ter-
ritory, " and Director of Colonization ;" and to Padres the commission of " Sub-
director of Colonization." (Manifesto, 1, 10, 12 ; Forbes, 142 to 146.) The in-
structions of the National Government to Hijar, required him to take possession
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of all the property of the missions of both the Californias," to establish villages
(pueblos) by regular plans and streets, and to donate to every settler therein one
lot in the village proper ; and on the outside of the village four " cabalerios,"
i. e., about one hundred and thirty-three acres of lands. (Manifesto, p. 11 ; U.
S. Exhibits, Sup. 9, 10.) Their expeditions (in separate companies) arrived at
San Diego and at Monterey, in September, 1834. Bearing, as they did, directly
on the positions of the priests, and their longer enjoyment of the wealth and
power they had by that time accumulated in their " vast establishments,'' and
also interfering with the expectations of those already in the county, the arrivals
of Hijar and Padres produced an extraordinary excitement throughout this
Territory. (Manifesto, 15, 16, 17.) The personal property alone, which this ex-
pedition sought to wrest from the priests, cannot perhaps be fairly estimated at
less value, at that time, than three or four millions of dollars in stock and
raoney. AH the lands about them were constantly in use for the purposes of
these " vast establishments." The poor mission of San Francisco alone, had
some 150,000 cattle and sheep, 3,000 breeding and tame horses and other
stock, " and $25,000 in specie," not long before. (Forbes, ch. 5 ; Colton's Three
Years, ch. 23.) And when it is remembered that twenty thousand converted
Indians had produced the wealth and improvements, and were being supported
by these public settlements, and were then occupying and tilling the lands and
attending to the vast herds of these public establishments, and that all of them
were regarding the priests as their fathers ; and that the priests were regarding
them with pious affection, as poor nations whom they had redeemed ; and
when it is remembered that the Californians had then but feeble sympathies at
best with Mexico, or with Mexicans, and that Californians proper, -were Span-
iards, and the descendants of Spanish soldiers and Mastizos ; and when we re-
member the clashings of interests and races, unavoidably aroused by an actual
and present attempt to donate the lands and property in and about these old
establishments, to Mexican " ladrones" and " pobrecites," brought here into
the country from Mexico ; the revolutions against Mexico which soon followed,
seed cause no surprise, and were, in fact, creditable to the rude projenitors of
our own political name and State.
Before Hijar had arrived, Governor Figueroa had received a dispatch, by ex-
press, overland from Msxico, directing him not to surrender the Governorship to
Hijar. Upon Hijar's arrival, Governor Figueroa immediately convened his
Council, or the Territorial Deputation, for consultation, and submitted to them
the whole subject, and demanded their advice as to the future management
and disposition of the real and personal property of the mission or public estab-
lishments. (Manifesto, 8, 18; Jones, 15, 16.) The Territorial Deputation made
a report on the subject on the 21st of October, 1834, in which they declared
that all the property, real and personal, of the missions belonged to the con-
verted or pueblo Indians, and that they were "its only owners." (Manifesto, 20.)
That "the lands of the missions belong to the Indians and no colony shall be
established in them." (Ibid 22.) That " Hijar shall not interfere in seculariziEg
the missions, and that Gen. Figueroa retain the performance of that duty." (lb.,
21, 22.) This last expression referred to steps which had already been taken by
Figueroa with the advice of the Deputation. This action, we observe, was om
the 21st of October, 1834. On the 9th of August, 1884 (before Hijar had
arrived in the country), Gov. Figueroa, with the advice of the Deputation, had
adopted, t© use his own language, "certain rules for that which was going -to
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ha established in this Territory," "for distributing the lands of the missions,"
etc. (Ibid, 28, 3*7 ; Mis. Exhibits, Sup., pp. 3 to 9.) The rules for disposing of
all the mission-pueblo lands in this country, prescribed (to use Gov. Figueroa'a
own language), " the manner of distributing to the converted Indians of each
mission the lands which they possess, and also a part of the other property of
which they are also in possession, because they are the lawful owners of the
whole." '(lb., 3*7.) These regulations adopted by Figueroa and the Territorial
Deputation, also provided, that if the Indians should sell, encumber, or transfer
the lauds granted them, such contracts with the Indians should be void, and the
land should " revert to the nation." And that the missions should be converted
into villages or pueblos, and that where the pueblo Indians had rancherias outside
of the missions, and exceeding twenty-five families, they (the rancherias), should
be formed into " separate pueblos, under the same rules as the principal ones
"
—to be formed in the missions. (Jones, 16 ; U. S. Exhibits, " Mission Lands,"
p. 3, et seq.) These rules were to be first applied to ten of the missions (not
named), and afterwards to the others (Art 1), Figueroa says this plan was very
properly approved by the Deputation, " in order to present it for the approba-
tion of the Supreme Government." A.nd the Regulations, Article 4, expressly
provided that they should be submitted to the Supreme Government for its
approval. (Manifesto, ?7 ; Mission Exhibits., Sup., p. 3.) Hijar, it may be men-
tioned, accomplished nothing. He was subsequently arrested by orders of
Figueroa, and sent out of the country, together with his leaders and most of his
followers. (Man. 97 ; Forbes, 145.) But the expedition of Hijar seems to have
stimulated the Governor and Territorial Deputation to prompt action, in disposing
of the lands and other property of these Government settlements, taking them out
of the hands of the priests and converting them into pueblos, and establishing po-
litical governments over the country " wherever there were none." On the 3d day
of November, 1834, the Territorial Deputation adopted further regulations, in ad-
dition to those of the 9th of August, 1834, for converting the missions into
parishes, as to " matters appertaining to the spiritual administration ;" while
they were to be converted into pueblos, as to matters appertaining to " the ad-
ministration of tho temporalities." (Exhibits Mis. Sup. 11.; Arts. 1, 2,3
Regulations August 9, 1834; Mis. Exhibit, Sup., p. 3. Read the Regulations.)
Tfiose Regulations, we observe, of August 9th, 1834, proposed to begin "in the
next month of August," i.e. in August, 1835, to "partially convert into pueblos
the missions of this territory, commencing at first with ten missions and after-
wards with the remainder.'" (Art. 1, see U. S. Mission Exhibits, pp. 3 to
9.) These Regulations also proposed to give " to every individual head of a
family," or over twenty-one years of age, a lot " out of the common lands of
the missions" not less than one hundred nor over four hundred varas square.
—
Art. 5. And to equitably distribute among them one-half the live stock.—Art.
6. And one-half the chattels, etc.—Art. 7. And it was expressly provided
that " The remainder of all the lands" and other property " will remain at the
disposal of the Supreme Federal Government."—Art. 8. Art. 13 required "in
ventories to be made" of the property, debts, credits, etc. of " each mission,"
and to "be forwarded to the Supreme Government."
Art. 16 provided that " the vineyards, orchards and cultivated fields" re-
mained "for the present undisposed of until the resolution of the Supreme
Government." Art. 18 prohibits contracts with the natives concerning the pur-
chase or pledge of the property to be given them, and declares, if made, they
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" shall be of no value" and " the government will reclaim the property." Art.
23 provides rules for the conduct of the Government Commissioner and Stew-
ard, to be appointed for each mission, to take charge of the public property, the
distributions to the natives, and specifies the particular things to be enumerated
in the "inventories" to be sent to the Supreme Government, "which (inventories) :
shall be kept from the knowledge of the priests," etc. etc. And among these
directions is the following, showing the intention of the whole Regulations, viz :
.
" The Commissioner will inform the natives—explaining to them with mildness
and patience—that the missions are to be changed into villages (pueblos) which
will (thereafter) only be under the government of the priests so far as relates to-
spiritual matters ; that the lands and property for which each one labors are to
belong to himself, and to be maintained and controlled by himself without de-
pending on any one else ; that the houses in which they live are to be their
own, for which end they are to submit to these regulations, which are to be ex-
plained to them in the best possible manner." They also provided, under the
same Article (23) that " what is called the priesthood shall immediately cease ;"
the children " being handed over to their fathers" who should be taught " their
obligations as parents." Part 7th. Also that " the rancharias" (called " settle-
ments" in this pamphlet translation, but see Jones' Rep., 16,) "situated at a dis-
tance from the missions, and consisting of more than twenty-five families, might
form separate pueblos," (if they desired it,) " under the same rules as the prin-
cipal one."
It will be seen that the regulations applied to all the missions in California
:
that the Governor was not to commence their enforcement until the month of
August, 1835, beginning then with about one-half, and " afterwards with the.
remainder," i. e. all the remainder. The instructions of the Territorial Depu-
tation of November 3d, 1834, to change the government over the northern dis-
trict of the country ; i. e. all of this country, from San Jose to the Oregon line,,
to change the government over that portido, from a military to a civil govern-
ment, seems to have nothing to do with the subject of disposing of the lands of
the mission of San Francisco, which, after ihe adoption of these regulations was -
called the village (or pueblo) of San Francisco. The forming of an Ayuntanu-
ento for the immense partido (or district) called the partido of San Francisco,,
seems to have no necessary connection with the pueblo of San Francisco, except
that after holding its sessions for two or three years at the barracks or persidio,,
the pueblo was the place where it afterwards held its sessions, until it was.
abolished shortly afterwards.
The instructions show on their face that the Ayuntanuento was to exercise the--
political functions with which the military commander had been charged, over-
" that demarcation." More will be said on this hereafter. The regulations for
disposing of the lands in the missions applied to San Francisco as a matter of
course, as much as to any mission in the country. And in the additional regu-
lations of November 3, 1834, it is expressly named among the inferior settle-
ments provided for. (Exhibit, Sup., p. 11, sec. 2.)
That resolution of November 3d, 1834, for converting the missions into towns,,
and that for establishing a local political "Ayuntamiento" or Government over
the " Partido" of San Francisco, seems to have made no change in the regula-
tions previously established for the distribution and management of the property
of the " missions." (Jones, 16.) That resolution of the Territorial Department.
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of November 3d, 1834, to establish an Ayuntamiento or local civil government
in place of a military government over the inhabitants of the partido of San
Francisco, is this respondent's proof that the pueblo of San Francisco, (four miles
distant from where that Ayuntamiento war organized and held its sessions for
two years), was incorporated and was given a grant or title, according to some
of four leagues, according to Cohas and Rosin and the Judge's charge to the
jury in this case, of " all the lands in its boundaries," and according to the very
learned and very wonderful jurist, (?) , and those who agree
with him, of all the lands in the present city and county of San Francisco. And
the first document in evidence in this case by the plaintiff is to prove that the
boundary of this grant or title is the Buri Buri Rancho,
There was no power in the Governor, nor in the Governor and his Council or
Deputation, to pass acts of municipal incorporation. Governor Figueroa him- -
self referring to their powers in making the identical orders of November 3d,.
1834, says : " The Deputation never had the vain pretension to attribute to any
of their acts the force of laws." (Manifesto 26.) The Territorial Deputation
was not a " Legislature," but was a body strictly subordinate to the law. (V»
Manifesto, 14, 15, 16 and passim ; Forbes, 133, 134, 135; Mis. Ex., 113 to 115.) •
Now, from the regulations of August 1834, from Governor Figucroa's "Man-
ifesto" of the design of those regulations—it seems manifest that aside from
provisions for the priests, their chief object and care was, that in disposing of
the lots and commons of these pueblos, the rights of the pueblo Indians
should be sacredly preserved. Certainly not less than four-fifths of the persons-
concerning whom and for whom these regulations were adopted were Indians..
(Forbes, 202.) Indeed, they actually seem to refer and apply almost exclusively
to Indians. Four-fifths of the entire civil population of San Francisco, at that
very time, undoubtedly, were Indians. (Forbes, 201, 202.) The same regu-
lations which authorized, the missions to be converted into pueblos, as we have
seen and as must have been judicious, authorized the pure rancharias of Indians-
&t a distance from the mission to be also converted into pueblos : i. e. to have a.
local civil government of their own. If these regulations, or any acts of the
Governor and Deputation in 1834, made San Francisco a municipal corpora-
tion, then the Indian rancherias were made municipal corporations wherever
they chose their Alcaldes and other officers, which they did in some places. An.
Ayuntamiento—as this court knows—means simply a local civil governments
And the establishment of an Ayuntamiento over a particle has no more to do-
with the incorporation of villages within the partido (district) than has the es-
tablishment of a county government, under our system, to do with incorporating-
the villages in a county. Besides the pueblo or village of San Francisco, there
were at least two other villages in the partido of San Francisco, viz : San Rafael
and San Francisco Salano.
In the territories under the Mexican Government, Figueroa says it was " one
of the principal duties of the Territorial Government to see to it that Ayunta-
mientos, i. e. local governments, should be established wherever there were none?r
(Manifesto 41 ; Jones' Rep., pp. 48, 50, 54, 57, and p. 42 "Art. 12.") There
was none within the whole partido or district of San Francisco, and never had
been until one was elected there at the presidio or garrison, under the order of
November 3d, 1834, and communicated by Governor Figueroa, November 4th,
1834, which was for the partido, not the pueblo of San Francisco. Besides, it
seems most manifest that the Territorial Deputation had no power to create
16 SHAw's ARGUMENT.
municipal corporations and endow them with the power to receive and hold
large and unbounded tracts of country, or any lands at all. San Jose, as is well
known, was incorporated by the direct act of the King of Spain. And the very
next year after this order of November 3d, 1834, to form a civil government
over the partido ofSan Francisco, Los Angeles was incorporated by a special Act
ofthe Supreme Government of Mexico. (Arch. Ex. W., p. 5.) If the Territorial
Deputation was competent to create an actual municipal corporation, why did
the Supreme Government do it? According to all our ideas and all our actual
knowledge on the subject, the creation of municipal corporations seems to have
always been deemed an act requiring the exercise of the sovereign power. And
when we recollect the important powers of government they are to exercise, and
know of their being created in some instances by the Supreme Government, why
shall we suppose an act of the Supreme Government to have been unnecessary ?
Have we any proof that it was unnecessary? Do we know that the Depart-
mental Deputation could create such municipal corporations without the express
aid of the Supreme Government ? Dc we know that a resolution by them to
elect an Alcalde at San Francisco would have made a municipal corporation at
that place, and endowed it with the privilege of holding a vast tract of land in'
mortmain ? Do we know a resolution to elect an Alcalde, and other local
officers, or an Ayuntemiento for the local government of the district or partido
of San Francisco would make an incorporated town or city of the place where
the Ayuntamiento was to be elected ? Conceding an Ayuntamiento to be a
strict corporation, there is a vast distinction between creating one for the in-
habitants of one town only and for the inhabitants of a vast district of country
like the partido of San Francisco. Why should we believe that San Francisco,
the most barren and insignificant mission in California, was a corporation and
was granted all the lands about it, or any lands by this mere order of November
3d, 1834, to elect officers, and upon mere assertions and fanciful conjectures?
There are persons who seem really to believe that such was the fact. And ac-
cording to a sober law writer, there are persons " whose minds are incapable of
overcoming the delusions of fancy." (Stephens' Introduc. De Lolme's Eng.
Con., p. 63.)
But suppose the Ayuntamiento of the partido was the Ayuntamiento of the
pueblo of San Francisco, and suppose it created the pueblo into a municipal
corporation capable of acquiring and holding lands by the league, or in any
quantity. Does that fact make it own the leagues of land ? There is an im-
mense distinction (painfully realized by most of us) between being legally
capacitated to own lands and actually owning them. In De Armis vs. New
Orleans, 5 Milter's Law Rep., it was plainly said : " As to the right supposed to
arise from the establishment of a cabildo (Ayuntamiento) and the incorporation
of a city, it may be disposed of by stating that acts of incorporation may confer
a capacity to acquire, but do not of themselves operate as a transfer of property."
(P. 209.) And there is also an immense distinction between a place being a
pueblo and being actually incorporated. To say because the missions were
pueblos therefore they were municipal corporations, seems to be merely jumping
at conclusions—not proving them by competent evidence or by sound reasoning.
Besides, the fact is notoiious, and is actually admitted in Cohas vs. Roisin, that
the Ayuntamiento of the partido of San Francisco, which held its sessions
at the garrison and also at the village, never existed at all anywhere for over
four or five years. What became of the corporate body and its immense estates
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after the Ayuutamiento was abolished ? We are absolutel)7 told in a serious and
authoritative manner, by the said former decisions of this court, that they de-
scended into the Justices of the Peace or Alcaldes who were afterwards ap-
pointed to reside in that place, and perform the functions of the Ayuntamiento:-
(Cohas vs. Roisin, 3 Cal., 449, 453.) It seems important to remember that there-
never was a local government or Ayuntamiento created expressly and only for
the town or pueblo of San Francisco. There was one created for that partido,
which was to hold its sessions there and whose chief officers resided and exer-
cised official duties there. And after that was abolished, instead of leaving- Sen
Francisco without any civil local officer at all, Justices of the Peace and Aieal
were appointed for that place. (See record in this case.) And no Ayuntamiento
or incoiporated local government existed there at any time from 1839 down to-
the American occupation of this, country. (L. Com. Ex. O., p. 55.) And we defy
the learned counsel to" show- any legal evidence of an incorporation. It would
seem to be strictly true that the first regular local political government ever
created by law, expressly and only for the inhabitants residing on the peninsula
of San Francisco, was the one established in 1850, by the law of this State, cre-
ating for them a city government. But conceding that the old towns owned all
the lands about them (instead of regarding any such ownership as a misfortune
to the conntry, not to be inflicted nor tolerated except on clear and positive proof.)
still, it is hot easy to conclude that the Justice of the Peace who used to be the
civil officer for San Francisco was the corporation which owned all the lands at
that place after 1839, when the Ayuntamiento was abolished. By the law of
Mexico, passed March 20th, 183*7, there could be no corporation or corporations
rights at San Francisco unless given by " special law." No Mexican law has ever
yet been proved or seen incorporating the town of San Francisco. And if the
Ayuntamiento which existed there prior to the law of March 20th, 183*7, owned
all the lands there, the ownership must of necessity have reverted to the nation^.
by operation of law, when it was abolished in 1839; audit was never ag? ii
revived by any law, or authority of law, from 1839 to this day.
But I repeat, to concede that the Indians and the few white men residing -
amongst their settlements during the Mexican dominion, were possessed of in- -
eorporated towns, would seem to be no evidence that such corporation (or the -
Indians) owned the lands about them. The Government of the United States
now has, in this State, a plan for the care of the same tribes of Indians. They
are gathered, " through choice or force," upon the public lands of the United
States, at places which are called Reservations, where lands are reserved for
them by Government and are used and cultivated by them in common. As- te
the inhabitants of these Reservations, the lands are their common lands. Sup-
pose the government of this State should now create all those Reservations into
municipal corporations, what effect would that have on the title to the lands
which the United States had reserved for their common benefit \ If incorpo-
rated, would it not be for the purposes of local government ? And do we know
of any system of local governments which makes them own all the lands where-
ever they are established ? And suppose boundaries were or were not estab-
lished to the lands occupied by our government Indian Reservations, what con
that have to do with the title of the United States in the lauds ? Why, then,
should we suppose it has anything to do with the title of Mexico in the lands
occupied by the Mexican Indian Missions or Reservations 1 Now again : Sup-
pose the United States Indian Reservations in this country* should be continued
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for seventy-five years, what would be said of the title to the kinds occupied and
held in common by the Indians for so long a period ? Might it not be said or
be claimed by good men that the lands belonged to the Indians, who had.
cultivated and improved them, and whose tribes and descendants should, be
found at that remote day still living upon them ?
Now if our Government should hire salaried Missionaries to take spiritual
charge of the Indians in our Reservations ; if their captains, or afterwards soma
civil local officer, were- authorized to grant lots to actual settlers within them
;
and if Government declared the intention to eventually convert all the Reserva-
tions into towns or villages, and should locate them over the country with that
view
; and having done this, should continue them under only one sect of de-
voted priests for fifty-six years, there would then be presented the same kind of
public settlements, in every material respect, as the Indian Missions of California.
Aud if our Government should, after so manv years, .undertake to change their
nature from Government establishments into towns and villages, still reserving
lands for them for commons, and make grants of the lands in lots to settlers, it
would undertake to do what Mexico sought to accomplish by its laws passed in-
1833. And wherever such Indian Reservations should be converted into villages
or towns, we should have a precise parallel of our California " pueblos,'' estab-
lished where there had been Indian missions. If our Indian Reservations should
be continued in the common use of the Indians, and others, for from thirty to
sixty-six years—as the Mexican Indian. Reservations or Missions had been—it
would have become no easy matter for our Government, with all our boastful
superiority, to convert them into towns and make a just and wise disposition of
the property which they would have accumulated, and of the lands which the
inhabitants would have always claimed and used in common. And if the at-
tempt were made to accomplish that purpose at a time when such Reservations
had gathered within and about them nearly all the inhabitants of the country,
the difficulties would be found infinitely increased, and the white settlers would
probably be found, in a tew years, in possession of the towns and their property,
with little regard to the wishes of good meu, or the just designs of Government
towards the Indians. What would be likely to occur with us seems to be pre-
cisely what did occur when Mexico undertook to dispose of the property of her
Indian Missions in California.
It is hard to realize, but not unimportant to remember, that down to 1835
this whole country was an unbroken wilderness, inhabited almost only by In-
dians, a few priests, and squads of soldiers at stations remote from each other.
All the Spaniards in the country, if all collected in one place, would hardly have
constituted one small village by themselves. They were so few that, notwith-
standing their utmost kindness to the Indians at the missions, they were often
in peril, and are said to have often endured trials.and hardships of which we
Americans have no proper ideas. (Pablo De la Guerra's speech iu State Senate,
1856.) The Missions seem, in fact, to have been inhabited almost exclusively
by Indians. (Regulations of Alvarado, 1839, Art. 11 U. S. Ex. Mis., p. 14,)
The difficulty of converting into towns and disposing of the lands of such public
establishments, filled with wild and half civilized Indians who had there endured
a rude and irksome civilization, and (most of them) only a sort of pseudo resi-
dence for so many years, must indeed have been serious. The priests seem to
have regarded the attempt as quite impracticable and unchristian, (Petition of
the Hishop to the Sup.* Govt., November, 1840 ; U. S. Ex. Sup., p. 22, et«.) I
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have endeavored to give a faint sketch of some of those difficulties. The good
Figueroa seems to have been the earnest friend of the town or pueblo Indians
of this country, and sought most earnestly to protect tuem. Just five days after
signing the identical order of November 4th, 1834, to establish to Ayuntamiento
at San Francisco, in an official communication, signed by him and addressed to
the Supreme Government of Mexico, and dated November 9th, 1834, Gosrernor
Gigueroa says : " There are more than twenty thousand Indians settled in tl*e
missions in this country. (Manifesto. 32.) These Indians have, " through choice
or force., been made Christians." (lb. S3.) "The estates, the temples, the real and
moveable property, and whatsoever exists in the missions, have been acquired by
die labor and privation of these Indians." (lb. 31.) And, " unquestionably," equi-
tably speaking, they "only are its owners." (lb. 32.) And '''for this reason"
continues the same able and distinguished man, "the deputation of this Terri-
tory determined that half the property of the missions should be distributed to
these Indians, 'in full ownership,' reserving the other half for the disposition of
the Supreme Government? (lb. 31.) "This disposition of these missions," he
• continues, " is entirely in accordance with the directions which the Supreme
Government gave to Echaudeia, Victoria and myself, in the instructions which
were given us on confiding to us the office of Political Chief of California."
' (Manifesto, 31, 32.) What insane folly to have written thus to his own Govern-
ment, if the orders made just before it was written to establish an Ayuntamiento
at San Francisco did create, or if it was intended to create a corporation which
was, " by the laws of Mexico," to own all the lands " within her boundaries."
The lands of the missions were never granted to the pueblo Indians of this
country. It is said that in New Mexico such lauds were granted to the pueblo
Indians, wno are still, in some instances, in the occupation of them. But fortu-
nately for us, our State has never been so incumbered. Administrators of the
missions were appointed by the Governor, but before any disposition of the lands
occupied by the missions had been made, viz : on the 29th of September, 1835,
Figueroa died. And any grants to Indians were probably never afterwards urged
with much vigor. Indeed, the great body of the mission or pueblo Indians in
this country at that time were, perhaps, really incapable of being much benefited
by receiving a title to lands. Thus we find from what seems to be indisputable
: authority, that the lands in all the missions of this country, including San Fran-
cisco de Asis, remained wholly undisposed of by the Government to any corpo-
ration or to individuals down to the 29th of September, 1835. Gutierrez suc-
ceeded Figueroa, but his position seems to have been uneasy and insecure, and
the laws and regulations for disposing of the mission establishments wero not
enforced during his brief term of office.
In 1836, the Californians, constituting nearly the entire population, declared
-their independence ; avowed themselves a sovereign State; established a Con-
gress; elected General Vallejo Commander in Chief; imprisoned or drove from
the country all Mexicans occupying any positions in this' Territory, including
Governor Gutierrez ; and made Alvarado Governor. Forbes (writing in June,
1838,) says California has remained for nearly two years to do as it pleases ; to
liave a government of its own manufacture or none at all, (p. 151.)
The missions and their property seem to have remained under the care of
.public administrators or commissioners from 1835 to 1839, when Governor Alva-
fado> declared they had already been reduced to a "pitiful state." (U. S. Ex.
Mis., p. 13.) Governor Alvarado proclaimed new regulations respecting tha.
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missions, dated January 17 th, 1839. These rules require the administrators to •
render immediate accounts of their proceedings to the Government, with " an
exact account of the debts owing by and to the missions." (Arts. 1 to 5.) They
provide that under no pretence whatever shall they (the administrators) contract
debts, whatever, may be the objects, nor make sales of any kind, to anybody,,
without the previous knowledge of Government. And that if made, they " shall
be null and without effect." (Art. 5.) Also, that no debts due from the missions
to private persons shall be paid "without an express order from Government.55
(Art. 6.) And that no cattle of the missions shall be slaughtered except what is-
necessary for food, " without previous permission from the Government." (Art. !l.y
Thit they shall no more traffic for woolen manufactures, but " the persons in
charge will see to it t^at the looms are got into operation." (Art. 8.) That
" at the end of each month they will ^end a statement to Government of the in-
gress and egress of all kinds of produce that may have been warehoused or dis-
tributed." (Art. 9.) That " the establishments of San Carlos, San Juan Bautists
and Sonoma are not comprehended in these regulations." (Art. 13.) No others
were excepted. That Government shall be informed " of all persons employe*!
under them, designating their monthly pay, according to the orders which majr
have been given, including that of the reverend padres." (Art. 14.) That "the
administrators will, under the strictest responsibility, fulfill their orders and send
the information required of them in one month." (Art. 15.) And that Govern-
ment will continue to make regulations respecting the police and the manner of
"
making out accounts.- (Art. 16.) And provided that an inspector should be ap-
pointed to have special charge of the accounts and other interests of these pub-
lic establishments. The late Win. E. P. Hartnell was appointed the inspector
of the missions of Upper California. And it seems, from his instructions, that
he was to personally inspect and report the condition and property of the mis-
sions, and among other things to recommend that the punishment infiictttfl or*
the Indians "be moderate and proportioned to their state of uncivilization."
Alvarado published further regulations concerning these Government estabs
lishments, dated March 1st, 1840. (U. S. Ex. Sup., p. 17, etc.) He declaret
that his regulations of the previous year " have not been sufficient to root on-
the evils which are experienced, particularly on account of the high salaries witfe
which the establishments are burdened, and which they cannot support." (lb.) .
He abolished the office of administrators and created the office of mayordomo
for each mission
;
provided rules for their government, and fixed their salaries.
To remove all dispute as to San Francisco having been and still being, in 1840,
one of the very missions to which all these laws and regulations were applied, it
is shown in these regulations what salary the mayordomo of "San Francisco de
Asis" was to receive. (Art. 2.) These new officers were to be the channels of
communication "between the Government and the subaltern officers of said mis-
sions." (Art. 28.) Showing that the management of all the property of these-
places was entirely managed by public officers, responsible to the Territoi-ial
Government, and not to the pueblo. These regulations of March 1st, 1840,
are only remarkable for the total change of tone from those of 1839, which they
evince towards the reverend padres. Judging from the petition of the Bishop,.,
before mentioned, the padres must have grown quite exasperated. That petition
says the conduct of the Territorial Government towards the missions here, was
u very unsupportable." (U. S. Ex. Sup., p. 23.)
On the 7th of November, 1835, a law had been passed by the Mexican C
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-gress, providing: "Until the curates shall take possession -mder the second
article of the law of August l'Vth, 1833, the Government shall suspend the exe-
cution of the remaining articles, and keep matters in the condition in which they
were before the passage of said laws." (17. S. Ex. Sup., p. 12.) This law could,
mot have arrived probably before 1<336. It may have prevented any disposition
of lands to the Indians as proposed by the regulations of Figaeroa (which had
probably been forwarded to Mexico for approval.) But it does not seem to have
been any further respected (if respected at all) during the administration of our
good Governor Alvarado. The petition of the Bishops of California to the
Supreme Government near the beginning of the year 1 841, received a reply favor-
. able to the priests again getting control of the missions.
.
In 1842, Micheltorena was appointed Governor, and sent from Mexico with
.a " battalion" to enforce obedience to his commands. He was instructed "to
• examine the situation of all the missions, with respect to their management,
improvement, and state of accounts." (U. S. Ex. Sup., p. 31.) Under these
instructions Micheltorena, having arrived in the country, issued a proclamation,
•dated March 29th, 1843, in which he declares it was one of the "ample or com-
,
plete instructions or orders with which" he was invested, to inquire concerning
the missions " in order to regulate them." And that " the Supreme National
Government" had " transmitted all its powers" to him over the subject. He
"then complains "that the vast and immense landed property formerly belong-
ing to the missions had been scattered or partitioned out to individuals? (Not
to corporations—there seems to be nothing to indicate that any such thing was
-ever thought of, much less done.) That "the most reverend ecclesiastics have
no support but chanty." " That the Indians, naturally lazy, * * and in a
state of nudity," * * " prefer to keep out of the way, and die impenitent in
• deserted woods, in order to escape a life of slavery. That this continual emi-
gration of the natives from the service of individuals to the service of the mis-
. sions, and from that of the missions to that of individuals, or to the woods, re-
tards agriculture more and more, and frightens off, instead of drawing together
the Gentiles, and keeps them without the pale of our holy religion. That, in
the administration of the missions have been committed some frauds and noto-
rious extravagance." And " that there is no other method of reanimating the
: skeleton of a giant like the remains of the ancient missions," except to restore
them to the priests, or, as he terms it, to " the lovers of civil and ecclesiastical
power." And in that first order he " denies" that twelve of the missions, which
he names, and which were of the most importance, " be delivered up or re-
stored to the most reverend fathers." (U. S. Ex. Sup., pp. 33, 34.) He further
•decreed that " lands granted prior to that date" should not be revoked ; and
•closed his decree by binding himself "' to defend and sustain" the missions " in
the possession and preservation of all the lands they may hold from this (said)
day." (Ibid.) But the California Regency of those days, headed by Jose
Castro, who was the Warwick of this country, and Commander-in-chief and
Alvarado Governor, were not to be so easily overcome. A revolution against
Micheltorena was begun in 1844, and energetically pursued until he was forced
to leave the country. (U. S. Exhib. ; my Law Pamphlet, vol. 4, pp. 258 to
288.) And on the 15th of February, 1845, the Departmental Assembly passed
.a decree declaring Pio Pico Governor ad interim. (lb., 288.) And on the 22d
February, 1845, Micheltorena abdicated, and, according to the official report,
was allowed to march out of the country with his battalion, " with all the honors
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of war." (Ibid, p. 291, 292.) During this domestic war no disposition was?
made of the lands occupied by the missions. In fact the great wealth which
had been accumulated in the Indian missions of this country seems to have en-
abled the Californians to maintain quite an independent political position to-
wards Mexico, from the death of Figueroa to the day of the American conquest.
When Santa Anna, the champion of the Church, sent Micheltoreua, wiih an'
army, and ample instructions and authority to restore the missions to the priests^
and he made the attempt, we find him driven from the country, and a Oalifor-
nian elected in his place, as had been done in the case of Gutiernez.
Indeed, during the administration of Alvarado, which continued from. 1836 ;
to Sept., 24th, 1842, (U. S. Ex., No. 1, p. 3, " N"), all the moveable property
of the missions seems to have been disposed of, more to the personal advantage
of the rancheras than to that of their ralers. And the twenty thousand Indians,
,
under the care of the Government, at the missions, only eight years before, hsdr
melted away "into the woods," and upon numerous ranchos granted to indi-
viduals, and supplied with stock " loaned them" from the missions.
The stoct, goods and other personal property being disposed of, and the In-
dians mostly dispersed, nothing more was left to be disposed of excepting the :
buildings and lands in and about the missions. The fear that the United
States would acquire this country had probably been entertained for some time
before ; but, in September, 1844, official information was received here that the -
annexation of Texas to the United States was proposed, and that " the integrity
of Mexico must be defended." (U. S. Ex., Sup. Digest, 107, etc.) At all event* ;
the fear of war with the United States seems to be the excuse for urging a rapid
conversion of all the lands and buildings of the missions to private individuals
then in the country, reserving only such buildings as might reasonably be re-
quired for public purposes or religious worship.
On the 24th of August, 1844, a Committee of the Departmental Assembly,.,
two members of which were David Spence, of Monterey, and Pio Pico, (shortly
afterwards Governor), both still living, and who had been instructed "• to point
out means whereby the Government can defray the expeuses of the war with
which the Government is threatened by a foreign nation," (Mission Exh., p. 35),..
submitted a report, which report was "unanimously approved" by the Departs
mental Assembly. By that report it was unanimously agreed by the Territorial
Deputation, substantially, that " the Government of the Department expose to
sale, mortgage or lease the property, chattels and cultivated lands of the mis-
sions of Upper California, including the whole from San Diego to Sorior/ia.,
and dispose of them to defray the expense of the war, their respective legal
debts being first paid out of the price they may bring." (Ibid, 36, section l.y
The missions of Santa Barbara and Santa Inez, are alone excepted from this
resolve. (lb., sec. 2.) Not only the commons of the missions which were not
cultivated, but also their very "cultivated fields" were "unanimously" deemed
saleable by the Government, as much as the chattels which had beeu accumu-
lated at such Government settlements. And it was also " unanimously" de-
clared and agreed b}^ the Departmental Assembly that " the missions, when
their lands had been sold, should thereafter hold the character of pueblos or vil-
lages." (lb., 37, sec. 5.) By a decree of the Departmental Assembly of May
28th, 1845, it was ordered that the Government "call together the Indians of
the missions of San Rafael, San Francisco, (called in the decrees by its other-
name of ' Dolores,') Soledad, San Miguel and La Pari sima, which are abandon**!
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by their Indians, by a proclamation," which shall give them one month to re-
turn "for the purpose of occupying and cultivating," and informing them in
such proclamation that "if they fail to do so, said missions will be declared to
be without owners, and the Government will dispose of them." It will be re-
membered that the deputation, with Figueroa, had taken the ground that the
lands of these missions belong to the Indians. Said decree further provides " The
Carmello, San Juan Bautista, San Juan Capistrano, and San Francisco Salano
shall be considered as pueblos, which is the character they have at present ; and
the Government, after separating houses tor the church, etc., "and court-house. ,
'
for these particular pueblos, " will proceed to sell the remaining premises at
public auction." (lb., Sup., 38, 39.) Thus, San Francisco is expressly called a
mission, in section 1 of that decree, and is not mentioned in that decree as being
a village at that time, but is expressly called a mission, and no provision is niacin
for reserving a court-house, or any other building, for San Francisco. This also
is shown in the most positive manner, that no distinction existed in those places
which were pueblos and those which were missions as to the title in their lands.
And by another act, passed by the Departmental Assembly on the 28th of Oc-
tober, 1845, the premises of five '•pueblos'1 '' so expressly and officially called,
were, after reserving a court-house, school-house, etc., again expressly required
or directed to be sold by the Government, at public auction. Thus, proving
conclusively that such pueblos had no ownership in the lands about them, not
even in the 'public buildings existing in them. Their very court-lwmes were
allowed to them by these : orders of the Government, made not eighteen months
prior to the acquisition of the country by the United States. (Miss. Exhib.)
And it will be remembered that in the law of the Mexican Congress of August
17, 1833, for colonizing the lands of these settlements and establishing town
governments over them, provision was expressly- made to allow each pueblo or
local government to have such of the mission buildings as they should require
to use for " a town-house, primary school, public establishments and offices."
(Art. 7 of said law.) And it will be observed that in the decree itself of the
Departmental Assembly, the same places which are admitted to be pueblos, are
called indifferently "pueblos" and " missions." (lb., p. 39, art, 2 ; p. 40, arts. 2
and 4.) By that decree of the Mexican Government of California, passed just
eight months and nine days before this country passed to the United States, it
was expressly provided that the entire town of San Francisco should be soM by
the Government at public auction to the highest bidder, and that the sale should
take place at Monterey, on the 23d and 24th days of January, 1846, and that
" the total proceeds of these sales shall be paid into the Departmental treasury."
(lb., 40, 41, arts. 1, 4 and 6.) Prior to the time fixed for the sales, viz : on the
14th of November, 1845, the Supreme Government at Mexico, ordered the
" immediate suspension of these sales until the determination of the Supreme
Government." (lb., pp. 47-48.) But this order seems to have been but little
attended to.
We thus find the truth to be, that during the Spanish and also the Mexicau
Government over this country, the title to the lands in California where towns
had been established, including our own town of Sa?i Francisco, was just the
same as it was to lands where towns had not been established, i. e., in the
nation. And we find, what this Court itself has expressly decided since the
Cohos and Roisin decision, (Nobile to. Redman, 6 Cal., 325), that the missions
of California were actually neither more nor less than regular Government es-
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fciblisfemeuts, whose property arid management bad to be accounted for to tbe
Government ; and that not only their ungranted and uncultivated lands be-
longed to the Government, but the very fields or " cultivate lands " which
their inhabitants had held in common ; and the very buildings on the ungranted
lands of such pueblos or towns were all and everywhere, including San Fran-
cisco, the property of the nation. I have been as candid in this inquiry as I
eouid.have been, had it been prepared without any reference to its use in this
judicial controversy. The official orders, decrees and correspondence, and all
Government acts concerning San Francisco, show and prove that it was a mis-
sion, just the same as Santa Clara was then a mission. Indeed the fact is so
notorious, that to this very day it is called " the Mission." And there is no
more ground nor excuse to question that it was a mission July "7th, 1846, than
to question that Santa Clara was then a mission, or, to question that Sacra-
mento, to-day, is Sacramento. We do not make this statement with any idea
of denying that it was also a " pueblo," for it was also called the pueblo of
San Francisco. And none but men who seem " incapable of overcoming the
<ielusions of fancy" can possibly suppose, that whether it was a pueblo or not,
or whether there existed there a Corporation or not, has any more to do with a
•question of a title to lands, than the question whether there was a man there
•©r not. Of course there was a "pueblo" there, because a pueblo is a pueblo
just the same as a town is a town, or a village is a village. And the existence
of a village or pueblo under " the laws of Mexico," has just as much necessary
connection with the title to lands, and of itself produces just the same influence
"to pass a title to lands as does the establishment of a village, town, or city
under our laws, or the laws of any civilized country, i. e., none whatever. Ana
we have just seen that the Mexican authorities " unanimously " offered for sale
the lands of the pueblos just the same as of the missions. But the reason why
1 insist that San Francisco was a mission is, because it proves that the case of
Mobile vs. Redman, 6 Cal. Reports, is inconsistent with Cohos vs. Roisin, and
virtually overthrows it.
PART II.
. HISTORY OF LAND TITLES - IN SAN FRANCISCO.
Let us now confine our history of titles in these old settlements, to San Fran-
cisco alone. On the day this country passed to the United States, there were
three small adobe settlements within the limits of the present city and county
of San Francisco. One was the Mexican garrison (Presidio) at Fort Point,
established by Spain, on the 17th of September, 1776. (Record in this case.)
The soldiers of three successive nations have continually occupied the lands in
and about that garrison, for National purposes, from that remote period down
to the present moment. The first and immediate object of that garrison seems
to have been, to protect a town to be established near it by the Government, as
may be inferred from the instructions of the Viceroy, dated Nov. 12th, 1770.
(U. S. Exhib., No, 1, "S." p. 1. Those directions required the Commander of
an expedition
%
" to examine by sea and land, the port of San Francisco, situated
to the north of Monterey, for the purpose of establishing a mission at that
point, in order that a place so important may not remain exposed to foreign
occupation? (Ibid.) Immediately after the garrison (Presidio) was prepared
for defense, viz.: on -the 9th of October, 1776, the missionary settlement, so
ordered to be established by the Government, from the said motives of Govern-
ment policy, was with considerable pomp and superstition duly founded at the
same place where it still continues. (Record in this case.) The name of that
settlement then duly given and proclaimed, was that of the father of the order
of priests, who had the spiritual charge of all the missions in California—they
called it " The Mission of Our Father San Francisco."
That mission (in after years frequently called "Dolores") and the said mili-
tary garrison, were the only inhabited places, within the boundaries of the present
county of San Francisco, during the period of sixty years after the time they
were first established. Not until the 3d day of July, 1836, (only ten years
before the conquest, and two years after the celebrated order for an Ayunta-
miento had been made), was there a human being residing where the present
city is chiefly erected. On the 3d of July, 1836, Jacob P. Leese, of Monterey,
(still living), built a house at Yerba Buena, which was the first dwelling ever
made at that place, and he was the first human inhabitant who ever resided there.
(Ev. in City Case, 30, 54.) Yerba Buena was about two miles north-east of the
pueblo or mission of San Francisco, and some four miles easterly from the gar-
rison (Presidio). The fact is notorious, that the place was never known by any
other name than Yerba Buena, until since the conquest.. The fact is notorious,
that no Ayuntamiento. ever met at Yerba Buena, except the Ayuntamiento of
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Americans elected there by the crowd, in 1849, and then supposed by new
corners to be acting under seme Spanish law, for the reason that they called
their council by a Spanish name. The fact is now notorious, that the Avdn-
tamiento (authorized by the Resolution of Novsmler 3d, 1834), existing a , ths
presidio, at first, and afterwards at the pueblo of San Francisco, ( the present
mission Dolores), was officially abolished in 1339, (Ev. in City Case, 46, avd
Sup.), and that no law or legal authority existe ? for electing any bach body at
any time afterwards, and that no such body had at any time been elected or
been in existence, within fifty miles of San Francisco, during a period of at
least seven years next before the conquest. In 1841, the boundaries of the
partido of San Francisco were dwly established by the Departmental Govern-
ment of the Californias, and probably for the last time. They seem to have been
established by the Departmental Junta, in compliance with an express law to
which they refer. By that legal decree, the boundaries of the San Francisco of
which " the establishment of Dolores'''' is expressly named as the Capital, were
" the anoyo de las Llagas" on the south, and the " northern frontier of Sonoma"
on the north. (U. S. Ex., No. 1, "W.," pp. 11 and 12.) These boundaries
seem to have included over one-third of the entire limits of this State. The
Partido of San Francisco for which the Ayuntamiento, under the said order of
November 4th, 1834, was organized, included the same boundaries, unless on the
south. In 1839, it was called "the frontier of the north." (Land Com. Ex.,
w O.,"p.29.)
The fact is notorious in the Mexican history of our State, that when the
Ayuntamiento was organized, which did exist at the garrison of San Francisco
in 1835 and 1836, and at the pueblo or mission in 1837 and 1838, (Ev. in
City Case, p. 46, etc.), it was not organized for the government of the garrison,
nor for the government of the mission or pueblo of San Francisco, but for the
government of the partido of San Francisco. And the " second Alcaide " of
that Ayuntamiento elected under said order of November 3d, 1834, was elected
from the east side of the Bay, in the limits of the present county of Contra Costa,
where he continued to reside after his election. (Ev. in City Case, pp. 10, 42,
43, 45, 46, 61, 62, and Exhibits 5 and 10.)
The fact is notorious, and has never been controverted by any evidence what-
ever, (and never can be,) that the mission of San Francisco, or of Dolores, is the
pueblo of San Francisco, and the only pueblo of San Francisco which ever at
any time existed in that county or in this State. (Ev. in City Case, pp. 11, 13,
14, 38, 39, 45, 46, 47.) It is also a further material feet, proved by the face of
Mexican grants of lots at San Francisco ; (Laud Com. Ex. " O," pp. 41, 42, 43,
44, 45 ; Review in this case) ; by the oaths of Mexican Governors and Mexican
local officers who made such grants of lots at San Francisco
;
(Ev. in City Case,
38, 40, 44); and by the oaths of some of those who received such grants;
(Ev. in City Case, 55) ; and by the express orders of the Departmental Govern-
ment of California of Sept. 22d, 1835 ; (U.S. Ex. " W.," p. 6); and which
orders were modified by (jrovernment in 1841, as to the extent of the lots to be
granted by the local officers; (Land Com. Ex. " W.," pp. 41, 42, 43); it is
proved by all these evidences, and uncontradicted by any evidence, that the
local officers of San Francisco, under Mexico, did not grant or pretend to grant
any lots of land in the limits of the present.county of San Francisco, in virtue
of any title in the town or pueblo of San Francisco ; but on the contrary, that
every such grant was made under and in virtue of the Colonization Laws of
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Mexico, authorizing donations of the public lands, and he laws of 1833, direct-
ing the missions to be colonized with the instructions and regulations of 1834,
under such laws ; (U. S. Miss. Ex., pp. 1 to 11) ; and that thf authority of said
local officers to grant lots at San Franerco and at the adjoining place, called
Yerba Buena, was derived solely from the Governor and the Departmental As-
sembly, who delegated it to them daring pleasure, (lb., Sup.), the Mexican
Governors themselves deriving their own authority to grant land* in towns from
the Colonization Laws of Mexico of 1824, and Regulations of 1828 ; (See Arti-
cles i and 15, of the latter.) The last Governor of the Territory of California
made grants of lots at the pueblo of San Francisco, down to as late as the 6th_
of May, 1846, and at the pueblo of Yerba Buena down to the 29th of the same
month. (Official Rep. of City Com'rs., 1851 ; Wheeler's Land Titles, 26. 27.)
No evidence is shown in this record, and none has ever been seen elsewhere,
showing that lauds were ever surveyed or marked off to any town in that
county, prior to July, 1846, even for commoners, much less for a grant to a
town, even supposing there had been a municipality there capable of holding a
title to lands. (Ev. in City Case, 39, 40, 63, "D.") And it is an amazing fact,
that the corporation of the city of San Francisco, completely infatuated by spec-
ulators, has paid out at least over $100,000 to establish a title to lands, against
the titles and the interests^ of all its own inhabitants, excepting the owners of
less than one hundred lots, who had possession and held under Mexican grants
made prior to July 7th, 1846. And so extraordinary was the public insanity
which had seized that community on this subject, that without hesitation that
city purchased, at an enormous price, a smoked document, that excited the ex-
ultation of the then flourishing house of Palmer, Cook <fe Co. That document is
Exhibit No. 1 8, in the Record in this case. (V., also Ev. in City Case, 1 1 and 12.)
Its object was said to be to establish the southern boundary of the land* of the
" Pueblo of San Francisco." The object it did tend to accomplish was, to es-
tablish the northern boundary of the Santillian or Bolton grant. Extraordi
nary as it really is, that boundary line so established at the cost of the city,
completely excluded and shut out the lands and the entire settlement of the
pueblo of San Francisco, and ran over a mile to the north of it, and included
within it only the garrison or presidio of San Francisco, and the new settlement
of Yerba Buena. (Ev. in City Case, pp. 10, 11, 20, 29, 32, 39, 42, 48, 50, 51, 54.)
That smoked document, having nothing whatever to do with any title in the
city, and manifestly manufactured for other purposes, was apparently quite well
proved in the City Case, to be a forgeiy, by the oaths of Gov. Alvarado. Gen.
Castro, and William E. P. Hartnell. (Ibid, 34, 41, 47.) Two persons have
since stated on oath, and another published a card, in the newspapers of San
Francisco, stating when, how, and by whom, that document was procure:.. I
do not know that any one now regards it as genuine. When it was offered in
evidence in this suit, the counsel who tried this case for appellants produced
their witnesses, and offered then and there in Court to prove it to be a forgeiy.
And the judge who tried this cause, as this record proves, actually refused to
allow the proof to be made ! And an exception to this having been duly taken,
ruling, it will of course be necessary, so far as this case goes at all events, to
regard it as false and unproved.
The site of the mission or pueblo of San Francisco (as is shown in the Record
in this case), was selected with great care, and after careful examinations at aii
points about the bay. And that oldest town in the county may yet become the
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heart of the new city. But Yerba Buena was the most convenient for landing
and receiving goods from ships, as the shore then and there was, the town in-
creased most rapidly. That San Francisco would become a great city had been
predicted eighty years prior to the conquest. (Record in this case.) When
Yerba Buena, the recent and new settlement, became the property of the United
States, it is said by disinterested spectators to have contained " about half a
dozen houses," and in all, perhaps, one hundred human beings. (Reeves' Tour
of Duty, p. 52; Evid. in City Case, pp. 31, 41, and passim.) The American
flag was no sooner raised in token of the conquest, than all knew it would
never again be lowered, and a scene of lawless speculations in lands almost im-
"mediately commenced, which is the sole origin of all the confusion and diffi-
culty about titles to lands in that city, which has since ensued. The confusion
and injury of titles was wholly unnecessary. It was occasioned by the gross
error of supposing that individual or local lawlessness, if persisted in, will finally
become lawfulness. Instead of continuing the Mexican system of disposing of
the lands, and giving possession of one lot to every citizen who came, and on
condition that if he did not take actual possession and inclose it, or put a house
on it, in a fixed time, another might receive possession of it ; a totally different
system was adopted. It was determined by the few Americans in the country
in 1846, that the persons to be elected Justices of the Peace, or Chief Magis-
trates, should make absolute grants of lots. At first?, it was expected that some-
regard would be paid to the Mexican law, and that not more than one lot would
be granted to any one person. It was found that the Mexican Justice of the
Peace (Juez de Paz) had continued to make grants down to as late as the 22d
of June, 1846, but that only one lot had ever been granted to the same indi-
vidual. The grants which had been made at the pueblo of San Francisco and
at Yerba Buena under Mexican authority were as follows, and by the following
officers : In 1836, three ; one bj* the Governor, and two by the Alcalde, under
the special direction of the Governor. In 1837, three by the Alcalde, under
special directions from the Governor. In 1838, three; two by the Alcalde,
and one by the Governor. In 1839, six ; two by the Alcalde, one by the Pre-
fect, and three by the Governor. ' In 1840, ten ; nine by the Justice of the
Peace, and one by the Governor. In 1841, none. In 1842, four by the Jus-
tice of the Peace. In 1843, sixteen ; fifteen by the Justice of the Peace, and
one by the Governor. In 1844, seventeen ; fifteen by the Alcalde, and two by
the Governor (Micheltorena). In 1845, thirteen ; eleven by the Justice of the
Peace, and two by the Governor. And in 1846, nineteen ; sixteen by the Jus-
tice of the Peace, and three by the Governor. All the grants of lots ever made
in the limits of the present city prior to July 7th, 1846, seem to have been less
than one hundred and twelve.
The Americans determined to grant lots in about ninety days from the time
they first occupied the city. And in 1846, during November and December,
they granted thirty-four lots, " by virtue of the authority in them vested,"
which was equally good for the granting of cattle as for granting lands. In
1847, they granted five hundred and forty-two lots. In 1848, they granted
three hundred and ninety-two lots. And in 1849, they granted nine hundred
and forty-nine lots. Meantime the crowd in San Francisco had chosen a num-
ber of persons (under the advice of Gov. Mason, I think), to act as a Town
Council, or Board of Trustees, and they wisely called themselves an " Ayunta-
miento." The mere name of that seif-coustituted body, absolutely served the
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ingenious purpose of protecting its own members against the necessity of ex-
plaining their powers, or having any knowledge of them, whilst our country-
men, newly arriving in a strange land, were wholly subdued by its mysterious
orthography and unquestioned antiquity. Under the authority of this Ayun-
tamiento, the slow progress of granting lots on petitions was soon dispensed
with, and they began to put them up at auction and knock them down in
whole platoons to the highest bidders, to whom the Chief Magistrate (called an
" Alcalde") would make deeds. And in this manner, by the 5th of January,
1850, our enterprising countrymen had made deeds to each other, for three
thousand one hundred and fifty-three fifty vara lots : equal to twelve hundred
acres of land, exclusive of streets ! And all this land is in and around the very
center of the present built up city. So far from paying any attention to any
law, or shadow of law, they granted not merely at auction sales, but on peti-
tions prior to the introduction of auctions, as many as four, and eight, and ten,
and twenty, and even as many as sixty fifty vara lots, in the heart of the city,
to the same individual. (See Lists in Wheeler's Book, Land Titles.)
Now, on the outside and far removed from all these transactions, beyond
Larkiu street on the west, and Johnson street on the south-west, beyond which
streets these speculations never extended, the lands were peaceably but actually
settled upon, in 1847 and in 1848 ; but nearly all of it, in 1849 and 1850.
The actual settlers on those lands were usually poor ; they were mostly gardeners,
brickmakers, milkmen, poulterers, butchers, and other laborers, carrying sup-
plies to the city. And in not over two or three instances, so far as I know,
were any such possessions taken and continued by mere speculators. And, in
but few instances, did their possession include over twenty to fifty vara lots in
the city limits. Why are such settlers worse off, because they did not obtain
void papers for their lands ? I confess I know of no reason why they should
be. Was there any law whatever against their taking such possession ? None
whatever. Were the rights of the town interfered with by their taking such
possession ? Not at all ; for we have already seen there were no town rights
to be disturbed by such possessions. Were the rights of any individual inter-
fered with by such possessions ? Not at all ; for when such possessions were
generally begun, even the Limantour grant and the Bolton grant had not been
heard of; and no private valid title was interfered Avith so far as was known,
or could be ascertained. Was any principle of law or of equity violated or in-
fringed by taking such possessions ? Not at all ; for even Chief Justice Kent
declared, concerning a person who had taken possession, without title, of a lot
in the heart of the city of New York, that " a peaceable entry upon land, appa-
rently vacant, furnishes, per se, no presumption of wrong. The benign and
legal intendment is otherwise." (Smith vs. Burtis, 6 J. R., at p. 218.) We
have seen that beyond all rational controversy, the title to all the lands in and
about San Francisco, which had not been previously granted to individuals,
passed to and became the property of the United States. We shall see that
the laws of the United States, as they have existed for the last fifteen years, not
only authorize persons to take possession of its lands without title, but require
them to be in possession, if they wish to be preferred overall others in obtaining
its title. So far, then, from their being any just or legal ground for this Court
to have ever interfered for the protection of inside speculators, and for the ruin
of the outside speculators or possessors, the latter had really the strongest claims
upon the Court, for the reason that they have never violated the laws, but have
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always asked for the protection of them whilst the former commenced in the
school of lawlessness, and were the grand original and powerful causes of a most
pernicious public sentiment, i. f., that ihe laws cannot always accomplish justice,
as well as other means.
The lands in the heart of the city (where one foot front is worth acres of inte-
rior lands) were gravely " granted " to a few persons, in the manner I have men-
tioned, and those who hold the outside lands are holding them in precisely the-
same way and by precisely the same tenures, excepting only that they do not
hold these void papers made by Americans amongst each other. Not one of
these void papers, however, has ever been made against their lands. Thev are
outside of all such titles, and are wholly free from them. The outside owners
do not interfere at all with (so called) Alcalde titles, nor do the (so called) Al-
calde titles interfere with them. Both can be let alone. For many years those-
Alcalde titles have been regarded by all just men, as equitable titles. The con-
dition of the country at the time' rendered their creation excusable, and if they
had been made with the obligation to inclose or take possession of the lots, the
laws need not have been violated and would always have rendered them secure.
And owing to the fact that they were created over the whole heart of the city,
and that two-thirds of the city lot holders held under them, they became popular
titles. And they ought to have been confirmed by an Act of Congress, and
probably would have been had the citizens generally chosen to take that course.
In December, ] 850, these American Alcalde titles came before this court for
judicial decision. In that case the ground was taken that the lands in the city
belonged to the " pueblo," and that consequently its chief magistrate had the
right to grant them. And I have been assured by one of the Justices then
presiding that tremendous efforts were made by outside persons to induce the
court to so decide. But he was firmly of opinion that an immediate and firm
recourse to law and to the necessary legislation was the only fit and wise rem-
edy. In this view he was greatly strengthened by a private opinion on the sub-
ject, which had been obtained from the Hon. John A. Campbell, of Alabama,
then regarded as " one of the first lawyers in the Southern States," and at present
probably the best acquainted with the Spanish law of any of the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court. This court then decided what we have clearly
seen the law to be, that the lands iu the county of San Francisco, the same a* in
any other county which had not been granted previous to the conquest, "still
remained a portion of the public domain." (SeeWoodworth vs. Fulton, 1 Cal.,
at pp. 305 and 306.) So far as I have ever heard, the intelligent members of
the Bar of San Francisco then and now admit that decision to have been an
honest and tearless adherence to the laws. The next great event in San Fran-
cisco was the Vigilance Committee of 1851. Instead of resorting to law where
immediate and just relief would have been offered by legislative aid, a miserable
system of denunciation was resorted to. And by the sheer power of wealth
and denunciation, the pueblo title came at length to be generally considered as
a thing which must and should exist whether it did or not. And I think an
honest conviction that it did exist, at length prevailed. And the final determi-
nation of popular opinion was, at one time, that all the lands in the charter
limits ought to be sold and the pi'oceeds applied to pay off the city debt. It
was not proposed to sell inland lots illegally acquired, nor to sell any by authority
of law, but. by virtue of the lands being the property of the city corporation.
And it was probably owing to these opinions and determinations that a new set
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of speculators set to work and sold every foot of lands in the city limits, on
executions against the city, and now chum that they own tbe "pueblo title" in
virtue of their Sheriff's deeds. In 1853 Congress legislated on the subject of
titles in al! the towns in this State, to which I will refer. But after ample pro-
vision was made by Congress, arid late in 1853, this court declared that the
said "pueblo title" did exist And in 1857, four years afterwards, this court
decided that such Sheriff's deeds do convey a title mainly on the ground of
the former decisions of this court. It is said that this court is bound, by such
former decisions. I shall hereafter submit that this court is bound by nothing
but the laws, and that it does not possess the constitutional power to administer
its own decisions when known and admitted to be in violation of law and of
legally acquired lights. I now, respectfully submit that all the former
-
opinions
of this court, which are now claimed to be stare-decisis, have been already
reversed. It is well known to the court that such decisions have been con-
tinued on the strength of the decision in Cohas vs. Roisin. During the whole
time that the Cohas vs. Roisin decisions were being made by the former mem-
bers of this court that the city owned the lands, the identical city against whose
interests those decisions were made was a private litigant in the courts of the
United States, in a suit brought by itself to recover against the United States
the identical lands which this court was deciding to belong to it.
That suit, brought by the city itself to try the truth or falsity of its title to
lands, was prosecuted regardless of expense and in a manner which, in my
opinion, was as foolvsh as it was reckless and immoral. As a specimen of its
conduct, it could find no legal evidence that the settlement at San Francisco
had ever had any fixed or defined boundaries. That difficulty was suggestive to
its pueblo title advocates. And the result was the payment of $7,500 for the
Zamerano Document, (No. 18 of the Exhibits in this case), a notorious forgery,
to which I have already referred. Aud by that forged document alone they
established one boundary hue, and the Laud Commissioners, with no evidence
whatever, so far as I know, established the other boundaries. The pressure
brought to bear on the Board of Land Commissioners and the United States
District Court to confirm the " pueblo claim" of San Francisco, no man knows,
or ever can know, who was not watching its progress. Every effort short of
bribery was resorted to. A pervading and senseless madness was created in the
public mind against bringing the titles to lands in the city under operation of
the laws of the United States. Any »aw was preferred except law. Horrible
pictures were drawn of the consequences of defeating the " pueblo title." It
was declared they would, in such case, be governed by no laws, but would be
compelled to resort to force " to defend property." And eveiy man who had
the common sense to advise that land titles in San Francisco would be sooner
settled if they would place them at once ou law and fact, and not seek to quiet
them on errors and known falsehoods, was declared to be a " squatter" and an
"enemy to the city." But notwithstanding the tremendous efforts continued
for three years and a half to procure a decision in favor of their " pueblo title,"
it was found so utterly baseless that the Commissioners were forced to reject it,
as just such claims had always been rejected before in the countries acquired by
the United States from Spain and from France. Although to allay the public;
excitement, as I suppose, for I cannot conceive of another reason, they did decide
that the United States intended, by the Act of 1851, to give a title. It may be
conjectured what the outside pressure was when the Board rejected the claim
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and confirmed it on a title derived from the United States. This part of the
decision I will refer to hereafter. Thus, in January, 1856, by the unanimous
decision of the United States Court of Land Commissioners, all the Cohas and
Roisin decisions made by former members of this court, so far as title ta lands
in the city derived from Spain and Mexico is concerned, were judicially
ascertained and declared to be unfounded in law and unsupported by evidence.
(See the Decision.)
The conclusion which the United States Board of Commissioners unani-
mously agreed to after three years' investigation by them, and with the aid of all
that was in human power to do for the title, and so far as any light or title " de-
rived from Jjie Spanish or Mexican Government" is concerned, is in these words,
taken from their decision and immediately preceding the decree entered by them
in favor of the city of San Francisco, namely : " 1st. That under the laws of
Spain and Mexico, no right ofproperty iri lands assigned to pueblos or towns
was ever vested in those corporations, by which they could alienate or dispose
of them in any manner ; but such arrangement only conferred a right to use
and occupy them in the manner prescribed by the laws tender the direction of
the superior authorities. 2d. That the right to alienate or dispose of such
lands whenever exercised by the municipal authorities, was by virtue of powers
specially delegated to them for that purpose by the King or Nation, in the
same manner as the authority to dispose of other portions of the public domain
was conferred on other functionaries specially charged with the subject." Im-
mediately after these conclusions which, as we have seen, are unquestionably
correct, the Board of Commissioners proceed to render a decree, not in virtue of
any right or title derived from Spain or Mexico, but in virtue of a title derived
from the United States. And to dothis they proceed as follows, in brief : " 1st.
There was a town established under Mexico, on the site of the present city
;
2d. That town did exist on the 7th of July, 1846; 3d. Lands were assigned
and laid off for the use of the town and its inhabitants, and ' the boundaries of
said lands derermined ;' 4th. ' The boundaries so established are those described
in the communication from Governor Figueroa to M. G. Vallejo, dated November
4th, 1834, a copy of which is filed in this case, marked Exhibit No. 18, to the
deposition of Said M. G. Vallejo.' " (This boundary, and the only one shown,
is the now notorious forgery to which I have referred.) Next after these find-
ings, the court used these words, which are the last words of the decree itself:
M These conclusions bring the case, in our opinion, clearly within the operation of
the presumption raised in favor of a grant to the town by the 14th section of the
Act (of Congress) of the 3d of March, 1851, and entitle the petitioner to a con-
firmation.'" And on the strength of this title, supposed to be derived from the
United States, and on a United States title only, did the said Board of Com-
missioners render a " decree of confirmation" in favor of San Francisco.
That decision of the United States Commissioners was simply "affirmed" by
the United States District Court for the Northern District. And that decisiou
establishes the United States titles and denies any other. Can it be pretended
that the Cohas and Roisin decisions of this court are binding on the United
States ? Can it be pretended that the United States has acquired no title to any
lands in any of the Mexican towns of this State, because it has become " sfare-
decisis'''' in this court, that all such lands belong to the towns themselves ? This
court could not defeat a private title to lands by deciding in a hundred suits
that no such private title existed, provided the owner of the private title was
HAKT VS. BURNETT ET AL. 33
not a party to any one of such suits. The United States was never made a
party to any of the suits in which this court undertook to destroy its title. How,
then, could this court destroy its title without ever giving it an opportunity to
be heard ? Besides, has this court jurisdiction to try and decide on the validity
and the extent of the original titles to lands acquired by the United States from
Mexico by treaty ? Where a private grant to lands is shown to this court and
proved by legal evidence to be a valid and perfect private title, this court may
eject the United States or persons claiming its title, because such evidence is made
by law conclusive proof in all courts that the United States had acquired no title
in such lands. But were this court to undertake the same thing without the
production of any grant at all, and in the absence of legal evidence to establish
a, private title, it certainly could not make its decisions binding on the United
States, because there would then be no evidence against the title of the United
States. If this court, by the simple proeess of making decisions and repealing
them, could take away or affect the title acquired by the United States to the
lands in the limits of our towns, it would then, as a matter of course, be com-
petent to do the same thing with regard to its title to lands throughout the
State.
It seems plain that any decision of any court on the question of the existence
of a private title to lands, when expressed without any trial and without any evi-
dence, to ascertain the existence of such a title, is not a judicial decision, but is
a mere avowal of opinion, entitled to great respect considering its source, but
binding neither on this court nor on any body. And it certainly cannot be
binding on a nation, (whose rights this court cannot determine), after its own
courts, in a suit brought by the land claimant itself, have judicially ascertained
there is no such title as that declared by the such decisions of this court. But
the Court of Land Commissioners, having rejected the pueblo title, and yet en-
tered ' ; a decree" confirming lands to the city " north of the Vallejo," or Zamo-
rano Dourinent line, has, instead of clearing away difficulties, tended to prolong
the confusion.
By reference to the law of Congress, it will be seen that " the reasons on which
the decree is founded," are expressly required to be given, and to be certified to
the District Court, (section 8.) No decree could be certified to the District
Court, and therefore none could become final, unless accompanied with the find-
ino- or reasons of the Court of Commissioners. Being made and certified to the
District Court, as required by the act of Congress, Mr. Attorney General Cush-
ing, evidently ignorant of the subject and ignorant of the fact that the decree
confirmed the garrison of the United States at Fort Point to the city, ordered
the appeal in the case to be dismissed. And, consequently, the decision of the
Board of Land Commissioners stood affirmed, and a decree was so entered.
The city, however, has since taken an appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States ; and, therefore, there is not at this time any final decision or de-
cree in the case. And, I submit, the decree which was entered, that the United
States had or wculd confer a title on the city to the lands described in the
decree, was entered without any authority of law. Such decrees being designed
to blight the prosperity of our oldest settlements, by covering their lands with
a cloud of title which may be long continued, renders it not only excusable,
but rio-ht and proper, that this court investigate the authority under which they
have been rendered. It is not the courts of the United States, but this court
to which our people must finally look for protection in their titles to property.
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This court is, of course, bound to know that the Court of Commissioners was-
a tribunal created for one single object, and was destitute of any jurisdiction,
beyond that object. And that nothing could be done by that tribunal nor by
the courts of the United States, under the act of Congress of March 3d, 1851 ? ,
excepting only to carry out that object. That object was, and is expressly
stated in the law, to be " to ascertain and settle private land claims in the State
of California," (sec. 1,) which existed in favor of "each and every person claim-
ing lands in California by virtue of any right or title derivedfrom the Spanish.
or Mexican Government," (sec. 8.) Excepting, however, and " the provisions
of this act shall not extend to any lot of any kind in any city, town or village-
in said State, existing in 1846," (sec. 14.) All holders of city, town or village
lots were exempt from their jurisdiction. And all lands in the State of Cali-
fornia, known as the lands of the missions—those held by civilized Indians,,
" and those occupied by Pueblos or Rancheros Indians,"—were not to be sub-
ject to their decisions, the law making it their " duty" to perform a totally differ-
ent service concerning all such lands, viz : it was made the express duty of said
Commissioners to merely report to the Secretary of the Interior the tenure by
which all such lands were held, (sec. 16.)
No law could seem more plain, clear and explicit than is the act of Congress-
itself.of March 3d, 1851, against any court, or authority therein mentioned, de-
ciding or entering a decree of confirmation in favor of a title not derived from
either of the governments, to which they are by said law specifically confined.
It is not improbable that the United States Supreme Court has been advised of
'
the extraordinary proceedings of the United States tribunals in this State, con-
cerning the lands occupied by the old missions and pueblos of this country. At
all events, at the last term of the U. S. Supreme Court, it approved the follow-
ing language : " The matter submitted by Congress to the inquiry of the U.
S. Land Commissioners and to the courts of the United States, under the act of
3d March, 1851; are the claims by virtue of any right or title derived from the-
Spanish or Mexican Government, and it will be at once understood that these
comprehend all 'private land claims' to lands in California." (The U. S. vs..
Fosset, 1 Howard.)
Now, the decree of the U. S. Board of Commissioners, " with the reasons on
which it was founded," as the same was certified and is now of record in the U. I
S. District Court for the Northern District, proves on its face that no decree of
confirmation should have been rendered. The Land Commissioners expressly
decided, without a dissenting voice, that the city of San Francisco had no title-
" derived from the Spanish or Mexican Government," That decision, I submit,,
is all they were authorized to render in any case. But, after unanimously decid-
ing that the city had established no claim which they were authorized to inves-
tigate, they then render a decree of confirmation in favor of a city on the
ground that it had acquired or should acquire an American title, with which
class of titles they had nothing to do. Now, I insist, this court is bound by the
decision, if it were final, so far as it applied to the case they were authorized to-
decide, but ne> further. In rendering a decree that San Francisco had acquired
or may acquire a title from the United States, their action, I most respectfully
submit, exceeded their authority.
The eighth section of the law expressly confines their jurisdiction to claims
" derived from the Spanish or Mexican Government, The eleventh section enu-
merates what laws and rules shall govern in deciding on the validity of claims-
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brought before them, and does not include acts of Congress, nor use any terms
by which it can be inferred, that it was intended any title from the United
States should be passed upon. The thirteenth section declared that all lands
the claims to which they should reject should be deemed part of the public
lands of the United States, Vvhich is evidence of the intention of the law to as-
certain what lands belonged to the United States, not what lands the United
Slates had granted or confirmed. It was, therefore, plainly without any au-
thority to pass upon titles not derived from the Spanish or Mexican Government.
And any decision by it in favor of any other title is simply extra-judicial and
intemeddling, and of no binding force or effect on the rights of any individual,
much less those of this court. And when, in addition to this, we see the act of
Congress making other provision for lands in the missions, (sec. 16), and ex-
cluding from all interference the mere lots claimed in the cities, towns and vil-
lages, (sec. 14), and still further see that no final decree has yet been rendered
in the case of San Fraacisco, there seems to be no actual and legal difficulty in
that quarter.
Now, moreovsr, there is nothing in the decision of the Land Commissionaes
to controvert the fact that the lands about San Francisco were public lands and
passed to the United States, so far as they had not been granted to individuals
by Spanish or Mexican authority. The finding of the Commissioners so proves,
and so far from their decree contradicting this fact, it is solely based upon it, and
the decision of the Commissioners so expressly shows and proves. This important
fact is clear and certain, that the lands about San Francisco were rpuhlic lands of
the United States on the 3d of March, 1851. And the thirteenth section of said
act of Congress expressly declares that " all lands, the claims to which shall have
been finally rejected by the Commissioners in the manner herein provided," shall
be deemed, held and considered as part of the public domain of the United States.
Now, we submit, conceding it to be true, that the lands were part of the
public lands of the United States, then this law of Congress declaring they shall
be so held and considered, is binding law on this court, and renders it impos-
sible to disregard it, in order to adhere to any former opinion of this court, in
opposition to the title in said lands being in the United States.
As to any former decisions against us, and in favor of Peter Smith titles being
rule of property, we deny that they are a rule of property, and defy the respond-
ents to the proof. They are not a rule of property. They are a rule against proper-
ty. Properly speaking, no uplands are held under that title. If any body holds
under it it is an exception to the rule. The only case in the county of San
Francisco in which a lot above high-water mark is held by virtue of the Peter
Smith title only, so far as I have ever heard or known, is the lot acquired by the
decision and judgment in the case of Welch vs. Sullivan. And as a just re-
buke against seeking to maintain and enforce land titles which really do not
exist, it may be stated that since this court ejected Sullivan in that case, a new
title has been confirmed to the same lot in favor of claimants under Shereback.
If the question is to be determined on the inquiry whether the decisions of this
court favorable to Peter Smith, favor more property than they injure, then let
the issue be tried and the proof demanded. We deny it in toto. And it is a
plain proposition that if such decisions of this court cannot be binding on the
United States, and be made sufficient of themselves to deprive the United States
of all right and title in the lands, they cannot be made to produce such an effect
against persons holding title under the United States,
PAET III.
THE TITLE OF THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN CONVEYED TO
AND VESTED IN THE PRESENT OWNERS IN POSSESSION.
I now beg leave to humbly submit to the court, not as necessary to the de-
fense of these appellants, but as part ot the history of the subject matter, that
these appellants do hold the national right to the lands, as well as the city title
whatever that may be. We claim that, by means of the joint exercise of the
legislative powers of the United States and of this State, all the title acquired
by the United States to the locus in quo has been actually and legally passed to
and vested in these appellants. In all, I say, I am well aware I am giving no
information to this court, but only recalling to the recollection of your honors
what, 1 trust, you will admit to be correct, or find to be so on examination. I
make this remark not only with reference to what I have yet to say, but also
with regard to all I have said. The United States has at last a settled, well
defined, liberal and impartial system for disposing of its title to lands. This
system has almost entirely originated and been perfected since 1S40, and it seems
to me it is not only wise but eminently just for the courts of new States to pay
great attention to the principles of these new laws and their application to old
principles, and to second and further the liberality of their provisions on every
just and proper occasion. Because it seems manifest that there can be no policy
more precious to a free State, or more consonant with national justice, than the
ownership of its soil by the greatest number of its citizens. The present system of
the United States is almost a free donation of its lands in fixed and limited
quantities, and under regular plats and surveys, to all its citizens who will peace-
fully and without injury to the legal rights of others reduce them to actual pos-
session and use. It is a policy which, more than any other, perhaps, brings
inhabitants into new States, insures their permanency, contentment and means
of support. Whilst mere speculators in titles to lands are, on the other hand,
a useless and injurious class, who need neither take possession, nor cultivate, nor
improve, nor even be residents in the country.
Under the present land system of the United States, all violent proceedings
by the United States against " squatters" on its lands, and all sales of its lands
in {.large quantities to speculators, have ceased. Its unvarying legislation for
fitl e-n "years, and its settled land policy seem to fully warrant the proposition
as a fixed, settled rule of law, that there are no vacant lands, the title to which
is in the United States, which its citizens may not lawfully take possessiou of
and hold in small quantities, until disposed of by the United States, and that at
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the disposal of it by the United States, those in possession will be preferred over
all others, excepting only where there may be some law of the United States
expressly prohibiting settlement on some particular land. Under this rule of
law, clearly sanctioned by the spirit of the present land system and by the leg-
islation of Congress in behalf of residents on its lands, the mining lands of this
State are now lawfully held and dealt in as private property. Its present land
system goes further ; it invites its citizens to take possession of its vacant lands.
And where the lands are not expres-ily reserved or exempted, it gives the pos-
sessors the guarantees of express laws—that if they will give notice of their
possessions to the Government, where a notice is required, and comply with the
reasonable regulations which the laws prescribe, they who will first acquire and
afterwards continue the possession, shall eventually receive the title of the
United States at a fixed price per acre, no matter how valuable it may be, acd
no matter how much greater sum may be offered. It is, therefore, clear that
the right acquired by citizens on the lands of the United States, under the pre-
emption laws of the United States, is a higher right than mere naked possession.
By compliance on their part with the laws and offers of the Government pro-
prietor, they acquire an equitable right to the lands, with a public agreement
made by express law and not to be broken without public perfidy, that they
shall receive the legal title to the land at the stipulated price per acre. This
agreement is tendered to all citizens, and is made with all who comply with the
conditions expressed in the laws. The possessions of such persons not only
create in their favor the usual presumption of law that they are the owners, but
it is notice to any one seeking to obtain the title of the United States, of an ex-
press agreement by the Government to convey the title to them. By no gov-
ernment in the world, perhaps, are the possessors of property more favored than
by the government of this State. Even possessors of lands belonging to the
public and expressly reserved by the laws of the United States from being sub-
ject to pre-emption, have been declared by this court to have acquired absolute
rights of property in the soil. (Hicks vs. Bell, 3 Cal. ; Irwin- vs. Phillips, 5
Cal. ; Conger vs. Weaver, 6 Cal. ; State vs. Moore, 1859.) It would be folly to
say that a preference of employment on lands gives a preference' to the soil in
law or in natural justice. The destruction of the soil to obtain a product from
it, can give no superior claims to these created by cultivating it or erecting
dwellings upon it. (V. Opinion by Ch. J. Field in vs. , Oct. Term,
1859.) But where the laws of the United States sanctions possession and ex-
pressly provides for securing its title to the possessors, there they enjoy not only
the presumption of title in fee, raised by the common law, but also an express
security or further assurance of title, from the " true and only legal source of
title." Sach a right is plainly an indefeasible right to the soil as long as the
possession is continued, and becomes an absolute right of property, wherever the
law for passing the title to the possessors has been carried out. Now the re-
quirements of the laws of the United States for obtaining the title of the United
States to country lands, are only concluded and completed by issuing the patents
of the United States to the possessors, but as to lands in " towns or villages," no
patents are required, and I do not know that any have been issued since the
law of May 23d, 1844.
In Tartar vs. Spring Creek Water Company, 5 Cal., 39*7, this court used the
following emphatic language, concerning the line of public policy which the
legislative branches of this Government have recommended, in favor of settlers
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in any capacity and on any kind of lands of the United States, and even if ex-
pressly reserved from settlement. The observations are made in a case concern-
ing lands in the mines which have always been reserved from settlement, while
the lands in the towns of California have never been reserved from settle-
ment under any laws of the United States. The court said : " The current
of decisions of this court go to establish that the policy of this State,
as derived from her legislation, is to permit settlers, in all capacities, to occupy
the public lands, and by such occupation to acquire the right of undisturbed
enjoyment against all the world but the true otvner" i. e., against all the
world except the United States, or this State. If there are any places in this
State where such laws are applicable, and where they ought to be firmly and
promptly administered, it is certainly in the old " cities, towns or villages" of this
State where so many people are living, and where all the lands not previously
granted to individuals passed to the United States. Now the pre-emption laws
of the United States do not extend, and never have extended, to lands occupied
as town sites prior to the time they are settled upon. And consequently the
pre-emption laws never have been applicable to the old towns in this State. But
before referring to the laws of the United States which do provide for acquiring
its title to the lands in such towns, I beg to refer further and more particularly
to a principle in all our laws which applies everywhere alike, and which seems
to me to be the most remarkable feature in the land system of the United States,
and perhaps distinguishes it particularly from the land systems of other nations.
The principle to which I refer is this, that titles to lands are not given on con-
dition that possession shall be taken. But the grand object of our Government
which is to have its lands in limited quantities in possession of citizens, is sought
to be accomplished before not after it gives them titles. The consequence is,
that no man can calculate upon obtaining the legal title to lands of the United
States unless he first takes possession of them. For the law practically requires
possession as a condition precedent to the issuing of the title ; and invariably
prefers those whom it finds in possession over those who are not in possession.
Under the old system, when settlers on the public lands were prosecuted and
driven off by the Government, it used to lay off towns itself and sell town lots at
fine prices. (V. U. S. Laws, April 30th, 1810 ; April 27th, 1816 ; and lots in
N. 0., April 20th, 1818.) But that whole policy has been abandoned since
the triumph of the democratic land system by the passage of the pre-emption
law of September 4th, 1841. Since that law the policy of Government has
been not to speculate in lands, but to let all citizens make the most they cau out
of them who will first take actual and bona fide possession of them. In the dis-
cussions of Congress when our present land system was adopted, the most scath-
ing and bitter denunciations ever uttered, were poured out against the heartless
speculators who buy up titles to lands in the peaceable possession of others. It
was insisted that the Government should not tolerate the practice. And the in-
tention and most earnest determination was avowed, to crush out and destroy to
the utmost power of the law, all purchases of the lands which others held in
peaceable and bona fide possession. No difference has been made in the ap-
plication of these principles where the lands are in towns. The same prin-
ciples seem to have universally applied to lands in towns as well as out of
towns ; that the first possessor shall be preferred over all others to the extent
to which lands shall be allowed to him. And that never, in any instance, will
the Government voluntarily part with its title so that mere speculators may
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-acquire it over lauds in the peaceable, bona fide and adverse possession of
• others. A uniform and rigid preference of possessors over all others seems to
'be adopted as the universal and fixed policy of the United States. And I
undertake to affirm, after a careful examination of all the laws of the United
'States affecting this subject, that no law has been passed by the United States
within at least the past fifteen years which, either in design or in words, either
. as to lands in towns or lands not in towns, has preferred claimants to its title
who were out of possession over claimants in possession, or which has rendered
it possible under any legal, just, or honest construction of its laws, to make
the United States Government responsible for any such sweeping and scanda-
lous schemes of speculation over the lands of others, as have been attempted
by means of these. Sheriffs' sales, which are now presented for the appro-
bation of an honorable and impartial tribunal. A tribunal whose duty it is
to determine between the rights which the laws have secured to speculators,
and which they have secured to those who have been continually, from eight
and thirteen, to even twenty and fifty years, in peaceable possession of the
lands which the speculators now seek to wrest from them.
Now, bearing in mind the intention, object and policy of the land laws of the
United States for the encouragement and defense of those in possession, let us
learn precisely how those principles ha\e been applied and what the laws are in
• cases of lands situated in the " cities, towns and villages of California," and
whether the laws have really been so lame as to sanction these sweeping schemes.
' The provisions of law for one hundred and sixty acre tracts are familiar to all.
But the laws for disposing of the lands occupied by towns in California have
never been judicially investigated and construed. It seems that, down to the
passage of the general pre-emption law of September 4th, 1841, lands in towns
were sold at public auction in the same manner as other public lands. (Acts
• of Congress last above cited ; also, Acts of March 2d, 1833, and others.) When
the pre-emption laws were passed, the lands in towns were expressly excluded
from their operation. In the said Act of September 4th, 1841, it is expressly
enacted that no lands "included within the limits of any incorporated town
. shall be liable to entry under and by virtue of the provisions of this Act." (Sec.
10 of said Act.) Thus the pre-emption laws left all lands "within the limits"
• of towns to be disposed of under such regulations as Congress might continue
! to make.
We can affirm, then, with certainty, the truth of this proposition—that the
pre-emption laws have never made, and do not now make any provision for the
disposition of lands of the United States, within the corporation limits of cities.
It was not until three years after the general pre-emption law was passed, that
Congress finally agreed upon a general plan for disposing of lands occupied for
purposes of towns, " and not agriculture," or lands within the corporate limits of
towns. This law would exist in perfection, if all laws and parts of laws secur-
ing pre-emption rights were abolished. It is not a settler's law, but a law of
the United States, passed for the protection of property, and for the adjustment
•and settlement of titles to lands in towns, within the United States, and where,
as is manifest, the pre-emption laws securing the rights of settlers would be
totally insufficient. The law of Congress of March 3d, 1853, provides for the
"disposing of the United States title to lands in California, under two distinct and
; separate plans, one applying to " the whole " of the lands which are within
"the corporate limits of towns, and therefore not subject to the pre-emption laws ;
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and the other offers to dispose of its title to all lands which are subject to the
pre-emption laws. It is difficult to conceive of two classes of cases more com-
pletely dissimilar, and requiring a more completely dissimilar plan of disposi-
tion than lands in towns and cities, and lands for agriculture. It would have
been as preposterous and iniquitous to have extended the pre-emption laws over
the lands " within the limits " of cities, as to have extended them over the
mines. The Government does not make the distinction between the lands in
towns, and the lands not in towns, on account of any advantage to the Govern-
ment, but because it is of great moment to those holding property in towns,
that the title of the United States be not disposed of to such lands, except with
great care, and under special laws to meet the peculiar exigencies which may
exist. Indeed, twenty thousand citizens in possession of one hundred and sixty
acres of land in a city, are as much entitled to the protection of Government
against disposing of its title to encourage and benefit speculators, as one man
would be on the same quantity of land in the country. As far as the United
States is concerned, it does not receive any more nor ask any more for one hun-
dred and sixty acres of land, covered by brick buildings, than it does for the
same quantity on the plains of the Colorado. What, then, is the object it
seeks to accomplish in making disposition of its title in cities ? It is, of course,
to extend equally the same protection, as far as it might be just to do so, to its
citizens in towns as it extends to its citizens out of towns.
There is no denying the fact, that this Court would hold that the United
States has made ample provision for disposing of its title to citizens on public
lands not " within the limits " of cities. Now, why should it be supposed it
has not made ample, and as was its duty, more expeditious, and even more care-
ful provision, for those settled on its lands in cities, where thousands may be
interested, and millions worth of property may be depending on the proper
disposition of its titles ? Congress has not taken the greatest pains where the-
least was necessary ; nor has it exercised the greatest care where there was the
least danger to.be apprehended from the presence of schemers. On the con-
trary, what the wisest men would do after' years of reflection, seems to be just,
what Congress did do in 1844, whilst the wisest men were yet present in its
councils, for disposing of its titles to lands in ' cities. It took care, in the first
place, that no lands "within the limits" of cities should be subject to be
claimed by squatters or settlers, in one hundred and sixty acre tracts. It took
care in the next place, to avoid any expression as to how much or how little
any person should be allowed to have of such lands. It did nothing further
than to render it certain that no claim to the title of the United States in
cities could be legally asserted by any body, under any law passed by Congress
alone. And also, to render it certain that the price to be paid should be the
same as for other lands, and that no disposition of such lands should be made
in violation of the just rights of those in the occupation or actual possession of
them. Having done this much, it most wisely refused to assume a responsibil-
ity which it could not, in the nature of things, perform as well as the govern-
ments of the States in which the lands should be situated. For example, it
would be no easy matter for the remote Legislature at Washington to deter-
mine what would be the wisest and most just rule to adopt for disposing of the
title of the United States to lands in San Francisco. The annoying difficulties
and heavy expenses which have been imposed on all the possessors of lands in
that city, by enormous taxations, and by two, three, and sometimes four " titles "
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being created against the same lands, and which the possessors have been driven
to contest at their own expense, seem to render their claims of more than
ordinary merit. I have been somewhat familiar with their difficulties, and I do
not suppose any prudent man can be found who would contract to pay as much
for their lauds, as it has cost them in a thousand ways, to maintain their pos-
sessions for the last nine, and ten, and thirteen years. It has kept many of
them poor. Perhaps no community has ever existed in the United States,
which has suffered so much, or paid so much to be enabled to obtain the Gov-
ernment title to their lands, as the law-abiding citizens of San Francisco. How
could Congress understand or be made acquainted with their difficulties, and
with considerations which ought to be weighed against them, as well as the-
Legislature of this State. The difficulties justly entitled to consideration, both
for them and against them, were too numerous, too important, and too entirely
local, to render it either expedient or necessary, for the remote Congress of the
United States to attempt to adjust them. The United States had no interest
in the subject, except to secure the best interests of the citizens who held its
lands, and of the community, and it could best leave it to the Legislature of
the State to secure those interests. Congress, therefore, did the best thing that
could have been done. Having settled the chief principles which should govern
the disposition, it transferred all its authority over the subject to the Legisla-
ture of this State. The very act of transferring the disposition to the State was
a guarantee against injustice to bona fide holders. It dispensed with the delay
and expense of each citizen obtaining a patent to his lot ; and rendered no
patent necessary in order to vest the title of the United States in every person
in whom the State Legislature should, by law, vest the title. What could
have been done more likely to insure the protection, to a just extent, of all bona-
fide possessors of lands in the cities of California? Congress could not have
granted the lands to the State, to be again granted by the State to such as it
deemed proper, with no directions to protect the possessors, for that would have
subjected the people of the cities to less security,'and would have been a tempta-
tion to the evil-minded to commit impositions, which the Legislature ought not
to be empowered to impose. The plan of the disposition, therefore, was a trust
for the occupants. The United States could not have granted' them to' the
cities, to be by the cities conveyed to those entitled, because that would have
been less likely to occasion a disinterested and intelligent disposition ; and be-
cause of other plain and serious reasons. She could not grant them to the in-
habitants of the cities in possession of lands to the extent of their possessions,
for such a grant would be too sweeping and careless, for it was not possible for
Congress to know or easily ascertain, whether that would be the best and most
just course to adopt. Congress, therefore, passed the entire power of vesting
the title from itself, and appointed the Legislature of the State to make the dis-
position
; and invested the State Legislature with full powers to do what Con-
gress itself could only do as well, by being as well informed of what was most
just to be done. As to the dollar and a-quarter an acre to be paid to Govern-
ment, there is no condition that the title shall not vest until that is 'paid. It
seems to be required rather as a matter of equality and precaution, than as a
thing to be insisted on. A bill was introduced in Congress, just at the close of
the last session, to relinquish it as to the lands " within the limits " of San
Francisco, in 1851, and it is understood no objections exist to its passage. (V.
U. S. Senate Jour., for 1858-9.) In any event, the price to be paid is only a
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matter resting between the Government and those who have acquired its title.
It is, of course, not a matter for just complaint by the United States, until some
law is passed authorizing the amount of lands to be ascertained, and authoriz-
ing the money to be paid. And the fault of its want of payment is, of course,
a matter interesting only to the government which is to receive it. Its pay-
ment or non-payment has nothing whatever to do with the vesting of the title
under these special laws for our towns. Because they do not so provide. They
authorize this State to dispose of the lands, and of the proceeds of the sales (if
sales be ordered). Congress has never yet passed a law authorizing the quantity
of lands so entered in California to be ascertained, nor authorizing the money to
be paid, nor is there anything whatever forbidding the State to make the dis-
position until after the ten bits an acre be paid. The United States being the
proprietor, authorizes the absolute " disposition " of the lots, and also the dis-
position of " the proceeds of the sales of the lots," under just such rules and
regulations as this State shall prescribe. And this sovereign nation in which
they are situated has disposed of the lots, under the full and unreserved author-
ity of such political proprietor. Now, who can call in question the disposition
which has been made ? The disposition would have to be gross and monstrous,
before it would be either becoming or just to question the conduct of a sove-
reign State, in endeavoring to perform so imperious a duty as to quiet the titles
i to the lands covered by its cities. To deny this disposition is to defeat the very
object of quiet and security in titles, sought to be attained by the joint legisla-
tive powers of the United States and this State. Besides, the State does not
make the disposition as a trustee, but as an independent and sovereign power.
The authorities entering the lands are the "trustees, not the State. This policy
of transfering the adjustment of titles to lands in towns from the United States
i to the States, was adopted fifteen years ago. It being then an experiment, it
was cautiously proceeded with, and at first expressly limited to only three hun-
dred and twenty acres, and the entries were to be made " in conformity to the
legal " surveys of the public lands, and no entry was authorized except the
legal entry known to the pre-emption laws of " the surveyed public lands."
The law was never u special act, afterwards made general, as some have sup-
posed. It is the general law of the United States concerning the lands in cities,
towns, or villages. For the last fifteen years no other system has prevailed or
existed, for obtaining the title of the United States to town, city, or village
. lands. And I know of no system to be devised more perfect in itself, or more
liberal to the States, when rightly understood. It being a beneficial statute, it
is, of course, to be constructed liberally, and in a manner most favorable to the
expressed and manifest object of quieting titles, with as little delay and upon as
equitable a basis as the State government might deem it just and advisable to
adopt. The authority conferred on the State, is an absolute and unlimited
. authority over the whole subject. There is not an intimation of any bounds
•whatever to the authority, excepting only that no basis of adjustment is directed
which should wholly fail to prefer those in bona fide possession of the lands
over all others. We have seen that the same just preference was required by
the laws of Spain, and of Mexico, concerning identically the same lands in this
- State. And it is manifest, that no other system could be easily devised, likely
to accomplish, on the whole, the same extent of benefits, and at the same time
to effect the transfer of the National title to individuals with so little disturb-
ance, and an equal amount of quiet and of general satisfaction, as to prefer the
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possessors over all others. In my own opinion, it would be just and proper for
the State to limit or curtail the quantity or value of the lands which each
• occupant should hold, and such ought always to be done, provided it were ascer-
tained that some held " too much ;" and provided, especially, that such a plan
• could be adopted without causing scramblings, law suits, and public turbulance,
ten times worse for the grand object in viexo, and for the interests of the public
at large, than would be caused by a mere excess of justice to a few above that
i received by others. In San Francisco, a few persons held lands in the heart of
•the city worth millions; and in the adjoining portions of the town some two
persons, perhaps, held " too much " in quantity, though not of equal value
vnth inside claimants. The fee to all these lands, we knew and have seen for a
• certainty, was in the United States. We desired to obtain that fee, and place
the titles to lands of so much present and perspective importance, upon a firm
i and secure basis. The grand object in view was to quiet our titles without
1 longer delay. Were we to stop and quarrel as to the precise quantity which each
i citizen should hold in a town, oppressed by forged and sham titles, and which
.had continued for ten years an American city, without legal titles, and where
f the lands in possession of its residents, were held under various kinds of titles
. and numerous claims of right ?
The only opposition which has ever been made to adopting the law of Con-
.• gress and quoting titles in San Francisco, (except by speculators), has been be-
cause those who proposed the plan of disposition did not attempt to take away
some of the lands from two or three persons, who never received any Alcalde
grants, but who may be admitted to have received more land than should have
. been conceded to them. But no way could probably have been devised by
limiting the quantity, which would not have been met by the time it was passed,
by the requisite number of claimants and possessors. So that little or nothing
could have been gained by the city excepting litigation and disputes, which
were the very thiugs we sought to avoid. Hence, it was determined to settle
everything by leaving everything, after nearly ten years' of American occupa-
tion, as it had settled itself. And on the 20th of June, 1855, the authorities of
the citj" passed an Ordinance, introduced by Mayor Van Ness, then a member
of the Board of Aldermen, " for the settlement and quieting of land titles in the
city of San Francisco," based upon the said special law contained in the eighth
section of the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1S53. That Act being an amend-
ment or extension of the Act of 1844, expressly provided that the lands could
be entered in trust for the occupants and could be disposed of by the State,
whether they had been subdivided or surveyed or not, and whether they
covered 320 acres or 320,000 acres, provided only they were actually occupied
as town lands or were actually a town site. It will hardly be disputed that the
•locus in quo are town lands, in the meaning of the Act.
It could be held with much force that some lands in San Francisco, beyond
"the confined corporate limits fixed in the city charter of April, 1851, (Laws of
1851, p. 357), are properly within the lands "actually occupied by the town."
But, in order to admit no doubts on this point, the "corporate authorities" con-
fined themselves to the said charter boundary of 1851, and to that extent did
I
enter the lands and did give legal notice of their intention to hold them in trust
for the benefit of the occupants, at the place, in the manner and to the extent
i specified and authorized by the eighth section of the said Act of Congress of
i March 3d, 1853, and by the general law before alluded to of May 23d, 1844.
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These two Acts of Congress must, of necessity, be construed together, for the
last Act expressly requires it. I will quote them as, I submit, they will read
when so construed, referring, in parenthesis, to the date of the law in which each
preceding sentence may be found. (See Laws of the U. S., May 23d, 1S44, and
March 3d, 1853.) Read together, they disclose the following most important
law, viz : " Lands in the State of California not being mineral lands, aud occu-
pied as towns or villages, (1853), or occupied by the town as a town site, (1844),
shall not be subdivided, (i. e., shall not be surveyed by the United States), nor be
appropriated under this Act, (1853), but ' the whole of such lands,' whether they
have been surveyed or. whether they have not been surveyed, (1853) ; whether
they are settled upon now or whether they shall be settled upon hereafter,
(1853) ; the whole of such lands (1853) may be entered (1844) by the corpo-
rate authorities (1844) at the proper law office, (1844), in trust for the several
use and benefit of the persons in actual possession of the same, (1844), according
to the respective interests of such persons so in possession, (1844.) The dis-
posal (.1844) of the whole of such lots in such toion, (1853), the proceeds of
the sales of all such lands, (1844), (if sales of them shall be ordered), and gen-
erally the execution of this trust, (1844), shall be conducted under such rules
and regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of the State
(1844) of California, (1853.) Provided, (1844), this entry of such lands shall
be made at any time before a sale by the United States, of the body of surround-
ing lands out of which such lands are taken, and that the entry shall include
only such land as is actually occupied by the town, (1853); i. e., within the
limits or actually occupied by the corporation or its people l as a town site,''
(ib.) ; also, that any Act by the said corporate authorities, ' said trustees'
(1844) not made in conformity with the rules and regulations prescribed by
the authority of the State (1844) shall be void and of none effect, (1844.)"'
This is the only law in existence for obtaining the title of the United States to
lands in this State "within the limits" of cities. It gives ample authority
to the,St,ate-goveMmient to provide* every needful regulation which justice could
.require. By the term "occupants" being used in the law, some
<
persons jump
to, the conclusion that, the law is good for nothing. But it does not seem ne-
cessary to attribute any such sweeping consequences to the mere use of that
,
word, especially as it is the most appropriate word Congress could have adopted.
Nor is it a legal mode of interpretation to attach more consequence to one word
in a law than to ail the other words it contains, and their whole scope and in-
tention. It is, I submit, only a narrow and erroneous view of the law to sup-
pose, it is applicable to nobody but occupants actually living on their lots. It
• expressly .authorizes all "the whole" of lands, actually occupied by the town,
not' by individuals, to be disposed of under the rules and regulations of the
State. It secures occupants, and at the same time in express terms contemplates
the existence of lots not in possession of occupants which can be sold or
otherwise disposed of as the State shall deem best. And I most respectfully
submit, there is no power in any court, nor in the Government of the United
States itself, to arraign this sovereign State for the manner and form in winch
it has deemed it right and proper to prescribe rules and regulations for the
execution of a trust, after it was expressly authorized to adopt just such rules
and regulations for the purpose as it should deem proper. I see no power any-
where to invalidate such rules and regulations after they have actually beeu
established. Being vested with full and constitutional power t« adopt them,
! ,
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after it has fairly executed the authority and vested the title ia express terms,
the Act seems to be final and conclusive, and to be invested with all the guar-
antees of an executed contract. It is to be observed and remembered, that not
a person in San Francisco had acquired any such legal right to the title of the
United States prior to 1853, as to make it obligatory on that Government to
give him its title at all. The United States never having previously adopted
any law for acquiring its title to any lands in this State belonging to the United
States, it was free from any legal obligations to any body, and could dispose
of its title as it pleased. And it pleased the United States to authorize this
State to act in its behalf, and adopt such rules and regulations as it should deem
just and proper for disposing of its title to lands in any city, town or village in
California, not being situated on mineral lands.
The intention is plain to give its titles to lands in cities immediately as soon
as the town authorities and the State Legislature would act. This is not only
apparent in the fact that the entry in the land office is expressly authorized
before any survey, and without any knowledge of the quantity on the part of
the United States being first required ; but also in the fact that immediate dis-
position of the lands in the mining towns was then made in the same section.
The entry being expressly authorized by the Act of 1853, and the quantity
being by express words unlimited, so far as the same should be " occupied as
towns," the Act of 1844 is manifestly to be construed accordingly. And the
sovereign State having disposed of all the lands in the old corporate limits of San
Francisco, and above high water mark, under this authority of Congress* it
would seem to be conclusive, both against the United States and against any
pre-emption claimants, or other claimants under the United States, that such
lands were lands occupied as a town. It is, at all events, prima facia evidence,
and prima facia proof is conclusive until overcome by conclusive proof to the
contrary. As to the lands in mining towns, " the inhabitants " are expressly
given, in the same section, the right of occupation and cultivation until Con-
•gress shall dispose of them. Though not yet given the legal fee, they are
given a vested right ofproperty, which only Congress can take away or disturb.
But Congress very properly refused to make or authorize a final disposition of
such lands until better advised.
These laws of Congress impose none of the duties nor requirements contained
in the pre-emption laws, I repeat it has nothing whatever to do with those
laws. It applies no condition of citizenship ; it protects the rights and posses-
sions of resident foreigners as well as native citizens, and leaves all like matters
,to the just discretion and disposition of the State Legislature. And the rules
and regulations adopted by the State are, to all intents and purposes, the rules
and regulations of the Congress of the United States itself.
Congress does not "appropriate" such lands under "this act 'of 1853, but it
does do so under the act of 1844. It does not make the State a trustee. It
simply transfers to " the legislative authority of the State" the legislative author-
ity which Congress itself had, as the proprietor, to adopt rules and regulations
for the disposition of the lands, making the city authorities the trustees, and ex-
pressly prohibiting them from making any disposition of the lands, except by
and in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the State. And
that authority7, I submit, is just as absolute and conclusive when exercised by
the State as though it had been exercised by Congress directly. The idea of
attributing to the acts of a sovereign State, authorized by the United States to
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regulate the mode and manner of disposing of its title to lands in its towns,
anything less than the authority of the proprietor itself would seem contrary to
the just dignity and powers of the States. Without the existence of the United
States, the acts of this State so disposing of the public title to lands within \
would have been conclusive. The act being performed by express delegated au-
thority from the United States does not render her sovereign act any less conclu-
sive. No rational construction of the authority delegated, I submit, can raise a
reasonable doubt that the authority of the State is, and was intended to be ample,
conclusive and final. If any citizen has any right to complain of the action
his State has taken, or may take, possessed as it is of direct authority and su-
preme constitutional powers, let him apply to the United States to call his State
to an account for disappointing his expectations. We deny the propriety, and
insist it would be useless for him to enter here and charge his State with any
useless legislation, or with any dereliction of duty. No action could ever 1
taken by any State in so troublesome a matter with more unanimity or more
justice than the action which was taken last year by this State, with the con-
sent and authority of the United States, to quiet titles to lands in the city of
San Francisco.
That action, I insist, completed and executed by " the corporate authorities"
as far as their powers and consent could go, and, by the State, including in its au-
thority the express sanction and assent of the United States, the only other power
whose consent was required, renders the titles so obtained absolute legislative or
statute titles ; which, I submit, no power on earth can now lawfully divest or
divert, without the consent of those to whom the title has been so passed.
(Laws of 1858, p. 55.)
It is, 1 submit, owing to the very fact of the multiplicity of interests and of
different kinds of possessions, existing in towns, more numerous and important
than the mere abstract rights acquired by possessing or occupying (such, for
example, as the rights created by leases, by contracts of sale, by deeds, by
mortgages, and other agreements about lands, and which wrere well-known to
exist in all towns, and especially the old towns of California,) which induced
Congress to transfer the duty of adjusting such interests to the Legislature of
this State, where they could be inquired into, understood and provided for, as the
necessities of every city or town would naturally and necessarily require. There
is no definition of the meaning of the word " occupant" in the law or out of the
law, which prevents the Legislature from making it include ex vi termini, the -
persons described in the second section of this State law, as well as the others
therein described. And tenants in possession of leased property are occupants.
.
But, because tenants can be called occupants, is the object of the law to be for-
gotten, the power and sole control it confers on the States to be overlooked t
'
Suppose the term used had been possessors instead of occupants ; tenants are
possessors. What reason or authority is there in mere quibbles ? What pro-
priety would there be in supposing that the U. S. Congress have passed a law,
and repassed it for all the new States, which is a mere abortion, and prevents
the just disposition of lands which it was the very object of the law to bring
about. What reason or good sense is there in the idea that wherever it is at-
tempted to be carried out, it insures its own defeat and want of adaptation to
the very places it specifically mentions ; and, instead of enabling justice to be
done, is to be held to cripple the Legislature in doing what is just. What
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could be more unreasonable than to adopt such a construction of any law where
the language used does not require it, nor the sense admit of it ?
It is to be remembered that the State, being authorized to establish the rules
for disposing of such lands without Congress attempting or having the power
to control or limit the legislative power it trusted, the State has done so as a
supreme legislative power, not as any inferior or subordinate power. It has
claimed to be authorized to dispone of the lands and has disposed of them, and
vested the title in these appellants, as far as legislative power can vest a title.
If there had been no United States, the State, I repeat, would have been sole
proprietor, and then, of course, the disposition she has made would be final.
Congress gave the State power to adopt the rules for disposing of the lands,
knowing the State to be as supreme as Congress itself in passing any laws which
it is not, by the constitution, prohibited from passing. Therefore, the disposi-
tion which has been made by the State we insist and confidently submit, in
any view of the subject, is precisely as powerful, conclusive, complete and obli-
gatory, in every particular, as though precisely the same rules had been adopted
directly by Congress itself. And the Act of this State, approved March 11th,
1858, is, in reality, a law passed by the sanction and authority of both the leg-
islatures of the United States and of this State. No authority is assumed in
that Act which was not conferred, and it contains nothing which is in violation
of any constitutional provision. And no man's just or legal rights have been
injured by it. And all things considered, a more just or more judicious or more
universally sanctioned law among all who have studied and comprehended it,
was probably never passed on the same difficult subject in any other State. I
have referred to every objection to it which I have heard urged with any
tenacity. A few more may be referred to. It has been said the lands were
never legally entered.' This is another error occasioned by confounding
it with provisions about entry contained in the pre-emption laws. It not only
has not been, but could not be entered under the pre-emption laivs, and,
therefore, could not be entered under the ordinary rules, nor in the ordinary
sense of the word entry. The pre-emption laws do not permit the same entry.
Those laws, as we have seen, expressly forbid it. No such entry was
made or attempted ; nor could there be an entry made under the law
of 1844, for that also requires the quantity to be first ascertained, and also
limited the quantity. But the " entry 1 ' which was made was merely that-
kind of "entry" authorized by the law of 1844, "as modified and made
applicable to the State of California by the act of the 3d of March, 1853."
(This language is that of the Congress which passed said law, and is used in an
act of March 1st, 1854.) The law for disposing of lands in towns here did
most materially modify and make applicable to our condition the said law of
1844. It expressly authorized, an entry. It expressly made "the whole of
such lands" subject to the provisions of the law of 1844, no matter when
settled upon, and without any survey or ascertainment of quantity. "The
whole oi such lands (says the law) * * shall be subject to the provisions,
of sai I act of 1844." Whether yat settled upon or not, made no difference
;
and whether surveyed or not, made no difference ; it was to be " entered," that
is an "entry" was to be made of it at the proper office, subject to said law.
Said law of 1844 applied only to "surveyed public lands" which had been
"settled upon and occupied as a town site, and, therefore, (says the law), not
subject to entry, under the pre-emption laws." And said law of 1844 provided
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how the lands could be entered, because it applied only to surveyed public
lands. Our law provided that the lands should not be sub-divided, and no law
of Congress permits them to be sectionized, which seems to render it certain
that the usual entry of lands was not the kind of entry contemplated. And
this view is further strengthened by the fact that our law expressly reserves the
lands from sale by the Government. And no law has ever passed permitting
the lands in our towns to be sectionized or to be offered for sale by the United
States. It is fair to presume, therefore, that nothing of that kind was intended.
And no subdivision being allowed, and the law being that such lands shall not
be sold at public auction at all, it seems plain that the ordinary entry is not re-
ferred to, because that renders the law nugatory. Whereas it is manifest tbe
law intended to afford relief for cities on public lands as well as for mere single
individuals, as has been already urged. Indeed, the entry which was authorized
is manifestly nothing more than a notice to the Government by town or city
authorities, of the lands which were within the limits of their towns, and
which they claimed as being the lands occupied as town sites; and the fact
alone of their being town sites prohibited their survey and their sale at auction.
It seems to be simply an entry in the sense of a record. To enter land in the
land office means necessarily only to file a notice, or cause a record in the office,
of the land claimed. The word " entry" is an old law term for that sort of re-
cord. (Note by Blackstone, 3 Com., 271 ; Burrill'sLaw Die, " Entry, intratio;"
Pike vs. Dyke, 2 Greenleaf, 213 ; Preble vs. Reed, 5 Shepley, 169 ; Evens vs.
Osgood, 6 Shepley, 213.) It is most manifest that we wero not expected to
wait for a survey before making an entry, where a survey is expressly for-
bidden, and where, as we have just seen, it is really unnecessary. And it is
equally plain that the inhabitants of our cities were not expected to wait before
receiving their titles until a survey and a sale, or until the Receiver should be
authorized to receive the money ; for, as the law stands, these steps are pro-
hibited. What reason can be suggested why the Government should be sup-
posed to wish or permit a perpetual or indefinite delay in our obtaining its title,
where it is so necessary to have it as it is in our towns ; and what benefit could
j
be gained by postponing an entry and disposition under the laws of the State.
Would it not be the same to the United States whether done this year or next
year, or whether done five years ago ? Besides all this, the State has deemed
the authority to enter, and the entry which was made, as sufficient ; and there
seems to be nothing in reason or justice, or the language of the law, rendering
it necessary or proper to invalidate and annul in this court what the Govern-
ment has done. If anybody has been injured, it is the United States. When
that Government complains of a want of proper or legal notice, or a want of
payment of the price, it will be time enough to raise and decide such points.
Nobody, claiming under the law, is dissatisfied, and nobody else is affected in
his legal rights. The United States alone can complain of what has been done.
It will be observed the law gives the State Legislature the power to "dispose"
of the lands, and the Legislature has " disposed" of them. Where is the ob-
ject, and where the power to take them back and make another and totally
different disposition of them. Will it be better, will it be more lawful, more
equitable to try and wrest them from those in whom the Congress and the
State Legislature have jointly and legislatively vested them, and bestow them
on Peter Smith speculators ? That is the only question which can concern the
respondent in this case.
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The power to " dispose" of trie lands which was given the Legislature, is
the most ample which could have been expressed. It means to part with,
to sell, to alienate, to distribute. (Web. Die, 1 Watts Rep. 386; 3 Atk.
287; 14 Peters 529.) The lands have now been thus "disposed of" by
Government, that is certain. And it is certain that Government can never
dispose of them again. (Jackson vs. Murray, V J. R. 5.) The persons to
whom the disposition was made were in possession of them when the disposi-
tion was begun and when the disposition was finished. And it was therefore
according to plain policy and uniform authority in similar cases, not neces-
sary to do more than was done to pass the Government title to them. In
Mayo vs. Libby, 12 Mass. R. 339, it was decided that a release by a mere
resolution of the Legislature, is sufficient to pass the title of the Government
to persons already in possession. (See also Sumner vs. Conant, 10 Vermont,
R. 9.) So a release by proprietors of a town by vote, has been held conclu-
sive and incapable of being revoked by a contrary vote at any subsequent
time.
A freehold title can only be conveyed at common law, by deed ; but by
statute, a title maybe acquired without deed. (Jackson vs. Wood, 12 J. R.
73 ; Jackson vs. Wendell, Ibid, 355. See also Ward vs. Bartholomew, 6
Pick. 144, and Thorndyke vs. Richards, 1 Shepley, 430.) In Strother vs.
Lucas, 12 Peters, 410, it was decided that a grant may be made or confirmed
by a law, as well as by a patent pursuant to a law; So a grant by the pro-
vincial Legislature, though depending on the approval of the Crown, which
was never given, but which grant was confirmed by legislative resolutions
after the revolution, was held to be a valid title from the date of the act in
that behalf by the provincial Legislature. (Proprietors, etc., vs. Jones, 12
Mass. R. 334.)
It has also been decided that a State Legislature has a right to pass laws
for quieting the possession of occupants and settlers ; and that such laws will
be enforced unless plainly repugnant to acts of Congress. (Pettyjohn vs.
Akers, 6 Yerger, R. 448.) So far from the law of this State of March 11,
1858, being " plainly repugnant to Acts of Congress," I have endeavored to
show it was in plain conformity with the express authority of Congress.
In concluding the history of the subject matter, involved in the case now
before the Court, I beg to refer to the authority under which the grant from
the city to the inhabitants was made, and to acts in connection therewith
which will perhaps be the subject of comment, by our learned brothers on
the other side.
In 1853, and when the first decisions of this Court of 1850 to 1853 were
still in force, the Congress of the United States passed the said law authoriz-
ing our Legislature to adopt rules and regulations for disposing of the title
of the United States to any lands in this State, not mineral lands, and
occupied as towns, and the whole thereof. In 1855, the Legislature of this
State passed a law, authorizing the Common Council of the city of San
Francisco " to confirm, dispose of, and make all needful rides and regulations
respecting the title to lands of the city? (Laws of 1855, p. 266, sec. 65.) And
under these two laws, one to dispose of any title of the city to lands, and the
other to take steps to acquire the title of the United States to lands in said
city, in behalf of its resident citizens, the Common Council of the City, with
the consent and approbation of the leading and best property owners in San
4
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Francisco, passed an ordinance " for the settlement and quieting of land titles
in the city of San Francisco." And by that ordinance, and under the said
express authority of the State, the city relinquished and granted " all the
right and claim of the city to the lands within its corporate limits, to the
parties in the actual possession thereof by themselves or tenants on or before
the first day of January, A. D. 1855, and to their heirs and assigns forever;"
excepting only some slip property and the water property outside of the
water-lot boundary of 1851. And providing that Alcalde lot holders should
be deemed and held to be the possessors of the lands granted, wherever they
had a grant for lands made prior to July 7th, 1846 ; and wherever they had
a regular and recorded grant at any time afterwards down to April, 1850, of
lands in the angle of Johnston and Larkin streets. And in the same pro-
ceeding the city gave notice to the United States in the proper land office,
of the extent of its claim, in trust for the benefit of the lot-holders. And
recommended rules and regulations, to be adopted by the Legislature, (see
sec. 10) for "disposing" of the lands, as authorized by the Acts of Congress,
of 1844, and extended, and made applicable to the unsurveyed lands in the
towns of this State, in 1853. And, as before shown, the State expressly
adopted, ratified and confirmed said rules and regulations, and " enacted" that
the lands so entered in the land office "shall pass inure to and be deemed to
have immediately vested in the said occupants," as in said rules and regulations
defined and expressed. And further enacted, that all courts shall take judicial
notice thereof. And further enacted, that the grant and relinquishment of
title made by the said city in favor of the said possessors " shall take effect,
as fully and completely, for the purpose of transferring the city's interest, and
for all other purposes whatsoever, as if deeds of release and quit claim had
been duly executed and delivered, to and in favor of them individually and by
name; and that no further conveyance or other act, shall be necessary to invest
the said possessors with all the interest, title, rights, benefits, and advantages
which the said order and ordinances intend or purport to convey or transfer,
according thereto. (Law, 1858, p. 56.)
Now all these laws of Congress, laws of the State, ordinances of the said
city, and said former decisions of this Court, from 1850 to 1853, have created
" a rule of property" and a stare decisis as fully, and during the very
same periods of time, and in our favor, as any other decisions of this Court
have created in favor of these speculators. It has been already shown, and
will not be denied, that the constitutional legislation of the country is the
supreme law of the country. How then is the rule of property fixed by de-
cisions or opinions of this Court, to reverse, annul, or overcome the rule of
property fixed, and settled, and vested by the supreme and express law of this
State ? Are the laws of Congress, and of the State, and the ordinances of
the city made in our behalf, all or any of them unconstitutional and void, be-
cause they interfere with some decisions of this Court on the same subject?
Are they unconstitutional because they interfere with the titles here sought
to be created and originated on the doctrine of stare decisis ? Is this the
legal meaning of stare decisis ? The very idea is preposterous. If, then,
these laws of our State are not unconstitutional, they are the supreme law on
this subject, as between them and any more opinions or decisions by former
members of this Court. If the decisions of this Court have created any rule
of property at all in opposition to the rights of persons not parties nor privies
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to such decisions, it cannot be denied, it seems to me, that they have been
created only in favor of water-property lots, and of Alcalde grant lots. And
as to these, the very legislation referred to has confirmed them, or all which
were in possession, which is certainly all which deserved to be confirmed.
And, at all events, and under any view of the subject, these laws did not
militate against any decisions in favor of such lots. Such decisions can
now stand as the rule of property sanctioned by legislation. But as to
any rule of property in favor of Peter Smith titles above high water mark,
it is a monstrous error. And every man who will inquire of the possessors of
the lands, south-west of Johnston street and west of Larkin street, to whom
said laws have conveyed the title of the United States, and the title of the
city, can immediately discover that they are nearly entirely held against Peter
Smith titles and not under them. And if the stare decisis in the Cohas and
Roisin cases, that the city owned the lands, be adhered to, it, by no manner
of means, ensues that these speculators have got the title. We have the
direct and absolute grant of the city title. Can decisions convey it to oth-
ers ? This Court cannot make a title by stare decisis which it cannot at any
time afterwards annul ; because the Court is utterly inccqjable of making any
contract . and no person or power can possibly make any contract or have any
contract with it. Such a thing would at once incapacitate it from impar-
tially passing upon contracts, by enabling it to have contracts of its own.
Besides it cannot be a party to any transaction, but is carefully and rigidly
confined to passing on the transactions of others. It cannot give its consent
to any bargains, because it has no faculties except the faculties of the law;
and it cannot, of itself, express any consent to any thing. The only consent
it can express is that which the law has previously expressed, before the Court
is asked to announce it. Being incapable of making any contract, of course,
it is incapable of making any title. All it can possibly do, or rationally hope
to accomplish, by adhering to the decision which we attack (the decision
rendered in 1857 of Welch v. Sullivan) is to confuse, disturb, and keep eter-
nally depending on the decisions of this Court, titles to twenty millions of
property, which ought, by this time, to be placed beyond the control and dis-
position of this tribunal, and where the laws to which we have referred have
securely placed them.
It has been suggested that the grant to the city by the possessors
might be objected to, on account of the city being in debt in 1855, when
it was made. But, in the first place, that objection could only be raised
by the creditors of the city, and on their complaint. And, in the next
place, there are no creditors whose claims are recognized in law as valid,
whose demands have not been settled and paid by the bonds of the city, with
provisions of law to pay such bonds, principal and interest, by taxation, ex-
cepting some judgments. And all the judgments against the city are now
fully provided for, by special law of last Session, and are now all being paid
by special taxation (Laws 1859, p. 157). So that not a lien on the lands, or
on any of them existed or now exists, which is prejudiced by the grant of the
town. And the creditors of the city, who are its bond holders, doubtless
consider their bonds more secure since all the lands formerly kept from taxa-
tion, by reason of the supposed pueblo title, have, for the past two years, been
by law required to be taxed, the same as other lands of the inhabitants.
(Laws, 1858, p. 6, sec. 8.)
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And besides, it would be a bitter subterfuge to bold tbat the town grant
made to us is void against credi tors, but tbat tbese speculators can take them
from botb tbe town and tbe people for nothing. And this, in order to admit the
stare decisis title, wbicb not only equally deprives the corporation of any title
it had, but bestows it, without any consent of the city, on these speculators
;
and bestows it where it can only lead to turmoil, conflict, and bitter litiga-
tion ; and thus defeat the whole object of the city and of the State, in trying
to settle and quiet titles to land in that city, the confusion and insecurity of
which is a disgrace to Us all. I say it is a disgrace, because it is perfectly
manifest that the whole trouble has been brought upon us by a system of
falsehood and lawlessness of which we ourselves have been guilty ; and by
the exercise of every species of sense and ingenuity except common sense and
the ingenuity of adhering firmly and rigidly to the laws—which constitute
the only basis of land titles which, by any possibility, can be true, lasting,
and forever secure. For as long as our titles are kept afloat, with nothing to
rest on but mere judicial decisions, and they admittedly erroneous, how can
any man of common intelligence or good sense, really feel or admit that our
titles are upon a secure and immovable basis ? But once place them where
they belong, and where they can be reposed, without a single jar or disturb-
ance of any property, and they then become forever after incapable of dis-
turbance, either by this Court, or by any court or power on earth. Because
they then become legal contracts with the city, and with the State, and with
the United States, and will forever after enjoy what preserves all genuine
private titles from disturbance, i. e. the guarantee of the Constitution of the
United States against impairing contracts. We have already seen, and no
intelligent lawyer will deny, that where a private title to land is legally
vested, it is a contract which cannot afterwards be annulled.
If these lawrs disposing of the property are unworthy of respect and obe-
dience, then, of course, we must continue subject to just such decisions as it
may forever please our courts to vouchsafe. Because, they are the only laws
we have ; and, besides, we can never hope to obtain any laws which to-day
can accomplish more good for the city of San Francisco. Whatever may
have been justly urged in 1855, I am assured by gentlemen who will defend
their statements, here or elsewhere, that there are not three not three persons
in San Francisco, or out of it, who now hold possession of thirty acres of
lands, exclusive of the public streets, within any portion of the limits to which
said laws extend. And not only is the justice of said laws now manifest, but
we need never hope to hereafter obtain any law, passed by the assent and
approbation of any higher or more numerous legislative bodies. And, more-
over, it is to be steadily observed, that, by these laws, whatever title the city had
on the 20th of June, 1855, it has relinquished and granted forever to the posses-
sors. (State laws, sup. sec. 2.) And whatever title the city ever hopes to get,
or ever hereafter can get, from a patent of the United States, in pursuance of
the " Decree of Confirmation" in the United States District Court, has also
been specifically relinquished and granted forever to its resident people. In
the language of the law, " The patent issued, or any grant made by the
United States to the city, shall inure to the several use, benefit, and behoof of
the said possessors, their heirs, and assigns, as fully and effectually, to all
intents and purposes, as if it were made or issued directly to them individually
and by name? (lb. sec. 3.) And it also declared that its claim for lands shall
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be presented " for the several use, benefit, and behoof of the said possessors
mentioned," and for " the corporation as to all other lands not hereinbefore
released and confirmed to the said 2>ossessors.'n (lb. sec. 11.)
It has already been shown by competent authority, and should, perhaps,
be deemed manifest without any authority, that such acts, once actually
adopted, are, and ought to be, forever after binding on' the corporation. If
any individual should make such a contract with residents or possessors on
his lands, he would not only be held afterwards unable to violate or destroy
the contract so voluntarily entered into, but he would be justly despised and
condemned, should he attempt it. Lest any should imagine said act of the
city was passed in haste, or without due deliberation, it is also to be remem-
bered (and it is shown in the law) it was first passed during the mayoralty
and approved by Mayor S. P. Webb, a lawyer and an honest man. And
during the administration of James Van Ness, also a lawyer, and one of the
best meaning, most intelligent, and able men in this State, the self-same grant
and contract with its own citizens was again expressly " re-ordained, ratified,
and confirmed in all its parts.." (Laws 1858, p. 55.) Thus two successive
and honest-minded lawyers, at the head of that corporation, seeing clearly
the means of placing land titles in that city upon a permanent and secure
basis, honestly endeavored to do so, whilst others, the pests of that city, have
endeavored to keep our titles still unsettled. That city corporation never
has and never can make a contract more deliberately, and it never has and
never can make a contract better calculated for the improvement and pros-
perity of the city, if it is only, and in good faith, strictly enforced and ad-
hered to. But the very next year, after this grant and contract to and with
its inhabitants had been passed and repassed, and after the United States
Board of Land Commissioners had, by unanimous vote, rejected " the pueblo
title," and this stare decisis title, San Francisco again passed under the cloud
of a Vigilance Committee. That committee purchased " the Green papers,"
which Green papers are the papers spread out in this record in this suit, and
which any man of common intelligence, much less any lawyer, it would seem,
ought to know are not legal evidence to prove a title to lands, even if they
tended to do so. But, in point of fact, they do not purport to prove any, nor
tend to prove any. Nor do they tend to prove, nor purport to prove, any
fact whatever, from which any lawyer could rationally infer the existence of
a title to lands in a corporation at San Francisco.
The " Pueblo title" was rejected in January, 1856 ; and if it had not been
that the Vigilance Committee of 1856 lent itself to the opinionated efforts of
the same leaders who flourished over the Vigilance Committee of 1851, and
through whose wilful ignorance these green papers were purchased, the evil
moonshine of " the Pueblo title " would have caused no more derangement.
That Pueblo title, after having been decided by this Court in 1850, to have
no existence; after having been decided in 1856 by the Land Commissioners
(who were manifestly anxious to confirm it) to have no existence ; and al-
though never established in this Court, by any evidence, or any pretence of
evidence, but only by assumptions, and suppositions : and although every one
knew or should have known, that the corporation or local government of
San Francisco, was by law incapacitated to take and hold any such vast tracts
of lands; still, the same cry was heard after 1856, as after 1851, not by the
people, but only by the same deluded leaders, chasing the ignis fatuus called
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" the Pueblo title." And in the winter of 1857, before the last Judge of the
Superior Court of San Francisco, who warmly concurred with the same lead-
ers in what they felt, and what they did, and who also had thought that a
'• war existed ;" this case was tried. In vain was an effort made, as this re-
cord shows, to get the case removed into some other Court. The case was to
be tried before him, and was tried before him ; and before him all these amaz-
ing Green papers were introduced, and admitted in evidence, and here they
are now before this Court, in spite of our objections to their being admitted
as evidence. But even the Judge himself found they proved nothing towards
showing a title to lands in the corporation at San Francisco; and he there-
fore fell back upon Cohas and Roisin. And he actually charged the jury, as
this record, approved by himself, shows, that if they found that any Alcalde
had been granting lots about the lands in controversy, that fact was proof
of a title to the lands in the judgment debtor, and they must find for the
plaintiff. (See the charge.) And upon the charge by that Judge, and not
upon any legal evidence of title, this respondent procured his judgment against
these appellants. * * * That was in 1857 ; and it is material to observe
that the judgment in this case was obtained before any decision by this Court
in the case of Welch vs. Sullivan.
And now I beg to refer to one more instance of lawlessness, by the blind
who have been leading the blind ; and also by the blind who have been lead
by the "Pueblo title" pests, the Peter Smith speculators. In 1858, when
the Legislature was about to ratify by law, and make completely valid and
final, the relinquishment and grant and contract between the corporation and
its resident citizens, an ordinance was introduced in which it was proposed
that the same corporation should withdraw the relinquishment and grant it
had made, and annul its own contract! Such an ordinance had been passed
to printing and was being published, but had never been finally acted upon,
nor finally passed by the Board of Supervisors, nor been delivered to the
President of the Board for his approval or rejection, but was still lawfully in
the office and in the custody of the Clerk of the Board, when news was sent
from Sacramento by telegraph, that the law was passed, or that the Governor
was about to sign and approve it. Whereupon the President of that cor-
poration rushed to the public office of the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors
of the city and county of San Francisco, and knowingly mutilated the said
" document," " ordinance," " minute," or " proceeding," by signing and ap-
proving it, in its embryo or unfinished state, and in plain violation of the
eighty-seventh section of the law of this State " concerning crimes and pun-
ishments." (Laws of 1850, p. 240, sec. 87.) "With what intent, or motive,
the act was perpetrated, I leave it to the conscience of him who did it to de-
cide ; for it concerns him most. A majority of the Board of Supervisors of
March, 1858, excused his conduct. But there is no reason to doubt or question
the probability, that if we had been guilty of the same uprincipled and law-
less conduct, to acquire our rights from the city, which were exercised against
us, in March, 1858, to take them away, we would have been held up before
this Court, as we would have deserved to be. And we would have been ac-
cused of not only having attempted the commission of an undignified, and
unprincipled act of legislation, but also of having been either the perpetra-
tors, or the apologists, of one of the most grave and most severely punished
offences known to our criminal laws. Nay more, we would not have been
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allowed to rest in San Francisco ; we would have been denounced from one
end of the city to the other ; and those of us who had rendered ourselves
amenable to the laws, would have been at least indicted and tried for our of-
fences. But so lost had become that sentiment of reverence for the laws, and
so dead had become that obligation which all good citizens, and most espec-
ially all public officers owe to the laws, for equal justice's sake, if not for their
own, that numerous offences, wisely and necessarily punishable by our laws
as crimes; such as illegally demanding money as a compensation for entering
a public hospital, established for the express purpose of affording relief to the
unfortunate, without money and without price from the poor unfortunates
themselves; and such as disposing of the effects left by the dead, who died
in the public hospital, instead of religiously passing them to the value of
every farthing, to the public officer, chosen by law to take charge of all such
estates, and made by law accountable for their proceeds ; and such as know-
ingly trying to give the force of a law to an ordinance which had never been
passed ; and knowingly mutilating the the proceedings or the records of one
of the public offices of the local government of which he was the head, and
where it was made his special duty, by express law, to go with a complaint be-
fore the Grand Jury, and have any other officer of the same government pun-
ished, if he had caught him in the perpetration of a similar act. (Sec. 68,
Cons. Act.) All such offences as these, not done by accident, but repeated
many times, excepting the last mentioned, were publicly acknowledged and
publicly excused, by this same officer, and a majority of this same Board of
Supervisors, who undertook to repeal a grant and destroy a contract executed
and completed as far as it could be by that corporation over two years before.
Why should we wonder, that men who could perpetrate, or freely excuse
such lawless conduct, on the ground that the corporation received the spoils,
were found willing to attempt to repeal the " Van Ness Ordinance," and get
back a grant of lands, on the same principle ! We shall presently show by
authority, that a release of title by a town to its inhabitants in possession,
when once made and passed, cannot be revoked even at an adjourned meet-
ing, and where the release is only by vote. Here the release and grant had
been made two years before, and had been deliberately and regularly passed
and repassed by two successive and politically opposing city governments.
First, during the American or Know Nothing administration of the city gov-
ernment, and next by the Democratic administration, which suceeded them
in 1855, when the Know Nothings themselves had control of the most im-
portant ballot boxes. And when the general election of the general officers
of Mayor and members of the Legislature, were as fair as any which have
since been held.
We have already shown that a grant is a contract executed. (Fletcher vs.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87.) The only question to be determined seems to be,
whether consent of the corporation was actually given or not. As for any
fraud, the law expressly says that question " shall be deemed a question of
fact, and not of law." (Laws of 1850, p. 268, sec. 23.) Therefore it must
be proved, and cannot be presumed. And hence no such pretense can have
any influence in the decision of these cases. For there is no proof, nor was
' there a shadow of fraud in point of fact, or it would have been shown. And
if the corporation did lawfully consent to a grant, and release all its title
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to its citizens, as mentioned, and did lawfully express that consent, and make
the grant and the release, how was it possible for it afterwards to take it back
and destroy it ? The grant and release is unconditional, unqualified and ab-
solute. Suppose an individual had done the same thing, could he, I repeat,
afterwards annul it and take it back ? How, then, could the corporation ?
How would this President of the Supervisors, and his followers who passed
this repealing ordinance, be pleased to have all those who have made any of
them a grant or relinquishment of title, seek to take their titles back, and de-
stroy their conveyances ? And who but persons destitute of principle, or
ignorant of what they were about, can have supposed that public bodies are
not bound by the ordinary rules of respectable dealing, which prohibit mere
individuals from destroying their past contracts ? If the State Legislature itself
makes a grant, it cannot afterwards destroy, take away, or at all impair it, by
any subsequent legislative act. (Town of Paulet vs. Clark et. al. 9 Cranch
292.) It is not in the power of the Crown after a grant is executed "to re-
sume it again at its pleasure.". (Co. Litt. 333; Com. Dig. Grant [F] ; do.
[G 3] and 9 Cranch, ib. Sup.) And to do so, as we have already submitted,
and as we all know, would be one of the very acts which the Legislature of
the State itself could not do. We have already shown that the State Leg-
islature in 1855 gave express authority to the corporation to make the relin-
quishment and grant, which it made. And, besides, we have shown that the
town actually did make the grant and relinquishment, in due form, and by
due and lawful ordinance. And that the town actually ratified and reor-
dained it a second time. It is plain that if the State Legislature itself had af-
terwards passed a law to destroy that grant and relinquishment, and retake from
the inhabitants whatever rights they acquired by it, this Court would feel
bound to regard the act as a direct violation of the Constitution of the Uni-
ted States, (and of this State,) prohibiting the State from passing any law
"impairing the obligation of contracts." (Act 1, sec. 10.) Can there beany
question that this repealing ordinance. did impair, or would impair, if admit-
ted to be valid, the obligation of the said contract previously entered into and
executed by the corporation 1 How could the mere corporation do what the
State itself could not do ?
And besides all this, since this repealing ordinance was suddenly and in
excitement rushed through, between the time the law went to the Governor,
and the time he returned it to the Legislature, the law of the State was pass-
ed annulling their repealing order ; for no ordinance can exist in opposition
or contravention of a law of this State, any more than the creature can resist
or countervail the will of the creator. Why then shall this law not be
obeyed ?
It is as much in force, and has been passed by the same authority as that
which passed the charter itself by which the corporation of San Francisco
exists. If those lawless wiseacres can by ordinance defeat a law of the State,
they can by ordinance defeat the act of incorporation itself under which they
held office. Is it for them to say what laws of this State shall be enforced, and
what laws shall be annulled ? If this be not a law of the State, then the
State has no laws. And if this law is to be any longer trifled with, sneered
at and disobeyed, because the thoughtless example has been set by thought-
less men in San Francisco, then why not further adopt the same thoughtless
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examples and disregard any other laws which the same wiseacres in San
Francisco may advise to be disregarded ? It is time San Francisco wiseacres
were taught better examples than they yet have been, on this subject.
At the first session of the Legislature succeeding the second passage of
said grant and relinquishment, by the city, in the act to incorporate the
county of San Francisco, the said ordinances were agreed to by the delega-
tion from that county ; and their express confirmation proposed and recom-
mended in the consolidation bill as introduced and printed by the Assembly,
at the session of 1856. And the law to confirm the said ordinances then
passed the Assembly. It did not then pass the Assembly without opposition.
But on a distinct vote on the question to strike the provision from the con-
solidation bill, it was lost ; two to one of the delegation from San Francisco
voting against striking it out, and nearly two to one of the entire Assembly
voting the same way. (Assembly Journal, 1856, pp. 474 and 633.) In the
Senate at the same session, the confirmation of said ordinances was favored
by three-fourths of the delegation from San Francisco ; was reported in
favor of, and was agreed to in committee of the whole. But, solely owing
to a senseless and untrue charge that it was only a measure for the benefit of
squatters, together with the bitter opposition of one of the delegation from
San Francisco, who was a member of the then dominant Know Nothing
party, it was lost in the Senate of 1856 only by a tie vote, on refusing to con-
cur with the committee of the whole. (Senate Journals, 1856, p. 758.) At
the session of 1857 the entire San Francisco delegation, with one exception,
who were present during that session, had been elected by the Vigilance
Committee, whose leaders bought these " Green papers." And although the
delegation, even then, or at least several of them, were in favor of passing a
law adopting the said ordinances as the rules and regulations of the State,
for disposing of the title of the United States in said lands, as already ex-
plained ; and of adding to said town grant and relinquishment, the sanction
and authority of a State statute ; still it was deemed best, on the whole, to
let the subject pass for that session, and let the people of the city and the
country see what a precious lot of "green papers" the wiseacres of the Vigi-
lance Committehad purchased in 1856, and paid $12,500 for by subscription.
And which precious "green documents" constitute the great bulk of the
matter of which this immense record was made up, in this said trial, had
during the closing months of the legislative session of 1857. In 1858, with
a delegation from San Francisco entirely Republican, and a Legislature
entirely Democratic, the said law of this State of March 11th, 1858, was
passed without opposition in the Legislature, and, as I believe, by an almost
unanimous vote in both houses. The law has therefore received the
sanction of all parties ; and of nearly all persons except the opinionated
few who seek to keep land titles in San Francisco still longer in confusion
and insecurity.
What they can accomplish, by longer indulging their propensities against
those who have procured the written, legislative and vested grant of the city
in spite of their opposition, is of little consequence. For they are few in
number and never to be feared, except when they obtain a place in the Ex-
ecutive Council of Vigilance Committees. Whenever and wherever truth
and respectable dealing, towards men and families who ride in carts and go
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on foot, as well as towards others, is indulged ; and wherever laws and the
superior policy of adhering to laws, and to solemn contracts entered into and
confirmed by law, are involved ; it would seem that such men are not to be
depended upon.
Certain it is, that what with the Bolton & Baron title, the Larkin title, the
Sherreback title, the Limantour title, and the Peter Smith title, the possessors
of lands in the city of San Francisco have had, and still have quite enough
to contend against, without any man of good sense, good principles and good
nature being able to begrudge them any assistance which the town grant can
give them. And as to those who do begrudge it, we can only say we feel,
and feel keenly, that it is high time 'this Court should throw over us the
shield of the laws, and defend us, as the law does defend us, against unprinci-
pled slanders against our rights and our titles. For whatever others may
have done, we have steadily and hopefully, and for many years, placed our
whole reliance on the truth and on the laws. And upon every principle of
of justice and of uprightness, as well as of policy, they ought not to be dis-
appointed who have trusted in the laws ; but on the contrary, they who have
so confidently trusted in their violation, should be deceived. And according
to the religious principles on which our common laws are founded, the re-
wards of justice should be bestowed on those who have, and will now obey
"the statutes, and the ordinances, and the law." (2 Kings, 17, 37.) And
they ought not to be withheld, to please and uphold those " who have de-
parted out of the way of the law;" (Mai. 2 : 8, 9, 10,) and whose "lips have
spoken lies, and whose tongues have muttered perverseness." (Isaiah, 59, 3.)
I know of no example so frightful, so utterly disheartening and discourag-
ing ; so reproachful, and so well calculated to drive communities in disgust
and shame from the country in which they live ; as would be the example of
attempting to drive American citizens from the lands which they peaceably
possess, without being able to produce the title on which the attempt is asked
to be made. So far as I know the feelings (and I ought to know them
well) of the people settled on and interested in the " outside lands " in the
old corporate limits of San Francisco, they would unanimously prefer to see
this Court assist to uphold any of the numerous outstanding titles against
their property, in preference to this "Peter Smith" title. Because, the
Bolton, the Larkin, the Sherreback, and the Limantour, are each founded on
titles, which are produced and shown, and which .we can examine, criticise,
construe, and overcome by legal proofs. But this Peter Smith title, this
title from execution sales of " the Pueblo rights," or rights hoped for from
stare decisis, has no such origin, and is not accompanied by any of those
evidences by which its genuineness or its falsity can be tested. The others
are regarded as forgeries and frauds, and no doubt are so. But the feeling
about this title is entirely different. It is regarded as far more frightful than
any other title ever before created against a civilized community. Because
it is incapable of examination ; it is incapable of criticism and of construc-
tion, and they cannot read it favorably or unfavorably for themselves, be-
cause it is incapable of inspection. And it has been held and decided in this
case, to be a good title to the lands of all who hold in opposition to it ; and
to be sufficient to eject them from their lands, without being produced in
any writing, or being shown to include any particular lands at all.
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The difference felt between opposing any of the other claims against them,
and opposing this " Peter Smith " or stare decisis claim, seems to be about
the difference there is between rational opposition and disarmed terror ; or
the difference between opposing a title which they can see, and a title which
is invisible, and has never yet been seen ; or the difference between opposing
a fraud, which they have the evidence to detect, and overcome in court, and
opposing a fraud which has overcome the court itself, and seeks to render the
very evidence inadmissible which insures its exposure !
!
PAET IV.
WHAT HAS BEEN PROVED; AND THE THREE TITLES UNDER
WHICH THESE PETER SMITH SPECULATORS HOLD.
We have now ascertained, I trust, beyond the power of rational contra-
diction, that the " Missions" of this county, those which were given local gov-
ernments and called pueblos, the same as all the others, were government set-
tlements, and all their personal property as well as the lands they occupied,
which did not belong to private individuals, was the property of the govern-
ment, and continued so down to the time they passed to the United States,
so far at all events, as San Francisco, Santa Clara, San Juan, in Monterey Co.,
and many others are concerned, which were not actually sold by the author-
ity of the Mexican Government at public auction. Also, that the fact of San
Francisco having no title to any lands derived " from the Spanisli or Mexican
government," has been judicially ascertained and decided, since the decisions
of this Court to the contrary, in a suit brought by that city itself against the
United States. That in such suit the issue was, whether that city had a
Spanish or Mexican title to lands or not, and that that was the only issue
which could be passed upon under or in virtue of the Act of Congress of
March 3d, 1851 ; and that the judgment and decision was, that the City of
San Francisco had no title " derived from the Spanish or Mexican govern-
ment," to any lands.
And that the decree of confirmation which was rendered in the Board
of United States Land Commissioners, and " affirmed" on the ground that
the United States has signified its willingness to make a title to San Francisco,
is coram no judice. And that its affirmance in the United States District
Court, by reason of carelessness of Mr. Attorney-General Cushing, does not
render it any more valid. The law of Congress being express and plain, that
the authority of said courts to enter decrees was confined to titles " derived
from the Spanish or Mexican Government," and that they therefore could not
be extended to titles derived from the United States, any more than to titles
derived from the government of California, or from any other government not
mentioned in the law of Congress. And that the settlement and quieting of
titles to lands in California, and the law of Congress passed for that purpose
neither required, nor at all excuse, the entering of such unauthorized and
purely mischief-making decrees.
Also, that this State Government, with the consent and authority
of an Act of Congress, has expressly enacted, that all the lands within
the limits of the city of San Francisco, as they existed in 1851, "shall
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pass and inure to, and be deemed to have vested in the occupants " thereof,
as defined and specified in said law. And that the grant or relinquishment
of title, by that city to the several possessors of its lands, as declared in said
law, " shall take effect, and be as complete as if deeds had been duly executed
and delivered to, and in favor of them individually, and by name ;" and that
" no further conveyance, or other act, shall be necessary to invest the said p>os-
sessors with all the interest, title, rights, benefits, and advantages which the said"
law and ordinances, and regulations " intend orpurport to transfer or convey."
(Laws 1858, at p. 56.)
Now to leave titles in San Francisco, on the secure basis where said law of
1858 has placed them, and where the statute of limitations of this State, now
about to expire for the second time, will place them, it is only necessary to
remove the so-called " title " claimed by the respondent in this case, and
known as before stated, as Peter Smith.
This title, I shall submit, (and my colleague, Mr. Williams, will more fully
argue), is void, because the execution under which his Sheriff's deed was ob-
tained, was plainly void. But for the present we will suppose him to hold a
valid Sheriff's deed, obtained against the city as a judgment debtor, on the
day it bears date, June 22, 1852, and we will suppose the deed to date back,
by relation to the date of the sale, Nov. 26th, ] 851 ; what title would be con-
veyed by such a Sheriff's deed ? The Respondent claims that his Sheriff's
deed has conveyed to him a good and complete title. Because, 1st,- his judg-
ment debtor had a title to the lands derived from Mexico. Because, 2nd,
his judgment debtor had a title to them derived from the United States, by
the 14th section of the Act of Congress, of March 3d, 1851. Because, 3d,
his judgment debtor had a title to them on account of what this Court has
decided in some other cases. If any inference is to be drawn from the fact of this
respondent bringing into Court such an enormous collection of Spanish and
Mexican documents, as this record contains, that inference must be, that he
has hitherto placed little reliance on showing any title from the United States,
for his benefit.
And if he is able to show a title in him from the United States, he has lit-
tle occasion to ask the assistance of the Court to make a title for him out of
the Cohas and Roisin decisions, because proof that he had a title from the
United States would, of itself, be sufficient.
And if he can prove no title in himself from either Spain or Mexico, or the
United States, and shall conclude to fall back as did the judge in the court
below, on the assistance of this Court to help him to a title, existing in spite
of any title, from any of said governments, and sufficient to defeat and over-
come the titles from either of said governments, he will certainly then accom-
plish more than he can rationally anticipate, and more than he can honestly
wish to see bestowed upon any person, for any purpose, if he considers that a
respect for the laws of the country, is of more consequence to the country,
than his success in this judicial " enterprise," in which he is engaged. For it
cannot be possible that any honest or respectable man can desire success, if
the laws of the country are against it.
This extraordinary suit of ejectment seems to be based on the said three
fees, or three separate sources or claims for title.
PART V.
UNIFORMITY IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAWS, IS COM-
MANDED BY THE CONSTITUTION, ETC.
About the first and most important thing to be desired in any country, is
uniformity in the operation and administration of the laws established for the
protection of liberty and property. Without such uniformity, all do not en-
joy the same protection, and justice is not administered. We have to do in
this case, only with the general laws established by this State for the protect-
ion of property in this State. If those general laws could be made to apply
only for the protection of such citizens and such cases as a court might chose
to prefer, no matter what pretense it should set up to justify the preference,
the protection of property would not be equal, and the titles to property, in
cases of ejectment, would not be made to depend on the laws, but on the
court. But our Constitution has been careful to render such a catastrophy
impossible, and it has guaranteed the same application of the general laws of
the country to every citizen within its limit3. To accomplish this, it has ex-
pressly commanded all its courts to give to " All laws of a general nature a
uniform operation." (Art. 1, Sec. 11.) If any attempt were made anywhere,
said this Court, to violate this provision of our Constitution, " it would be the
duty of this Court to interfere and prevent the commission of so grave an in-
justice." (People vs. Coleman, 4 Cal. at p. 56.) The laws of this State,
fixing the only kind of evidence which shall be received in any case, in the
courts of this State, to prove a private title to lands in the adverse possession
of others, are, in their terms and provisions, the same in all parts of the State.
So likewise, are all other laws governing suits of ejectment, laws of a general
nature, just as much as the laws governing suits of forcible entry and unlaw-
ful detainer, and the laws governing cases of robbery and theft. These facts
being plain, the conclusion seems inevitable, that there can be no such thing
as one kind of evidence to prove a private title to lands in San Francisco,
which would not be received to prove a private titleto lands in Amador or any
other county of the State. The inhabitants ofSan Francisco are as much entitled
to the protection of the laws, against schemes of public plunder and general
private robbery, as those coming here from other counties. And that which
is made law for ejectment suits in San Francisco, must be law for ejectment
suits from San Jose and Monterey, and such other towns as judgment sales
shall hereafter be obtained against. And the principles made appliable to
the decision of this suit, must be applied, where precisely the same kind of
title is to be presented ; and whether in favor of plaintiffs now possessed of
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them, or those who may hereafter acquire them. And generally, " the set-
tled and fundamental principles " of evidence, which constitute the Law of
Evidence of this State, for trying and deciding suits of ejectment in the courts
of this State, must be made to prevail, and be applied alike in all cases, where
the facts of the case are the same. It would be monstrous to assume, that
this Court could itself create a state of facts concerning titles in any one
county, which could relieve it from enforcing all such general laws in San
Francisco, as well as elsewhere. Because that would be assuming that the
court can, by its own acts if persevered in, relieve itself from being obe-
dient to the Constitution, and to the principle of equal justice to all suitors.
And the very fact that the law of this case must be settled so that it can be
applied to the same kind of titles everywhere, causes the decision of this case
to affect more or less, the titles to lands in seven cities, and in at least twenty-
one different villages or communities, in this State ; all of which have preeisely
the same common origin and history, and have always been governed by the
same general laws, so far as regards their title to lands. The proper decision
of this case, therefore, -is really of vast and permanent interest; and it must
have an incalculable effect to excite litigation, or to quiet titles and remove lit-
igious clouds which are rising over a very large portion of the oldest settled
and choicest lands in the State. The decision of this single case will, undoubt-
edly, affect directly more than five thousand resident citizens and land owners.
Indeed, the decision of this case involves clouds of titles, which are being
gathered over large portions of fourteen counties, besides the county of San
Francisco which many persons are industriously endeavoring to entirely
envelop. This case, therefore, is of more extended importance than has, per-
haps, been supposed. And whatever we may think of its present importance,
it must necessarily vastly increase as the country becomes more settled, and
the desire to have the titles to lands quieted becomes still more universal in
our agricultural counties. According to the best estimate I have been able
to make, these litigious and pestilential clouds of title are floating and gath-
ering over about one million acres of the oldest settled lands in this county.
Now, we will assume for the present, (and I shall hereafter endeavor to
prove) that these cases must be decided according to lavj, and not according
to judicial errors which have been committed. We have just submitted, and
we insist upon it as too plain to require argument, that the laws governing
actions of ejectment, are " laws of a general nature," and must be applied,
without the slighest variation or change being countenanced, or even thought
of. on account of their coming here from the county of San Francisco. Con-
ceding then, that the laws are general and uniform laws, and the same
throughout the State, and conceding then, that they must, therefore, require
the same degree of proof to establish a legal title to land in one part of the
,
State as in another, what law is it which is to fix and determine what that
proof shall consist of ? This brings us to the next point.
PART VI.
WHAT LAW MUST GOVERN ALL SUITS OF EJECTMENT IN THE
COURTS OF THIS STATE?
This is a suit of ejectment brought into our own courts, and confined to
our own citizens. What law then, must determine the evidence which the
plaintiff must produce in this suit to warrant our conviction of the unlawful
withholding of the property ? No doubt, our learned brothers on the other
side, are primed and ready for a four days' seige against us, about the Spanish
law and the Mexican law. But, I submit, those laws have nothing to do with
determining the kind and degree of evidence which these claimants must pro-
duce, before we can be convicted of the offence with which we are chai'ged.
We are being tried in our own country, are we not ? Is not our own country
governed by our own laws ? We are being tried in our own courts, are we
not ? Do the modes of trial or the rules of legal evidence which would gov-
ern suits of ejectment in the courts of Mexico, govern suits of ejectment in
the courts of this State ? It would seem to be as rational, to apply the Mex-
ican rules of legal evidence to the settlement of controversies between our
own citizens, in our own courts, concerning personal property, as it would be
to do so concerning real property. Indeed, as we all know, the rules of legal
evidence which prevail in the courts of Mexico, cannot prevail in our courts
;
because thev are not in force in this State. They, in common with all the
laws of Spain and of Mexico, have been repealed and abolished, and are now
purely the laws of foreign countries. And not one of them can now be
referred to as having any more force in this State as laws, than have the
laws of France, or of Russia, or of any other foreign nation whose system of
laws we have not adopted.
All the laws of Spain and of Mexico, therefore, are foreign laws, and must
be regarded as having no more force in this State, in any respect whatever,
excepting as mere matters of evidence, than they have in the States of New
York and Virginia. Now, with the abolishment of these laws, all the rights
which existed under them have been swept away ; excepting only vested rights
acquired prior to the act of repeal of April 22d, 1850, and such as were guar-
anteed by the Treaty of Peace of 1848, between the United States and
Mexico.
What are the rights which the repeal of those laws have not disturbed nor
destroyed ? They are not the right? of political or public corporations, for, as
I shall hereafter submit, these pertained only to the political systems of local
government which prevailed ; and were necessarily subject to be controlled,
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modified or entirely taken away, according as the interests and success of the
new nation and the new constitution might demand and provide. But, the
rights vested, and which the repeal of all former laws did not disturb, were
simply and only, the rights of private property. And the laws which once
prevailed here, and which are now abolished, may now be referred to in con-
nection with these suits, merely as evidences to prove the existence of past
contracts, and vested rights or interests, concerning lands. But, I mostrespect-
fully submit, until the legal evidence is duly introduced to prove the facts, this
Court cannot attempt to judicially determine when, where, by whom, and to
what extent, the former laws of this country, either general or special, have
created private rights and titles to lands in this State. When the laws are
produced which did create them, then of course it will become the duty of
counsel to argue, and of the Court to judge and determine their relevancy,
and their sufficiency under the "laws of this State, to prove a private title to
lands. And if it be found in a case in court that according to the law of evi-
dence of this State, they are sufficient to prove a private title to land, the
Court will then determine what kind of title it is ; whether the legal title
absolute, or a title in trust ; and in a case like this, whether it could be sold
and conveyed by a Sheriff or Constable under an execution ; or whether it
was merely a community right, prevailing in idle countries, and continuable
only during the pleasure of the sovereign or national proprietors.
But to go into the judicial inquiry and decision of these, and other purely
secondary and consequential inquiries, before any cause is legally shown or
proved, we insist is not merely unreasonable and contrary to all logical inves-
tigation, but is in plain and direct violation of the law of evidence of this
State, established for the very purpose of insuring accuracy and certainty in
precisely such controversies as these now at bar.
The kind and the sufficiency of evidence, which will be deemed competent
to prove the existence of a private title to land good against our government,
or good against persons in adverse possession, and claiming the protection of
our laws, or claiming title under our governments ; and the time within which
such evidence must be produced, or the claim prosecuted, in order to entitle
it to be heard in our courts ; are matters which, from the necessities of the
case, and by the assent of all governments, are, and must be, left to the
reasonable laws of the country in which the lands are situated, and in whose
courts the right must be tried, and decided, according to the production or
non-production of precisely that kind of evidence which such reasonable
laws exact.
Indeed there can be no rational controversy as to the right of this State to
fix by precise and careful laws, the only kind of evidence of which its courts
shall take notice, or to which they shall listen, as competent to prove a pri-
vate title to lands. In fact it seems to be the first and highest duty of every
State government to do this. And wherever it is not done, it cannot be said
that the rights of property can be legally enforced. Because the real pur-
pose of such a law of evidence is to insure the protection and enforcement of
all private titles to lands which do exist; and at the same time insure the
country against the establishment and enforcement of any title which does
not exist. And no titles can be enforced which do not exist, without inter-
ference with those which do. The highest authority on this subject says :
Suits and controversies touching lands, ex directo, are generally if not uni-
5
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versally recognized as belonging " to the forum of the situs, and not else-
where." And that "it would seem a just and natural, if not an irresistible
conclusion, that the law of evidence of the situs touching such rights, titles,
suits and controversies, must, and ought exclusively to govern in all such
cases." (Story Conn1 . Laws, sec. 630 b.) For example, he says even a com-
plete deed to lands cannot be received in evidence as competent to prove an
existing and valid title, unless it be proved to be duly recorded " according
to the lex locirei sitce ;" at the time. (ib. 631.)
In the case of the United States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch 115, the United
States claimed title to lands in Maine, (while under Massachusetts,) founded
on a deed duly executed and delivered "at the Island of Granada in the West
Indies, before a notary public, according to the existing laws to pass real
estate in that colony ; and both parties wer,e at that time residents therein."
The Court refused to recognize the deed as evidence of title because it did
not conform to the laws of Massachusetts, which were precisely the same as
the law of this State respecting the evidence required to prove that any in-
terest or estate in lands have been conveyed from one owner to another.
The Supreme Court of the United States (Story J.,) said : " The question
presented for consideration is, whether the lex loci contractus or the lex loci
rei sitce is to govern in the disposal of real estates. The court entertain no
doubt on the subject; and are clearly of opinion that the title to land is to
be acquired and is also to be lost in the manner prescribed by the law of the
place where such land is situated." Of course titles acquired before the laws
of this State existed, cannot be destroyed by acts of this State. And when it
is shown that any legislation of this State has destroyed a pre-existing valid
title, by violating the contract which created it, this Court will, of course,
hold such violation void as to such title. But there is no legislation of the
kind. The legislation is only of that character, which requires all pre-exist-
ing individual titles to be proved, and prohibits the recognition of any which
are not proved, according to the law of evidence of this State ; which law is
not unconstitutional nor unreasonable, and cannot impair any title to land
which actually does exist. The laws previously existing here are the law of
the private contracts of title, previously made here. But the courts and the
laws which then existed for their enforcement, have all been abolished, and
new courts and new laws have been substituted. And under these new laws
all the old private contracts can be enforced so far as they actually were
private contracts, and provided those who held them will comply with the
new regulations ; which do not tend to impair them, but which require all
of them to be recorded, and require all of them to be sued on within a
reasonable time, and require all of them to be established by conclusive
written proof. Each and all of which requirements, either actually were, or
could have been imposed by the former government, without causing -or
tending to produce any violation of the contracts. And therefore their impo-
position by the present government cannot be held to have produced any
injurious effect. In fact if our courts are to enforce them, they must either
be enforced according to our laws, and the evidence required by our laws, in
such cases, or not at all. Because all the former laws being totally abolished,
nothing of them remains. But nevertheless the private contracts made
under those laws, we recognize as still valid and obligatory ; but we will not
be imposed upon, nor allow those who have good contracts to be imposed
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upon; and therefore we have adopted laws to prevent it. And the same
principle which makes the lex loci rei sitae govern in cases of contracts made
after the law exists, justifies the application of the law of the situs to con-
tracts made before the law existed, provided no violation of the contract is
occasioned. And to require a contract never existing except in writing, to
be proved by producing the writing ; and to require a contract to be pub-
licly recorded, which was before required to be so recorded ; and to require a
contract to be enforced within a certain time, or not at all, when this also
was required by the former laws ; renders it unquestionable, that our laws in
these respects so far from tending to impair any rights, are indispensible to
the security of all rights in real property ; and ought to be adhered to with
the utmost firmness and rigor. For they are the very means and the only
means, of removing the deadening incubus on this state of uncertainty in
titles to lands. The laws do not create nor admit of the uncertainties as to
original titles in lands, which have so afflicted this country. I insist it is
owing to a laxity in adhering to the fixed rules of legal evidence of which this
record presents only one instance, which has at last produced the deadening
and destroying pestilence, of rendering everything about land titles in Cali-
fornia uncertain to everybody. In the law, land titles wherever they exist, are
certainties ; never uncertainties. In Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 655, the Su-
preme Court of the United States (Washington J.) said : " It is an unques-
tionable principle of law, that the title to and the disposition of real property,
must be exclusively subject to the laws of the country where it is situated."
And the same principle is reiterated by the same Court in McCormick v.
Sullivant, 10 Wheat., 192.
But the decision of this Court, in Nims v. Palmer, 6 Cal. 13, is so em-
phatic and plainly conformable to law, that no more need be said to warrant
us in affirming positively that this case must be tested by the laws of evi-
dence of this State, referred to. In that case, this Court (Heydenfeldt J.)
said : " This State has the most perfect right to determine what shall constitute
evidences of title, as between her own citizens, to all the lands within her
boundaries." (Nims v. Palmer, 6 Cal. R. 13.) Now, this State has consti-
tutional^ exercised this " most perfect right" and not in any manner to
destroy vested rights, but to render vested rights secure, against all attacks,
by whatever individuals attempted, and by whatever department of the
government undertaken.
PAET VII.
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE OF THIS STATE CONCERNING PROOF
OF TITLE TO LANDS.
And First, The Common Law.
In determining what evidence shall be admissible to prove a private title
to lands, in ejectment against those in peaceable and bona fide possession, this
State has justly determined, in the first place, that it shall be that degree of
evidence required by the " Common Law of England," in all such cases.
(Laws of 1850, p. 219.) According to that law (as is well known to us all)
there is only one " true original source of all private titles to lands." In
England that original source is the King. And in this State, and throughout
the United States, we have applied the same doctrine to our republican
government, and " it is a settled and fundamental doctrine with us," that the
only true original source of all private title to lands are our own State and
National Governments; excepting only where such titles have been made
and 'perfected by former and recognized national proprietors. (See 3 Kent,
377, 378.) In this State, then, according to " the settled and fundamental
law of this country," every private title to lands must be derived either from
the Government of Spain, or Mexico, or the United States, or the State of
California. No city, and no court, is included or to be recognized as capable
of being the origin of a legal private title to lands. It has been wisely sug-
gested that the object of this " fundamental principle" requiring only one
common source for all individual titles to lands, is not for the profit, or the
aggrandisement of the King, or of the National Governments, but for the
benefit and security of individuals in their titles. (Angel Tide Waters, 20.)
Such being the law, it is important, in this case, to recall the character of
the national title, and the fact, that it is an impossibility for it to be passed
from the national owner, to any individual, or to any local or private corpora-
tion, except by an actual grant or transfer in writing.
Things (as we are taught in the books) things have their existence in
nature, independent of any idea of ownership, in anybody. (Introduction to
Powell's Wood's Conveyancing, vol. I. p. 8.) The title which is created in
them and exists separately and independently of the possession of them, has
no existence except only in "contemplation and notion of law." (Ibid.)
" Every nation has, by consent or agreement among its people, established
rules, by which to determine men's interests in all things, admitted by the
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laws of each particular State to be capable of ownership. These rules
—
pre-
vailing in every civilized nation where lands are transferable—admit, from
nature and from necessity, of two kinds of property in lands : One kind
created by " actual corporal possession and use," of the land ; and the other
created by having a legal title to it, which carries with it an " ideal posses-
sion," existing only in contemplation of the mind, and " in notion of law."
(lb. 1 and 8.) That acquired by actual possession is called the corporeal
right. And that acquired by an estate or interest " considered distinctly
from the land in which the interest is," is called the incorporeal right. (lb.
2 : 2 Bl. Com. 21.) "Estates in things, considered in the abstract, and
distinctly from the things themselves," (says Powell) are incorporeal heredita-
ments, (lb. 22 and 25.) Now, of course, this is the nature of the title held
by a nation or a King, in their remote territories. How can such a title be
passed to a private person or corporation ? The corporeal title could be
passed with or without any writing, because that title is transferable by trans-
ferring the actual possession of the land. But how can the abstract, and
incorporeal title be transferred, without a writing? How can a purely ideal
and abstract right of property, having no existence excepting in the contem-
plation of the mind, be taken hold of and delivered to another, so that it can
be retained and shown by that other ? It is absolutely impossible, except
in one way, and that way the law has fixed, and no other is countenanced in
law, or noticed by our courts, and that way is by a writing. And hence
the maxim or truism of the common law, that incorporeal property does
not lie in livery but lies in -grant, and can pass by grant only. (lb. Introduc.
25.) (That property of a corporation may be called a "hereditament," see
lb. Introduc. 6 and 7, and 3 Kent, 401, and 2 Bl. Com. 19.)
The title then, which the nation has, is not the possession of lands, nor is
it affected by the possession of others, without its consent. Its title is simply
the right of possession. It is an incorporeal property, or an incorporeal right
to the property, considered distinctly from the land in which the interest is.
(3 Kent, 401 ; 2 Bl. Com. 17.) It is a right incapable of manual delivery.
It is a right incapable of being transferred by delivery of possession of the
land. It is precisely the same class of property as an incorporeal heredita-
ment, " which lies only in grant." (2 Bl. 108, 109, 317 ; Co. Lit. 96, 172 a;
4 Kent, 490 ; 2 Hilliard, Real Prop. 604 ; French vs. French, 3 N. H. Rep.
255 ; Powell's Introduc. Wood's Conveyancing, pp. 22 and 25.) And the
transfer of title to land by any nation, is the trausfer " of a virtual or ideal
possession (or right) existing in the contemplation of the mind alone."
And not only the nature of this title, but the nature of the national pro-
prietor also, is such as to preclude the possibility of an actual transfer of the
title except by writing. The national proprietor, whether it be the republic
of the United States, or the republic of Mexico, is a corporation. (A. and A.
on Corpo. sec. 15.) And, of course, it is impossible for it to transfer its title
verbally, or in any manner except by a conveyance or transfer in writing.
Hence, another learned author of the past century, " All conveyances by the
King, and by bodies politic, were grants, for they could not convey but by deed.'1 ''
(Sanders on Uses and Trusts, 251, v. also, 272.)
And hence Kent decided, while Chief Justice, and expressly and unquali-
fiedly declares in his Commentaries, that our Courts of Justice, " cannot take
notice'''' of any private title to lands, no\$dn possession, unless the same be
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derived from the proper national owner, and be " duly verified by a patent"
(Jackson vs. Ingraham, 4 J. R. 163 ; 3 Kent Com. 378 ; Jackson vs. Waters,
12 J. R. 365.)
And upon this point, every member of the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
in their very able and very learned and separate decisions in the case of De
Armis vs. New Orleans, argeed. They unanimously held, in that case, that
by the laws of France and of Spain, as well as our own laws, an actual writ-
ten grant or patent is indispensable to transfer the title of the nation to an in-
dividual, or to a town or a city. (De Armis vs. N. O., 3 La., 132 ; see pp.
156, 187, 197, 214.) . The accuracy of that decision, upon this point, was
not questioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, on the appeal to
that Court by said city in said case. (10 Peters R. 726.) Indeed the Su-
preme Court of the United States has acknowledged itself bound, by the same
" fundamental doctrine ;" and has carried it so far as to decide that until the
patent of the United States is actually issued, the legal title of the United
Stales to its lands cannot be deemed to have been conveyed; and that when its
patent does issue, the patent transfers of its own force the absolute and con-
clusive title. (Bagnal vs. Broderick, 13 Peters, 450. See also to same eifect
Hosier vs. Smith, 3 Blackford, 132 ; McConnell vs. Wilcox, 1 Seammon, (111.)
367; Goodlet vs. Smithson, 5 Porter, (Ala.) 245.) No allusion is made to
our titles transferred directly by national statutes, for, of course, they are valid,
provided the statute does transfer or vest the title. It is equally well known to
this Court and to all lawyers, that under the common law, parol proof can
never be received in any case, nor under any circumstances, to prove a pri-
vate title to land. (Jackson vs. Sherman, 6 Johns R. 21; Jackson vs. Gary,
10 ib., 302 ; Jackson vs. Miller, 6 Cowen, 751.) There is, I submit, nothing
whatever in the whole range of the common law more perfectly settled than
what Kent calls " the settled and fundamental doctrine," that all such titles
must exist, where they exist at all, in written deeds or grants from the proper
government. And it seems equally well settled, and is the express statute
law of this State, that where there must be written evidence of such title, if
there be any at all, that written evidence must be produced, and cannot be dis-
pensed with under any pretext whatever, except the pretext that the laws can
be dispensed with. (4 Cow. and H. Notes, 264 ; 1 Greenl. Ev., sees. 85, 86,
480 ; 1 Bl. 68, Practice Act, sec. 447.) (It is not pretended in this case that
the document proving the title of the judgment debtor has been lost.) It is,
as we likewise all know, equally well settled law, that what is not made to
appear by legal proof, in each case, concerning the material issues in dispute,
must be regarded, for all the purposes of the case, as not existing at all. In-
deed this doctrine, as this Court is well aware, has been received for ages
among our most familiar truisms or maxims of law, viz : Quod non apparent,
non est, and Idem est non probari, et non esse. And to the same effect is the
other familiar and long established maxim of law, that what is not sufficiently
proved is not proved at all. Idem est nihil, probare et non sufficienter proba.re.
(3 Co. Inst. 158; 2 ib. 178; Vaughn 169; Birch vs. Alexander, 1 Wash.
C. C. R. 34, 37.)
Again : It seems also equally long and well settled, in the common law, and
results, I submit, from the fundamental principles already noticed, that every
person claiming a title from the government must show it, and subject it to
the actual sight and inspection ot the Court, unless it is proved that it has
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been lost, of which there is no pretense in these cases. " If a man pleads
letters patent to him (says Comyns), or to another under whom he claims, he
mud show them to the Court" (Com. Dig. Pleader, O. 3.) " So a man who
claims any estate or interest by deed (says the same accurate authority) must
show the deed, though he is no party to it." (lb. 0. 4.) "Although (he con-
tinues) he has only part of the estate granted by letters patent, he must show
the letters patent." (lb. O. 5.) The title must be "duly verified by a
patent," said Chief Justice Kent. And where there is a patent it is the best
evidence, and must be introduced, say all the authorities in the law. Judge
Adams, in his learned work on suits of this sort, says, the principle that the
plaintiff must be clothed with the legal title to lands in order to recover, is
attended with such clearness and certainty as to amply compensate for any
inconvenience it may sometimes occasion. " The plaintiff must be clothed
with the legal title to the land." No lesser or equitable title will avail. This
principle (says Adams) is "fixed and immutable" "So fixed and immutable
that (even) a trustee may maintain ejectment against his own cestui que trust."
(Adams Eject. 43, 44, and numerous authorities, lb.) The rule is univer-
sal that the plaintiff in ejectment "must show the right of possession to be in
himself. It is immaterial to his right whether it be in the defendant or not,
for if it be not in himself he cannot recover. (Love vs. Simms' lessees, 9
Wheat. 515; Chief Justice Boyle, in Colston vs. McKay, 1 Marshall Ky.
251; Lane et al. vs. Raynard, 2 Serg. and R. 64; Covert vs. Irwin, 3 ib.
383 ; Walker vs. Coulter, Addison's Rep. Pa. 390 ; Clark vs. Diggs, .6 Ire-
dell, 159; Chief Justice Kent, in Jackson vs. Demont, 9 J. R., 60; also,
Winn vs. Cole's heirs, Walker's Miss., 119; Robinson vs. Campbell, 3
Wheat., 212 ; Talbot vs. Callaway, Hardin's Rep. Ky. 35 ; also 36 ib.) In
ejectment the legal title, and the legal title only, is in question. (Sinclair
vs. Jackson, in error, 8 Cowen, 543.) "It is necessary" for the plaintiff not
to allege, assert, or claim, or reason himself into a title, but "to show" to
exhibit before the Court, a "good" and "sufficient" " legal title" to the land.
(Adams Eject. 310 ; also 33, 199, 378.)
Again : It seems also a well settled rule of the common law, as applicable
to suits in ejectment, as it is to suits on indictments, that a man in possession
of land, claiming it to be his property, cannot be presumed guilty of claim-
ing another man's property. The law does not seem to afford any authority
for regarding persons in the peaceable possession of lands as prima facie crim-
inals ; not only that, but also as persons who must prove their innocence.
But the law regards the possessors of lands as it does the possessors of money,
or of any other property which they claim to be their own. It regards them
as acting truthfully until they are proved to be acting falsely. It regards
them as innocent of trying to deprive another man of his property, until they
are proved to be guilty of it. Chief Justice Kent said (as before mentioned)
in reference to a lot in the heart of the city of New York, which a person
had taken possession of without a title : "A peaceable entry upon lands ap-
parently vacant affords, per se, no presumption of wrong ; the benign intend-
ment of the law is the reverse." (Smith vs. Burtis, 6 J. R. at p. 218.) "The
law (said Justice Story) will never construe a possession to be tortious unless
from necessity. It will, on the contrary, presume every possession lawful the
commencement and the continuance of which are not proved to be wrongful."
(Ricard vs. Williams, 1 Wheat. 59.) Naked possession alone (says Black-
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stone) even by a wrongdoer, may by length of time, " ripen into a perfect
and indefeasible title." (2 Bl. 196.) The law would be chargeable with
an absurdity (said the old Supreme Court of New York) if it preferred a
person not in possession, who does not produce a legal title, to a person in
possession, who cannot produce any. It is against law, against principle, and
against right, to hold that a defendant in possession showing no title, has no
right to complain against being ejected in favor of a person who also proves
no legal title. ( Vide McRaven vs. McGuire, 9 Smedes & Marshall, 34.) By
nature all places previously unoccupied may be held on the land, the same
as on the sea. But by law, land is made an article of property ; and, in order
that property may be secure, the possessor must be ejected where he is
proved, in a suit by the owner himself, and by the evidence required by the
law, to be guilty of withholding the legal right to the property. But the
complaint cannot be listened to if made by anybody else except the true
owner in law ; nor can it be listened to unless made within the reasonable
time prescribed by law. The law has so provided that every private per-
son, who is the true legal owner, can prove himself to be so by a written
chain of legal evidence. And the right of no private person is listened to
against the person in possession, except in the manner authorized by law; i. e.
by producing his title, and showing it before the possessor and before the Court.
A possessor has as plain a right to see and examine the title brought against
him, as a prisoner has to see and examine the witnesses who are to be intro-
duced to prove his guilt. And to presume the prisoner guilty without pro-
ducing a witness against him, would seem as just and as legal, as to presume
the possessor guilty without showing or producing a title against him. And
the rule of law that every man shall be presumed innocent until proved to
be guilty, is certainly no better settled, and can scarcely be more important
in cases of felony than in cases of ejectment. And the rule is immutably
established throughout England and America, and affirmed and re-affirmed,
and never denied by any decision of this Court, that the peaceable possession
of land, under claim and acts of ownership, shall, of itself alone, be deemed
and regarded as legal evidence that the possessor is the true and legal owner
of the land in fee. (Adams on Eject., 30, 94, 275, 281, 282, and numerous
authorities there cited ; and also numerous American authorities cited in note
[2] to p. 215 ibid ; 2 Tucker's Black., 176 ; 2 Chit. Black., 1 96 and note [1];
Jackson vs. Rowland, 6 Wend., 666 ; Day vs. Alverson, 9 Wend., 223 ; ibid,
511 ; Smith vs. Lorrillard, 10 J. R., 339 ; Ricard vs. Williams, 7 Wheat., 59;
Potter vs. Knowles, 5 Cal., 87 ; JVorris vs. Russell, 5 Cal., 249 ; Grover vs.
Hawley, 5 Cal., 485 ; Moore vs. Goslin, 5 Cal., 266 ; Fitzgerald vs. Urton, 5
Cal., 380 ; Hutchinson vs. Perley, 4 Cal., 33 ; Hicks vs. Davis, 4 Cal., 67 ;
Winans vs. Christy, 4 Cal., 70 ; Plume vs. Seward, 4 Cal., 95.)
It seems worthy of attentive remark, that the guarantee in Magna Charta
against dispossessing a man of his lands or property, except by the law of
the land, applies to estates created by lawful possession alone. In John's
Charter the law is said to read that no man shall be disseized (aut utlagetur),
but by the law of the land, etc. John's Charter, it is true, is not deemed the
authentic evidence of "the law of Magna Charta," because there is no
authentic record of it. (1 Reeves' His. Eng. Law, 214.) But the authentic
record of the same charter, to be seen in the English Statutes at large (25th
King Edward), is even more precise upon this point. It says (chap. 29),
" aut disseisiatur de aliquo libero tenemento suo :" nor be dispossessed of his
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free tenement, or freehold estate, except by law, etc. (Stephen's De Lolme,
Eng. Con. p. 53 ; Creasy, Eng. Con. p. 153, etc.) This freehold estate, free
tenement, or libero tenemento, as we know, was an estate created by possession,
and was at that time incapable of being legally created in any manner with-
out the delivery of the possession. (2 Bl. 104; Intro, to Wood's Convey-
ancing, sup. 4, 5, and passim.) And so the law seems to have remained
until written deeds were made sufficient of themselves to transfer a freehold
as well as any other estate, where the possession was not held at the time in
opposition to the interest sought to be conveyed. And, as your Honors re-
member, the common law deemed it so important to the validity of the deed
of transfer, that no one should be at the time in opposing possession of the
lands, that it used to require the deed to be made and delivered "upon the
very spot to be transferred." (2 Bl. 294.) So much has our Common Law
(which is the rule of decision in this Court') always respected the actual and
peaceable possessors of lands. It is an astounding fact, and most important to
our clients to be remembered, that the only cases in which these essential
and fundamental principles of law have all been disregarded, and new and revo-
lutionaiy dogmas announced and enforced, hitherto, seem to be the cases which
have come to this Court from the county of San Francisco. Ejectment suits,
coming here from any other county are determined according to the settled
and known laws of the State. Ejectment suits by speculators in San Francisco
have not been always so determined. It is true that the possession, and claim,
and exercise of ownership (unless continued for the length of time required
by law to make it so) is not conclusive evidence of the right of property in
the soil possessed. But it is prima facie evidence of title in fee, and, accord-
ing to the laws of this State it can only be overcome by contrary legal proof.
(Mathews Presump. Ev. 1 ; 1 Starkie Ev., 544; 6 Peters R., 622, 632 ; 13
Peters R., 334 ; 2 Greenl. Ev., sec. 555.) And that contrary legal proof
must be, as has been abundantly shown, competent evidence in turiting,
and, as before observed, if possession alone be continued for the requisite
time fixed by law, it, of itself, amounts to the strongest proof of title known
to the laws, i. e. absolute and conclusive proof, incapable of being overthrown,
even by a patent itself. (Authorities sup. on this point ; also, 1 Greenl. Ev.
sec. 16.) And before that time may elapse such possession of itself is con-
clusive evidence of a right to the land, as against all the world excepting, only,
the true owner. For it is most manifest, that nobody has any right to com-
plain of another's possession of land, if the owner does not. And if he
chooses to leave the citizen in possession until his right becomes absolute he
certainly has the right to do so, and no other has any right to complain.
And hence the law does not authorize nor permit any lawful and bona fide
possessor of lands, to be driven off by the judicial power, or any other power,
excepting only for the benefit and on the application of the true owner of the
superior legal right, i. e. the abstract legal right of property. This seems not
only manifestly just, but it is also manifestly in accordance with legal princi-
ples, and " the law of the land." Among others which could no doubt be
found the following authorities seem to clearly uphold this doctrine, if author-
ities be necessary to uphold so plain a right. That is, the legal and " im-
mutable right," of the claimant in peaceable possession, to be preferred over
all persons, all authorities and all powers, excepting only the demand of the
true owners of the law title, or " legal title." (McRaven v. McGuire, 9
Scmedes and Marsh., 34; Hall v. Gettings, 2 Harris and Johns., 122; Love
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v. Simons' Lessees, 9 Wheat, 515 ; Oh. J. Boyle, in Clortdn v. McKay, 1
Marsh., Ky., 251; Lane v. Raynard, 2 Serg. & R., 64; Covert v. Irwin, 3
Serg. & R., 283; "Walker v. Coulter, Addison's Pa. R. 390; Lane v. Raynard,
1 Serg. & R., 65 ; Clarke v. Diggs, 6 Iredell, 159 ; Jackson v. Demont, 9
Johns. R. 60 ; Winn v. Cole's heirs, Walker, Miss., R., 35 ; Quarles v. Brown,
ibid 36 ; Sinclair v. Jackson, in errors, 8 Cowen, 543 ; Buxton v. Carter, 11
Miss. Rep. 481; Carroll v. Norwood's heirs, 5 Harris & Johnson, 164;
Adams Eject. 308, 309, 310, 319 ; and 2 Greenleaf's Ev., sections 304, 305,
and 553.)
When the plaintiff in ejectment does prove his legal right to lands held by
another, in opposition to his right ; by proving and producing in court, within
the time given by law for that purpose, a regular and unbroken chain of
legal and perfect conveyances, with not a link wanting (8 Watts' Rep., 101)
and reaching back, in all cases, in new countries, to " the only true original
source of all private titles to lands," and without even a material scratch or
erasure unaccounted for ; and without a material defect in the acknowledg-
ment or recording uncorrected; then, but not until then, "the law changes
sides ;" and instead of regarding the peaceable possessor as any longer enti-
tled to countenance, commands him to forthwith overcome this proof of his
guilt ; and if he fail to do so the law (not the judges, for, of course, they have
no more right to interfere than anybody else, but the law) will convict him
of a wrong done against the legal rights of another, and will punish him by
driving him from the land, with the power of the whole people, if necessary
;
and by making him pay to the owner his damages for its use, and will thus
justly secure the true owner in the enjoyment of his right. (Livingston v.
Peru Iron Co., 9 Wend. R., 511.)
But what could well occur more directly in violation of law, and of natural
justice, than to so convict a citizen and undertake to drive him from his
property, without any legal evidence at all, and without knowing, with cer-
tainty, whether the person complaining of him is really the true owner of the
land he claims, or not ?
It is abundantly manifest, that the law presumes the bona fide pos-
sessor innocent, and presumes he owns what he says he owns, and appears
to own. And if we presume he is not the owner we directly violate the pre-
sumption which the law has established in his favor. For the law says, the
contrary shall not be presumed, but must be proved. Hence, so far as the
Court has presumed that San Francisco is the owner of lands, the presump-
tion is not only without law, but it is in plain and direct violation of law.
And unless we be greater than the law, it would be preposterous indeed to
say that our presumptions, however ingeniously created, can overcome the
presumptions which the law has created. The law is so plain and well set-
tled, and the principle is so self-evident, that this also has been reduced to a
familiar legal maxim, viz : where the law presumes a fact the contrary must
be proved. (3 Bouv. Inst. Nos. 3,063, 3,090.) It seems as plain as the sun
at noonday, that if the law presumes a man to be the owner of the library,
money, and lands which he possesses and claims to own, a court or judge can-
not presume that another man owns them, and issue process ordering them to
be delivered to another on the judge's own presumption. And because one
judge has been suffered to indulge and enforce such presumptions, cannot be
authority for another to do so, while the law remains the same. Again : it
also seems too plain a matter to dwell upon, that the respondent in this case
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stands in the position of any other plaintiff in any other suit of ejectment
holding a mere sheriff's deed. If the nature of his judgment debtor permitted
him to obtain such a deed at all, it is certainly against law and against com-
mon sense to permit him to introduce his mere sheriff's deed here, as any
evidence of a title, until he shows us by competent legal evidence that his
judgment debtor was the legal owner of the land it pretends to convey. A
private deed, says Kent, conveys nothing, " where there is no evidence that
he had any title .who made the conveyance." (Jackson v. Hudson, 3 J. R.,
at p. 384. To same effect see Arnold et al v. Gorr et al, 1 Rawle, 223
;
Jackson v. Town, 4 Con. 599 ; Henderson v. Overton, 1 Yerger, 394.)
It is a general principle of law, reasoned Chief Justice Marshall, that a
party who sets up a title to land, must furnish all the evidence necessary to sup-
port it. And if the validity of his deed depend upon some other act, that
also must be proved by competent evidence. (Williams vs. Peyton, 4
Wheat. 77.) The Sheriff, of course, makes no pretence that he had any title
to the land described in his deeds in these cases, nor that the judgment debt-
or had any. The Sheriff does not pretend to convey any thing more than
the right, title and interest of the debtor, at the time of the sale, as directed
in the execution, and could not if he should try, for his agency or power ex-
tends no farther. And hence he guarantees nothing except the regularity of
his own proceedings. (2 Hilliard, R. Prop. 388, pi. 28.) His deed was only
a release, a mere quit claim. And, therefore, the -Court below seems not only
to have acted in direct violation of law, but in plain violation of reason, in not
requiring the plaintiff to show title in the judgment debtor, by competent le-
gal evidence. To presume a title in the judgment debtor was, I repeat and
resubmit, in violation of law. The legal evidence of title in the judgment
debtor in this case, instead of being dispensed with and avoided, ought more
than in usual cases to have been insisted on. Because, not only did the re-
spondent's grantor buy at public sale, where the rule of caveat emptor strongly
applies in all cases.. But all transfers of this scheming title over our lands,
have been made knowing we were in the peaceable and adverse possession of
them ! (Hunter vs. Watson, Jan. Term, 1859, this Court.) And hence this
respondent's deed is not only a mere release, but the presumption of the com-
mon law is, that the deed is absolutely void, and that the purchase is one of
those which is held in such detestation that it subjects the purchaser in
most countries to actual punishment ; under the Roman law, to the horrid
punishment of " perpetual infamy." (4 Bl. 135.) And under the common
law to the punishment of " fine and imprisonment." (lb. see also Van Dyke
vs. Van Buren and Vosburg, 1 J. R. 361, 362 ; Jackson vs. Ketchum, 8 J. R.
481 ; Knox vs. Kellock, 14 Mass. 200 ; Livingston vs. Prosens, 2 Hill 526
;
Cameron vs. Irwin, 5 Hill 272.) The 34th section of our act concerning con-
veyances, authorizing sales of " interest^ in lands of others, being in deroga-
tion of the common law, and plainly (as would seem) against the quiet and
good morals of the community, must be strictly construed. And though it
permits combinations of speculators to get up law suits as to other people's
property, and upholds traffic in such mere law suits, we have no fears that this
Court will so far depart from law, from reason, and from justice, as to insist
that such deeds must be held superior to all others, and so superior as to be
deemed good without proof, valid without evidence, and capable in law to
deprive a community of their property, in spite of law, and in spite of evi-
dence.
PART "VIII.
"KULE OF PROPERTY" IN FAVOR OF PETER SMITH TITLES
TO UPLANDS.
It is claimed, that new and erronoeus decisions concerning land titles in
San Francisco, are now a rule of property ! A " rule of property " which
must not now be disturbed ! We do not wish this Court to tolerate the
disturbance of the rules of property. Precisely what we insist upon is, tbat
the rules of property, in San Francisco, ought not now to be disturbed. Pre-
cisely what we insist on is, that property in San Francisco should be let
alone. And that the Court should not feel at liberty to disturb or destroy
the rules of property in San Francisco, any more than in any other county
in the State. We want all rules which are not the rule of property, to be
put an end to, in order that we may begin to enjoy that new feeling of settled
security never yet experienced in San Francisco, i. e. the feeling that our
titles to property do not depend upon the decisions of the Supreme Court
;
but depend on laws, and the solemn contracts which the laws have made in
our behalf. Because the moment they are left on this basis where the laws
have at last placed them, they then become impregnable, and not only the
Court, but the whole three departments of this government combined, could
not disturb tbem. While on the other hand, so long as the rule of property
is regulated, and the mere rule of admittedly erroneous decisions adhered
to, we cannot be said to have any titles to property at all. For where any
true titles to property exist, they exist just as completely beyond the power
of the Court, as beyond the power of the Legislature. Whereas, titles which
do not exist in fact, and in positive legal contract, but are depending only on
erroneous decisions of courts, are reposing where they are all the time liable
to be disturbed, impaired or totally destroyed. For every body knows, that
it is often as much the duty of courts to change, modify, or reverse its erro-
neous decisions, as it ever can be to make them. And none can pretend that
this Court has not the power to disregard erroneous decisions delivered here,
whenever it deems it proper to do so. But let us look into this rule of prop-
erty, which is said to be created in favor of this respondent, and which is not
the rule which actually does exist in law, but which is based upon some erro-
neous opinions of this Court. These opinions are those said to be delivered
by this Court, in what we will call the Cohas vs. Roisin decisions. Now, al-
though it is well known that erroneous opinions of a court, are not, and
ought not to be actually obligatory, still, it is a remarkable fact, and consid-
ering the pretensions here set up, it ought to be remembered, and called to
HAET VS. BUKNETT ET AL. 77
the attention of the Court, that while the conclusion or judgment, in the case
of Cohas vs. Roisin was concurred in, the reasoning of Mr. Justice Heyden-
feldt by which that conclusion was arrived at, has never been expressly an-
nounced as the opinion of this Court. The only time in which those views
were formally re-expressed was, I believe, in the case of Welch vs. Sullivan.
Two of the Justices, we know did not concur in those views, though they did
both concur in the judgment entered in that case. And in just the same
way did two of the Justices concur in the judgment, but not in the opinion
given in the case of Cohas vs. Roisin by Mr. Justice Heydenfeldt. And if I
be correct in this, there is no opinion of this Court which can be referred to
as necessarily combining an express and absolute adoption of the theories and
reasoning of that case. And no " rule of property " which can be said to
depend on those views. It can be inferred that they were adopted. And it
can also be just as fairly inferred that they never have been adopted. In Leese
& Vallejo vs. Clark, Mr. Chief Justice Murray, in delivering the opinion of
this Court, most truthfully and accurately said : " The alienation of the pub-
lic domain of Mexico, was a subject of careful consideration with that govern-
ment." And that "by the fundamental law of 1824, and the regulations of
1828, * * must be ascertained and determined the validity of every grant of
land in California" (meaning, of course, grants subsequent to Mexican inde-
pendence.) This Court has never questioned the correctness of this decision
as to this point. And we have already contended, and endeavored to demon-
strate its accuracy as to the power to create Mexican titles in California. In-
deed, until some other authority is shown, I insist that the fact is undeniable
by any body, that no valid private Mexican title can exist to an inch of the
soil of this State, unless made in accordance with said laws of 1824, and said
regulations of 1828. And no matter whether the claim is set up by an indi-
vidual or a corporation, which is the same thing as to titles in property.
They are the laws which were adopted by Mexico for disposing of its public
lands. And Mexico never adopted any others. They only, were in force in
this State, from the year 1828, to the day on which this country passed to
the United States. And, possibly it cannot be affirmed with equal certainty
as to the grants held to the old Mission Pueblos, sold at public auctions by the
Mexican authorities, under claim of having had special authority from Mexi-
co. Still I do include every other conceivable Mexican grant or title to
whomsoever made, whether a corporation or an individual.
Mr. Ch. J. Murray, in the decision just quoted from, also declared with
equal emphasis, that this Court can alone look to said law of 1824, and Regu-
lations of 1828, and by them every grant (to lands in California) must be deter-
mined. And that had this Court " the power to discriminate, its exercise
would be more dangerous, and productive of more injustice, than the total ina-
bility to go beyond " the said laws and regulations. (3 Cal. R. 24, 25.) Will
any one tell me, that the same judge, and a majority of the same Court de-
nied and repudiated these words of the law, during the very same year, and in
the very same volume of the reports of this Court? It was not so. Nor
have those views to the extent quoted, ever been reversed by any decision of
this Court. The same decision was actually reiterated in two subsequent de-
cisions signed by a majority of this Court, viz., in Vanderslice & Clarkson vs.
Hanks, and in the very decision of Cohas & Roisin itself. In the opinion in
Vanderslice and Hanks—concurred in by J. Wells—Ch. J. Murray reiterated
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his former views, declaring that he had fully considered the principles declared
in Leese & Vallejo vs. Clarke ; and notwithstanding the sebsequent decision by
this Court itself, (by J. Hydenfeldt) in opposition merely to the extent to
which he carried his views, he and his associate, Mr. J. Wells, actually re-
versed that subsequent decision of this Court, and restored its first decision,
on the ground, that even the material conditions in a grant, could not be
legally presumed to have been performed. How has it been possible for us
to suppose or imagine, that the same justices could turn round, in the same
year, and carry the. doctrine of presumptions so far, as to decide, that not
merely any conditions in a grant, but the very grant itself, can be legally pre-
sumed, in an individual or local corporation out of possession. In his opinion
in Leese & Vallejo vs. Clarke, Ch. J.Murray further said : " There is no map,
no survey, no record, no evidence of judicial possession, no evidence that the
grant was confirmed, no evidence that the grant was recorded in a book kept
by law as a record of such grants." [3 Cal. p. 26.] And in Vanderslice vs.
Hanks, reaffirming these doctrines even to the extent of reversing a decision
of this Court on the strength of them, he also, solemnly declared, " I am
aware that the principles involved are important, and that no case has ever
been passed upon by this tribunal which so distinctly affects the prosperity of
this State ; at the same time I am fully satisfied not only that the conclu-
sions of law at which I arrived, [in Leese & Vallejo vs. Clarke] are sound, but
also, that a different rule of decision would be disastrous, iniquitous, unjust, and
inequitable.'1 '' [3 Cal. 48.] How can we believe that in six months from the
time of using this language, the very two justices of this Court solemnly de-
cided precisely the reverse of every one of the propositions they so strenu-
ously insisted on in all their former decisions ? How can we believe, that in
six months these same justices did not modify nor moderate, but reversed and
repudiated all the principles which they just before so solemnly declared they
had " fully considered," and were " fully satisfied " that without adhering to
them, such " disastrous," and " unjust," and " iniquitous " consequences would
ensue. How can we believe, that after deciding that all incomplete Spanish
and Mexican titles in this State, should be first affirmed or rejected by the
United States, before this Court should be called on to enforce them as defin-
itively valid, and that a bona fide and lawfully executed, written grant or
patent, from the Mexican nation, and undisputed as to its genuineness, was
not a sufficient legal title on which to maintain ejectment, unless accompanied
by a survey, and unless the conditions in it were proved to have been com-
plied with ; and after insisting and reiterating that even such conditions can-
not be presumed, but must be proved ; that in six months afterwards, they not
merely decided that all the requisite acts, and all the stipulated conditions
can be presumed, without any proof, but that the very grant itself can also be
presumed, without any proof of its existence, and without its having ever been
seen ? If they did it, it is certain that they both expressly and publicly, and
from this bench, denied that they did it; and justice to us, as well as to them,
seems to demand that that denial should not be forgotten.
Ch. J. Murray published a separate opinion in the case of Cohas vs. Roisin,
with which separate opinion, Mr. J. Wells concurred, making it the opinion
of a majority of the Court. In that opinion they say : " It is contended that
this decision [of Cohas & Roisin] trenches upon the principles laid down by
this Court, in the cases of Leese & Vallejo vs. Clarke, and Vanderslice &
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Clarkson vs. Hanks. We [i.e. the majority of this Court] do not think so.
If we did, we would not decide anything to shake the authority of those decis-
ions which we believe to be correct." This other opinion by this Court is not
published in the Reports, but it is recorded in the office of the Clerk of this
Court, in connection with the opinion which is published. And in the sylla-
bus of the case, [in 3d Cal. Rep.], matters are referred to as decided, which
do not appear in the opinion published, but only in the opinion omitted from
the blundering and improper report. But the most essential part of this ex-
planatory opinion of this Court, remains to be stated. They did not pretend
to agree with the doctrines and speculations given in the opinion of Mr. J.
Heydenfeldt, in that case. They said, and said carefully as it would seem,
that they concurred with him in the judgment, or in their own words, "in the
conclusion to which he has arrived." And the ground on which they place
their of>inion of a title in San Francisco, is directly in the teeth of the pre-
sumptions which are found in the opinion published in the Reports. They,
or at least the Ch. J. concurred upon the ground most prominently stated,
that an actual grant had been made to San Francisco. A lawyer would, per-
haps, hardly suffer himself to knowingly adopt any other ground on which
to place the conclusion, that such 'a corporation owned lands. In the said
opinion by the majority of this Court, the Ch. J. said: "lam satisfied that,
long before the grant upon which this controversy arises was executed, the pueblo
of San Francisco was organized, and a grant of Pueblo or municipal lands
made to it by the Governor of California, and confirmed by the Territorial
Legislature." [/]
It may also be doubted, whether Mr. J. Heydenfeldt intended to repeal the
"settled and fundamental doctrine " of the common law, that courts of justice
cannot notice private titles to lands, [in possession of others] unless they be
duly verified by writing, produced and shown to the Court. Certain it is
that six months before his decision in Cohas vs. Roisin, he decided differ-
ently in a case in which a title in the anciently incorporated city of San Jose
was set up against the plaintiffs right. That town had been expressly incor-
porated by the king of Spain. " Its lands," speaking in the sense in which
you would speak of the lands of a county or a city, meaning the lands within
it, were proved to have been actually surveyed, and marked out upon the
ground ; and yet when the title of that ancient town was claimed to exist,
Mr. J. Heydenfeldt decided it did not, because " no title was exhibited estab-
lishing the fact." (3 Cal. p. 45.) Are there not more decisions of this Court
to the same effect, than there are decisions to a contrary effect? And
which class of these decisions constitute the best " stare decisis," the best
"rule of property ?" Have not the decisions of this Court, which we will all
admit to be correct, created a better rule of "stare decisis " than any or all
its admittedly erroneous decisions can have created? And besides, we are to
keep in view the constitutional prohibition against applying any kind of law
against us from San Francisco, which would not be applied against others
from other parts of the State. We have not come here to have San Fran-
cisco laws applied to us. We have come here to have the laws of the
State of California applied to these cases ; and we insist that the honor of the
State and the honor of this Court is solemnly pledged to administer justice
to these parties now here, according to the laws of the State of California,
regardless of whatever has been done heretofore, incompatible with the laws
of the State.
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Conceding, for the present, that the Court had power to change or to sus-
pend the "settled and fundamental doctrine " of the laws of the State of Cal-
ifornia, requiring that no court shall notice any private title to any lands in
the bona fide possession of others, unless it is proved by a legal chain of
written conveyances; still it seems manifest that a majority of this court did
not intend to make any such decision. And there is another maxim in our
laws, concerning erroneous decisions of judges, which does not consign them
to dishonor, nor require any animadversion upon their conduct ; but simply
declares that the commission of errors are not to be deemed wilful ; nor are
they to be regarded as having ever been actually consented to. " He who errs,"
says the maxim, " does not consent.'1 ''
2. The Statute Rule of Evidence.
But if the power shall be asserted to change " the settled and fundamental
doctrine of the common law," to which I have referred, by repeated decisions
in violation of it ; still that power will hardly be claimed to extend so far as
to repeal the constitutional statutes of the State by the same process. Every
statute law is the supreme law, unless restricted by the Constitution. [1 Kent,
494.] And our statute laws fully recognize and affirm the doctrine contended
for, and prohibit the violation of "the 'settled and fundamental principles' of
the common law," as to proof of private title to lands of others. Our act
concerning conveyances permits no actual transfer of any estate or interest
in lands, except by deed. [Laws 1850, p. 249, etc.]
And by another "supreme law " of this State, because equally constitutional,
our State has, I submit, expressly prohibited the courts of the United States,
and the courts of this State, as well as all other subordinate powers and per-
sons, from "declaring" or "creating" any title to any portion of the soil of
this State, unless it be done " by deed or conveyance in writiug " made by
the owner, or " by act or operation of law? [Statute against frauds, Laws
1850, p. 267, sec. 6.] This excludes every species of trust estates. [4 Kent,
316]. A title created "by operation of law," I submit, means what it says,
and not what it does not say ; that is, it means " by operation of law" and
does not mean nor include, by operation of judicial opinions or decisions.
Decisions may be, and may not be, law. If the statute had meant to include
them, or make any exception on account of them, it would, of course, have
been so expressed. The phrase " by operation of law," has of course, only
reference to the legal mode of classifying the adopted and established means
by which titles are legally acquired. The old mode of classification of the
means of acquiring title to lands was : all titles are acquired by descent or by
purchase ; but the present classification is : all titles are acquired " by opera-
tion of law," or by purchase. \y. 4 Kent Com. 391.] Our statute creates no
new mode ; on the contrary, it prohibits any new mode of creating or ac-
quiring titles to lands.
There seems to be no authority in law, to take notice of any mere declar-
ations or assertions, or even oaths of any man, or of any officer, or of any
court, as of itself, legal evidence of a private title to lands, in the adverse pos-
session of others. I have endeavored to prove that the " settled and funda- !
mental principle " of the common law on this subject, prohibits it ; and, I sub-
j
mit, our statute laws prohibit it. The only power on earth, which either our
\
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laws or our reason, or our security, can recognize as capable of " creating,
granting, assigning, or surrendering," " any estate or interest in land," to any
person not in possession, is the power of the owner, and " the act or opera-
tion of law ;" and all titles " by act or operation of law," rest on the basis
of the owner's assent. They are titles, as we know, created by marriage, by
descent, by operation of the statute of limitation, the statutes regulating judi-
cial sales, etc. . But the title here in question is claimed to be regularly and
legally derived from the owner, merely by opinions of this court
!
The consent of the true owner must be had to pass the title ; and the con-
sent of all the courts or individuals in Christendom ought not to be sufficient
without it. And the law will not listen to any evidence that the owner has
parted with his title, except the act or deed of the owner himself. Decisions
of courts cannot pass it. The owner must pass it, and must pass it by such
solemn acts as the laws wisely require ; so that afterwards, whether absent or
dead, or become a mortal foe, his transfer can always be shown, and can never
be disturbed. Titles asserted over lands in the peaceable possession of others,
are solemn claims, and considering the magnitude, extent, and duration of
the interests to be affected, they should require solemn testimony to uphold
them. They affect the homes, and the stable plans of society, which should
be secured against revenge, and be placed beyond the power of envy, cupidity,
and perjury, and also beyond the power of judicial enmity, prejudice, and
favoritism. And our laws, and our laws only, have so secured them. And
if this Court will suffer the laws, and not erroneous decisions, to be adminis-
tered in the county of San Francisco, the titles to our lands, which have been
kept in confusion for ten years, by trying other expedients, will be quieted
and settled in one day. Even the State itself is not allowed to make a grant
of its own lands, except by solemn deed. " All grants" says our constitution,
" shall be in the name and by the authority of the people of the State of Cal-
ifornia, sealed with the great seal of state,' signed by the Governor, and coun-
tersigned by the Secretary of State." [Art, 5, Sec. 15]. If the State itself
cannot make a grant to a person or corporation without all this solemnity,
how could this single Department do so, by merely declaring that a grant
exists, and afterwards finding a virtue or an excuse for adhering to such an
assertion. And as the State itself is not the original proprietor of all the
lands within it, and hence even its own grant would not, of itself alone, be
conclusive on this Court, unless or except as to lands below high water-mark
;
how could this Court feel that a grant or title is conclusive upon it, which was
merely made by the opinions of its predecessors in office, without anything
appearing to show sufficient authority for such opinions ; or to show that the
owner has ever consented to it, or even been consulted on the subject.
Indeed, we know well enough, that if an actual and valid grant in writing,
had been duly proved and introduced in evidence, in the case of Cohas and
Roisin, and in every ejectment suit tried since that decision, it would not help
this case, it would amount to no legal evidence, and could not be legally
taken notice of in this case, because every such case must be decided by its
own evidence, not the evidence in other cases.
:pa.:rt ix;
The question whether San Francisco has a Grant or a Deed eor Lands,
IS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, A QUESTION OF FACT, NOT OF LAW. And THE
reasons given for judicial judgments do not, of themselves, prove
facts. And if any rule of Stare Decisis can be applied at all, it
cannot be -against these appellants, who do not hold under ant
title so created.
Whether any private person or corporation has a title to lands in the pos-
session of another seems to be a question of fact, and not a question of law.
The construction and effect of a grant, or of a statute title when produced,
may raise questions of law. According to the settled and fundamental prin-
ciples of the common law, and of the statute law, and the laws of all former
governments having dominion here, the grant or statute title, if it exist, must
have been in writing. But the question whether any such writing has been
made or not, cannot be a question of law, any more than the question,
whether a promissory note, or any other contract also required to be in writ-
ing, has been made or not ? A conveyance of land is a contract in writing, exe-
cuted and binding on the grantee. (6 Cranch. 97.) How can this Court
find that such a contract was made and executed between any parties whom-
soever, without ever having seen the writing, and without ever having seen or
heard of anybody who has seen it, and without its being shown in the record ?
Nothing can be legal evidence of the fact that a conveyance was made by some
law, or by some deed, except of the law or the deed, unless they have been
lost ; and if lost, not some title, but the contents of the law or the deed,
is certainly all that could be safely listened to ; and, therefore, the law de-
clares it is the only evidence which shall be received to prove such facts, and
the only evidence which courts of justice shall take notice of. (Pr. Act, sec.
447.) There is no pretense that any title paper in this case has been lost.
Therefore they must produce their title. They must show it to this Court,
and to us. We deny that they have any. And if they have any they can
produce it, and they must prodnce it, or else it must be conceded that all the
most familiar principles of law for the security of property, and against the
commission of frauds are meaningless. But in any view, this point seems
undenied and indisputable ; that the first question in these suits of ejectment
is a question of fact, viz : has the plaintiff or his judgment debtor a title to
the lands sued for ? Not what the title is, nor how it comes ; but the ques-
tion has the city any title at all from any body, or in any manner ; necessa-
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rily raises a question of fact. Not what a deed conveys, nor what a law con-
veys ; but is there any deed or any law conveying, or purporting to convey
anything, is a question of fact. Before a court can move it must have some
fact presented and proved or agreed to. For it is also a plain truism, and
hence a legal maxim, that " ex facto, jus oritur" Upon proof of the fact
that this plaintiff owns our land, this Court must give him a legal process for
our land; and on proof in another case that he owns our ship, this Court
must also give him due process for our ship. This is not done in virtue of
any power inherent in, or capable of being originated by the Courts, but
because the laws have so previously provided and fore-ordained. But can the
Court grant the process without the fact being proved that the plaintiff actu-
ally had a title to our land, or a title to our ship ? No ; because the law
prescribes the manner in which final process may be granted, i. e. on legal
proof of ownership; and if the process be granted without such proof, and
merely on the strength of something said or decided in some cases between
other persons, it seems manifest it will not be the process which the law con-
templates. The Court may say there is a law which gives San Francisco all
the lands about it ; but that is plainly a statement of fact which no man is
bound to believe, unless the law is shown. For, although courts can take judi-
cial notice of the, general laws of a country, they cannot make judicial notice
extend further than actual notice, and make'men see judicially what is not
otherwise discoverable at all. For that would enable Courts to see things
which might keep men's property continually subject to its discoveries. Courts
do not seem invested with any such authority ; but seem bound, in common
with the rest of mankind, to be governed by evidence. And they seem no
more authorized to say that does exist which does not exist, under any pre-
text, or for any purpose, than has any other department of the government,
or any citizen under it. Courts of Justice, I most respectfully submit,
have nothing whatever to do with the acts by which titles are made, or trans-
ferred, or destroyed. Those are acts upon which courts of justice can pass,
but in which they cannot participate. The acts must be performed elsewhere,
and the fact as to what has been done, must be proved and shown before the
judicial power can attempt to prescribe consequences. But if this court has
the power to create titles, or to declare titles by its own decisions, then it
must continue to do so in each case, for no title can be made for one judicial
case which can answer for all other judicial cases of the same kind ; because
courts of law, as well as jurors, (most wisely) are sworn to try and determine
every case by itself and according to the evidence produced in the particular
case presented. The fact of the creation of a title to land is as much a mat-
ter of evidence, I repeat, as the fact of the creation of a promissory note, and
the judgment or decision of this Court on one title in one case, can no more be
noticed as evidence of the fact that there is a title in another case, than a judg-
ment, (or forty judgments,) that there was a promissory note given in one
case, can be referred to, or noticed, to establish the fact that there was a promis-
sory note given in another case, or in all other cases where the same debtor is
involved. The law seems to be well settled, that not evenjudgments, much less
mere decisions, can be afterwards referred to for the purpose of showing a
title in suits between new parties. Titles in every case of ejectment must be
proved with the same particularity, and by the same degree of legal evidence
as though no other case had ever before been submitted. A reliable authority
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(Adams on Eject.) says the true rule would seem to be, that " a judgment in
ejectment is not, in any case, admissable in evidence in a subsequent eject-
ment;" but, says the learned author, "where the parties and premises are the
same in both actions," the judgment may be introduced " as against the party
against whom it was before recovered." (Adam's Eject, 334.) But, he adds,
such evidence even in such cases " must be slight, and the courts will not
extend the principle." (Ibid.) "We are all aware it is not the words or opinions
of judges, but the judgments they render which constitute precedents and
sometimes, after many years of universal acquisence, create the rule of stare
decisis. But a judgment in a criminal action, that the man tried shall be ex-
ecuted, cannot be taken notice of nor be made to effect the minds of the court,
as to the guilt or innocence of all men who shall afterwards be tried for the
same offense. The manner in which a question of law is decided in one case,
or forty cases, may be continued at the discretion of the court, provided the
law has not been violated, and will not have to be violated every time such
decision is repeated. But the guilt or innocence of men charged with crime
is not a question of law ; it is a question of fact, which can only be deter-
mined by the evidence contained in the record, and if the record contains no
evidence of guilt, amounting to legal proof, the court canifot convict, no
matter what any other court may have done. We shall see that a suit of
ejectment is governed by the same rule ; and that if the former court had con-
victed a hundred men of (land) robbery without proof, their decision in such
cases would not form precedents to continue and repeat such acts. And to
convict men in a hundred cases of illegally taking and withholding lands with-
out legal proof of title in the record of each case, would seem to form no
precedents to justify a continuance of such acts. And in the entire range of
jurisprudence, I defy the learned counsel for the respondents to find any case
justifying or excusing, much less approving and encouraging such acts, on
the ground of " a rule of property " or of " stare decisis, 1 '' or on any other
ground. I submit, no principle of law is better settled than that each eject-
ment suit must be decided according to the proof of title contained in its
own record ; and no other trial nor decision can be referred to or noticed, as
capable of supplying evidence, or of dispensing with it. " It is a well settled
rule, says a reliable authority, that the records in former cases of ejectment
cannot be introduced as any evidence against new parties, and concerning
new premises in new suits of ejectment." A decision of a court is a record
in a former trial ; therefore it cannot be noticed nor thought of as supplying
any evidence or any want of evidence which the law has prescribed, and ex-
acts for each and every case. (Jackson v. Vedder, 3 J. R. 10 ; Lawrence v.
Hunt, 10 Wend, 80; Jackson v. Wood, 3 Wend, 27, 8 Wend, 9.) On points
of law, of course, former decisions may be appropriately referred to, and if
not now, when sought to be applied, in violation of any existing law, or of
any private right, such mere decisions or opinions can be respected and
adhered to as evidence of what the law is. But it will hardly be pretended
that the original and primary question, whether the respondent has a legal
title to our lands or not, is a question of law at all. I insist it is not a ques-
tion of law, but a question of fact, whether he has a title for our lands or
not ; and it has been expressly decided, that " in deraigning a title " to land,
former decisions of courts cannot be taken notice of. (Walsh v. Ostrander, 22
Wend., 178 ; Adams' Eject. 334. See also Leland v. Tousey et. al., 6 Hill,
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328.) Therefore if respondent must deraign his title through the decisions of
this Court, those links in his title must be thrown out, and his title must fall.
It is a matter of the utmost importance to be remembered in these. cases, that
the Cohas v. Roisin decision can stand, without forming any precedents to
justify or excuse the support of sham titles like this now before the Court.
In that case the question before the Court, or rather the question decided by
the Court, was, whether an American Alcalde could make an original grant of
land or not. It ivas not decided that a grant could, in any case, be dispensed
with, but whether an American Alcalde was authorized to make the grant
which was produced and shown to the Court, was the question decided. The
grant so produced and shown to the Court, was an original government
grant. It was precisely such a grant, that if made by a Mexican officer of
the same grade and of the same place, would have been legally made and
valid. The question before this Court was, whether an American, holding
the same office during the continuance of a war between the two countries,
and after the peace, was authorized to make the same kind of grants. What
was the judgment of this Court on the question ? The judgment of this
Court was, that the grant made by an American was valid. Now suppose
the Court had said and had decided forty times, that all such Alcalde grants
were valid, because the Partido of San Francisco owned the " lands within
her boundaries," would it now be a " rule of property ;' would it now be
" stare decisis " that that Partido owned the lands within it ? Why not ? If
those decisions are " a rule of property " and " stare decisis " against ten
thousand acres, why not against thirty millions of acres, if the word Partido
had only been used in the decision instead of Pueblo? Suppose this Court
had decided that American Alcalde grants were valid, because the lands be-
longed to the Territorial Government of California, and the Alcalde was a
local officer of that government, (which was the fact,) and therefore authorized
by law to make the grant, would it be " stare decisis " and " a rule of pro-
perty " that said Territorial Government owned the lands ? Suppose the
Court decided that such Alcalde* grants were valid, because the town of San
Francisco owned all the lands about it, wherever such Alcaldes had made
grants ; would it be " stare decisis " and a " rule of property " that said
town owned the lands ? Is the reason on which a decision is based
capable, by any process, of becoming a title to land ? Who ever heard
of such a thing before as the reasoning of the judges becoming a rule
of property ; and so sweeping a rule as to deprive five thousand citizens of
their rights and titles, and possessions of lands ? Where did any of us ever
read or hear of such a thing as a " rule of property," established by a court,
becoming an independent title over property, capable of destroying other
rights and titles? When a title is shown to property, and that title, the exis-
tence of which is not in dispute, receives a settled judicial construction, and
on that construction the property has been divided, or inherited, or sold, or
otherwise disposed of, such judicial construction and decision on a title proved,
becomes a rule of property, and, of course, ought never to be disturbed, un-
less the decisions are forbidden by law, or violate the settled rules of evidence,
or are sought to be turned against new parties, who do not claim under the
title which has been so construed. If we were here holding title in opposi-
tion to an Alcalde grant we might be told, with some show of reason, that
this Court has repeatedly decided that such officers were authorized by law
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to make grants ; and having construed such grants to be valid, although the
law did not authorize such decisions, yet having been made on question of law
alone, and having been long continued, and bona fide rights of property grown
up under them, such decisions and constructions of the law, so far as they do
not affect the rights of property, must now be adhered to. Because they have
become " a rule of property," and because such a construction of such grants
has become " stare decisis" and consequently that all such titles will be held
valid when no prior legal right or grant is shown to have been made. But
we are not here holding in opposition to any Alcalde grant whatever. "We
are not here claiming title from the same source, nor from the same authori-
ties. All the decisions which have been made, and all which can be made
concerning Alcalde grants, do not concern us, and do not necessarily, nor in
truth, have anything whatever to do with our titles. The lands Ave claim
have never been granted by any Alcalde, and, of course, never can be here-
after. We have produced and proven the authority by which Alcaldes made
original grants of land in San Francisco ; and the fact is undeniable that if the
town had ovmed the lands " by the laws of Mexico," the Alcalde under the
Mexican law could not have granted them at all. (1 Febrero, page 294 note
;
Siete Partidas, law 1, title 2.) And the Governor of the Territory, of course,
could not have done so, (and we have seen he did every year, down to May,
1846,) because we all know the only authority the Governor possessed to
grant any lands was the Colonization Laws of 1824, and Regulations of 1828.
And we have seen that the laws of Mexico of 1833 and 1834, required the lands
in our pueblos to be colonized ; and after those laws, but not before, grants of
lots were made at Yerba Buena, and at the Mission or Pueblo of San
Francisco. (See Wheeler's list of grants in San Francisco. IMone will be
found of an earlier date, and none now exists there of an earlier date.) But
are the mere reasonings of this Court binding on us ? If they are not
binding, when in themselves rational and true, are they binding when in
themselves irrational and untrue ? Moreover, it has been shown that these
reasons of the Court were, that San Francisco had derived a title to the
lands under the laws of Mexico ; and that, what this Court then supposed
and asserted to be a fact, has since been proved, and duly and judicially de-
cided,, by the United States Commissioners, to be a mistake of fact. And that
the fact is, said town had no title from Mexico. Is an assertion on a ques-
tion of fact requiring proof, to be continued and repeated after it is proved
to be untrue ? We shall see that this Court has no jurisdiction to determine
matters of fact, requiring any evidence to be here introduced to prove their
existence. Whether Alcaldes were authorized by lawful authority to make
grants, is a question of law. ^Whether Alcaldes did make grants, is a
question of fact, to be proved by the best evidence; that is, by producing the
grants. That proof cannot be produced in this Court. If in any suit de-
pending on such grant, it was not introduced in evidence before the case
came here, it could not be introduced here. Suppose this Court had de-
cided forty times that such grants need not be introduced nor proved in a
Court below in any case depending on them, would that make such decisions
stare decisis ? Can the Court conceive of any case whatever where it will
be right and lawful to insist there is a private grant, and insist on the right
to drive men from their property on the strength of it, although satisfied and
knowing perfectly well there is no such grant at all ? Whether the city of
HART VS. BURNETT ET AL. 87
Sacramento owns ten thousand acres of land or not, cannot be determined
by this Court ; because, if true, it must be proved by legal evidence in the
manner required by law. But suppose this' Court had decided that Sacra-
mento was an incorporated town thirty years ago ; that by the act of incor-
poration it was authorized to hold and own any quantity of lands, and that
under and in virtue of the laws of Mexico, it does own all " the lands within
her boundaries." Would such a decision be binding on this Court, and on
the property owners of Sacramento ? Could this Court undertake judicially
to eject every citizen of Sacramento from his property in virtue of a title "so
created by this Court, and justify itself on the ground that men had been
found to invest money on the strength of such a title, and consequently it
had become a "rule of property," and "stare decisis V
Would not every such decision, based on no actual title, be simply extra-
judicial and void ? Would it not be a decision against property, as well as
in favor of the property of those who had invested money on the strength
of it ? If it would be a rule of property for speculators out of possession,
would it not be a rule against property for hone fide holders in possession ?
Would it not be just as rational and as equitable to hold that the Lirnan-
tour title, and the Bolton title, are a "rule of property" in San Francisco, and
are stare decisis, because the United States Court of Land Commissioners de-
cided they were both valid titles, and because under such decisions men in-
vested money in them ? The Cohas and Roisin decisions were not originally
made against the city of San Francisco, on the ground of a rule of property,
nor on account of stare decisis. And they were not repeated on that ground,
except by Judge Terry in the case of Welsh vs. Sullivan.
We most respectfully submit, and most earnestly insist, that the doctrine
of stare decisis has nothing whatever to do with the fact, whether the judg-
ment debtor in this case owns lands or not. We insist that stare decisis can-
not create titles where titles never existed, nor be made to destroy rights and
titles which do exist; and that a rule of property cannot be made to de-
stroy the property of those who had nothing to do with establishing the rule,
and who do not hold under the rule, not even in opposition to the actual rule
which was established ; that new rules, like these, cannot be made to sus^
pend the rules which the laws prescribe ; nor to disturb the rules fixed by
" the settled and fundamental doctrines" of legal evidence ; and, moreover,
that whatever "rules of property" or stare decisis may exist, can have
nothing whatever to do with these cases ; and that they can no more excuse
the continuance of such decisions than they could justify their origin.
Again: But perhaps it will be claimed, that whether San Francisco owned
lands or not, as held in the Cohas and Roisin decisions, was really a question
of law, because there were Mexican laws regulating the rights of towns to
lands. And these Mexican lawrs the Court could take judicial notice of.
It is claimed, that by some general laws appertaining to Mexican towns,
they became the owners of the lands in their boundaries. I submit, that
although foreign laws may be judicially noticed, yet even if there were
foreign laws giving lands to towns in this country, this Court cannot under-
take to determine judicially, and with no evidence of the facts, whether any
particular town or downs complied with the laws, or had lands ceded to them
under such laws. No system of laws can be rationally conceived of, which
leaves nothing to be proved, to actually pass the national- title to lands to au
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individual or subordinate corporation. Can the Court judicially determine,
without proof (and without the facts appearing in any law) where towns were
incorporated in California, and their corporate names, and where the lands
are which were conveyed to them ? And also that they are conveyed in fee ?
For example, the archives of the Mexican Government over this country,
prove that there were in the present county of San Francisco, three settle-
ments, viz: the Presidio (Garrison) of San Francisco; the Pueblo of San
Francisco de Asis, also called the JPueblo of San Francisco, and the Pueblo
of Dolores, and the Mission of Dolores ; and Yerba Buena, sometimes called
the Pueblo of Yerba Buena.
Gomacindo Flores, the first Administrator of the ex-Mission of San Fran-
cisco, and who is mentioned assuch in "Exhib. A" in the record of this case,
has recently testified in the trial of Leese vs. Clark et al. in Fourth District
Court, that there was only one Mexican pueblo in San Francisco county.
Now, it is claimed that this Court can take judicial notice, that that pueblo
was an incorporated town. Is the existence of the act of incorporation a
question of law ? And is its corporate name a question of law ? The very
reason of things compels a particular name to be given to every corporation,
no matter under what government or system of laws it is created. The name
is the most absolute requirement which can be thought of, in connection with
a corporation. It is, says Blackstone, " the very being of its constitution,"
and " the knot of its combination, without which it could perform no act."
(1 Bl. 475.) Can this Court undertake, or could it at any time have under-
taken, by exercising judicial notice, to even tell, with certainty, what the
corporate name of San Francisco was ? Again : Under the decree of the
Departmental Assembly, of May 28th, 1845, for selling at public auction,
to the highest bidder, all the pueblo lands of California, " from San Diego
to Sonoma," there are four places expressly named as then being pueblos.
(See "Art. 2," Miss Ex. p. 39.) These places are " The Carmelo, San Juan
Bautista, San Juan Capistrano, and San Francisco Solano." Now, these
places, I say, were expressly declared to be pueblos, on the 28th of May, 1845,
in this high and most important official decree. Can this Court or could it
ever, take judicial notice that those places were actually " municipal corpora-
tions, and invested with title to all the lands within their boundaries ?" And
take judicial notice that their boundaries were anywhere about them where
an officer in them had made grants ? Why not ? If it can do it for San
Francisco, it must do it for the other towns, then as populous.
Now I most respectfully submit, that the rule allowing courts to take
judicial notice of foreign laws does not admit of any loose, unbounded, or
obscure application. And that in no instance can the court, by judicial notice,
establish a title to land in any Mexican corporation which may have existed
in California. What is the true meaning and limit of the, rule, that courts
may take judicial notice of foreign laws ? Mexican laws, I submit, are merely
facts, of which our courts can take judicial notice, just as of other public
occurrences and public facts well known to have existed.
A work which is itself authority in all English and American Courts, says:
"The established doctrine now is (1841) that no court takes judicial notice of
the laws of a foreign country, but they must be proved as facts." (Story
Conflict of Laws, sec. 637, where fifteen authorities are cited in support of
this avowal.) Greenleaf also expressly declares this to be the settled law, in
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his work on Evidence, sec. 486, edition of 1852 ; and on the authorities cited
by Story. Neither our courts nor our people can be presumed to know the
laws of any foreign country, under which they have never been governed.
" Foreign laws (said Chief Justice Marshall) are well understood to be facts,
which must, like other facts, be proved to exist before they can be received
in a court of justice. The principle (he continues) that the best testimony
shall be required which the nature of the thing (to be proved) admits of,
applies to foreign laws, as it does to all other facts.'''' And the evidence
required to prove the existence of a foreign law is " such high authority that
the law respects it not less than the oath of an individual." " In this as in
all other cases (he continues) no testimony will be required which is not
attainable." But it is not to be presumed that any civilized nation will refuse
to give such copies duly authenticated, which are usual and necessary for
administering justice in other countries." (See Church vs. Hubbart, 2
Cranch, 187, and 1 Greenlf. Ev., sec. 487.) In that case the U. S. Supreme
Court refused to receive a law of Portugal, prohibiting vessels from entering
certain Portuguese ports, as genuine, although duly certified to be so by the
American Consul at Lisbon. Some men would say that was unnecessary
particularity. But such men, it may be presumed, have but feeble concep-
tions of the certainties and securities which the laws are really designed to
afford, when administered with the purity and precision, of which they them-
selves usually consist. In Talbot vs. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1, Ch. J. Marshall,
said : " That the laws of a foreign nation, designed only for the direction of its
own affairs, are not to be noticed by the courts of other countries unless proved
as facts ; and also that this Court with respect to facts is limited to the
statement made in the Court below, cannot be questioned." Now this doctrine
has not been overruled. But it is to be observed, that this doctrine is not
held to prevent a court from proceeding on its own knowledge of foreign
laws, if it chooses to do so. But its decisions must be reversed if it turns out
that it was mistaken in those laws. It was so decided in The State vs. Rood,
12 Vermont R. 396. But no authority seems necessary to prove so plain a
proposition. If this Court should decide that by the laws of this State,
Sacramento owns 10,000 acres, the decision would have to be disregarded
when it should be found no such law had ever existed. So also it has been
decided, and was so declared by Chief Justice Marshall himself, in the same
case of Talbot vs. Seeman, that the public laws of a foreign nation made and
promulgated with reference to the rights of other nations, may be acted on
from judicial notice. And on the same principle our courts take judicial
notice of the laws which have been in force over American territory, and
which have become foreign in consequence of American acquisition. But
these rules admitting judicial notice of foreign laws, when given the utmost
latitude, do not seem to justify nor permit judicial notice of any private con-
tracts made and concluded with private individuals or local corporations, while
these laws were in force over the soil. All private contracts pre-existing
must be proved. And if the contracts were created by laws or by deeds, can
make no difference, in either case they must be proved. And if they are
contracts respecting title to lands, no evidence of their having been made can
be received except the written evidence by which alone they could be made, or
can exist. If there be any foreign law or laws, which created a contract
whereby some corporation in the county of San Francisco became vested
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with the legal title to lands, that law or those laws must be produced, and be
proved to have been complied with ; for the existence of any such contract is
the very point in issue in this suit, affirmed on one side and denied on the
other. No private title to lands can exist except by a contract executed. And
to sue another on a contract of title to lands in fee, without making out the
title by complete legal proof, certainly ought not to entitle a plaintiff to
recover on a mere assertion of the Court, that there was such a contract.
According to the laws of evidence governing all suits of ejectment brought
by citizens of this State in the courts of this State, persons, natural or incor-
porated, claiming a private title to lands under a former law or under a former
patent or concession, must produce the law, or produce the patent, under
which they claim. To assert, or give an opinion, that such titles exist in
virtue of foreign laws generally, or some foreign system of laws, does not
meet the requirements of the law of evidence of this State, (nor as I suppose
of any civilized State,) in suits of ejectment ; because the law of evidence
requires precision and certainty, and its very object is to insure the destruc-
tion of all uncertainties connected with titles. And to insure certainty, it is
manifestly as necessary to demand the proof when a title is set up under a
foreign law, or statute, or system of laws, as though set up under a foreign
patent or deed. No matter what the claim is based on, the proof must be
produced. And its submission to actual inspection, is of course, and in every
particular, important and wholly indispensable. Nor is it possible there can
be any hardship in this exaction ; for it is precisely the same thing which we
require concerning titles derived from or created under our own govern-
ments ; and, so far as we are informed, exactly what would be required in
any suit of this character in Mexico, or in any part of the (so called)
Christian world.
The question of the existence of a private title to lands, under former laws,
then, is simply a question of whether or no, a contract was made and con-
cluded between two or more parties when such laws prevailed. And when
the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of foreign laws, to the extent of
finding by judicial notice alone, all the facts necessary to make, conclude and
execute an individual contract, and to determine what that contract was, and
"without a scintilla of evidence to prove any contract at all ; then we insist,
it necessarily undertakes to pass upon questions of fact, besides and beyond
those which are questions of law. Indeed, it is manifest, if any contract of
conveyance was ever concluded between the Mexican nation and some cor-
poration about or in San Francisco, for lands, it must have been under or in
virtue of a patent, or a statute law. It could not have been done under
•books and treaties about Spanish law, even if such could be found to uphold
any such notion ; because every national proprietor has, of course, the right
to prescribe its own mode and plan of disposing of its public lands, and
Mexico prescribed a different mode. And no lawyer in California can be
supposed ignorant of the fact, that the only mode of passing the title of
Mexico to lands, was, a grant or concession in writing from Mexico. And
where this is manifest, and the existence of any such transfer is denied, I in-
sist no decision has ever been known, nor can any be found, to justify or
excuse any notice of the transfer, until it is proved by legal evidence. The
production and proof of such transfer, is required by all Courts where the title
is genuine ; and I do not know, why titles resting upon nothing but fancy
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and sham, should ever be preferred by Courts, over those which are genuine.
(See Robinson v. Clifford, 2 Washington Court, C. R. 1, that statutes must
always be shown as much as a patent ; also to same effect as to a British
statute, Kenny v. Clarkson, 1 J. R. at p. 394. And our law regulating pro-
ceedings in our Courts expressly requires the production of authentic co-pies
of the statutes of any foreign government, relied on in any judicial proceed-
ing, and does not take any authority as evidence of what such statutes
contain, except copies of the statutes themselves. Pr. Act., sec. 453.)
PAET X.
We submit also that the respondents have no title, because they show no
title, nor legal evidence of a title, which is recorded as required by the laws
of this State. No title sufficient to maintain this action, and created since
April, A. D. 1850, can possibly exist, except by some " instrument in writ-
ing, by which any real estate, or interest in real estate, is (i. e. can be) crea-
ted, aliened, mortgaged, or assigned." And every such instrument must be
recorded. And if any title to land is, or has been made or created by deci-
sions, the decisions creating it ought to have been recorded in the Recorder's of-
fice. The law says every act since its passage, amounting to any title or en-
cumbrance on real estate, excepting only " wills, leases for one year or under,
executory contracts for the sale or purchase of lands and powers of attorney,"
shall be recorded. And if " not recorded as provided in this law, it shall be
void, as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith, and for a valuable
consideration of the same real estate, or any •portion of it, where his own con-
veyance shall be recorded first." (Laws 1850, p. 252, sec. 26 and 36.)
This, I admit, is only an argument ad absurdum, to show the injustice of
encouraging, or advising property owners in San Francisco to rely on defeat-
ing the recorded Bolton & Barron grant, with no grant at all. And not even
with any title at all, which a single soul of them has ever seen for himself,
or which could even be recorded in the Recorder's office, or which any hu-
man being can make a copy of, or show to any other human being. But with
these mere vague notions, which are the very things which the laws of every
enlightened country take great pains to render impossible concerning titles
to lands, and which, if they were permitted, would render titles to property
uncertain, and incapable of being understood by every body ; I say, on these
vain notions men in San Francisco have been actually advised to rely, with
confidence, on defeating a recorded Mexican grant, which can only be defeat-
ed by resorting to the means afforded by the laws. And not by relying on
vague notions, which appertain only to the rights which Mexicans enjoy under
their systems of local government, but have nothing to do with the title
to land at all. Yet, so absolutely deluded are my fellow-townsmen, that they
do not yet plainly see and understand, that titles to lands are things which can
always be seen, and
-produced
,
just as readily as a promisory note, or any other
contract Avhich must, ex necessitate, be always put in writing. And that no
such thing is within the range of legal possibility, as the existence of the latv^s
title to land, in any body, or in any country, excepting where the law or the
writing can be produced, by which alone it could have existed. The idea that
titles to lands under the laws of Mexico were, prior to 1846, or are now, any
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more vague, unknown, or uncertain, than they are under our own lavjs, is wholly
gratuitous. Such notions ought to be sufficiently disproved by what we see
of actual Mexican titles, every day before our eyes. And the idea that any
corporations, except supreme national governments, ever do hold or can ac-
quire the national title to lands, unless it is passed to them by writing, we
have shown by authority to have no foundation, and also to be a thing actually
impossible, from the nature of titles, and of national proprietors. Titles to
lands are things certain. And where every body cannot see that a title ex-
ists, (without any necessity of reading Spanish,) every body can, of course, be
entirely certain that it does not exist. Because there is no law in force in
this State, except our own laws, and no title to lands exists in this State, except
in pursuance of our own laws, and unless it can be proved in our own courts,
just as every title which does exist can be proved, it is no title at all.
We have now done, what the former decisions of a court of justice proba-
bly never before required, in a suit of ejectment. We have proved by his-
torical, legislative, and official transactions, of the former governments of this
country, that a plaintiff in ejectment, who has not shown nor proved a legal
title in accordance with the law of evidence of this State, has no title. We
have not rested, as we might have done, with perfect security, on our denial
of the plaintiff's title, and his failure to prove any. But, owing to former de-
clarations of Justices of this Court, we have gone further, and have proved
the truth of our denial. By the evidence before alluded to, by the unanimous
decision of the United States Board of Land Commissioners, and by the de-
cision of this Court, in the case of Redman vs. Nobile, decided in 1856, we
have such a weight of authority, all harmonious and in one direction, as to
any national transfer of lands to any corporation in the county of San Fran-
cisco, prior to 1846, that no man, "though a fool, need err therein." I shall
hereafter submit other reasons why no title in this judgment debtor can be
admitted. But at present, I most respectfully submit this proposition as be-
yond the power of successful contradiction or rational controversy, viz.: That
in the county of San Francisco, the same as in all the other counties of Cali-
fornia, all the lands not granted by actual transfer prior to July 7th, 1846,
passed by treaty with Mexico, to the United States.
Perhaps we might here properly and confidently submit our case. But
, we deem it necessary to go still further. There is too much at stake in
these cases to justify leaving even a pretense behind, for longer continuing
the reproach of such injustice, and the boast of such speculators, that " they
have the Supreme Court in their favor."
PAET XI.
HAS THE CORPORATION" OF SAN FRANCISCO A GRANT FROM
THE UNITED STATES ?
Failing to show any title from Spain or from Mexico, the next thing we
shall hear will be that the United States has made a grant of lands to the
corporation of San Francisco, and that this grant has been confirmed by the
United States Board of Land Commissioners, or, perhaps', by decisions of this
Court ! It has been shown that these speculators cannot claim the benefit of
a grant, unless they produce it, as all other speculators are required to do.
Where then is their grant ? The learned counsel who tried this case in the
court below introduced a mass of irrelevant documents to show that Mexico
made one. The learned judge, Shattuck, before whom this case was tried,
decided that this Court has made one by its decisions, and so charged the jury !
(See the charge.) And now we come to " the decree of confirmation" shown
in this record, to prove that the United States has made one ! Did any mem-
ber of this Court ever before hear of a plaintiff in ejectment so lost as to
where his title originated ? It has been already sufficiently demonstrated that
he has no title from Mexico. It has been also shown and" will be still further
insisted hereafter, that he cannot look to this Court to assist him to a title.
And, now, I submit, this last pretense, that the United States has helped him
to a title, is the most absurd claim of all. Because, to claim a title, incapable of
being shown in evidence, by virtue of some laws made by Spain, or by Mex-
ico, or by stare decisis, is tracing the title to obscure sources, where the com-
mon mind of the country cannot penetrate with clear ideas, nor deny and
confute assertions of title, however preposterous, from any positive present
knowledge of their own on the subject. But when a title is set up from the
United States the whole country understands the subject. And, therefore, it
seems the most absurd of all sources to which to trace a title incapable of
complete and definitive proof. It is like claiming a title from the Legislature
of California, where everybody can easily understand, from reading the law
and the debates in the Legislature, whether it is, or was at all intended to be,
a confirmation or transfer of title to lands. But let us examine this claim.
This respondent claims that the United States has granted or confirmed a
title of from ten thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand acres of the
choicest lands in California to the local governments of this State, established
over the places where Mexicans used to live. Whilst the American and
Mexican inhabitants who have resided in those old settlements from ten to
sixty years have been utterly neglected, and had all their legal and equitable
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possessions ruthlessly clouded and incumbered by the United States, and, in
a manner so reckless and heedless that their entire possessions, where their
Spanish or Mexican titles are not perfect, are now subject to the demands of
these speculators in sheriffs' sales ; and such others as may continue the same
schemes against other towns. This claim of title seems to prove too much.
It seems to raise a reasonable presumption at the start, that the United States
has not engaged in any legislation so utterly useless and iniquitous. It seems
more reasonable to suppose that there must be also some misapprehension as
to the United States ever having made or confirmed any such sweeping
claims. And we may certainly presume that the most positive and irresisti-
ble evidence will be demanded to prove the actual and perfect existence of
such a title, before this Court will attempt, for one moment, to uphold it.
Nobody pretends that the United States has granted or confirmed any lands
to the corporation of San Francisco. The debates and proceedings of the
United States Senate show that such a proposition was expressly voted down,
by a majority of more than three to one against it. No grant, then, has
been made and confirmed to San Francisco. That will not be disputed. But
the claim is that by the 14th section of the act of Congress of March 3d, 1851,
the United States granted or confirmed a title, to all the cities, towns, and
villages in California ; and San Francisco, being one of them, therefore has a
grant. We see then, at the start, and positively, that no grant has been made
by the United States to San Francisco, the judgment debtor in these cases.
We see that all which can be claimed is, that the Congress of the United
States, in passing a law to ascertain what private titles existed here, " derived
from the Spanish or Mexican government," used such language in the 14th
section of said law as amounts to a grant to " all the cities, towns, and
villages" existing in California on the 7th of July, 1846. Now if the lan-
guage used really is a grant, we must all, in common candor, admit that it is
the most singularly worded, the most vague and the most unguarded and
reckless grant ever before made by an intelligent government. The pro-
vision of law which is said to create or confirm this title is as follows,
viz. : The provisions of this act shall not extend to any town lot, farm lot, or
pasture lot, held under a grant from any corporation or town to which lands
may have been granted (for the establishment of a town) by the Spanish or
Mexican government, or the lawful authorities thereof: Nor (shall the pro-
visions of this act extend) to any city, or town, or village lot, which city,
town, or village existed on the 7th of July, 1846; but the claim for the same
(£. e. the lots) shall be presented by the corporation ; or, where the land on
which the said city, town, or village (is situated) was originally granted to
an individual, the claim (for lots) shall be presented by or in the name of such
individual ; and the fact of the existence of the said city, town, or village, on
the said 7th of July, 1846, being duly proved, shall be prima facie evidence
of a grant to such corporation or individual, under whom the lot holders claim.
(See sec. 14 of said act of Congress of March 3d, 1851.)
Now this law of Congress does not say it grants lands ; then what right have
we to say it does ? It does not say it confirms any former title to any lands
;
then what right have we to say it does ? It does not fix the boundaries, nor al-
lude to any boundaries to any lands. Nor does it specify any counties, any
districts, any locations by which the boundaries can be known, or can be as-
certained, from any description, or from any allusion to a description, to be
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found in the grant. Nor does it define any quantity, nor does it contain any
language by which it is in human power to fix any definite boundaries, or
any definite quantity of lands, from anything to be found in the said pro-
visions. Nor does it specify any names, or give any descriptions by which it
can be known, with certainty and with no liability to err, even the grantees
intended to be the recipients of the grant. Conceding it to be a grant, it
seems to be precisely as vague and uncertain as would be the bare words
" we grant," without specifying to whom, or how much, or where. Or the
words " we grant to every American, existing in the State of California on
the 7th of July, 1846." Grant what? Grant when ? Grant how much ?
Grant within what boundaries ? Grant to what kind of Americans ? It
would be a grant made to the dead, as well as to the living. And certainly
it would be a grant as completely uncertain in its terms, and as ambiguous
on its face, as it is in the power of the mind to admit of being seriously made
or attempted, by any intelligent human being, much less by the Congress of
the United States. But equally so, seems to be a grant to all the cities, towns
and villages in California, existing July 7th, 1846. It is plainly ambiguous
on its face, if applied to any thing but lots. And the law is familiar that
" where the ambiguity is patent, is apparent on the face of the deed, without
reference to any extrinsic proof, it cannot be explained by parol evidence,
and avoids the deed." [2 Hilliard It. Prop. p. 329, pi. 38, and ten decided
cases, there cited, note 4.] Our common sense seems to teach us, that' where
there are no boundaries mentioned in the grant, or law ; and where there is
no quantity mentioned, nor means given to ascertain the quantity or the
boundaries from any thing in the grant, or law ; we surely cannot be
allowed to supply both the boundaries and the quantity by parol testi-
mony. Because, that would be nothing less than making a title over
particular lands by parol proof. Where no particular lands are granted,
or confirmed, it is a corrollary, that, no particular lands are granted, or
confirmed. And where no particular lands have been granted, or confirmed
by a law, it is a corrollary, that no particular lands can be claimed to have
been granted or confirmed, by a law. No material omissions in a deed,
"said the Supreme Court of N. Carolina,] can be supplied upon conjecture.
Dismukes vs. Wright, 4 Dev. and Bat. 206.] The Court is not bound
said Queen's Bench] to find out a meaning, where the language used admits
of no certainty. [Doe vs. Carew, 2 Ad. and El. N. S., 321.]
"To render a deed valid," said this Court, " the rule is, that there must be
two things, parties, and a subject matter. As land rests in grant, these
essentials must be shown by the grant, viz. : the grantor, the thing granted,
and the person to whom the grant was made. The thing granted cannot rest
in parol, but must be shown (in the grant) with that distinctness of descrip-
tion that will enable it to be identified. The law requires that the convey-
ance of land shall be in writing, but it is not guilty of the solecism of per-
mitting that the land to which the title passed may rest in parol, or need not
be in writing. The general rule upon this subject is, that every conveyance
must, either on its face or by words of reference, give to the subject intended
to be conveyed, such a description as to identify it ; if land, it must be shown
(in the grant) so as to afford the means of locating it. Nell v. Hughes, 10
Gill and Johnson. Again it is said if the description in a deed be so imper-
fect that it cannot be understood (from the deed itself) what land is intended
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to be conveyed, the deed is void. 5 Ohio, 454 ; Worthington v. Hyler,
4 Mass. 205; Jackson vs. De Lancey, 13 J. R. ; United States vs. Forbes,
and Burch vs. the United States, 15 Peters ; Jackson vs. Rosevelt, 13 J. R.
;
and Kee vs. Robison, 5 Iredell Equity, 373 ;" all cited by this Court to
sustain its views just read.
And adopting and quoting the language of Lord Bacon, this Court con-
tinued : "Ambiguitas patens, (ambiguity apparent on the face of the instru-
ment or deed,) is never holpen by averment, and the reason is, because the law
will never couple and mingle matter of specialty, which is the higher amount,
with matter of averment which is of inferior amount in law ; for that were to
make all deeds hollow and subject to averment, and so in effect, to pass that
without deed which the law appointeth shall not pass hit by deed" etc. (Mesick
v. Sunderland, 6 Cal. at p. 312.) These laws and settled principles for con-
struing all deeds and grants of lands, this Court held to be conclusive against
a description in a deed in these words : " the following described property
situate, lying and being in the city of Sacramento and State of California, con-
sisting of two thousand two hundred [2,200] town lots, be the same more or
less, said lots being bounded according to the original plat or plan of said
city." No clear head could fail to see, that this description neither specifi-
cally mentions nor describes, so as to be specifically pointed out, precisely the
lots intended to be conveyed. And the Court was therefore forced to
say that that defect was incurable, or " would be perfectly conclusive of the
whole case," if it rested only on the sufficiency of the deed as a legal and
absolute conveyance.
If a grant be so uncertain and vague altogether, that its own language is
not capable of being made certain, as to the particular lands it conveys (or con-
firms,) the grant is void. (Powell's Wood on Conveyancing, vol. 5 p. 53 ;)
Comyn's Dig. "Grant," (E 14) (G 6,) 5 Barn, and Cr. 583 S. C; 12 Eng.,
Com. L. R. 327; 1 Russ and Mylne, Ch. R. 116; Worthington vs. Hylyer
4 Mass., R. 196; Jackson vs. Ransom, 18 J. R. 107; Duncan vs. Beard, 2
Nott & McCord, (S. C.) 400; Law vs. Hempstead, 10 Con. 23 ; Wright vs.
Pond, ibid. 255 ; Doe vs. Porter, 3 Pike (English Ch.) R. 18, in Atkyn's R ;)
Windsmore vs. Hobert, Hobart R. 313 ; Mesick vs. Sunderland, 6 Cal. 311,
312 ; Jackson vs. Clark, 7 J. R. 217.)
Again : It seems just as important to know with certainty who the
grantees are, as to know with certainty the particular lands granted or con-
firmed to them. (5 Powell's Wood's Con. sup. p. 18.) It has been said as
an axiom, that "certainty is the mother of repose, and therefore the law
aims at certainty." It has been declared that " when the description is not
that of one individual object, but designates only the kind," the particular
thing meant is not certain. (La. Code, Art. 3522, No. 8.) The grantees or
confirmees, (imagined) in the 14th section, are merely classes or kinds of
grantees. They are, first, "any"^. e. all "cities;" second, "any," i. e. all
" towns ;" and third, " any," i. e. all " villages "—which were in existence in
California, July 7th, 1846. We concede that villages, existing thirteen
years ago, are precisely as much grantees as any towns or cities, existing
thirteen years ago. San Francisco at that time, as has already been shown,
was not a city. It was a mere little adobe settlement, with not three hur-
dred human beings either at the pueblo, (now called the Mission,) or at
Yerba Buena, (now the heart of the city.) But I concede that it was, at the
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time specified, a village, and therefore that it is one of the class specified in
the supposed grant, or act, or confirmation. But we have already seen, from
the authentic history of our own State, that there were at least twenty-four
other " cities, towns or villages," here, at the time specified. And in order
that this fact shall not be questioned, I will presently specify their names.
But before doing so, we must settle clearly, the meaning of the words " cities,
towns, or villages." They being the grantees named, of course the first thing
to be done, is to ascertain who or what they are. A city we will concede is
a town incorporated by that name. [Comyns' Dig. " Burrough " B]. We
will also all admit that a " town " is an indefinite term, applied indifferently
to incorporated and unincorporated places, and includes both or either. By
the Mexican law of January 4th, 1823, which was officially before the Senate
when this 14th section was adopted, it was enacted that "The union of many
families at one place, should be a city, town, or village." (Sec. 12.) In our
language, " any small assemblage of houses in the country, is a village."
(Web. Die, Burrill's Law Die.) By the common law, a town or village is a
place which has or has had, a church, and celebration of divine service, sac-
raments and burials. (Co. Lit. 115 b.) Therefore under either the legal or
the ordinary meaning, and either the Mexican or the American meaning, the
words "any city, town or village, existing on the 7th of July, 1846," actually
and truly includes twenty-four different grantees. They are as follows : San
Francisco Solano, or Sonoma ; San Rafael, county seat of Marin county ; San
Francisco or Dolores, including Yerba Buena ; Santa Clara, Ex Mission San
Jose ; San Jose City ; San Juan Bautista or "Pueblo of San Juan de Castro ;"
Santa Cruz ; Carmelo ; Monterey; Soledad ; San Miguel ; San Antonio ; San
Luis Obispo; Santa Ynez; La Purisima ; Santa Barbara; San Buenaven-
tura ; San Fernando ; Los Angeles ; San Gabriel ; San Juan Capistrano
;
San Luis Rey, and San Diego.
Now if the said 14th section be a grant or a legislative confirmation of
title to these former "cities, towns or villages," the title was vested by said
law, and can never be recalled. And if it has granted or confirmed lands to
one, it has done so to all. Because "the fact of the existence" of each and
all, or, I am certain, of at least twenty of them, on the 7th of July, 1846,
can be "duly proved" just as readily as the existence of the pueblo or village
of San Francisco has been proved on that day. Many of them are places
which were of far greater importance than San Francisco in 1846 ; and it
would be a contradiction of the law to hold that it applies to any less than
all the villages existing in California at that date.
Again : We are to remember that these twenty-four "cities, towns and vil-
lages" existing here in 1846, actually included within their recognized limits
all the lands in this State. If the 14th section has granted or confirmed a title
to them of all the lands then within their respective jurisdictional limits, then
the entire State is conceded to them as completely as though such a release
were now made to the counties now existing. If the lands granted or con-
firmed to them be to the extent of four leagues, as has been supposed by
some persons, then the United States Land Commissioners are at fault ; for
they have not acted upon nor discovered the existence of any such law as to
any town in California. And so likewise the United States District Court for
the Northern District, which has lately sanctioned the entry of a decree in
that Court for at leastforty leagues of lands to the corporation of San Jose. In-
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deed the United States Land Commissioners and District Courts have confirmed,
under this 14th section, to the town corporations of California, at least from
four to five hundred thousand acres of the choicest lands in this State. And
if this Court should hold them to be confirmations to the corporations of the
lands described in the decrees, (instead of confirmations merely to the extent
of lots held by " lot holders" in such towns,) then at least ten thousand
property owners have been ruthlessly incumbered; and all the possessors and
holders of lands in the oldest settled portions of the State have been treated
with contempt and cruelty ; and merely in order that their lands and posses-
sions may be given to corporations, or towns, existing here thirteen years
ago! And if the decrees which actually have been entered are to be tolerated
in this Court as valid titles in the corporations, to the extent of the bound-
aries given in the decrees, then the same direct outrage will be committed
against property, only less extensively, as though one tenth of the State were
given at once to these corporations, utterly regardless of the rights of indivi-
duals.
Again : if this section be a grant or a confirmation of any former right to
the political town governments, where are the lands which it grants or con-
firms ? The law does not say it is the lands in their boundaries, or in their
jurisdictions, or to the extent of four leagues, or of one league, or of one inch.
The only power which could fix the boundaries, where none are given in the
act, is the power which passed the act. This is expressly decided in the re-
cent and very able decision of this court, in the case of Biddle Boggs vs.
Merced Mining Company. Has the United States government yet specified
or fixed, or even referred to any boundaries, to which this fourteenth section
shall operate as a grant or a confirmation of a pre-existing right ? It has
not. What right then had the Land Commissioners, or the District Court
of the Northern District to do it ? None whatever. Why, then, have they
gravely listened to evidence to prove the boundaries of these old towns, as
they existed under the Mexican government ? Is there anything said or even
intimated in the law, about granting or confirming to such towns the lands in
their boundaries? There is not. What then has the question of boundaries
to Mexican towns to do with the fourteenth section ? Nothing whatso-
ever. Is it pretended that any boundaries are referred to in the 14th section,
in connection with any prima facie grant? By reading the section, it will be
seen that nothing whatever is said about any boundaries at all. Is it pre-
tended that the boundaries of the Mexican towns here must be proved from
necessity, because no boundaries are given in the law ? I ask what is the
necessity? Is it the necessity of sustaining these Peter Smith speculators?
I know of no other human beings to be benefited by the proceeding. What
then makes the necessity of proving such boundaries? There is certainly
no justice, nor law, nor ordinary common sense in the proceeding. If the
law does not describe nor refer to any boundaries, as included in a grant
or legislative confirmation, who, in his ordinary senses, can suppose the
grantees themselves are to fix the boundaries of the lands they are to have ?
1 insist and reiterate, if no particular lands are mentioned nor indicated in the
law, none can be fixed out of the law. And since the law shows on its face,
that no particular lands are granted or confirmed, to any corporation any-
where, what sense is there in supposing that some lands are granted or con-
firmed to corporations somewhere ? When the law says in plain terms that
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as to lots in towns in this country, existing in 1846, the lot-holders shall not
prosecute the claims, but the corporate authorities shall do it for them, in
order that they may all be included in the suit; what convenient excuse is
that for claiming that the corporate authorities themselves are to be given a
title to vast tracts of lands. And that "the lot-holders" claiming lots under titles
" derived from the Spanish or Mexican government," are to be treated by
their corporate authorities, not only with contempt and indifference, but a title
is sought to be obtained from the United States, to the town corporations of
from four to forty leagues, in virtue of no shadow of right, except to present a
claim for "lots," for the benefit of "lot-holders."
Of what conceivable advantage is it to tolerate such pretensions on the
part of our local town corporations ? Their inhabitants require lands, but
their corporations do not. Bring these same things home. Suppose a patent
from the United States could now be obtained under an Act of Congress, to
the corporation of Sacramento, for all the lands from ten to thirty miles around
it ; could a greater outrage be perpetrated than to overshadow this whole
county with such a new title in the corporation of Sacramento ? Few men
could, perhaps, be found to deny, that such a thing would be an unjustifiable
outrage, committed against the rights of the present possessors and owners of
the lands ; and that it would only be well calculated to operate as a sweeping
curse against the prosperity and growth of this city.
Now, suppose there had been a settlement here for the past fifty years
:
would that fact be calculated to render the act any less scandalous, iniqui-
tous, and sweepingly injurious ? All will readily see and admit the injustice
of creating such a title in favor of an individual. It is manifest that it would
be no more just to create one in favor of a corporation ; and, on the whole, it
might prove to be even less beneficial than to make one to an individual,
Now suppose, in anticipation of the creation of such a new title over this city
and county, speculators had already commenced, and procured and duly
recorded Sheriffs deeds over nearly every inch of the lands, would that ren-
der the creation of the new title any more desirable or respectable? It is a
legal maxim, that "what is plain, needs no proof," and it is plain that if it
would be monstrous to attempt such a thing against the city and county of
Sacramento, it is equally monstrous to attempt the same thing against the city
and county of San Francisco. Do not let it be thought that the property
holders in Sacramento have been any longer in possession of their lands or
their titles, or that their rights or titles to their lands are in any respect,
more legal or equitable, for we have already seen that .such cannot be the
fact And do not let it be thought that the injury and injustice would be
any more sweeping and extensive in the case supposed, than would actually
be attempted, by sustaining these Sheriffs titles on the strength of these "de-
crees of confirmation," or of any past decisions of this Court. Reference has
already been made to the vast extent of those sweeping and heedless decrees.
They have not only been made against the private property of whole commu-
nities, but also against, probably, not less than a million dollars' worth of the
public property of the United States. In this estimate of value I mean what
the United States would have to pay to reacquire the legal title to lands now
in its indispensable use, provided these "decrees of confirmation" were to be
deemed actually legal and obligatory. In Monterey, I beg to repeat, they
have " confirmed " the United States Garrison, and the Point Pinos Light
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House buildings, both of considerable value, to that corporation. And in San
Francisco, tbe large building on the Rincon, known as the United States
Marine Hospital. And the military reservation, and garrison, barracks, officers'
houses, and all the lands around and up to the very walls of Fort Point itself,
have all been " confirmed," [by means of the reckless or uninformed conduct
of Mr. Attorney General Cushing,] to the new corporation of San Francisco.
And we have already seen, that all said lands have been in constant military
use by three successive national governments, during every day for the last
eighty-three years. And not only this, but these Peter Smith speculators are
actually now here in this court, with an agreed case, in which the defendant,
by Frank Pixley, Esq., his attorney, admits that San Francisco owns the
lands, and this very attorney has a Sheriff's deed now on record in his own
name, covering all the lands, houses and barracks, just mentioned, and abso-
lutely including the entire fortifications of Fort Point itself! And here is a
certified copy of the deed, recorded in book 86, p. 188, Dec. 13th, 1858, and
the affidavit of a surveyor attached, that it includes " the entire of Fort Point."
(Hands the deed to respondent's counsel.)
Mr. J. Baldwin: How do you get that into this case?
Your honor, as to the deed, I have dragged it in, as a thing which ought
to be known to the Court. But the case to which I have referred, of Wheeler
vs. Hampson, is submitted in connection with this case I am now arguing.
A pretty business is that case of Wheeler and Hampson !
!
It would seem that no man of ordinary intelligence and good sense, can
either suppose or desire, that the patents of the United States will be, or
ought to be, issued to the corporations for the lands which have been so
" confirmed " to them. According to the laws, and the uniform practice of
all our American governments, about the most worthless "purposes to which
large landed estates can be given, is to give them to corporations established
for the local government of cities, towns, or villages. And we will look
abroad in vain to find any such system practiced, or tolerated, by any en-
lightened government. Let us look further into this subject. I confidently
submit that this Court should take notice of the law under which these "con-
firmations" have been made. And I insist that the law cannot be taken no-
tice of, without seeing that they confer no authority to confirm titles derived
from the United States, and every person acquainted with the subject knows
that the confirmations are based on such a title, and no other.
PAET XII.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF CALIFORNIA HAVE NO CA-
PACITY TO TAKE OR HOLD SUCH VAST TRACTS OF LANDS
AS HAVE BEEN " CONFIRMED " TO THEM.
Only a few of the " cities, towns and villages" of California, existing in
1846, have been incorporated. "It is a well settled rule of the common law,
that a community not incorporated, cannot purchase and take lands." (Per
Curiam, in Jackson vs. Cory, 8 John. R. 387.) A community not incorporated
cannot purchase. (Comyn's Dig. Capacity [B 1.] ) A grant to such a
community would he void. (Hornbeck vs. Westbrook, 9 John. R. "73
;
Hornbeck vs. Sleight, 12 do. 200.) Of course the United States cannot di-
rectly, nor indirectly create any corporations in this State, nor authorize
them to hold lands. This State alone has the right to say when, where, and
how far its municipal corporations shall engage in land speculations, or be suf-
fered to hold lands.
Lands held by municipal corporations, beyond what their necessities re-
quire, says a high authority, " are removed from commerce." They are ex-
empt (usually) from taxation, and are dead to the public. (See De Armies
vs. N. O., 5 Miller's La. R.) Our true statesmen, I think, without any ex-
ceptions, have always deemed it against public policy, and against the interests
of our citizens, to make municipal corporations the owners of large tracts of
lands. And the Congress of the United States has never in any instance
whatsoever, or wheresoever, endowed town corporations with large tracts of
lands, by actual and unqualified grants in fee. I have examined the acts of
Congress in vain, to find a single instance of such folly on the part of the
United States Government. Laws have frequently been passed, authorizing
towns to sell lands, or making them trustees for the disposition of lands, for
the benefit of citizens who have erected villages, or cities, upon them, or for
the support of schools, or some other pvblic or eleemosynary purposes. But
I know of no instance, nor do I believe any exists, nor should it be believed
until it is shown, where Congress has granted large tracts of lands in fee un-
qualified, to municipal corporations for purposes of speculation, or private
ownership. And if it should be done, and the towns were deemed capable of
holding such tracts of lands, as private owners, it would be the imperious
duty of the State Legislature to require such corporations to immediately dis-
pose of such lands, or otherwise to immediately repeal their charters, and
cause the land to revert. Because, it must be evident to every intelligent per-
son, that hardly any injury could be inflicted upon our inhabitants, and con-
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sequently upon our State, more mischievous and unjust, than to refuse to give
good titles to those who have, and will improve the lands, for the mischiev-
ous and silly purpose of giving the lands in fee to mere local political gov-
ernments, about the most useless, and the most unreliable owners imaginable.
In all the United States, do we know of any city being the owner, and pro-
prietor of the lands about it ? Have any of us ever lived in any city, where
the corporation, (and not the citizens,) owned all the lands; and was the great
land proprietor, and land speculator of the place ? Do we know of any in-
telligent, or even semi-civilized nation, engaged in endowing- its local political
corporations, instituted for mere purposes of local civil government, with the
ownership of the title and proprietary care, and corrupting management of
immense landed estates ? We, perhaps, all agree that it would be miserable
policy to allow our local governments to continue in the ownership of vast
tracts of lands. Why, then, should they be given lands at all, if they cannot
or ought not to continue to hold them ? All our people can get their titles
direct from the State, or the United States, why then should we desire to see
our local corporations vested with title to lands intended for our inhabitants ?
There seems to be no good object to be gained by it. And the very fact of
its being useless and injurious, is the reason why Spain, Mexico, the United
States, England, and probably all civilized governments, do not encourage,
nor permit their local governments to own large tracts of lands as private
proprietors.
We are all aware, that only a few of the imagined grantees of the said
14th section, were incorporated when the act was passed. And to say Con-
gress confirmed their title to their pueblo commons, or made them a grant, is
to convict an intelligent national Legislature, of making sweeping provisions
for the benefit of towns and villages, incapable of receiving its bounty ! And
in any view of the case, this disposes of the 14th section, being any concession
to corporations, by showing that certainly a majority of all the places it ex-
pressly enumerates, are not corporations at all. But let us go further, and see
if it can be a grant, or legislative confirmation, to those which are corpora-
tions. Grants, or conveyances, or transfers of title to lands, in fee absolute,
to a city, is a conveyance in mortmain. [Comyns' Dig. Capacity (B 2,) 2
Bl. Com. 268, 269.] The King, however, " by granting a license of mort-
main," "could enable any corporation to purchase and hold lands, or tene-
ments in perpetuity." (2 Bl. Com. 272; Comyns' Dig. lb. Sup., B. 3.) "But
a corporation sole or aggregate cannot purchase, or take lands or tenements
without license to take in mortmain," i. e. in perpetuity. (Comyns' Dig. Fran-
chise (F. 17.) Now our State Constitution expressly prohibits all perpetuities
of this sort. It says : "No perpetuities shall be allowed (in this State) except
for eleemosynary purposes. (Art. 11, sec. 16.) Owning lands by a local
corporation, as a private proprietor, is not for eleemosynary purposes. Now is
such ownership of lands in any sense a perpetuity ? If it is, it is expressly
prohibited. We have just seen that Blackstone call such ownership, the
permissive right to hold lands " in perpetuity." It is manifest, after the least
reflection, that this constitutional prohibition does not extend to public
property held for public purposes. For the very sense and meaning of
" perpetuity" in law, confines it to property held as private property. We
have already seen that land held by cities is u out of commerce," and the
city can hold it as long as the city lasts or indefinitely.
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Now a perpetuity is "Any limitation tending to take the land out of com-
merce for a longer period than a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years
and nine months afterwards." (2 Hilld. Real Prop. 586 ; 4 Kent, 267
;
Bouv. Die.) "All restraints which exceed that period are void." (2 Hilld.
Real Prop, sup.) To hold lands out of commerce for a longer period, or to
place any limitation or restraint on them "tending" to do so, is against public
policy. The "English Common Law abhors it." [4 Kent, 264.] "Estates
may be rendered unalienable by act of Parliament." [Billiard, sup.] But
the power of our Parliament in this respect, is limited by the Constitution.
And it cannot authorize estates, i. e. property held for private purposes, to be
so situated as to be rendered unalienable, or to be out of commerce for a longer
period than just stated. Now by creating corporations and prohibiting them
from selling any lands conveyed to them, there would be a '•' limitation tending
to take them out of commerce" for a longer period, would there not?
True, our corporations are the creatures of the Legislature, and may be
compelled to sell, etc. But that goes to the remedy. What I submit, is this,
for example : The present city and county of San Francisco is prohibited by
law from selling any lands belonging to it. " Now I submit, if A., or U. S.,
grants a farm or a tract of land in private propei ty to the present corporation,
it is placed where there is a limitation on it tending to keep it out of com-
merce forever, or indefinitely ; and that is a perpetuity, [Burrill's Law Die],
and prohibited. Therefore what lands" are so held, must be deemed held for
'public purposes, and not as a private owner, nor subject to seizure and sale
on execution as the property of a private owner, for if held as a private
estate it is a perpetuity, and not permitted. Indeed, we shall see that it is
the settled tendency of the legislation of this State, not to allow our corpora-
tions to hold lands " for purposes foreign to their institution." [2 Kent, 283]
Now, I most respectfully submit, if a municipal corporation organized for
"municipal purposes" only, be allowed to hold estates as a private owner, it
would be authorizing such estates to be held forever, or indefinitely, out of
commerce; which is prohibited by sec. 16 of article 11 of the Constitution.
Nor is such a prohibition unreasonable or unwise ? It is the same thing to
all intents and purposes as holding lands in dead hands or mortmain. And
such kind of useless and mischief-making ownerships, seem to be firmly
resisted and prohibited by all enlightened countries. Spain, like England,
seems to have passed many laws on the subject. And long before any town
or local civil government was established in San Francisco, it was the settled
law of Spain, that no lands should be held by any corporations, religious or
political, in mortmain. (Nueva Recop. title 17, book 10, note 5; Royal
Order Ferdinand VI., August 20th, 1757 ; Law Spanish Cortez, January 4th,
1813, art. 18 ; and especially, the same, of Sept. 27th, 1820 ; vide also art.
13 Mexican Colonization Laws of 1824; see also the very learned brief of H.
Hawes, filed with this Court, in case of Nobile vs. Redman, 1856, to which I
am mainly indebted for the Spanish authorities here cited.) These laws are,
of themselves, sufficient to disprove the unfounded, unproved, and yet per-
sistent notion (amongst persons only who are ignorant of the subject) that
the local governments in California, owned the lands about them.
So also by the civil law, " a corporation was incapable of taking lands
except by special privilege from the Emperor," (1 Bl. Com. 479, note [y];
Ang. and A. or Corpo. sections 49 and 150.) The State of Louisiana is not
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a common law State ; and there estates in mortmain are expressly prohibited
by law. [Civ. Code, Art. 1507.] And now, I submit, the Common Law of
England, which is the rule of decision in this Court, is opposed to the existence
of such estates.
The first express prohibition against corporations owning farms or tracts of
land, seems to be that of chapter 36, of Magna Charta, made the ninth year
of Henry III. [A. D. 1225.] It is as follows : " If any from henceforth give
his land to any religious house, and thereupon be convict, the gift shall be
utterly void, and the land shall accrue to the lord of the fee." But what
difference is there, as far as the public is concerned, between allowing religious
or political corporations, to own the lands of a country beyond what is actually
required for the legitimate and actual use of such corporations, in and about
their own legitimate purposes ? It would manifestly be just as bad to
encourage such ownership in political as in religious corporations. And so
it was found in England very soon. And in less than sixty years after
religious corporations were prohibited, all others were prohibited also. And
the statute of 9 Edw. I. [A. I). 12*79] declared "no person whatsoever, religious
or other, should presume" to buy or sell, or in any manner acquire or hold any
lands " so as such lands should come into mortmain." [2 Rev. His. Eng. L.
154.] Six years later, in the same reign, another law was passed, prohibiting
priestly devices for evading the former act. [lb. 155, 156.] But in the year
1392, the law of 15 Ric. II., ch. 5, was passed, expressly prohibiting cities, as
well as other corporations, from owning any landed estates.
" Moreover, because Mayors," etc., " of cities" etc., " were as perpetual as
religious institutions, it was declared that any purchase by them, or to their
use," should be with!n the statute of mortmain. [lb. Sup. vol. 3, p. 169.]
So the statute of 23 Henry VIII. [A. D. 1532] made void all transfers of
land for the use of corporations. [Comyns' Dig. " Capacity" B. 2.] The
learned Justice Comyns refers to many other statutes to the same effect, and
of even older date, and says these statutes apply to every corporation sole or
aggregate. And cites Co. Lit. 2 b ; 2 Inst. 75. [Dig. lb. Sup.] Blackstone
nowhere says that mortmain has ever been tolerated or encouraged by the
common law. He says, in vol. 1, p. 479, that it was regularly true at com-
mon law, that corporations (like natural persons) could purchase lands. But
that is the announcement of a general principle. In vol. 2, p. 268, he says:
" By the common law any man might dispose of his lands to any other
private man, especially after the feodal restraints against alienation were
worn away. Yet in consequence of these (restraints) it was always, and is
still, necessary for corporations to have a license to enable them to purchase
lands." " And such licenses (he continues) of mortmain seem to have been
necessary among the Saxons, above sixty years before the Norman conquest;"
(which would be before about A. D. 1000.) He also says, in referring to the
evils of permitting corporations to hold estates, " that the circulation of landed
property from man to man began to stagnate," etc., " and therefore in order
to prevent this, it was ordered by the second of King Henry III., great charter
[A. D. 1217], and afterwards by that printed in our common statute book
(the 9th Henry III. before mentioned), that all such attempts (to convey
estates to corporations) should be void." And that though this applied to
religious corporations, the statute of 7 Edw. I. (before mentioned) ' ; seemed
to be a sufficient security against all alienations in mortmain." [B. 2 p. 270.]
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He also says that " actual alienations in mortmain" are " pernicious in a well
governed state." [p. 272.] And that grants for uses to corporations, were
as void as direct grants, [Ibid.] In Giblet vs. Hobson, 3 Mylne and Keene,
517, Lord Chancellor Brougham seems to hold that the law was always
opposed to mortmain because it created tenants who never died, and thereby
interfered with the rights of the lord of the fee ; and also because it removed
lands from commerce. But it was decided in a chancery case in England,
[Attorney-General vs. Stewart, 2 Merivale 161] that these laws were wholly
political and local, and did " not extend to the alienation of land in the West
India Colonies." And it was decided in another chancery case in England,
[Mackintosh vs. Townsend, 16 Ves. 338] that they do not apply to Scotland.
And, no doubt it could be decided, with equal truth, that they do not apply
among any other people, where they have never been adopted by competent
authority, and claimed as part of the laws of the country. And, I submit,
no court would decide they are not in force in a state or country where they
have been adopted, as a part of the common law of the country. Our statute
has expressly and in the broadest terms enacted : " The common law of
England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with, the Constitution
of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, shall be the
rule of decision (i. e. shall be law) in all the Courts of this State." Now are
the laws against mortmain (which " always" rendered it " necessary for
corporations" to have express permission to own landed estates before they
can hold them) repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, or any
constitutional law of the United States ? Are they repugnant to any law of
this State ? On the contrary, do they not actually harmonize with the
express prohibition of our Constitution against all conceivable kinds of per-
petuities, excepting only those which are for eleemosynary purposes ? Now
in England, the purpose for which such estates are created are not the subject
of exception. [2 Bl. 4, 74, and note 5.] Does not the very fact of an
exception being made, indicate that the same evil is intended to be prohibited,
with the single exception mentioned ?
Again : It is said by great authority that it is the established doctrine with
" our common law courts" that English statutes, as well as other laws, not
inconsistent with our condition or our laws, and in force prior to the emi-
gration of our ancestors, " constitute a part of the common law of this
country." (1 Kent 473, q. v. and numerous other authorities, note a.; V. also
1 Kent, 604.) The English common law theory, as we know, with regard to
all the old statute laws, was that they were only declaratory of what was
previously the common law. [1 BL, 86.] It is certain these statutes of
mortmain were passed " before the emigration of our ancestors," for, as has
been shown, they were passed before the existence of this continent was
known to Europe. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, expressly decided
and maintained that said statutes of mortmain constituted a part of the Eng-
lish common law of that State, so far as to prohibit grants to corporations
without a statutory license. Many years ago, all the learned judges of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, (five in number,) were specially requested
by the Legislature of that State, to ascertain and inform the State, among
other laws, what, if any, English statutes were in force in that State. In De-
cember, 1808, they made their report, which is the Appendix to 3 Binney's
Reports. The report seems to have been made with the greatest care, and
the subject certainly required it. They declare unanimously, and in the ab-
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sence of any thing found in the Constitution or the statute laws of Pennsyl-
vania, that the statutes of 7 Ed. I, of 13 Ed. I, of 15 Rich. II, and of 23
Hen. VIII, all which prohibit alienation to corporations without previous
license, " are in part applicable and in force in this country ;" that " they are
so far in force that all conveyances, either by deed or will, of lands, tene-
ments, hereditaments, made to a body corporate, or for the use of a body cor-
porate, are void, unless sanctioned by charter or act of Assembly." And, in
1832, notwithstanding the authorities mentioned in Kent, [vol. 2, page 283,
etc.,] and, although no legislation appears to have ; been had to especially
adopt said English statutes, they were decided by the Supreme Court of that
State to be law in this country, and to require a license on the part of corpo-
rations before they can be allowed to hold or own landed estates. [Metho-
dist Church v. Remington, 1 Watt's R. 220.] Statutes of later date have
been generally held and decided to be a part of our common law on the
" established doctrine " just referred to in Kent ; and the evils which the
mortmain statutes prevented, are apparently quite as serious, and quite as
applicable to our condition, and quite as free from being repugnant to any
provisions in our written laws ; and while this Court would be expected to
adopt the one, in the absence of State legislation, on the strength of the
" established doctrine," I cannot comprehend a sufficient cause why it may
not adopt the other to which the same "doctrine" is also applicable. The
statutes of 28 Edw. I, (A. D. 1300,) against the scandalous practice of
champerty, or buying titles over lands in peacable possession of others, have
" become incorporated into the common law," (4 Kent, 489-90.) ; and the
English statutes of 13 Eliz., and 27 Eliz. (A. D. 1585, almost 200 years after
the statutes of mortmain,) which were passed to prevent fraud by setting up
a title to land with no written proof of the title, are to be considered, says
Kent, as part of the common law which accompanied the emigration of our
ancestors." (4 Kent, 510.) By the same principle, on the same authority,
and for the same reasons of public justice, I submit the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania was right ; and the statutes against the accumulation of vast
amounts of dead property in corporations should constitute a part of our
common law, as well as other and more recent English statutes, unless it were'
true that they were only political laws concerning rights of towns and cities,
and formed no part of the laws concerning the rights of persons. The im-
policy, I have said, of allowing cities to hold vast tracts of land, we will all
admit. True, it cannot and ought not to make any difference with this Court,
whether it is politic or impolitic, for courts of law are not the bodies or-
ganized by Government to originate or determine matters of public policy
;
but the impolicy of the law permitting such a thing, being clear and certain,
raises a presumption that the law does not permit it, because the rule is, that
the law does not permit that to be done, which clearly and certainly ought
not to be done ; and the common law does certainly seem to prohibit it, and
to require a special license from the King in order to allow any corporation
to hold lands ; and the ancient statutes against it are, I submit, to be legally
construed as declaratory of the common law. But I will not, for one mo-
ment, contend that this Court is under obligations to so decide, because the
law on this point is not uniformly held in the same way ; but our Courts,
falling into the English decisions before referred to, seem to have generally
adopted a different view ; but, perhaps, not in any case where the Constitu-
tion and the act adopting the common law were the same as ours.
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2. It is prohibited by our Statutes.
But, nevertheless, if this Court shall conclude the law to be, that "the com-
mon law of England " does not require a license to enable corporations to
hold large tracts of land as private owners, and shall decide that the ancient
English statutes, passed to insure the prevention of such abuses, constitute
no part of the common law of this State ; and shall further conclude that
our constitutional prohibition against every conceivable species of per-
petuity, excepting only those for eleemosynary purposes, has no application
to that kind of perpetuity created by donating estates to corporations ; still,
after all these objections should be gotten over, another would remain which
cannot be overcome. Of course, no one will deny that where the State (not
the United States,) shall make a grant to a corporation, it can hold what is
granted
;
because it cannot be necessary for the power which gives the
license to license an act of its own ; its own act of giving, being of itself, a
sufficient license to take and hold. But while all our courts, and our govern-
ments seem agreed as to the evil, of alienating vast landed estates to corpo-
rations or municipalities, the only difference between our Courts is as to how
the evil is to be effectually prevented. Some agree that it is done when no
special permission is given in their acts of incorporation to hold lands as pri-
vate property
;
and others decide that their power to hold must be limited by
words of limitation in the laws under which they are incorporated. Accord-
ing to Kent, (which is sufficient authority,) the Courts in nearly all the States
have held that words of limitation must be used, and that the ancient statutes
against their holding, as private owners, without permission, we are not enti-
tled to enjoy. ^Whether any such decisions have been made in any State,
where the common law of England has been so broadly adopted as with us,
and where the Constitution expressly declares that " no perpetuities shall be al-
lowed," I seriously question, though I have not ascertained with certainty. But
the same object has been accomplished in favor of San Francisco, as though
the ancient statutes of mortmain were as far in force here as they were de-
clared and decided to be, in favor of Pennsylvania. The charter of San
Francisco itself expressly limited the power of that corporation to hold lands.
So that, if the 14th section of the Act of Congress had been a grant, and if
the United States Board of Commissions, and the United States District
Court had been authorized to make the decrees of confirmation, still the
attempt would have failed, and the title offered would have been void, at
least as to most of the lands " from the incapacity of the alienee to take."
(2 Bl. Com. 268.) The first charter of San Francisco, that of April 15,
1850, in its first section defines the boundaries of the city, and then provides
that nothing in that section " shall be construed to divest, or in any manner
prejudice any right or privilege to which the city of San Francisco may be
entitled beyond the limits above described." All that can be made of this
proviso seems to be, that the limitation of boundaries in that section shall
not divest or prejudice any right or privilege then existing. But the^ next
section expressly limits its capacity " within the city," except for specified ob-
jects. It says ; may purchase, hold and receive property, real and personal,
within said city ; may lease, sell and dispose of the same for the benefit of
the city ; " may purchase, hold and receive property, real and personal, be-
yond the limits of the city, to be used for burial purposes ; also for the estab-
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lishment of a hospital for the reception of persons afflicted "with contagious
or other diseases ; also for a workhouse or house of correction ; also for the
erection of water works to supply the city with water." Now could the
city, under that charter, hold after-acquired lands outside its limits for general
speculative purposes ? Of course not, unless the Court could legislate and give
authority for monopoly and injury , which the law took so much pains to pre-
vent.. But in precisely one year from that day, that charter was repealed and
another law substituted. And the charter of April 15, 1851, positively pro-
hibits the city, by law, from owning or holding any "pueblo title'''' or any other
general and sweeping title to lands. This law expressly declares as follows
:
" may purchase, receive and hold property, real and personal, etc.; provided,
that they shall purchase without the city only such property as may be neces-
sary for the purposes of burial, or for the erection of prisons, hospitals,
asylums, and water-works for supplying the city with water." (Laws of 1850,
page 223, and of 1851, page 357.) What is the meaning of these limitations
if they are not to be obeyed ? We have seen that our Constitution expressly
prohibits similar estates. And we have seen that the laws of the State, by
virtue of which alone, the corporation of San Francisco even had an existence,
have by express words of limitation, deprived it of the capacity to take such
sweeping estates, as have been, without authority, " confirmed" to it for its own
private property. Why then is it not the imperious duty of this Court to main-
tain these laws, and sweep away all these idle and mischief-making " confirm-
ations " ? They are both contrary to our laws, and contrary to the laws of
the United States, authorizing confirmations of titles to be made, provided
they are for the corporation itself as a private owner. Our statute laws
limit the quantity of lands which our local governments may hold, prohibit
their being corrupted, and their people hindered and harrassed by their local
governments being made landed proprietors, and land speculators. And, I
insist, it is the imperious duty of this Court to enforce our laws, and to pro-
tect our citizens against the evil consequences, which it has been the very
object and sole purpose of these restrainining laws to protect them against.
Few general laws are more important, and certainly none can be more obli-
gatory than these restraining clauses, against their acquisition of lands as
private owners and for private purposes. Prior to the decision by the United
States Board of Commissioners, " confirming " a title to the local govern-
ment at San Francisco, viz., on the 5th May, 1855, the city of San Fran-
cisco was again re-incorporated, and the express prohibition against its be-
coming the owner of lands [which should belong to its citizens] was repeated
with equal emphasis in these words : " Provided that it shall purchase with-
out the city no property, except such as shall be necessary for establishing
hospitals, prisons, cemeteries, asylums, powder-magazines and water-works."
It could " purchase, receive, hold and enjoy " " real property without the city"
for those specified public purposes, but could hold no outside property not
"necessary" for those purposes. And the boundaries of the city were the same
in that act as in the Act of 1851. (Laws of 1855, page 251.)
Now, I submit, it is no answer to the position taken, that these charters
authorized the city to sell, and therefore lands granted to it would in no sense
create estates in perpetuity ; because the manifest purpose of the law is to pro-
hibit the power of holding in perpetuity. If the laws compelled or expressly
required the city to sell any lands granted to it, beyond what were " necees-
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sary " for its public use, and to sell them immediately or within a specified
time, then, I grant, they would not be perpetuities of any kind. But such is
not the law. Nor does the question seem fairly to be, whether the corpora-
tion could sell, but whether it could take and hold estates indefinitely or "in
perpetuity." (2 Bl. Com. 272.) The present law of the State absolutely
prohibits San Franciscofrom selling any of its lands. (Laws of 1856, page
165 sec. 74.) And therefore it seems plain and indisputable, that if the confir-
mations " have given it a title to lands, it is a title in perpetuity, for the law
compels it not to sell."
I insist it is no answer to say the law may be changed, and the city be
hereafter required to sell, if it gets the lands. For the laws must be admin-
istered as they are, and not as they may be, provided changes take place,
which may or may not occur. If the last clause of section 2 of the charter
of San Francisco of 1855, (laws of 1855, p. 252,)'be held to authorize the
city to take any lands confirmed to it, it must be remembered that nothing
was ever done under it, and it was shortly afterwards repealed, by the charter
of 1856, just mentioned. And the law of 1856, which is the existing law,
does not authorize the city to prosecute any claim for United States lands,
for the city had already secured such rights for its inhabitants, under the acts
of Congress and the ordinances before mentioned. But it was authorized to
prosecute its claim for "the pueblo lands" only. And even that authority
cannot be understood as being for the good of Peter Smith speculators, but
only for the "use, benefit and behoof" of the same inhabitants in possession,
as the city had already undertaken and promised, in said ordinances, as I
have already fully shown. None of those provisions, therefore, can be fairly
construed, I submit, to impair, or at all interfere with, the restraints against
the city acquiring lands for itself, as a private owner, and for private pur-
poses. But, on the contrary, they strengthen the evident intention of the
Legislature to prohibit it from acquiring vast monopolies in lands, as a private
owner. [Its authority to prosecute its claim further, applies only to upueblo
lands." See laws 1856, p. 167; place "23d."] Hence, the restraining pro-
visions in the charters of 1851 and of 1855 were actually in full force, both
when the petition for "pueblo" lands was filed in the Board of Land Commis-
sioners by the city, on the 2d day of July, 1852, and when the "decree of
confirmation" was rendered, in January, 1856. And I most respectfully sub-
mit, under the existing law, prohibiting the city from "any power to sell or
incumber the same, or to lease it for more than five years," [sec. 74, charter
of 1856,] a grant or patent made to it, to-day, by the United States, of all
the lands in that county to the Buri Buri Rancho, or to "the Vallejo line," it
could not receive for its own benefit, or as a private owner. Because, in the first
place, it would be "tending to take the land out of commerce" for a longer
period than the law allows, or creating a perpetuity. [See authorities sup.]
And because, in the next place, it could not hold such an immense landed es-
tate, as its own property, " from the incapacity of the alienee to take," under
the restraining laws in said former charters. And because, before " the con-
firmation" it was bound, by its own agreement, to prosecute the claim for its
lot holders only. Kent says : "The inference to be drawn from the statutes
creating corporations and authorizing them to hold real estate to a certain
limited extent, is, that our statute cojporations cannot take and hold real estate
for purposes foreign to their institution." [See 2 Kent, 283 ; and Jackson
HART VS. BURNETT ET AL. Ill
vs. Hartnell, 8 J. R., 424.] Kent further says, "those special restrictions con-
tained in the acts by which they are incorporated, and which usually confine
the capacity to purchase to special and necessary objects," are a ''legal check
to the acquisition of lands by corporations? [2 Kent, 282.] Religious cor-
porations are deemed strictly limited
; then why not, also, municipal corpo-
rations? How is it that the same laws mean something in one place, but
not in another ? If they are to be rigidly applied to cases of religious and all
other statute corporations, why not also to these political statute corporations ?
In the general law " to provide for the incorporation of cities," passed
March 11th, 1850, whereby any place containing over 2,000 persons can
form an incorporated city government, it is enacted that "they shall not pur-
chase or receive any real estate, other than such lands or lots within the
city as shall be necessary for the erection thereon of public buildings', or for
the laying out of streets or public grounds, or such lands without the city
as may be required for burial grounds. [Laws 1850, p. 88, sec. 7.]
Suppose a hundred, local political governments were incorporated under
this law, and each sought to acquire a title to ten thousand acres of city lots,
or ten millions of dollars worth of real estate, "for purposes foreign to their
institution," would not the Court hold that these restraining laws mean some-
thing, and must be rigidly enforced ? Is it the extent to which an evil may
reach, which is to determine whether a law made to prevent it is to be
rigidly enforced or not ? The entire current of the legislation of this State
upon this subject, evinces the utmost determination to prohibit the accumula-
tion of vast landed estates in corporations. And precisely as obligatory and
vigorous restrictions are imposed against our local political corporations becom-
ing landed monopolists, as against religious or any other corporations. And
such being the plain and settled policy of our State, as well as of all other en-
lightened States whatever ; and being manifestly the most wise and judicious
policy which our government could adopt; and a contrary system being declared
and conceded to be "pernicious in a well governed State," [see 2 Bl., 272,]
why should the United States tribunals in California be allowed to introduce
a new, different, and hitherto unheard of policy, in contempt of our laws, in
manifest injury to our cities, and in violation of our fixed policy concerning
our local political government ? If there be any good reasons why such pro-
ceedings should be countenanced and upheld by this Court, it is certain they
are not to be found in any law.
Now all these laws seem like a tower of strength in favor of the principle
announced by this Court in the .case of Lowe vs. the City of Marysville, 5 Cal.
214. That principle is, that if corporations are to be created, with authority
to purchase or receive vast landed estates, for example, seventeen thousand
acres, as claimed by San Francisco, and one hundred and fifty thousand acres,
as claimed by San Jose ; then such bodies must be incorporated under general
laws, and not by special acts. Because, corporations cannot be created by
special act " except for municipal purposes." (Con. Cal., Art. 4, Sec. 31). In
reply to a suggestion made here to my colleague, Mr.Williams, at the last April
term, I most respectfully submit, all language is " merely descriptive." But
this provision of the Constitution is descriptive of what ? It is descriptive of
two classes of laws, which the Legislature may pass for creating corporations,
viz., general laws and special laws. Now, can a special law be passed to
authorize the purchase, leasing, and management of vast landed estates, like
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those just mentioned ? Why not ? Only because " corporations shall not be
created by special act, except for municipal purposes" San Francisco and
San Jose were created by special acts, therefore, they were created for muni-,
cipal purposes, or else their charters are void. Now, being created for muni-
cipal purposes, every act they perform, and every purpose they attempt to
carry out, must be municipal, or else the Constitution can be readily perverted,
as suggested in said opinion of this Court. The rule of construction is well
settled, that what they could not be directly authorized to do, by special act,
they cannot do indirectly, nor by straining or perverting the purposes for
which alone they could be created by special act. Municipal purposes, as
used in this clause of our Constitution, plainly means political or governmental
purposes, and no other. (2 Kent, 275, Burrill's Law Die.) As first proposed
in the constitutional convention, it read " for political or municipal purposes."
(Debates in Con. 108, 112.) And the whole debate truly shows (what this
Court said in the case of Lowe,) that it was the determination of the conven-
tion to allow no special charters to be passed, unless (as stated in the conven-
tion) their " power shall be confined strictly to municipal purposes." (Debates
p. 126.) As to the policy of strictly confining all municipal corporations to
the purposes and duties of good local governments, and to that alone, the very
example of the corporation of San Francisco, and the sweeping and continual
curses it has -brought against the growth and prosperity of the place, by en-
gaging in schemes for lands, as a private owner, is a more forcible argument
than anything I can say. Even the donation of a strip of water property to
that city by the State, in 1851, lead to a hundred times more corruption,
fraud, injustice, and loss, both to the State and to the city, than though the
State had at once put up the property, in proper form, and sold it all directly
to private hands. Local governments never want lands, beyond what they
may require for actual public use. But, in San Francisco, the corporation
created by the Legislature for purely municipal or governmental purposes,
has almost neglected the purposes for which it has existed, in order to attend
to titles to lands for itself, not for its people. Why has this been so ? Ask
these unprincipled schemers who have been using it as a catspaw, and who have
made Alcalde title holders assist them, by means of the falsehood, that the city
must own the lands to make their Alcalde titles good ; whereas, they are
precisely as valid without the city owning the lands, as with it, as has already
been shown. And better, too, because, as we have shown, where the corpo-
rations under Mexican law, actually did own lands, their officers could not
grant the lands away from the corporation to individuals.
Why should a title in the corporation of San Francisco be any longer en-
couraged ? The existence of any such title is, beyond all rational controversy,
a mere sham and falsehood, which must, from the very nature of things, sooner
or later give way, and deceive all who shall place dependence upon it. What
can be more insane, than to now ask this court to assist in bringing all the
possessions and titles in the city of San Francisco, under the operation of no
title at all, but of mere judicial mistakes ? What conceivable advantage
could be gained by it, even if the court were authorized to engage in any such
business ?
No man in his senses, and with any knowledge of the fact, can suppose that
such a course would tend to quiet titles now in San Francisco, any more than
the same course, if now started here, would quiet titles in Sacramento. It
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would manifestly produce the most sweeping outrages, and the most inextri-
cable confusion and insecurity in titles, which fifty years would hardly be suf-
ficient to wholly overcome ; because error must perish, and truth must pre-
vail, in time. Whilst on the other hand, let us alone as we are, and firmly
assure us that we shall enjoy henceforth the full and rigid protection of truth
and the laws, and in fifty days, instead of years, the titles to lands in San
Francisco, will be deemed as plain and as secure, as in any city on this conti-
nent. And not an individual can be injured in any legal or equitable right, by
adhering to law and the truth. Nor will any human being then be disturbed,
except the few persons interested in these scandalous speculations.
I cannot conceive what policy will be consulted, if the policy of the laws
and of truth shall be abandoned. I cannot conceive what policy has been
thought of, in seeking at this late day, if ever, to endow our local political
governments with vast landed estates. And it is impossible to understand,
why it should be supposed that such a policy will be any more excusable
against our old towns, than if the same policy be now attempted against our
new towns. We are certainly, the inhabitants of the same State, governed
by the same general laws, and entitled to the same protection in one part of
the State as in another. And all our cities which are populous, have been
made so by our own people, not by our corporations. And if every new title
now sought to be created over the lands they occupy, would bring confusion,
turmoil and injury, if aimed against our cities which entirely originated since
1 846, how can it be supposed the same evils will not be experienced, if aimed
against those which existed here, in adobes, prior to 1846 ? What sense is
there in making the distinction, which only aids lawyers and speculators, by
confusing titles where no confusion is necessary. But if deemed a privilege,
instead of a nuisance, then why should San Francisco be endowed with lands,
any more than all our other local governments? Indeed, can any one tell
why titles in that city should be kept in eternal confusion, in order to indulge
the baseless expectation, that if the lands it occupies can be kept long enough
from its citizens, and can be defended long enough by its citizens against its
speculators, they may eventually come to be the property of the corporation ?
But how can this court recognize it, as owning the vast tracts of lands described
in the copy of the " degree of confirmation," shown in the record in this case?
The law of this State prohibits it. And the authorities in the law say, " there
can be no doubt, that if a corporation be forbidden by its charter to purchase
or take lands, a deed made to it would be void." Because its capacity to take
must be determined from the instrument which gives it existence. (Per Ch. J.
Tilghman, in Lazuere vs. Hillegas, 7 Sergt. and R., 319 ; v. also Ang. and A.
on Corp. sees. 151 & 152). And what right, I insist, has any court of the
United States, to create any of our corporations into landed monopolists,
when our laws forbid it ? " It is obvious, (say the authorities) that the real
estate of a corporation can be dealt with only by the judicial authority of the
State in which it lies." And this is true, " even though the corporation is
created by the concurrent acts of several governments." (Binney's case, 2
Bland's Ch. R. (Md.) 142 ; Ang. and A. sup. sec. 163). I am aware there are
men in San Francisco who seem to think it would be "smart" to keep quiet
about the "confirmation" affirmed by Judge Hoffman to that town ; and to
first get the patent of the United States to the lands, and then make the gov-
ernment of the United States pay some millions of dollars to that corporation
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for its own military barracks, and other buildings, and the lands between them
and the fort on Fort Point, where millions are being expended by the United
States for the defense of that city. With such men, no man of correct prin-
ciples can have one particle of sympathy. No true man can wish his city
government (any more than himself) to be enriched by property which does
not in law, nor in equity, nor in moral right, belong to it. Nor is it to be
even imagined, that the heedlessness which seems to have hitherto character-
ized the conduct of the law officers of the United States, in this one particular,
will continue until such void and rotten confirmations can be made successful,
through the voluntary folly of the United States Government, by issuing its
patent against its own military defenses. I suppose a patent in such a case
would be the source of new suits against titles in that city ; although, if issued,
it would be without authority of the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1851, be-
cause, as we insist, the United States has confirmed no lands to anybody by
said law, and the provisions in said act for issuing patents have no applica-
tion to any "right" or title, unless it be '•'•derived from the Spanish or
Mexican government," and the law so declares. (See sections 8 and 13.)
3. Further Reasons why this " Confirmation" Amounts to Nothing,
as to any Title in the Corporation.
My colleague, Mr. Williams, read to the Court, at the last April term, the
United States Senate debates, which preclude all ideas of the said 14th sec-
tion being a grant or a confirmation. In cases of actual doubt and uncer-
tainty, of course, such debates are to be referred to, in order to ascertain, if
possible, the meaning of the words used in a law. And those debates, in this
instance, are so plain and so uncontradictory that only one conclusion can be
arrived at. And that conclusion is, that if it is a grant or a legislative con-
firmation of any pre-existing right to any corporation of any particular tract of
land in this State, then the Senate which passed it were in total ignorance of
the fact. And not only that, but they did what they expressly refused to do,
on a direct vote being taken to grant lands to San Francisco. (See Cong.
Globe and Appendix, 2d Sess. 31st Cong. vol. 23, pp. 347, 348, 363, 394, 427
and passim.) It was expressly stated by Mr. Barien, Ch. of the Jud. Com.,
who drew the 14th section, that the object they then had in view was only to
ascertain who already had titles, and not to make titles, or confirm imperfect
rights, which would be the same thing.
It was, of course, well known in Congress that there were a large number
of old Missions and villages existing in California in 1846. The Government
had sent a special Agent to this country to ascertain the condition of private
land titles in and out of the old settlements. And his Report was received
and published before Congress attempted to pass a law on the subject.
Moreover, this country had been in the occupation of the United States for
four or five years, and had been organized into a State, and its Senators and
Representatives were present in Congress when the law of March 3d, 1851,
was passed. It is therefore unnecessary to suppose that the United States
proceeded blindly, or adopted the 14th section of said law in a careless man-
ner, or with a vague and unknown meaning. The law of March 3d expressly
required that every person having a claim to lands in California, at that time,
should present his claim ; and if he failed to do so the penalty was, that the
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United States would dispose of the lands as its own. But it was well known
there were numerous towns and villages here, and, consequently, that the
claims for " city, town, or village lots" would be almost innumerable. For
the Land Commissioners to attempt to pass separately on each claim for a
mere town lot, would have overwhelmed them with thousands of cases, and
would, moreover, have been such a burden imposed on the holders of mere
lots in towns, that to have imposed the expense of prosecuting a title to them,
through the Board of Commissioners and the District Court, and, perhaps,
the Supreme Court of the United States, would have amounted virtually to a
direct confiscation. AYhat was to be done, then, with " city, town, or village
lots ?" Why, that which we ourselves would do, if we should assist, to-day,
in passing a law of the same kind—all such lots were excepted from the pro-
visions of the bill. And the first words of the 14th section so expressly de-
clare. Why then do we seek to bring them within the bill ? But it was as-
serted in Congress, that some of the towns in this country owned the lands
about them, and at least three cities (Stockton, Sacramento, and Marysville)
were known to be erected on lands claimed by individuals. Therefore, an
exception was made in favor of the holders of " lots" but no exception what-
ever is made in favor of any person, or any corporation claiming lands, as
contradistinguished from town " lots." On the contrary, towns claiming
" land" are expressly required to present their titles, if they have any, for
" the land within the limits." And all the lot holders claiming under any
such corporation, or individual, as claimed the lands ; and, also, all the lot
holders in the old towns existing here in 1846, claiming lands under such
towns, or the authorities thereof, were to be regarded, for the purposes of that
inquiry before the courts under that act, as having a title in their grantees.
The law does not say there is "prima facie evidence of a grant" to any
corporation or town existing here in 1846 ; as has been stated in opinions of
this Court. It may not be material, for reasons already given, but it is a mis-
take of fact. The law does not say so. What the law says is "prima facie
evidence of a grant to such corporation under which the lot holders claim."
Therefore, whatever corporation or town existed here July 7th, 1S46, "under
which the lot holders claim" has aprimafacie title to such "lots" for their benefit,
benefit. Ifo other corporation or town exceptthose under which lot holdersclaim,
and excepting such as existed July 1th, 1846, is mentioned, and hence no other
can be included. Again, language cannot be used with more certainty, to indi-
cate that only lots and not tracts or bodies of lands are referred to, than is used
in this section. If that part of the section containing the words "prima facie
evidence of a grant to such corporation or individual under whom the said
lot holders claim," be made to include or to refer to any lands excepting
merely lots, it is manifest it must be done by interpolating words into the law
which the law does not contain. The law only says, " any town lot, village
lot, farm lot," and " any city, town, or village lot," and neither includes nor
mentions any " land" until the words about a prima facie grant for the bene-
fit of " lot holders" is passed. And then, as if to. render the meaning plain,
it refers, for the first time, to " the land embraced within the limits" of
towns, and says, "any city, town, or village existing in 1851, may present its
claim for land" "embraced within its limits," but not beyond its limits.
That is, of course, if they had any claim, they could present it. A lot is de-
fined to mean, in law, " a small piece of land in a town or city." There are
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two kinds of lots, viz. : in-lots and out-lots. In-lots are " within the boundary
of the city or town." Out-lots are " out of such boundary, and those which
are used by some of the inhabitants of such town or city." (Bouv. Law Die.)
Such lots, and such only, are mentioned in connection with &prima facie title.
And whatever may be said as to the sense of the section in other respects, it
is plain in this particular. And the eyes of the keenest speculator in exist-
ence, cannot discover any mention or the remotest allusion to any tract of
land, in connection with any prima facie title. And even when the law men-
tions land it confines it to the limits of towns. No town has any right what-
ever to present a claim for land beyond its limits. Another fact, before re-
ferred to, is plain, that is, that lands, not lots but lands in and about the
Missions, were not to be confirmed to anybody. Because the law ex-
pressly required the Commissioners to " ascertain and report to the Secretary
of the Interior, the tenure by which the Mission lands are held." (Sec. 16.)
And I shall submit that no provision of the Treaty, no law of nations, and no
local law, nor principle of law or of justice, could prevent the rights of the
Mexican municipal corporations, from passing to, and remaining entirely sub-
ject to the new sovereignty created over them. The laws which created them
and gave them rights, of property as well as of government, were merely politi-
cal laws, subject to be modified, or continued, or limited, or wholly abolished,
as the new sovereign power might direct. [Story on the Con. sec. 1324.]
Another fact seems plain ; that is, if the 14th section is a grant "to such
corporation or individual" under whom the lot holders claim, it is not a grant
" to such corporation or individual" under whom the lot holders do not claim.
And it is also manifest, if it be a grant " to such corporation" it is also a grant
" to such individual," for no distinction is made, and therefore none is admis-
sible. Now, in San Francisco, three different sets of private speculators, be-
sides the speculators with the pueblo title, presented claims for the general
title to the lands in that city. And every person who held a " lot" under
either of them is expressly allowed, for the purposes of the Commission, a
prima facie evidence of title in the party under whom he claims. The pur-
pose of the Commission was merely and solely to ascertain who owned lands
in this country, by titles prior to that of the United States. And alb lot
holders in towns were assured by the law, that they need not present any
claims for lots in any case ; and if they claimed under any " such corpora-
tion or individual" then they could not present their claim for a lot, but their
claim was to be presented for them, either by " the corporate authorities" or
" by or in the name of the individual," as the case might be. As a matter
of course the presentation of such claims was to be for the benefit of lot
holders holding under the towns existing in 1846, at the date when the whole
country passed to the United States. As to any title to any land in Califor-
nia, since that date, the United States is competent to provide for that, with-
out requiring the aid of a Board of Land Commissioners, as to the disposition
of its own title. The United States disposes of its title to lands in California
to citizens, not to corporations. And it, long ago, nearly seven years ago,
passed a law for disposing of its title to lands in the limits of all the towns in
California, and in the most liberal manner. And yet the pests of the city
of San Francisco, have been afraid to trace the titles of its inhabitants to
lands, to their own country, and their own government, which was " the only
true owner," after Mexico ceased to be.
It seems certain, that no more need be said to prove, that this law creating
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[merely for the purposes of an inquiry into foreign titles] & prima facie grant
to lots, in towns existing July 7th, 1846, cannot be applied, under any
pretext, to lands which are not "lots." And that authority to present a claim
for lots, by " such corporation under whom the lot holders claim," is no
authority of itself to present claims to vast tracts of lands, of from four to
forty leagues, and not for lots, as the law expressly directs and provides.
[Sec. 14.]
And the provision of the 14th section, so far as it creates any prima facie
title, being confined specifically and exclusively to " lots," the authority for
any political corporation in California, to present a claim for four leagues or
forty leagues of lands, is nowhere to be found in the Act of Congress of 1851,
or in any other act of Congress. Indeed, all attempts to cast the odium
upon Congress, of justifying "decrees of confirmation" of vast tracts of lands,
like that lately rendered by Judge Hoffman against the people of the county of
Santa Clara, of three hundred square miles, to a town corporation in that
county, must utterly fail. Because, no act of Congress, nor one line or word
in any act of Congress, in the present or in the past, can be found to tolerate
or countenance any such gross, palpable, and senseless outrage, against the
rights of property, held by citizens of this State. It has already emboldened
attacks against some of the oldest, and most genuine private titles, in this
State. And we insist, it is the imperious duty, as it is unquestionably the
privilege of this Court, to investigate the authority, under which such mischief-
making and iniquitous " decrees " have been rendered. And if it can be
found that the Congress of the United States has actually authorized such
conduct, our citizens should be so informed, in order that those having
genuine and confirmed Spanish and Mexican grants, may demand indemnity
from the United States for its spoliation of their property. But, I insist upon
it, that a candid and lawyerly examination will at once convince your honors,
that such decrees have been entered under a total misapprehension of the
sense, and the purpose, of said 14th section, in virtue of which they have
been rendered. Because, as already abundantly shown, no tracts of lands
are confirmed, or presumed to be granted to any towns, or so much as men-
tioned in the 14th section, in connection with any presumption of title. And
the only authority for a town to present a claim, accompanied with such
a presumption, is, for " lots" of such lot-holders as hold under it, [where any
such case exists,] as to towns existing in 1846. And without any such pre-
sumption, ''for the land embraced witkin^the limits of the town," as to towns
existing March 3d, 1851. [Read the whole section.] The least attention in
reading the section, must convince your honors, that it does not contain any
conveyance, or grant, or confirmation of title or right, even in favor of lot-
holders. It only presumes a grant with reference solely to " lots," and for
the benefit only of lot holders, with the evident purpose of preventing such
lot holders from incumbering the Board, and incurring the expense of proving
their claims of titles before the Board. And in plain fact, no such word as
grant, or confirm, implying action on the part of Congress to convey a title,
or to confirm a pre-existing right to any tract of land ; can be found anywhere
in said law, or in any other law. And I defy my learned brothers on
the other side, to show any word or clause, expressing or implying any
such thing.
The 14th section, in any view of the subject, cannot be construed to affect,
118 SHAW'S ARGUMENT.
nor to include any particular lands, for none is described. All the lots in the
towns, existing here in 1846, is a description capable of certainty by proof.
And so is, " the land embraced within the limits " of " any city, town, or vil-
lage," "in existence at the time of passing this act^ 1 wherever, at that time,
they had limits. But to confirm claims, not for lot-holders, nor for lots in
such towns, nor for lands in their limits in March, 1851, but for three hun-
dred square miles, or wherever the boundaries of old political Mexican corpora-
tions can be shown to have extended, is precisely, and plainly without any more
authority of law, than to have confirmed, on such petitions, all the lands in
the State of California. The law of Congress refers to, and includes all the
lands in the State, precisely as well as the lands in the boundaries of former
Mexican pueblos. It has no word about either. But "prima facie evidence
of grant," in any view of the case, means only what it says, not what it
does not say. It does not say it confirms a title, nor that it confirms a pre-
existing right. Kit had been intended to confirm any pre-existing right, the
law would have said so, and mentioned what it confirmed, and to whom, and
how far. A confirmation, is " a conveyance of an estate, or right, whereby a
voidable estate is made sure and unavoidable, or whereby a particular estate
is increased." [Coke Litt. 2,956 ; 2 Bl. Com. 225.] To hold that the 14th
section is a confirmation by Congress, would be to hold that the words may
be interpolated into the law, which the law does not contain. Prima facie
evidence of a grant, does not mean confirmed, any more than it means con-
vey. It means, 1 repeat, just what it says, and not what it does not say.
What it says, is, that it makes "primafacie evidence" of a grant. An&pri-
ma facie evidence, is precisely that kind of evidence, which can be overcome
by positive evidence. If we leave another in the possession, and the claim
and exercise of ownership over his propertv, that creates for him uprima facie
evidence of a grant." But such evidence of a grant, is not a grant. And if
an actual grant were made by the United States to another, that other could,
of course, eject the party having only the "prima facie evidence of a grant."
An actual grant is not prima facie evidence of one, but is conclusive evidence.
And on the trial, and test of title, an actual grant is just as necessary, to a
party who has only "prima facie evidence of a grant," as to a party who has
no grant at all. To say primafacie evidence of a grant is a grant, is as plain
a contradiction of terms, as to say presumptive evidence is not presumptive
evidence, but is conclusive evidence. To say that prima facie evidence of
title to "lots," answered all the purposes of the law, for inquiring into titles
before the Commissioners, would be true. And that being the case, why the
law should be strained and distorted, and made to justify assertions and con-
firmations, not warranted by anything contained in the law ; and why this
should be done for the manifest and sweeping injury of property, and the dis-
turbance of communities, and for the benefit of no human beings except Peter
Smith speculators out of possession, is beyond my comprehension. In my
humble opinion, the utter lawlessness of such confirmations, is only sur-
passed by their gross and sweeping injustice. We insist upon it, that nothing
whatever can befound in the Act of March 3d, 1851, conceding, granting, or
confirming any particular lands, or right to lands, any where, to any cor-
poration. And the utter folly and injustice of such decrees as have been ren-
dered to corporations, regardless of the rights of all who are in possession of
property, cannot be attributed to any act by the Congress of the United
States, nor to any thing, perhaps, but sheer official carelessness.
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If this Act of Congress did contain a grant, or did confirm lands to the cor-
poration of San Francisco, of course it could maintain ejectment upon it.
But the United States, as we all know, has never surveyed any lands under
it, nor under any confirmation in pursuance of it, nor given any patent. Now,
suppose San Francisco should sue to recover the lands, what particular lands
could it mention as having been granted, or confirmed to it, by said act of
Congress? None whatever, except by mere averment. And we have already
seen that this cannot be permitted, because " that were to make all deeds
hollow, and subject to averment, and so, in effect, to pass that without deed,
which the law appointeth, shall not pass but by deed." [Mesick vs. Sun-
derland, 6 Cal. p 312.] If the city itself could not now maintain ejectment,
until the land is surveyed, as this Court has expressly, repeatedly, and most
correctly decided, during the present year, that it could not, (see Water-
man vs. Smith, Moore vs. Wilkinson, and Biddle Boggs vs. Merced Mining
Company,) then how is it possible for this respondent to maintain eject-
ment, when he does not pretend to claim any other, or superior right, to that
which the city itself had on the 22d of June, 1852, when all the interest, or
right this respondent has, was conveyed to 'him by the Sheriff. If he did
claim any subsequent acquired title, he could not receive it, because the law
is settled, and the principle of law plain, against any such pretense. [See
Weidman vs. Hubble, 1 Cowen, 613 ; Jackson vs. Winslow, 9 do. 13; Jack-
son vs. Peck, 4 Wend. 300.]
When this Sheriff's deeds, under which respondent claims, was executed
and delivered, the city had not yet even presented a petition, or claim for lands,
to the United States Board of Commissioners. It is useless to deny or dis-
guise the fact, that all these Peter Smith titles, of which we complain, were
based on the idea of a title in the towns " by the laws of Mexico" or in other
words, on " the pueblo title." There being no such title, it does now seem
too bad to ask, that citizens of the United States, shall be driven off from the
lands of the United States, and that those who hold valid Mexican titles, shall
now have their property rendered comparatively valueless, when there is no law
which actually compels or requires it to be done, and no conceivable good to be
gained by it. No doubt the counsel will urge for this respondent, that this
Court has made the act of Congress a title, by constructions now claimed to
be settled by the rule of stare decisis. But ho such pretense can help him.
Because, what we claim is, that even if it were an actual grant, or confirma-
tion, it would be plainly void for uncertainty.
And it is to be remembered, that although the construction of a grant is
matter of law, still, its legal effect, as to what lands it includes, and what
lands it excludes, is solely and exclusively " matter for the jury." And, as
we have abundantly shown, the jury must act upon the testimony given as to the
description or boundaries named in the grant: And, if no description, or
boundaries, are named in the grant, it is conclusive evidence, that whether it is
called a grant or not, it cannot be admitted, nor noticed as a grant, or con-
firmation to any particular lands, for the plain reason that it does not describe
any particular lands at all, nor mention any particular lands, as being so
granted, or confirmed. "A survey of lands, and a survey made by one offi-
cially qualified according to law, is an indispensible link in a chain of title."
[2 Hilliard R. Prop. 263, cites 2 Ohio, 418; V. also the three cases decided by
this Court, and just now referred to.] Suppose it is a grant, or a confirma-
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tion of any pre-existing right, can this Court, or any other Court, or any hu-
man being, ascertain with certainty, from any words in the act, or the grant,
whether it conveys our lands or not ? How can the lands be surveyed at all ?
Every Surveyor in the known world, will make oath, if required to do so,
that he cannot survey the lands, conveyed in a grant, or a deed, or a confirm-
ation, without boundaries, or calls; without a beginning or an ending; without
form or shape ; without any quantity, and without any limits. What sense
would there be among lawyers, or among farmers, in talking about making a
deed certain by survey, where the deed has no boundaries at all, and says
nothing about conveying any lands in particular anywhere ? This grant, as it
may be facetiously called, is not even certain as to the counties of the State into
.
which it extends. And all the ingenuity of Beelzebub could not survey nor
locate it, for it says nothing about quantity, and contains no words alluding
to quantity, or to any facts from which quantity can be fixed. And it has no
boundaries to the east, nor to the west, nor to the north, nor to the south.
And if there were boundaries, where they are, would be plainly, and accord-
ing to sound authority, " exclusively in the province of the jury " to decide.
[Frier vs. Jackson, (in Errors) 8 J. E,. 508.] The opinion of Ch. J. Livingston,
and of the Court, in that case, says : The construction of a grant, is matter of
law. But its legal effect, can be deduced onlyfrom its own terms, and accord-
ing to the intent at the time of the making it. [3 Bacon Abr. 393.] And
matter subsequent, which may authorize a jury to give a more liberal, or re-
stricted construction to it, as deduced from such matter, (meaning from the
boundaries,) is exclusively in the province of the jury. It applies with equal
force, whether the terms in which the grant is conceived, are certain or am-
biguous ; for both require extraneous aid to give them effect, which aid it is not
in the potver of the Court to afford. Thus, (e. g.) if the place from which the
description commences is a lake, and the place to which it is to proceed is
a brook, the Court would restrain the parties from taking a rock for the one,
or a mountain for the other ; but which was the particular lake or brook
intended, must necessarily be left to the jury." (At p. 508.) " The Court
below erred in deciding beyond the mere question of law, for, as to the facts,
the jury were to decide exclusively." (lb. at p. 515.)
:pa.:rt xiii.
Whatever Rights and Privileges existed in Mexican "Cities, Towns
and Villages," were Rights created by, and dependent on, the
Mexican System op Local Government ; and they were (fortu-
nately) NOT CONTINUED NOR CONFIRMED, BUT COMPLETELY EXTINGUISHED,
by the New System of Local Governments which we have intro-
duced.
There is nothing in the treaty with Mexico, by which this country was
acquired; nothing in international law; nor in any principle of justice or right
reason, to prevent all the rights of the Mexican municipal corporations, or
"cities, towns and villages" in California, from passing to and becoming sub-
ject to the new sovereign, just as completely as did the rights of the greater
Mexican corporation. They were [and are still] purely political institutions.
They constituted parts of the Mexican system of political government, and
were dependent for their continuance, change or abolition, then, as now, only
on considerations of public policy. They could, at no time since the treaty,
claim rights which did not pass to and become completely subject to the
control and disposition of the new sovereign. [Story on Con., sec. 1324.]
And the Mexican or foreign laws by which such towns were brought into ex-
istence and endowed with rights, be those rights what they may, were most
manifestly laws of a political character, which could be totally abolished
without the violation of any contract. [2 Kent, 305-6.] And by express
provision of our State Constitution, all such corporations are created to be
continued only during the pleasure of the Legislature. [Art. 4, sec. 31.]
It is no longer contended by anybody, that any of our towns acquired lands
during the Spanish or Mexican dominion by purchase or by direct grant. But
what is claimed is, that under general laws of Mexico, towns were endowed
with rights or titles of some sort, in the lands about them. Now if such
was the policy of Mexico (or Spain) concerning their towns or local govern-
ments, such is not the policy of this State concerning its towns and local
governments. And if all those laws of Spain and Mexico, which are claimed
to have created some vague right or title to lands, in favor of their local gov-
ernments, have been abolished, what has become of the rights which entirely
depended on such laws ?
The act "subdividing the State into counties," etc. [Laws 1850, p. 58] ; the
"act to supersede certain courts, etc. [ib., 77] ; the "act concerning offi-
cers" ib., 205] ; the "act to regulate proceedings in courts of Justices
of the Peace" [ib., 179]; the general laws "to provide for the incor-
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poration of cities" [ib., 87], and "to provide for the incorporation of
towns" [ib., 128] ; and the provisions of our Constitution, expressly com-
manding the Legislature to everywhere make provision for new local
governments over the country [art. 4, sec. 37: art. 11, sec. 4]; and the
numerous special acts for creating local city and town governments, wherever
such governments existed before under former laws, and in many places be-
sides, which may readily be seen in our statutes ; and the first section in the
schedule of our Constitution, which provides that no laws in force at the
adoption of our Constitution shall continue in force longer than "until altered
or repealed by the Legislature;" and the law of this State passed on the 22d
day of April, 1850, entitled "An act to abolish all laws now in force in this
State, except such as have been passed by the present session of the Legislature 1
'
1
(ib. sup., p. 342), which law did positively abolish and repeal uall laws in
force in this State, except such as have been passed, or adopted, by the Legisla-
ture." These laws, we submit, prove conclusively that every municipal cor-
poration, or local political government, ever existing in this State, under the
laws of Mexico (or of Spain), and every Spanish or Mexican law by which
"any city, town or village" in this State held any rights, either of property
or of government, were totally and absolutely abolished and repealed. There-
fore, whatever rights or privileges those political and public corporations
may have held, under Spanish laws or Mexican laws, necessarily expired when
those laws were extinguished. Because, whatever those rights or privileges
may have been, they were manifestly political, and appertained exclusively
to the general laws of those countries for the establishment of local political
governments. And however wise it may have been for the government of a
pastoral people, to reserve vast tracts of lands about their towns and villages,
over which their peaceful and indolent inhabitants might go in common and
from generation to generation, for wood and water, and pasture ; still that sys-
tem was wholly unadapted to the energetic, agricultural, and commercial people,
who have succeeded to the inheritage of their country. And, therefore, the
entire Spanish and Mexican system of local governments was swept away
;
and an entirely new and different system of government was introduced, upon
the introduction of a new race of inhabitants, and the establishment of a
new constitution, and an entirely new and independent nation or State. It
is admitted by our learned brothers for respondent, and is declared in the de-
cision of Cohas vs. Roisin, and repeated in the opinion of one of the Justices,,of
this Court, in the case of Welsh vs. Sullivan, and seems to be on all hands con-
ceded, that the rights of the pueblos to lands depended (I repeat) not on any
formal or actual grants, nor on any particular law including a grant, but on
the general laws of Mexico, securing such rights to all her "pueblos." Now
all those laws, with no exception or reservation whatever, and be they what
they may, have been repealed ; and that repeal was required and commanded
by the new constitution, and by the new order of general and local govern-
ments, which our new constitution introduced. Will it be contended that that
repeal was unconstitutional, when the constitution itself required it ? Unless
the laws of this State, adopting a new system of local governments, and
rigidly limiting the quantity of lands which they may hold, are unconstitu-
tonal, they are in force ; and no doctrine of stare decisis can repeal them, and
re-introduce the Mexican laws and the rights enjoyed by Mexicans under their
system of local governments. I am well aware that no law of this State, nor
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its constitution, can be made to impair the obligation of contracts ; but, as
we have already seen, the creation of such corporations, and the laws intro-
ducing and defining their rights and privileges, are not contracts. "A public
corporation (says Kent) instituted for purposes connected with the admin-
istration of the government, may be controlled by the Legislature, be-
cause such a corporation is not a contract within the provisions of the Con-
stitution of the United States." " In those public corporations (he continues,
such 'as counties, cities and towns,') there is in reality but one party, and the
trustees, or governors of the corporation, are merely trustees for the public."
[2 Kent, 305-6.] "The main distinction (says another standard authority)
between public and private corporations is, that over the former the Legisla-
ture, as the trustee, or guardian of the public interests, has the exclusive and
unrestrained control, and, acting as such, as it may create, so it may modify
or destroy them, as public exigency requires or recommends, or as the public
interests will be best subserved. The right to establish, alter or abolish such
corporations, seems to be a principle inherent in the very nature of the in-
stitutions themselves, since all mere municipal regulations must, from the
nature of things, be subject to the absolute control of the government. Such in-
stitutions are the auxiliaries of the government, in the important business of
municipal rule, and cannot have the least pretension to sustain their privileges
or their existence, upon anything like a contract between them and the Legis-
lature ; because there can be no reciprocity of stipulation, and because their
objects and duties (and, it may be added, the advantages and disadvantages
of their continuance,) are incompatible with everything of the nature of com-
pact." [Ang. and A. on Corp., sec. 31 ; McKim vs. Odom, 3 Bland. Ch. R. (Md)
417.] " The framers of the Constitution (said Chief Justice Marshall) did
not intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions
adopted for internal government." "If the act of incorporation be a grant
of political power, if it create a civil institution to be employed in the gov-
ernment," * * " the Legislature of the State may act according to its own
judgment, unrestrained by any limitation of its power, imposed by the Constitu-
tion of the United States. [Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat.,
518.]
I am aware, the act of the Legislature repealing all former laws, contains
the just and proper proviso, " that no rights acquired, contracts made, or suits
pending shall be affected thereby." But this proviso cannot apply to any
imaginary contract, or obligation to continue the old Mexican towns or local
governments, for reasons already given. It could apply to no suits, then
existing. And the only other subject of the proviso is, that " no rights" shall
be affected thereby. But it needs no argument to prove, that the "rights"
referred to, must be construed to mean legal rights, and not to mere com-
munity or public rights, conceded by a former government, from considerations
of public policy, and affording the inhabitants of all its towns and villages, the
right in common, to get wood, and pasture, on lands reserved by the former
government for that purpose.
It is manifest, if any such rights must be retained at all, on the ground that
their abolition would impair the obligation of a contract, or the rights of
property, then they must continue forever, as they did exist under the
Mexican laws. Because, if they canot be changed nor taken away by the
State Constitution, and State Legislature, they certainly cannot be by this
Court, nor by a sheriff's or constable's sale, on an execution.
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It seems equally plain, that if rights were established under the general laws
of Mexico, of the nature contended for, they were not personal rights, in the na-
ture of private property. For, as we have already seen, they were not affected
by death, nor absence of persons ; nor could they be granted, or conveyed to
another, or sold under execution, or be in any manner incumbered, or dealt in,
or disposed of, as private property. And we have seen by numerous laws,
here shown to the Court—and it is part of the history of this country—that
the Mexican Government both did, and could, dispose of such lands. And
if Mexico could do so, could not the United States and this State do the same
thing? Are not our laws sufficient to govern us? Can we not adopt a
system of local governments of our own, different from those of Mexico, and
incapable of holding vast tracts of our soil in idleness ? We have abolished
the Mexican system and all its laws. Is our sovereign and national action
void, because some former rights of former local political governments have
been disturbed ? . The laws previously existing here, were unknown to us.
Our people even yet have generally only vague and erroneous notions of the
systems of town and district governments which prevailed under Mexico.
They had never lived under any such systems, or any such laws, and they
refused to do so. They abolished them all, and adopted laws and systems of
local government which they understood. Had they no right to adopt laws
and systems of government of their own ? Both laws, and both systems
cannot stand nor be continued, together. They are totally incompatible with
each other. Which are best for us, and which shall prevail ? Which are
most constitutional with this tribunal ? By the treaty with Mexico, the in-
habitants of this country were to be thenceforth governed by our laws, and
our constitutions. And all others being abolished and repealed, all com-
munity titles, and all community rights, ceased with the laws which created
them, except to the precise extent to which they have been revived, and con-
tinued, under our own laws and our own systems of government. This is as
true of the local governments of this country, as of the greater government
over the whole country. And one has been as completely extinguished as
the other.
PAET XIV.
THE EXECUTION SHOWN IN THIS CASE, AND ON WHICH THE
RESPONDENTS CLAIM ALSO DEPENDS, WAS ISSUED WITH-
OUT AUTHORITY OF LAW, AND IS VOID.
The acts of public officers selling lands (said Chief Justice Marshall) should
be examined by purchasers before they buy titles so passed. If the validity
of such a deed (he continued, in effect) depends on an act in pais, the
purchaser is as much bound to prove the performance, and show the legality,
of the act in pais, as he would be if it were part of his written chain of title.
The acts of the officer selling, and the authority he had to undertake to
transfer a legal title to lands, " forms a part of the purchaser's title, and is a
link in the chain which is essential to its continuity." [Williams vs. Peyton,
4 Wheat. 77.] No sale by a sheriff will affect the title to lands not subject to
sale under the execution. [Hewson vs. Deygert, 8 J.R. at p. 334.] "No case
admits a title in the purchaser when the sheriff acted without authority" to
sell. And " the proof of a purchase at sheriff's sale, without showing authori-
ty" sufficient in law, to authorize the sale [besides showing a title in the
judgment debtor] gives no title to the purchaser. [Carter vs. Simpson, 7 J.
R. 335.] An execution irregularly issued is a nullity. [Reade vs. Markle, 3
J.R. 525.]
The judgment debtor in this case, was a peculiar body, differing entirely
from all ordinary persons and all business corporations. It was a corporation
only to exert political power, and asssist the State to govern its inhabitants.
It was that kind of a corporation which the old Supreme Court of New York,
said—" More nearly resembles the Legislature [or government] of an inde-
pendent State, acting under a constitution prescribing its powers." [Denning
vs. Roome, 6 Wend. 651 ; 4 Cowen and Hill's Notes, 264.] In organization,
in theory, in design, in the legal means of proceeding, and in the manner of
supporting its officers, and paying its obligations, the city of San Francisco
was a political state. In ancient times, it would have been called a state,
instead of a city. [Aristotle's State.] In modern times, and by common law
writers, it has been called a "little republic." [l Bl. Com. 468.] We call
it a city, which is but another name for a state, as originally understood.
[Aristotle, Plato's Republic, B. 2 D.] It is no more an ordinary corporation,
in any sense, than were the governments of each of the " original thirteen
States," prior to their independence. They were of the same class of depend-
ent political corporations. [V. 1 Bl. Com. 108.] Our Constitution expressly
commanded the State Legislature to create such subordinate corporations, as
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essential organs of the main State corporation. [Vide Art. 4, sec. 37.] Our
whole government is but a system of corporations within corporations. This
judicial department of which we are all. members, is, in a limited sense, a
corporation.
Cities are usually more important organs of the State government, than
counties. They have more dense and difficult populations to govern, and
hence are given stronger local corporations or governments.
In the natural order of populations, States do not beget cities, but cities
are the mothers of States. Cities are claimed to have been the schools of free
governments, and the originators of free States. [See Ang. & A. on Cor.
sees. 16, 17, 18, 22.] Cities are not only not subject to the same liabilities,
or the same legal powers, as business corporations, but they are not at all of
the same nature. A statute regulating judicial proceedings on execution
against corporations, I submit, can no more be fairly construed to refer to
the cities, counties, or towns of the State government, ex vi termini, than to
the state government itself, supposing it also had been authorized to be sued.
Because these local governments are all but parts of one and the same gen-
eral political plan of State government. [3 Stephen's Com. 170, 191 ; 2
Kent 275, 305.] If the local governments of cities are more complete cor-
porations than the local governments of counties, it is only because their more
dense populations seem to require it. \V. 1 Bl. Com. sup. ; 1 Kyd Municipal
Cor. 15 ; Ang. <fe A. Cor. sees. 4 and 5.] The former county of San Francisco,
was a corporation over the same lands included in the city corporation ; and
could sue and be sued, under the name of the " Board of Supervisors," etc.
[Laws 1851, p. 322, sec. 7.] And the identical corporation, which was then
by name an incorporated "city" of this State, is now nothing more and noth-
ing less, than a strictly incorporated "county" of this state. [Laws 1856, p.
145, sees. 1 and 6.] Because our constitution compels every portion of the
State to be in some county. And where there is but one local government,
it must be a county, no matter what name be given to it. [Con. Cal., Art.
4, sees. 4. 5, 30 ; Art. 6, sees. 1, 7, 8, 9 ; Art. 11, sees. 1, 5 ; "Schedule,"
sec. 14.] Any and all our counties, I believe, can be sued, and judgments
can be obtained against them, the same as against cities. [Wood's Digest
Cal. p. 697, sec. 24.] But the right to obtain a judgment does not carry
with it, ex vi termini, the right to an execution and sale of the debtor's lands,
to enforce it. That right to sell a judgment debtor's lands, does not exist at
common law, even in cases of judgments against individuals. [Comyns' Dig. c,
c. 2 ; 4 Kent, 429.] There are many cases still, where the right to obtain a
judgment is perfect, but the right to an execution sale of the debtor's lands,
does hot follow. Where the right to an execution sale of lands exists, it is
expressly given by statute, and is by statute particularly provided for, as so seri-
ous a proceeding should be. It is contrary to the common law, I repeat, to
sell lands on execution. And therefore, we insist, where it is not expressly
authorized and provided for by statute, it does not exist. At present, it is a
bad law in itself. And where statutes give remedies contrary to the modes
of the common law, such statutes must be construed strictly, not loosely. And
the remedy cannot be enlarged and extended to cases not expressly mentioned,
or unavoidably included in the statute. [Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195.] The
statute authorizing the city of San Francisco to be sued, and judgments to be
obtained against it, gave no new right. That right to sue and obtain judg-
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ment against such local governments, would have been just as perfect if the
statute had not mentioned it. It is not a right created by statute, it is given
by the common law. [1 Bl. Com. 475; 3 ib. 418, 419; Comyns' Dig.
"Franchise," F. 10 ; 2 Kent, 275, 281]. It is also expressly declared in our
State Constitution. [Art, 4, sec. 33.] But does that right give the further
and statute right to sell lands on execution ? Most clearly not. Municipal
corporations, says Kent, such as counties, cities, and towns, exist only for public
purposes. They are the mere creatures of the legislative will, existing, not
for themselves, but solely for the public. [See 2 Kent, 275, 306, 283.] It
is plain—for the constitution so authorizes, and their charters so provide
—
that they are to pay their debts and current expenses- by " their power of
tjaxation" and "assessments." [Con. Art. 4, sec. 37.] If any different pro-
cess is to be resorted to, at the pleasure of creditors and county clerks, the
law should be plain and careful which should leave it to them, and not to the
Legislature or the city, to determine when and how its debts should be paid.
Debts owing by our local political governments, are public debts, to be paid by
public taxation on the property within them, as only public debts can usually
be paid. If they are to be paid in any other manner, it seems to me most man-
ifest, that the law must first make express provision for such other manner.
I most seriously question the power of the State Legislature, to provide that
the debts of our local governments shall not be paid by public " taxation "
and " assessment," but only by" sheriff's and constable's sales, on executions, so
long as any property can be found. Because, such a system of paying their
debts, though appropriate in cases of individuals, and business corporations,
would not be at all appropriate to corporations not allowed to engage in
merchandise, or trade, to make money
; but designed to assist and protect its
people in doing so ; and dependent on their contributions for its support.
" Each city," says our Constitution, " shall make provision for the support of
its own officers, subject to such restrictions and regulations, as the Legislature
may prescribe." [Art. 11, sec. 9.] The Legislature did restrict and regulate,
and the city, in this case, did provide " for the support of its own officers,"
by taxation; and as to all its debts, contracted prior to April 15th, 1851, by
giving its bonds with interest, also to be paid by taxation, as provided in the
law. That was what the law expressly provided for this identical creditor,
who is the respondent in this case. What authority was there for this cred-
itor and the clerk of the court, to collect this debt in a manner contrary to that
which the law did expressly provide for him ? It cannot be pretended, that
there was any statute authorizing him to have execution, and sell the lands
of the city of San Francisco. "What he claims is, that he had the right to an
execution and sale, by inference, and merely because he had procured a judg-
ment against the city, and because by a general statute law of the State, an ex-
ecution and sale is allowed to those who hold a judgment. But this judg-
ment debtor was not a corporation, nor a person bearing the remotest resem-
blance to the persons against whom executions were authorized by said gen-
eral law. This debtor was a body created by a special law, and subject to a
special law. That special law makes no provision, and gives no authority to
any body to collect demands against it by executions. But it expressly pro-
vided, that all such demands should be paid by the bonds of the city, and the
State again repeated that command by another law passed May 1st, 1851,
expressly for that purpose. [Act to fund the floating debt, etc., still in force,
and repeatedly upheld by this court. Laws of 1851, p. 387.]
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The execution was issued in this case, in 1851, and it must be decided by
the laws as they then stood. We demand the production of the law, which
authorized this judgment creditor to have the execution, or the clerk to issue
it, under which he procured this sheriff's sale of four hundred acres of city
lots for fifty dollars. We deny that any such law or authority existed. We
insist that it was a plain and unwarrantable departure from the provisions
made by law ; and that the constitutional power of this Court cannot now
make such proceedings valid, be the consequences what they may. If they
are to be made valid, the legislative power must be invoked for that purpose.
No such power exists here.
There was not only no authority for issuing the executions in these cases,
but I submit, not even a rational or just apology or excuse, for so doing.
They were not issued by mistake, for we must presume the law was well
known. And nobody is entitled to the consideration of innocence, who has
purchased into the speculations they have created ; for they all knew the
law, and knew not only that no law did authorize, but that no law could
authorize such proceedings, without endangering the usefulness and destroying
the harmony and dignity of our political system of State governments. And
besides, the subsequent dealers in these deeds so acquired, where they have
never had possession of the land, show themselves, on the face of the papers,
to be merely champertous speculators. And speculators in lands in the
peaceable possession of others, can have no rights, except such as the laws
clearly and unavoidably compel the Court to concede. Their claims are
not so superior in equity and so far preferred in law, that the rights of others
must be wrested from them, and the laws themselves be violated and set at
defiance, in order to make good their speculations. I beg to submit a few
words more on this point, and even at the hazard of some repetitions ; for I
regard this point alone, aside from the many others, as fatal to all such sales
as these.
It is an axiom in law, that public debts are not private debts. It is a
maxim of our law, that the individuals under a municipal corporation " do
not owe what the corporation owes." (Maxim, " Si quid universitate
debetur, singulis non debetur ; nee quod debet, universitas singuli debentP
It is also settled law, that the debts of a city can be "totally extinguished
by its dissolution." [1 Bl. Com. 484; 2 Kent, 307; Con. of Cal., Art. 4,
sec. 31, on which provision v. Ang. and A. on Cor. sec. 767 at p. 803.]
Persons do not trust such bodies as they do individuals, or business corpora-
tions. These bodies are totally distinct from the business world. They exist
" only for 'public (not at all for private) purposes." They are not designed to
subserve private interests, and they cannot be forced to do so, without a vio-
lation of principle and right. When trusted at all, they are trusted
solely on the "public faith and credit, just as the State itself is trusted. We
all know this to be true. All talk about " how then will you force them
to pay their debts," has no more to do with the subject, than to ask how we
will force the counties to pay their debts, and the State to pay its debts. All
such debts are public debts. And if, in any instance, the public owing them
does not pay them, application for relief must be made to the Legislature, not
to the Courts. And such has been the course pursued at every session of
the Legislature, since the State was organized. The right to sue in our
Courts, is given against all persons and all bodies whatever capable of making
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a contract, with the single exception of the State itself. Attachments, exe-
cutions, and forced sales, are given where merely private individuals and
private interests are involved ; but never where the people in their public
and political relations are concerned. It is by their own authority, and no
other, that any process can be issued against any body. [Con., Art. 6, sec.
18.] And it seems against principle, for the people of the State to issue
execution against themselves, or any portion of themselves, in their merely
political relations. These corporations are only intended to enable the people
in their respective limits, to have somebody attend to those interests among
them which are common to them all, and to protect them all while attending
to their own business. We insist, they ought neither to be treated, nor thought
of, nor are they thought of in the law, as mere business corporations, or
private persons. Indeed they are, manifestly, exceptions from all ordinary or
private corporations ; and are so expressly indicated in our Constitution. [Art.
4, sec. 31.] Their creation by the Legislature, and their making contracts,
does not prohibit them from being abolished, nor their contracts from being
virtually annulled ; because even their existence or their continuance at all,
creates no contract, " within the purview of the Constitution." They consti-
tute, " in reality but one party." And their officers who make any contracts,
or contract any debts, " are merely trustees for the people, and act " for public
purposes only? [People vs. Morris, 13 Wend., 325 ; 2 Kent, 305, 306.]
In the poetry of lawyers, they are " the Flowers of Sovereignty ;" and the
power which wholly creates, can totally annihilate them. \V. Comyn's Dig.
"Franchise" (G-.) ] There can be no question of the power of the Legisla-
ture to determine how their debts shall be paid ; nor can there be any
question, that private persons and clerks of courts, or other officers in pursuit
of fees, cannot determine how such public debts shall be paid. Nor can
there be any question, that when the State has provided a way to pay such
public debts, the creditor must accept it, or go without being paid. The
State having provided, by act of May 1st, 1851, that all debts and demands
against the city of San Francisco, " due, or the consideration whereof accrued
prior to May 1st, 1851," [sec. 2 of said Act,] should be funded, and the
principal and interest thereof paid by a special tax, [sec. 4, ib.,] the officers
or trustees of the corporation could not pay this creditor in a different man-
ner ; then how is it, that he could help himself to pay in a different manner ?
The law should be plain indeed, to authorize such conduct. Nor does there
seem to be any doubt, that where the law makes special provision for the
payment of particular debts, the general laws of the State on the same subject
do not apply. [Titcomb vs. Union Ins. Co., 8 Mass. R. 326 ; People vs.
Morris, 13 Wend., 325.] The necessary existence of contracts with corpo-
rations, is the very reason why they should be liable to be sued. For the
power to make contracts should subject those who make them to their strict
fulfillment. And where a failure ensues, some mode must be provided for
trying the case and settling the damages, independently of the will of the
failing party. The right to sue, therefore, is not only proper but necessary,
and has always existed ever since corporations have existed. But the par-
ticular privilege of every judgment creditor of a municipality, to stay away
from its public treasury, or avoid application to its officers for some orderly
and proper arrangements for liquidating his demand, and after getting a
judgment, to obtain an execution from a clerk or a justice of the peace for
9
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a sheriff or a constable, as the case may be, and then levy on and dispose of.
the public graveyards, and parks and school-houses, and all public buildings
and other property acquired by our people in their public relations, and
thus attempt to force payments against communities, and keep them subject
to the whims, revenge or speculating schemes of a single individual ; is a
thing unknown and unheard of under "the common law of England." And
if there is any statute of this State, authorizing and providing for such sales,
under any circumstances, for public debts, and whether the public property
be expressly exempted from execution or not, we ask that the statute may
be produced, or specified, in order that the country may see it, and change it.
We insist, there is no statute in this State, and never has been, authorizing
clerks of courts and justices of the peace to issue executions to sheriffs and
constables, and sell the public property of a political community, and transfer
the title of it to purchasers at such sales, in the manner which has been con-
tinually practiced in San Francisco, since these Peter Funk sales were be-
gun. It is plainly contrary to principle, and to justice ; and has been, from
the beginning, a continual violation of special and continual acts of the Leg-
islature, making provision for the debts of that corporation ; all which special
laws have been knowingly and intentionally disregarded, not because those
special laws were insufficient for the just relief of such creditors, but for the
sole purpose of engaging in these sweeping and most iniquitous speculations.
And now upon what conceivable principle of honor, or law, should this
Court be called upon to excuse and uphold, such attempted plunder of public
and private property ? Where is the law authorizing it to be done ? The
Practice Act cannot be read without seeing that its provisions authorizing
execution, have no application nor allusion to "The People" of a place
incorporated for purposes of government, as at San Francisco. [Ministers,
etc. vs. Adams, 5 J. R. 347.] Besides, it has been abundantly shown that
such a corporation cannot hold lands for purposes foreign to its institution.
There is no proof in this record that these identical lands, if held by the
city, were not held for public purposes only. And we insist, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, the presumption of law must be, that they were
held strictly for public purposes. And this strengthens the view, that, all
the lands it held, must be deemed, in law, to have been held by or in the
name of the corporate body, purely as a trustee for the public. [2 Kent, 306,]
And the idea that such trusts can be defeated, by a constable's or sheriff's
sale, with no statute expressly authorizing such a proceeding, seems too absurd
to need argument. [Wood vs. San Francisco, 4 Cal. 190; Munroe vs.
Thomas, 5 Cal. 470 ; Thomas vs. Armstrong, 7 Cal.] In New York, [2
Revised Statutes,] in Louisiana, [Civil Code,] and no doubt in other States
where executions are tolerated against political institutions, it will be found
such conduct, where allowed at all, is under special provisions of statute law.
Be the law what it may in other States, there is no statute law of this State
providing, that whenever a judgment is obtained against a municipal corpo-
ration, it may be enforced the same as against a pecuniary or business cor-
poration, or that it may be enforced at all, by ordinary execution. No
statute law of this State ever has been, or ever ought to be passed, allowing
executions and sheriff's and constable's sales, against our local political gov-
ernments. And so long as there is no statute, making provision for such
executions and such sales, it seems plain, that where ground for complaint
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exists, application must be made to the Legislature. Such institutions in this
State, are peculiarly the creatures of the Legislature ; and the statutes are
full of special laws providing for the payment of their debts. As to these
special laws, concerning this local government or political corporation at
San Francisco, see Laws 1851, p. 361, sections 14, 15 ; ib. pp. 387 to 391.
Laws 1852, p. 197, also p. 201. Laws 1855, p. 259, sec. 32; also pp. 285
to 287. Laws 1856, pp. 172, 173, 174, also 167. Laws 1857, 153, 255,
201. Laws 1858, pp. 183 to 190, also special Act, p. 191, also 235 "First"
et seq. Laws 1859, pp. 64, 87, and 157, 158. Now, with all these special
laws providing for the payment of debts, and of judgments against that local
government, and with no statute laio providing for forced sales against the
special corporation of San Francisco, by constables and sheriffs, on execu-
tions, where is the authority for issuing such executions ? There is no such
laio to befound in any statute of this State, nor can the Practice Act of 1851,
by fair and legal construction, be made to include executions against such
special bodies, created by special laws, and for peculiar and solely political
objects. And, of course, no such right exists at common law, or in equity.
It would then be by writ of sequestration. [Ang. and A. Corpo. sees. 670, 673 ;
Comyns' Dig. "Franchise" (F. 19.) There was precisely as much authority
to issue attachments, as executions, against " The People of the city of San
Francisco constituted a body politic.'1 '' [Laws '51, p. 357, sec. 1.] If an execu-
tion could be levied against it, "the same as against an individual," then, an
attachment could be. And in that case the institution could be closed, and
its public offices placed in the hands of keepers. Why not? It either is to
be treated the same as a mere individual, or money corporation, or else it is
not. Those who say it is to be so treated, must apply the law as if such
were really the case. What right have they to say, it is to be deemed
applicable just far enough to uphold sweeping schemes of fraud and wrong,
but no further ?
PAET XV.
THIS COURT HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO DECIDE
ANY CASE CONTRARY TO LAW, NO MATTER WHAT THE
PRETEXT, NOR WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES.
And this brings me to the concluding part of my argument. How far can
judicial errors be continued, on the ground that they have been previously
committed ? This involves, I submit, the extent of the constitutional powers
of this Court. Can this Court undertake to enforce erroneous decisions
where they come in conflict with any law or legal right ? What question
could be more interesting to all of us, as lawyers, as well as citizens ? And
what subject is of more moment, or is more important to be distinctly settled
and understood ?
I regret, most deeply, my inability to present the subject in the manner I
would like to see it presented, and in the manner its great seriousness and
importance requires. And I am aware that to address Your Honors as to the
powers and obligations of this Court, seems like speaking to gentlemen con-
cerning their own rights and their own authority, or at least it has something
of the embarrassment of personality ; because it is difficult to address the
Court, without thinking of those who constitute its visible organization. And
it is hard to refer to errors without an effort of the mind to inquire who com-
mitted them.
Chief Justice Field—" You certainly need have no hesitation in speaking
freely of the powers of this Court."
Mr. Justice Baldwin—"Of course, we expect your language will be respect-
ful."
Most undoubtedly, Your Honor.
But, in order that all of us may be relieved from every embarrassment, and
from every imagined reflection and allusion of a personal nature, I beg leave
to speak of the powers of the Court as of the powers of an institution of our
government, of which we are all brother members and all sworn officers, and
of which Your Honors are admittedly the leaders, and the honored and re-
spected presiding officers. I have no new ideas to advance, but I beg the
indulgence of the Court to recall those which are not new. For what we
desire is, that this Court will continue the noble task of returning this State
to the rules and principles which are old, and quickly relieve us from our
headlong career, under rules and principles which are not merely new and
untried, but are opposed to those which are old, and have stood the severe
tests of ages of experience. And as we have every reason to believe that
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some former decisions of this Court will be relied upon by the respondent
more than either law or evidence, we beg the Court to allow us free scope
in the argument, and, as before, free reference to familiar principles. An
aged and profound English jurist of our own times, Sir Fortunatus Dwarris,
in his recent and very learned general treatise on the written law, says : It is
a remarkable fact, that in an enlightened age, and among so many intelligent
inquiries into the philosophy, both of history and of law, so little attention
should have been paid to this important question : What are the principles
on which the jurisprudence of a country ought to proceed ? [Dwarris on
Statutes, 694.] "Our ancient (English) institutions" (said a committee of
the House of Commons, as quoted by Dwarris) " having been adapted to a
rude and simple state of society, the Courts, in later times, gradually became
sensible of defects of jurisdiction and other inconveniences, to which the
altered circumstances of the nation had naturally given rise. In some cases
the remedy was supplied by legislative regulations ; but where this was
wanting, the judges were apt to resort to fiction, as an expedient for effecting
indirectly what they had no authority to do directly. But to whatever cause
legal fictions are assignable, we have no doubt that they have an injurious
effect in the administration of justice, because they tend to bring the laiv itself
into suspicion with the public, as an unsound and delusive system ; and the
natural effect is a tendency to degrade the law in popular estimation." The
same observations, says Dwarris, should be applied " to all instances of in-
genuity employed (by judges) in contrivances to evade "laws." [Dwarris,
7 12.
"| Stare decisis is merely a fiction or dogma, created by English courts,
to avoid the disturbance of questions after they had become settled by their
decisions. It is part of an old verse
—
" Stare decisis et non quieta movere."
"To stand by precedent, and not disturb what has been quieted." [ V. Bouv's
and Burrill's Law Dies.] The intention of the rule is, to prevent decisions
which unsettle and disturb the '•'settled and fundamental doctrines of the law"
To apply this rule to uphold new decisions made at this day, in plain and di-
rect violation of the settled rules of property, of law, and of legal evidence, es-
\ tablished by unbroken series of decisions for ages before, is applying the rule to
justify its own violation. But this rule cannot be invoked to uphold the de-
cisions of which we complain, for other, and, perhaps, still more serious
reasons.
I submit it would be a fatal error for us, under our constitutions, to resort
to English precedents to justify a repetition, in our courts, of the early Eng-
lish practice and experience as to the doctrine of adhering to decisions.
When such precedents were being established in England, the government of
that country was very rude and imperfect. Its legislation then consisted in
mere generalities or declarations of general principles, making it imperative
on the courts to supply details and omissions in the laws. [Dwarris, 705,
706.] At one time, the House of Parliament was held to give its assent to
laws before they were written, by petitioning the King for statutes on speci-
fied subjects. If the King granted the petitions, he directed his judges to
write out the laws, and whatever the judges wrote, constituted the laws on
the given subjects. [Dwarris, 34-5-6-7—8.] In the beginning of those ages,
you remember, judicial duties were always in theory, and sometimes in fact,
performed by the Executive, i. e. the King. And judicial decrees, like mer-
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chandise, were bought and sold. And the King used to send out his justices
upon their circuits, not to administer laws, but actually to make and to col-
lect revenue, [lb., 33, 39; 1 Reeve's His. Eng. L. 205, 206; Creasy Eng.
Con. 45 et seq. ; Stephen's De Lolme, 47.] About 1272, the Judges "were
sent through the kingdom not to punish offenders, but to compound with
them; not to execute justice, but to collect fines." [Stephen's ibid., p. 81.]
Many ages afterwards, even in the 17th century, English Judges, openly
and upon the Bench, treated Magna Charta itself, with expressions of ineffable
contempt. [Dwarris, 35, note.] Property, life, and liberty itself were still
under the control of the English judges almost down to the beginning of the
18th century. And, previous to that period, their powers were so undefined,
and deemed so unbounded, that they undertook to punish men with death by
mere rules of court. An instance is given where all the judges agreed, that
in any case before them, " a man who should challenge thirty-eight jurors
should be hung." [lb. 804, 805.] But the English posterity of the judges
of those times neither tolerate, follow, nor excuse their examples. They ac-
cuse them of having acted " contrary to law." [4 Bl. Com. 449.] They
charge them with having rendered valid laws ineffectual, in order to gratify
their own opinions, and please suitors whom they preferred. [Dwarris, 809.]
They charge them with having perpetrated judicial acts " on which," in the
language of Dwarris, " it is needless and would be disgusting to dwell." [lb.
815.] The Earl of Clarendon, a judge of probity, and once Lord Chancel-
lor, who wrote about 1670, bitterly complained of the courts of England, for
urging "reasons of State (i. e. public policy) as elements ©f law." And for
rendering "judgments of law grounded on matters of fact, of which there was
neither inquiry nor proof" [F. note ib. 35, 36.] And Clarendon declared,
in effect (and who can feel that it is without force in our own times and
State.) that the judges were less to blame than unprincipled lawyers, who
surrounded them and gave them countenance and support, and who, hoping
for favors themselves, urged on the judges to the perpetration of illegal acts.
\_V. ibid., and Hist. Rebellion, p. 153, and^assm.]
Not the conduct of the people, nor their representatives, but of the King's
judges, who obeyed not the will of the law but the will of individuals, per-
haps, tended most, of all other causes put together, to introduce the Revolu-
tion of 1688, with nearly universal joy. [ V. Creasy Eng. Con. 272, 273, 278.]
Our own ancestors, who originated the plan on which this Court is organ-
ized, were the posterity and countrymen of the very men of those times. Can
it be supposed they were forgetful of the always present dangers of the judi-
cial power ? Can it be questioned that they intended to constitutionally pro-
hibit and render without obligation, all judicial acts not authorized by pre-
existing laws ?
England no longer tolerates what too many of us seem to regard as within
the constitutional power of our courts. Is England farther advanced than we
in the true science of administrative justice ? If she is to be so regarded,
the fault is in our Courts, not in our p>olity. King's Bench once held that
" judges have power over laws, to mould them to the truest and best use, ac-
cording to reason and best convenience." [Sheffield vs. Ratcliff, Hobart R.,
346.] But the doctrine seems to be now firmly established in England, that
their courts have no power at all over the laws. To admit they have, says
Dwarris, would be equivalent to admitting that " the Legislature had abdi-
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cated its functions, and delegated all its powers and duties to the judges."
[Dwarris, 617.] And he avows it as now the best law, in England, that in
every case the laws in force, as well the settled principles of the unwritten
laws as the statute laws, must be administered as they are settled. And if
any change whatever is to be made in either the common law or the statute
law, the legislative power alone is authorized, and responsible, for the altera-
tion, or its refusal. If any changes whatever are to be made in the pre-
viously settled laws, or any deficiencies to be supplied, or any mistakes to be
corrected, the legislative power, say the present courts of England, " is al-
ways at hand" to perform that duty. And if the legislative power neglect to
do it, that affords no authority nor excuse for the courts to perform their
functions. For a usurpation of authority by a court of justice is neither
necessary nor justifiable, since the country has organized more numerous and
more appropriate bodies to determine, in all cases, what policy shall be pur-
sued and what the laws shall be. The Executive can attempt to make or
change the law, or refuse, in any instance, to enforce it, under the same pre-
tense, and with the same right and authority as the judges. [V. Creasy, pp.
4 and 287 ; also, ibid sup. and pp. 584, 587, 595, 597.] They have nothing
whatever to do with questions of public policy, or with the consequences of
enforcing the laws, as they find them. Each department of the government
must perform its own duties only, and leave the others to perform theirs
;
and neither can be held responsible for what does not appertain to their own
office. If the consequences be severe in any case, they alone are responsible
who had the authority to avert them.
All pleas of policy, and all talk of consequences, belong elsewhere. The
only question to be tolerated, or listened to, in courts of justice, should be
:
What is the law ? Bad consequences invariably and only result, when settled
laws are violated, or evaded ; never when they are adhered to and obeyed.
At this age of jurisprudence, and in this constitutional government, the
doctrine is intolerable, that courts of justice sometimes find a "necessity,"
for disregarding the settled law.
I am aware that American-hating Mansfield, [Story's Life and Let. vol. 2,
pp. 12, 20, 21,] made laws on the bench, in England, since the revolution of
1688, and as late as the time of our own grandfathers. But although he
claimed to do so, only where no previous laws existed to the contrary; and
although English judges, as we have seen and shall see, were not officers of a
written constitution, defining their powers ; still the example of Mansfield, is
no longer tolerated even in England. And he is accused of having usurped
authority, appertaining to the duties of Parliament. Such acts have already
seriously lessened the respect for his official character ; and will eventually
rise up, as sure as the vigils of truth are eternal, and be the very means of
dispelling the false lights, with which he sought to immortalize his judicial
fame. [Dwarris, passim, 708, 709, 595, 597.] When the memory of Mans-
field shall have been consumed by time, the fame of our own Marshall, will
blaze afresh
;
and his views in regard to the judicial power, will be revered
even in England itself. Truth alone, and nothing else in all this world, can
be continual and without decay. Since the time of Mansfield it has become
the settled doctrine in England, that the judicial power cannot be claimed to
be exclusively vested in either of the three departments of the English Gov-
ernment. What the judicial power is understood to mean in England, and
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hence what it means under our common law, is thus explained by high
authority : " The Constitution of England being a free constitution, demanded
from that circumstance alone, extraordinary precautions to guard against the
dangers which unavoidably attended the judicial power."
Hence " the judicial authority is not only placed out of the hands of the
man who is invested with the executive authority, but it is even placed out of
the hands of the judge himself." And not only the man trusted with the
executive power, cannot exert that executive power, until he has received
the permission of those who are set apart to administer the laws ; but those
who are set apart to administer the laws " are also restrained in a manner
exactly alike, and cannot make the law speak until, in their turn, they have
also received the permission" of the legislative power. And the legislative
power being thus the controlling power of all, is not permitted to remain
" a permanent body of men, who can have time to study how their power can
serve to promote their private views or interests ; but they are men selected
at once from among the people, and who were perhaps never before called
to the exercise of such a function, and cannot foresee that they shall ever be
called to it again."
"In fine," (says De Lolme), such is the happy nature of this plan of gov-
ernment, that the judicial power, a power so formidable in itself, a power
which is to dispose, without finding any resistance, of the property, honor, and
life of individuals ; and which, whatever precautions may be taken to restrain
it, must, in a great degree, remain arbitrary
;
(this judicial power) may be
said, in England, to exist—to accomplish every intended purpose—and to be
in the hands of nobody." [Stephens' De Lolme Eng. Con. p. 785.] The
learned Stephens adds to these explanations, simply this noble boast : " The
consequence of this is, that no man in England ever meets the man of whom
he may say, ' that man has a power to decide on my life or death.' " And,
with equal truth, it shall be added, in our country, " or on my right to my
property."
It will be seen from this explanation and this boast, that what is understood
in England, as the judicial power, means only this: the power of the law.
Where the law comes, all must give it sway and reverence, or else none are
bound to do so. For there are no exceptions, and none are exempt from
obedience. Blackstone does not mention the mere opinions of Judges, as
capable of making binding rules, even against themselves, much less against
the legal rights of others. It is not opinions, but judgments, which some-
times grow into precedents. And in the course of many ages, sometimes, and
when it is not for the sheer good of speculators instead of bona fide property
holders, their former judgments come to be accepted as rules of property,
important to be left undisturbed. But, I submit, no such effect should be
given even to judgments, when they are admitted, all along, to violate the
settled laws of the country, and especially when their longer continuance is
not necessary to protect property, but only necessary to build up new, sweep-
ing, and most iniquitous schemes of speculation. Stephens, in his introduc-
tion to De Lolme, says of a decision of the Court of Exchequer concerning an
import tax : " This was a most illegal decision, because it made the King su-
perior to the statute law." [P. 328.J I most respectfully submit, that the
Cohas vs. Roisin, and Welch vs. Sullivan decisions, are worse, because they
made the Judges superior to the law, and superior to all the laws at once, by
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disregarding the "settled and fundamental doctrines of law," and deciding
that a private title exists (to an indefinite extent) to the soil of this State,
without a jury and without evidence, and in a court where no jury is allowed
to sit, and where no evidence can be introduced.
"In all political governments," it has been most truly said, "no man
should be stripped of his honor, or his property, until after an impartial and
strict inquiry." It was lately said by Lord Campbell, in deciding an applica-
tion, to review a decision by an Archbishop against a clergyman, not merely
that it is the first principle in law, but " it is one of the first principles of nat-
ural justice, that no man shall be convicted without being first heard." Even
if the decision was right, said he, " it was wrongly made." And he adopted
the maxim of Seneca, that " he who decides against a party without hearing
him, though he decides justly, yet he is not just." [In. the matter of Poole
vs. the Archbishop of London, 1858.] What is it but condemning us without
a hearing, to seek to apply those mere decisions against us, which are now
being orally argued for the first time since they were commenced ! And to
which we were never parties. And in which cases, if titles have been made by
the decisions, let not those decisions be turned against us, whom they will con-
vict without a hearing, and whom they will ruin, for no want of law and of
evidence in our favor ; nor for any lack, or fault, or mistake of ours !
It is not the judgments, but the opinions of the justices, in the Cohas vs.
Roisin cases, of which we complain. This Court, as we all know, is bound to
render judgments according to law, but is not bound to deliver opinions.
This was decided, by this Court, in Houston vs. Williams, at the last April
term. It would seem that the opinions of the judges, do not constitute, in
England, a part of the legal records of the Court.'''' " At an early period of
our Constitution, (says Douglas,) the reasons of the judgment were set forth
in the record, but that practice has long been disused. [1 Douglas Reports,
Preface, p 5, note.] How then can this Court be deemed bound by opinions
of only a recent date, and almost universally admitted to be in violation of
law, when the law did not even render them necessary. " The Court must
exercise its own discretion, as to the necessity of giving an opinion upon pro-
nouncing judgment." [Houston vs. Williams, sup.) Such opinions may be
erroneous. They may be, once in a hundred years, like those in the Cohas
vs. Roisin cases, in the very teeth of the law. They may be bad by mistake
;
they may be wilfully bad. It would be monstrous to say, that such opinions,
when known, and admitted to be in violation of the settled laws of the coun-
try, must be obeyed. Judges, said Blackstone, " are bound by an oath to de-
cide according to the law." They are not bound by an oath to decide ac-
cording to previous opinions. The people are not bound to know judicial
opinions, nor even judicial judgments. They are bound to know and obey
the laws, and judgments of courts bind only those who are parties and privies
to the suits, wherein they are rendered. We often hear it said, that courts
make laws. And so they did in England during the early periods of which
we have spoken. But our American constitutions prohibit it. And, as we
have seen, and will further show, no such ideas now prevail, either in Eng-
land or America, that courts make laws, or that their opinions are of them-
selves laws. "The opinions of Judges are their reasons for their judgments."
[Houston vs. Williams, sup;] They " are, of great importance," (ib.) but
they are not of themselves laws. And the reports of such opinions, are pub-
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lie relations of what has been done in the courts, concerning controversies
there judicially determined ; and they constitute infallible guides for the ad-
judication of other, or future cases, unless shown to be contrary to law to
apply them to future cases. [V. Coke Litt. 293.] They are not referred
to, nor treated as laws, but as evidences of what the law was considered to be,
by those judges who wrote them, or followed them. But no court is actu-
ally bound by such opinions. What every court is bound by, and is sworn to
observe and adhere to, is the law.
And if the law and the judicial opinion, in any case, do not agree, it is the
opinion, not the law which must be disregarded. Opinions, not contrary to
law, may be adopted as the rule for deciding future cases, provided no law
will be violated by so doing, but not otherwise. The first inquiry is, what is
the law which governs this case? This case, I most respectfully submit, is not
to be decided according to the will and pleasure of any former members of
this Court, nor according to opinions of theirs in other cases, but it is to be
decided by the law. And former decisions cannot be, and in a new court
like this, ought not to be referred to, as things to be obeyed whether right or
wrong. No law, nor honorable obligation, requires any such thing, but they
require that they shall not be obeyed, when known to be wrong. An act
passed by the Legislature itself, and expressly requiring this Court to obey
former erroneous opinions, in the decision of these cases, would require to be
disobeyed, for it would tend to violate the solemn obligations of this Court to
decide all cases according to pre-existing law. "The will of the Legislature,
(says Kent,) is the supreme law of the land, and demands perfect obedience."
And though "the principle of the English Government, that the Parliament is
omnipotent, does not prevail in the United States, yet if there be no Consti-
tutional objection to a statute," it is as obligatory in our State, as is an Act of
Parliament in England. [ V. 1 Kent, 448.] If, then, an express act of the su-
preme legislative power, could not be of any obligation in compelling this Court
to follow erroneous decisions by its predecessors, how can the mere act of com-
mitting and continuing those errors, be of any actual obligation. A law passed
by the Legislature, requiring judges to follow all decisions of their predecessors,
would be plainly unconstitutional. The plan on which this Court is organ-
ized, the limitation of the terms of its judges to six years, and requiring
one to be elected every two years, was manifestly intended (though unwisely
designed) to protect the country against errors, not to allow errors to be con-
tinued. And not only this, but the constitutional oath of the judges seems to
prohibit them, from obeying decisions which they see and know to be in vio-
lation of the law. Judges, (says Blackstone,) " are sworn to determine,
(every case which comes before them) not according to their own private
judgments, but according to the known laws and customs of the land." They
have no authority, or to use his language, they a,re " not delegated, to pro-
nounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one." And he ex-
pressly repudiates the right, to follow precedents set by the Court, where
there are opposing precedents, set by the law. He declares it is unjustifiable
for courts to follow former decisions, " where the former determination is most
evidently contrary to reason, i. e. contrary to law, which is the perfection of
reason." This same concise and reliable "father of our English common law,"
says, it is " always " the " intention " of the common law " to conform with
reason."
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And he shows that the mere declaration of ajudge that law " is not law," has
no binding force ; it is reason, not assertions without reason, which is of binding
force. It is reason (not mere assertion,) which is able to declare " what is not
law." And when subsequent judges disregard even former judgments of the
Court, he says, " they do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the
old law from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is
manifestly absurd, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but
that it is not law, that is, that it is not according to the established custom of
the realm." [1 Bl. Com. 69, 70.] He boasts that while in other countries
judges can render judgments without respecting the laws, yet that in England
they cannot do it ; for according to the common law of England it is not courts
nor judges, but only the law itself, which can render valid judgments. And
the courts and judges are the mere instruments of the law, not to announce
their determinations, but to announce the previous determinations made by the
law. He says they cannot " make or new-model the law," but all they can
do, is " only to declare and pronounce it." [3 lb. 327.] Judgments, says the
same familiar authority, as to what the common law is : " Judgments are the
sentence of the law, (not the judges,) pronounced, (not made,) by the court,
(not by the judges,) and upon the matter contained in the record? not upon
statements for facts, made by the very judge himself who renders the judg-
ment, and with nothing to sustain him but the statements which he himself
makes. I most respectfully submit, that all judgments or decisions, involving
important questions of fact, like that of a corporation owning vast landed
estates, based upon no legal evidence in the record of the existence of such
ownership, are not legal judgments nor legal judicial decisions, excepting in
form, but are void for want of authority to so pronounce them. If they are
not void, then they may be rendered against law, against reason, against evi-
dence, against truth, and upon matters not contained in the record, and still be
valid. That is, whatever the judges chose to do and do is lawfully done, and
is obligatory upon their successors in office ! The great English authority from
whom I have just quoted, utterly repudiates the remotest verge of such doc-
trine. He insists throughout, that judges or courts, by means of any wills in
its judges, cannot render any judgment at all, in any case whatever ; and that
the law, and the law only is competent to render judgments ; and that the
judges are sworn to pronounce judgments on the evidence shown in each case
just as the law would pronounce them if the law could speak without their as-
sistance. The judgment, he most carefully and most emphatically reiterates
:
" The judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their
determination, nor their sentence, but the determination and sentence of the
law." [3 lb. 396.] If an erroneous decision be made, says Dwarris, is it
not too much to contend, (on any ground,) that it may not be corrected ? To
say, he insists, to say that an erroneous judgment, when brought before the
sworn judges of the land, sitting to administer justice according to law in all
cases, brought judicially before them, neither seeking nor declining, but only
conscientiously deciding questions which must be decided ; to say that a
judgment of which they, the recognized interpreters of the law, discover the
unsoundness, must be received as valid—must be allowed, adopted and en-
forced by the judges sworn to do right, and all the while perceiving this to
be wrong ! Is not this absurd and most unreasonable ? Is it not monstrous ?
[Dwarris, 113.] And this language is not used in reference to the imperious
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and sacred duty of a court of justice to correct its own errors, but concerning
the duty of a court to even reverse a decision by the court of the House of
Commons itself, (although it had undisputed jurisdiction,) in order that the
sway of the laws be rendered impregnable to all attacks from within the
government itself, as well as from without. Stephens, (in his Introduction to
De Lolme's English Constitution,) says : " The arbitrary discretion of any
man is the law of tyrants ; it is always unknown ; it is different in different
men ; it is casual, and depends upon condition, temper and passion ; in the
best it is often times caprice ; in the worst, it is every vice, folly and passion
to which human nature is liable." [Page 455.] The sacred, and of all others
the most important doctrine of the complete inviolability of the laws, was
aimed at in England by ages upon ages of dear-bought experience. For no
written constitution there devised it, as it has been devised with us. True, a
recent author, on the English Constitution and the " present distribution of
political power," in England, lays it down as the second cardinal doctrine of
that government, that " no law can be made or changed, except by consent of
Parliament." [Creasy, page 4.] And it seems also true, that Parliament
passed a law about 170*7, [4 & 5 Anne, c 16,] for the "better advancement of
justice," but apparently of little point and vague meaning. [Dwarris, 852.]
But no written law seems to ever have been passed, not merely prohibiting,
but expressly taking away all power in courts of law to exercise any control
whatever over the laws, as has been done (though not, perhaps, in the best
manner,) by our written constitutions. It follows from this, that the true
English doctrine of the power of courts, as just mentioned, (and, I submit,
the only doctrine which can be supported by any people who wish to enjoy and
not to talk of liberty,) was arrived at in England, by direct force of the suf-
ferings which were endured by its inhabitants until that doctrine was adopted
in the present century, and adhered to with the utmost rigor. Dwarris allud-
. ing to this subject, says, "it is certainly a remarkable fact, that the jurisdic-
tion or methods of proceeding in all our superior courts, (in England,) will
be discovered, on inquiry, to be founded in usurpation, and sanctioned by fic-
tion." [lb. 710.] But, I submit it would be a fatal error for an American court
to go back to the days of "judicial discretion" in England, to determine the
obligations of either an English or American court at the present day. The
days of "judicial discretion," as formerly understood, (as we have already
seen,) have long since passed in England. And in the United States, as we
shall see from the very highest authority, they have never existed since the
adoption of our written constitutions.
Our ancestors, whom Burke so highly complimented for their extraordinary
devotion to Blackstone, and whom we remember and revere, only because of
their implacable detestation of all official usurpers, and usurpations ; those
men whose experience we cannot forget with impunity, were especially alive
to the necessity of restrictions on the judicial power.
Fortunately for their endeavors, the dreadful experience of England, in
attempting to administer justice under a system of " wise judicial discretion;"
had brought her wisest jurists to openly deny, that any officer or court in the
kingdom had right or authority to make any rule or decision, or order any
judgment, or process, whereby any man should be deprived of his liberty or
his property, except in pursuance and by authority of previously existing
laws. And to crush "judicial discretion" out of existence, as to the final
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judgment, and the final process to be issued, in any suit, seems to have been
the earnest determination of the originators of our plans of government. The
powers of court, said one of their first constitutions, " shall be limited and de-
fined by express laws." [Con. N. H. 1*792.] Each individual has a right,
said another, to be protected by standing laws. [Con. Mass. 1780.] The
Constitution of North Carolina, of 1116, like others made during the same
period, avowed in terms, that no man shall be deprived of his property " but
by law," And that no power should exist to suspend the operation of the law,
except the Legislature. And all seem to have been determined, to adopt
strict governments of laws, not courts. And to insure this, they at once
completely separated the judicial department, from both the other depart-
ments of government, and vested it with no power at all, except only to apply
pre-existing laws to the cases brought judicially before it. The first sentence
of the first Constitution agreed to after the Declaration of Independence,
(that of Virginia, July 5th, 1776,) declared that the judicial department
should be " separate and distinct," from the others. The judicial department
was relieved of all care and responsibility, as to what the laws should be,
which they were to administer. That care and responsibility was devolved
exclusively on the other two departments, and carefully guarded and regu-
lated, as to its performance. And, in Virginia, maladministration was made
matter of impeachment, the same as corruption. That the courts could decide
laws to be in violation of the Constitution itself, was perhaps rather too loosely
conceded. But that they could disobey, or evade, or avoid faithfully admin-
istering any law, except on the ground that it was unconstitutional, was not
provided against, further than to deprive the courts of the power to do other-
wise, and to' swear their members to discharge their duties "agreeably to the
rules and regulations of the Constitution and the laws." [Cons. Mass., Con-
necticut, and perhaps other original States.] The greatest precautions were
taken, to insure that no few persons, nor persons long in office, should have
anything to do with preparing, improving, making, or changing the law in
any respect whatsoever. Whether all the precaution in this regard, was wise
or not, it proves conclusively, that not one iota of that power, was vested in
the judicial department, created for a totally different and distinct purpose.
To deprive those who were to administer the laws, of all power over them,
except to administer them, as they should find them ; was thought to be as
necessary, as to deprive those having control over the laws, from the power
of administering them. And by the law, was meant, as we shall see, " the
common law" as much as the statute law.
The Constitution of this State, as to this complete division of powers, is
only a reflex of the Constitutions established by our forefathers. And the
only power vested in this Court is the power to judge and decide, or " The
Judicial Power." ' That is, that most sacred, and morally sublime Power, of all
the powers which can be witnessed on this earth. That Power, which works
in silence, the machinery of the laws, and the daily government of enlightened
nations. That Power, which seems indeed to be but the reflex of that other
Supreme Power, which we are taught is to be next administered over our
race, by God Himself. It is a Power which cannot be moved by conse-
quences ; because it is not at all responsible for consequences. It foretells
what shall be the consequences of every outward human action against the
property or the rights of others. And they produce the consequences who
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act. The judicial power remains impassive and immovable. It is no more
in the hands of the judge, than in the hands of all the other inhabitants of
the State. It can see nothing, hear nothing, and understand nothing, but the
recorded and abstract facts, brought before it in the record of every suit.
And upon those facts, and those facts alone, the judicial power is to be exerted,
and the legitimate rewards and consequences which the laws had fore-ordained,
are to be applied, undisturbed and unprevented, by any act, or opinion, or
wish, or will, of the mere judge, chosen to be its oracle, %,nd not his own
oracle. If mercy be due in any case, the Government has provided the
means of exercising mercy. But not one iota of mercy is reposed in the
judicial power. The exercise of mercy, requires that it be reposed where
some discretion can be indulged. Our Constitutions therefore repose that
quality in the Executive, in all criminal cases. And in the Legislature with
the Executive, in all other cases. What our fathers sought to accomplish
above all things else, after they had achieved their independence, was a right
which they had previously but imperfectly enjoyed ; and which, to our own
disgrace, is better secured to-day, in England, than in most of our own States.
I mean, that right of rights : that right, without which there are no civil
rights : that right which alone produces liberty ; and without which, all talk
of liberty is a sham and a mockery : that right, which it was the special
glory and pride of our forefathers to assert and seek to achieve ; and which
it should be the glory of our age to consummate and complete ; I mean the
right, to be governed by laws ; not by any man nor set of men, however
numerous, or however few, but by laws alone. And not laws made by the
consent of those who are to administer them (for none but a God could be
safely intrusted with that power) ; but laws made beforehand, and by the
consent of those amongst whom they are to be administered. And not laws
either, which judges are merely required to administer, "without fear, favor,
or affection ;" but laws which they are required to administer, without the
power of exercising or inflicting either their fears, their favors, or their affec-
tions. To accomplish this, our Constitutions have removed from our Judges
all power whatsoever, which they could call their own, or make their own.
And have invested in incorporeal civil bodies, the application of that resistless
power contained in the pre-existing laws of the commonwealth. And the
judicial power, so invested in all our courts of justice, is that power which is
authorized to apply our pre-existing laws, and our laws only, to the decision
of judicial cases. Courts and Judges can have no more authority to disre-
gard the will of such laws, or to new-model, or change, or suspend that will,
than the ministers at our religious altars, can have, to change, new-model, or
suspend the will of their Maker.
And however much the judges or the ministers may err, the laws, as pre-
viously settled and agreed to, continue in force the same as before ; un-
changed by their errors, and unrepealed by any acts of those who have been
vested with no power to change or to remodel them. Now it is plain, that
the power contained in the Judicial Power, is only the power contained in The
Laws. Or, that the power which courts possess to decide cases, is that power
only which is contained within the pre-existing and fore-ordained laws. And
if this be the only power which courts do possess, they cannot decide cases
by any other rule or authority ; because they have never been vested with
the right to decide cases according to any rule or authority, not found in the
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pre-existing laws, to which all their authority is sacredly confined. And to
. make new rules for their decision, and adopt new principles for their guid-
ance, which pre-existing laws do not contain, would be making the court a
body which is capable of manufacturing its own powers ; and capable of pro-
ceeding, when it may choose to do so, independently of the pre-existing laws.
A court which could so proceed, when it has been given no authority so to
fdo, could accomplish it with equal propriety, if expressly prohibited from
doing it. Because to do that which there is no authority for doing, and
which the laws oppose being done, would be to do what is prohibited. But
the Constitution of this State, exercising extreme care, and going further
in language though not in plan, than most of our State Constitutions, not only
vests our courts with no authority at all, except what the law alone exercises
and requires ; but also prohibits them in terms from exercising any which even
"appertains" to any other functions of 'the government. [Arts. 3 and 6.]
This Court, I submit is an incorporeal body, the sphere of whose powers are
as clearly defined as the corporations of the Governor, and the two houses of
the Legislature, with this grand and most essential difference, that the latter
one can exercise discretion, and can do whatosever it chooses to do except
what it is prohibited from doing ; whilst this department cannot exercise any
discretion where the law is plain as to how it shall decide, in any case.
The right to act, which our courts possess, does not come from the com-
mon law, nor does it come from decisions which our courts have made, which
are, at best, but guides to ascertain the law. But for their right to act, our
courts must look to the Constitution and the law ; which is the supreme
authority in all cases, and under all circumstances. [V. 1 Kent, 339.] The
third article of our Constitution expressly prohibits this Court from exercising
any control whatever over the laws, except to administer them, as previously
settled and agreed to, wherever they are settled ; and in the same words
which prohibit the executive and legislative departments from exercising the
judicial power. There is no law of the State of California, except that intro-
duced by the Constitution, and the Legislature of California. Its Constitu-
tion, its statutes, and " the Common Law of England," which they introduced,
constitute the entire laws of this new State. If either or any of said laws
are to be changed in any respect, it must be done by legislative authority, as
a matter of course. And inasmuch as the Constitution has vested no legis-
lative authority in this. Court, and has expressly prohibited it from exercising
any, it is absurd to say its opinions or decisions constitute any portion of
" the laws " of California. As to the Constitution and the statutes, our reports
contain evidence of their construction and their application to actual cases.
And as to "the common law of England" our courts do not and cannot
make it for us, any more than they can make it for England. If it had been
intended that the decisions of this Court should constitute our common law,
or any law, except the law of the case decided, the Constitution would not
have expressly prohibited it from making any laws whatever. Its decisions
are not " the common law of England," and therefore they are not in force as
laws. Our people must not look to the decisions of this Court, to ascertain what
" the common law of England " is, any more than they must look here to as-
certain what our statute laws are. They must resort to the original sources,
and refer to our reports to assist in the investigation, not to dispense with it.
For our reports, on what the English common law is, must be received as
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reliable,- but not as conclusive authority. And when any decisions of tins
Court are shown, with certainty, to be contrary to the law of this State,
(whether the statute or the common law,) I insist this Court has no legal
right to decide new cases according to its own mistakes, but must decide
them according to the law. All talk about this course producing a want of
uniformity and reliability in our decisions, is on a par with applying the rule
of stare decisis to justify its violation. [Read 3 Bl. Com. 328 to 331.]
How can decisions become uniform and reliable, when they are allowed to
be made according to the will and pleasure of every officer who shall come
to preside in this Court? Nothing can be uniform and reliable in courts
of justice except the law. Therefore every decision of this new court, in this
new country, should be carefully tested by the law, not with reluctance, but as
the highest service to be rendered the court and the country. And when
the settled common law as to the '"manner and form of acquiring and trans-
ferring property," " the rules of expounding deeds and acts of Parliament,"
and " that real -property may be acquired and transferred by writing" only.
[See 1 Bl. Com., 68.] When these doctrines are violated, as in the Cohas
vs. Roisin, and Welsh vs. Sullivan decisions, uniformity and reliability require,
according to all principles and all authority, that such decisions should not
be suffered to subrogate such settled law. These views do not tend to lower
the dignity nor to lessen the power of this high tribunal, nor of any judicial
tribunal. It is not the assumption of new powers, but the capacity to dis-
charge well what it has, which exalts judicial tribunals. It is not the capacity
to go wild lengths to find modes of relief and rewards for mere violators of
law, but the firmness to convince the country that those only who rely on the
law shall not be disappointed, which constitutes judicial policy. It is not
adherence to mere personal power, but adherence to the mightier and wiser
power of the law, which alone becomes and proves the presence of the great,
far-seeing and wise judge. It is not the desire to be the Almighty God, but
the desire to imitate Him, which inspires the truest confidence in mortal
judges. But courts are not only absolutely, and by constitutional plan and
design, devoid of every vestige of power which they can call their own, and
possessed only of the authority of uttering the judgments previously prepared for
all cases by the laws;, but this very exclusion has carried with it an exclusion
from all power over evidence, and over facts. Laws have no power over the
creation of facts. Laws, to be laws, must be pre-existing. Facts to which
they can be applied must arise afterwards ; and out of the facts the law arires,
and pronounces its fore-ordained and foreknown judgments. [3 Bl. Com. 330.]
Decisions are not always the same. They must vary ; not from any variableness
in the law, nor in the courts, but because of the continual variableness of the
cases presented. The facts, first legally ascertained and certified in the record,
are what constitute the case. And there must be a case, legally presenting the
facts shown, by legal proof, before the law can pronounce its judgment. "Ex
facto jus oritur" says the maxim. Thus administered, the law is a science.
It concerns itself no more, about consequences when some few persons' prop-
erty is concerned, than when their lives are concerned. It knows no policy
equal to the unvarying application of its own foreknown and foreseen will,
and it sees no consequences so disastrous as to withhold the expression of its
own judgments and adopt judgments not its own. To gratify the views of
some transient and time-serving purpose, or some transient and scheming in-
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dividuals, or some incautious purchasers, forms no part of its plans, or its
intentions or purposes. On the contrary, any such undertaking is entirely in-
compatible with all the principles on which it proceeds. Because, it tends to
impair that impartiality which forms the entire basis on which the court is
established, and constitutes the very ground on which its judgments are entitled
to respect, and ought to be implicitly obeyed; and which impartiality is
necessarily impaired the instant the court strains the law, or wavers from it,
to uphold the claims of any one man or set of men, where the rights of others
may come in controversy to the same thing before the same tribunal. And
where the facts are not in favor of any claimants before the court, the
court has no power to make judgments to favor them. For courts cannot
create or change facts, any more than they can create or change laws. And
they can no more make cases, and then decide real cases, by the cases they
themselves have made, than they can make judgments on their own cases
and by their own rules.
It would be an easy matter to decide cases according to our own state-
ments of what the facts are, and what the laws are. But any proceedings of
that sort, I insist, would be plainly extrajudicial, and completely without ob-
ligation on any court. For what the constitution, the constitutional laws, and
the rights of the country, demand of the courts, is the application of the laws
of the country, to the facts actually transpiring and transpired, among the in-
habitants of the country ; and not to supposed transactions which have been
honestly believed to have transpired, but have never been proved ; and have
been ascertained, on better investigation, to have never occurred. Surely
facts, and cou elusions of law on facts, which might have occurred, but have
not occurred, cannot be made to control and change the actual condition of
things. And wherever real laws, and real facts do exist, all merely supposed
laws, and supposed facts, coming in opposition to them, must give way. If
our courts have the constitutional power to disobey the law, under any pre-
text, or if they can in any case, be legally excused for not rigidly adhering to
the law, or for avoiding the application of the law, and its " settled and funda-
mental principles," by reason of "judgments of law grounded on matters of
fact, on which there was neither inquiry nor proof;" and by adhering to such
judgments and enforcing them against us, knowing them to be contrary to
law ; then it follows that they have the constitutional power to deprive us of
the protection of the law, if they chose to attempt it, or to exercise it. We
do not merely urge that it would be a wrong to attempt it. We insist that
the power to do it has never been vested in our courts. If the power has been
vested, then our courts can, either with or without pretexts, render such judg-
ments as their judges approve, whether in known violation of law and of
" fundamental principles," or not. And can subject us to other kinds of judg-
ments than those which the laws would pronounce ; and can subject us to
•other and different kinds of facts from those which the records of cases pre-
sent. That is, if we concede they are vested with the power, if they chose to
exercise it, then our courts can, constitutionally, subject us all to judgments,
made admittedly contrary to law, and contrary to truth. And they can con-
stitutionally, if they chose, subject the innocent to the penalties of guilt, and
extend to the guilty, the rewards of innocence.
To decide now for the first time, that our property shall be taken from us,
and shall be delivered to this respondent, who neither shows to the court,
10
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nor produces in the record, any of the evidences of title which the laws de-
mand as the only evidence of legal ownership amounting to proof, would
seem to be plainly unjust, unathorized, and illegal. But to so decide the sec-
ond time, would seem to be worse, not better, than to make the first decision
;
because the first decision might have occurred in entire innocence and mis-
take, as I have every reason to believe, and do believe it did, in the Welch
and Sullivan case, at least so far as Mr. Justice Burnett is concerned. But
to justify such a decision now, on the ground that the court has often decided
so before, and is now thoroughly committed to that line of decisions, even
conceding it to be true, and conceding it to be possessed of the power to
make laws stronger than the laws themselves, and conceding that the court
may decide cases, not by laws, but according to its own previous judgments
;
still all justifications and excuses for the court, no matter on what ground,
nor how ingeniously put, would not be giving us our rights ; and would be
giving others more than their rights, and at our expense. And not on ac-
count of any errors of ours, but on account of the errors of the court itself.
It would in fact, simply be making us suffer on the ground that the court has,
in former times, made others suffer ; and would be depriving us of our rights,
on the ground that others have several times been deprived of theirs.
To change or suspend the operation of laws favorable to us, and follow un-
authorized decisions which have been made, we submit, would be the same
thing in effect, to all intents and purposes, as to do it at once, without
there being any such unauthorized decisions to follow. Because such decis-
ions being of themselves without authority, can confer none. If this court is
without the power to change, and is moreover, constitutionally prohibited
from changing any settled and existing law or fundamental rule of evidence,
it cannot do so at all ; no matter what the contrivance or the ground. Con-
ceding the Cohas and Roisin decisions to be contrary to law, so far as it finds
the fact of a private title to indefinite quantities of lands, in favor of persons
never in possession of them, and finds, prima facie, where the boundaries of
the lands are, with no evidence legally before the court, and none anywhere,
of there being any such title or any such boundaries at all ; and conceding
that the mode or manner adopted for ascertaining such facts, is unknown to
the constitution, and unknown to the laws, and is morever, in violation of
both ; and then, certainly, it cannot be doubted that such decision is null and
void, at least to that extent. And this appearing plainly to be the fact, it is,
so far at least, without authority for any purpose, much less for the purpose
of depriving us and all our neighbors, of our constitutional rights, and also
of our natural rights. I am not speaking loosely, but precisely ; and what I
mean by our constitutional and natural rights is this : we have been long and
peaceably in possession of the property in dispute. If there were no laws
which have created the higher and abstract idea of property, it would be
wrong, i. e. "contrary to the law of nature," to force us from "the use or oc--
cupation of it." (2 Bl. Com. 3, 4, 8.) Possession was the origin of the right
of property in lands. (lb. 258.) And our possession gives us, therefore, the
natural right to be left in the enjoyment of it. (2 Kent, 368, 369.) We
have before shown by abundant authorities, that our possession gives us also
the legal right to be left in the enjoyment of it, as against all the world ex-
cept the true owner ; and by this I mean our constitut; onal right. Because the
right to be governed only by laws, and to be deprived of the peaceable and
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bona fide possession of property, only in pursuance of the law, and the legal
rules of evidence of this State, are our obvious constitutional rights.
If we are to be now driven from our property, on the ground of " stare
decisis" it is necessary to regard it as a constitutional law, or else it cannot
be sufficient authority for " the due process of law" requisite to such serious
undertakings. And if this new ''stare decisis" which violates the very " funda-
mental doctrine of the common law," is now a constitutional law, who made
the law ? Who made it to repeal the former law, and to require this court
to obey it, instead of the law ?
To admit the notion that mere decisions can be carried that far, at once
" impairs the harmony," and destroys all certainty in the law. And reduces
the law from a science, in which the sole object and pursuit of the lawyer
need be, to ascertain the precise law applicable to his case ; to a mere system
of guesswork and uncertainty, in which the inquiry is to be less anxiously
made, as to what the law is, than as to what the judges will decide. We in-
sist that the very object of having laws made and adopted by the Legislature,
is to prevent their being made and adopted by the courts. And if there is
anything positive and certain in the constitution, it is this : that our courts
are absolutely excluded from the power to withhold the " settled and funda-
mental doctrines " of the unwritten law, or of the statute law, from the adju-
dication of any case, either civil or criminal, and of substituting, instead, the
merely new and mistaken views of their presiding officers. Where there are
no settled legal doctrines nor laws, against decisions of a court, then the pub-
lic have a right to regard them as correct evidences of the law. But where
the public know and see, and hear the entire profession admit, that decisions
are in violation of law, and of the settled rules of legal evidence ; then we
insist, the community against whom they were made, had no right to regard
them as law, nor to act upon them as law. And all pretense that men have
been misled by such decisions, would seem reasonably to be but the mere
pretense of persons who have in vain endeavored to deceive themselves, as to
what the law is, and has been.
How can such decisons be treated as law, when all admit they violate law ?
How can any one rationally claim that there can be such a thing thought of,
as a legal justification of what is continually illegal? And who shall dare to
utter here, in this court of last resort, the lawless sentiment that the laws
cannot be adhered to, because there is a " necessity " for adopting a new or
different rule? What "necessity? " Whose "necessity?" Even if such a
proposition could be listened to, there is no power here to obey it ; for in
courts of law no "necessity" for violating law can be listened to. And
besides this, there is no " necessity" at all in these cases to justify or excuse
the adoption of a new rule, unless an attempt to deprive other people of their
property, without authority of law, can be treated as a necessity.
Why should we resort to new rules, to determine the rights of property,
for any man or against any man ? Are not the means adopted by the law
sufficient? Are they not just as old and just as well settled concerning the
rights of property, as concerning the rights of life ? And if the Court is de-
void of discretion in the greater judgment, where the law must destroy life,
is it not equally devoid of discretion in the lesser penalty, where the law
must destroy some mere speculations ? Who on this earth can do anything,
or settle anything, as purely and as wisely as the law ? Indeed, the means
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of settling all our controversies on earth, by purely abstract and previously
agreed on laws, principles, and rules of evidence, to be applied through the
machinery of the courts, and irrespective of the views, feelings or opinions
of any man or set of men, in the courts, or out of them, is the very object of
all our efforts and expenses to organize and support a constitutional govern-
ment of laws. And he who impairs it, is an enemy to the law, and an enemy
to his race ; for it is the only true means of human justice. It supplies for
the settlement of all human rights, the judicial experiments and experience
of all ages of the world; the wisdom of all mankind, [4 Kent, 522,] the
teachings of all nature ; and the moral directions and example of God him-
self. [Story's Life and Letters, vol. 1, p. 31 ; vol. 2, p. 8.] It enables every
human right to be most carefully and impartially determined, not merely
without the " necessity," but without any excuse for subjecting any human
being, or any ofthe agreed rights among human beings, to the prejudice,the will,
the passions, or the power of any other human being, or any number of other
human beings. And in the same ratio as this system of government by laws,
is perfected and rigidly adhered to, the liberties of our people are not dimin-
ished, but increased ; and precisely in the ratio it is departed from, their
protection becomes less and their liberties depart. It is a system introduced
and supported for the sole purpose of obtaining and enjoying liberty ; and
without which " liberty " cannot by any possibility exist. Liberty, except in
the minds of dreamers, is the protection of each man and his property,
against all other men. And to secure that protection is an impossibility,
except by submitting every act done or undertaken against another, to be
judged of and decided by laws, and according to their settled principles and
rules. And to do this, the government must secure officers learned in these
laws, principles and rules. But these officers have no more right, or legal
authority to change the laws by any act, or repetition of acts of their own,
than governors, legislators, or any other officers have. And from the very
fact, that the office of the judge affords him opportunities, to interfere
wrongfully under the guise and shield of his sacred office ; therefore our
judicial systems have been so devised as to render judicial treachery almost
legally impossible. Under our existing laws and judicial system, if the
judges of any court by any mere order, decision or act of theirs alone, and
not of the laws, should undertake to interfere with the property of any man,
that man would have the same right to resist as if the same thing were at-
tempted by the Governor of the State, or any officer. But what the law
commands must not be resisted nor disobeyed by any one, anywhere ; for
among freemen obedience^ to the law of their own State, is the command of
God. And disobedience by the law's own ministers, is no less an offense
than though committed by those who do not stand in its altars, pledged by
an oath, to make no judgment of their own, and to obey no voice but the
voice of the law. With the policy of the law, said Justice Baldwin of this
Court, in Patterson vs. Supervisors of Yuba county, [1859] : "with the policy
of the law, as the Courts of Indiana and New York remark, we have nothing
to do. Our duty is to declare the law as we find it.n So strictly are judges
compelled to listen to nothing but the law, that they are deemed in theory,
absolutely incapable of performing any judicial act; and if they attempt to
enter any judgment of their own, judicially, they are punishable. For ex-
ample, if a man were charged with murder, and the judges before whom his
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case was brought, should adopt some such plan and grounds of decision as in
the case of Cohas vs. Roisin, that is, should act entirely upon assumptions
and presume the man guilty, and render a judgment against him of murder,
when there was no evidence at all in the record of any offense or any guilt
;
the judges, according to our common law, would be guilty of murder. [4
Bl. Com. 178 ; Stephens DeLoline, Eng. Con. p. 783.] The reason is, be-
cause what the laws do not require to be done, concerning another man's
life, the court has no power nor right to command to be done.
We submit and insist, that according to our settled laws and rules of evi-
dence, the same principle applies in cases of property as in cases of life. And
when the law does not require that a man's property shall be taken from him,
and given to another, there is no authority in existence, which has any right
to do it, or to command it to be done. Now, how is it to be positively deter-
mined when the law does require it, in cases of criminal cognizance, and in
cases of ejectment? Let us review the familiar subject. The common law
suffers no substantial distinction to be made between trying a man on an in-
dictment, and trying him on an "ejectment." The plea in both cases is the
same. In both, the defendant says he is "not guilty," and that he "puts him-
self upon the country." [Ad. Eject., 270, and App. No. 30 ; Wharton's Amer.
Crim. Law, 134 " Pleas."] In ejectment, if there be a defendant not proved to
be in possession, the Court may direct the jury to find him not guilty, in order
that he may be examined as a witness for the other defendants." [American
case "cited in Coxe's Digest," 272 ; see Amer. note to Ad. Eject., p. 319.]
In England the judgment (in ejectment) "used to run, quod defendens
capiaturT [Ad. Eject., 331, note (d).] In England, the suit is still, in theory
and in form, a suit for trespass vi et armis. [Ibid, and App. ibid. Nos. 10 and
12.] It is declared on in England as a wrong, and an act against the peace and
dignity of the State. [Adams' Eject., p. 466.] And the defendant is com-
pelled, before proceeding to trial, to take the responsibility of admitting him-
self in possession, and of admitting he removed the claimant from the land,
and of agreeing that at the trial the question of his guilt or innocence, shall
depend on the fact whether the plaintiff holds the legal title to the land or
not. [Ad. Eject., App. Nos. 24, 25.] It is a serious thing to charge a man
with openly taking and holding another man's property. If the plaintiff
proves and shows to the Court that he holds the legal title, the verdict
of the jury is "guilty," and the judgment runs that he has been "con-
victed." [Ibid. Nos. 36, 40, 41.] And, according to the American forms
of judgments (and it is manifest that the judgments in these cases are the
same in legal theory in this State as in others,) the record runs that the de-
fendant has been found guilty of an unlawful act. [Ibid. sup. "American
Forms," Nos. 13 et seq.~] By express law of this State, the question of the
legal title to lands cannot be submitted to arbitration any more than a ques-
tion of guilt can be. [Practice Act, section 380.]
Titles claimed to lands in peaceable possession of others, must be
tried and determined according to the evidence and the law. They cannot be
tried by such judicial interference as the charge to the jury in this case dis-
closes, except where they are tried without regard to either law or evidence.
The Constitution expressly prohibits judges from charging juries concerning
matters of fact. And yet the judge below not only charged the jury that a
local corporation owned lands merely because this Court had said so in some
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opinions, but also charged where the boundaries of that ownership extended,
merely because this Court in some opinions had said so ! And without one
scintilla of evidence before the judge, or the jury, to prove the truth of either
such ownership or such boundaries! ! Animadversion on such a proceeding is
due from this Court, but not from me in its presence. The charge of the judge
and the record of the evidence offered in the cause, show its utter want of
authority in law, in truth, or in common sense.
Douglas, in the preface to his reports (K. B.,) says : " The law of this
country (England) has been peculiarly watchful to prevent the approaches
of falsehood in the investigation and proof of the particular facts litigated
between contending parties. For this purpose, many rules have been estab-
lished relative to the competency or admissibility of evidence ; of all which
rules the ultimate object is, to guard the avenues of belief, and to secure the
minds of those who are to decide against imposition and mistake." But
of what use are these rules for ascertaining the truth, if the very fact of having
acted independently of them, and of having, in consequence, been imposed
upon and mistaken, is to be urged as a good reason why such rules should
continue to be neglected, in order that we may continue subject "to imposi-
tion and mistake." Would this Court undertake to incorporate such a blotch
upon the law? would it undertake to pursue such a line of decisions, even
to save life ? And if it could exercise the power to save one life, by such
means, would it not have to be admitted that punishment and the withhold-
ing of punishment depends on the decisions of the Court? But is not the
occasion infinitely contemptible, when the court is asked to exert its influence,
and subject its decisions to such an undertaking, merely to stir up strife and
litigation, and benefit nobody, unless some dozen speculators, and which
could only benefit them by a cost to the cause of justice more sweeping and
pernicious than their lives, much less their mere speculations, could compen-
sate the country for committing ? Is it not monstrous, to ask that thousands
of citizens (or even one man) shall be deprived of their property merely and
only on account of the past errors of the court ?
We insist it is not in the constitutional power of this Court to make titles,
nor to make boundaries, either prima facie or otherwise ; nor to determine,
of its own power, or on the knowledge of its own justices, who are guilty of
withholding other people's lands. That power, we insist, rests only with the
laws, and can be exerted only by means of legal proof, introduced in the
courts authorized to try cases. We insist that facts which the law requires to
be proved by legal evidence, must be so proved ; and that this Court
cannot authorize courts below to dispense with such proof. Nor can the
nature of such proof be changed in this Court, nor can its omission be excused
or supplied through the instrumentality of opinions or decisions, or in any
manner or form, or to any extent whatever. It is manifest, without argument,
that if this Court had jurisdiction to determine material matters of fact, in
issue in suits at law, (like the facts of this respondent holding the legal title
to our lands, and the prima facie boundaries of the lands which he or his
judgment debtor owns,) it would be its imperious duty to impannel a jury,
and demand that evidence be introduced to establish such ownership and
such boundaries. Because that is the only mode known to the laws, and the
only mode compatible with certainty or security, for determining such issues.
But a Court cannot acquire jurisdiction over such matters of fact, by deciding
HART VS. BURNETT ET AL. 151
that it has it. [Dwarris, III.] The Court, (said Ch. J. Marshall,) is under
equal obligation, not to exercise jurisdiction where it is not conferred ; as it
is to exercise it where it is conferred. [Bank U. S. vs. Deveaux, 5 Cranch,
61.] If all the parties concerned should consent, and the court should order
a jury to be impanneled, and the evidence to be introduced, the whole pro-
ceeding would of course be null and void. Why then is it not null and void,
when done here without any jury, and without introducing any evidence?
The Constitution has excluded this tribunal of last resort, from all control in
ascertaining questions of fact, which require to be proved. Suppose the
combined powers of the Legislative and Executive departments of this Gov-
ernment should pass an express law, that the city corporation once existing in
San Francisco county, or the corporation now existing there, owned large
tracts of land about it, and suppose they re-enacted the law fifty times, would
that law be binding on this Court ? Would not this Court feel bound to
protect us, in this case, against such a monstrous usurpation of power?
Would not the court say, that if the legislative power could give the lands in
San Francisco to that corporation, without requiring the consent of its true
owners, it could give it as well to the corporation of Marysville, or Sacramento,
or any other ? Would not the existence of such a power endanger the foun-
dations of property, and force us all to admit that there is a power under this
government, to deprive us of our rights without jury, without proof, without
inquiry and without compensation ? If the combined powers of the other
two departments of this government, by no conceivable nor possible means,
could exert that authority, how is it that this department can do so, by
any conceivable or possible means ? And if this Court would be forced to
declare such an act null and void, if attempted by either or both the other
departments, how is it possible to deem the same act valid, if attempted by
this department ? Would the same act be an}7 less wrong in itself, and less
unjust to us, or any less unconstitutional and void, if undertaken by this
Court by means of decisions and opinions, than if undertaken by means of
express legislative enactments ? It is of little consequence to us to have our
rights secured against the usurpations of the Legislature, and the Governor,
if they can be taken from us by the courts.
We insist, that as no evidence was introduced before the jury, sufficient to
convict us, we cannot now be convicted here by mere opinions formerly ex-
pressed by this Court, concerning matters requiring legal proof. And whether
we are guilty or not, of the unlawful acts charged in this complaint, must be
established, if it is to be established at all, by legal evidence, and by the legal
verdict of a jury, i. e. a jury not misled by the charge of a judge. To at-
tempt to rule us, not by evidence nor by law, but by mere erroneous opinions
expressed here, makes any defense by us, a mere mockery. It makes any in-
vestigation of a jury in our behalf, a mere farce. It makes juries find, not
according to the evidence, but according to some decisions which have been
rendered in this Court without any evidence, and contrary to evidence. It
renders our reliance upon evidence a snare. It would make those of us who
are innocent of any offense against the law, punishable for what has been
made an offense by the court.
It is not, we insist, within the range of constitutional possibilities for this
Court to create facts in any case. They must have occurred, or else they are
not facts. If they occurred, they did not occur here but elsewhere, and can
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be shown here by evidence, produced in the manner and to the extent re-
quired by law. The idea of convicting a man, or depriving him of his pro-
perty by presumptions made here, and without any evidence, and by adhering
to such mere presumptions against law and against evidence, is, when we come
to think upon it, monstrous beyond the power of becoming expression. To
possess the power to establish facts " without inquiry and without proof," but
by presumptions arising only from facts themselves presumed ; and then to
prescribe the consequences, would be to possess the power, not only to deprive
citizens of life, liberty, and property at pleasure, but also the power to strip
truth itself of all its force, and also of all its consequences. And, I submit,
the exercise of such an extravagant assumption in times past, cannot authorize
nor exercise its repetition now.
When juries should attempt to be governed by their presumptions, and to
render verdicts for plaintiffs in ejectment, contrary to the evidence produced
before them, or without any evidence in the case which was on trial, this
Court would not uphold nor defend them, although it was known they were
acting under oath ; but would fearlessly set aside their verdict, and instruct
them to decide according to the legal evidence produced before them in the
cause. Why then should this Court feel bound by a finding, made contrary
to evidence, and without any jury, and where no new evidence could be intro-
duced ? The law seems as well settled with courts as with juries, that they
cannot exceed their functions and their jurisdictions. [Dwarris, III.] It
would seem to be settled law, that not merely the decisions, but the very
judgments of courts, if entered without the sanction and authority of pre-
existing law, are mere nullities, and need not be obeyed. For when a judge
exceeds the laws he exceeds his office. And it is an old maxim of our laws,
that "judici officium swum excedente, non paretur.n [Jenk. Centuries Rep.
139, case 84.]
If unauthorized judgments should be persisted in, to the utter demoraliza-
tion and corruption of a community, for five or six years, would that amount
to any legal ground or rational excuse for continuing them ?
If laws should be violated to the continual reproach of justice, for one year,
or for five or six years, is that any legal ground why they should be violated
now ?
If some persons in San Francisco have been benefited by illegal decisions
about lands, is that any reason why others should be ruined by the same
process ?
If erroneous decisions have been made in favor of the possessors of uplands
in San Francisco, who hold grants from American town magistrates, is that
any reason why the same decisions should be made to ruin all other possessors
of uplands in San Francisco, who hold under the laws of the United States
and of the State of California, and the ordinances of the city, and against
whom no town magistrate's grants have ever been made ?
If erroneous decisions have been made for the benefit of American Alcalde
lot speculators, is that any reason why erroneous decisions should now be
made for the benefit of the more sweeping, lawless and iniquitous Peter
Smith speculators ?
It will be pretended here in the most earnest, able, pathetic and elaborate
manner, that these erroneous decisions must now be adhered to, because they
preserve the rights of property. Whose rights of property do they preserve ?
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Are there no rights of property in San Francisco but those of some few
speculators ? What rights of property do they preserve ? Are there no
rights of property in San Francisco, except those which were created by, and
which are now dependent on the Cohas and Roisin decision ? They, perhaps,
will venture to assert that millions of dollars of property would be destroyed
if those past decisions are not now adhered to. We say, if any dollars
would be destroyed, they are only the dollars which they calculate to have if
their speculations succeed. We say, all the dollars they will lose, are the
dollars they seek the aid of this Court to plunder from us, without law, with-
out compensation, without necessity, and without possessing any claims to our
property, founded upon any evidence, or upon any principles of law or of
good conscience.
We say further, (and in justice to Judge Heydenfeldt, I will say, that is
his opinion if I am well advised,) that all the Cohas and Roisin decisions,
however rigidly adhered to, do not require their being used for the benefit of
these claimants and for our ruin. Because to hold Alcalde titles valid, we
reiterate, does not at all interfere with us, nor any of us. But to make Al-
calde titles uphold Peter Smith titles against lands which have now been held,
bought, sold, mortgaged, built upon, and dealt in for the last eight, nine and
thirteen years by actual bona fide possessors, could not be done to uphold any
equitable claim
; because the destruction of Peter Smith titles injures nobody
in possession any more than the destruction of the Bolton title, or the Liman-
tour, or any other fraud. Whereas its enforcement, like the enforcement of
either of said frauds, benefits none but the speculators in them, who have
no possession
; and brings poverty and desolation upon those in possession
holding adversely to the fraud. We insist, that in point of fact, the Cohas
vs. Roisin decisions never can have created any actual property, and that their
cessation would disturb nothing, except the plans of speculators, who have
never had possession. And, we say, that the laws of nearly all, and perhaps,
all civilized States, excepting this State, characterize all such claims as these
now here as " pretended titles," and from consideration of public justice and
public policy, make all such claims utterly void and illegal ab initio, and
even where founded upon valid titles originally. And that though a clause
in our statute concerning conveyances, is held to tolerate such schemes in this
State, yet that there is nothing in our laws, nor in the principles of justice or
equity, which requires them to be favored beyond all other titles, and all
other actual and vested claims to property. We flatly deny and pronounce
the statement totally unfounded, that a refusal to uphold Peter Smith titles
will impair and destroy property; on the contrary we aver it will completely
lift from a whole community, the most sweeping and iniquitous, because the
most baseless and unfounded, of all the frauds and attacks against property,
ever yet attempted in this country, or perhaps in any other claiming to be
possessed of a government of laws.
We say, that in point of fact, the Cohas vs. Roisin decisions have legally
created nothing. That their errors have all performed their office, and their
functions have ceased. And that, although they have left the traces of their
delusion still behind, it would be inexcusable to recall and reinvigorate them
into new life, and sweep their umbrageous torments over property which they
have never yet clouded nor involved.
We say that the title to every lot of ground in San Francisco, is now, just
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as good without those decisions as with them. And that this Court is not
only not bound by law to ruin us for the sake of adhering to such former
decisions, but there is nothing in reason, nor in law, much less in equity and
good conscience, to justify or excuse such a proceeding.
We insist that the powers of this Court are expressly confined to the cor-
rection of errors of law, occurring in the trial of causes in courts below; and
that it is a plain perversion of the Constitution to knowingly require any court
below to commit errors.
Suppose a District Judge trying a suit in ejectment, should instruct the
jury, when there was no evidence in the case proving either title or bounda-
ries, that from his knowledge of the parties and their rights, and the rights
which one of them had under Mexican laws, he must instruct the jury that
the plaintiffs' judgment debtor owned lands, and the boundaries of its lands
were established prima facie wherever Alcaldes made grants of lots ; and
thus establish a case for the plaintiff, without requiring him to produce any
legal evidence but a sheriff's deed, and without his having any other legal evi-
dence to produce; and when it was known that what the judge said about
boundaries, and about rights under Mexican laws, were not only devoid of
proof, but also devoid of truth. Could any act be done by a judge, more
completely one-sided, dangerous, and lawless ? Would it not be the imperious
duty of this Court to reprehend such conduct, and correct so daring and
egregious an error ? How then can this Court authorize him to do what it
would be the constitutional duty of this Court to prevent him from doing?
Nothing can be more plain, than that such opinions or instructions, usurp the
authority to establish matters of fact without proof, which the common law,
and the common safety of every 'man's property, require not to be estab-
lished but by legal proof. It would be leaving the power to judges, appointed
to pass upon title according to evidence, to create title and fix boundaries to
propert}T
,
without any evidence at all ; and this too, while the law says such
facts shall not be passed on by judges at all, but by juries, (where that right
is not waived,) and the Constitution expressly prohibits judges, from even in-
structing juries as to any matters of fact whatever, and much more from find-
ing the facts by themselves alone. Can opinions of this Court authorize District
Judges to directly violate the law and the Constitution ? Do not such opin-
ions, and such charges to juries based on them, plainly confound the broad
and settled distinction between the duties of judges and the duties of juries?
Indeed, is it possible to obey such opinions, or approve and uphold them on
any legal, or constitutional, or just grounds ? To cite the mere authority of
this Court cannot justify them. It would be an alarming doctrine to say a
court can justify and legalize any opinions it may choose to deliver, by merely
referring to its own opinions. They must be justified by reference to the Con-
stitution and the laws, or else they cannot be justified at all. Over a century
ago, Lord Hardwick, while Chief Justice of England, declared : " It is of the
greatest consequence to the law of England, and to the citizens, that the powers
of the judge and jury are kept distinct; that the judge determine the law,
and the jury the fact ; and if ever they come to be confounded, it will prove the
confusion and destruction of the Law of England?"1 This language is promi-
nently quoted, and adopted as evidence of the principles of the " English
Common Law," by Chief Baron Comyns. [Com. Dig. "Enquest," (A. 1,)
vol. 3, page lYl.] Probably a thousand authorities could be collected to the
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..same effect. And since the people of the United States came near rejecting
the Constitution of the Union, for not containing an express clause guarantee-
ing the same doctrine to govern the courts of the United States, and since it
is now guaranteed in that and all other American Constitutions, including our
own, no question exists as to the fact that juries are judicial institutions, as
sacred and as secure under our Constitution and laws, as under the Constitu-
tion and laws of England ; and as the Courts themselves, of which they con-
stitute an essential part, in all controversies of this sort. [Story on Con. sec.
1763, et seq.\ Con. of Cal. art. 1, sec. 3 ; Pr. Act of 1851, sec. 155.] The Con-
stitutional right of trial by jury, said Story, is scarcely inferior in civil cases
to what it is in criminal cases. [lb. sec. 1768.] All questions of facts, in
suits at law, being " a material allegation in the complaint " denied by the
answer, says our Constitutional Statute Law, "shall be tried by a jury," if that
right is demanded or is not expressly waived. [Pr. Act, sees. 153, 155.] We
insist on the perfect enjoyment of that right.
We deny the authority to impair that right, by asserting here anything
which it is the legal object and purpose of a jury to ascertain in the court below.
We insist, and reiterate again and again, that the question whether this
respondent actually holds the legal title to our land, or the lands in any pre-
cise boundaries, or not, and where these boundaries are, does not depend on
anything which has been or can be said here, and which has been or can be
done here ; but depends entirely on what has been done elsewhere.
It seems to be of no importance to determine whether the respondent is
theoretically, and according to some erroneous opinions, possessed of a legal
title or not; but the question to be decided is, whether he is actually and in
truth possessed of the legal title or not.
Let that question be submitted, not to this Court, nor to the Court below,
but to the jury, as the law directs. Let not the jury be told, that here it has
been said the plaintiff has a title, and whatever is here said is law, and not to
be called in question. On the contrary, let the jury be made to do their duty
according to their oaths, "and a true verdict render according to the evidence."
Leave them alone, as the Constitution commands the inferior judges to do with
respect to all matters of fact. In a word, give us a fair trial according to the
laivs of our country, and what will become of this plaintiff's pretended title?
How will he go to work to prove, before the jury, and with no assistance
from any judge or court with respect to the facts, that in truth he does own
and hold the legal title to our lands ? Must he not prove it as a fact, i. e. as
a truth? Must he not prove it by introducing truth, and not by introducing
error ? Must he not prove it by producing the legal evidence before the jury
which the law requires to be produced ? Can this Court authorize him to prove
it by producing other and different evidence, from that which the law has pru-
dently and most wisely exacted from all such claimants ? If this Court can au-
thorize him to prove it by scraps of old papers, chapters from boots of travels,
.
records that other persons have had grants made to them, and have been put
in possession of their lands ; whole books from the office of County Recorders;
forged documents about some boundaries to lands ; and such heaps and loads
of irrelevant papers, as constitute this immense record, and which it has cost
more than the lands of some of us are worth to get copied, in order to bring
this case to the notice of this Court; I say, if this Court can authorize the
plaintiff to prove his title in this manner, a manner wholly unknown and hitherto
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unheard of, could it not just as well authorize him to prove his title without pro-
ducing any evidence at all ? All these heaps of papers not only do not prove,
but they do not refer to, nor purport to prove a title to land. The record in
this case positively shows no legal evidence of any title in this respondent. And
yet, we shall hear it pretended that to put an end to such proceedings, and such
suits as this, will impair the rule of property—will interfere with stare decisis.
If property will be destroyed, let it perish ; for it is not only better that
property should be destroyed, but that lives should perish, rather than suffer
the laws and the administration of justice to be brought into contempt. The
law never requires a man to prove impossibilities ; nor should it be trifled
with, by such idle attempts to do so, as are here displayed.
If these schemers have acquired the legal title to our property, they can
prove it ; can they not ? If they cannot prove it, it should not be given to
them, any more than to anybody else who cannot prove it ; should it ? The
law has not imposed any unnecessary difficulties on the actual owners ofprop-
erty to prove their title. If these parties were the actual owners of lands,
they could prove their title and their boundaries, with the precision and cer-
tainty, and written evidence, which the law secures for every true owner of
lands in the possession of others ; and unless they do prove a title as the law
requires, by what right are the Courts to drive us off, and put them in pos-
session ? The law does not uphold such attempts as this to prove, what it has
rendered so easy to prove, when the attempt is not made falsely and to con-
fuse and deceive? And they are poor babes—are they not?—who hope to
deceive our far-seeing and venerable Father—The Law ? And if this new rule
of property, of which we shall hear so much, depends on so much uncertainty
as this, where certainty is so necessary, and depends upon bringing before
this Court such a record as this, which is an insult to our intelligence, and an
insult to the law, the best thing to be done with this new rule is to
immediately break it ; is it not ? What do these men desire ? What
do they demand ? They demand that they be allowed to take from
our citizens in this State, at least ten millions of dollars' worth of prop-
erty. By what authority do they make such an astounding demand ? By
authority of the owners ? No. By authority of the law ? No ; but by
authority of stare decisis. Who is stare decisis ? Is he the owner ? Has
he got the legal title ? How did he come by it ? Is not the mere
fact, that such a request as this is to be made in this court of last resort,
and that such a record as this has been brought here to justify the request,
enough to startle us at the departure from the law which we ourselves, as
lawyers, are going to ask or listen to in this very palladium of our laws ; and
from these very judges whom we all know to be under the most solemn obliga-
tions to grant nothing either for friend or foe, but to preside like impassible
gods, and to administer to all, not what might please them or displease them,
but what the laws command ? Can we regard it possible, that we can secure
a reverence for the laws and the judicial tribunals of our country, when we
see the attempt seriously made, and actually advised, to wrest property from
whole communities, who are in lawful possession of it, on mere talk about
u
stare decisis'''' or some "rule of property" which has been established here
with no consent of the owners of the property, and established, as we all
know, and as has been stated on this very bench (by one who concurred to
aid such an undertaking) to be of such plain and manifest illegality, that no
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man of ordinary intelligence can pretend that there is any law to support it,
or aDy evidence to uphold it ? Can we suppose our people so ignorant as to
believe that the Court is compelled, under a sense of duty, to inflict judg-
ments against a whole community of people, or against any one man, when
it is known and admitted, that such judgments have not originated in any-
thing which was sustained by evidence or upheld by the laws ? What do
our people understand about stare decisis ? What do they know about " a
rule of property" which has been made here for their ruin, without their
knowledge, privity or consent, and owing to no faults, or mistakes, or dis-
obedience of any law, on their part ? How are they to be satisfied that an
outrage against their rights is not attempted, when they are told that although
they have been in the possession of their property for the past eight to thir-
teen years, still it must now be taken from them and be delivered to these
speculators, not because of any legal title against them and in favor of these
persons, but because it is necessary to preserve some errors of court which have
been committed here
}
in decisions about some other people's property ! I say it
is but treating the laws with contempt and mockery, to come into a court
of law with such a record as this, and upon such a claim ask, that the rights
of a community, or of any one person, shall be or ought to be sacrificed.
If the ceaseless and heartless speculators, who are eternally hatching their
machinations, have acquired a legal title to our property, let them produce
it ; and we will immediately acquiesce. If they have a title, the laws, I re-
peat, have imposed no difficulties, and admit of no uncertainties, in their
proving it.
If this mode of proving a private title to lands, which is here attempted,
be sufficient to warrant the issuing of process to drive our inhabitants from
their property in one county, the same species of evidence must be sufficient
to do it in other counties.
And if individuals can establish a title in themselves to nearly all the lands
in the largest city of this State, without ever having had possession of one
foot of it, and without showing any legal chain of title, or producing the
legal evidence of any; it is certain, that it must not only be done without
any authority, but in plain and direct violation of several of the most essen-
tial, most familiar and most just laws, which are in force in this State. And
if it can be done by the process here to be recommended, and which will
be here insisted upon, of stare decisis ; it is perfectly manifest that the formality
of a suit, and the impanneling of a jury, and the introduction of such stuff
as composes this record in this suit, are all useless ; because, these suits cannot
be governed and conducted according to the laws, and at the same time ac-
cording to these stare decisis notions, which are contrary to the laws. The
laws, I repeat, require every plaintiff asserting such a claim as this, to prove his
title, by complete and indisputable legal evidence in regard to boundaries, as
much as to title. But these so called " stare decisis" and " rule of property "
opinions, do not require anything of the kind. They are based on the idea,
that this Court, whose duty it is to see to it, that inferior courts do not deter-
mine questions of boundaries and of titles to lands, except according to legal
proof ; may itself determine them for the District Courts and for all parties
concerned, without any jury and without any proof at all ! And that when
so determined here, by Justices of this Court, without any jury and without
any proof, District Judges, and juries, and this Court, must obey such de-
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cisions ; although admitted here on the bench, by one of the justices who
made or adhered to them, (J.Terry,) to be "without any law to uphold
them, or any evidence in the record to sustain them." I most respectfully
submit, that such views of " the principles on which the jurisprudence of a
country ought to proceed," are abhorrent to every legal view, and object, of
the doctrine of stare decisis ; and imperil at once every principle of law, and
every security in administrative justice. And so far from our being required
to produce decisions, showing that such precedents ought not to be followed,
I insist that some authority ought to be produced showing that they can be
followed ; for there are no such decisions to be found in any volume of re-
ports extant. They are absolutely without precedent or parallel. And if
they possess any authority at all, it is, I most respectfully submit, not to be
found in the Constitution, nor in any law or principle of law adopted and in-
troduced by this State.
Suppose a District Court of this State in a case where the owners and pos-
sessors of lands could not be heard, where no jury was allowed, and no issue
on the question of title and of boundaries was formed or proved, and where
not one scintilla of legal evidence was introduced to prove any survey, any
boundaries, or any title at all in a corporation—should decide, dogmatically,
and without jury, proof or truth, that such corporation, created by the Legis-
lature of this State, did own all the lands of such possessors and claimants,
and should prescribe, on the. bench, a prima facie rule for ascertaining the
boundaries of such ownership,—this Court would, undoubtedly, treat such a
decision as a monstrous usurpation, not to be countenanced nor tolerated.
For, a more lawless, revolutionary, hazardous and iniquitous mode of determ-
ining the rights of property, could not be attempted within the precincts of
Courts, and under the garb and forms of law.
Indeed, it is self-evident, that such matters must be proved by legal
issues and a trial thereof, in the manner, the form, and to the full extent re-
quired by law, before courts of justice can properly attempt to proclaim what
the truth is, and declare the consequences. And for the very reason, that
falsehood cannot be respected nor acted on as truth, without acting iniqui-
tously ; the first step demanded by law, in every instance, is, to ascertain the
truth, and the law has in nothing taken more pains than to elicit the facts,
that is the truth in every case, and to decide according to the truth. In all
acts concerning property, a falsehood is a fraud. And it is the falsehood aud
the iniquity resulting from acting on it. and not the manner of telling it, nor
its source, which constitutes the fraud. Hence in the case supposed, the
District Judge would not only outrage justice, but would perpetrate a fraud
against the peaceable possessors and owners of the lands, so sought to be
taken from them by falsehood. And whether the person so "misrepresenting
a material fact, knew it to be false, or made the assertion without knowing
whether it was true or false, is wholly immaterial ; for the affirmation of what
one does not know, or believe," (on good and clear proof,) "to be true, is in
morals and in law, equally as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known
to be positively false." [See Story Eq. Jurisp. sec. 193, etc.] " Fraud is
even more odious than force." [Ibid. sec. 186.]
"Fraud includes all acts, omissions and concealments, which involve a
breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are
injurious to another." [Ibid. sec. 187.] Truth cannot defraud any man,
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nor can the law. But if a man be deprived of his claim to property, con-
trary to law, and by means of a falsehood, is he not defrauded ? And surely
r the injury would be the same, whether done where it could be relieved by
the court, or done by the judge himself presiding in the court, and beyond
the means of relief.
And surely if this Court would be bound to correct such a course of j>ro-
ceeding by District Courts, as in the case just supposed, it cannot be bound
- to justify and authorize such a proceeding. And I most respectfully submit,
if a District Court could not so proceed, this Court cannot, because this Court
cannot try any suit, nor determine by itself any question requiring proof. On
the contrary, this Court exists solely for the purpose of correcting errors oc-
curing in the courts below, where all suits must be tried, and where all mat-
ters of fact not admitted, and material to the parties, must be proved, and if
not proved, must be regarded as unproved, and not to be presumed. In the
debates in the Convention which formed the plan and defined the jurisdiction
of this Court, it was declared, " In the Supreme Court new evidence is not
granted." If an appeal is made it is made upon some wrong decision. [De-
bates in Con. 227.] Again, it was said, as if the matter was on all hands
taken for granted : The Supreme Court " has nothing to do with trying
questions of fact (to be) tried in the Court below." But no language could
be reasonably used, more explicit and emphatic, than the words of the Con-
stitution itself. It not only gives this Court only appellate jurisdiction, which
of itself excludes everything coming before it except the record ; and it not
only says its appellant jurisdiction shall be on questions of law; but it confines
its jurisdiction beyond cavil or question by adding the adverb only or
"alone." It says ''the Supreme Court shall have . ajipellate jurisdiction in
all cases," etc., etc., etc., " on questions of law alone." [Art. 5, sec. 4.]
Is the fact of the existence of a Mexican act of incorporation, creating an
incorporated town on the peninsula of San Francisco, and by a particular corpo-
rate name, a question of law ? Is the fact of a grant, or concession, or national
dedication to public use, of five thousand or seventeen thousand, or one hundred
and fifty thousand acres of land, to such a town corporation as San Francisco,
a question of law ? Could it, in the nature of things, be any more a question
of law under Mexico than under the United States? Is the number of acres
which were granted, conceded or dedicated to such imagined corporation, a
question of law ? Is the place where these acres are located a question of law ?
Are the boundaries of the lands so granted, conceded, or dedicated, questions
of law? Is the time-when the grant, concession or dedication was made a
question of law ? Are the terms, conditions and names of the parties, and
the nature and extent of the subject matter of this supposed contract or
agreement as to lands, questions of law, to be decided by this Court, with no
proof of any agreement at all ? Are the facts whether lands were ever sur-
veyed and set apart by the Mexican Government, or specified or described by
that Government, to or for the ownership or use of any particular person or
corporation, and the name of the particular person or corporation, questions
of law ? Can all or any of these facts be determined by the justices who
preside in this Court, with not one scintilla of legal evidence to prove any of
them, and with the Constitution expressly limiting their jurisdiction to "ques-
tions of law alone ? "
I insist, that every and all material and important questions of fact raised
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and involved in suits at law, must be proved by evidence duly introduced
on the trials thereof. And that to presume such facts in any case, either by
this Court, or by any District or other Court, acting under the laws and Con-
stitution of this State, is a direct violation of the settled and fundamental
doctrine on which the judiciary must proceed ; and if done by this Court, is
also a plain violation of said constitutional limitation to " questions of law
alone." And therefore that the presumption of facts of great moment to
these claimants, and to the ends of justice, which were made in the Cohas vs.
Koisin decisions, cannot be adopted nor acted on as facts affecting these
cases. But they must be regarded as having been announced merely as the
"prolata " or views of the justice making them, with no expectation nor in-
tention to have them acted on as facts, destructive of the claims of third par-
ties, and decisive of new controversies wherein they are not only not proved
to be true, but shown to be untrue. The notion that opinions of judges can
be received as, of themselves, conclusive on an inferior court, or on a jury, as
to any matters of fact material to the rights of parties in suits, is plainly
subversive of justice ; subversive of the " settled and fundamental rules of
legal evidence," and the purposes they are intended to accomplish, and sub-
versive of everything material in the right of trial by jury.
It is essential to a free people (says Blackstone,) "that their property may
be as certain and fixed as the Constitution of their State." [3 Com. 327.]
Property cannot be secure, where judges or any other officers are possessed of
the power, by official acts, to take it away. It is not secure unless it is secure
against all the powers of courts and lawyers, as well as other persons. It is
not secure except where it cannot be disturbed nor taken away " but by the
law of the land." Our courts are appointed and their judges sworn to ad-
minister that law according to law. The law imperiously demands that every
case be decided according to the law and the truth. And where the truth is
plainly violated, or the law disregarded, a new trial is ordered for the pur-
pose of arriving at a legal and truthful adjudication. How degrading to the
law ; how abhorrent to justice ; how contrary to the objects and purposes of
the courts, is the base idea, that what is known and seen to be untrue shall be
made to take the place of truth, and what is known and seen to be contrary
to law shall take the place of law ; and upon this basis of lawlessness and un-
truth, the rights of property of a whole community, or of any one man, shall
be attempted to be settled and adjusted ! Who but an idiot, or an enemy,
could desire to see the titles to the lands on which a great city is to be erected,
placed upon the basis of falsehoods, whereby security and repose are not only
postponed, but rendered impossible.
Property, as we have seen, is the legal right to things. Therefore, when
the legal right to things is made to give way to a merely assumed but not
legal right, property is made to give way to assumptions against property.
Justice cannot be done concerning material issues between suitors, except
according to the facts. Therefore, when it is attempted, not according to the
facts, but according to admitted errors, it may be called justice because done
in courts of justice, but it cannot be justice, because justice cannot proceed
on errors of fact. The decisions of courts do not constitute laws. [Story, J.,
16 Peters, 18.] And hence they cannot be deemed to have the power to
suspend, repeal, or at all modify or change any law. And although the
courts should fluctuate in their opinions, the law remains the same. Though
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the courts should seek to shun the laws, the laws will not shun the courts.
Though the courts should seek to surmount the laws, still the laws will re-
r main above them. Though the courts should seek to get round the laws,
still the laws will get round the courts. Laws cannot be changed nor
destroyed by violating them, wherever the attempt be made, and however
constantly it be pursued. And falsehood can never be made truth, wherever
.attempted, and however frequently and solemnly repeated. How idle and
foolish and unjust, then, is the idea that the courts should attempt to settle
titles to the lands of a country, or a city, not according to law and evidence,
but contrary to law and contrary to the facts. God Himself (I say it with
profound reverence) would act iniquitously should he render judgments upon
such a basis.
Again : The law of Magna Charta, so far as applicable to our condition,
has always been insisted on in the United States, as part of our common law.
[1 Kent, 523, 524, 604, 605, 612, 613.] That law, as written nearly six
hundred years ago, and so far as applicable to this case now at bar, is in these
words familiar to us all: "Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut
disseisiatur de aliquo libero tenemento suo ******** nisi
per legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terrse." [Magna Charta
of Ed. I, ch. 28 ; Creasy's Eng. Con., 153 ; Stephens' De Lolme, 53. As to
want of authenticity of King John's Charter, see 1 Reves' His. Eng. Law,
Law, 214; Dwarris, 716.] No freeman shall be arrested or imprisoned, or
be deprived of the possession of his freehold (i. e. of lands in his possession,
with, it may be, a title less than the fee,) except by the legal judgment of his
peers, or by the law of the land. The words in our Constitution, "due pro-
cess of law," have been expressly decided to mean the same thing as the said
29th chapter of the Magna Charta. [Dwarris, 722.] And the words, "law
of the land," have been expressly decided to include the common law just as
much as the*statute law. [Ibid.]
It seems to be sufficient to say, because the fact is plain, that if process
be ordered to deprive us of our property, not by reason of law and evidence,
but only by reason of decisions contrary to both, it will not be a "due process
of law''1 because the law cannot be accused of authorizing what "no person
of ordinary intelligence can pretend" it authorizes. And therefore, the direc-
tion of process against us, in such a case as this, would be a plain and direct
violation of those few words in our Constitution which constitute its very
heart's core ; and which cannot be violated without defeating all the other
provisions of our Constitution, and all the purposes for which governments
of laws are instituted and supported.
As to what ought to be done on account of the errors committed here
under the Cohas vs. Roisin opinions, it seems enough to say, that the present
members of this Court are not responsible for a single one of them ; and the
benign maxims of our law enable this Court to relieve against them, without
imputing dishonesty to those who adopted and concurred in the opinions to
which they are confined. They who commit errors in the judicial office, says
a benign maxim, have never intentionally consented to them. [Bouv. Inst.,
n. 581.] And "The progress of time (says Coke) reveals many things which
could not have been foreseen at the beginning." [6 Co., 40.] But (says
Coke) what is found to have been done contrary to the reason of the law,
ought not to be drawn into precedents. [12 Co., 75.] And he who cati
11
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avoid continuing evil precedents, he further says, and does not do it, himself
causes and consents to continuing them. [2 Co. Inst., 146 ; Jenk. Cent., 2*71.1
And "Whatsoever has not been done with sufficient consideration"; (still
further say the sages of our law) "upon further consideration we should re-
voke." [Co. Lit., 260.] The real ultimate object in the last resort of judi-
cature (says Dwarris) is to correct all mistakes, and repair every possible
wrong. [Dwarris, 123.]
Whatever good these errors may have been imagined to do in times past,
it is certain that they cannot justify nor require new and far more extended
and more cruel errors to be committed now ; and it does seem hardly possible
that any true friend to a government of laws, and to the honor and useful-
ness of this Court, can hesitate to urge that it pursue, firmly and fearlessly,
the path it has evidently marked out; and that its position be steadily "super
antiquas vias" where Kent says Lord Kenyon ascended to review the acts of
Mansfield, and to recall " like a Roman dictator, the ancient discipline " of
the law. [1 Kent, 47 1-8.]
"A solemn decision (says Kent,) upon a point of law, arising in any given
case, becomes an authority in a like case, and the judges are bound to follow it
so long as it stands unreversed UNLESS it can be shown that the law was mis-
applied or misunderstood in that case." But, says Kent, the doctrine of fol-
lowing decisions must not be carried too far. It is probable (he continues,)
that the records of many of the courts of this country are replete with hasty
and crude decisions, and such cases ought to be examined without fear, and re-
viewed without reluctance, rather than have the character of our laws im-
paired, and the harmony of our system destroyed by the perpetuity of error.
Even a series of decisions are not always conclusive evidence of what is law.
[Kent Com. 475, 476, 47V.]
What says Chief Justice Marshall and the judges of the old Federal Supreme
Court of the United States, who may be presumed to have been as friendly to
the possessions and exaltation of the judicial power, as any true and just man
could dare be. I know this Court must venerate, as all of us ought to do, the
decisions of that Court on constitutional questions, when Marshall and Story
were the authors and participants in its decisions. The Constitution of the
United States vests the judicial power in its Supreme Court, in the same
words which our State Constitution uses to vest the same power in this Court.
[U. S. Con., Art. 3, sec. 1 ; Cal. Con., Art. 6, sec. 1.] The language is,
" The judicial power shall be vested " in the courts, designated. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall had defended the Constitution of the United States before it
was adopted. [Story's Miscel. Wri., p. 188.] Nearly forty years afterwards,
when his great mind had become cool and careful by age, and accurate and
precise by long continued habits of thinking ; after he had actually been pre-
siding for twenty-three years over probably the most learned judicial tribunal
then in the world, and carefully investigated nearly all the decisions made by
his court during that great length of time, [Story's Biog. of M.] it became
necessary to explain what the "judicial power" should be understood to
mean, under our American Constitutions. The question of the power of the
Judicial. Department of the government was raised and discussed, and involved
in the case,- (as to this see p. 866, and passim.) The case was elaborately
argued by such men as Webster, Clay, Hammond, Wright and Sergeant. It
was argued a second time by the direction of the tCourt ; and we may rest
HAET VS. BUKNETT ET AL. 163
assured that an opinion, written in a case, involving so much labor and exam-
ination, and in some degree involving the question of the true principles " on
which the jurisprudence of (our) country ought to proceed," was not written
hastily nor excitedly. The opinion is one of the most elaborate which Ch. J.
Marshall ever wrote. In the decision and opinion of the court, the Chief
Justice in a few brief and extraordinary sentences defines the true, legal, and
constitutional meaning of " the judicial power." He excoriates the idea that
courts can by any series of decisions not authorized by law, and still in dis-
regard of law, create authority to justify and excuse renewed decisions regard-
less of law. The language used is, perhaps, of the most extraordinary em-
phasis and precision of any ever used by the same great, sagacious and vene-
rated man. There is no way of avoiding his meaning or the conclusions to
which he, in common with Story and his other learned associates, had arrived.
It deserves to be repeated before any judicial opinion is read, or rendered, or
concurred in. It deserves to be printed in letters of gold, and to be kept in
front of every desk where a judge presides.
It is in these words : " The Judicial Department is the instrument em-
ployed by the government, in administering the laws. The judicial depart-
ment of the government has no will in any case. Judicial power, as con-
tradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. Courts are
mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to
exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised
in discerning the course prescribed by law ; and when that is discerned, it is
the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the
purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge ; but always for the purpose
of giving effect to the will of the Legislature ; or, in other words, to the will
of the law." [Osborne vs. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 866.]
And Story, the tenderest and most intimate friend of Marshall, and uni-
versally admitted, even in England, to have been the greatest jurist of the age
—
[Life and Letters, vol. 2, pp. 429, 443, 446,) who exercised the judicial office
for nearly thirty years with unsurpassed fidelity and correctness, may also be
referred to, as one whose views and example on this question, will command
respect with this Court. On an occasion, only three years before his death,
when he had been assailed by fanatics for deciding according to law, not
merely on a question of property, but on the question of the legal right of
property in slaves where the law commands it, he used the following lan-
guage in calm rebuke of those who deem courts possessed of some discretion
to withhold the operation of the laws, and refuse to rigidly adhere to them
in matters of final judgment, on the ground that public policy is opposed to
it, and somebody's interests likely to be injured by it. Story said : "I shall
never hesitate to do my duty as a judge, according to the Constitution and the
•laws, be the consequences what thet may. I have sworn to do this, and I
cannot forget or repudiate my solemn obligations at pleasure." [2 Life and
Letters of Story, 431.]
And now what says Kent, of whom Story once said to his class, "his fame
will live longer in the coming ages of the world, than the proudest relic of
the great Empire State in which he lived." This great American -Judge has
left, for our daily perusal, the following solemn and impressive admonition,
not written in haste, but in his Commentaries, and like a warning from the
Law itself. He says : " It requires more than ordinary hardiness and
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audacity of character, to trample down principles which our ancestors culti-
vated with reverence ; which we imbibed in our early education ; which
recommend themselves to the judgment of the world by their truth and
simplicity ; and which are constantly placed before the eyes of the people,
accompanied with the imposing- force and solemnity of a constitutional sanc-
tion." But, " when the spirit of liberty has fled, and truth and justice are
disregarded, then private rights can easily be sacrificed under the forms of
law." [Kent Com. 607.]
" A greater inheritance comes to every one of us," said Coke, " from the
right and the laws, than from our ancestors." (Co. Inst. 56.) " The settled
rules of law and of legal evidence," said Coke, " admit of no dispute in courts
of justice. They must be obeyed." [Co. Lit. 343.] "Every innovation against
the settled rules of legal evidence," said Coke, "disturbs more than it benefits,
because experience has framed the settled rules of law." [4 Co. Inst. 50.]
"If you depart from the law as your guide," said he, "you will wander; with-
out any guide, and everything will be in a state of uncertainty to every one."
[Co. Lit. 227.]
Others have done, and will of course continue to do, as they please; but
as for myself, I would no sooner advise this Court to attempt to further en-
force mistakes of law and of fact, under the forms of law, than I would do it
myself; when I knew and felt, that I was publicly pledged by a solemn oath,
and by every principle of honor not to do it.
Indeed it does seem to me, that we, as members of the bar, and as infe-
rior members of this Court, ought also to be held in some degree responsible
for the justice, the necessity, and the excuse, of any longer attempting to
continue and enforce such sweeping and admitted errors, instead of truth
and justice, according to the established laws of the State. For what is the
meaning of the oaths which we have taken and recorded as counsellors of
this Court, if we too have not some duty and some obligations to perform
towards the Constitution and the laws, which we too, as inferior public offi-
cers, have been sworn to observe ? It seems to me our obligations bind us
to the extent of the duties which we have to perform, as fully as the oaths
of the judges who preside bind them to the extent of the more vast, more
sacred, and responsible duties which they must discharge.
As for the rights of clients and suitors, they have no rights in courts
of law which the laivs do not concede to them. In my humble opinion,
no lawyer would comply with his first and truest obligations, who should
advise, defend, uphold or encourage sworn judges on the bench to know-
ingly disregard or falsely construe a law, even for the sake of life itself;
and much less for the sake of upholding merely transient, unprincipled, de-
tested, and purely mercenary schemes, like these now before this Court.
It seems to me to be the solemn duty of all of us, the Bar, as well as the
Courts ; it seems to me we owe it to the State, to the profession, to the par-
ties interested, and to our own reputations in the coming history of our State,
to carefully ascertain the laws concerning these cases, and when the laws are
ascertained, to follow them, and be advised by nothing else ; for it cannot be
denied that we, ourselves, are at best but human men, who can err, and can
do injustice. But The Law of our country, and The Truth, cannot err,
and cannot do injustice. We have appealed to this Court for the protec-
tion of the laws of our country, and for their application and enforcement in
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f these cases according to the truth. And we most respectfully insist,
that every denial of this is a denial of justice, and a perversion of the pur-
pose for which this Court exists. That to enforce the erroneous opinions
against us, of which we complain, will be forcing us into trials which are not
to be governed by law nor by truth, but by the errors of the very Court
appointed to guard and protect us against errors.
It would be as wrong to disguise as to deny, that such a course would not
» be convicting us according to law and evidence, but only by opinions of the
court admitted and most clearly shown to be contrary to the law and the
proof. Would it not be most plain injustice, to drag this Court into such
acts of wrong and oppression, merely to sustain the titles of Peter Smith
speculators? No other mere speculators in other peoples' lands, have been
so cruelly and mercilessly aided to titles and to boundaries, who cannot prove
either ; then why should these be so supported ? They knew what the law
was, when they engaged in their schemes in 1851-2. They knew there was
no difference between lands in the legal limits of cities, and out of those
limits, so far as the necessity of jtroving a title is concerned. They knew that
this is not the first country acquired by the United States, which was pre-
viously governed by Spanish law. They knew that New Orleans was a
Spanish city, from 1763 to 1800; and that the Supreme Court of Louisiana
rejected the title of that old Spanish city even to its very quay. No member
of the bar, or judge of the court, there pretended, that it could have any title
to any land anywhere to which it coud not prove a title. The only difference
of opinion that existed, was, whether the city (like any other city) might not
prove a title to a w7ell described piece of land, by proving its actual dedication
to public use by the government, and its actual and long continued use for a
street or quay. But there is no pretense that the tracts of thousands of acres
of lands here involved, were a street or a quay. Nor is there one iota of evi-
dence to prove, that these lands were actually and by law or legal authority,
set apart and dedicated to public use, and so held and used. And the evi-
dence to prove a title by dedication to public use, is just as indispensable, and
must be just as legal, precise and conclusive, as to prove a title by any other
mode. And had there been an actual dedication to public use by law, it would
be ridiculous to say a constable or sheriff could deprive the public of the use,
and defeat or change the public use, by their sales ! A dedication of property
to public use, is, of course, what its very language implies, and it is not held as
private property, nor could it be liable for the debt of any private body or
corporation, as a matter of course, unless it was the property of the debtor,
of which he himself could dispose by a voluntary conveyance. Indeed, in
every particular, as far as title to the ungranted lands are concerned, every
city, town and village, ever acquired by the United States from Spain, or ever
previously governed by Spanish laiv, have been found no more entitled to the
lands about them, than our own towns are. And in all of them, from Florida
and the Gulf to St. Louis, with no exception whatever, it was found, sooner or
later, that the legal title had continued in the former government, and must
come from the United States. I have discussed this subject in full, and
endeavored to show that it could not be otherwise. In closing, I only refer
to some instances, proving the notoriety of these truths in our own country
only one age ago. Look at the case of Vincennes, where the United States
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disposed of its lands, some of which the United States itself had expressly <
" appropriated as a common," hy an Act of Congress of March 3d, 1791. [3
U. S. Laws, 468, Act of April 20th, 1818.] In 1832 Congress passed a
law to dispose of the title of the United States, acquired in the lots and
" commons " of a full Spanish pueblo, which had been built by Spaniards on&
hundred and thirty-three years before the passage of the law by Congress, for
disposing of its lands on its very streets, and reserving some of its very
buildings for government use ; as was done in California by the Mexican «
authorities, as we have already fully explained. I refer to the city of Pen-
sacola, Florida, which was a regular Spanish pueblo for one hundred and
twenty years before the United States acquired that country. And the
United States did the same thing concerning the lots and " the commons" of
the oldest city within the United States ; and required lands to be disposed
of, as the public lands of the United States, which had been and continued as
" the commons'''' of a complete Spanish pueblo for two hundred and sixty-seven
years prior to the passage of the law, to make disposition of it to private
owners. [See 4 Laws U. S. p, 550, Act of June 28, 1832.]
It may be imagined by an indifferent reader, that the exceptions in the
proviso of the 2d Section of this Act of Congress, renders the law meaning-
less. But to except lots of land " which have been by the laws of Spain or
of the United States, vested in the corporations of said towns," etc., etc., does
not except lands which were not so vested by law. And as we have abun-
dantly shown the law does not, and cannot vest a title to lands in any individual
or corporation, except where it can be shown and proved by law.
Again: It is to be remembered that from the time these lands were first
settled on by our people to the present moment, not only they, but this
Court itself, has remained utterly incapable of determining with positive
certainty who held or will hold the legal title, until the Mexican grants set
up to the whole of them shall be finally disposed of. What greater injustice
could be committed, than to eject, or attempt to eject, a whole community
of peaceable possessors of lands, upon a new title created here, which we all
know is not and cannot be the only true title ; because it is not in the nature
of things, that the title can originate here, nor be made to depend on false
constructions of acts of Congress. And what a spectacle would be pre-
sented, if, after we were driven off by this Court, and the unprincipled specu-
lators were placed in possession of the lands we have peacefully held for so
many years, the Bolton & Barron, or some other grant still pending for con-
firmation, and confidently claimed by its owners to be genuine, should be
confirmed ! In such an event, the possibility of which must be admitted,
what a bitter and just reproach would not this Court receive, and eternally
merit. If this Court shall ever undertake to eject our people, upon the title
made here by mere decisions of the Court itself, on the doctrine of stare
decisis, is it not imperiously demanded by every consideration of propriety,
that the attempt shall at least be postponed, until the titles held adversely to
this pretended title shall be finally adjudicated and settled?
Indeed the truth and the law was upheld by this Court when these specu-
lators originated their Peter Smith title. And never until 1857, in case of
Welch vs. Sullivan, did this Court decide that such titles to uplands, were of
the least validity.
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All talk of evil consequences by not repeating and adhering to that deci-
sion, bears in its own terms the brand of untruth ; because it is not possible in
the nature of things, that truth and law, in these cases, can do injustice to
any man. It is only by denying the law and denying the truth, in the tribu-
nals appointed to maintain them, that confusion and instability will be brought
about, and sweeping and downright wrong and injustice will inevitably be
perpetrated.
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LAND POLICY,
National and State.
i.
the lands of the united states.
Uxtent of the Public Domain.
According to the latest report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
the public domain not yet disposed of amounted on the 30th of June, 1870, to
1,387,732,209 acres.
These figures are truly enormous, and paraded as they always are whenever land
enough for a small empire is asked for by some new railroad company, or it is pro-
posed to vote away a few million acres to encourage steamship building, it is no
wonder that they have a dazzling effect, and that our public lands should really seem
" practically inexhaustible." For this vast area is more than eleven times as large as
the great State of California ; more than six times as large as the united area of the
thirteen original States ; three times as large as all Europe outside of Eussia. Thir-
teen hundred and eighty-seven millions of acres ! Boom for thirteen million good-
sized American farms ; for two hundred million such farms as the peasants of France
and Belgium consider themselves rich to own; or for four hundred million such tracts
as constituted the patrimony of an ancient Koman ! Yet when we come to look closely
at the homestead possibilities expressed by these figures, their grandeur begins to
melt away. In the first place, in these 1,387,732,209 acres are included the lands
which have been granted, but not yet patented, to railroad and other corporations,
which, counting the grants made at the last session, amount to about 200,000,000
acres in round numbers ; in the next place, we must deduct the 36*9, 000,000 acres of
Alaska, for in all human probability it will be some hundreds if not some thousands
of years before that Territory will be of much avail for agricultural purposes ; in the
third place, we must deduct the water surface of all the land States and Territories
(exclusive of Alaska), which, taking as a basis the 5,000,000 acres of water sur-
face contained in California, cannot be less than 80,000,000 acres, and probably
largely exceeds that amount. Still further, we must deduct the amount which will
be given under existing laws to the States yet to be erected, and which has been
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granted, or reserved for other purposes, which in the aggregate cannot fall short of
100,000,000 acres; leaving a net area of 650,000,000 acres—less than half the gross
amount of public land as given by the Commissioner.
When we come to consider what this land is, the magnificence of our first con-
ception is subject to still further curtailment. For it includes that portion of the
United States which is of the least value for agricultural purposes. It includes the
three greatest mountain chains of the continent, the dry elevated plains of the east-
ern slope of the Rocky Mountains and the arid alkali-cursed stretches of the great
interior basin; and it includes, too, a great deal of land in the older land States
which has been passed by the settler as worthless. Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada,
Idaho,"Montana, New Mexico and Arizona, though having an abundance of natural
wealth of another kind, probably contains less good land in proportion to their area
than any other States or Territories of the Union, excepting Alaska. They contain
numerous valleys which with irrigation will produce heavy crops, and vast areas of
good grazing lands which will make this section the great stock range of the Union
;
but the proportion of available agricultural land which they contain is very small.
Taking everything into consideration, and remembering that by the necessities
of tfceir construction the railroads follow the water courses and pass through the
lowest valleys, and therefore get the best land, and that it is fair to presume that
other grants also take the best, it is not too high an estimate to assume that, out
of the 650,000,000 acres which we have seen are left to the United States, there are
at least 200, 000, 000 acres which for agricultural or even for grazing purposes are
absolutely worthless, and which if ever reclaimed will not be reclaimed until the
pressure of population upon our lands is greater than is the present pressure of pop-
ulation upon the lands of Great Britain.
And, thus, the 1,387,732,209 acres which make such a showing in the Land Office
Reports come down in round numbers to but 450,000,000 acres out of which farms
can be carved, and even of this a great proportion consists of land which can be
cultivated only by means of irrigation, and of land which is only useful for grazing.
This estimate is a high one. Mr. E. T. Peters, of the Statistical Bureau, esti-
mates the absolutely worthless land at 241,000,000 acres. Senator Stewart, in a re-
cent speech, puts the land fit for homes at one-third of the whole—332,000,000
acres by his figuring, as he makes no deductions except for Alaska and the Texas
Pacific grant. Assuming his proportion to be correct, and admitting that the rail-
roads, etc., take their proportion of the bad as well as of the good land, we would
have, after making the proper deductions, but 216,000,000 acres of arable land yet left
to the United States.
But taking it at 450,000,000 acres. Our present population is in round numbers
40,000,000, and thus our "limitless domain," of which Congressmen talk so much
when about to vote a few million acres of it away, after all amounts to but twelve
acres per head of our present population.
Our Coming Population.
But let us look at those who are coming. The amount of our public land is but
one factor ; the number of those for whose use it will be needed is the other.
Our population, as shown by the census of last year, is 38,307,399. In 1860 it was
31,443,321, giving an increase for the decade of 6,864,078, or of a fraction less than
22 per cent. Previous to this, each decade had shown a steady increase at the rate
of 35 per cent., and this may be considered the rate of our normal growth. The
war, with its losses and Kirdens, and the political, financial and industrial perturba-
tions to which it gave rise, checked our growth during the last decade, but in that on
which we have now entered, there is little doubt that the growth of the nation will
resume its normal rate, to go on without retardation, unless by some such disturbing
influence as that of our great civil war, until the pressure of population begins to
approximate to the pressure of population in the older countries.
Taking, then, this normal rate as the basis of our calculation, let us see what the
increase of our population for the next fifty years will be :
In 1880 our population will be 51,714,989, an increase in that decade of 13,407,590
.. 1890 69,815,235, 18,100,246
.. 1900 94,250,567, 24,435,332
.. 1910 127,238,267, 32,987,700
.. 1920 171,771,610, 44,533,593
This estimate is a low one. The best estimates heretofore made give us a popu-
I lation of from 100,000,000 to 115,000,000 in 1900, and from 185,000,000 to 200,000,000
j in 1920, and there is little doubt that the Census of 1870, on which the calculation is
I based, does not show the true numbers of our people. But it is best to be on the
I safe side, and the figures given are sufficiently imposing. In truth, it is difficult to
I appreciate, certainly impossible to over-estimate, the tremendous significance of these
I figures when applied to the matter we are considering.
By 1880, the end of the present decade, our population will be thirteen millions
I and a half more than in 1870—that is to say, we shall have an addition to our popu-
lation of more than twice as many people as are now living in all the States and
Territories west of the Mississippi (including the whole of Louisiana), an addition
in ten years of as many people as there were in the whole of the United States in
I
1832.
By 1890 we shall have added to our present population thirty-one and a half
millions, an addition equal to the present population of the whole of Great Britain.
By the year 1900—twenty-nine years off—we shall have an addition of fifty-six
millions of people ; that is, we shall have doubled, and have increased eighteen mil-
lions beside.
By 1910, the end of the fourth decade, our increase over the population of 1870
will be eighty-nine millions, and by 1920 the increase will be nearly one hundred and
thirty-four millions; that is to say, at the end of a half century from 1870 we shall
have multiplied four and a half times, and the United States will then contain their
present population plus another population half as large as the present population of
the whole of Europe.
What becomes of our accustomed idea of the immensity of our public domain in
the light of these sober facts? Does our 450,000,000 acres of available public land
seem " practically inexhaustible " when we turn our faces towards the future, and
hear in imagination in the years that are almost on us, the steady tramp of the tens of
millions, and of the hundreds of millions, who are coming?
Vast as this area is, it amounts to but 33 acres per head to the increased popu-
lation which we will gain in the present decade ; to but 14 acres per head to the new
population which we will have in twenty years; to but four acres per head to the
additional population which we will have by the close of the century!
We need not carry the calculation any further. Our public domain will not last
so long. In fact, if we go ahead, disposing of it at the rate we are now doing, it will
not begin to last so long, and we may even count upon our ten fingers the years
beyond which our public lands will be hardly worth speaking of.
Between the years 1800 and 1870 our population increased about thirty-three
millions. During this increase of population, besides the disposal of vast tracts of
wild lands held by the original States, the Government has disposed of some
650,000,000 acres of the public domain. We have now some 450,000,000 acres of
available land left, which, in the aggregate, is not of near as good a quality as that
previously disposed of. The increase of population will amount to thirty-two mil-
lions in the next twenty years! Evidently, if we get rid of our remaining public land
at the rate which we have been getting rid of it since the organization of the General
Land Office, it will be all gone some time before the year 1890, and no child born this
year or last year, or even three years before that, can possibly get himself a home-
stead out of Uncle Sam's farm, unless he is willing to take a mountain-top or alkali
patch, or to emigrate to Alaska.
But the rate at which we are disposing of our public lands is increasing more
rapidly than the rate at which our population grows. Over 200,000,000 acres have
been granted during the last ten years to railroads alone, while bills are now pending
in Congress which call for about all there is left. And as our population increases,
the public domain becomes less and less, and the prospective value of land greater
and greater, so will the desire of speculators to get hold of land increase, and unless
there is a radical change in our land policy, we may expect to see the public domain
passing into private hands at a constantly increasing rate. When a thing is plenty,
nobody wants it; when it begins to get scarce, there is a general rush for it.
It will be said: Even if the public domain does pass into private hands, there
will be as much unoccupied laud as there otherwise would be, and let our population
increase as rapidly as it may, it will be a long time before there can be any real
scarcity of land in the United States. This is very true. Before we become as popu-
lous as France or England, we must have a population, not of one hundred millions
or two hundred millions, or even five hundred millions; but of one thousand millions,
and even then, if it is properly divided and properly cultivated, we shall not have
reached the limit of our land to support population. That limit is far, far off—so
far in fact that we need give ourselves no more trouble about it than about the
exhaustion of our coal measures. The danger that we have to fear, is not the over-
crowding, but the monopolization of our land—not that there will not be land enough
to support all, but that land will be so high that the poor man cannot buy it. That
time is not very far distant.
The Prospective Value of Land.
Some years ago an Ohio Senator* asserted that by the close of the century
there would not be an acre of average land in the United States that would not be
worth $50 in gold.
Supposing that our present land policy is to be continued, if he was mistaken at
all, it was in setting the time too far off.
Between the years 1810 and 1870, the increase in the population of the United
States was no greater than it will be between the years 1870 and 1890. Coincident
with this increase of population we have seen the value of land go up from nothing
to from $20 to $150 per acre over a much larger area than our public domain now
includes of good agricultural land.
And as soon as the public domain becomes nearly monopolized, land will go
up with a rush. The Government, with its millions of acres of public land, has
been the great bear in the land market. When it withdraws, the bulls will have it
their own way. That there is land to be had for $2 50 per acre in Dacotah lessens
the value of New York farms. Because there is yet cheap land to be had in some
parts of the State, land in the Santa Clara and Alameda Yalleys is not worth as much.
And in considering the prospective value of land in the United States, there are
two other things to be kept in mind : First, that with our shiftless farming we are
exhausting our land. That is, that year by year we require not only more land for an
increased population, but more land for the same population. And, second, that the
tendency of cheapened processes of manufacture is to increase the value of land.
Land Policy of the United States.
The best commentary upon our national land policy is the fact, stated by Senator
Stewart, that of the 447,000,000 acres disposed of by the Government, not 100,000,000
have passed directly into the hands of cultivators. If we add to this amount the lands
which have been granted, but not delivered, we have an aggregate of 650,000,000
acres disposed of to but 100,000,000 acres directly to cultivators—that is to say, six-
sevenths of the land has been put into the hands of people who did not want to
use it themselves, but to make a profit (that is, to exact a tax) from those who do
use it.
A generation hence our children will look with astonishment at the recklessness
with which the public domain has been squandered. It will seem to them that we
must have been mad. For certainly our whole land policy, with here and there a
gleam of common sense shooting through it, seems to have been dictated by the
desire to get rid of our lands as fast as possible. As the Commissioner of the General
Land Office puts it, seemingly without consciousness of the sarcasm involved, "It
has ever been the anxious desire of the Government to transmute its title to the soil
into private ownership by the most speedy processes that could be devised."
In one sense our land dealings have been liberal enough. The Government has
made nothing to speak of from its lands, for the receipts from sales has been not
much more than sufficient to pay the cost of acquisition or extinguishment of Indian
title, and the expenses of surveying and of the land office. But our liberality has
been that of a prince who gives away a dukedom to gratify a whim, or lets at a
nominal rent to a favored Farmer-General the collection of taxes for a province.
"We have been liberal, very liberal, to everybody but those who have a right to our
liberality, and to every importunate beggar to whom we would have refused money
we have given land—that is, we have given to him or to them the privilege of taxing
the people who alone would put this land to any use.
* Ben Wade.
So far as the Indians, on the one hand, and the English proprietaries of Crown
grants, on the other, were concerned, the founders of the American Republic were
clearly of the opinion that the land belongs to him who will use it ; but further than
this they did not seem to inquire. In the early days of the Government the sale of
wild lands was looked upon as a source from which abundant revenue might be
drawn. Sales were at first made in tracts of not less than a quarter township, or nine
square miles, to the highest bidder, at a minimum of §2 per acre, on long credits. It
was not until 1820 that the minimum price was reduced to §1.25 cash, and the Gov-
ernment condescended to retail in tracts of 160 acres. And it was not until 1841,
sixty-five years after the Declaration of Independence, that the right of pre-emption
was given to settlers upon surveyed land. In 1862 this right was extended to unsur-
veyed land. And in the same year, 1862, the right of every citizen to land, upon the
sole condition of cultivating it, was first recognized by the passage of the Homestead
law, which gives to the settler, after five years occupancy and the payment of $22
in fees, 160 acres of minimum (§1.25) or 80 acres of double-minimum (§2.50) land.
Still further in the right direction did the zeal of Congress for the newly enfran-
chised slaves carry it in 1866, when all the public lands in the five Southern land
States—Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida and Arkansas—were reserved for
homestead entry.*
But this growing liberality to the settler has been accompanied by a still more
rapidly growing liberality to speculators and corporations, and since the pre-emption
and homestead laws were passed, land monopolization has gone on at a faster rate
than ever. Without dwelling on the special means, such as the exercise of the treaty-
making power, by which large tracts of land in some of the "Western States have been
given to railroad corporations and individuals for a few cents per acre, let us look at
the general methods by which the monopolization of Government land has been and"
is being accomplished.
Public Sale and Private Entry.
The first method adopted for the disposal of public lands was their sale to the
highest bidder. This theory has never been abandoned. After lands have been
surveyed, they may, at any time, be ordered to be offered at public sale. This public
sale is only a matter of form, purchasers at more than the minimum price seldom or
never appearing. But the offering makes an important difference in the disposition
of the lands. Before being offered at public sale they are open only to pre-emption
and homestead entry—that is, to actual settlers, in tracts not exceeding 160 acres.
After being offered, they are open to private entry—that is, they may be purchased by
any one in any amount, at the minimum price, §1.25 per acre.
Whether by the misrepresentations of speculators or the inadvertence of the
authorities, public sales, as a general thing, have been ordered before the line of
settlement had fairly reached the land, and thus the speculator has been able to keep in
advance, picking out the choice lands in quantities to retail at a largely advanced
price, or to hold back from improvement for years.
By means of cabins built on wheels or at the intersection of quarter section lines,
and false affidavits, a good deal of land grabbing has also been done under the pre-
emption and homestead laws. More, however, in the Mississippi Valley States than
elsewhere.
Donations of Public Lands.
Thus land monopolization has gone on in the ordinary course of our land deal-
ings. But the extraordinary means which have done most to hasten it, have been
the donations of land in immense bodies.
It is a trite saying that men are always disposed to be liberal with that which is
not their own—a saying which has had exemplifications enough in the history of all
our legislative bodies. But there is a check to the appropriation of money, in the
taxation involved, which, if not felt by those who vote the money away, is felt by
their constituents. Not so with appropriations of land. No extra taxation is caused,
and the people at whose expense the appropriations are made—the settlers upon the
land—have not yet appeared. And so Congress has always been extremely hberal in
giving away the public lands on all pretexts, and its liberality has generally been
sanctioned, or at least never seriously questioned by public opinion.
* This reservation has been broken through by the passage of the Southern Pacific Railroad bill,
which gives 5,000,000 acres to a branch road, in Louisiana, which would be sure to be constructed
without any aid.
The donations of land by Congress have been to individuals, to States, and to
corporations.
The Bounty Land Grants.
The grants to individuals consist chiefly of bounties to soldiers and sailors of the
war of 1812 and the Mexican War, and amount to about 73,000,000 acres, for which
transferable warrants were issued. Nearly all of this scrip passed into the hands of
speculators, not one warrant in five hundred having been located by or for the
original holder. It has been estimated that, on an average, the warrants did not
yield the donees 25 cents per acre. But taking 50 cents as a basis, we are able to form
an idea of the disproportion between the cost of the gift to the nation and the benefit
to the soldiers. Leaving out of the calculation the few that have taken the land
given them, we find that the Government gave up a revenue of $91,067,500, which it
would have received from the sale of the land at $1.25 per acre, in order to give the
soldiers $36,427,000, or, in other words, every dollar the soldiers got cost the nation
$2.50! Nor does this tell the whole story. Though some of this scrip was located by
settlers who purchased it from brokers at an advance on the price paid soldiers, most
of it has been located by speculators who, with the same capital, have been enabled
to monopolize much more land than they could otherwise have monopolized, and to
monopolize land even before it was offered at public sale. If we estimate the advance
which settlers have had to pay in consequence of this speculation at $2 per acre for
the amount of transferred scrip, we have a tax upon settlers of $145,708,000, which
added to the loss of the Government, gives a total of $236,775,500, given by the Gov-
ernment and exacted from settlers in order to give the soldiers $36,427,000! And yet
the story is not told. To get at the true cost of this comparatively insignificant gift,
we should also have to estimate the loss caused by dispersion—by the widening of
the distance between producer and consumer—which the land speculation, resulting
from the issue of bounty warrants, has caused. But here figures fail us.
Grants to States.
The donations of land by the General Government to individual States have been
large. Besides special donations to particular States, the general donations are
500,000 acres for internal improvements, ten sections for public buildings, seventy-
two sections for seminaries, two sections in each township (or l-18th) for common
schools, and all the swamp and overflowed lands, for purposes of reclamation. These
grants have been made to the States which contain public land, of land within their
borders. In addition, all the States have been given 30,000 acres for each of their
Senators and Bepresentatives, for the establishment of agricultural colleges.
If land is to be sold, it is certainly more just that the proceeds should go to the
States in which it is located than to the General Government, and the purposes for
which these giants have been made are of the best. Yet judging from the stand-
point of a right land policy, which would give the settler his land at the mere cost of
surveying and book-keeping, even in theory, they are bad. For why should the cost of
public buildings, or even of public education, be saddled upon the men who are just
making themselves farms, who, as a class, have the least capital, and to whom their
capital is of the most importance?
But whether right or wrong in theory, in practice, like the military bounties,
these grants. have proved of but little benefit to the States in comparison with their
cost to the nation and to settlers. As a general rule they have been squan-
dered by the States, and their principal effect has been to aid in the monopolization
of land. How true this is will be seen more clearly when we come to look at the land
policy of the State of California.
The Agricultural College Grant
The Agricultural College grant was made in 1862, and has since been extended
as the Bepresentatives of other States have been admitted. It aggregates 9,510,000
acres, and if extended to the Territories as they come in, will take at least 11,000,000
acres. This grant differs from the other State grants in this : that it is given to all
States, whether they contain public land or not; those in which there is no public
land being permitted to take their land in other States which do contain it. This
feature makes this grant, in theory at least, the very worst of the grants, for it throws
upon the settlers in new and poor States the burden of supporting colleges not merely
for their own State but for other and far richer States.
For instance, the State of New York, the most populous and wealthy member of
the Union, receives 990,000 acres, which must all be located in the poor far-Western
States. Thus to this old and rich State is given the power of taxing the settlers upon
nearly a million acres in far-off and poor States for the maintenance of a college
which she is far more able to support than they are. If New York has located this
land well, and retains it (as I believe is the intention), in a very few years she will be
able to rent it for one-fourth or even one-third of the crop. That is, for the support
of one of her own institutions, New York will be privileged to tax 50, 000 people,
fifteen hundred or two thousand miles away, to the amount of one-fourth or one-third
of their gross earnings. And as time passes, and population becomes denser, and
land more valuable, the number of people thus taxed will increase and the tax
become larger. The Cornell University, to which the New York grant has been made
over, is a noble and beneficent institution; but will any one say that it is just to throw
the burden of its support upon the laboring classes of far-off States?
The same thing is true of all the old and rich States which are thus given the
right to tax the producers of new and poorer States. That most of these States have
sold this right to speculators at rates ranging from 37% to 80 cents per acre, only
makes the matter worse.
But perhaps this injustice is even more evident in the case of those Southern
States which do contain public land. The public land of Texas (of which there are
some 80,000,000 acres left) belongs to the State ; that in the other Southern land
States was reserved for homestead entry by the Act of 1866. These States get the
same amount of land under this grant as the others; but none of it is taken from
their own lands, and their college scrip is now being plastered over the public lands
in California and the Northwest, much of it being located here
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California gets 150,000 acres under the Act. Yet, besides this, there have been
located here up to June of last year more than 750,000 acres of the land scrip of other
States, and large amounts have since been located or are here ready for location as
soon as immigration sets in. This scrip brought to the States to which it was issued
an average of probably, 50 cents per acre. What the giving of this paltry donation
has cost us we know too well. A great deal of the land thus located at a cost to the
speculator of 50 cents per acre has been sold to settlers at prices ranging from $5 to
$10 per acre, much of it is held for higher prices than can now be obtained; and a
great deal of it is being rented for one-fourth of the gross produce, the renter supply-
ing all the labor and furnishing all the seed; while the land monopolization of which
this agricultural scrip has been one of the causes, has turned back immigration from
California, has made business of all kinds dull, and kept idle thousands of mechanics
and producers who would gladly have been adding to the general wealth.
Badly as California has suffered, other States have suffered worse. Wisconsin is
entitled to 210,000 acres; yet, up to June, 1870, 1,111,385 acres had been located in
that State with agricultural scrip. Nebraska gets only 90, 000 acres, yet the agricul-
tural scrip locations in Nebraska up to the same time were nearly a million acres.
Railroad Grants.
Some four millions of acres have been donated for the construction of various wagon
roads, and some four millions and a half for the construction of canals ; but by far
the largest grants have been to railroads—the amount given to these companies
within the last ten years aggregating nearly oue-half as much as all the public
lands disposed of in other ways since the formation of the Government. This policy
was not commenced until 1850, when six sections per mile, or in all 2,595,053 acres,
were granted for the construction of the Illinois Central road. This donation was
made to the State, and by it assigned to the company on condition of the payment to
the State of seven per cent of its gross receipts in lieu of taxation. This grant, which
now seems so insignificant, was then regarded as princely, and so it was, as it has
more than paid for the building and equipment of the road. The example being set,
other grants of course followed. In 1862, a long leap ahead in the rapidity of
the disposal of the public lands was taken in the passage of the first Pacific Railroad
' bill, giving directly, without the intervention of States, to the Union, Central and
Kansas companies ten sections of land per mile, (at that time the largest amount ever
granted) and $16,000 per mile in bonds. In 1864 this grant was doubled, making
it twenty sections or 12, 800 acres per mile, and at the same time the bonded subsidy
was trebled for the mountain districts and doubled for the interior basin while the
Government first mortgage for the payment of the bonds was changed into a second
mortgage.
But the disposition to give away lands kept on increasing, and the Northern and
Southern Pacific getting no bonds, the land grant to them was again doubled
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making it forty sections or 25,600 acres per mile, or, to speak exactly, twenty sections
in the States and forty sections in the Territories. To these three Pacific roads alone
have been given 150,000,000 acres in round numbers—more than is contained in all
Germany, Holland and Belgium, with their population of over fifty millions—more
land than that of any single European State except Russia. The largest single
grant—and it is a grant unparalleled in the history of the world—is that to the
Northern Pacific, which aggregates 58,000,000 acres. And besides this these roads
get 400 feet right of way (which in the case of the Northern Pacific amounts to
100,000 acres), what land they want for depots, stations, etc., and the privilege of
taking material from Government land, which means that they may cut all the tim-
ber they wish off Government sections, reserving that on their own. With these
later grants has also been inaugurated the plan of setting aside a tract on each side of
the grant in which the companies may make up any deficiency within the original
limits by reason of settlement. Thus the grant to the Southern Pacific withdraws
from settlement a belt of land sixty miles wide in California and one hundred miles
wide in the Territories, and that to the Northern Pacific withdraws a belt one hun-
dred and twenty miles wide from the western boundary of Minnesota to Puget Sound
and the Columbia River.
Since the day when Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage we may search
history in vain for any parallel to such concessions. Munificence, we call it ! Why,
our common use of words leave no term in the English tongue strong enough to
express such reckless prodigality. Just think of it! 25,600 acres of land for the
building of one mile of railroad—land enough to make 256 good sized American
farms; land enough to make 4,400 such farms as in Belgium support a family each in
independence and comfort. And this given to a corporation, not for building a rail-
road for the Government or for the people, but for building a railroad for themselves;
a railroad which they will own as absolutely as they will own the land—a railroad for
the use of which both Government and people must pay as much as though they had
given nothing for its construction.
The Value of These Grants.
If we look but a few years ahead, to the time when we shall begin to feel the
pressure of a population of one hundred millions, the value of these enormous grants
is simply incalculable. But their immediate value is greatly underestimated. Land
was given to the first Pacific roads as though it had not and never would have any
value. Money enough to build the roads and leave princely fortunes besides was
placed in the hands of the companies and the land was thrown in as a liberal grocer
might throw an extra lump of sugar into the already falling scale. Yet it is already
apparent that by far the most valuable part of these franchises are these land grants.
The timber which the Central Pacific gets in the Sierra will of itself yield more than
the cost of the whole road. In addition, it has large amounts of good agricultural
lands in California and along the Nevada river-bottoms, and millions of acres of the
best grazing lands in the sage brush plains of Nevada and. Utah, while there are thou-
sands of acres of its lands which will have enormous value from the coal, salt, iron,
lead, copper and other minerals they contain. The Union Pacific lands in the Platte
Valley have, so far as sold, yielded it an average of $5 per acre; and though it gets no
timber to speak of, it has millions of acres which will soon be valuable for grazing,
and for a long distance its route passes through the greatest coal and iron deposits of
the Continent, where much of its 12,600 acres per mile will in time be valued at thou-
sands of dollars per acre.
Twenty years ago, when the Illinois Central received its grant, its lands were
worth no more than those now given the Northern Pacific. Yet the lands sold by the
Illinois Central have averaged over $12 per acre, and those yet remaining on hand
are held at a still higher price. Counting at the Company's price what is held, the
grant has yielded over $30,000,000—much more than the cost of the road. If six
sections per mile will do this in twenty years, what should forty sections per mile do?
The Directors of the Northern Pacific have themselves estimated their grant to be
worth $10 per acre on the completion of the road. I think they rather under than
over estimated it, and for an obvious reason. A true statement of the real value of
the grant would tend to discredit the whole affair in the eyes of the cautious foreign
capitalists, from whom the Company seeks to borrow money, for they would not
believe that any Government could be extravagant enough to make such a donation.
But it must be remembered that the line of the Northern Pacific passes for nearly its
whole length through as fine an agricultural country as that of Illinois; that its grant
consists, in large part, of immensely valuable timber and mineral land, and that it
will build up town after town, one of them at least, a great commercial city, on its own
soil.
Furthermore, for reasons before stated, the increase in the value of land during
the next twenty years must be much greater than it has been in the last twenty years.
Taking these things into consideration, is it too much to say that in twenty years from
now the lands of the Company will have sold for or will be worth an average of at
least $20 per acre? At this rate the grant amounts to over half a million dollars per
mile, or in the aggregate to the enormous sum of $1,160,000,000—a sum more than
half the National debt. This donated absolutely to one corporation. And for what?
For building a road which cannot cost more than eighty millions, and for building it
for themselves
!
No keener satire upon our land grant policy could be written than that which is
to be found in the published advertisement of this Northern Pacific Company. The
Directors show that if they get an average of but $2 per acre for their land, they can
pay the whole cost of building and equipping the road and have a surplus of some
$20,000,000 left. That is to say, the Government might have built the road by merely
raising the average price of the lands $1 per acre, and have made a profit by the
operation, while it would then own the road, and could give or lease it to the Com-
pany which would agree to charge the lowest rates. As it is, the Government has
praised the price to settlers on one-half the land $1.25 per acre; the other half it has
\given to the Company to charge settlers just what it pleases ; and then on this railroad
which it has made the settlers pay for over and over again both Government and
settlers must pay for transportation just as though the road had been built by private
means.
The Argument for Railroad Grants.
So plausible and so ably urged are the arguments for these grants, such general
acceptance have they gained, and so seldom are they challenged (for the opposition
which has been made has been rather against the extravagance than the theory of the
grants) that it is worth while to consider them with some care.
The plea for railroad land grants is about this : By giving land to secure the
building of railroads, we develop the country without expense, or at least at the ex-
pense of those who largely profit by the operation. The land which we give is useless
as it is; the railroad makes it useful and valuable. The Government giving really
nothing of present value, does not even deprive itself of that which it might receive
in the future, for it is reimbursed for the selling price of the land it gives by doub-
ling the price of the land it retains. The Government in fact acts like a sagacious
individual, who having an unsalable estate, gives half of it away to secure improve-
ments which will enable him to sell the other half for as much as he at first asked for
the whole. The settler is also the gainer, for land at $2.50 per acre with a railroad
is worth more to him than land at $1.25 per acre without a railroad, and vast
stretches of territory are opened to him to which he could not otherwise go for lack of
means to transport his produce to market; while the country at large is greatly the
gainer by the enormous wealth which railroads always create.
" Here are thousands of square miles of fertile land," cries an eloquent Senator,
"the haunt of the bear, the buffalo and the wandering savage, but of no use whatever to
civilized man, for there is no railroad to furnish cheap and quick communication
with the rest of the world. Give away a few millions of these acres for the building of a
railroad and all this land may be used. People will go there to settle, farms will be
tilled and towns will arise, and these square miles, now worth nothing, will
have a market and a taxable value, while their productions will stream across the conti-
nent, making your existing cities still greater and their people still richer; giving
freight to your ships and work to your mills.
"
All this sounds very eloquent to the land grant man who stands in the lobby wait-
ing for the little bill to go through which is make him a millionaire, and really convinces
him that he is a benefactor of humanity, the Joshua of the hardy settler and the
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Moses of the down-trodden immigrant. And backed tip, as it is, by columns of figures
showing the saving in railroad over wagon transportation, the rapidity of settlement
where land grants have been already made, and the increase in the value of real
estate, it sounds very plausible to those who have not anything like the reason to be
as easily convinced as has the land grant man. But will it bear the test of examination?
Let us see
:
In the first place it must be observed that the consideration for which we make
these grants is purely one of time—to get railroads built before they would otherwise
be built. No one will seriously pretend that without land grants railroads would never
be built; all that can be claimed is that without grants they would not be built so soon
—that is, until the prospective business would warrant the outlay. This is what we get,
or rather expect to get, for we do not always get it. What do we give ? We give land.
That is, we give the company, in addition to the power of charging (practically what
it pleases) for the carrying it does, the unlimited power of charging the people who
are to settle upon one-half the land for the privilege of settling there. If the Govern-
ment loses nothing, it is because the settlers on one-half of the land must pay double
price to reimburse it, while the settlers on the other half must pay just what the com-
pany chooses to ask them.
Now, in the course of the settlement of this land there comes a time when there
are enough settlers, together with the prospective increase of settlers, to warrant the
building of a railroad without a land grant. Admitting that the settlers who come
upon the land before that time are gainers by the land grant in getting a railroad
before they otherwise would, * it is evident that the settlers after that time are losers
by the amount of the additional price which they must pay for their land, for they
would have had a railroad anyhow.
And this point where the gain of settlers ceases, and the loss of settlers com-
mences, is very much nearer the beginning of settlement:—that is to say, there are
fewer gainers and more losers, than might at first glance be supposed. For if there
were no land grants at all, the land would be open to settlers as homesteads, or at
$1.25 per acre, and therefore the number of actual settlers which would justify the
construction of a non-land grant railroad would be very much smaller than that which
would suffice to furnish a land grant railroad with a paying business, as the pros-
pective increase during and upon the completion of the road would be very much
greater.
So therefore, when, by giving a land grant, we get a railroad to precede settle-
ment, if the first settlers gain at all, the others lose. The gain of the first is lessened
by their having to pay double price for their lands; the loss of the others is mitigated
by no gain. Ho that, as far as settlers are concerned, we are sacrificing the future
for the present; we are taxing the many for the very questionable benefit of the few.
And even in the case of the gainers, their first advantage in having a railroad before
its natural time, is offset by the subsequent retardation of settlement in their neigh-
borhood which the land grant causes.
For if the first effect of the Land grant is to hasten settlement by getting a railroad
built, its second effect is to retard it by enhancing the price of lands. Illinois, where
the first railroad land grant was made, may in a year or two after, have had more
people, but for years back her population has certainly been less because of it. For
* But as to this it must be remembered, that the gain to the settler is not to be measured by
the increased advantage which the railroad gives to the new land through which it is built, but by
the difference in advantage which that land offers over the land on which he would otherwise have
settled. Thus we cannot estimate the gain from the building of the Northern Pacific road to the
people now settling along its route in Minnesota and Decotah by the saving in the cost of transporta-
tion of the produce of that land ; for had the road not been projected, they would not have settled
there, but would have settled in Iowa or Nebraska, where railroads are already built ; and thus the
gain they derive from the building of the Northern Pacific is not to be measured by the increased
advantage which the railroad gives for the cultivation of the land on which they are settling, but by
the advantage which the railroad gives that land over land in Iowa or Nebraska, on which they would
otherwise have settled.
At first look, it would appear that all the people who go where a new railroad is built must
gain something that they could not gain elsewhere, as otherwise they would not go there. This is
doubtless true as regards such gain as inures to the individual without regard to other individuals,
but not always true as regards such individual gain as is also a gain to the community. For some
part of the population which accompanies the building of a railroad through an unsettled country, come s
to minister to the needs and desires of those who build it, and is merely to be regarded as an append-
age of the building force, and with many of the others the expectation of advantage is prospective
and speculative. They settle in the new country which the road is opening up, not because their
labor will yield them a larger return than in other places to which they might go, but because they
ean get choice locations or a larger amount of land, which population afterwards to come will make
valuable. That, is the gain which they expect is not from the increased productiveness of their own
labor, but from the appropriation of some portion of other people's labor—and is not a gain to the
community, though it may be a loss.
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nearly half a million acres— one-fifth of this grant—remained unoccupied in 1870, the
company holding it at an average price of $13 per acre. If this land could have been
had for $1.25 per acre, it would have been occupied years ago. This is the case
•wherever land grants have been made, and long before the Territories in which we
are now giving away 25,000 acres per mile for the building of railroads, are one-tenth
settled, we will be asked to give away like amounts of other unappropriated territory
(if there is any by that time left) in order to furnish "cheap homes to the settlers!"
Considering all the people who are to come upon our now unoccupied lands,
weighing the near future with the present, is it not evident that the policy of land
grants is a most ruinous one even in theory—even when we get by it that which we
bargain to get? Let us see how it affects the community at large in the present.
Where a land grant is necessary to induce the building of a road, it is because
the enterprise itself will not pay—that is to say, at least, that it will not yield as large
a return for the investment as the same amount of capital would yield if invested
somewhere else. The land grant is a subsidy which we give to the investers to make
up this loss.
Is it not too plain for argument, that where capital is invested in a less remu-
nerative enterprise than it otherwise would be, there is a loss to the whole community?
Whether that loss is made up to the individuals by a subsidy or not, only affects the
distribution of the loss among individuals—the loss to the community, which includes
all its individuals, is the same.
But it will be said : Though this may be true so far as the direct returns of the
railroad are concerned, there are other advantages from railroad building besides the
receipts from fares and freights. The owners of the land through which the road
passes, the producer and the consumer of the freight which it carries, and the pas-
senger who rides upon it, are all benefited to an amount far exceeding the sums paid
as fares and freights. When we give a land grant, we merely give the railroad com-
pany a share in these diffused profits, which will make up to it the loss which would
accrue were it confined to its legitimate share. Thus: Here is a railroad, the business
of which would not pay for building it for five years yet. The loss to the unsubsi-
dized company which would build it now and run it for five years, would be
$10,000,000. But the gain to land owners and others would be $100,000,000. Now,
if by a land grant or otherwise, we secure to the railroad company a share of this
collateral gain, amounting to $20,000,000, the railroad company will make a profit of
$10,000,000, instead of a loss of $10,000,000, by building the road, and others would
make a profit of $80,000,000.
But it must be remembered that every productive enterprise, besides its return
to those who undertake it, yields collateral advantages to others. It is the law of the
universe—each for all, and all for each. If a man only plant a fruit tree, his gain is
that he gathers its fruit in its time and its season. But in addition to his gain, there
is a gain to the whole community in the increased supply of fruit, and in the benefi-
cial effect of the tree upon the climate. If he build a factory, besides his own profit
he furnishes others with employment and with profit; he adds to the value of sur-
rounding property. And if he builds a railroad, whether it be here or there, there
are diffused benefits, besides the direct benefit to himself from its receipts.
Now, as a general rule, is it not safe to assume that the direct profits of any
enterprise are the test of its diffused profits? For instance: It will pay to put up
an ice-making machine rather in New Orleans than in Bangor. Why? Because
there are more people in New Orleans who need ice, and they need it more than in
Bangor. The individual profit will be greater, because the general profit will be
greater. It will pay capitalists better to build a railroad between San Francisco and
Santa Cruz than it will to build a like railroad in Washington Territory. Why?
Because there are more people who will ride, and more freight to be carried, on the
one than on the other. And as the diffused benefit of a railroad can only mure
from the carrying of passengers and freight, is it not evident that the diffused benefit
is greater in the one case than in the other, just in proportion as the direct benefit is
greater?
In the second place, in any particular case in which we have to offer a subsidy to
get a railroad built, the question is not, shall we have this railroad or nothing?—but,
shall we have this road in preference to something else?—for the investment of capi-
tal in one enterprise prevents its investment in another. No legislative Act, no issue
of bonds, no grant of lands, can create capital. Capital, so to speak, is stored-up
labor, and only labor can create it. The available capital of the United States at any
given time is but a given quantity. It may be invested here or it may be invested
there, but it is only here or there that it can be invested. Nor is there any illimit-
able supply abroad to borrow from. The amount of foreign capital seeking invest-
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ment in the United States is about so much each year; and if by increasing our
offers we get any more, we must pay more, not merely for the increased amount which
we get, but for all which we get.
To recur, now, to our former example : Here is a railroad through an unsettled
country, which to build now would, relying upon its direct receipts, entail a loss of
$10,000,000, the diffused benefits of which may be estimated at $100,000,000. Here
is another railroad which it would take the same capital to build, which, in the same
time, would yield a direct profit of $5,000,000, and the diffused benefits of which it is
fair to presume might be expressed by $300,000,000. Now if we offer to the build-
ers of the first road a land grant which will enable them to obtain one-fifth of the
diffused benefits of the road, we could induce them to build that road rather than the
other, for they would make twice as much by doing so. But what would be the net
result to the community ? Clearly a loss of $215,000,000. That is to say: By offering
a land grant we could induce capitalists to build a road in Washington Territory,
rather than between San Francisco and Santa Cruz. But if we did do so, the people
between San Francisco and Santa Cruz would lose far more than the capitalists and
the Washington Territory settlers would gain ; the people of the Pacific Coast, as a
whole, and the United States, as a whole, would be poorer than if we had left capital
free to seek the investments which would of themselves return to it the largest profits.
The comparison between an individual and the nation is fallacious. The one is a
part, the other is the whole. The individual lives but a few years, the lifetime of the
nation is counted by centuries. It may profit an individual to induce people to settle or
capital to be invested in certain places; the nation can only profit by having its pop-
ulation and its capital so located and invested that the largest returns will be realized.
It may profit an individual to sacrifice the near future to the present, but it cannot
profit a nation.
As concerns the statistics by which the benefits ofland grant railroads are attempted
to be shown, it must be remembered, first, that the population of the United States is
growing at the rate of a million per year, and next, that increase in the value of
land is not increase in wealth. That whatever population railroads have brought to new
States and Territories is dispersion, not increase, is proven by the fact that the popu-
lation of the United States is not increasing faster than it did before railroad building
commenced, while the slightest consideration of economic laws shows that whatever
gain has resulted from their building is at the expense of a greater gain which would
have resulted from the investment of the same capital where it was more needed—in
fact, that there is no gain, but a loss. We have been supposing that land grants secure
the consideration for which they are given—the building of roads before they would
otherwise be built ; but this is far from being always the case. With the excep-
tion, perhaps, of the little Stockton and Copperopolis road, the California grants have
not hastened the building of railroads, but have actually retarded it, by retarding
settlement. The fact is, that in nearly all cases these land grants are made to men
who do not propose, and who have not the means, to build the road. They keep
them (procuring extensions of time, when necessary*) until they can sell out to others
who wish to build, and who, on their part, generally delay until they can see a
profit in the regular business.
To sum up : When we give a land grant for the building of a railroad, we either
get a railroad built before it would bu built by private enterprise, or we do not.
If we do not, our land is given for nothing; if we do, capital is diverted from more
to less productive investments, and we are the poorer for the operation.
In either case the land grant tends to disperse population; in either case it causes
the monopolization of land; in either case it makes the many poorer, and a few the
richer.
I have devoted this much space to answering directly the argument for railroad
land grants, because they are constantly urged, and are seldom squarely met, and
because so long as we admit that we may profit by thus granting away land in " rea-
sonable amounts," we shall certainly find our lands going in " unreasonable amounts."
?5ut surely it requires no argument to show that this thing of giving away from twelve
o twenty-five thousand acres per mile of road in order to get people to build a rail-
road for themselves, is a wicked extravagance for which no satisfactory excuse can be
made. This land, now so worthless that we give it away by the million acres without
a thought, is only worthless because the people who are to cultivate it have not yet
arrived. They are coming fast—we have seen how fast. While there is plenty of
uncultivated land in the older States we are giving away the land in the Territories under
the plea of hastening settlement, and when the time comes that these lands are really
* Congress, in 1870, actually passed a bill extending the time for the completion of the
first 20 miles of Western road to which a land grant was made in 1853,
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needed for cultivation, they will all be monopolized, and the settler, go where he will,
must pay largely for the privilege of cultivating soil which since the dawn of
creation has been waiting his coming. We need not trouble ourselves about
railroads; settlement will go on without them—as it went on in Ohio and Indiana, as
it has gone on since our Aryan forefathers left the Asiatic cradle of the race on their
long westward journey. Without any giving away of the land, railroads with every
other appliance of civilization will come in their own good time. Of all people, the
American people need no paternal Government to direct their enterprise. All they
ask is fair play, as between man and man; all the best Government can do for them
is to preserve order and administer justice.
There may be cases in which political or other non-economic reasons may make
the giving of a subsidy for the building of a road advisable. In such cases, a money
subsidy is the best, a land subsidy the worst. But if the policy of selling our lands
is continued, and it is desirable to make the payment of the subsidy contingent upon
the sale of the land, then the proceeds of the land, not the land itself, should be
granted.
There is one argument for railroad land grants which I have neglected to notice.
Senator Stewart pleads that these grants have kept the land from passing into the
hands of speculators, who would have taken more than the railroad companies, and
have treated the settlers less liberally than the companies. Perhaps he is right; there
is certainly some truth in his plea. But if he is right, what does that prove ? Not the
goodness of railroad grants; but the badness of the laws which allow speculation in
the public lands.
II.
THE LA^DS OF CALIFORNIA.
How Far Land Monopolization has already Gone.
In all the new States of the Union land monopolization has gone on at an alarm-
ing rate, but in none of them so fast as in California, and in none of them, perhaps,
are its evil effects so manifest.
California is the greatest land State in the Union, both in extent (for Texas owns
her own land) and in the amount of land still credited to the Government in Depart-
ment reports. With an area of 188,981 square miles, or, in round numbers, 121,000,000
acres, she has a population of less than 600, 000—that is to say, with an area twenty-
four times as large as Massachusetts, she has a population not half as great. Of this
population not one-third is engaged in agriculture, and the amount of land under
cultivation does not exceed 2,500,000 acres. Surely land should here be cheap, and
the immigrant should come with the certainty of getting a homestead at Government
price! But this is not so. Of the 100,000,000 acres of public land which, according
to the last report of the Department, yet remain in California (which of course in-
cludes all the mountains and sterile plains), some 20,000,000 acres are withheld from
settlement by railroad reservations, and millions of acres more are held under
unsettled Mexican grants, or by individuals under the possessory laws of the State,
without color of title. Though here or there, if he knew where to find it, there may
be a little piece of Government land left, the notorious fact is that the immigrant
coming to the State to-day must, as a general thing, pay their price to the middlemen
before he can begin to cultivate the soil. Although the population of California, all
told—miners, city residents, Chinamen and Diggers—does not amount to three to
the square mile ; although the arable land of the State has hardly been scratched
(and with all her mountains and dry plains California has an arable surface greater
than the entire area of Ohio), it is already so far monopolized that a large part of the
farming is done by renters, or by men who cultivate their thousands of acres in a
single field. For the land of California is already to a great extent monopolized by a
few individuals, who hold thousands and hundreds of thousands of acres apiece.
Across many of these vast estates a strong horse cannot gallop in a day, and one may
travel for miles and miles over fertile ground where no plow has ever struck, but
which is all owned, and on which no settler can come to make himself a home, unless
he pay such tribute as the lord of the domain chooses to exact.
Nor is there any State in the Union in which settlers in good faith have been so
persecuted, so robbed, as in California. Men have grown rich, and men still make a
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regular business of blackmailing settlers upon public land, or of appropriating their
homes, and this by the power of the law and in the name of justice. Land grabbers
have had it pretty much their own way in California—they have moulded the policy
of the General Government; have dictated the legislation of the State; have run the
land offices and used the Courts.
Let us look briefly at the modes by which this land monopolization has been
carried on.
The Mexican Grants.
California has had one curse which the other States have not had*—the Mexican
grants. The Mexican land policy was a good one for a sparsely settled pastoral
country, such as California before the American occupation. To every citizen who
would settle on it, a town lot was given; to every citizen who wanted it, a cattle range
was granted. By the terms of the cession of California to the United States it was
provided that these rights should be recognized.
It would have been better, far better, if the American Government had agreed to
permit these grant-holders to retain a certain definite amount of land around their
improvements, and compounded for the rest the grants called for, by the payment of
a certain sum per acre, turning it into the public domain. This would have been
best, not onlyfor the future population of California, but for the grant-holders them-
selves as the event has proved.
Or, if means had been taken for a summary and definite settlement of these
claims, the evils entailed by them would have been infinitesimal compared with what
have resulted. For it is not the extent of the grants (and all told the bona fide ones
call for probably nine or ten million acres of the best land of California) which
has wrought the mischief, so much as their unsettled condition—not the treaty with
Mexico, but our own subsequent policy.
It is difficult in a brief space to give anything like an adequate idea of the
villainies for which these grants have been made the cover. If the history of the
Mexican grants of California is ever written, it will be a history of greed, of perjury,
of corruption, of spoliation and high-handed robbery, for which it will be difficult to
find a parallel.
The Mexican grants were vague, running merely for so many leagues within
certain natural boundaries, or between other grants, though they were generally
marked out in rough fashion. It is this indefiniteness which has given such an
opportunity for rascality, and has made them such a curse to California, and which,
at the same time, has prevented in nearly all cases their original owners from reaping
from them any commensurate benefit. Between the Commission which first passed
upon the validity of the grants and final patent, a thousand places were found where
the grant could be tied up, and where, indeed, after twenty-three years of litigation
the majority of them still rest. Ignorant of the language, of the customs, of the laws
of the new rulers of their country, without the slightest idea of technical subtleties
and legal delays, mere children as to business—the native grant-holders were com-
pletely at the mercy of shrewd lawyers and sharp speculators, and at a very early day
nearly all the grants passed into other hands.
How the Grants Float.
As soon as settlers began to cultivate farms and make improvements, the grants
began to float. The grant-holders watched the farmers coming into their neighbor-
hood, much as a robber chief of the Middle Ages might have watched a rich Jew
taking up his abode within striking distance of his castle. The settler may have been
absolutely certain that he was on Government land, and may even have been so
assured by the grant-holder himself; but so soon as he had built his house and fenced
his land and planted his orchard, he would wake up some morning to find that the
grant had been floated upon him, and that his land and improvements were claimed
by some land shark who had gouged a native Californian out of his claim to a cattle
run, or wanting an opportunity to do this, had set up a fraudulent grant, supported
by forged papers and suborned witnesses. Then he must either pay the blackmailer's
price, abandon the results of his hard labor, or fight the claim before Surveyor-
*The Territory of New Mexico is afflicted in the same way.
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General, Courts, Commissioner, Secretary, and Congress itself, while his own property
parceled out into contingent fees, furnished the means for carrying the case from one
tribunal to another, for buying witnesses and bribing corrupt officials. And then,
frequently, after one set of settlers had been thus robbed, new testimony would be
discovered, a new survey would be ordered, and the grant would stretch out in an-
other direction over another body of settlers, who would then suffer in the same way,
while in many cases, as soon as one grant had been bought off or beaten away,
another grant would come, and there are pieces of land in California for which four or
five different titles have been purchased.
The ruling of the Courts has been, that so long as the grants had not been
finally located, their owners might hold possession within their exterior boundaries
and eject settlers. Thus, if a grant is for one league, within certain natural
boundaries which include fifty, the claimant can put settlers off any part of the
fifty leagues.
Whenever any valuable mine or spring is discovered in the neighborhood of
any of these grants, then the grant jumps. If they prove worthless, then it floats
back again. Thus the celebrated Mariposa claim, after two or three locations in the
valley, was finally carried up into the mountains, where it had as much biisiness as it
would have had in Massachusetts or Ohio, and stretched out into the shape of a
boot, to cover a rich mining district. Among the property given to John Charles
Fremont and his partners, by this location, was the Ophir mine and mill, upon
which an English Company had spent over $100, 000, after assurances from the Mari-
posa people that the mine was outside their claim. In the southern half of Cali-
fornia, where these grants run, there has been hardly a valuable spring or mine
discovered that was not pounced upon by a grant. One of the latest instances, was
the attempt to float the Cuyamaca grant over the new San Diego mining district, and
to include some sixty-five mines—one of them, the Pioneer, on which $200,000 has
been expended. Another was the attempt to float a grant over the noted Geyser
Springs, in Sonoma county. In both these cases the attempt was defeated, General
Hardenburgh refusing to approve the surveys. In the latter case, however, it was dog
eat dog, the great scrip locator, W. S. Chapman, having plastered a Sioux warrant
over the wonderful springs. He has since obtained a patent, though I understand
that somebody else laid a school land warrant on the springs before Chapman.
How the Grants are Stretched Out.
Hardly any attention seems to have been paid to the amount of land granted by
the Mexican authorities. Though, under the colonization laws, eleven leagues (a Mexi-
can league contains 4,438 acres) constituted the largest amount that could be granted,
many of these grants have been confirmed and patented for much more (in the teeth
of a decision of the United States Supreme Court) and under others yet unsettled,
much larger amounts are still held. Grants for one league have been confirmed for
eleven. Claims rejected bj the Commission have been confirmed by the District
Courts, and claims rejected by other decisions of the Supreme Court have been got
through by the connivance of law officers of the Government who would suffer the
time for appeal to lapse or take it so that it would be thrown out on a technicality.
As for the surveys they might almost as well have been made by the grant hold-
lers themselves, and seem, as a general thing, to have run about as the grant holders
wished. The grants have been extended here, contracted there, made to assume all
sorts of fantastic shapes, for the purpose of covering the improvements of settlers
and taking in the best land. There is one of them that on the map looks for all
the world like a tarantula—a fit emblem of the whole class. In numbers of cases the
names of which might be recited, grants of four leagues have been stretched in the
survey to eight; grants of two leagues to six; grants of five to ten; and in one case it
has been attempted to stretch one league to forty. In one case, the Saucal Kedondo,
where a two-league grant had been confirmed to five, and a survey of 22,190 acres
made, a new survey was ordered by a clerk of the Surveyor-General, and a survey
taking in 25,000 acres more of United States land covered by settlers was made and
fixed up in the office; and it was not until after some years litigation before the
Department that this fact was discovered. In some cases speculators who were
"on the inside " would buy from a Spanish grantee the use of the name of his
claim, and get a new survey which would take in for them thousands of acres
more. The original claimant of Eancho la Laguna asked for three leagues, or
13,314 acres; the survey was made and confirmed for 18,000. Afterwards it was
set aside, on the pretense that the Santa Barbara paper, in which the advertise jient
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of survey had been published, was printed for part of the time in San Francisco, and a
survey taking in 48,703 acres made, which, after being rejected by Commissioner
Edwards, was patented by Commissioner Wilson. The Rancho Guadaloupe, a grant
of 21,520 acres, was surveyed for 32,408 acres in 1860, the survey approved, a patent
issued, and the ranch sold. Now the new owner, supported by an affidavit from the
surveyor that objection was made to the 32,000-acre survey in 1860 by the two
Mexican owners (one of whom died in 1858) is trying to get a new survey confirmed
which takes in 11,000 acres more. The survey of Los Nogales was mad6 in 1861,
under a decree for one league and no more, and now an application for a new survey
which will include 11,000 acres more is being pushed. The land is covered by settlers.
The Big Grape Vine Rancho.
Perhaps the most daring attempt to grab lands and rob settlers under pretense
of a Mexican grant—so daring that it has almost a touch of the comic, is the case
of Los Prietos y Najalayegua, which was shown up first in a little pamphlet by
James F. Stuart, of San Francisco, and afterwards in Congress by Mr. Julian, to
whom the settlers of California are indebted for many signal services. In Santa Bar-
bara county there is living an old Mexican, named Jose Dominguez, on whose little
ranch grows an immense grape-vine. In the old times Dominguez had petitioned for
another tract of land of about a league and a half, but he neglected to comply with
the conditions, and sold it for the sum of one dollar. In fact he seems to have sold it
twice. Finally the claim passed into the hands of Thomas A. Scott, the Pennsyl-
vania railroad king, and Edward J. Pringle, of San Francisco. It had never been
presented to the United States Commission, and was consequently barred. But in
1866 a bill confirming the grant, and accompanied by a memorial purporting to be
from Dominguez, but which Dominguez swears he never saw, was introduced by Mr.
Conness, and slipped quietly through, under pretense of giving the old man with his
sixty children and grand-children, the big grape-vine which his mother had planted.
The bill was assisted in the House by the reading of a letter from Mr. Levi
Parsons, in which a visit to the Mexican Patriarch and his great grape-vine, the only
support of a greater family, was most touchingly described, and the intervention of
Congress asked as a matter of justice and humanity. Then came the survey; and
the speculators, emboldened by their success with Congress, went in for a big grab,
taking in the modest amount of 208,742 acres*—a pretty good dollar's worth of land,
considering that it included many valuable farms and vineyards. They asked too
much, for an outcry was made and a resurvey was ordered, which is now pending.
Bogus Grants.
The real grants have been bad enough, the bogus grants have been worse. Their
manufacture commenced early—the signatures of living ex-Mexican officials being
sometimes procured. Of this class was the famous Limantour claim to a great por-
tion of San Francisco. It was finally defeated, but not until a large amount had
been paid to its holders, and enormous expenses incurred in fighting it. Many of
these claims have been pressed to final patent, and settlers driven from their homes
by Sheriff's posses or the bayonets of the United States troops. Others have only
been used for purposes of blackmail, the owners of threatened propertj' being com-
pelled to remove the shadow from their title when obliged to borrow or to sell,
and finding it cheaper to pay the sums asked than to incur the expense of long and
tedious litigation, many steps in which had to be taken in Washington.
Thanks to the possessory law of the State, as interpreted by State Courts, where
the holders of a bogus claim secure possession they have been all right as long as
they could delay final action. After the action of the District Court five j-ears are
allowed for appeal to the Supreme Court, and then a smart attorney can easily keep
the case hanging from year to year. In one case where a modest demand for some
forty leagues was rejected, because in forging the Mexican seal on the grant, the head
of the cactus-mounted eagle had been carelessly put where his tail ought to be, the
appeal has been kept at the foot of the docket for years, while the claimants are
enjoying the land just as fully as if they had paid the Government for it, and are
actually selling it to settlers who know the claim to be fraudulent, at from $2 to
*The survey was not strictly official, though made by a United States Deputy, he having
reported that the calls were uncertain, and the grantees asking a survey according to their views.
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$10 per acre. If the Supreme Court ever does reach the case, the appeal will be dis-
missed. A new motion will then be made, and finally, when all the law's delay are
exhausted, the settlers will have to pay the Government $1.25 per acre for the land.
In the meantime they cannot get it without paying his price to the holder of this
notoriously fraudulent claim.
It has at all times been within the power of Congress to end this uncertainty as
to land titles, and settle these Mexican claims. There has been a great deal of
legislation on the subject, but somehow or other it has always turned out for the
benefit of the land grabbers. Modes of procedure have been changed; cases have
been thrown from the Courts into the Land Offices; from the Land Offices back
to the Courts, and then from the Courts back to the Land Offices again. Always
some excuse for delay; always some loophole in the law, through which the land
grabber could easily pass, but in which the settler would be crushed. The majority
of these Mexican grants are yet unsettled. Their owners do not want them settled
so long as they can hold thousands of acres more than they have a shadow of
claim to, and delay as much as possible. These are cases where the last step to
secure patent can be taken at any time, by the making of a motion or the payment
of a fee ; but which are suffered to remain in that condition, while in the meantime
the claim holders are selling quitclaim deeds to settlers, for land which their patents
would show they do not own.
The Pueblo of San Francisco.
For the injuries which these Mexican grants have done to California, the Mexi-
can land policy is not responsible. That merely furnished the pretext under cover
of which our policy has fostered land monopolization. What of the Mexican policy
was bad under our different conditions, we have made infinitely worse; what would
still have been good, we have discarded. The same colonization laws under which
these -great grants were made gave four square leagues to each town in which to
provide homes for its inhabitants, the only conditions being good character and occu-
pancy. The American city of San Francisco, as the successor of the Mexican pueblo,
came into a heritage such as no great city of modern times has enjoyed—land enough
for a city as large as London, dedicated to the purpose of providing every family with
a free homestead. Here was an opportunity to build up a great city, in which tene-
ment houses and blind alleys would be unknown; in which there would be less pov-
erty, suffering, crime and social and political corruption than in any city of our time,
of equal numbers. This magnificent opportunity has been thrown away, and with
the exception of a great sand bank, the worst that could be found, reserved for a
park, and a few squares reserved for public buildings, the heritage of* all the people
of San Francisco been divided among a few hundred. Of the successive steps, cul-
minating in the United States law of 1866, by which this was accomplished, of the
battles of land grabbers to take and to keep, and of the municipal corruption engen-
dered, it is not worth while here to speak. The deed is done. We have made a few
millionaires, and now the citizen of San Francisco who needs a home must pay a
large sum for permission to build it on land dedicated to his use ere the American
flag had been raised in California.
The Railroad Grants of California.
The grants made to railroads of public lands in the State of California are: The
grant to the Western Pacific and Central Pacific, of ten alternate sections on each
side per mile, (12,800 acres,) made to half that amount in 1862, and doubled in 1864;
the grants to the Southern Pacific and to the California and Oregon, of ten alternate
sections on each side, with ten miles on each side in which to make up deficiencies,
made in 1866; the grant to the Stockton and Copperopolis, of five alternate sections
on each side, with twenty miles on each side in which to make up deficiencies, made
in 1867; the grants to the Texas Pacific* and to the connecting branch of the Southern
Pacific, of ten alternate sections on each side, with ten miles for deficiencies, made in
1871. A grant was also made in 1866 to the Sacramento and Placerville road, but the
idea of building the road was abandoned, and the grant has lapsed.
Upon the map of California, opposite page 1, the reservations for these grants
are marked in red. This marking does not show the exact limits of the reservations,
as they follow the rectilinear section lines, which it is, of course, impossible to show
^Between the line of the road and the Mexican boundary this Company gets all the public land.
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on so small a scale—nor are the routes of the roads precisely drawn. But it gives a
perfectly correct idea of the extent and general course of these reservations. The
exhibit is absolutely startling—a commentary on the railroad land grant policy of
Congress to the force of which no words can add. Observe the proportion which
these reservations bear to the total area of the State, and observe at the same time the
topography of California—how the railroad reservations cover nearly all the great
central valleys, and leave but the mountains, and you may get an idea of how these
reservations are cursing the State.
It is true that the companies do not get all of the land included in these reserva-
tions, nor even half of it; but for the present, at least, so far as the greater part of it
is concerned, they might as well get it all. Pre-emption, or homestead settlers may
Btill go upon the even sections, but the trouble is to find them. The greater part of this
land is unsurveyed, or having been once surveyed, the vaqueros, who share in the
prejudices of their employers against settlers, have pulled up the stakes, and the
settler cannot tell whether he gets on Government or on railroad land. If on Gov-
ernment land, he is all right, and can get 80 acres for $22, as a homestead; or 160
acres for $400 by pre-emption. But it is an even chance that he is on railroad land,
and if so, he is at the mercy of a corporation which will make with him no terms, in
advance. Settlers will not take such chances.
These railroad grants have worked nothing but evil to California. Though given
under pretext of aiding settlement, they have really retarded it. Of all the roads
ever subsidized in the United States, the Central Pacific is the one to which the
giving of a subsidy is the most defensible. But so large was the subsidy, in money
and bonds, that the road could have been built, and would have been built, just aa
soon without the land grant. The Western Pacific land grant became the property
of a single individual, who did nothing towards building the road—the Company that
did build the road (the Central), buying the franchise minus the land grant. The
Southern Pacific land grant has actually postponed the building of a road southward
through California, and had the grant never been made, it is certain that an unsubsi-
dized road would already have been running further into Southern California than
the land grant road yet does. Of the California and Oregon land grant, the same
thing may be said. The Stockton and Copperopolis grant was made in 1867, but the
building of the road has only been commenced this year. And it is exceedingly prob-
able that had this land been open to settlers, the business, actual and prospective,
would by this time have offered sufficient inducements for the building of the road.
All these land grants with the exception perhaps, of that from the Eastern
boundary to San Diego, and with the exception of the Western Pacific grant, are
owned by a single firm, who also own all the railroads in California, having bought
what they did not build.
It is generally argued when land grants are made, that it is to the interest of the
companies to sell their lands cheaply, because settlement will bring them business.
But the land grant companies of California seem in no hurry to sell their lands, pre-
ferring to wait for the greater promise of the future. Neither the Southern Pacific
nor the California and Oregon will make any terms with settlers until their lands are
surveyed and listed over to them. It is, of course, to their interest to have the Gov-
ernment sections settled first, and to reserve their own land for higher prices after
the Government land is gone. The Central Pacific advertises to sell good farming
land for $2.50 per acre; but when one goes to buy good farming land for that price,
he finds that it has been sold to the Sacramento Land Company, a convenient
corporation, which stands to the Company in its land business just as the Contract
and Finance Comjjany did in the building of the road.
Private Entry and Scrip Locations.
Large bodies of the public lands of California were offered at public sale long
before there was any demand for them. When the failure of placer mining
directed industry towards agriculture, and the beginnings of the railroad system led
to hopes of a large immigration, these lands were gobbled up by a few large specu-
lators, by the hundred thousand acres. The larger part of the available portion of
the great San Joaquin Valley went in this way, and the process has gone on from
Siskiyou on the north to San Diego on the south.
According to common report, the speculators have received every facility in the
Land Offices. While the poor settler who wanted a farm would have to trudge off to
look at the land himself, the speculator or his agent had all the information which
could be furnished. Land which had never been sold or applied for, would be marked
on the maps as taken, in order to keep it from settlers and reserve it for speculators;
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and in some cases, it is even said that settlers selecting land and going to the Land
Office to apply for it, would be put off for a few minutes while the land they wanted
would be taken up in behalf of the speculator, and then they would be referred to
him, if they desired to purchase.
A great deal of this land has been located with the Agrictiltural College scrip of
Eastern States, bought by the speculators at an average of about fifty cents per acre,
in greenbacks, when greenbacks were low, and sold or held at prices varying from
$4 to $20 per acre, in gold. Whole townships have been taken up at once in this
way; but the law was amended in 1867, so that only three sections in the same town-
ship can now be located with this scrip. The Agricultural scrip of California has
been sold at about $5 per acre, having special privileges.
The Act of last year, making this California scrip locatable on unsurveyed land,
within railroad reservations, etc., is a good sample of the recklessness of Congressional
legislation on land matters. It is so loosely drawn that by the purchase of forty
acres a speculator can tie up a whole township. The Land Agent of the University
has only to give notice to the United States Kegister that he has an application for
land (without specifying amount or locality) in a certain township, and the Kegister
must hold the plats of survey for sixty days after their return. Should a pre-
emptor go on before this time, there is nothing to prevent the speculator "from
swooping down upon him and asserting that his farm is the particular piece of ground
he wanted. Happily, nearly all this scrip will be used for locating timber land,
for which the scrip of other States is not available, as it can only be located on
surveyed land, and the surveyed timber land has long since been taken up.
Besides the Agricultural scrip, a large amount of Half Breed scrip has been
located by speculators. This scrip was issued to Indians in lieu of their lands, and
was made by law locatable only by the Indians themselves, and though the specula-
tors pretended to locate as the attorneys of the Indians, the location was illegal.
However, it was made, and patents have been issued.
In this way millions of acres in California have been monopolized by a handfull
of men. The chief of these speculators now holds some 350,000 acres, while thousands
and thousands of acres which he located with scrip or paid $1.25 per acre for, have been
sold to settlers at rates varying from $5 to $20 per acre, the settlers paying cash
enough to clear him and leave a balance, and then giving a mortgage for and paying
interest on the remainder; and a large quantity of his land is rented—cultivators fur-
nishing everything and paying the landlord one-fourth of their crop.
And as has been the case in all the methods of land monopolization in California,
these scrip locations have been used not only to grab unoccupied lands, but to rob
actual settlers of their improved farms. In one instance a large scrip speculator got
a tool of his appointed to make the survey of a tract of land in one of the southern
counties which had been long occupied by actual settlers. This Deputy Surveyor
persuaded the settlers that it would be cheaper for them to get a State title to their
lands than to file pre-emption claims, and they accordingly proceeded to do
this. But as the clock struck nine, and the doors of the Land Office in San Francisco
were thrown open on the morning the plats were filed, another agent of the specu-
lator entered with an armful of scrip which he proceeded to plaster over the settlers'
farms.
Management of the California State Lands.
"We have seen what Federal legislation have done to inflict the curse of land
monopoly upon California. Let us now see what has been done by the State herself.
"We shall find that reckless as have been the dealings of the General Government
with our lands, the dealings of the State have been even worse.
And here let it be remarked that for most of these wrong acts of the Federal Govern-
ment, the people of California are themselves largely responsible. For the manifestation
public of a strong sentiment here could not have failed to exert great influence upon
Congress. But, for instance, instead of objecting to railroad grants, we have, for the
most part, hailed them as an evidence of Congressional liberality; and when the
Southern Pacific had once forfeited its grant, the California Legislature asked Con-
gress to give it back without suggesting a single restriction on the sale or
management of the lands. In 1870, a bill actually passed the House reserving
the public lands Of California for homestead entry, as the lands of the Southern States
had been reserved, but it went over in the Senate on the objection of Senator Nye, of
Nevada. There is little doubt that the manifestation of a strong desire on our part,
would, at any time, secure the passage of such a bill.
The specific grants made to California, in common with other land States, which
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have been before enumerated, amount to an aggregate of 7,421,804 acres—an area
almost as large as that of Massachusetts and Connecticut combined. Besides these
grants, all the swamp lands are given to the State for purposes of reclamation, of
which 3,381,691 acres have already been sold—about all there is.
These large donations have proved an evil rather than a benefit to the people of
California; for in disposing of them, the State has given even greater facilities for
monopoly than has the Federal Government, and the practical effect of the creation of
two sources of title to public land has been to harass settlers and to give opportunity
for a great deal of robbery and rascality.
The land policy of the State of California must be traced through some thirty-five
or forty Acts, in whose changes and technicalities the non-expert will soon become
bewildered. It is only necessary here to give its salient features.
It must be understood in the first place that the only grant of specific pieces of
land is that of the 16th and 36th sections of each township. "When these are occu-
.
{)ied or otherwise disposed of, other sections are given in lieu of them. These lieu
ands, as well as the lands granted in specific amounts, the State has had the privilege
of taking from any unappropriated Government land, the ownership of the swamp
lands being decided by the nature of the land itself. With this large floating grant,
as it may be termed, the general policy of the State has been, not to select the lands
and then to sell them, but in effect to sell to individuals its right of selection.
Now, under the general laws of the United States, until land is offered at public
sale, there is no way of getting title to it save by actual settlement, and then in tracts
of not over 160 acres to each individual. And though since 1862 the pre-emption
right has applied to unsurveyed lands, yet until land is surveyed and the plats filed,
the settler can make no record of his pre-emption.
To this land thus reserved by the general laws for the small farms of actual
settlers, the State grants gave an opportunity of obtaining title without regard to
settlement or amount—an opportunity which speculators have well improved. In
defiance of the laws of the United States, and even of the Act admitting California into
the Union, the State at first sold even unsurveyed land, a policy which continued until
the Courts declared it illegal in 1863. In 1852, to dispose of the 500,000-acre grant
(which the Constitution of the State gave to the School Fund) warrants were issued
purchasable at $2 per acre in depreciated scrip, and locatable on any unoccupied
Government land, surveyed or unsurveyed. These warrants, however, were not sale-
able to any one person in amounts of more than 640 acres, and the buyer had to make
affidavit that he intended to make permanent settlement on the land. But as the war-
rants were assignable, and affidavits cheap, these restrictions were of but little avail.
Passing for the most part into the hands of speculators, the warrants enabled them to
forestall the settler and even in many cases to take his farm from him ; for though by
the terms of the law the warrants could only be laid on unoccupied land, yet when
once laid, they were prima facie evidence of title, and the difficulty could be got over
by collusion with county officers and false affidavits. These school land warrants have
been a terror to the California settler, and many a man who has made himself a home,
relying upon the general laws of the Federal Government, has seen the results of his
years of toil and privation pass into the hands of some soulless cormorant, who, with-
out his knowledge, had plastered over his farm with school land warrants. The law
under which the warrants were issued was repealed in 1858, and the policy adopted of
selling the State title to applicants for land, in amounts not to exceed 320 acres to
each individual, at the rate of $1. 25 per acre, payable either in cash, or twenty per cent,
in cash, and the balance on credit with interest at 10 per cent. The 16th and 36th sec-
tions, or the lands in lieu of them, were at first given to the respective townships, to
be sold for the benefit of the Township School Fund; but were afterwards made sale-
able as other lands for the benefit of the General Fund.
The swamp lands were from the first made salable in tracts not exceeding 320
acres to each person, for $1 per acre, cash or credit, the proceeds to be applied to the
reclamation of the land, under regulations varied by different laws, from time to time.
This was virtually giving them away—the true policy; but the trouble is that for the
most part they have been given to a few men.
Up to 1868, the State had always, in words at least, recognized the principle that
one man should not be permitted to take more than a certain amount of land; but by
the Act of March 28th, of that year, which repealed all previous laws, and is still,
with some trifling amendments, the land law of the State, all restrictions of amount,
except as to the 16th and 36th sections proper, were swept away; and with reference
to those lands, the form of affidavit was so changed that the applicant was not required
to swear that he wanted the land for settlement, or wanted it for himself. This
Act, has some good features; but from enacting clause to repealing section, its
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central idea seems to be the making easy of land monopolization, and the
favoring of speculators at the expense of settlers. In addition to sweeping away the
restrictions as to amount and to use, it provided that the settlers upon the 16th and
36th sections should only be protected in their occupancy for six months after the
passage of the Act, after which the protection should only be for sixty days, and
changed the affidavit previously required, from a denial of other settlement to a denial
of valid adverse claim. Under this provision a regular business has been driven in rob-
bing settlers of their homes. Unless a new law is very generally discussed in the
newspapers (and land laws seldom are), it takes a long time for the people to become
acquainted with it; and there were many settlers on State land who knew nothing of
the limitation until they received notification that somebody else had possession of a
clear title to their farms. Did space permit, numbers of cases of this kind of rob-
bery might be cited—some of them of widows and orphans, whose all was ruthlessly
taken from them; but I will confine myself to one case of recent occurrence, where
the looked for plunder is unusually large.
The town of Amador, and the very valuable Keystone Mine, are situated on the
east half of a 36th section. The survey which developed this fact was only made in the
early part of the present year. The Deputy Surveyor, who was evidently in the plot, re-
turned to the United States Land Office the plat of the township, with the mine and
the town marked in the west half. Application was at the same time made to the
State Surveyor-General, in the name of Henry Casey, for the east half. In regular
course, the Surveyor-General sent the application to the United States Land Office,
whence it was returned, with a certificate that the land was free; whereupon, the
Surveyor-General approved the application, and twenty-five cents per acre was paid
the State. And thus for $80 cash, and $32 per annum interest, a little knot of specu-
lators have secured title to the Keystone Mine, worth at least a million dollars, and
the whole town of Amador, besides.
And as further evidence of the recklessness of California land legislation, and of
the lengths to which the land grabbers are prepared to go, two facts may be cited:
The last Legislature, instead of repealing or removing the objectionable features from
this Green law, actually, passed a special bill legalizing all applications for State lands,
even where the affidavits by which they were supported did not conform to the re-
quirements of the law, eitlier inform or in substance. After this had been passed, on
the last day of the session a bill was got through and was signed by the Governor,
designed to restrict applicants for lieu lands to 320 acres. But after the Legislature
had adjourned, when the Act came to be copied in the Secretary of State's office, lo,
and behold! it was discovered that the engrossed and signed copy did not contain
this provision.
Yet, to understand fully what a premium the State has offered for the monopoli-
zation of her school lands, there is another thing to be explained. To purchase land
of the State, an application must be filed in the State Land Office, describing the
land by range, township and section, and stating under what grant the title is asked.
This application must be accompanied by a fee of five dollars. The Surveyor-General
then issues a certificate to the applicant, and sends the application to the United
States Land Office, for certification that the land is free, before he approves the
application and demands payment for the land. J£ there be no record in his office,
of pre-emption, homestead or other occupation, the United States Register thereupon
marks the land off on his map, but he does not certify to the State Surveyor-General
until he gets his fee. The State Surveyor-General has no appropriation to pay the
fee, although the present incumbent asked for one in his first report; and so the pay-
ment of the fee and the return of the United States certificate depend upon the appli-
cant, whose interest it is, of course, not to get it until he wishes to pay for his land.
And thus, by the payment of five dollars, a whole section of United States land can
be shut up from the settler. There are 1,244,696 acres monopolized in California
to-day in this way. For thousands and thousands of the acres which are offered for
sale on California and Montgomery streets there is no other title than the payment
of this five dollars. When the immigrant buys of the speculator for two, five, ten or
twentjr dollars an acre, as the case may be, then the speculator goes to the United
States Land Office, pays the Register's fee, gets his certificate and the State Surveyor-
General's approval, and pays the State $1.25 per acre; or, if with the immigrant he
has made a bargain of that kind, he pays twenty-five cents per acre, and leaves his
purchaser to pay the dollar at some future time, with interest at ten per cent.
Swamp Land Grabbing.
And as the speculator has had a far better opportunity in dealing with the State
than with the United States, there has been every inducement to get as much land as
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possible tinder the jurisdiction of the State, by declaring it swamp land. The certifi-
cate of United States officers as to the character of the land has not been waited for;
but the State has sold to every purchaser who would get the County Surveyor to seg-
regate the land he wanted, and procure a couple of affidavits as to its swampy character.
Probably one-half of the land sold (or rather given, as the money is returned) by
the State as swamp, is not swamp at all, but good dry land, that has been sworn to
as swamp, in order to take it out of the control of the pre-emption laws of the United
States. The State has been made the catspaw of speculators, and her name used as
the cover under which the richest lands in California might be monopolized and set-
tlers robbed. The seizure of these lands of the State (or rather by speculators in the
name of the State) is for the most part entirely illegal; but by the Act of 1866, pre-
vious seizures were confirmed, and the land grabbers of California, though Mr. Julian
occasionally makes them some trouble, have powerful friends in Washington,
and unless energetic remonstrance is made, generally get what they ask. This
swamp land grant has not yielded a cent to the State, but it has enabled specu-
lators to monopolize hundreds of thousands of acres of the most valuable lands in
California, and, of course, to rob settlers. For the settler, though he has a right
under United States laws, can get no record nor evidence of title until his land is sur-
veyed and the plats filed. In the mean time, if the speculator comes along and can
get a couple of affidavits as to the swampy character of the settler's farm, he has been
able to buy the title of the State. Lands thousands of feet above the level of the
sea have been purchased as swamp; lands over which a heavily loaded wagon can be
driven in the month of May ; and even lands which cannot be cultivated without
irrigation.
Sierra Valley is in Plumas County, in the very heart of the mountains. Stand-
ing on its edge, you may at your option toss a biscuit into a stream which finally
sinks in the great Nevada Basin, or into waters which join the Pacific. When the
snow melts in the early spring, the mountain streams which run through the valley
overflow and spread over a portion of the land; but after a freshet has passed, water
has to be turned in through irrigating ditches to enable the lands to produce their
most valuable crop, hay. The valley is filled with pre-emption and homestead set-
tlers, who, besides their own homes and improvements, have built two churches and
seven school-houses. Many of their farms are worth $20 per acre. The swamp land
robbers cast their eyes on this pretty little valley and its thrifty settlement, and the
first thing the settlers knew their farms had been bought of the State as swamp
lands, and the United States was asked to list them over. Energetic remonstrance
was made, and the matter was referred by the Department to the United States Sur-
veyor-General to take testimony. His investigation has just been concluded, and the
attempted grab has probably failed. But in hundreds of cases, similar ones on a
smaller scale have succeeded.
Another recent attempt has been made to get hold of 46,000 acres adjoining Sacra-
mento. This land was formerly overshadowed by the rejected Sutter grant, and for
some time has been all pre-empted. Something like a year ago it was surveyed and
the plats returned to the United States Land Office, with this land marked as swamp;
applications being at the same time made to the State for the land. The ex-Surveyor-
General, Sherman Day, signed the plats, and the land had actually been listed over by
the Department, when a protest was made and forwarded to Washington, accom-
panied by his own personal testimony, by the new Surveyor-General, Hardenburgh,
who, having been long a resident of Sacramento, knew the character of the land.
This forced the suspension of the lists, very much, it seems, to the indignation of the
Acting Commissioner of the General Land Office, W. W. Curtis, who wrote a letter
to the Surveyor-General, which has been published in the newspapers, (which is a curi-
iosity of official impudence, ) and which betrays a very suspicious anger with what the
Acting Commissioner seems to consider the interference of the Surveyor-General.
Mr. Julian, in his speech entitled " Swamp Land Swindles," has detailed how a
party of speculators, one of whom was ex-State Surveyor-General Houghton, and
another the son of the then United States Surveyor-General Upson, got hold of sixteen
thousand acres in Colusa (as to the dry character of which he gives affidavits), under
the swamp land laws; by having the survey of two townships made and approved in
a few days, just before the map of the California and Oregon Bailroad Company was
filed. These swamp land speculators are in many cases attempting to shelter them-
selves behind the growing feeling against railroad grants; but bad as the railroad
grauts are, the operations of these speculators are worse. The railroad companies
c"-i only take half the lands; the speculators take it all. The railroad companies
CJ-anot easily disturb previous settlers; but the speculators take the settler's home from
under his feet.
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• Who Have Got Our Lands.
The State Surveyor-General ought to give in his next report (and if he does not
the Legislature ought to call for it) a list of the amounts of State lands laken in large
quantities by single individuals (with their names) under the Act of 1868. Such a list
would go far to open the eyes of the people of California to the extent their State
Government has been used to foster the land monopoly of which they are beginning
.to complain. Yet such a list would not fully show what has been done, as a great
(Tor others, are W. S. Chapman, George W. Eoberts, ex-Surveyor-General HoughtonX
V deal of land has been taken by means of dummies. Of the 16th and 36th sections'
\
proper, to which even now one individual cannot apply for more than 320 acres, one
speculator has secured 8,000 acres in Colusa County alone. Among those who have,/
secured the largest amount from the State,, either in their own names or as attorneys^
John Mullan, Will S. Green, H. C. Logan, George H. Thompson, B. F. Maulden,
I. N. Chapman, Leander Ransom, N. N. Clay, E. H. Miller and James W. Shanklin.
The larger amounts secured by single individuals range from 20,000 acres to over
100,000.
What Should Have Been Done.
The true course in regard to State lands is that urged upon the Legislature by the
present Surveyor General in his first annual report—to issue title only to the
actual settler who has resided on the land three years, and who has shown his intention
to make it his home by placing upon it at least $500 worth of improvements.* Had
this course been adopted from the start, California would to-day have had thousands
more of people and millions more of property. Had it even been adopted when urged
by General Bost, over half a million acres of land would have been saved to settlers
—that is to say, four thousand families might have found homesteads in California
at nominal rates—at rates so much lower than that which they must now pay that
the difference would more than have sufficed for all the expenses of their transporta-
tion from the East.
To amend our policy in regard to sales of State land now, is a good deal like lock-
ing the stable door after the horse is stolen. Still it should be done. Our swamp
lands are all gone, and the most available of the school lands have gone also. Yet
there may be a million of acres of good land left. These we cannot guard with too
jealous care.
The Possessory Law.
But the catalogue of what the State of California has done towards the monopoli-
zation of her land does not end with a recital of her acts as trustee of the land donated
herby the General Government. Besides giving these lands for the most part to monop-
olists, she has, by her legislation, made possible the monopolization of other vast
bodies of the the public lands. Under her possessory laws before alluded to, millions
of acres are shut out from settlement, without their holders having the least shadow
of title. It is Government land, but unsurveyed. The only way of getting title to it
is to go upon it and live; but the laws of California say that no one can go upon it
until he has a better title than the holder—that of possession. Tracts of from two to
ten thousand acres thus held are common, and in one case at least (in Lake county)
a single firm have 28,000 acres of Government land, open by the laws of the United
States to pre-emption settlers, enclosed by a board fence, and held under the State
laws. It is these laws that enable the Mexican grant owners to hold all the land they
can possibly shadow with their claims, and that offer them a premium to delay the
adjustment of theirtitles, in order that they may continue to hold, and in many cases,
to sell, far more than their grants call for.
How a Large Quantity of Public Land may be Freed.
A large appropriation for the survey of the public lands in California, managed
* In his biennial message to the same Legislature (the last) Governor Haight speaks in the same
strain. He says: " Our land system seems to be mainly framed to facilitate the acquisition of large
bodies of land by capitalists and corporations, either as donations or at nominal prices. It is to be
regretted that the land granted by Congress to railroad corporations had not been subject to continued
pre-emption by settlers, giving to the corporation the proceeds at some fixed price, and it would have
been much better for the State and coimtry if the public lands had never been disposed of except to
actual settlers under the pre-emption law."
24
by a Surveyor-General who really wished to do his duty,* would open to settlers
millions of acres from which they are now excluded by railroad reservations or the
monopolization of individuals. If our Representatives in Congress desire to really
benefit their State, they will neglect the works at Mare Island, the erection of public
buildings in San Francisco, and the appropriations for useless fortifications, until
they can get this. And one of the first acts of the next Legislature should be to limit
the possessory law to 160 acres, which would be a quick method of breaking up pos-
sessory monopolizations. In the mean time there is a remedy, though a slower and
more cumberous one. At the last session of Congress an Act was passed (introduced
by Mr. Sargent) authorizing the credit to settlers, on payments for their lands, of
money advanced for surveying them. Here is a means by which, with combined
effort, a large amount of public land may be freed. Let a number of settlers, suffi-
cient to bear the expense, go upon one of these large possessory claims. If ejected,
let them deposit the money for a survey with the United States Surveyor-General,
and the moment the lines are run and the plats are filed they have a sure title to the
land.
More Monopolization Threatened—"Wood and "Water.
There is little doubt that one of the greatest attempts at monopolization yet made
in California would have followed the passage of Sargent's bill for the sale of the
Pacific Coast timber lands, which was rushed through the House at the last session,
but was passed over by the Senate, and which has been re-introduced. These timber
lands are of incalculable value, for from them must come the timber supply, not of the
Pacific States alone, but of the whole Interior Basin, and nearly all the Southern
Coast. The present value of these lands when they can be got at, may be judged by
the fact that there are single trees upon the railroad lands which yield at present prices
over $500 worth of lumber. Under this bill, these lands would have been salable at
$2.50 per acre. The limitation of each purchaser to 640 acres would of course amount
to nothing, and within a short time after the passage of the bill, the available timber
lands would have passed into the hands of a small ring of large capitalists, who would
then have put the price of lumber at what figure they pleased. The amount of capi-
tal required to do this would be by no means large when compared with the returns,
which would be enormous, for though some estimates of the timber lands of Califor-
nia go as high as 30,000,000 acres, the means of transportation as yet make but a small
portion of this available. And it would be only necessary to buy the land as it i8
opened, to virtually control the whole of it. There is, however, a good deal to be said
in favor of the sale of these lands, and some legislation is needed, as there is a great
deal of land of no use but for its timber, but upon which individuals cannot cut, except
as tresspassers, while the railroad company in the Sierra, having been given the priv-
ilege of taking timber off Government land for construction, has a monopoly there,
and is clearing Government land in preference to its own. If waste could be pre-
vented, it would perhaps be best to leave the timber free to all who chose to cut, on
the principle that all the gifts of nature, whenever possible, shoiild be free. This
is problematical, perhaps impossible. If so, the plan proposed by Hon. Will S.
Green, of Colusa, seems to be the best of those yet brought forward; that is, to sell the
lands only to the builders of saw mills, in amounts proportioned to the capacity of the
mill. At all events, almost anything would be better than the creation of such a mon-
strous monopoly as would at once have sprung up under the Sargent bill—a monopoly
which would have taxed the people of California millions annually, and would have
raised the price of timber on the whole coast.
It is not only the land and the timber, but even the water of California that is
threatened with monopoly, as by virtue of laws designed to encourage the construc-
tion of mining and irrigation ditches, the mountain streams and natural reservoirs are
being made private property, and already we are told that all the water of a large sec-
tion of the State is the property of a corporation of San Francisco capitalists.
The Effect of Land Monopolization in California.
It is not we, of this generation, but our children of the next, who will fully
realize the evils of the land monopolization which we have permitted and encour-
aged; for those evils do not begin to fully show themselves until population be-
comes dense.
* And we seem to have secured one in the present Surveyor-General.
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But already, while our great State, with an area larger than that of France or
Spain or Turkey—with an area equal to that of all of Great Britain, Holland,
Belgium, Denmark and Greece, combined—does not contain the population of a
third class modern city; already, ere we have commenced to manure our lands or
to more than prospect the treasures of our hills, the evils of land monopolization
are showing themselves in such unmistakable signs that he who runs may read.
This is the blight that has fallen upon California, stunting her growth and mocking
her golden promise, offsetting to the immigrant the richness of her soil and the
beneficence of her climate.
It has already impressed its mark upon the character of our agriculture—more
shiftless, perhaps, than that of any State in the Union where slavery has not reigned.
For California is not a country of farms, but a country of plantations and estates.
Agriculture is a speculation. The farm houses, as a class, are unpainted frame
shanties, without garden or flower or tree. The farmer raises wheat; he buys his
meat, his flour, his butter, his vegetables, and frequently, even his eggs. He has
too much land to spare time for such little things, or for beautifying his home, or
he is merely a renter, or an occupant of land menaced by some adverse title, and his
interest is but to get for this season the greatest crop that can be made to grow
with the least labor. He hires labor for his planting and his re'aping, and his hands
shift for themselves at other seasons of the year. His plow he leaves standing
in the furrow, when the year's plowing is done; his mustangs he turns upon the
hills, to be lassoed when again needed. He buys on credit at the nearest store,
and when his crop is gathered must sell it to the Grain King's agent, at the Grain
King's prices.
And there is another type of California farmer. He boards at the San Francisco
hotels, and drives a spanking team over the Cliff House road; or, perhaps, he spends
his time in the gayer capitals of the East or Europe. His land is rented for one-
third or one-fourth of the crop, or is covered by scraggy cattle, which need to look
after them only a few half-civilized vaqueros; or his great wheat fields, of from ten
to twenty thousand acres, are plowed and sown and reaped by contract. And over
our ill-kept, shadeless, dusty roads, where a house is an unwonted land-mark, and
which run frequently for miles through the same man's land, plod the tramps, with
blankets on back—the laborers of the California farmer—looking for work, in its
seasons, or toiling back to the city when the plowing is ended or the wheat crop
is gathered. I do not say that this picture is a universal one, but it is a character-
istic one. *
It is not only in agriculture, but in all other avocations, and in all the manifesta-
tions of social life, that the effect of land monopoly may be seen—in the knotting up
of business into the control of little rings, in the concentration 'of capital into a few
hands, in the reduction of wages in the mechanical 'trades, in the gradual decadence
of that independent personal habit both of thought and action which gave to Califor-
nia life its greatest charm, in the palpable differentiation of our people into the classes
of rich and poor. Of the "general stagnation " of which we of California have been
bo long complaining, this is the most efficient cause. Had the unused laud of Califor-
nia been free, at Government terms, to those who would cultivate it, instead of this
" general stagnation " of the past two years, we should have seen a growth unexampled
in the history of even the American States. For with all our hyperbole, it is almost
impossible to overestimate the advantages with which nature has so lavishly endowed
i this Empire State of ours. "God's Country," the returning prospectors used to call
;. it, and the strong expression loses half of its irreverence as, coming over sage brush
1
plains, from the still frost-bound East, the traveler winds, in the early Spring, down
1 the slope of the Sierra, through interminable ranks of evergreen giants, past laughing
!
rills and banks of wild flowers, and sees under their cloudless sky the vast fertile val-
i
leys stretching out to the dark blue Coast Range in the distance. But while nature
has done her best to invite new comers, our land policy has done its best to repel
1 them. We have said to the immigrant : " It is a fair country which God has made
| between the Sierra and the sea, but before you settle in it and begin to reap His
I bounty, you must pay a forestaller roundly for his permission. " And the immigrant
j having far to come and but scanty capital, has as a general thing stayed away.
*An old Californian, a gentleman of high intelligence, who has recently traveled extensively
' through the State upon official business, which compelled him to pay particular attention to the
'. material condition of the people, writes: " The -whole country is poverty-stricken ; the farmers shift-
1 less, and crazy on wheat. I have seen farms cropped for eighteen years with wheat, and not a vine,
tree, shrub or flower on the place. The roads are too wide, and are unworked, and a nest for noxious
[
weeds. The effect of going through California is to make you wish to leave it, if you are poor and
, want to farm."
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The Landed Aristocracy of California.
Though California is a young State ; though she is a poor State, and though a
few years ago she was a State in which there was less class distinction than in any
State in the Union, she can already boast of an aristocracy based on the surest foun-
dation—that of land ownership.
I have been at some trouble to secure a list of the large land owners of Cali-
fornia, but find exact and reliable information on that point difficult to obtain. The
property of most of the largest land owners is scattered through various counties of
the State, and a comparison of the books of the various Assessors would be the only
means of forming even an approximate list. These returns, however, are far from
reliable. It has not been the custom to list land held by nlere possessory title, and
the practice of most of the Assessors has been to favor large land holders. The
Board of Equalization have ferreted out many interesting facts in this regard, which
will probably be set forth in their coming report. Some remarkable discrepancies, of
which the proportion is frequently as one to ten, are shown between the Assessors'
lists and the inventories of deceased land owners. In San Luis Obispo, one of the
largest land owners and land speculators in the State returns to the Assessor a total
of 4,366 acres. Reference to the United States Land Offices, shows that he holds in
that county, of United States land, 43,266 acres.
The largest land owners in California are probably the members of the great
Central-Southern Pacific Railroad Corporation. Were the company land divided, it
would give them something like two million acres apiece; and in addition to their com-
pany land, most of the individual members own considerable tracts in their own
name.
McLaughlin, who got the "Western Pacific land grant, has some three or four
hundred thousand acres. Outside of these railroad grants, the largest single holder
is, probably, Wm. S. Chapman, of San Francisco, the "pioneer" scrip-speculator,
who has some 350,000 acres; though ex-State Surveyor-General Houghton is said by
some to own still more. Ex-United States Surveyor-General Beals has some three
hundred thousand acres. Across his estate one may ride for seventy-five miles.
Miller & Lux, San Francisco wholesale butchers, have 450,000 acres. Around one of
their patches of ground there are 160 miles of fence. Another San Francisco firm,
Bixby, Flint & Co., have between 150,000 and 200,000 acres. George W. Eoberts &
Co. own some 120,000 acres of swamp land. Isaac Friedlander, San Francisco grain
merchant, has about 100,000 acres. Throckmorton, of Mendocino, some 146,000; the
Murphy family of Santa Clara, about 150,000; John Foster of Los Angeles, 120,000;
Thomas Fowler, of Fresno, Tulare and Kern, about 200,000. Abel Stearns, of Los
Angeles, had some 200,000 acres, but has sold a good deal. A firm in Santa Barbara
advertises for sale 200,000 acres, owned by Philadelphia capitalists.
As for the poorer members of our California peerage—the Marquise3, Counts,
Viscounts, Lords and Barons—who hold but from 80,000 to 20,000 acres, they are so
numerous, that, though I have a long list, I am afraid to name them for fear of
making invidious distinctions, while the simple country squires, who hold but from
five to twenty thousand acres, are more numerous still.
These men are the lords of California—lords as truly as ever were ribboned
Dukes or belted Barons in any country under the sun. We have discarded the
titles of an earlier age; but we have preserved the substance, and, though instead
of "your grace," or "my lord," we may style them simple " Mr.," the difference is
only in a name. They are our Land Lords just as truly. If they do not exert the
same influence and wield the same power, and enjoy the same wealth, it is merely
because our population is but six huudred thousand, and their tenantry have not yet
arrived. Of the millions of acres of our virgin soil which their vast domains enclose,
they are absolute masters, and upon it no human creature can come, save by their
permission and upon their terms.* From the zenith above, to the center of the earth
below (so our laws run), the universe is theirs.
It must not be imagined that these large land holders are merely speculators—that
they have got hold of land for the purpose of quickly selling it again. On the con-
trary, as a class, they have a far better appreciation of the future value of land
and the power which its ownership gives, than have the people at large who have
thoughtlessly permitted this monopolization to go on. Many of the largest land
holders do not desire to sell, and will not sell for anything like current prices ; but on
* They are coming. According to Government statisticians, California will, in 1890, contain a
population of 3,500,000.
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the contrary are continually adding to their domains. Among these, is one Irish
family, who have seen at home what the ownership of the soil of a country means.
They rent their land ; they will not sell it ; and this is true of many others. Some-
times this indisposition to sell is merely the result of considerations of present inter-
est. As for instance : An agent of a society of settlers recently went to a large land
holder in a southern county, and offered him a good price for enough land to provide
about two hundred people with small farms. The land holder refused the offer, and
the agent proceeded to call his attention to the increase in the value of his remaining
land which this settlement would cause. " It may be," said the land holder, " but I
should lose money. If you bring two hundred settlers here, they will begin agitating
for a repeal of the fence law, and will soon compel it by their votes. Then I will be
obliged to spend two or three hundred thousand dollars to fence in the rest of my
ranch, and as fences do not fatten cattle, it will be worth no more to me than now.
"
Let me not be understood as reproaching the men who have honestly acquired
large tracts of land. As the world goes, they are not to be blamed. If the people
put saddles on their backs, they must expect somebody to jump astride to ride. If
we must have an aristocracy, I would prefer that my children should be members of
it, rather than of the common herd. While as for the men who have resorted to
dishonest means, the probabilities are that most of them enjoy more of the respect
of their fellows, and its fruits, than if they had been honest and got less land.
The division of our land into these vast estates, derives additional significance
from the threatening wave of Asiatic immigration whose first ripples are already break-
ing upon our shores. "What the barbarians enslaved by foreign wars were to the
great landlords of Ancient Italy, what the blacks of the African coast were to the great
land lords of the Southern States, the Chinese coolies may be, in fact are already begin-
ning to be, to the great land lords of our Pacific slope.
III.
LAND AMD LABOR.
What Land Is.
Land, for our purpose, may be defined as that part of the globe's surface habit-
able by man—not merely his habitation, but the storehouse upon which he must
draw for all his needs, and the material to which his labor must be applied for the supply
of all his desires, for even the products of the sea cannot be taken, or any of the
forces of nature utilized without the aid of land or its products. On the land we are
born, from it we live, to it we return again—children of the soil as truly as is the
blade of grass or the flower of the field.
Of the Value of Land.
Though land is the basis of all that we have, yet neither land nor its natural pro-
ducts constitute wealth. Wealth is the product—or to speak more precisely, the equiv-
alent of labor. That which maybe had without labor has no value, for the value of any
object is measured by the labor for which it will exchange.* And when in speaking of
" natural wealth," we mean anything else than the general possibilities which nature
offers to labor, we mean such peculiar natural advantages as will yield to labor a
larger return than the ordinary, and which are thus equivalent to the amount of labor
dispensed with—that is, such natural objects or advantages as are scarce as well as
desirable. If I find a diamond, I may not have expended much labor, but I am rich
because I have something which it usually takes an immense amount of labor to
obtain. If I own a coal mine which is valuable, it is because other people have not
coal mines, and cannot obtain fuel with as little expenditure of labor as I can, and
will therefore give me the equivalent of more labor for my coal than I have to bestow
to get it. If diamonds were as plenty as pebbles, they would be worth by the
cart-load just the cost of loading and hauling. If coal could everywhere be had by
digging a hole in the ground, the possession of a coal mine would make nobody rich.
* I use the word value throughout in the sense in which it is used by the writers on political
economy—that of exchangeable power, not of utility.
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And so it is with land. It is only valuable as it is scarce. Land (of the average
quality) is not naturally scarce, but abundant, and it may be doubted whether there
is any country, even the most populous, where the soil could not easily support in
comfort all the people, though the law of diminishing return, as laid down by the
English economists, is doubtless true. But the density of population permits other
economies which go far to make up for, and which, probably, in a right social state
would fully make up for, any increase in the amount of labor necessarily devoted to
agricultural production.
But land is a fixed quantity, which man can neither increase nor diminish, and
is therefore very easily made artificially scarce by monopolization. And artificial
scarcity arising from unequal division produces the same effect as real scarcity in
giving land a value. There is no scarcity of building lots in San Francisco, for there
is room yet within the settled limits for ten thousand more houses. But if I want to
put up a house I must pay for the privilege, just as if there were more people wanting
to put up houses than there is room to put them upon.
And the value of land is, the power which its ownership gives of appropriating
the labor of those who have it not; and in proportion as those who own are few, and
those who do not own are many, so does this power which is expressed by the selling
price of land increase. We speak of railroads raising the value of land by reducing
the time and cost of transportation. But if we analyze the operation by imagining the
construction of a railroad through a country in which there are few settlers and land
can be had for the taking, we will see that the direct effect of the railroad or other
improvement which increases the value of the product of land is to increase the value
of labor—or to speak more precisely, of the value of labor and capital, in the relative
proportions determined by the circumstances which fix the shares of each—and that
it is only when the land is so far monopolized as to enable the land owners to appro-
priate to themselves this benefit that the value of land is increased. No matter how
few people there might be, ifthe land were all in private hands the owners might appro-
priate to themselves the whole benefit. This is the result in a country like England,
but in a new country, those owners having more land than they can work or desire
to work, will, in selling or renting their lands, yield some of the new advantage
in order to induce people to take their surplus land. It will be said : If the value of
land is the power which its ownership gives of appropriating the labor of others, so
is the value of everything else, from a twenty-dollar piece to a keg of nails. But in
this is the distinction : The twenty-dollar piece or the keg of nails are themselves
the result of labor, and when given for labor the transaction is an exchange. Land
is not the result of labor, but is the creation of God, and when labor must be given
for it the transaction is an appropriation. In the one case labor is given for labor;
in the other, labor is given for something that existed before labor was.
Of the Value of Land and the Common Wealth.
And thus we see that the value of land, being intrinsically merely the power
which its ownership gives to appropriate the fruits of labor, is not an element of the
wealth of a community. This principle is as self-evident as that two and two make
four, yet we seem to have lost sight of it altogether. All over the country the increase
in the value of land is cited as an increase of wealth, Year after year we add up the
increased price which land will bring, and exclaim, Behold how rapidly the United
States is growing rich! Yet we might with equal propriety count the debts which
men owe each other, in estimating the assets of a community. The increased price
of his land may be increased wealth to the owner, because it enables him to obtain a
larger share in the distribution of its products, but it is not increased wealth to the
community, because the shares of other people are at the same time cut down. The
wealth of a community depends upon the product of the community. But the pro-
ductive powers of land are precisely the same whether its price is low or high. In
other words, the price of land indicates the distribution of wealth, not the production.
The manner of distribution certainly reacts on production, and so the price of land
indirectly and gradually affects the wealth of the community; but this effect
is the reverse of what seems generally imagined. High prices for land tend to
decrease instead of adding to the wealth of a community. For high priced land means
luxury on the one side, and low wages on the other. Luxury means waste, and
low wages mean, unintelligent and inefficient labor.
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Of The Value of Laud and the Value of Labor.
The value of land and of labor must bear to each other an inverse ratio. These
two are the "terms " of production, and while production remains the same, to give
more to the one is to give less to the other. The value of land is the power which its
ownership gives to appropriate the product of labor, and, as a sequence, where rents
(the share of the land owner) are high, wages (the share of the laborer) are low.
And thus we see it all over the world, in the countries where land is high, wages are
low, and where land is low, wages are high. In a new country the value of labor is
at first at its maximum, the value of land at its minimum. As population grows and
land becomes monopolized and increases in value, the value of labor steadily de-
creases. And the higher land and the lower wages, the stronger the tendency towards
still lower wages, until this tendency ,is met by the very necessities of existence.
For the higher land and the lower wages, the more difficult is it for the man who
starts with nothing but his labor to become his own employer, and the more he is at
the mercy of the land owner and the capitalist.
Of Speculation in Land.
The old prejudice against speculators in food and other articles of necessity is
passing away, for more exact habits of thought have shown that where speculators
do not control all the sources and means of production (which is impossible as to
most things in this age of the world*), and speculation does not become monopoly,
instead of causing scarcity, it tends to alleviate it; and this, on the one side, by giv-
ing notice of the impending scarcity, and thus inducing economy, and on the other
by stimulating production.
But land not being a thing of human production, speculation in land cannot have
this result. A country may export people, but it cannot import land. Whatever be
the price put upon it, the number of acres in any given place is just so many, with
just such capabilities. And though high prices for land may lessen the demand by
driving people further away, this is not economy, but waste, as the labor of a diffused
Eopulation cannot be so productive as that of a more concentrated population, com-
ined action cannot be so effective and economical, and exchanges must be much
more difficult and at a greater cost. It is sometimes said (and the English landlords
piously believe that in raising their rents to the highest figure they are doing their
best for their fellow men) that the increase in the price of land leads to increased
thoroughness of cultivation, yet how can that be when the increase in the price of
land must take from the means of the cultivator, either by reducing his capital when
he buys, or by reducing his earnings when he rents. + That the two things go to-
gether is undoubtedly true; but it seems to me that the increased thoroughness of
cultivation is due to the increased pressure of population—to higher prices for
produce and lower prices for labor rather than directly to the increased price of land.
There is another attribute in which land differs from things of human produc-
tion. It is imperishable. The speculator in grain must sell quickly, not merely
because he knows another crop will soon come in, but because his grain will spoil by
keeping; the speculator in a manufactured article must also sell quickly, not merely
because the mills are at work, but because the articles in which he is speculating will
spoil or go out of fashion. Not so with land. The speculator in land can wait; his
land will still be there as good as ever. If he dies before he reaps the benefit, the
land will be there for his children.
Thus land, being a thing of limited quantity, of imperishable nature and of
unchanging demand, is a thing in which there are more inducements for speculation
than in anything else. And being, not the result of human labor, but the field for
human labor, the increased price caused by speculation is a tax for which there can
Possible as to some things. The Bothschilds and the Bank of California control the quicksilver
production of the world, and sell quicksilver in China cheaper than in California, where it is
produced.
tit may be said (and it is probably to some extent true in new countries), that where land is low
a man will buy as much as he can ; where land is higher, and he must take less for the same money,
he will cultivate it better. But if a man takes more than he can well use, this in itself is specula-
tion, and another remedy should be looked for than the increase of speculation. Whereas, if by high
prices a man is driven to bestow the same labor on a smaller piece of ground than he would with
greater profit expend on a larger piece—the increased thoroughness of cultivation reduces production
instead of increasing it—is an evil, not a benefit.
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be no beneficial return. Speculation in land is, in fact, but a shutting out from the
land of those who want to use it, until they agree to pay the price demanded—the
land speculator is a true " dog in the manger." He does not want to use the land
himself, but he finds his profit in preventing other people from using it. The specu-
lator knows that more people are coming, and that they must have land, and he gets
hold of the land which they will want to use, in order that he may force them to pay
him a price for which he gives them no return—that is, that he may appropriate a
portion of their labor. Our emigrating race may be likened to a caravan crossing the
desert, and the land speculator to one of their number who rides a little in advance,
taking possession of the springs as they are reached and exacting a price from hie
comrades for the water which nature furnishes without price.
Of Prospective Value as Affecting the Present Value of Land.
According to the doctrine of rent advanced by Bicardo and Malthus, and genet
'
ally accepted by the best authorities on political economy, the value of land should be
determined by the advantages which it possesses over the least advantageous land in
use. This would be true, though subject to the modifications arising from custom and
the inertia of population, were it not for the influence which prospective value exer-
cises upon present value. Where speculation in land is permitted—more so. where it
is encouraged, as it is with us— the prospective value of land (the incentive to specu-
lation) must exercise a very great influence upon the present value of land, and the
value of land be determined, not by its actual advantages over the poorest land in
use, but by its advantages, prospective as well as actual, over land which offers just
sufficient prospective advantage to make its possession desirable. The prices of
land in the United States to-day are not warranted by our present population, but are
sustained by speculation founded upon the certainty of the greater population which
is coming. Every promise, every hope, is discounted by land speculation. And
land being indestructible and costing less to keep than anything else (for the taxes on
unimproved land are generally lighter than on anything else), and being limited in
amount (so that no increase in price brings about increase in supply), these anticipa-
tions torm a firm basis for price. Land has no intrinsic value. It is not like a keg
of nails, which costs about so much to produce, and the price of which cannot, there-
fore, go much above or fall much below that point. It is worth just what can be had
for it. If a man must have land where speculative prices rule, he must pay the
price asked, and the price he pays is the guage by which all the surrounding holders
measure the value and assess the price of their lands. One rise encourages another
rise, and the course of prices is up and up, so long as there is expectation of future
demand. And whenever a temporary panic comes, the land prices recover as quickly
as it is natural for hope to reassert itself in the human breast. A great singer buys a
lot in a little Illinois town and real estate advances fifty per cent ; a train of cars
comes to Oakland, and for miles around land cannot be bought for less than a thou-
sand dollars an acre ; a few men in San Francisco say to each other that the city is
sure to be the second on the continent, and straightway the hill-tops for long distances
are being bought and sold at rates which would be exorbitant if San Francisco really
contained a million people, and he who wants a piece of land to use must pay the
speculative price. We are thus compelled to pay in the present, prices based on
what people will be compelled to pay in the future.
Of Speculation in Land, and the Supply of Capital.
We frequently hear it said : " Times are hard because land speculation has locked
up so much capital." Now it is evident that no amount of buying and selling in a
community can lock up capital, and the direct effect of a rise in land values, is to alter
the distribution of wealth, not to affect its amount. But to some extent the same
effect is produced as would be by the locking up of capital. When a rise in land val-
ues takes place, certain men find themselves much richer, without any addition to the
capital of the community having been made. Some of these will employ part of
their new wealth in unproductive uses—in building finer houses, buying diamonds for
their wives, or traveling in the East, or in Europe. This reduces the supply of pro-
ductive capital. At the same time the profits of land speculation, and the new security
whichjhe rise in values gives, will increase the number of borrowers, and compe-
tition between them will have a tendency to keep up rates of interest. But a fall in
land prices does not at once increase the available supply of capital, as capitalists
are made timid, and there is a tendency to hoard rather than lend.
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Of the Necessary Value of Land.
Where the monopolization of land is not permitted, where a man can only tak*
land which he wants to use, unused land can have no value—at least, nono above the
price fixed by the State for the privilege of occupying it . But as land becomes occupied,
most of it would acquire a value—either from the possession of natural advantages
superior to that still unoccupied, or from its more central position as respects popula-
tion. This we may call the necessary or real value of land, in contradistinction to the
unnecessary or fictitious value of land which results from monopolization. To illus-
trate : If, on the outskirts of San Francisco, any one who wished to build a house
might take a lot from the unused ground, outside land would be worth nothing, but
Montgomery or Kearny street property would still be very valuable, as, being in
the heart of the city, it is more convenient for residences or more useful for business
purposes. The difference, however, between this necessary value of the land of the
United States and the aggregate value at which it is held must be most enormous, and
the difference represents the unnecessary tax which land monopolization levies upon
labor.
•Of Property in Land.
The right of every human being to himself is the foundation of the right of
property. That which a man produces is rightfully his own, to keep, to sell, to give,
or to bequeath, and upon this sure title alone can ownership of anything rightfully
rest. But man has also another right, declared by the fact of his existence—the right
to the use of so much of the free gifts of nature as may be necessary to supply all the
wants of that existence, and as he may use without interfering with the equal rights
of any one else, and to this he has a title as against all the world.
This right is natural; it cannot be alienated. It is the free gift of his Creator
to every man that comes into the world—a right as sacred, as indefeasible as his right
to life itself.
Land being the creation of God and the natural habitation of man, the reservoir
from which man must draw the means of maintaining his life and satisfying his
wants; the material to which it was pre-ordained that his labor should be applied, it
follows that every man born into this world has a natural right to as much land as is
necessary for his own uses, and that no man has a right to any more. To deny this
is to deny the right of man to himself, to assert the atrocious doctrine that the Al-
mighty has created some men to be the slaves of others.
For, to permit one man to monopolize the land from which the support of others
is to be drawn, is to permit him to appropriate their labor, and, in so far as he is
permitted to do this, to appropriate them. It is to institute slavery.
For whether a man owns the bodies of his fellow beings, or owns only the land
from which they must obtain a subsistence, makes but little difference to him or to
them. In the one case it is slavery just as much as the other. And of the two forms
of slavery, that which pretends to the ownership of flesh and blood seems to me, on
the whole, far the more preferable. For in England, where the monopolization of
land has reached a point which gives to the mere laborer a share of the product of his
labor just sufficient to maintain his existence, the land owner gets from the laborer
all that any master can get from his slave, while he is not affected by the selfish
interest which prompts the master to look out for the well-being of his slave, and is
not influenced by those warmer feelings which any ordinarily well disposed man
feels towards any living thing of which he claims the ownership, be it even a dog.
For in free, rich England of the Nineteenth Century—England, whose boast it is that
no slave can breathe her air—England, that has spent millions of pounds for the
abolition of slavery in far off lands, and that sends abroad annually hundreds of thou-
sands of pounds for the conversion of the heathen—the condition of the agricultural
laborer is to-day harder, more hopeless and more brutalizing than that of the average
! slave under any system <jf slavery which has prevailed in mudern times. And, going
I
even further, I do not believe that the cold-blooded horrors brought to light by the
| various Parliamentary Commissions which have investigated the condition of the
|
laboring poor of England, can be matched even by the records of ancient slavery,
I under which system slaves were sometimes fed to ftshes, or tortured for sport, or even
|
by the annals of Spanish conquest in the New World. Certain it is that the condition
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of the slaves upon our Southern plantations was not half so bad as that of the land
monopoly slaves of England. Legrees there may have been in plenty, but I have yet
to hear of the Legree who worked children to physical and moral death in his fields,
or ground them, body and soul, in his mills.
There is in nature no such thing as a fee simple in land. The Almighty, who
created the earth for man and man for the earth, has entailed it upon all the genera-
tions of the children of men by a decree written upon the constitution of all things
—
a decree which no human action can bar and no prescription determine. Let the
parchments be ever so many, or possession ever so long, in the Courts of Natural
Justice there can be but one title to land recognized—the using of it to satisfy reason- '
able wants.
Now, from this, it by no means follows that there should be no such thing as
property in land, but merely that there should be no monopolization—no standing
between the man who is willing to work and the -field which nature offers for his labor.
For while it is true that the land of a country is a free gift of the Creator to all the
people of that country, to the enjoyment of which each has an equal natural right, it
is also true that the recognition of private ownership in land is necessary to its proper
use—is, in fact, a condition of civilization. When the millennium comes, and the old
savage, selfish instincts have died out of men, land may perhaps be held in common;
but not till then. In our present state, at least, the " magic of property which turns
even sand into gold " must be applied to our lands if w% would reap the largest bene-
fits they are capable of yielding—must be retained if we would keep from relapsing
into barbarism.
And a full appreciation of the value of land ownership tends to the same practical
conclusion as the considerations I have been presenting. If the worker upon land is
a better worker and a better man because he owns the land, it should be our effort to
make this stimulus felt by all—to make, as far as possible, all land-users also land-
owners.
Nor is there any difficulty in combining a full recognition of private property in
land with a recognition of the right of all to the benefits conferred by the Creator, as
I will hereafter attempt to show.
We are not called upon to guarantee to all men equal conditions, and could not if '
we would, any more than we could guarantee to them equal intelligence, equal indus-
try or equal prudence ; but we are called upon to give to all men an equal chance. If
we do not, our republicanism is a snare and a delusion, our clatter about the rights of
man the veriest buncombe in which a people ever indulged.
IV.
THE TENDENCY OF OUR PRESENT LAND POLICY.
What Our Laud Policy is.
Is our land policy calculated to give to all men an equal chance? We have seen
what it is—how we are enabling speculators to rob settlers ; how we are by every
means enhancing the tax which the many must pay to the few ; how we are making
away with the heritage of our children, and putting in immense bodies into the hands
of a few individuals the soil from which the coming millions of our people must draw
their support. If we continue this policy a few years, the public domain will all be
gone; the homestead law and the pre-emption law will remain upon the statute books
but to remind the poor man of the good time past, and we shall find ourselves embar-
rassed by all the difficulties which beset the statesmen of Europe—the social disease
of England; the seething discontent of France.
Was there ever national blunder so great—ever national crime so tremendous as
ours in dealing with our land ? It is not in the heat and flush of conquest that we
are thus djing what has been done in every country under the sun where a ruling class
has been built up and the masses condemned to hopeless toir^ it is not in ignorance of
true political principles and in the conscientious belief that the God-appointed order
of things is that the many should serve the few. We are monopolizing our land de-
liberately
—
our land, not the land of a conquered nation, and we are doing it while
prating of the equal rights of the citizen and of the brotherhood of men.
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The Value of Our Public Domain.
This public domain that we are getting rid of as recklessly as though we esteemed
its possession a curse, can never be replaced, nor are there other limitless bodies of
land which we may subdue. Of the whole continent, we now occupy nearly the whole
of the zone in which all the real progressive life of the world has been lived. North
of us are the cold high latitudes, south of us the tropical heats. The table lands of
Mexico and the valleys of the Saskachewan and Red rivers, which comprise almost
all of the temperate portions of the continent yet unoccupied by our race, are of very
small extent when compared with the vast country we have already overrun, and when
our emigration is compelled to set upon them will be filled as we now populate a new
State.
It is not pleasant to think of the time when the public domain will all be gone.
" This will be a great country," we say, "when it is all fenced in. " Great it will be
—
great it must foe, in arts and arms, in population and in wealth. But will it be as
great in all that constitutes true greatness ? Will it be such a good country for the
poor man? Will there be such an average of comfort and independence and virtue
among the masses. And which to me is the important fact—that I am one of a nation of
so many more millions, or that I can buy my children shoes when they need them?
" The greatest glory of America," says Oarlyle, "is that there every bootblack may
have a turkey in his pot." We shall be credited with no such glory when the country
is all " fenced in " as we are now rapidly fencing it.
From this public domain of ours have sprung and still spring subtle influences
which strengthen our national character and tinge all our thought. This vast back-
ground of unfenced land has given a consciousness of freedom even to the dweller in
crowded cities, and has been a well-spring of hope even to those who never thought
of taking refuge upon it. The child of the people as he grows to manhood in Europe
finds every seat at the banquet of life marked "taken," and must struggle with his
fellows for the crumbs that fall, without one chance in a thousand of forcing or sneaking
his way to a seat. In America, whatever be his condition, there is always more or
less clearly and vividly, the consciousness that the public domain is behind him; that
there is a new country where all the places are not yet taken, where opportunities are
still open, and the knowledge of this fact, acting and reacting, penetrates our whole
national life, giving to it generosity and independence, elasticity and ambition.
Why should we seek so diligently to get rid of this public domain as if for the
mere pleasure of getting rid of it? What have the buffaloes done to us that we should
sacrifice the heritage of our children to see the last of them extirpated before we die ?
Are the operatives of New England, the farmers of Ohio, the mechanics of San Fran-
cisco better off for the progress of this thing which we call national development
this scattering of a thousand people over the land which would suffice for a million;
this fencing in for a dozen of the soil to which tens of millions must before long look
for subsistence?
All that we are proud of in the American, character all that makes our con-
dition and institutions better than those of the older countries, we may trace to the
fact that land has been cheap in the United States; and yet we are doing our utmost
to make it dear, and actually seem pleased to see it become dear, looking upon the hen
which the few are taking upon the labor of the many as an actual increase in the
wealth of all.
No Tendency to Equalization
Nor can we flatter ourselves that the inequality in condition which we are
creating will right itself by easy and and peaceful means. It is not merely present
inequality which we are creating, but a tendency to further inequality. When we
allow one man to take the land which should belong to a hundred, and give to a cor-
poration the soil from which a million must shortly draw their subsistence, we are
not only giving in the present wealth to the few by taking it from the many, but we
are putting it in the power of the few to levy a constant and an increasing tax upon
the many, and we are increasing the tendency to the concentration of wealth not
merely upon the land which is thus monopolized, but all ov6r the United States.
Even if the large bodies of land which we are giving away for nothing, or selling
to speculators for a nominal price, are subdivided and sold for small farms, the mis-
chief we have done is not at an end. The capital of. the settlers has been taken from
them, and put in large masses into the hands of the speculators or railroad kings.
3 " .
"
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The many are thereafter the poorer; the few thereafter the richer. We have concen-
trated wealth; that is, we have concentrated the power of getting wealth. "We have
set in operation the law of attraction—the law that " unto him that hath shall it be
given, ' ' and never in any age of the world has this law worked so powerfully as now.
It must not be thought that because we have no laws of entail and primogeni-
ture the vast estates which we are creating will in time break up of themselves. There
were no laws of entail and primogeniture in ancient Home where the monopolization
of land and the concentration of wealth went so far that the empire, and even civila-
tion itself, perished of the social diseases engendered. It is not the laws of entail and
primogeniture that have produced the concentration of wealth in England which makes
the richest country in the world the abode of the most hopeless poverty. In spite of
entail and primogeniture, wealth is constantly changing from hand to hand, but always
in large masses. The richest families of a few centuries back are extinct, the blood of
the noblest of a comparatively recent time flows in the veins of people who live in gar-
rets and toil inki tchens. And the same causes which have reduced the 374,000 land-
holders of England in the middle of the last century to 30,000 now areVorking in this
country as powerfully as they are working there. Wealth is concentrating in a few
hands as rapidly in New York as in London; the condition of the laboring classes of
New England is steadily approximating to that of Old England.
Nor, if we are to have a very rich class and a very poor class, is there any particu-
lar advantage in the fact that one is constantly being recruited from the other, though
there are people who seem to think that the fact that most of our millionaires were
poor boys is a sufficient answer to anything that may be said of the evils of a concen-
tration of wealth. As wealth concentrates, the chances for any particular individual
to escape from one class to another becomes less and less, until practically worth
nothing, while there is nothing in human nature to cause us to believe, and nothing in
history to show that members of a privileged class are less grasping because they once
belonged to an unprivileged class. Nor, after wealth has become concentrated, is
there any tendency in this changing of the individuals who hold it to diffuse it again.
The social structure is like the flame of a gas-burner, which retains its form though the
particles which compose it are constantly changing.
The Tendency to Concentration.
There is no tendency yet to the breaking up of large landholdings in the United
States; but the reverse is rather the case. The railroad lands are not being sold any-
thing like as fast as they are being granted, and large private estates, are increasing
instead of diminishing. It is true that tracts bought for speculation are frequenty cut
up and sold, but it will generally be found that others are at the same time secured
further ahead, though not always by the same parties. And as wealth concentrates,
population becomes denser, and the advantages of land ownership greater, the. ten-
dency on the part of the rich to invest in land increases, and the same cause which has
so largely reduced the number of land-owners in Great Britain is put in operation.
Already the custom of renting land is unmistakably gaining ground, and the concen-
tration of land-ownership seems to be going on in our older States almost as fast as
the monopolization of new land goes on in the younger ones.* And at last the steam
plow and the steam wagon have appeared—to develope, perhaps, in agriculture the
same tendencies to concentration which the power loom and the trip hammer have
developed in manufacturing.
* " Our farms in older States instead of being divided and subdivided as they ought to be, are
growing larger and more unwieldly. The tendency of the times is unquestionably towards immense
estates, each with a manorial mansion in the center and a dependent tenantry crouching in the
shadow."
—
North American Review, 1859.
" A non-resident proprietary like that of Ireland is getting to be the characteristic of large farm-
ing districts in New England, adding yearly to the nominal value of leasehold farms, advancing
yearly the rent demanded, and steadily degrading the character of the tenantry, until, in the place
of the boasted intelligence of rural New England, a competent authority can to-day write: ' The gen-
eral educational condition of the farm laborer is very low, even below that of the factory operative;
a large percentage of them can neither read nor write.' " —New York World, May, 1871, in. an article on
the returns for New England of the Census of 1870.
"The part of the report, [Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics] however, which of all is,
in our opinion, the most remarkable, is that relating to agriculture in Massachusetts. It may be
summed up in two words: rapid decay. Increased nominal value of land, higher rents, fewer farms
occupied by owners; diminished product, general decline of prosperity, lower wages; a more ignorant
population, increasing number of women employed at hard outdoor labor (surest sign of a declining
civilization) , and steady deterioration in the style of farming—these are the conditions described by
a cumulative mass of evidence that' is perfectly irresistible, and that is unfortunately only too
strongly confirmed by such details of census statistics as have been so far made public."
—
New York
Nation, June, 1871.
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We are not only putting large bodies of our new lands in the hands of the few
;
but we are doing our best to keep them there, and to cause the absorption of
small farms into large estates. The whole pressure of our revenue system, National
and State, tends to the concentration of wealth and the monopolization of land. A
hundred thousand dollars in the hands of one man pays but a slight proportion of the
taxes which are paid by the same sum in the hands of fifty ; a hundred thousand
acres owned by a single landholder is assessed but for a fraction of the amount
assessed upon the hundred thousand acres of six hundred farms. Especially is this
true of the State of California, where the large handholders are frequently assessed at
the rate of one dollar per acre on land for which they are charging settlers twenty or
thirty, and where the small farmer sometimes pays taxes at a rate one hundred fold
greater than his neighbor of the eleven league ranch. Our whole policy is of a piece
—everything is tending with irresistible force to make us a nation of landlords and
tenants—of great capitalists and their poverty-stricken employes.
The life of all the older nations shows the bitterness of the curse of land monop-
olization; we cannot turn a page of their history without finding the blood stains and
the tear marks it has left. But never since commerce and manufactures grew up, and
men began to engage largely.in other occupations than those connected directly with
the soil, has it been so important to prevent land monopolization as now. The ten-
dency of all the improved means and forms of production and exchange—of the
greater and greater subdivision of labor, of the enslavement of steam, of the utiliza-
tion of electricity, of the ten thousand great labor-saving appliances which modern
invention has brought forth, is strongly and more strongly to extend the dominion of
capital and to make of labor its abject slave. Once to set up in the business of mak-
ing cloth required only the purchase of a hand-loom and a little yarn, the means for
which any journeyman could soon save from his earnings; now it requires a great
factory, costly machinery, large stocks and credits, and to go into business on his own
account one must be a millionaire. So it is in all branches of manufacture; so, too, it
is in trade. Concentration is the law of the time. The great city is swallowing up
the little towns; the great merchant is driving his poorer rivals out of business; a
thousand little dealers become the clerks and shopmen of the proprietor of the mar-
ble-fronted palace ; a thousand master workmen, the employes of one rich man-
ufacturer, and the gigantic corporations, the alarming product of the new social forces
which Watt and Stephenson introduced to the world, are themselves being welded into
still more titanic corporations. From present appearances, ten years from now we
will have but three, possibly but one railroad company in the United States, yet
our young men remember the time when these giants were such feeble infants that we
deemed it charity to shelter them from the cold, and feed them, as it were, with a
spoon. In the new condition of things what chance will there be for a poor man if
our land also is monopolized ?
Of the political tendency of our land policy, it is hardly necessary to speak. To
say that the land of a country shall be owned by a small class, is to say that that class
shall rule it; to say—which is the same thing—that the people of a country shall con-
sist of the very rich and the very poor, is to say that republicanism is impossible. Its
forms may be preserved; but the real government which clothes itself with these forms,
as if in mockery, will be many degrees worse than an avowed and intelligent despot-
V.
WHAT OUR LAND POLICY SHOULD BE.
How "We Should Dispose of Our New Land.
When we reflect what land is; when we consider the relations between it and
labor; when we remember that to own the land upon which a man must gain his sub-
sistence is to all intents and purposes to own the man himself, we cannot remain in
doubt as to what should be our policy in disposing of our public lands.
We have no right to dispose of them except to actual settlers—to the men who
really want to use them; no right to sell them to speculators, to give them to railroad
companies or to grant them for agricultural colleges; no more right to do so than we
have to sell or to grant the labor of the people who must some day live upon them.
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And to actual settlers we should give them. Give, not sell. For we have no right
to step between the man who wants to use land and land which is as yet unused, and
to demand of him a price for our permission to avail himself of his Creator's bounty.
The cost of surveying and the cost of administering the Land Office may be proper
charges; but even these it were juster and wiser to charge as general expenses, to be
borne by the surplus wealth of the country, by the property which settlement will
make more valuable. We can better afford to bear the necessary expenses of the Land
Office than we can the expense of keeping useless men-of-war at sea or idle troops in
garrison posts. When we can give a few rich bankers twenty or thirty millions a year
we can afford to pay a few millions in order to make our public lands perfectly free.
Let the settler keep all of his little capital; it is his seed wheat. When he has gath-
ered his crop, then we may take our toll, with usury if need be.
And we should give but in limited quantities. For while every man has a right to as
much land as he can properly use, no man has a right to any more, and when others
do or will want it, cannot take any more without infringing on their rights. One hun-
dred and sixty acres is too much to give one person; it is more than he can cultivate;
and our great object should be to give every one an opportunity of employing his own
labor, and to give no opportunity to any one to appropriate the labor of others. We
cannot afford to give so much in view of the extent of the public domain and the
demand for homes yet to be made upon it. While we are calling upon all the world
to come in and take our land, let us save a little for our own children. Nor can we
afford to give so much in view of the economic loss consequent upon the dispersion
of population. Four families to the square mile are not enough to secure the great-
est return to labor and the least waste in exchanges. Eighty acres is quite enough for
any one, and I am inclined to think forty acres still nearer the proper amount.
There should be but this one way of disposing of the agricultural lands. None
at all should be given to the States, except such as was actually needed for sites of
public buildings; none at all for school funds or agricultural colleges. The earningslof
a self-employing, independent people, upon which the State may at any time draw,
constitute tae best school fund; to diffuse wealth so that the masses may enjoy the
luxury of learning is the best way to provide for colleges.
Some Objections.
It will be said: If the public land is to be morseled out in this way, what is to be
done for stock ranches and sheep farms? There will be the unused land, the public
commons. Let the large herds and flocks keep upon that, moving further along as it
is needed for settlement. But there would be plenty of stock kept on eighty-acre or
even forty-acre farms. In Belgium each six-acre farmer has his cow or two of the
best breed, and kept in the best condition.
And it may be said : There is some land which requires extensive work for its
reclamation. Capital cannot be induced to undertake this work if the land be given
away in small pieces. But if capital cannot, labor can. The most difficult reclama-
tion in the world—that of turning the shifting sands of the French sea coast into
gardens has been done by ten and twelve-acre farmers. Observe that it is proposed
to give the lands only to actual settlers. Is there any of our land which requires for
its reclamation greater capital than that involved in the labor of sixteen men to the
square mile, working to make themselves homes? The cost of reclaiming the swamp
lands of California, which has been made an excuse for giving them away by the hun-
dred thousand acres, does not in most cases equal the cost of the fencing required on
the uplands. Let men be sure that they are working for themselves; give them a little
stake in the general prosperity, and labor will combine intelligently and economically
enough.
How Settlement "Would Go On.
Under such a policy as this, settlement would go on regularly and thoroughly.
Population would not in the same time spread over as much ground as under the
present policy ; but what it did spread over would be well settled and well cultivated.
There would be no necessity for building costly railroads to connect settlers with a
market. The market would accompany settlement. No one would go out into the wil-
derness, to brave all the hardships and discomforts of the solitary frontier life; but
with the foremost line of settlement would go church and school-house and lecture-
room. The ill-paid overworked mechanic of the city could find a home on the soil,
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where he would not have to abandon all the comforts of civilization, but where there
would be society enough to make life attractive, and where the wants of his neighbors
would give a market for his surplus labor until his land began to produce; and to tell
those who complain of want of employment and low wages to make for themselves
homes on the public domain would then be no idle taunt.
Consider, too, the general gain from this mode of settlement. How much of our
labor is now given to transportation, and wasted in various ways, because of the scat-
tering of our population which land grabbing has caused?
Something Still More Radical Needed.
But still the - adoption of such a policy would effect only the land that is left us.
It would be preventive, not remedial. It would still leave the great belts granted to
railroads, the vast estates such as those with which California is cursed, and the large
bodies of land which everywhere have been made the subject of speculation. It would
leave, moreover, still in full force, the tendeney which is concentrating the ownership
of the land in a few hands in the older settled States. And further than this, I hard-
ly think, agitate as we may, that we can secure the adoption of such a preventive
policy until we can do something to make the monopolization land unprofitable.
What we want, therefore, is something which shall destroy the tendency to the
aggregation of land, which shall break up present monopolization, and which shall
prevent (by doing away with the temptation) future monopolization. And as arbitrary
and restrictive laws are always difficult to enforce, we want a measure which shall be
equal, uniform and constant in its operation; a measure which will not restrict enter-
prise, which will not curtail production, and which will not offend the natural sense
of justice.
When our 40,000,000 of people have to raise $800,000,000 per year for public pur-
poses * we cannot have any difficulty in discovering such a remedy, in the adjustment
of taxation.
A Lesson from the Fast.
Let us turn for a moment from the glare of the Nineteenth Century to the dark-
ness of mediaeval times. The spirit of the Feudal System dealt far more wisely with
the land than the system which has succeeded it, and rude outcome of a barbarous age
though it was, we may, remembering the difference of times and conditions, go back
to it for many valuable lessons. The Feudal System annexed, duties to privileges.
In theory, at least, protection was the corollary of allegiance, and honor brought with
it the obligation to a good life and noble deeds, while the ownership of land involved
the necessity of bearing the public expenses. One portion of the land, allotted to the
Crown, defrayed the expenses of the State; out of the profits of another portion, alot-
ted to the military tenants, the army was provided and maintained; the profits of a
third portion, given to religious uses, supported the Church and relieved the sick, the
indigent and the wayworn, while there was a fourth portion, the commons, of which
no man was master, but which was free to all the people. The great debt, the grind-
ing taxation, which now falls on the laboring classes of England, are but the results of
a departure from this system. Before Henry VIII suppressed the monasteries and
enclosed the commons there were no poor laws in England and no need for any; until
the crown lands were got rid of there was no necessity for taxation for the support of
the government; until the military tenants shirked the condition on which they had
been originally permitted to reap the profits of land ownership, England could at any
time put an army in the field without borrowing and with taxation; and a recent
English writer has estimated that had the feudal tenures been continued, England
would have now had at her command a completely appointed army of six hundred
thousand men, without the cost of a penny to the public treasury or to the laboring
classes. Had this system been continued the vast war expenses of England would
have come from the surplus wealth of those who make war; the expenses of Govern-
ment would have borne upon the classes who direct the government; and the deep
gangrene of pauperism, which perplexes the statesman and baffles the philanthropist,
would have had no existence. England would have been stronger, richer, happier.
Why should we not go back to the old system, and charge the expenses of government
upon our lands ?
* Estimate of Commissioner Wells.
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If we do, we shall go far towards breaking up land monopoly and all its evils, and
towards counteracting the causes now so rapidly concentrating wealth in a few hands.
"We shall raise our revenues by the most just and the most simple means, and with the
least possible burden upon production.
Taxation of Land Palls only on its Owner.
There is one peculiarity in a land tax. "With a few trifling exceptions of no prac-
tical importance it is the only tax which must be paid by the holder of the thing taxed.
If we impose a tax upon money loaned, the lender will charge it to the borrower, and
the borrower must pay it, otherwise the money will be sent out of the country for in-
vestment, and if the borrower uses it in his business he, in his turn, must charge it to
his customers or his business becomes unprofitable. If we impose a tax upon buildings,
those who use them must pay it, as otherwise the erection of buildings becomes
unprofitable, and will cease until rents become high enough to pay the regular profit
on the cost of building and the tax besides. But not so with land. Land is not an
article of production. Its quantity is fixed. No matter how little you tax it there will
be no more of it; no matter how much you tax it there will be no less. It can neither
be removed nor made scarce by cessation of production. There is no possible way in
which owners of land can shift the tax upon the user. And so while the effect of taxa-
tion upon all other things is to increase their value, and thus to make the consumer
pay the tax—the effect of a tax upon land is to reduce its value—that is, its selling
price, as it reduces the profit of its ownership without reducing its supply. It will not,
however, reduce its renting price. The same amount of rent will be paid; but a por-
tion of it will now go to the State instead of to the landlord. And were we to impose
upon land a tax equal to the whole annual profit of its ownership, land would be worth
nothing and might in many cases be abandoned by its owners. But the users would
still have to pay as much as before
—
paying in taxes what they formerly paid as rent.
And reversely, if we were to reduce or take off the taxes on land, the owner, not the
user, would get the benefit. Kents would be no higher, but would leave more profit,
and the value of land would be more.
Land Taxation the Best Taxation.
The best tax is that which comes nearest to filling the three following conditions
:
That it bear as lightly as possible upon production.
,
That it can be easily and cheaply collected, and cost the people as little as possi-
ble in addition to what it yields the Government.
That it bear equally—that is according to the ability to pay.
The tax upon land better fulfills these conditions than any tax it is possible to
impose.
1.—As we have seen, it does not bear at all upon production—it adds nothing to
prices, and does not affect the cost of living.
2.—As it does not add to prices, it costs the people nothing in addition to what it
yields the Government; while as land cannot be hid and cannot be moved, it can be
collected with more ease and certainty, and with less expense than any other tax.
3.—A tax upon the value of land is the most equal of all taxes, not that it is paid
by all in equal amounts, or even in equal amounts upon equal means, but because the
value of land is something which belongs to all, and in taxing land values we are
merely taking for the use of the community something which belongs to the com-
munity, but which by the necessities of our social organization we are obliged to per-
mit individuals to hold.
Of course, in speaking of the value of land, I mean the value of the land itself,
not the value of any improvement which has been made upon it—I mean what I be-
lieve is sometimes called in England the unearned value of land.
From its very nature it must be apparent that property in land differs essentially
from other property, and if the principles I have endeavored to state in the third sec-
tion of this paper are correct, it must be evident that it is not unjust to impose taxes
upon land values which are not imposed on other property. But as the proposition
may be somewhat startling, it may be worth while to dwell a little on this point.
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Of the Justice of Taxing Land.
Here is a lot in the central part of San Francisco, which, irrespective of the
building upon it is worth $100,000. What gives that value? Not what its owner has
done,* but the fact that 150,000 people have settled around it. This lot yields its
owner $10,000 annually. Where does this $10,000 come from? Evidently from the
earnings of the workers of the community, for it can come from no where else.
Here is a lot on the outskirts. It is in the same condition in which nature left it.
Intrinsically it is worth no more than when there were but a hundred people at Yerba
Buena Cove. Then it was worth nothing. Now, that there are 150,000 people here
and more coming, it is worth $3,000. That is, its owner can command $3,000 worth
of the labor or of the wealth of the community. What does he give for this ? Noth-
ing; the land was there before he was.
Suppose a community like that of San Francisco, in which land though in indi-
vidual hands as now, has no value. Suppose, then, that all at once the land was
given a value of, say $150,000,000, which is about the present value of land in San
Francisco. What would be the effect ? That a tax, of whioh $150,000,000 is the capi-
talized value, would be levied upon the whole community for the benefit of a portion.
There would no more wealth in the community than before, and no greater means of
producing wealth. But of that wealth, beyond the share which they formerly had, the
land-owners would now command $150,000,000. That is, there would be $150,000,000
less for other people who were not land-holders.
And does not this consideration of the nature and effect of land values go far to
explain the puzzling fact that notwithstanding all the economies in production and
distribution which a dense population admits, just as a community increases in pop-
ulation and wealth, so does the reward of the laborer decrease and poverty deepen.
One hundred men settle in a new place. Land has at first little or no value. The
net result of their labor is divided pretty equally between them. Each one gets pretty
nearly the full value of his contribution to the general stock. The community be-
comes 100,000. Land has become valuable, its value perhaps aggregating as much as
the value of all other property. The production of the community may now be more
per capita for each individual who works, but before the division is made, one-half of
the product must go to the land-holders. How then can the laborer get so much as
he could in the small community ?
Now in this view of the matter—considering land values as an indication of the
appropriation (though doubtless the necessary appropriation) of the wealth of all
;
considering land rentals as a tax upon the labor of the community, is not a tax upon
land values the most just and the most equal tax that can be levied ? Should we not
take that which rightfully belongs to the whole before we take that which rightfully
belongs to the individual ? Should we not tax this tax upon labor before we tax pro-
ductive labor itself?
That the value of our lands, even the "necessary value " which it would have
when stripped of speculative value, would easily bear the whole burden of taxation,
there can be no doubt. The statistics are too confused and too unreliable to enable
ns to judge accurately, of the value of land as compared with the value of other prop-
erty; but we have high authority for the belief that the value of our land is equal to
the value of all other property, including the improvements upon it. The New York
Commissioners for the Revision of the Kevenue Laws—David A. Wells, Edwin Dodge
and George W. Cuyler, the first named of whom as United States Special Commis-
sioner of the Bevenue, has had better opportunities for studying all matters connected
with taxation than any other man in the United States—say in their report, rendered
this year : ' 'A careful consideration and study of the nature and classification of prop-
erty inclines the Commissioners to indorse the correctness of an opinion which ap-
pears to have been originally proposed by a financial writer of New York [George
Opdyke] as far back as 1851, viz. : ' That universally the market value of the aggregate
of land and that of the aggregate of productive capital are equal.' "t
* Though he may have done some part, as in grading, etc.
t By " productive capital " Opdyke means all property other than land. In his Treatise on
Political Economy he says: "The statistics presented by assessments of property for the purposes of
taxation invariably exhibit the estimated value of land and its meliorations under the head of ' real
estate,' and the estimated value of all other productive capital under the head of ' personal estate.'
Thus divided, we may readily infer that the value of real estate greatly exceeds that of personal
estate, and so these statistics invariably indicate. But if we take the estimate for any given village,
town or city, and from the gross value of the real estate deduct the value of the buildings, and add
to it the personal estate, we shall then find them equal, provided the assessment has been correctly
made, which by the way, very rarely occurs.
"
After citing examples from New York and Cincinnati, he goes on to say: " It is thus of all other
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And it may be here remarked, that these New York Commissioners in their elab-
orate report recommend the total abolition of the tax on personal property on the
ground (which has been proved in every State in the Union, and, in fact by every
nation of ancient or modern times) that it is utterly impossible to collect it with any
degree of fullness and anything like, fairness, and that the attempt to do so results in
injury both to the material and the moral interests of the community. They propose
intstead of the tax on personal property, to tax every individual on an amount three
times as great as the annual rental of the house or place of business he occupies, and
present a strong array of reasons to show that this would be a much more equitable and
productive mode of taxation. Better still, for the reasons I have given, to abandon
the attempt to tax personal property or anything in lieu of it, and to put the bulk of
taxation entirely on land values.
Nevertheless, after all that can be said, it must be confessed that there would be
some slight injustice in doing so. I had ten thousand dollars, let us say, which I
might have put out at high interest, or invested in my business. Supposing the ex-
isting policy would be continued, I bought land with it, calculating that in a few years,
when population became greater, people would be glad to buy it of me for a much
higher price, or give me one-fourth of the crop for the privilege of cultivating it.
You now impose taxation, which will lower the value of my land. If you do this,
you make my speculation less profitable than others I might have gone into, and thus
do me injustice, for you gave me no notice.
This is true, and it is this consideration which makes men like John Stuart Mill
shrink from the practical application of deductions from their own doctrines, and pro-
pose that in resuming their ownership of the land of England, the people of England
shall pay its present proprietors not only its actual value, but also the present value
of its prospective increase in value. But if we once do a public wrong, we can never
right it without doing somebody injustice. Englaud sought to right the Avrong of
slavery without injustice to the slaveholders who had invested their capital in human
flesh and blood. She succeeded by making them pecuniary compensation; but in
doing this she did a worse injustice to her own white slaves on whom the burden of
the payment has been imposed. And by shrinking from doing this slight injustice
which would affect but very few people in the community, and those most able to
stand it, we continue a ten thousand fold greater injustice ; and the longer we delay
action, the greater will be the injustice which we must do.
Of some Exemptions, and some Additions.
For the purpose ofmaking it still more sure that taxation should not bear heavily
upon any one ; for the purpose of making still further counteracting the tendency to
the concentration of wealth, and for the purpose of securing as far as possible to every
citizen an interest in the soil, there should be a uniform exemption to a small amount
made to each land-holder
—
perhaps a smaller amount in the cities, where land is only
used for residences and business purposes, than in the country, where labor is directly
applied to the land. Those whose land did not exceed in value this minimum would
have no taxes to pay ; those whose land did, would pay upon the surplus. This would
reverse the present effect of our revenue system, and tend to make the holding of land
in large bodies less profitable than the holding of it in small bodies.
And while, perhaps, it might not be wise to attempt to limit the accumulations of
any individual during his lifetime, or at any rate, it is not yet necessary to try the
experiment, there should be a very heavy duty, amounting to a considerable part of
the whole levied upon the estates of deceased persons, and in the case of intestates,
the whole should escheat to the State, where there were no heirs of the first or second
degree.
There is still another source from which a large revenue might be harmlessly
drawn—license taxes upon such businesses as it is public policy to restrict and dis-
courage, such as liquor selling, the keeping of gambling houses, (where this cannot
be prevented, ) etc. All other taxes of whatever kind or nature, whether National,
State, County, or Municipal, might then be swept away.
cities, towns and villages throughout the civilized world; and it is thus in all agricultural districts,
but in these the land and its meliorations are so much more intimately blended that we cannot per-
ceive the facts so readily. The truth is, the market value of land is merely the reflection of the value
of the productive capital placed upon it and its immediate vicinity. It has no real value of its own;
it costs nothing to produce; but since the laws have endowed it with the vital principle of wealth by
subjecting it to individual ownership, it can no longer be obtained without giving in exchange for it
an equivalent portion of the capital present and designed to concur with it in the production of
wealth."
•
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The Effects of Such a Change.
Consider the effects of the adoption of such a system :
The mere holder of land -would be called on to pay just as much taxes as the user
of land. The owner of a vacant city lot would have to pay as much for the privilege
of keeping other people off it till he -wanted to use it, as his neighbor -who has a
fine house upon his lot, and is either using or deriving rent from it. The monopo
lizer of agricultural land would be taxed as much as though his land were covered
with improvements, with crops and with stock.
Land prices would fall ; land speculation would receive its death-blow ; land mo-
nopolization would no longer pay. Millions and millions of acres from which settlers
are now shut out, would be abandoned by their present owners, or sold to settlers on
nominal terms. It is only in rare cases that it would pay any one to get land before
he wanted to use it, so that those who really wanted to use land would find it easy to
get.
The whole weight of taxation would be lifted from productive industry. The
million dollar manufactory, and the needle of the seamstress, the mechanic's cottage,
and the grand hotel, the farmer's plow, and the ocean steamship, would be alike un-
taxed. AH would be free to biiy or sell, to make or save, unannoyed by the tax-
gatherer.
Imagine this country with all taxes removed from production and exchange ! How
demand would spring up ; how trade would increase ; what a powerful stimulus would
be applied to every branch of industry ; what an enormous development of wealth
would take place. Imagine this country free of taxation, with its unused land free
to those who would use it ! Would there be many industrious men walking our
streets, or tramping over our roads in the vain search for employment ? Would we
hear much of stagnation in business, and of "over production" of the things that
millions of us want ? Consider the enormous gain which would result from leaving
capital and labor, untrammeled by tax or restriction, to seek the most remunerative
fields ; the enormous saving which would result from the settling of people near each
other, as they would settle, if any one could get enough unused land for his needs, and
it would pay nobody to get any more.
Consider the effects of this policy on the distribution of wealth— directly, by
reversing the effect of taxation—which is now to make the poor, poorer, and the rich,
richer ; indirectly, by freeing and cheapening land, and thus putting labor in a posi-
tion to make better terms with capital. And consider how equalization in the distribu-
tion of wealth would react on production—how it would lessen the great army of
involuntary idlers ; how it would increase the vigor and industry and skill of workers;
for poorly rewarded labor is poor labor all the world over, and the greater its reward,
the greater the efficiency of labor. Consider, too, the moral effects: Sharp alterna-
tions of wealth and poverty, breed vice and crime, as surely as they breed misery.
Personal independence is the foundation of all the virtues. Deep poverty brutalizes
men. Where it exists, #ie preacher will preach in vain; and the philantrophist will
toil in vain
; they are dumping their good words and good deeds into such a Slough
of Despond as Pilgrim saw.
"Who •would Gain and -who -would Lose.
That the policy proposed would be to the advantage of all who do not hold land
is clear enough. But it must not be imagined that all who hold land would lose. On
the contrary, the large majority of land-holders' would be gainers. Whether a land-
holder would gain or lose, would depend upon whether his interest as a land-holder,
which would be adversely affected, was greater or less than his other interests, which
would be beneficially affected. The man who owns a house and lot of equal value
would have less taxes to pay if taxation were taken off of buildings and put on land,
as the aggregate value of land is greater than that of buildings. His homestead would
sell for iess than before, but the money it sold for would buy just as good a house and
lot as before; so that, if his intention is to always keep a homestead, he would not
lose anything by the shrinkage in its value; or even if it was not, he would not have
to keep it long before his gain on taxes would make up for the loss in value. While,
if he was a mechanic, engaged in or connected with any of the building trades, he
would gain in more constant work and better wages by the stimulus which the exemp-
tion of improvements from taxation, and the reduction in the value of land would
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give to building. Or if he kept a store, or was engaged in any business or profession,
he would gain by the quickened growth and increased activity of the community.
And if taxes were removed from everything but land, (with the exceptions and
exemptions I have before indicated) the gain would be largely greater. Let the farmer,
the mechanic, the manufacturer, or the business man, who is also a land owner, cal-
culate how much he pays of the taxes which enter into the cost of everything he buys,
or in any way uses, and how much he loses by the restrictive effect which those taxes
have upon all industiy and business. Then let him set against this amount, which
he now pays and loses, the additional amount which he would pay as taxes on land,
or which he would lose by the reduction of its value, were all taxes placed upon land.
Did they make this calculation, three out of every four of those who own land would
see they would be gainers
. For as yet the class whose other interests are subordinate
to their interest in the high value of land is really small. And it must be remembered
that were our whole revenue raised by a direct land tax, the amount taken from the
people in order to give the same amount to the Government would be very much
smaller than now, and that there would be a positive increase in wealth, a large share
of which would go to the land-owners who would have additional taxes to pay.
What Can be Done at Once.
The more the matter is considered, the more, I think, it will appear that all our
taxation, or at least the largest part of it, should be placed upon land values. By
doing so we would substitute the best possible revenue system for our present cum-
brous, unjust, wasteful and oppressive modes of taxation ; we would, without resort
to special and arbitrary laws, prevent and break up land monopolization, and we
would, at the same time, and in the same simple, just way, do a great deal to counter-
act the alarming tendency to the concentration of wealth in a few hands, which is now
so apparent.
Nevertheless, the application of this remedy is not yet practicable. We are so
used to look upon land as upon other property, so accustomed to consider its enhance-
ment in value as a public gain, that it will take some time to educate public opinion
up to the proper point to permit this ; and even then there will be constitutional dim-,
cutties to be removed.
But in the meantime, we can do something to check the progress of land monopo-
lization, and even to break it up. So far .as the General Government is concerned,
we can insist that no more land grants be made on any pretext or for any purpose ;
but that all of the public domain still left to us shall be reserved for the small farms of
actual settlers. We can go further, and demand that something be done to open to
settlers the great belts which have been already handed over to railroad corporations.
These grants in the first place, outraged natural justice, and Congress had no more
right to make them, than Catherine of Bussia had to give away her subjects to her
paramours and courtiers, or than the Pope had to divide the Southern Hemisphere
between the Spanish and the Portuguese. We should be perfectly justified in taking
this land back, throwing it open to settlers upon Government terms, and paying the
companies the Government price. Such an operation would largely increase our debt,
but the money would be well expended. If this cannot be done, the land can at least
be immediately surveyed, so that settlers can find the Government sections, and the
right of the Companies to land reserved for them be declared subject to State taxation.
In this monopoly-cursed State of ours, we may at once do a great deal to free our
land. By restricting possessory rights to the maximum amount allowed by the Gen-
eral Government to pre-emptors, and by demanding payment for the large tracts now
held by speculators under five-dollar certificates, or the payment of twenty per cent,
of the purchase money, the Legislature could, in the first week of its session, throw
open to settlers some millions of acres now monopolized.* And millions of acres
more would be forced into market if its holders were only compelled to pay upon their
land the same rate of taxation levied upon other property. The Board of Equaliza-
tion created by the last Legislature, is endeavoring to secure the proper assessment of
these large tracts ; but the law under which it works is defective, and the Constitu-
tional requirement of the election of County Assessors is very much in the way of a
thorough reform, perhaps makes it impossible. But as under our Constitution as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court, all property must be taxed equally, we can do no
more than this to break up large estates until the Constitution is amended.
*Under the decisions of the Department, land within the exterior limits of Spanish grants, and
included in railroad reservations, does not go to the Kailroad Company when the grant is confined to
its real limitB, or is rejected, but becomes open to settlement.
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The Necessity of a Radical Remedy.
There are many who will think that if we do these things, or even if we merely
do something to check the grosser abuses in the disposition of our new land, we
shall have done all that is necessary. I wish to call the attention of those who thus
think to a certain class of facts :
There is a problem which must present itself to every mind which dwells upon
the industrial history of the present century ; a problem into which all our great so-
cial, industrial, and even political questions run—which already perplexes us in the
United States ; which presses with still greater force in the older countries of Europe
;
which, in fact, menaces the whole civilized world, and seems like a very riddle of the
Sphinx, which fate demands of modern civilization, and which not to answer, is to be
destroyed—the problem of the proper distribution of wealth.
How is it that the increase of productive power, and the accumulation of wealth
seem to bring no benefit, no relief to the working classes; that the condition of the
laborer is better in the new and poor country, than in the old and rich country ? That
in a country like Great Britain, whose productive power has been so enormously
increased, whose surplus wealth is lent to all the world, and whose surplus productions
are sent to every market, pauperism is increasing in England, while one-third .of the
families of Scotland live in a single room each, and one-third more in two rooms
each.* How is it that, though within the century steam machinery has added to the
productive force of Great Britain a power greater than that of the manual labor of the
whole human race, that the toil of mere infants is cruelly extorted—that cultiva-
tion in the richest districts is largely carried on by gangs of women and children, in
which mere babies are worked under the lash; that little girls are to be found wielding
sledge hammers, and little boys toiling night and day in the fearful heat of glass fur-
naces, or working to the extreme limit of human endurance in fetid garrets and damp
cellars, at the most monotonous employments—-children who work so early and work
so hard that they know nothing of God, have never heard of the Bible, call a violet a
pretty bird, and when shown a cow in a picture, think it must be a lion ;t children
whose natural protectors have been changed by brutalizing poverty and the want that
knows no law, into the most cruel of taskmasters?
Why is it that in the older parts of the United States we are rapidly approximat-
ing to the same state of things? Why is it that, with all our labor-saving machinery,
all the new methods of increasing production which our fertile genius is constantly
discovering—with all our railroads, and steamships, and power looms, and sewing
machines, our mechanics cannot secure a reduction of two hours in their daily toil;
that the general condition of the working classes is becoming worse instead of better;
and the employment of women and children at hard labor is extending; that though
wealth is accumulating, and luxury increasing, it is becoming harder and harder for
the poor man to live?
A very Sodom's apple seems this " progress" of ours to the classes that have the
most need to progress. We have been " developing the country" fast enough. We
have been building railroads, and peopling the wilderness, and extending our cities.
But what is the gain ? We count up more millions of people, and more hundreds of
millons of taxable property; our great cities are larger, our millionaires are more
numerous, and their wealth is more enormous; but are the masses of the people any
better off? Is it not so notoriously true that we accept the statement without ques-
tion, that just as population increases and wealth augments
—
just in proportion as we
near the goal for which we strive so hard, that poverty extends and deepens, and it
becomes harder and harder for a poor man to make a living?
That the startling change for the worse that has come over the condition c" the
masses of the United States in the last ten years is attributable in some part tj the
destruction caused by the war, and in much greater part to stupid, reckless, wicked
legislation, there can be no doubt. The whole economic policy of the General Gov-
ernment—the management of the debt and of the currency, the imposition of a tariff
which is oppressing all our industry, and actually killing many branches of it, the
immense donations to corporations—has tended with irresistible force, as though
devised for the purpose, to make a few the richer and the many the poorer; to swall
the gains of a few rich capitalists, and make hundreds of thousands of willing work-
men stand with idle hands.
,
*Census of 1861. See Journal of Statistical Society, vol. 32.
tReport Children's Employment Commission.
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But beneath and beyond these special causes, we may see, as could be seen before
the war had given the money power an opportunity and excuse for wresting the
the machinery of Government to its own selfish ends, the working of some gen-
eral tendency, observable all over the world, and most obvious in the countries which
have made the greatest advances in productive power and in wealth.
What is the cause or the causes of this tendency ? If we say, as many of the
economists say, that it is over population in England—that the working classes get
married too early and have too many children—what is it in the United States ? If
we say that in the United States it is solely due to special conditions, what is it in
Australia aiid other countries of widely differing circumstances ?
Now, although there are undoubtedly other general causes, such as the tendency
of modern processes to require greater capital and rarer administrative ability, to
offer greater facilities for combination, and give more and more advantage to him who
can work on a large scale
;
yet if the principles previously stated are correct, are we
not led irresistibly to the conclusion that the main cause of this general tendency to
the unequal division of wealth lies in the pursuance of a wrong policy in regard to
land—in permitting a few to take and to keep that which belongs to all ; in treating
the power of appropriating labor as though it were in itself labor-produced wealth ?
Is not this mistake sufficient of itself to explain most of the perplexing phenomena to
which I have alluded ?
When land becomes fully monopolized as it is in England and Ireland—when the
competition between land-users becomes greater than the competition between land-
owners, whatever increase of wealth there is must go to the land-owner or to the capi-
talist, the laborer gets nothing but a subsistence. Amid lowing herds he never tastes
meat, raising bounteous crops of the finest wheat, he lives on rye or potatoes ; and
where steam has multiplied by hundreds and by thousands manufacturing power, he
is clad in rags, and sends his children to work while they are yet infants. No matter
what be the increase in the fertility of the soil, no matter what the increase in pro-
duct which beneficent inventions cause, no matter even if good laws succeed bad laws,
as when free trade succeeds protection, as has been the case in Great Britain, all the
advantage goes to the land-owner ; none to the landless laborer, for the ownership of
the land gives the power of taking all that labor upon it will produce, except enough
to keep the laborer in condition to work, and anything more that is given is charity.
And so increase in productive power is greater wealth to the land-owner—more splen-
dor in his drawing rooms, more horses in his stables and hounds in his kennels, finer
yachts, and pictures and books—more command of everything that makes life desir-
able ; but to the laborer it is not an additional crust.
And where land monopolization has not gone so far, steadily with the increase of
wealth goes on the increase of land values. Every successive increase represents so
much which those who do not produce may take from the results of production,
measures a new tax upon the whole community for the benefit of a portion. Every
successive increase indicating no addition to wealth, but a greater difference in the
division of wealth, making one class the richer, the others the poorer, and tending
still further to increase the inequality in the distribution of wealth—on the one side,
by making the aggregations of capital larger and its power thus greater, and on the
other, by increasing the number of those who cannot buy land for themselves, but
must labor for or pay rent to others, and while thus swelling the number of those who
must make terms with capital for permission to work, at the same time reducing their
ability to make fair terms in the bargain.
Need we go any further to find the root of the difficulty ? to discover the point at
which we must commence the reform which will make other reforms possible ? And
while, on the one hand, the recognition of the main cause of the inequality in the
distribution of wealth which is becoming a disease of our civilization, condemns the
wild dreams of impracticable socialisms, and the impossible theories of governmental
interference to restrict accumulation and competition and to limit the productive power
of capital, by discovering a just and an easy remedy; on the other hand, the spread of
such theories should admonish those who consider the remedy of a common sense pol-
icy in regard to land as too radical of the necessity of making some attempt at reform.
This great problem of the more equal distribiuton ofwealth must in some way be solved,
if our civilization, like those that wentbefore it, is not to breed the seeds of its own de-
struction, In one way or another the attempt must be made—if not in one way, then
in another. The spread of education, the growth of democratic sentiment, the weak-
ening of the influences which lead men to accept the existing condition of things as
divinely appointed, insure that, and the general uneasiness of labor, the growth of
'
trade-unionism, the spread of such societies as the International prove it ! The terri-
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ble struggle of the Paris commune -was but such an attempt. * And in the light of
burning Paris we may see how it may be that this very civilization of ours, this
second Tower of Babel, which some deem reaches so far towards heaven that we can
plainly see there is no God there, may yet crumble and perish. How prophetic, in
view of those recent events, seem the words of Macauley, when, alluding to Gib-
bons' argument that modern civilization could not be overturned as was the ancient,
he declared that in the very heart of our great cities, in the shadow of palaces, libra-
ries and colleges, poverty and ignorance might produce a race of Huns fiercer than
any who followed Atila, and of Vandals more destructive than those led by Genseric.
The Fast and the Future of the Nation.
Five years must yet pass before we can celebrate the hundreth anniversary of the
Republic. A century ago, as the result of nearly two hundred years of colonization,
the scarce three million people of the thirteen colonies but fringed the Atlantic sea-
board with their settlements. Pittsburg was to them the Far West, and the Missis-
sippi as little known as is now the great river that through a thousand miles of Arctio
sohtudes, rolls sluggishly to its mouth in our newly acquired Northern possessions.
Looking back over the history of the great nations from whom we derive our
blood, our language, and our institutions, and a hundred years seems but a small span.
A hundred years after the foundation of the city, and Rome had scarce begun her
conquering mission ; a hundred years after the Norman Invasion, and the England of
the first Plantagenet differed but little from the England of the Bastard.
How wondrous seems our growth when compared with the past ! So wondrous,
so unprecedented, that when the slow lapse of years shall have shortened the per-
spective, and when in obedience to altered conditions, the rate of increase shall have
slackened, it will seem as though in our time the very soil of America must have
bred men.
We have subdued a Continent in a shorter time than many a palace and cathedral
of the Old World was a building ; in less than a century we have sprung to a first rank
among the nations ; our population is increasing in a steady ratio ; and we are carry-
ing westward the center of power and wealth, of luxury, learning and refinement,
with more rapidity than it ever moved before.
We look with wonder upon the past. When we turn to the future, imagination
fails, for sober reason with her cold deductions goes far beyond the highest flights
that fancy can dare, and we turn dazzled and almost awe-struck from the picture that
is mirrored. Judging from the past, in all human probability there will be on this
continent, a century from now, four or five, perhaps five or six, hundred million Eng-
lish-speaking people, stretching from the isothermal line which marks the northern
limit of the culture of wheat, to the southern limit of the semi-trophical clime. Four
or five hundred million people, with the railroad, the telegraph, and all the arts
and appliances that we now have, and with all the undreamed of inventions which
another century such as the past will develope. Beside the great cities of such a peo-
ple, the Paris of to-day will be a village, the London, a provincial town, and to the
political power which will grow up, if these people remain under one government, the
great nations of Europe will occupy such relative positions as the South American
States now hold to the great Republic of the North.
Yet we should never forget that we have no exemption from the difficulties and
dangers which have beset other peoples, though they may come to us in somewhat dif-
ferent guise. The very rapidity of our growth should admonish us that though we
are still in our youth, our conditions are fast changing ; the very possibilities of our
future warn us that this is the appointed theatre upon which the questions that
perplex the world, must be worked out, or fought out. What good, or what evil, we
of this generation do, will appear in the next on an enormously magnified scale. The
blunders that we are carelessly making, saying " these things will right themselves in
time, " will indeed right themselves ; but how ? How was the wrong of slavery righted
* And this French struggle also shows the conservative influence of the diffusion of landed
property. The Radicals of Paris were beaten by the small proprietors of the provinces. Had the
lands of France been in the hands of a few, as the first revolution found it, the raising of the red flag
on the Hotel de Ville would have been the signal for a Jacqeueire in every part of the country. So
concious are the extreme Beds of the conservative influence of property in land that they have for a
long time condemned as a fatal mistake the law of the first Republic which provided for the equal
distribution of land among heirs, not because it has not improved the condition of the peasantry,
but because the improvement in their condition and the interest which their possession of land gives
them in the maintenance of order disposes them to oppose tthe violent remedies which the workmen
of the cities think necessary.
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in the United States? The whole history of mankind, with its story of fire and sword,
of suffering and destruction, is but one continued example of how national blunders
and crimes work themselves out. On the smaller scale of individual life and actions,
the workings of Divine justice are sometimes never seen ; but sure, though not always
swift, is the N emesis that with tireless feet, follows every wrong doing of a people.
The American people have had a better chance and a fairer field than any nation
that has gone before. Coming to a new world with all the experiences of the
old
;
possessed of all the knowledge and the arts of the most advanced of the fami-
lies of men, the temperate zone of an immense continent lay before them, where un-
embarrassed by previous mistakes, they might work out the problem of human happi-
ness by the light of the history of two thousand years. Yet nobly and well as our
fathers reared the edifice of civil and religious liberty, true ideas as to the treatment
of land, the very foundation of all other institutions, seem never to have entered
their minds. In a new country where nothing was so abundant as land, and where
there was nothing to suggest its monpolization, the men who gave direction to our
thought and shaped our polity, shook off the idea of the divine right of kings without
shaking off that of the divine right of land-owners. They promulgated the grand
truth that all men are born with equal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness, without promulgating the doctrines in respect to land which alone could main-
tain those rights as a living reality ; they instituted a form of government, based on
the theory of the independence and virtue of the masses of the people without im-
posing those restrictions upon land monopolization which alone can keep the masses
virtuous and independent. They laid the foundations for a glorious house ; but they
laid them in the sand.
Already we can see that the rains will come, the winds will blow. We see it in
the increase of the renting system in agriculture; in the massing of men in the
employ of great manufacturers; in the necessity under which thousands of our citizens
lie of voting, and even of speaking on political matters, as their employers dictate;* in
the marked differentiation of our people in older sections into the rich and the poor;
in the evolution of " dangerous classes" in our large cities; in the growth of enormous
individual fortunes; in the springing up of corporations which dwarf the States, and
fairly grapple the General Government; in the increase of political corruption; in the
ease with which a few great rings wrest the whole power of the nation to their
aggrandizement.
Go to New York, the greatest of our American cities, the type of what many of
them must soon be, the best example of the condition to which the whole country is
tending—New York, where men build marble stables for their horses, and an army of
women crowd the streets at night to sell their souls for the necessities which unremit-
ting toil, such as no human being ought to endure, will not give them—where a hund-
red thousand men who ought to be at work are looking for employment, and a hund-
red thousand children who ought to be at school, are at work. Notice the great
blocks of warehouses, the gorgeousness of Broadway, the costly palaces which fine
the avenues. Notice too, the miles of brothels which flank them, the tenement
houses, where poverty festers and vice breeds, and the man from the free open West
turns sick at heart ; notice in the depth of winter the barefooted, ragged children in
the press of the liveried equipages, and you will understand how it is that republican
government has broken down in New York ; how it is that republican government
is impossible there ; and how it is that the crucial test of our institutions is yet to
come. If you say that New York is a great seaport, with different conditions from
the rest of the country, go to the manufacturing towns, to the other cities, and see
the same characteristics developing just in proportion to their population and wealth.
And while we may see all this, we are doing our utmost to make land dear, giving
away the public domain in tracts of millions of acres, drawing great belts across it
upon which the settler cannot enter; offering a premium by our taxation for the
concentration of land ownership, and pressing with the whole weight of our revenue
system in favor of the concentration of wealth.
How a Great People Perished.
In all the history of the past there is but one nation with which the great nation
now growing up on this continent can be compared : but one people which has occu-
pied the position and exercised the influence, which for good or evil, the American
people must occupy and exert. A nation which has left a deeper impress upon the
*See Keports Massachusetts Bureau Labor Statistics.
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life of the race than any other nation that ever existed; whose sway was co-extensive
with the known world ; whose heroes and poets, and sages and orators, are still familiar
names to us ; whose literature and art still furnish us models ; whose language Has
enriched every modern tongue, and though long dead, is still the language of science
and of religion, and whose jurisprudence is the great mine from which our modern
systems are wrought. That a nation so powerful in arms, so advanced in the arts,
should perish as Rome perished ; that a civilization so widely diffused, should be
buried as was the Roman civilization, is the greatest marvel which history presents.
To the Roman citizen of the time of Augustus or the Antonines, it would have ap-
peared as incredible, as utterly impossible that Rome could be overwhelmed by bar-
barians, as to the American citizen of to-day it would appear impossible that the great
American Republic could be conquered by the Apaches, or the Ghinooks, our arts for-
gotten, and our civilization lost.
How did this once incredible thing happen ? What were the hidden causes that
sapped the strength and eat out the heart of this world-conquering power, so that it
crumbled to pieces before the shock of barbarian hordes ? A Roman historian himself
has told us. "Great estates ruined Italy !" In the land policy of Rome may be
traced the secret of her rise, the cause of her fall.
"To every citizen as much land as he himself may use ; he is an enemy of the
State who desires any more," was the spirit of the land policy which enabled Rome
to assimilate so quickly the peoples that she conquered ; that gave her a body of citi-
zens whose arms were a bulwark against every assault, and who carried her standards
in triumph in every direction. At first a single acre constituted the patrimony of an
Roman ; afterwards the amount was increased to three acres and a half. These were
the heroic days of the Republic, when every citizen seemed animated by a public
spirit and a public virtue which made the Roman name as famous as it made the Ro-
man arms invincible ; when Cincinnatus left his two acre-farm to become Dictator,
and after the danger was over and the State was safe>vreturned to his plow ; when
Regulus, at the head of a conquering army in Africa, asked to be relieved, because
his single slave had died, and there was no one to cultivate his little farm for his
family.
But, as wealth poured in from foreign conquests, and the lust for riches
grew, the old policy was set aside. The Senate granted away the public domain in
large tracts, just as our Senate is doing now; and the fusion of the little farms into
large estates by purchase, by force, and by fraud, went on, until whole provinces were
owned by two or three proprietors, and chained slaves had taken the place of the
sturdy peasantry of Italy. The small farmers who had given her strength to Rome
were driven to the cities, to swell the ranks of the proletarians, and become clients of
the great families, or abroad to perish in the wars. There came to be but two classes
—
the enormously rich and their dependants and slaves; society thus constituted bred its
destroying monsters; the old virtues vanished, population declined, art sank, the old
conquering race actually died out, and Rome perished, as a modern historian puts it,
from the very failure of the crop of men.
Centuries ago this happened, but the laws of the universe are to-day what they
were then.
I have endeavored in this paper to group together some facts which show with what
rapidity, and by what methods, the monopolization of our land is going on; to answer
some arguments which are advanced in its excuse; to state some principles which
prove the matter to be of the deepest interest to all of us, whether we live directly by
the soil or not; and to suggest some remedies.
That land monopolization when it reaches the point to which it has been carried
in England and Ireland is productive of great evils we shall probably all agree. But
popular opinion, even in so far as any attention has been paid to the subject, seems to
regard the danger with us as remote. There are few who understand how rapidly our
land is becoming monopolized ; there are fewer still who seem to appreciate the evils
which land monopolization is already inflicting upon us, or the nearness of the greater
evils which it threatens.
And so as to the remedy. There are many who will concede that the reckless
grants of public land should cease, and even that the public domain shouldbe reserved
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for actual settlers ; but who will be startled by the proposition to put the bulk of tax-
ation on land exclusively ? But the matter will bear thinking of. It is impossible to
overestimate the importance of this land question. The longer it is considered, the
broader does it seem to be and the deeper does it seem to go. It imperatively de-
mands far more attention than it has received ; it is worthy of all the attention that
can be given to it.
To properly treat so large a subject in so brief a space is a most difficult matter.
I have merely outlined it; but if I have done something towards calling attention to
the recklessness of our present land policy, and towards suggesting earnest thought
as to what that policy should be, I have accomplished all I proposed.
HENKY GEOKGE.
San Feancisco, July 27, 1871.
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THE GUERRERO TITLE.
FRANCISCO GUERRERO TO THE COMMANDANT GENERAL, ETC.
PETITION.
Seal Fourth, one Cuartilla.
Provisionally used by the administration of the Maritime
Customs of Monterey, in Upper California, for the years 1834
and 1835.
CASTRO. ANGEL RAMIREZ.
Monterey, Nov. 4, 1836.
Take information from the
administrator of the Mission
of San Francisco, as to wheth-
er the land is vacant. The
petitioner can then he favored.
GUTIERREZ.
Dolores, Nov. 9, 1836.
In conformity with the Su-
perior degree, I will state that
the land is now vacant, and,
according to the order of Gen-
eral Figueroa, deceased, the
lot can be granted to the
party interested.
GUILLO. FLORES.
To the Commandant Gen-
eral and Political Chief of the
Territory of Upper California.
Francis Guerrero, a Mexi-
can by birth, comes before
your Excellency in due form,
and represents: That he is a
member of the colony that
came to this Territory, and
that the most Excellent Com-
mandant General, Don Jose
Figueroa, stated to us that we
might take up our residence
wheresoever it might please
us. I request of you the use
of the power vested in you to
grant to me four hundred
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varas square of land in a
swamp that forms a plain at
the north north-west of the
Mission, from the place that
the water starts from, from
the north to the south-east
and west, up to the road to
Yerba Buena, according to
the design accompanying this.
Should I receive this ser-
vice from your Excellency, I
shall make of use of said land,
and shall receive, therefore,
my welfare.
To your Excellency I request that you will duly grant my
request, for which you will receive my thanks. Swearing
the necessary, etc. San Francisco, October 28th, 1836.
FRANCO. GUERRERO.
GRANT.
Monterey, November 30, 1836.
Having seen the information from the Administrator of
the Mission of Dolores, and the Superior order relating to
Colonial Sessions, there is granted to the citizen, Francisco
Guerrero, four hundred varas in the place solicited, accord-
ing to the present request. To which effect he will present
this document to the Territorial Government as soon as the
Missions shall be regulated, so that the present document or
decree can be respected.
NICOLAS GUTIERREZ.
ORDER.
Political Government of Upper California.
With this date I state to the Commissioner, M. Solano,
the following:
Should Mr. Jose Maria Hijah, or any other individuals of
the colony, conclude to move to any other point he will fa-
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cilitate them with the necessary aid so that they can cross
the bay, and will also transport their equipage, he advising
me of those persons that do the same, also with their place
of destiny to serve for my goverment.
I transmit this to you in case it may be necessary so that
you can be prepared.
God and Liberty. San Francisco, March 5, 1835.
JOSE FIGTTEROA,
S. Comisionado de S. Francisco de Asis.
Recorded in Spanish.
Liber B Spanish records, page 14. And Liber 1 Spanish
Translations, pages 108 and 109.
Recorded in English.
Liber 1 Spanish Translations, pages 110 and 111.
Forming part of the record is a rough diagram or plan
of a tract of land, including the lot granted.
FEANCISCO GUEEEEEO TO JOSEPH SUTTON AND EICHAED
STEVENS.
LEASE.
Dated December 28th, 1849.
Of all those three rooms forming the south-west corner of
the adobe house, now occupied by said Francisco Guer-
rero, in the Mission Dolores. Also, all the tract of land
lying immediately west of said rooms, viz.:
Beginning at the south-west corner of said house and run-
ning west to a stake forming a boundary of said land on the
west line, thence north to a line opposite to the back wall
of said rooms, thence east to the wall of said house, thence
along said wall south to the place of beginning.
For the term of one year from Dec. 28, 1849, with privi-
lege of renewal for any number of years not exceeding
seven, at $20 per month, or improving the property to
that amount.
Not signed, acknowledged, nor certificate or date of rec-
ord attached.
On the margin is the following: "This deed was record-
ed by copy, and upon comparing with the original some
mistakes were detected, viz.: in second line from top the
name of Henry was written instead of Richard."
Recorded in Mission Book, page 3.
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PKOBATE COUET OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
—ESTATE OF FRANCISCO GUERRERO, DECEASED.
Register I, Case 155, Page 62.
July 31, 1851. Petition of Josefa De Haro Guerrero,
shows that Francisco Guerrero departed this life on or
about July 31, 1851, leaving him surviving your petitioner,
his wife aud two infant children, under the age of 10 years,
and that he was seized and possessed at the time of his
death of certain real and personal estate situated within the
County of San Francisco, and that said decedent died in-
testate, to the best of petitioner's knowledge and belief.
Prays that Letters of Administration upon said estate
may be granted to her jointly with Ramon de Zaldo, of
San Francisco.
Dated July 29, 1851.
July 31, 1851. Ordered that August 15th be appointed
for hearing above petition.
August 23. Josefa de Haro de Guerrero files request
that Joseph P. Thompson be joined with her in the admin-
istration of the estate.
October 7. Mr. Thompson, being unable to act, prays
that Henry F. Teschemacher may be joined with her in the
administration of the estate.
October 25. Ordered that Josefa Guerrero and Henry F.
Teschemacher be appointed administratrix and adminis-
trator of said estate, on filing bond, each in sum of $5,000.
Bond filed, ordered that letters issue.
November 13. Ordered that W. D. M. Howard, George
Howard, and J. K. Rose be appointed appraisers.
January 31, 1852. Inventory aud appraisement filed.
Real Estate.
Lot called Los Mausinitas (and other property).
January 31, 1852. Affidavit of publication of notice to
creditors filed.
April 19, 1852. Joseph P. Thompson stating that he is
going to be absent, prays to be released from the bond of
Josefa Guerrero.
Ordered that May 1st be appointed for hearing above
petition, and that notice be given to all interested.
(On the margin is written " notice given.")
H. F. Teschemacher files resignation as administrator.
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Ordered that May 1st be appointed to show cause why
above resignation should not be accepted.
April 19. H. F. Teschemacher files account.
May 1. Ordered that the widow of F. Guerrero be cited
to appear and show cause why account of Teschemacher
should not be accepted.
May 10. Affidavit of posting filed.
Resignation of H. F. Teschemacher accepted and bond
canceled.
March 4, 1867. Petition of Augustin Guerrero for Let-
ters of Administration shows that deceased, at the time of
his death, was possessed of real estate in the City and
County of San Francisco and the County of San Mateo of
the value of about $15,000, and personal property of about
$2,500.
That deceased left him surviving as. his heirs-at-law, his
widow, Josefa de Haro Guerrero, residing at the time in
the City and County of San Francisco, now residing in the
County of San Mateo, and three children, Augustin Guer-
rero, Victoriano Guerrero, residing in said city and county,
and Francisco Guerrero, who died in the month of Februa-
ry, 1853, unmarried and without children.
That all of said heirs are of the age of majority, except-
ing Victoriano Guerrero, who is of the age of 17 years.
That on Oct. 25, 1851, and after due proceedings had let-
ters of administration were duly issued herein to said widow
of deceased and H. F. Teschemacher, who thereupon, duly
qualified and entered upon the execution of their trust as
such administrators.
That on
,
an order was duly made and entered here-
in directing notice to be given to the creditors of said es-
tate, and thereafter on
,
an order and decree was duly
made and entered herein.
That an inventor}" and appraisement has been filed.
That said IT. F. Teschemacher resigned his trust as admin-
istrator.
That said widow of deceased continued to discharge the
duties of her trust as administratrix up to February 12, 1853,
upon which day she intermarried with James G. Denniston,
by which said marriage her authority as administratrix was
extinguished.
That a portion of said estate is thus left unadministered
upon.
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That the value of said estate left unadministered upon is
of the value of about $265,000, which is all common prop-
erty, consisting of real estate in the City and County of San
Francisco, and real estate in the County of San Mateo, aud
personal property.
That your petitioner is the son of said deceased and en-
titled to letters of administration upon the estate of de-
ceased.
That the real estate in San Mateo County has heretofore
been partitioned under the decree of the Twelfth District
Court of the County of San Mateo, Jan. 26, 1867, among
the parties entitled thereto.
"Wherefore petitioner prays that letters of administration
upon the estate left unadministered may be issued to him,
that a day may be appointed for hearing this petition, and
notice be given by posting, etc.
Ordered that March 20, 1867, be appointed a time for
hearing above petition, and that notice be given by posting.
March 20. Proof of posting filed.
March 27. Order appointing Augustin Guerrero admin-
istrator of the estate left unadministered, upon taking oath
and filing bond in the sum of $36,000.
August 19. Approved bond of Augustin Guerrero, in
sum of $36,000, filed and recorded.
Letters of administration with oath annexed issued to
Augustin Guerrero, recorded and duplicate filed.
Order of notice to creditors made, entered, and filed.
December 19. Affidavit of publication of notice to
creditors made, entered, and filed.
April 13, 1868. Petition of Josefa de Haro Denniston,
and James G. Denniston, her husband, Augustin Guerrero,
and Victoriano, for partial distribution, filed.
Recites death of deceased, the appointment of Josefa de
Haro Guerrero and H. F. Teschemacher as administrator
and administratrix, the resignation of H. F. Teschemacher
as such administrator, the appointment of Augustin Guer-
rero administrator of the estate left unadministered upon,
and the filing of the inventory and appraisement, that due
and legal notice has been given to creditors, and that there
are no debts outstanding against the estate of deceased.
That there are no other persons interested in said estate
other than or except petitioners.
That the real estate mentioned in inventory and appraise-
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ment as Los Mansinitas still remains subject to administra-
tion .
That on Nov. 1, 1867, letters of guardianship of the per-
son and estate of Victoriano Guerrero, a minor, were duly
issued to said Augustin Guerrero, which letters have not
been revoked, but are still in full force and eifect.
That under and by virtue of the authority conferred upon
him as such guardian by an Act of the People of the State
of California represented in Senate and Assembly, which
became a law on Feb. 20, 1868, said Augustin Guerrero,
as such guardian, sold at private sale to Alvinza Hayward
all the right, title, and interest of said minor, being 8-27ths
thereof in and to lot of land called "Las Manzanitas," situ-
ated in City and County of San Francisco, described as fol-
lows:
Commencing at a fence in the Mission Dolores (along
side of an old ditch), on the north side of a lane at a block
of China granite 40\ inches long, 7 inches wide, and 6 inches
thick, marked S. D. 1, from which the south-west corner of
Thompson's house bears north 34|- degs. east, the south ga-
ble end of the Hermitage Hotel bears north 21 degs. west,
and Richard's nursery house bears north 47^ degs. west,
thence along said ditch with hedge of willows on north side
of lane south 81f degs. west, 16.85J chs. to willow tree 5
inches in diameter, marked S. D. 2, thence north 8J degs.
west 16.85J chs., to a sawed red-wood post, marked S. D. 3,
from which north-east corner of brick house bears north 86J
degs. west 2.80 chs., thence north 81| degs., east 16.85J
chs. to sawed red-wood post marked S. D. 4, from
which the south gable of Hermitage Hotel bears south
37J degs. west, and Richard's nursery-house bears south 22
degs. west, thence south 8J degs. east, 16.85|- chs. to begin-
ning; containing 28.41 acres more or less.
Being all that tract of land near the Mission Dolores, and
known as the Manzanitas, 400-varas square, be the same
more or less, including all the land contained in said inclo-
sure.
That this Probate Court confirmed said sale April 7, 1868,
and directed said guardian to execute a conveyance to pur-
chaser.
That on April 9, 1868, said guardian did make, execute,
and deliver to said Alvinza Hayward such conveyance, and
that to make the same a good and sufficient conveyance of
the interest of said minor it is necessary that the interest ol
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said minor in said tract of land should be distributed to him
and be discharged and released from the further adminis-
tration of said estate of deceased.
That your petitioners, Josefa de Haro Denniston, and
James G. Denniston, her husband, and Augustin Guerrero
have sold their respective interests in said tract of land to
Alvinza Hayward at the same rate as the interest of said
minor was sold. That before the purchase money can be
obtained, therefore, it is necessary that said interest of said
Josefa and said Augustin, should be distributed to them and
be discharged and released from further administration of
said estate.
That your petitioners are entitled to share in the distribu-
tion of said tract in the following proportions : the said
Josefa de Haro Denniston, ll-27ths; Augustin Guerrero, 8-
27ths; Victoriano Guerrero, 8-27ths.
Wherefore your petitioners pray that an order may be
made for the distribution to petitioners according to the
above mentioned proportions of the above described land.
Order appointing April 17, 1868, a time for hearing above
petition, and that notice be given by posting.
April 17. Proof of posting filed.
April 17. Decree of partial distribution made, entered,
and filed.
Distributing the property in petition described in the pro-
portions as prayed for, upon each filing bond in the sum of
|l,000 to administrator.
April 21. Indemnity bonds of Victoriano, Augustin Guer-
rero, and Josefa de Haro Denniston, each $1,000 filed.
A certified copy of the decree of distribution is recorded
in the Recorder's Office, April 21, 1868.
Liber U, Miscellaneous Records, page 305.
BEFORE THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONERS TO
SETTLE PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS OF CALI-
FORNIA.
JOSEFA PALOMARES, WIDOW, JOSE AUGUSTUS PALOMAEES,
FRANCISCO PALOMAEES. AND VICTORINO PALOMAEES vs.
THE UNITED STATES.
May 15, 1852. The petition of Josefa Palomares, widow*.
and Jose Augustus Palomares, Francisco Palomares, and
Victorino Palomares, children of Francisco Guerrero Palo-
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mares, deceased, respectfully show that on the 30th No-
vember, 1836, Nicolas Gutierrez, Governor ad interim of
California, granted to said Francisco Guerrero Palomares a
suerte or lot of laud near the Mission Dolores, County of
San Francisco, 400 varas square, with the boundaries de-
scribed in the title and map, a copy of which original title,
papers, and map, is submitted herewith. Also submits a
plot of the land as surveyed by the Deputy County Sur-
veyor of San Francisco on 24th December, 1850. That said
Francisco Guerrero died July 13, 1851, leaving the peti-
tioners, his widow, and heirs. That said Guerrero for the
year 1836 to the time of his death, and his widow and
heirs since have been and are in the quiet and peaceful
possession of said land. That they know of no conflicting
claim, and pray for a confirmation.
May 15, 1852. Testimony of Gomenceiclo Florez was
taken proving the signatures of Gutierrez and Figueroa,
and also the occupation and improvement of the land by
Guerrero. Also testifies that Guerrero had but three
children (those named).
The petition and grant, with the original diseno, and the
survey made by Deputy County Surveyor Hoadley, are filed
with the papers in the case.
DECREE OF CONFIRMATION.
Iu this case, hearing the proofs and allegations, it is ad-
judged by the Commissioners that the claim of the peti-
tioners, Josefa Palomares, the widow, and the heirs at law
of Francisco Guerrero, deceased, is valid, and the same is
hereby confirmed to the widow and heirs of said deceased
to hold the said premises in the proportions to which they
were legally entitled as widow and heirs respectively at the
time of the death of said deceased.
The land, of which confirmation is hereby made, is situ-
ated in San Francisco, near the Mission Dolores, being 400
varas square in a marshy place which forms a plain north-
northwest of the Mission from the place where the water
springs from the north to south, east and west to the road
to Yerba Buena, according to the map of the same, at-
tached to the original grant of said land to said Francisco
Guerrero, which is on file in this case, the land hereby con-
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firmed being the same which was occupied by said Guerrero
from the year 1836 until his death, and by his family since
his decease, and which was cleared and fenced in by him
about the time last mentioned, and has been cultivated as
a garden since that time.
The land hereby confirmed embraces only the premises
thus enclosed and cultivated by said Guerrero, and is limi-
ted in its ulterior boundaries to the line of the fence
erected by him at the time above specified.
Signed by the three commissioners, March 14, 1854.
THE UNITED STATES VS. JOSEFA PALOMARES, ET AL.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
A lot at the Mission of Dolores. Case No. 131.
Nov. 2, 1854. Filed Transcript in United States Land
Commission in case No. 229.
Feb. 20, 1855. Notice of appeal from Attorney General.
Nov. 12, 1855. Petition and answer.
March 24, 1856. Decree confirming claim.
April 2, 1857. Stipulation and order vacating appeal.
JAMES DENNISTON AND WIFE TO GESNOUEN & CO.
(Signed and acknowledged).
James Denniston,
josefa haro denniston,
L. Gesnouen,
C. Aguillon.
LEASE.
Dated June 21, 1858.
Recites that I, Gesnouen & Co., bind myself to lease to
James Denniston and wife a tract of land in the Manzanitas
bordering on one side with Thomas Bordenare, on another
side with Messrs. Cruvreau and Didier, on another with
Mr. Dupuis, and on the other with the fence that divides
my land from that of Mr. Bolton, for the term of five years,
commencing April 7, 1859, at the monthly rent of $50,
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binding himself to clear and enclose said land with a good
fence.
Witness : Isaac V. Denniston,
J. Bte. Pellisiee.
Execution proven Nov. 12, 1860, by Jean B. Pellissier,
subscribing witness.
Before Geo. T. Knox, N. P.
Recorded Nov. 12, 1860.
Liber 9 of Leases, page 452.
JAMES G. DENNISTON AND HIS WIFE JOSEFA HAEO DENNIS-
TON TO J. BTE. PELLISSIEK.
LEASE.
Dated Nov. 15, 1859.
Of L' Hermitage property with a piece of land 100 varas
square, for five years from Dec. 1, 1859.
Recorded Sept. 11, 1860.
Liber 9 of Leases, page 822.
devoe babcock vs. augustin gueeeeeo.
Justice Court, Second Township.
June 22, 1861. This Court renders judgment for the
plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of $50 dam-
ages, $2.50 percentage, and costs of this suit.
November 23, 1861. Execution issued to John S. Ellis,
Sheriff.
January 17, 1862. Execution returned satisfied.
JULIEN PEEEAULT vs. AUGUSTIN GUEEEEEO.
June 22, 1861. This Court renders judgment for the
plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of $150 dam-
ages, and $7.50 percentage, and costs of this suit.
November 23, 1861. Execution issued to John S. Ellis.
January 17, 1862. Execution returned satisfied.
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julien pekrault vs. augustin guerrero ; devoe babcock
vs. augustin guerrero, by john s. ellis, sheriff, to
julien perrault.
Justice Court, Second Township.
SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE.
Dated January 2, 1862. Cons. $310.75.
By virtue of two executions in above causes, tested Nov-
ember 23, 1861, for amount of $150 and $50, sold at public
auction to Julien Perrault, who was the highest bidder, for
$310.75, all the right, title and interest of Augustin Guer-
rero in and to land
—
Commencing on the northerly line of Sparks street, 53
feet westerly from the north-westerly corner of Sparks and
Dolores streets, and running thence westerly along said line
of Sparks street 507 feet more or less to Church street,
thence at right angles northerly along said line of Church
street 400 feet more or less to the southerly line of Market
street, thence north-easterly along said line of Market street
100 feet more or less to the southerly line of Tracy street,
thence easterly along said line of Tracy street 335 feet,
thence at about right angles southerly 520 feet more or
less to beginning.
Filed, January 7, 1862.
Recorded Liber 6, Sheriff's Certificates, page 397.
ANDREW THOMPSON AND JAMES G. DENNISTON TO R. H. LLOYD.
DEED.
Dated August 15, 1862. Cons. $1000.
Do grant, bargain, sell, alien, remise, release, and convey
unto second party, his heirs and assigns, all that lot of land
commencing at the intersection of Ridley street with
Market street, thence running along Market street to Noe
street, thence northerly alone Noe street to Ridley street,
thence easterly along Ridley street to Steiner street, thence
northerly along Steiner street to Hermann street, thence
easterly along Hermann street to Fillmore street, thence
southerly along Fillmore street to Ridley street, thence
along Ridley street to beginning.
Including Block 80, 98, 99, 101, 102, 100, 373.
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Covenant of warranty against acts of grantor.
Witness : T. B. Merry.
Ackn'cl before T. B. Merry, K P.
Becorded September 12, 1862, Liber 173 of Deeds, pae;e
250.
' L
*
augustin guerrero by j. s. ellis, sheriff, to josefa
haro de denniston; julien perrault vs. augustin
guerrero and devoe babcock vs. augustin guerrero.
Justice Court, Second Township.
SHERIFF'S DEED.
Dated August 16, 1862. Cons. $310.75.
By virtue of two writs of execution, issued out of the
Justice Court, Second Township, tested November 23, 1861,
upon two judgments recovered in said Court, June 22, 1861
(in above causes), said sheriff levied on all interest said
judgment debtor had in the lands hereinafter described,
and January 2, 1862, sold said premises at public auction,
after notice according to law, to Julien Perrault, for $310.75,
he being the highest bidder, and gave to him such certifi-
cate as is by law directed, and six months having expired
and no redemption made, and said Perrault having, March
19, 1862, assigned to second party said certificate of sale
and all interest in the premises.
ISTow, &c, grants, bargains, and sells all interest of said
judgment debtor in the lot of land
—
Commencing on the northerly line of Sparks street, 53
feet west from Dolores street, running thence west along
Sparks street 507 feet more or less to Church street, thence
at right angles north along Church street 400 feet more or
less to Market street, thence north-east along Market street
100 feet more or less to the southerly line of Tracy street,
thence easterly along Tracy street 335 feet, thence about
right angles southerly 520 feet more or less to beginning.
Witness : Geo. T. Knox.
Ackn'cl before Geo. T. Knox, N. P.
Recorded February 17, 1865, Liber 277 of Deeds, page
151.
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R. H. LLOYD TO A. W. VON SCHMIDT.
DEED.
Dated August 25,
(Stamp, $2, canc'd).
1863. Cons. $2000.
Remises, releases and quit-claims to second party, liis
heirs and assigns, all that piece of land described as follows:
Commencing at a point on the north-westerly corner of
Market and Ridley streets, thence running along Market
street westerly 5.83 chains, thence south-westerly parallel
with Ridley street 4.76 chains, thence north-westerly to
Ridley street, thence along Ridley street to the point of
beginning.
Witness : Geo. T. Knox.
Ackn'd August 25, 1863, before Geo. T. Knox, E". P.
Recorded October 6, 1863, Liber 212 Deeds, 378.
A. W. VON SCHMIDT TO EUGENE L. SULLIVAN.
DEED.
Dated August 25th, 1863. Cons. $1.
(No Stamp.)
Grants, bargains, sells, remises, and quit-claims to second
party, his heirs, and assigns forever all right, title, and in-
terest in and to the piece of land described as follows
:
Commencing at a point on the north-westerly corner of
Market and Ridley streets, thence running along Market
street westerly 5.83 chs., thence south-westerly parallel with
Ridley street, 4.76 chs., thence north-westerly to Ridley
street, thence along Ridley street to the point of beginning,
(and other property.)
Witness: W. W. Wiggins.
Ackn'd Oct, 5, 1863, before W. W. Wiggins, K". P.
Recorded Oct. 6, 1863. Liber 212 Deeds, 381.
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JAMES G. DENNISTON and JOSEFA DE DENNISTON, HIS WIFE, TO
AUGUSTINE GUEREERO.
DEED.
Dated November 19th, 1863. Cons. $1.
(50-cent stamp, canceled.)
Remise, release, and quit-claim all interest which first par-
ties, or either of them acquired by deed from Jno. S. Ellis,
Sheriff, to said Josefa, dated August 16, 1862, in all that lot
of land,
Commencing on the northerly line of Sparks street 53
feet west of Dolores street, running thence west along
Sparks street 507 feet, more or less, to Church street, thence
at right angles north along Church street 400 feet, more or
less, to Market street, thence north-easterly along Market
street 100 feet, more or less, to the southerly line of Tracy
street, thence easterly along Tracy street 335 feet, thence at
about right angles southerly 520 feet, more or less, to be-
ginning.
It being expressly understood and agreed that the deed
shall not convey any other interest except that acquired by
said Sheriff's deed.
Witness : P. B. Cornwall.
Acknowledged Nov. 25, 1863.
And acknowledged by josefa Haro de Denniston, May 4,
1864.
Before P. B. Cornwall, N. P.
Recorded Feb. 17, 1865. Liber 277 of Deeds, page 154.
PROBATE COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
—ESTATE AND GUARDIANSHIP OF VICTORIANO GUERRERO,
A MINOR.
Register 3, Case 1898, Page 171.
Nov. 21, 1864. Petition of Victoriano Guerrero, minor,
and Josefa de Haro Denniston, for appointment of guardian.
Recites, that said minor nominates and requests the Probate
Judge to appoint his mother, Josefa de Haro Denniston,
widow by her first marriage of Francisco Guerrero, de-
ceased, father of petitioner, and now wife of James G. Den-
niston, to be the guardian of the estate and person of your
petitioner.
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The petition of Josefa de Haro Denniston recites that the
late Francisco Guerrero died in the county of San Francis-
co, in the year 1852, and his estate was opened the same
year, and is still pending.
That your petitioner Josefa, being administratrix of said
estate, was married some time in February, 1853, to James
G. Denniston, that the family of said James G. Denniston,
including the said Victoriano, resides a part of the time at
the rancho of the estate, in the county of San Mateo, but
the greater part of the time at the Mission of Dolores, in this
city and county.
That said estate of Francisco Guerrero, deceased, con-
sists principally of landed property, situated partly in the
county of San Mateo and partly in this city and county, in
which }Tour petitioner, Josefa, considered the residence of
the family to be.
That for the settlement of said estate, as well as for the
future administration of the property of said minor, it is
necessary that a guardian be appointed to said minor.
That being informed and advised that his mother cannot
be appointed such guardian your petitioner, Victoriana, res-
pectfully nominates her brother, Augustin Guerrero, for
such guardian, and requests your honor so to appoint him.
Signed, Victoriano Guerrero,
Josefa De Haro Denniston.
Ordered that citation be issued to James G. Denniston to
show cause why said Augustin Guerrero should not be ap-
pointed guardian.
March 20, 1865. Citation returned served on James G.
Denniston, March 17, 1865.
Answer of James G. Denniston filed. Recites that he
has no objection to the appointment of guardian.
Amended petition of Victoriano Guerrero and Josefa de
Haro Denniston, filed, shows that the residence of said minor
is at the Mission Dolores, within the city and county of
San Francisco, and in accordance with the petition herein
filed, ISTov. 21, 1864, they reiterate the other allegations
therein made.
That your petitioner, Victoriano Guerrero, nominates her
brother, Augustin Guerrero, for her guardian, and requests
your honor to appoint him.
Order allowing filing of amended petition made, entered,
and filed.
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March 23. Order appointing Augustin Guerrero guardian
upon taking oath and giving bond in sum of $10,000.
November 1, 186T. Approved bond of guardian, $10,-
000, filed and recorded.
Letters of Guardianship issued to Augustin Guerrero
recorded and duplicate filed.
March 9, 1868. Return and account of sales of real es-
tate filed. Guardian recites, that under and by virtue of
the authority conferred upon him as* such guardian by an
Act of the Legislature of the State of California, which be-
came a law on Feb. 20, 1868, he, as such guardian, sold at
private sale, subject to your approval, all the right, title,
and interest of his said ward, being 8-27th parts undivided
in and to land:
—
Commencing at a fence in the Mission Dolores (along
side of old ditch) on the north side of a lane at a block of
China granite 40J inches long, 7 inches wide and 6 inches
thick, marked S. D. 1, from which the southwest corner of
Thompson's house bears north 34|° east, the south gable
end of the Hermitage Hotel bears north 21° west, and
Richard's Nursery House bears north 47|° west, thence
along said ditch with hedge of willows on north side of
lane south 81f° west, 16.85J chains to willow tree 5 inches
in diameter marked S. D. 2, thence north 8|° west, 16.85|
chains to a sawed redwood post marked S. D. 3, from which
northeast corner of brick house bears north 86J° west 2.80
chains, thence north 81f° east, 16.85J chains to sawed red-
wood post marked S. D. 4, from which the south gable of
Hermitage Hotel bears south 37J° west, and Richard's
JSTursery House bears south 22° west, thence south 8^° east
16. 85|- chains to beginning, and containing 28^ acres,
more or less.
Being the tract of land near the Mission Dolores, hereto-
fore enclosed and cultivated by and on behalf of said ward
and his co-tenants, and known as the Manzanitas, 400 varas
square, be the same more or less, containing all the laud
contained in said enclosure, to Alvinza Hayward for
$14,814**.
That your petitioner is ready to file in this Court before
the execution of such conveyance such bond, conditioned
for the due and proper application of the proceeds arising
from such sale.
2
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Wherefore your petitioner submits said sale to your
Honor's consideration for approval, etc.
Copy of an Act of the Legislature of the State of Cali-
fornia, authorizing the guardian of Victoriano Guerrero to
sell above real estate at private sale, passed Feb. 20, 1868.
Filed.
April 7. Approved bond of guardian $25,000 on sale of
real estate. Filed and recorded.
April 7. Order confirming sale of real estate, and au-
thorizing guardian to make, execute, and deliver to pur-
chaser a good and sufficient deed of conveyance of the
interest of said minor.
A certified copy of the order of confirmation is recorded
April 9, 1868, in Liber XJ of miscellaneous records, page
278.
(Signed) Augustin Guerrero.
AUGUSTIN GUEEREbiO TO HENRY COWELL.
MORTGAGE.
Dated Feb. 17, 1865.
To secure payment of $3,857.36, gold coin, in twelve
months, with interest at 2 per cent, per month, with privi-
lege of extending payment for one year longer after
maturity, provided all interest due at maturity shall have
been paid. Stamps $4. Canceled.
Conveys all his interest, being an undivided one-third in
all that piece of land near the Mission Dolores, known as the
Guerrero tract, of 400 varas square, the same lying within
the boundaries of Ridley street on the north, Dolores street
on the east, Center street on the south, and Sanchez street
on the west.
Witness: Isaac T. Milliken.
Acknowledged Feb. 17, 1865.
Before Isaac T. Milliken, N. P.
Recorded Feb. 17, 1865.
Liber 134 of Mortgages, page 280.
Canceled by a certificate of release, dated March 20,
1867, and recorded April 29, 1867.
Liber 38 Releases, page 121.
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AUGUSTIN GUEEEEEO AND JOSEFA DE HAEO DENNISTON, WHO
SIGNS, JOSEFA DENNISTON, TO FORTUNE CAMILLE AGUILLON.
LEASE.
Dated March 21, 1865.
Of the piece of land hounded on the right by a line
fence, on the left by property now occupied by Benetti
Carlo Franco Giovani, north by Holt's fence, and south by
the "Hermitage" now occupied by Alexander Roze and
Aucelin Edoured. ($5 stamp. Canceled).
For the term of two years from April 1, 1865, at the
monthly rent of $85, gold coin (in advance).
"Witness: Wm. P. Wheeler,
M. Turrell.
Execution proven by M. Turrell, April 26, 1865.
Before W. C. Parker, K P.
Recorded April 26, 1865.
Liber 19 of Leases, page 240.
AUGUSTIN GUEEEEEO TO HENEY COWELL.
MORTGAGE.
Dated April 7, 1865.
To secure payment of $1,200, gold coin, in twelve
months, interest at 2 per cent per month.
($1.50 stamp. Canceled).
Conveys all his interest (being an undivided one-third) in
all that piece of land known as the Guerrero tract, of 400
varas square (described as in Liber 134 of Mortgages, page
280).
Witness: Geo. T. Knox. Acknowledged April 7, 1865,
before Geo. T. Knox, K P.
Recorded April 7, 1865.
Liber 138 of Mortgages, page 289.
Canceled by certificate of release, dated March 20, 1867,
and recorded April 29, 1867. Liber 38 of Releases, page
119.
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AUGUSTIN GUEEEEEO TO CONSTANT JACQUOT.
LEASE.
Dated November 2, 1866.
(Stamp, §2, canc'd.)
Grants, demises, and to farm, lets to second party all
that tract of land, being at the Mission Dolores on the line
of Market street, and better known as the hermitage
grounds, and within the 400 varas called " Manzanitas,"
being the same lot of ground formerly held under lease by
J. B. Pelissier, said lease having been made formerly by
James G. Denniston and wife to said Pelissier (see 9 of
Leases, page 322), said lot of ground containing about 100
varas square, etc.
• For the term of one year from November 1, 1866, at the
monthly rent of $65.
Witness : A. Schwab.
Ackn'd March 30, 1867, before J. H. Blood, N. P.
Eecorded March 30, 1867. Liber 25 of Leases, page 273.
JAMES G. DENNISTON TO JAMES E. NUTTMAN.
DEED.
Dated January 4, 1867. Cons. $1000.
(Stamp, $1, canc'd.)
Grants, bargains and sells, conveys and confirms to second
party, his heirs and assigns forever, all those pieces of land
described as follows :
A lot of ground in block 81 of the Mission Addition
—
Commencing at the south-east corner of Market and
Dolores streets, running thence southerly along the line of
Dolores street 316 feet, thence westerly along the line of
Tracy street 95.11 feet, thence northerly 220 feet to Market
street, thence north-easterly 146 feet along the line of
Market street to the place of beginning. (And other pro-
perty.)
"Witness : Wm. Huefher.
Ackn'd January 4, 1867, before Wm. Huefner, JST. P.
Eecorded January 5, 1867. Liber 351, Deeds, 279.
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JAMES G. DENNISTON, JOSEPHA DE HAEO DENNISTON, HIS WIFE,
AND AUGUSTIN GUEEEEEO, TO ALVINZA HAYWAED.
DEED.
Dated March 7, 1867. Cons. $35,116.
(Stamp, $36, canc'd.)
In consideration of 110,165 paid by second party to
Joseplia de Haro Denniston, and $7,393 paid by second
party to Augustin Guerrero, and the further sum of $10,165
to be paid to said Joseplia de Haro Denniston, and $7,393 to
be paid to Augustin Guerrero, within six months, grants,
bargains, sells, conveys and confirms to second party, his
heirs and assigns forever, all that piece of land (same as
described in 356 Deeds, page 342, Maria O'Connor, Acl-
ministatrix, to Haywarcl—see forward), except the distance
which the north-east corner of brick house bears from post
marked S. D. 3, which in this deed is 2.80 chains.
Witness : R. C. Hopkins.
Ackn'd March 7, 1867, before E. V. Sutter, K P.
Eecorcled March 8, 1867. Liber 363, Deeds 23.
JAMES G. DENNISTON, JAS. E. NUTTMAN, AND E. H. LLOYD, TO
ALVINZA HAYWAED.
DEED.
Dated March 8, 1867. Cons. $5.
(50-cent stamp, canc'd.)
Do remise, release, and quit-claim unto the said second
party all that piece of land in the city and county of San
Francisco, near the Mission Dolores, which has been here-
tofore enclosed and cultivated by heirs of Francisco Guer-
rero, deceased, and James G. Denniston, and known as the
" Manzanitas," 400 varas square, including all the land
contained in said enclosure ; also, all our right, title, and
interest in and to Mission blocks !N~os. 80, 81, 82, and 99.
Witness : Sol. A. Sharp.
Ackn'd March 20, 21st, 1867, before E. V. Sutter, H". P.
Kecorded March 27, 1867. Liber 361 of Deeds, page 338.
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AUGUSTIN GUERRERO, GUARDIAN OP THE PERSON AND ESTATE
OP VTCTORIANO GUERRERO, A MINOR, TO ALVINZA HAYWARD.
DEED.
Dated April 9, 1868. Cons. $14,814.82.
(Stamp, $15, canc'd.)
Recites that by virtue of an act of the Legislature, passed
February 20, 1868, said Augustin Guerrero, guardian of
Victoriano Guerrero, son of Francisco Guerrero, deceased,
made a sale of the interest of said ward, being 8-27 parts
undivided in the property hereinafter described, which sale
was duly reported to the Probate Judge of the city and
county of San Francisco, and was approved by said Judge,
etc., a certified copy of which order has been this day
recorded in the office of the County Recorder.
Now, etc., grants, bargains, sells, and conveys to second
party, his heirs and assigns forever, all right, title and
interest of said Victoriano Guerrero, being 8-27 undivided
in and to the piece of land described as follows :
(Same as in 356 Deeds, page 342, Maria O'Connor, Ad-
mi nistatrix, to Hayward) except the distance which the
north-east corner of brick house bears from post marked
S. D. 3, which in this deed is 2.80 chains.
Being the tract of land heretofore enclosed and cultivated
by and on behalf of said ward and his co-tenants, and
known as the Manzanitas, 400 varas square, etc.
Witness : Sidney L. Johnson.
Ackn'd April 9, 1868, before Henry Haight, N. P.
Recorded April 9, 1868. Liber 428, Deeds 274.
JAMES G. DENNISTON AND JOSEPHA DE HARO DENNISTON,
HIS WIFE, AND AUGUSTIN GUERRERO TO ALVINZA HAYWARD.
DEED.
Dated April 9, 1868.
(Consideration $1. Stamp, 50 cents. Canceled).
Recites that said first parties did, on March 7, 1867, sell
by deed duly executed to second party the premises
hereinafter described for the consideration therein ex-
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pressed, viz: the sum of $10,165, paid by said Hayward to
said Joseplia de Haro Deuniston, and the further sura of
$10,165 to be paid, same to same, within six months there-
after, and the sum of $7,393 paid by said Hayward to
Augustm Guerrero, and the further sum of $7,393 to be
paid by same to same, within six months thereafter ; and
said consideration and purchase money has been paid in
full by said Hayward to said Josepha de Haro Denniston
and Augustin Guerrero, etc.
Now, etc., grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm to
second party, his heirs and assigns, the piece of land (same
as described in 356 deeds, page 342, Maria O'Connor, Ad-
ministratrix, to Hayward, except the distance which the
northeast corner of brick house bears from post marked S.
D. 3, which in this deed is 2.80 chains).
Acknowledged April 22, 1868.
Before F. J. Thibault, N. P.
Recorded April 22, 1868.
Liber 432, deeds 219.
ALVINZA HAYWARD TO LESTER L. ROBINSON.
DEED.
Dated August 6, 1868.
(Consideration $175,000. Stamp, $175. Canceled).
Grants, bargains, sells, conveys and confirms to second
party, his heirs and assigns forever, all right, title and
interest in and to the tract of land near the Mission Dolores
(same as described in 356 deeds, 342 Maria O'Connor, Ad-
ministratrix, to Hayward, except the distance which the
northeast corner of brick house bears from post marked S.
D. 3, which in this deed is 2.80 chains.)
Being all that tract of land known as the Manzanitas,
400 varas square.
Excepting out of the same a tract of 100 varas square,
bounded as follows
:
Commencing at the southeast of the tract (at the south-
east corner) above described, and running thence south
81| degrees west 100 varas, thence north 8J degrees west
100 varas, thence north 81f degrees east 100 varas, and
thence south 8£ degrees east 100 varas, to the place of be-
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ginning, and also his interest in all of the lands adjoining
said Manzanitas 400—tract heretofore occupied by the heirs
of Francisco Guerrero and James G. Denniston within the
Mission Blocks 80, 81, 81, and 99, in the City of San Fran-
cisco. Witness : E. V. Joice.
Acknowledged Aug. 11, 1868.
Before E. V. Joice, K P.
Recorded October 31, 1868.
Liber 464, deeds 354.
LESTER L. ROBINSON TO THE PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY.
MORTGAGE.
Dated August 6, 1868.
(Stamp $125. Canceled).
To secure payment of §125,000 in 24 months, etc.
Conveys the piece of land (same as described in 356
deeds, page 342, Maria O'Connor Administratrix, to 'Hay-
ward) .
Excepting out of the same a tract of 100 varas square,
commencing at the southeast of the tract (at the southeast
corner) above described, and running thence south 81f de-
grees west 100 varas, thence north 8\ degrees west 100
varas, thence north 81| east 100 varas, thence south 8J east
100 varas to the place of beginning, and also all his interest
in all of the lands adjoining said Manzanitas 400-vara tract,
heretofore occupied by the heirs of Francisco Guerrero and
James G. Denniston, within the Mission Blocks 80, 81, 82,
and 99.
Recorded October 31, 1868.
Liber 246, Mortgages 99.
Canceled April 15,"l871.
On the margin of the records by Pacific Insurance Com-
pany, by J. Hunt, President.
MAURICE DORE TO .ALVINZA HAYWARD.
DEED.
Dated August 7, 1868. Cons. $1.
(50-cent stamp, canc'd.)
Grant, bargain, sell, alien, remise, release, convey and
confirm all that certain tract or j)arcel of land
—
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Commencing at a fence in the Mission Dolores alongside
an old ditch on north side of a line at a block of China
granite 40J inches long, 7 inches wide, and 6 inches thick,
marked S. D. 1, from which the south-west corner of
Thompson's house bears north 84f degs. east the south
gable end of the Hermitage Hotel, bears north 21 degs.
west, and Richard's nursery house bears north 47J degs.
west, thence along said ditch with hedge of willows on
north side of lane, south 81| degs., west 16 chains 85J links
to willow tree five inches in diameter, marked S. D. 2,
thence north 8J degs., west 16 chains 85J links to a sawed
redwood post marked S. D. 3, from which north-east
corner of brick house bears north 86| degs., west 2.80 chains,
thence north 81f degs., east 16 chains 85J links to sawed
redwood post marked S. D. 4, from which the south gable
of Hermitage Hotel bears south 37J degs. west, and Rich-
ard's nursery house bears south 22 degs. west, thence
south 8^ degs., east 16 chains 85f- links to the place of
beginning. Containing 28.41 acres more or less ; being
all that certain tract of land situated near the Mission
Dolores, heretofore enclosed or cultivated by the heirs of
Francisco Guerrero deceased, and James G. Denniston, and
known as the Manzanitas, 400 varas square, be the same
more or less, including all the land contained in said
enclosure, and also all the interest of first party in Mission
Blocks 80, 81, 82, 99.
Covenant of warranty against the acts of grantor, and all
persons lawfully claiming under him.
Ackn'd September 15, 1868, before J. W. McKenzie, ST. P.
Recorded, September 15, 1868. Liber 450 of Deeds,
page 377.
5no deed to grantor for the above property of Record.
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF THE MARKET AND FOUR-
TEENTH STREETS HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATION, NO. 3966.
Recites that the undersigned have associated themselves
into an incorporation under the acts of the Legislature of
the State of California, which shall be known and called the
Market and Fourteenth Streets Homestead Association.
The objects of said Association are : The purchase of
certain lands in the city and county of San Francisco, near
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the junction of Market and Fourteenth streets, the improve-
ment thereof, and the sub-division thereof into lots suitable
for Homesteads, and the distribution of said lots among
shareholders.
The capital stock of the corporation to be the sum of
$280,800, divided into 234 shares of $1200 each, and so
much more in addition thereto, as may be necessary for the
working expenses of the Association.
The corporation shall exist for a term of five years, unless
sooner dissolved.'
The business and concerns of said corporation to be man-
aged by a Board of seven Trustees, or Directors, and the
said Board of seven Trustees, or Directors, for the first
three months shall be Alvinza Hayward, Charles J. Bren-
ham, Lester L. Robinson, John B. Felton, Gustave Dussol,
George W. Mowe, and Henry Pichoir.
That the office and principal place of business shall be
located in city and county of San Francisco.
" In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands
and seals at the city and county of San Francisco, this 25th
day of September, a. d. 1868."
(Signed) L. L. Robinson, [seal,
H. Pichoir, [seal
G. Dussol, [seal,
Josiah H. Applegate. [seal
Ackn'd by the above, September 25, 1868, before W. H.
Chevers, 1ST. P.
Filed in the office of the County Clerk, September 25,
1868.
LESTER L. ROBINSON TO THE MARKET AND FOURTEENTH
STREETS HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATION.
COVENANT.
Dated September 26, 1868.
(20-cent stamp, canc'd.)
First party, in consideration of the sum of $280,800 gold
coin, to be paid to him as hereinafter provided, agrees with
second party, its successors and assigns, to sell and convey
to it by deed of grant, bargain, and sale, all th'at piece of
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land lying in the city and comity of San Francisco, de-
scribed as follows :
Commencing at a point where the north-westerly line of
Market street, if extended south-westerly, would intersect
the south line of Reservoir street, said point of commence-
ment being the north-east corner of Mission Block 80, as
laid down on the official map of said city and county, thence
running westerly and along the south line of Reservoir
street and the continuation thereof until it reaches a point
125 feet westerly of where the west line of Church street,
if extended northerly, would intersect the same, thence
running at right angles southerly 25 feet, thence at right
angles westerly 310 feet, thence at right angles southerly
25 feet, thence at right angles westerly 125 feet to the
easterly line of the extension northerly of Sanchez street,
thence at right angles southerly and along the easterly line
of Sanchez street 350 feet to the intersection of said east
line of Sanchez street with the westerly line of the Guerrero
tract of 400 varas square, thence southerly and along said
western line of said Guerrero tract about 15 feet until it
reaches a point 75 feet south of the south line of Tracy or
Fourteenth street when extended, thence at right angles
easterly 125 feet, thence at right angles southerly and par-
allel with Sanchez street 170 feet, to a point 100 feet north-
westerly from the north-westerly line of Market street when
extended south-westerly, thence south-westerly and parallel
with the extension of Market street 170 feet more or less
to the westerly line of the Guerrero tract as aforesaid, thence
southerly along the westerly line of said Guerrero tract
about 30 feet, thence south-easterly in a line at right angles
with the line of Market street, 85 feet, to the north-westerly
line of Market street when extended, thence southerly to
the intersection of the south line of Fifteenth street when
extended with the south-easterly line of the extension of
Market street, thence along the south-easterly line of the
extension of Market street until it reaches a point 90 feet
east of east line of Sanchez street, thence southerly and
parallel with Sanchez street to a point 100 feet south of the
south line of the extension of Fifteenth street, thence at
right angles easterly 75 feet, thence at right angles southerly
100 feet, thence at right angles easterly 125 feet, thence at
right angles northerly 25 feet, thence at right angles
easterly about 435 feet to the southerly line of said Guerrero
28 ' Abstract of Title of Lands of the Market and
tract, thence easterly along said line of said Guerrero tract
about 85 feet to a point 125 feet east of the east line of
Church street when extended, thence northerly parallel with
Church street about 68 feet to a point 100 feet south of the
south line of Fifteenth street when extended, thence at
right angles easterly 100 feet, thence at right angles nor-
therly 274 feet, thence at right angles easterly 210 feet,
thence at right angles northerly 300 feet, thence at right
angles easterly 25 feet, thence at right angles northerly 110
feet, thence at right angles westerly 25 feet, thence at right
angles northerly about 145 feet to a point 100 feet distant
south-easterly from south-easterly line of Market street
when extended, thence north-easterly parallel with Market
street about 60 feet to easterly line of said Guerrero Tract,
thence northerly along said line of Guerrero Tract 35 feet,
' thence on a line at right angles with Market street north-
westerly about 80 feet to the southeasterly line of the ex-
tension of Market street, and thence north-westerly about
122 feet to the point of commencement.
And second party agrees to purchase the above described
premises and will pay to first part}7
,
or his legal representa-
tives, the said sum of $280,800 in installments as follows:
$10,000 on Oct, 15, 1868, and $7,000 on the 15th of each
and eveiy month thereafter, beginning with November,
1868, and ending December 15, 1871, and also the remain-
ing sum of $4,800 on January 15, 1872; and whenever any
of said installments shall remain unpaid after the same be-
come due, and shall remain unpaid for 30 days, it shall bear
interest at the rate of one per cent, per month, payable
monthly, and if not so paid to be compounded with the
principal.
And in case default be made for the space of three
months in the performance of the covenants in this agree-
ment by second part}7
,
then all right and claim of second
part}7 to said premises, and to said installments and inter-
est (which may have been paid), either at law or in equity,
shall be forfeited and determined anything in the law or
principles of equity notwithstanding.
Executed on the part of the Market and Fourteenth
Streets Homestead Association by its President, H. Pichoir,
and Secretary, Josiah H. Applegate.
Witness: W. H. Chevers.
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Ackn'd June 28, 1870. Before W. H. Chevers, K P.
Recorded Nov. 14, 1870.
Liber 11, Covenants 14.
LESTEE L. ROBINSON vs. JOHN CARROLL, et als.
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT.
Register M., Case 15,233.
June 4, 1869. Complaint tiled to recover possession of the
piece of land commencing at a point on the westerly boun-
dary line of the Guerrero 400-vara tract where an old fence
crosses the same, said point being 247.6 feet northerly from
the north-westerly corner of said 400-vara lot, running thence
north-easterly along said old fence 221.10 feet to an angle in
said fence, thence north-westerly along said fence 274.11
feet to the westerly boundary line of said 400-vara tract,
and thence southerly along said westerly boundary 486.4
feet, more or less, to the place of beginning.
Summons issued.
July 21. Answer of Carroll filed.
April 1, 1870. Summons served fled.
April 30, 1873. Discontinuance filed.
UNITED STATES TO JOSEPHA PALOMARES, WIDOW, JOSE AUGUS-
TIN PALOMAEES, FEANCISCO PALOMAEES, AND VICTOEINO
PALOMARES, CHILDEEN OF FEANCISCO GUEEEEEO PALO-
MAEES, DECEASED.
PATENT.
Dated June 1st, 1870.
The United States of America, To all to whom these
presents shall come greeting
:
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Whereas it appears from a duly authenticated transcript
filed in the General Land Office of the United otates that,
pursuant to the provisions of the Act of Congress approved
the third day of March, 1851, entitled an Act to ascertain
and settle the private land claims in the State of California,
Josepha Palomares, widow, and Jose Augustin Palomares,
Francisco Palomares, and Victorino Palomares, children of
Francisco Guerrero Palomares, deceased, as claimants, filed
their petition on the fifteenth day of May, 1852, with the
Commissioners, to ascertain and settle the private land claims
in the State of California, sitting as a Board, in the city of San
Francisco, in which petition they claimed the confirmation
of their title to a tract of land called "Suerte," or lot of
land near the Mission of Dolores, containing 400 varas
square, situated in the county of San Francisco and State
aforesaid, said claim being founded on a Mexican Grant to
Francisco Guerrero, made on 30th day of November, 1836,
by Nicolas Gutierrez, the Governor ad interim of California.
And whereas, the Board of Land Commissioners afore-
said, on the 14th day of March, 1854, rendered a decree of
confirmation in favor of the claimants, which decree or de-
cision was, on appeal, affirmed by the District Court of the
United States for the Northern District of California, at a
stated term on the 24th day of March, 1856, as follows:
THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS vs. HEIRS OF FRANCISCO
GUERRERO PALOMARES, APPELLEES.
This cause came on to be heard at a stated term of the
Court on Appeal from the final decision of Board ofthe Com-
missioners, to ascertain and settle private land claims in the
State of California, under an Act of Congress approved
March 3d, A. D. 1851. Upon the transcript of the proceed-
ings and decisions of said Board of Commissioners and the
papers and evidence on which the said decision was found-
ed, and it appearing to the Court that the said transcript
has been duly filed according to law, and counsel for the
respective parties having been heard, it is by the Court
hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that said decision
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be and the same is hereby in all things affirm'ed, and it is
likewise further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the
claim of the Appellees is a good and valid claim, and that
the said claim be and the same is hereby confirmed to the
extent and quantity of four hundred varas square, being the
same land described in the grant and of which possession
was proved to have been long enjoyed. Provided that the
said quantity of four hundred varas square now confirmed
to the claimants be contained within the boundaries called
for in said grant and the map to which the grant refers, and
if there be less than that quantity within the said bounda-
ries, then we confirm to the claimant that less quantity.
And the Attorney-General of the United States having
given notice that appeal would not be prosecuted in this
case the aforesaid District Court, at a stated term, on the
2d day of April, 1857, ordered, adjudged, and decreed that
claimants have leave to proceed under the decree of this
Court heretofore rendered in their favor as under final de-
cree.
And, whereas, under the 13th Section of said Act of 3d
March, 1851, and the supplemental legislation, and in ac-
cordance with the proceedings had, pursuant to said Act and
supplemental legislation there has been deposited in the
General Land Office a return with a plat of survey of the
said claim confirmed as aforesaid, authenticated by the sig-
nature of the United States Surveyor-General of the State
of California, whereby it appears that said claim has been
designated as lot numbered forty-five, in township two,
south of range five, west of the Mt. Diablo meridian, con-
taining twenty-eight and forty-one hundredths acres in the
State of California, the plat in the aforesaid return of sur-
vey being in the words and figures as follows, to wit:
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PLAT OF THE TRACT OF LAND, CALLED STJERTE EN DOLORES,
Finally confirmed to the heirs of Francisco Guerrero Pal-
oraares, surveyed under instructions from the U. S. Sur-
veyor-General, by R. 0. Matthewson, Department Sur-
veyor. November 1860. Containing 28i4 1 acres.
Scale 4 chains to 1 inch.
flEO,
WOOD
BftlctC
HOUSE
'^••^1 life t
BOA
adore*'"*
NNING
vv/l
SKETCH
show/a/g the position of
the tract of land called
SUERTE EN DOLORES
WITH REFERENCE. TO
THE TOWNSHIP I- I N£
S
SCALE t>-0 CHS TO 1 INCH
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BOUNDARIES.
No. Course. Distance.
1 S 81%° W 16.85%
2 N 8%°W 16.85%
3 N81%°E 16.85%
i S 8%°E 16.85%
NOTE.
Notice of the approval of this plat and its retention in
office for four weeks, subject to inspection, was published
from 11th of March to 11th of May, 1861, in pursuance to
the Act of Congress of June 14, 1860.
J. W. Mandeville,
U. S. Surveyor-General, California.
The field notes of the tract of land called Suerte en Do-
lores, and from which this plat has been made out have been
examined and approved, and are on file in this office.
San Francisco, California, April 16, 1861.
J. W. Mandeville,
U. S. Surveyor-General, California.
NOTE.
It being suggested to the Surveyor-General that the pub-
lication of this plat in the "San Mateo Gazette," was in-
formal, in this that the "Alameda County Herald," pub-
lished in Oakland, is the paper " nearest the land," and it
being so found, a republication was ordered to comply with
the law, from the 4th of July to the 24th of August, 1861.
E. F. Beale, IT. S. Surveyor-General, California.
A full, true, and correct copy of the original plat on file
in this office.
U. S. Surveyor-General's Office, San Francisco, California.
August 16, 1866.
[seal.] Signed, L. Upson,
U. S. Surveyor-General, California.
And, whereas, there has been deposited in the General
Land Office a certificate dated October 13, 1869/ from the
Clerk of the Circuit Court, and ex-officio Clerk of the Dis-
trict Court of the United States for the District of Califor-
3
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nia, showing that no further proceedings have, since said 2d
day of April, 1857, been taken in said cause,
Now know ye, That the United States of America, in con-
sideration of the premises and pursuant to the provisions of
the Act of Congress aforesaid of the 3d of March, 1851, and
the legislation supplemental thereto, have given and grant-
ed, and by these presents do give and grant unto the said
Josepha Palomares, et als., and to their heirs, the tract of
land embraced and described in the foregoing survey, but
with the stipulation that, in virtue of the 15th Section of
the said Act, the confirmation of the said claim, and this
patent "shall not affect the interests of third persons."
To have and to hold the said tract with the appurtenances
unto the said Josepha Palomares, et al., and to their heirs,
and assigns forever with the stipulation aforesaid.
In testimony whereof, I, Ulysses S. Grant, President of
the United States, have caused these letters to be made pat-
ent and the Seal of the General Land Office to be hereunto
affixed.
Given under my hand, at the city of Washington,
this first day of June, in the year of our Lord one
[seal.] thousand eight hundred and seventy, and of the
Independence of the United States the ninety-
fourth.
By the President,
U. S. Grant.
By Ohas. "White, Secretary.
I. N. Granger, Recorder of the General Law Office.
Recorded Vol. 7, pages 308 to 311 inclusive. (Ex'd.)
Recorded June 20, 1870.
Liber 1 of Patents, page 49.
J. A. BUCK AND N. OHLANDT TO W. F. WHITTIER AND W. P. FUL-
LER (FrRM OF WHITTIER, FULLER & CO.) [SIGNED: OHLANDT
CO
.,
BY J. A. BUCK. J. A. BUCK AND N. OHLANDT.]
DEED.
Dated September 17, 1870. Cons. $2,250.
(Stamp, 10 cents, canc'cl.)
Grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer and convey to second
parties, their heirs and assigns forever, the undivided half
of the Glue Factory situate on the corner of Market and
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Clmrcli streets, known as the ' ' San Francisco Glue Works,
"
that is to say, the undivided half of the stock, good will,
machinery, buildings, etc., belonging to said business.
Covenant that all debts and demands against said factory
have been paid, and the same is clear of all debts contracted
whilst first parties were engaged in said business.
Witness : J. H. Blood.
Ackn'd September 26, 1870, before J. H. Blood, N. P.
Eecorded September 27, 1870. Liber 2 Miscellaneous
Records, page 216.
No lease to grantors of record.
J. H. PITTS TO W. F. WHITTIER, W. P. FULLER & CO.
DEED.
Dated September 24, 1870.
(Stamp, 5 cents, canc'd.)
Grants, bargains, sells and conveys to second parties, their
executors, administrators and assigns, all the undivided half
interest in and to the Glue Factory presently carried on at or
near the junction of Market and Church streets, under the
firm or style of The San Francisco Glue Works, consisting of
lease, plunt buildings, stock on hand, etc. ; and contracts to
pay all debts and demands existing against said undivided
interest.
Covenant of warranty against all persons lawfully claiming.
Witness: James Milburn.
Ackn'd September 26, 1870, before E. V. Joice, N. P.
Recorded September 26, 1870. Liber 2 Miscellaneous
Records, page 210.
No lease to grantor of record.
LESTEE L. ROBINSON TO THE MARKET AND FOURTEENTH
STREETS HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATION.
DEED.
Dated December 26, 1872. Cons. $280, 800.^
Grants, bargains, sells and conveys to second party, its
successors and assigns forever, all that piece of land (same
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as described in 11 Covenants, page 14, Robinson to the Mar-
ket street and Fourteenth street Homestead Association)
.
This indenture being made and executed in pursuance of
the covenants contained in a certain agreement dated Sep-
tember 26, 1868, between first and second party, and recorded
in 11 Covenants, page 14.
Ackn'd December 26, 1872, before Arnold Fuller, N. P.
Eecorded December 30, 1872. Liber 687 Deeds, 383.
THEODORE LE ROY vs. JOHN CARROLL, ET AL.
U. S. Circuit Court. Eeg. 3. Case 1,150.
1873.
May 5. Filed complaint, issued summons.
May 21. Filed answer.
June 5. Filed summons.
July 7. Order cause set for 31st July.
July 31. Order continued to August 21.
Filed stipulation waiving jury trial.
August 21. Order cause continued to August 22.
August 22. Order cause continued to September 22.
September 22. Order cause continued to September 30.
September 29. Issued original subpoena and one copy for
X3laintiff.
September 30. Order cause continued.
October 6. Order cause continued to November 13.
November 14. Filed stipulation setting cause for same
day in January, 1874.
1874.
February 2. Order set for March 18.
March 21. Complaint amended, substituting true for
fictitious names, and cause submitted for
decision.
June 19. Filed findings.
Judgment for plaintiff with costs (opinion read).
Entered judgment Judgment Book, Common
Law No 2, pages 44, 45.
Filed judgment roll.
June 22. Filed memorandum of costs.
Judgment entered June 19, 1874.
For possession of tract of land commencing at a point on
the westerly boundary of the Guerrero 400 vara lot, where an
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old fence crosses the same, said point being 147.6 feet
northerly from the south-westerly corner of said 400 vara
tract, running thence north-easterly along said old fence
221.10 feet to an angle in said fence, thence north-westerly
along said fence 274.11 feet to the westerly boundary line of
said 400 vara tract, and thence southerly along said westerly
boundary, 486.4 feet more or less to the place of beginning.
VICTORIANO GUERRERO TO CHARLES H. BURTON.
DEED.
Dated December 1, 1874. Cons.
Does grant, bargain, sell and convey unto second party
and to his heirs and assigns, all that certain lot of land in
the city and county of San Francisco, described as follows :
The property formerly known as "Manzanitas," and near
the Mission Dolores, being 8-27ths parts undivided in
and to the same, and which commences at a point where
once stood a fence on the Mission Dolores, alongside of
where was once an old ditch on the north side of a lane, at a
block of china granite 40J inches long, 7 inches wide, and 6
inches thick, marked S. D. 1, from which the south-west
corner of Thompson's house bore north 34f degs. east, the
south gable end of the Hermitage Hotel bore north 21 degs.
west, and Richard's nursery house bore north 47^degs. west,
thence along said old ditch with hedge of willows on north
side of lane south 81| degs. west 16 chains 85J links to
willow tree 5 inches in diameter, marked 8. D. 2, thence
north 85 degs. west 16 chains 85J links to where formerly
stood a sawed redwood post, marked S. D. 3, from which
north-east corner of brick house bore north 86\ degs. west 280
chains, thence north 81f degs. east 16 chains 85\ links to
where formerly stood a sawed redwood post marked S. D. 4,
from which the south gable of Hermitage Hotel bore south
37J degs. west, and Richard's nursery house bore south 22
degs. west, thence %\ degs. east 16 chains 85J links, to the
place of beginning ; and containing 28.41 acres, more or
less.
The same being the same tracl: of land situated as afore-
said, near the Mission Dolores in the said city and county,
and formerly enclosed and cultivated by and on behalf of
first party and his co-tenants, and being 400 varas square,
more or less.
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Witness : John Lloyd.
Ackn'cl December 1, 1874, before E. H. Tharp, N. P.
Recorded December 24, 1874. Liber .764 of Deeds, page
232.
VICTORIANO PALOMARES TO CHARLES H. BURTON.
DEED.
Dated December 1, 1874. Cons. 1100.
Does grant, bargain, sell and convej?" nnto second party
and to his heirs and assigns all that lot of land in city and
county of San Francisco.
(Same as described in Liber 764 of Deeds, page 232,
Guerrero to Burton.)
Witness: John Lloyd.
Ackn'd December 1, 1874, before E. H. Tharp, N. P.
Recorded December 24, 1874. Liber 764 of Deeds, page
235.
charles h. burton vs. the market and fourteenth
street homestead association, john rizzo, l. l.
robinson, john b. magenta, john johnson, ellen
bolton, john doe, richard roe, and other ficti-
tious names.
Fourth District Court.
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS.
Dated March 30, 1875.
Of action to recover certain real estate and the possession
thereof, with damages for the withholding thereof, and
accrued and accruing rents, and that the premises affected
by this suit are described as follows
:
The property formerly known as Manzanitas, and near the
Mission Dolores, and which commences at a point where
once stood a fence on the Mission Dolores, along side of
where once was an old ditch'on the north side of a lane, at a
block of china granite 40| inches long, 7 inches wide, and 6
inches thick, marked S. D. 1, from which the south-west
corner of Thompson's house bore north 34f degs. east, the
south gable end of the Hermitage Hotel bore north 21 degs.
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west, and Richard's nursery house bore north 47 3- clegs,
west, thence along said old ditch with hedge of willows, on
north side of lane, south 81-f clegs., west 16 chains 8oi links
to willow tree 5 inches in diameter, marked S. D. 2, thence
north 8j clegs, west 16 chains 85J links to where formerly
stood a sawed redwood post marked S. D. 3, from which
north-east corner of brick house bore north 86i clegs, west
280 chains, thence north 81| degs. east 16 chains 85J links
to where formerly stood a sawed redwood post marked S. D.
4, from which the south gable of Hermitage Hotel bore
south 37J clegs, west, and Richard's nursery house bore
south 22 clegs, west, thence south 8J degs. east 16 chains
85J links, to the place of beginning; and containing 28.41
acres, more or less.
Geeathouse & Haggin, and
Thomas H. Bueke,
Atty's for Plaintiff.
Recorded March 30, 1875. Liber 19 Lis Pendens, page
374.
Register P, Case 19,578.
CHAELES H. BURTON vs. THE MARKET AND FOURTEENTH
STREET HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATION, A CORPORATION; JOHN
RIZZO, L. L. ROBINSON, JOHN B. MAGENTA, JOHN JOHNSON,
ELLEN BOLTON, AND FICTITIOUS NAMES.
Foueth Distbict Couet. Reg. P. Case 19,578.
1875.
March 27. Suit to recover possession of the premises
(described as in Liber 764 of Deeds, page 232, Guerrero to
Burton), and $15,000 damages and costs of suit. Summons
issued.
CHARLES H. BURTON TO LESTER L. ROBINSON.
DEED.
Dated August 13, 1875. Cons. $7,500.
Does grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto
second party and to his heirs and assigns forever, all the
undivided 8-27ths of that piece of land in the city and county
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of San Francisco, State of California, formerly known as
Manzanitas, beginning at a point where once stood a fence
on the Mission Dolores,' alongside of where was once an old
ditch on the north side of a lane, at a block of china granite
40J inches long, 7 inches wide, and 6 inches thick, marked
S. D. 1, from which the south-west corner of Thompson's
house bore north 34f degs. east, the south gable end of the
Hermitage Hotel bore north 21 degs. west, and Kichard's
nursery house bore north 47J degs. west, running thence
along said old ditch with hedge of willows, on north side of
lane, south 81|- degs. west 16 chains 85| links to willow tree
5 inches in diameter, marked S. D. 2, thence north 8| degs.
west 16 chains 85J links, to where formerly stood a sawed
redwood post marked S. D. 3, from which north-east corner
of brick house bore north 86| degrees west 280 chains,
thence north 81f degs. east 16 chains 85J links, to where
formerly stood a sawed redwood post marked S. D. 4, from
which the south gable of Hermitage Hotel bore south 37J
degs. west, and Richard's nursery hoiise bore south 22 degs.
west, thence south 8J degs. east, 16 chains 85| links, to the
place of beginning; and containing 28.41 acres of land, more
or less.
It being expressly agreed, that first party hereby conveys
unto second party all such right, title and interest in said
land as first party received under and by virtue of the deed
from Yictoriano Palomares to him, dated December 1, 1874,
recorded in Liber 764 Deeds, page 235, and of the deed from
Yictoriano Guerrero to him of said last named date, recorded
in said Book of Deeds, page 232, to which said two deeds
reference is hereby made.
And it is further expressly understood and agreed, that
this deed and no covenant or guaranty, either expressed or
implied, herein contained, shall be taken as a covenant or
guaranty against any taxes or assessments of any kind,
whether now levied or hereafter to be levied, or imposed, and
that first party does not covenant against any taxes or
assessments of any kind whatsoever.
Witness: E. H. Tharp.
Ackn'd August 13, 1875, before E. H. Tharp, N. P.
Recorded August 13, 1875. Liber 795 Deeds, page 372.
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LESTER L. ROBINSON TO THE MAEKET AND FOURTEENTH
STREETS HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATION.
DEED.
Dated September 7, 1875. Cons. $5.
Does grant, bargain and sell unto second party and to its
successors and assigns forever, all right, title, and interest of
first party in and to that certain piece of land in the city and
county of San Francisco, State of California, described as
follows
:
Commencing at a point where the north-westerly line of
Market street, if extended south-westerly, would intersect
the south line of Reservoir street, said point of commence-
ment being the north-east corner of Mission block 80, as laid
down upon the official map of said city, running thence
westerly and along the southerly line of Reservoir street and
the continuation thereof 373 feet 11J inches, to the centre of
Church street, thence southerly and through the center of
Church street 5 feet, thence at right angles westerly 41 feet
3 inches to the west line of Church street at a point 275 feet
north of the north-westerly corner of Church and Fourteenth
streets, thence westerly and parallel with Fourteenth street
125 feet, thence at right angles southerly 25 feet, thence at
right angles westerly 310 feet, thence at right angles souther-
ly 25 feet, thence at right angles westerly 125 feet, to the
easterly line of Sanchez street, thence at right angles souther-
ly and along the easterly line of Sanchez street 323 feet 8
inches to the intersection of said easterly line of Sanchez
street with the westerly line of the Guerrero tract of
400 varas square, then southerly and along said westerly
line of said Guerrero tract 40 feet 5 inches, to a point
75 feet south of the south line of Fourteenth street, thence
easterly and parallel with Fourteenth street 122 feet
5 inches, thence at right angles southerly and parallel
with Sanchez street, 176 feet 1| inches, to a point 100 feet
north-westerly from the north-westerly line of Market street,
thence south-westerly and parallel with Market street 138 feet
9^ inches to the westerly line of Guerrero tract aforesaid,
thence southerly and along the westerly line of said Guerrero
tract 37 feet 5J inches, thence south-easterly in a line at
right-angles with the line of Market street 70 feet J inch to
the north-westerly line of Market street, thence southerly to
the intersection of the south line of Fifteenth street with the
south-easterly line of Market street, thence along the south-
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easterly line of Market street 39 feet 6 inches, thence souther-
ly and parallel with Sanchez street 74 feet 4 inches to a
point 100 feet south of the south line of the extension of
Fifteenth street, thence at right angles easterly 80 feet 9
inches, thence at right angles southerly 100 feet, thence at
right angles easterly 155 feet to the centre of Sharon street,
thence at right angles northerly through the centre of Sharon
street 25 feet to a point 175 feet south of the south line of
Fifteenth street, thence easterly and parallel with Fifteenth
street 397 feet llf inches, to the southerly line of said
Guerrero tract, thence easterly along the said southerly Hue
of said Guerrero tract 89 feet 8| inches, to a point 125 feet
east of the east line of Church street and 169 feet 2f inches
south of the south line of Fifteenth street, thence northerly
and parallel with Church street 69 feet 2f inches, thence at
right angles easterly and parallel with Fifteenth street 100
feet, thence at right angles northerly and parallel with
Church street 274 feet, thence at right angles easterly
210 feet, thence at right angles northerly and parallel with
Dolores street 300 feet, thence at right angles easterly 25
feet, thence at right angles northerly 142 feet to the centre
of Fourteenth street, thence at right angles westerly through
the centre of Fourteenth street 25 feet, thence at right angles
northerly 109 feet 11 inches, to a point distant south-easterly
100 feet from the south-easterly line of Market street, thence
north-easterly and parallel with Market street 31 feet 8^
inches, to the easterly line of said Guerrero tract, thence
northerly and along the said easterly line of said Guerrero
tract 20 feet 8 inches, thence on a line at right angles with
Market street north-westerly 83 feet 5| inches to the south-
easterly line of Market street, and thence north-westerly
across Market street 122 feet more or less to the point of
commencement.
This indenture being made and executed for the purpose
of correcting any and all errors or omissions that may exist,
in the description of the premises contained in a certain deed
dated December 26, 1872, from first party to second party
hereto, and recorded in Liber 687 Deeds, page 383; and also
for the purpose of conveying any and all interest that said
first party may have subsequently acquired in the premises
above described, by virtue of a certain deed made to him by
one Charles H. Burton, on August 13, 1875, and recorded in
Liber 795 Deeds, page 372.
"Witness : Josiah H. Applegate.
Ackn'd September 16, 1875, before J. H. Blood, N. P.
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Recorded, September 16, 1875. Liber 803 Deeds, page
117.
chaeles mayxe vs. james l. blakie, sophia a. feeeis, eich-
abd eoe, and albeet styles.
Thied Disteict Couet.
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS.
Dated
.
To obtain a decree against said defendants directing the
sale of that certain tract of land:
—
Commencing at a point in the centre of 15th street on the
west line of Dolores street, thence northerly 130.3 feet along
the west line of Dolores street to the north line of the land
conveyed by the Real Estate Associates to L. L. Robinson,
thence westerly 62.2 feet to the easterly line of the land known
as the ' ' Suerte en Dolores" thence northerly following the
easterly line of said tract called ' ' Suerte en Dolores " to its
north-east corner, thence at right angles westerly 1100 feet,
thence at right angles southerly 1100 feet to the south-west
corner of said "Suerte en Dolores," thence at right angles
westerly 825 feet to a point on the southerly line of said
tract, distant 275 feet easterly from the south-easterly corner
of said ' ' Suerte en Dolores, " thence at right angles northerly
200 feet, more or less, to a point in the middle of 15th
street, thence easterly following the middle of said 15th
street 335 feet, more or less, to the westerly line of Dolores
street, the point of beginning.
To pay the sum of $5,500 with interest at 1| per cent, per
month, from June 20, 1873; and for costs.
"Wm. Matthews,
Attorney for Plaintiff.
Recorded July 31, 1875.
Liber 20, Lis P., p. 224.
Reg. D, case 3711.
July 30, 1875. Complaint to foreclose.
Mortgage filed.
Summons issued.
August 7 . Dismissal filed.
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THEODORE LE KOY TO THE MARKET AND FOURTEENTH STREETS
HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATION.
DEED.
Dated March 1, 1875.
(Con. $1, and other good considerations.)
Does grant and convey unto the Market and Fourteenth
Streets Homestead Association, all that tract of land situ-
ated in the city and county of San Francisco, State of Cali-
fornia, described as follows
:
All that portion of the premises, heretofore conveyed to
the above named parties, by Lester L. Robinson, by deed
dated Dec. 26, 1871, lying between the westerly boundary
line of the Guerrero 400-vara tract and the fence to the east-
erly—thereof, and which fence is claimed as an easterly boun-
dary of the lands of one John Carroll, said strip or tract of
land lying to the east of Sanchez street and northerly from
16th street.
The premises hereby conveyed being the same which was
conveyed to the above named grantor by the above named
grantee, by deed dated May 2, 1873, and none other or dif-
ferent tract or parcel of lands.
Witness: Josiah H. Applegate.
Ackn'd April 15, 1875.
Before J. H. Blood, N. P.
Recorded Aug. 18, 1875.
Liber 794, Deeds p. 353.
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THE DE HARO TITLE.
The Grant is not recorded.
EOSALIE BROWN DE HARO, WIFE OF CHAELES BROWN.
INVENTOEY OF SEPAEATE PEOPEETY.
Dated June 13, 1851.
Declares as her separate property one undivided seventh
of all the estate, real and personal, which Francisco Haro,
late of the district of San Francisco, deceased, died, siezecl
and possessed of, said real estate lying and being within the
county of San Francisco, one dwelling house situate at the
Mission of Dolores, known as the Eight-Ward House, etc.,
(and personal property).
Witness: M. AV. Suersderve, Jno. H. Corkery.
Ackn'd June 13, 1851.
Before F. P. Tracy, N. P.
Recorded June 14, 1851.
Liber 1 Sep. Prop. Wife, p. 24.
I. N. DENNISTON TO C. HAEO.
MAEEIAGE OEETIFICATE.
I hereby certify that Isaac N. Denniston and Charlotte
Haro, both of Mission Dolores, were married by me, 14th
Aug. 1855. Eichaed Caeboll, Pastor.
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Mission Dolores, Aug. 21, 1855.
Recorded Aug. 24, 1855.
Liber 2 Mar. Cert.'s, p. 120.
JOHN B. PEEZZO TO C. DE HAEO.
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE.
Mission Dolores, June 30, 1856.
I hereby certify that I married John Baptist Prezzo and
Candelario De Haro on the 30th day of June, 1856.
Richard Carroll.
In presence of Isaac N. Denniston, Thos. C. May, Char-
lotte Denniston, and Clara Moses.
Recorded Sept. 30, 1856.
.
Liber 3 Mar. Cert., p. 41.
PEUDENCIO DE HAEO, [SIGNED EEUDENCIO (HIS MARK) DE
HAEO,] TO JOSEFA DE HAEO DENNISTON.
DEED.
Dated April 5, 1862.
(Cons. $500.)
Doth grant, bargain, and sell all the right, title, and inter-
est of said first party in and to that certain block or par-
cel of land near the Mission Church, known on the map of
said city of San Francisco as Block No. 83, bounded by Do-
lores, Church, Center, and Sparks streets.
Witness : Clinton Palmer.
Ackn'd April 5, 1862.
Before Clinton Palmer, N. P.
Recorded April 5, 1862.
Liber 157 of Deeds, page 12.
ISAAC N. DENNISTON TO E. H. LLOYD.
DEED.
Dated September 16, 1862.
(Cons. $1,000.)
Does grant, bargain, and sell unto second party his heirs
and assigns, all that lot of land described.
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(Same as in Liber 173 of deeds, page 250, Thompson et
al. to Lloyd.)
Witness: P. B. Cornwall.
Before P. B. Cornwall, N. P.
Ackn'd Sept. 16, 1862.
Eecorded Sept. 24, 1862.
Liber 174 of deeds, page 186.
CHAELES BEOWN AND EOSALIA DE HAEO BEOWN, HIS WIFE,
PAUL TISSOT AND NATIVIDAD DE HAEO TISSOT, HIS AVTFE,
ISAAC V. DENNISTON AND CAELOTA DE HAEO DENNISTON,
HIS WIFE, ALONZO DE HAEO, (WHO SIGNS ALONZS DE HAEO),
PEUDENCIO DE HAEO, JUAN PEUSSO, (WHO SIGNS JUAN
PEUZZO), AND MAEIA CANDELAEIA DE HAEO PEUSSO, HIS
WIFE (WHO SIGNS MAEIA CANDELAEIA DE HAEO PEUZZO), TO
AUGUSTUS D. SPLIVALO.
DEED.
Dated Dec. 21, 1865.
(Cons. $1. Stamp $5, canceled.)
Grant, bargain, sell, convey, and confirm all the undivided
one-half of that piece of land known and called ' ' La Huerta
Vieja" at the Mission of Dolores, the sam'e being the place
formerly called "La Huerta Vieja," to the north-west of the
Mission Establishment, said piece of land being 270 varas
square and the same tract granted by Manuel Castro to Fran-
cisco de Haro on June 2, 1846.
Witness : John Gorman.
Ackn'd Dec. 21, 1865, by Brown and wife, Tissot and wife,
and Prudencio de Haro, before John Gorman, N. P.
Ackn'd Dec. 26, 1865, by Pruzzo and wife, in Sonoma Co.,
before D. D. Carder, N. P.
Ackn'd March 1, 1876, by Alonzo de Haro, before John
Gorman, N. P.
Eecorded March 11, 1867.
Liber 355, Deeds 381.
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CHARLES BROWNAND ROSALIA DE HARO BROWN, HIS WIFE, PAUL
TISSOT AND NATIVIDAD DE HARO TISSOT, HIS WIFE, ISAAC
V. DENNISTON AND CARLOTA DE HARO DENNISTON
t
HIS
WIFE, (WHO DO NOT SIGN OR ACKNOWLEDGE,) ALONZO DE
HARO, PRUDENCIS DE HARO, JUAN PRUSSO, AND CANDELARIA
DE HARO PRUSSO, (SPELLED IN SIGNATURE AND ACKNOWL-
EDGED PRUZZO) TO AUGUSTUS D. SPLIVALO.
POWER OF ATTORNEY.
Dated December 21, 1865.
(No stamp.)
To enter into and take possession of the piece of land
known and called "La Huerta Vieja,"at the Mission of Do-
lores, being 270 varas square, and the same tract granted by
Manuel Castro to Francisco de Haro on June 2, 1846, and to
that end to institute and cause to be instituted all suits and
actions, he, our said Attorney, may deem proper to demand,
collect, sue for, recover, and receive any and all the rents,
issues, and profits which have heretofore resulted, or
which may hereafter result, from the said land or any part or
parcel thereof, to compound, settle, adjust, or compromise,
upon any terms our said Attorney shall think proper, and to
arbitrate and submit to arbitration any question touching
the possession or title to said land and the rents, issues, and
profits resulting or to result therefrom, and for all and any
of these purposes, to make and execute any releases, com-
promises, compositions, agreements, or contracts by deed or
otherwise in his opinion necessary and expedient in the
premises, of whatever kind or nature, etc.
Witness: John Gorman.
Ackn'cl Dec. 21, 1865 and March 1, 1866, before John Gor-
man, N. P. ; by all except the Pruzzos and Dennistons.
Ackn'd Dec. 26, 1865, before D. D. Carder, N. P., County
of Sonoma, by the Pruzzos.
Recorded July 18, 1868.
Liber 25, Powers 25.
ISAAC V. DENNISTON AND CARLOTA DE HARO DENNISTON, HIS
WIFE (SHE SIGNS CARLOTA DENNISTON) TO AUGUSTUS D.
SPLIVALO.
POWER OF ATTORNEY.
Dated January — , 1866.
Sepan todos por estas presentes letras que nosotros Isaac
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V. Deuniston y Carlota cle Haro Deuniston, marido y muger
vecinos cle la cuiclacl y condaclo cle San Francisco, Estaclo cle
California, clamos y confermos a Augustus D. Splivalo vecino
del mismo lugar todo nuestro poder aniplio bastante y com-
plido, cuanto en derecho se requiera especial para que como
nuestro legitirno representante liaga uso de los facultades
siguentes para que demande yaclquera posesion cle la septima
parte inclusa que nos pertence como herederos del finado
Francisco cle Haro en cierto terseno situado en esta cuidad y
condado al noroesta del Establecimiento cle la Mission
cle Dolores, llamaclo " la Huerta Yieja" y que con-
siste de 270 vara cuadradas sienclo el mismo toreno que
concediclo el dia dos cle Junio 1846, por Manuel Castro a
Francisco cle Haro y a cuyo ejecto si fuese necesario pueda
comparecer en juicio aiite todos los tribunales cle este Estado
danclo los parsos que a el mejor le parezea para que demande
y reciba frutos e entereses entre en composiciones y concil-
iacion, someta a arbitrio arregla venda y trespase y cle todos
y cualesquiera paso que fuere necesario en el asunto y
a tal ejecto le damo poder liara que finny y ejecute
toclos los documentos, actos y instrumentos necesarios sin
que se entienda restringido por falta cle clansulas que aqui no
se espresan dando por insertos los que aqui no se ex-
presau y que fueren necesarios, pues para to clo lo
refericlo le conferimos el poder mas amplio especial que en
derecho se requiera sin limitacion alguno con facultad de
sustituir revocar sustitutos y nombra otros.
Asi lo otorgamos y firmamos el clia del mes cle Enero cle
1866.
Ackn'd July 23, 1866.
Before John Gorman, N. P.
Eecordecl July 18, 1868.
Liber 25, Powers 22.
ISAAC V. DENNISTON AND CAELOTA DE HAEO DENNISTON, HIS
WIFE, TO A. D. SPLIVALO.
(Stamp, 50 cents, canc'il.)
Sepan toclos por estas presentes letras que nosotros Isaac
V. Deuniston y Carlota cle Haro Denniston, marido y muger,
vecinos cle la cuiclacl y canclado cle San Francisco, Estado cle
California, venclemos, conceclemosyhacemos formal traspaso
cle la mitad indiva cle la septima parte inclivisa en cierto
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terreno, situado en la cuidad y condado de San Francisco,
Estado de California, conocido bajo el nornbre de la Huerta
Vieja al noroeste del Establecimiento de la Mision de Dol-
ores, cuyo terreno consiste de docientos setenta varas cuadra-
das y es el misnio terreno concedido por Manuel Castro a
Francisco de Haro, el dio dos de Junio de 1846, en favor de
Augustus D. Splivalo veceno del niesnio lugar y de sus here-
deros y consecionarios para siempre en la surua de un peso
valor por nosotros ja recibido de la mitad indivisa, vale
Septima, vale San Francisco, Enero 23, de 1866.
Signed Isaac Y. Denniston, Jr.
Carlota Denniston.
Ackn'd January 23, 1866, before John Gorliam, ]S". P.
Kecorded July 18, 1868. Liber 437 Deeds, 264.
AUGUSTUS SPLIVALO, CHARLES BROWN, AND ROSALIA DE HARO
BROWN, HIS WIFE, NATAVIDAD DE HARO TISSOT, ISAAC V.
DENNISTON, AND CARLOTTA DE HARO DENNISTON HIS WIFE,
ALONZO DE HARO, AND JUAN PRUZZO, AND MARIA CANDEL-
ARIO DEHARO, HIS WIFE, vs. JOHN RIZZO, CHAS. HAMBERGER,
JOHN B. MAGENTA, PAOLO REALE, STEFFANO RUBINO, AN-
DREA DANERI, ANTHONY MARASCHI, JOHN CARL, JOHNBEALE,
JOHN JOHNSON, CAMDIDO MAYNUNO, AUGUSTINE ARMANINO,'
MARY JACQUOE, ELLEN BOLTON, SICH FREITT, AND RIVALLO
WELLS.
Fourth District Court. Pteg. M. Case 14,246.
1868.
April 17. Complaint filed Action to recover possession of
all that lot of land known by the name of Los Manzanitas y
La Huerta Vieja, at the place formerly called Mission
Dollorasso, being the same tract of land known as Los Man-
zanetos y La Huerta Vieja, 270 Spanish varas square, and
situate to the west of the Mission Establishment, and being
same land granted by Manuel Castro to Francisco de Haro,
June 2, 1846, and described as follows : Commencing at a
stone monument north of the old Mission building, about 42
feet west of the west line of Dolores street, thence south
81| degs. east 270 varas, south 8J degs. west 270 varas, to
beginning. (Description defective, two courses omitted.)
Summons issued.
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1869.
April 19. Answer of Bolton filed.
26. Demurrer filed.
Substitution filed.
29. Order demurrer sustained.
May 24. Amended complaint filed.
29. Sep. answer of Hamberger filed.
COPY OF DESCRIPTION TAKEN FKOM AMENDED COMPLAINT.
That piece of land known by the name of Los Manzanitas
y La Huerta Vieja, situate at the Mission Dolores, and to the
north-west of the old Mission church, being 270 Spanish
varas square, and being the same land granted by Manuel
Castro to F. cle Haro, June 2, 1846, and more particularly
described as follows
:
Commencing at a fence in the Mission Dolores, alongside
an old ditch on the north side of a lane, at a block of china
granite 40J inches long, 7 inches wide, and 6 inches thick,
marked S. D. 1, from which the south-west corner of
Thompson's house bears north 34|- degs. east, the south
gable end of the Hermitage Hotel bears north 21 degs. west,
and Richard's nursery house bears north 47^ degs. west,
thence northerly 270 varas, thence westerly 270 varas, and
thence southerly 270 varas, thence easterly 270 varas, to the
place of beginning.
JAMES G. DENNISTON TO EDWAED G. DENNISTON.
DEED.
Dated April 20, 1868. Cons. $1,000.
(Stamp, $1, canc'd.)
Grant, bargain, sell, alien, remise, release, convey, and
confirm to second party, his heirs and assigns forever, all
right, title and interest in and to the piece of land situate in
the city and county of San Francisco, near the Mission
Dolores, and known on the map of said city as block 83, and
bounded by Dolores, Church, Centre, and Sparks streets ;
the interest in said block 83 hereby conveyed and intended
to be conveyed being all the interest therein derived to first
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party under deed from Prudencio de Haro, dated June 17,
1867. (And other property.)
"Witness: Wm. V. Garvey.
Proven March 25, 1860. John Gorman, N. P., by William
V. Garvey, subscribing witness.
Eecorded March 25, 1869. Liber 490 of Deeds, page 254.
The deed from Prudencio de Haro referred to is not
recorded.
CHARLES BROWN AND WIFE, ROSALIA DE HARO BROWN, NATIVI-
DAD DE HARO TISSOT, ISAAC V. DENNISTON AND WIFE, CAR-
LOTA DE HARO DENNISTON, ALONZO DE HARO, PRUDENCIO
DEHARO, JUAN PRUSSO AND WIFE, MA.RIA CANDELARIA DE
HARO PRU-SO, BY AUGUSTUS D. SPLIVALO, THEIR ATTOR-
NEY IN FACT, TO F. E. LYNCH.
DEED.
Dated June 15, 1868. Cons. $1,000.
(Stamp, $1, cane'd.)
Do remise, release, and forever quit-claim all the undi-
vided half part of 6 undivided 7ths of that certain piece of
land known as La Huerta Vieja, at the Mission Dolores, in
the said city and county, the same being the tract of land
270 varas square, granted under the authority of the Mexican
government, on June 2, 1846, by Manuel Castro, Prefect, to
Francisco de Haro, as shown in the original title papers
thereto.
Witness : John Gorman.
Ackn'd June 15, 1868, by Augustus D. Splivalo, Attor-
ney in Fact for all the Grantors, before John Gorman, N. P.
Eecorded June 15, 1808, Liber 441 Deeds,. 171.
AUGUSTUS D. SPLIVALO (SIGNED AUG. D. SPLIVALO) TO
WILLIAM B. CARR.
DEED.
Dated July 10, 1868. Cons. $5.
(50-cent stamp, canceled.)
Doth remise, release, and forever quit-claim all the undi-
vided one-half of all his right, title, and interest in and to
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that certain piece of land known as La Huerta Vieja, at the
Mission of Dolores, the same heing the tract of land 270
varas square, granted under authority of the Mexican
government, on the 2d day of June, 1846, hy Manuel
Castro, Prefect, to Francisco de Haro, as shown in the
original title papers thereto.
Witness: John Gorman.
Ackn'd July 17, 1868, before John Gorman, IN". P.
Recorded July 18, 1868. Liber 445 Deeds, 324.
FRANCISCO E. LYNCH (SIGNED AND ACKN'D, F. E. LYNCH) TO
WILLIAM B. CARE.
DEED. •
Dated July 10, 1868. Cons. $5.
(Stamp, 50-cents, canc'd.)
Doth remise, release, and forever quit-claim all the undi-
vided one half of all his right, title, and interest in and to
that certain piece of land known as La Huerta Vieja, at the
Mission Dolores, the same being the tract of land 270 varas
square, granted under authority of the Mexican govern-
ment, on June 2, 1846, by Manuel Castro, Prefect, to
Francisco de Haro, as shown in the original title papers
thereto.
Ackn'd July 17, 1868, before John Gorman, K P.
Recorded July 18, 1868. Liber 445 of Deeds, page 326.
WILLIAM B. QAEE, FEANCIS E. LYNCH, AND AUGUSTUS SFLI-
VALO, TO THEODOEE LE ROY,
DEED.
Dated November 30, 1868. Cons. $20,000.
(Stamp, $20. canc'd.)
Grant, bargain, sell, convey, remise, release, and forever
quit- claim to second party, his heirs and assigns, all right,
title, and interest in and to the piece of laud. (Same as
described in 480 Deeds, page 6Q, Brown et al. to Splivalo.)
Ackn'd November 30, 1868, before John Gorman, 1ST. P.
Recorded January 22, 1869. Liber 480 Deeds, page 77.
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CHAELES BROWN AND ROSALIA DE HARO BROWN, HIS WIFE, NA-
TIYIDAD DE HAEO TISSOT, PEUDENCIO DE HAEO, AND ALONZO
DE HAEO, TO AUGUSTUS D. SPLIVALO.
DEED.
Dated December 3, 1868.
[Cons. §2,500. Stamp $2.50, canceled.]
Grant, bargain, sell, convey, release, and forever quit claim
to second party, his heirs and assigns, all right, title, and
interest in and to that certain piece of land lying and being
in the city and county of San Francisco, and more particu-
larly known as "La Huerta Vieja" at the Mission Dolores,
the same beiug the tract of land 270 varas square, granted
under the authority of the Mexican Government on June 2,
1846, by Manuel Castro, Prefect, to Francisco de Haro, as
shown in the original title papers thereto.
Witness : John Gorman.
Ackn'd Dec. 3, 1868. Before John Gorman, N. P. By all
except Alonzo de Haro.
Ackn'd Jan. 6, 1869. Before John Gorman. By Alonzo
de Haro.
Recorded Jan. 22, 1869.
Liber 480 of Deeds, p. 66.
JOHN PEUSSO AND CANDELAEIA DE HAEO PEUSSO, HIS WIPE,
[SIGNED JOHN PEUZZO AND CANDELAEIA DE HAEOPEUZZO,]
TO AUGUSTUS D. SPLIVALO.
DEED.
Dated December 9th, 1868.
(Cons. $350. Stamp 50c, canc'd).
Grant, bargain, sell, convey, remise, release, and forever
quit-claim to second party, his heirs and assigns, all right,
title, and interest in the piece of land, (same as described in
Liber 480 of deeds, page 66, Brown et al. to Splivalo.)
Witness : Frank AY. Shattuck.
Acknowledged Dec. 9, 1868, before Frank W. Shattuck,
N". P.
Recorded Jan. 22, 1869.
Liber 380 of Deeds, page 70.
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ISAAC V. DENNISTON AND CAKLOTA DE HAEO DENNISTON, HIS
WIFE, TO AUGUSTUS D. SPLIVALO.
DEED.
Dated Dec. 10, 1868.
[Cons. $5. Stamp 50c, canceled.]
Grant, bargain, sell, convey, remise, release, and forever
quit-claim to second party, his heirs and assigns, all right,
title and interest in and to the piece of land. (Same as
described in Liber 480 of Deeds, page 66, Brown et al. to
Splivalo.)
Witness : John Gorman.
Ackn'd Dec. 24, 1868.
Before John Gorman, ]ST. P.
Eecorded Jan. 22, 1869.
Liber 480 of Deeds, page 72.
AUGUSTUS D. SPLIVALO TO THEODOKE LE EOY.
DEED.
Dated January 6, 1869.
[Cons. $5,000. Stamp $5, canceled.]
Grants, bargains, sells, convej's, remises, releases, and for-
ever quit-claims to second party, his heirs and assigns, all
right, title, and interest in and to the piece of land. (Same
as described in Liber 480 of Deeds, page 66, Brown et al.
to Splivalo.)
Witness: John Gorman.
Ackn'd Jan. 6, 1869.
Before John Gorman, ~N. P.
Recorded Jan. 22, 1869.
Liber 480 of Deeds, page 75.
THEODOEE LE EOY TO THE MAEKET AND FOUETEENTH STEEETS
HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATION.
DEED.
Dated December 26, 1872.
[Cons. §1, and other good considerations.]
Does remise, release, and quit-claim unto second party, and
to its successors, and assigns forever, all that tract of land
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situated in the city and county of San Francisco, State of
California, described as follows:
Commencing at a point on the north-westerly line of
Market street if extended south-westerly would intersect
the south line of Reservoir street, said point of commence-
ment being the north-east corner of Mission Block 80, as
laid down on the official map of said city, thence running
westerly and along the south line of Reservoir street and
the continuance thereof, until it reaches a point 125 feet
westerly of where the west line of Church street if extend-
ed northerly would intersect the same, thence running at
right angles southerly 25 feet, thence at right angles wester-
ly 310 feet, thence at right angles southerly 25 feet, thence
at right angles westerly 125 feet to the easterly line of the
extension northerly of Sanchez street, thence at right an-
gles southerly and along the easterly line of the extension of
Sanchez street 340 feet to the intersection of said east line of
Sanchez street with the westerly line of the Guerrero tract
of 400-varas square, thence southerly and along said western
line of said Guerrero tract about 15 feet until it reaches a
point 75 feet south of the south line of Tracy or 14th street
when extended, thence at right angles easterly 125 feet,
thence at right angles southerly and parallel with Sanchez
street 170 feet to a point 100 feet north-westerly from the
north-westerly line of Market street when extended south-
westerly, thence south-westerly and parallel with the exten-
sion of Market street 170 feet, more or less, to the westerly
line of Guerrero tract as aforesaid, thence southerly along
the westerly line of said Guerrero tract about 30 feet,
thence south-easterly in a line at right angles with the line
of Market street 85 feet to the north-westerly line of Mar-
ket street when extended, thence southerly to the intersec-
tion of the south line of 15th street when extended with
the south-easterly line of the extension of Market street,
thence along the south-easterly line of the extension of
Market street, until it reaches a point 50 feet east of the
east line of Sanchez street, thence southerly and parallel
with Sanchez street to a point 100 feet south of the south
line of the extension of 15th street, thence at right angles
easterly 75 feet, thence at right angles southerly 100
feet, thence at right angles easterly 125 feet, thence at
right angles north erly 25 feet, thence at right angles easter-
ly about" 435 feet to the southerly line of said Guerrero
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tract, thence easterly along said line of said Guerrero tract
about 85 feet to a point 125 feet east of the east line of
Church street when extended, thence northerly parallel with
Church street about 68 feet to a point 100 feet south of the
south line of 15th street when extended, thence at right
angles easterly 100 feet, thence at right angles northerly 274
feet, thence at right angles easterly 210 feet, thence at right
angles northerly 300 feet, thence at right angles easterly
25 feet, thence at right angles northerly 110 feet, thence
at right angles westerly 25 feet, thence at right angles
northerly about 145 feet to a point 100 feet distant
south-easterly from the south-easterly line of Market
street when extended, thence north-easterly parallel with
Market street about 60 feet to the east line of said
Guerrero tract, thence northerly along said line of the Guer-
erro tract about 30 feet, thence on a line at right angles with
Market street north-westerly about 80 feet to the south-east-
erly line of the extension of Market street, and thence
north-wester]}" about 122 feet to the point of commence-
ment.
Witness : Josiah H. Applegate.
Proven April 15, 1875.
By Josiah H. Applegate, subscribing witness.
Before J. II. Blood, K P.
Recorded Aug. 18, 1875.
Liber 794 Deeds, p. 350.
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THE O'CONNOR TITLE.
BENJAMIN E. BUCKELEW TO FEEDEEICK W. HAHNE.
DEED.
Dated October 8tli, 1849. Cons. $3,000.
Sells, transfers, and conveys to Frederick W. Hahne all
right, title, and interest in and to all his buildings and oth-
er improvements on the public land located on by him, the
said Buckelew, on Nov. 13, 1848, which is situated north
and west of the Mission of Dolores. Said claim was in-
tended to commence at and was run from the point where
the upper fork of the road for the distance of a mile,
thence turning to a right angle and running due west for
the distance of half a mile, thence turning to a right angle
and running due east to the point of beginning.
The said F. W. Hahne to hold the same as fully as the
same was held by said Buckelew, and the confirmation of
title to said Hahne to be subject to the ultimate decision of
competent authority.
Witness : W. S. Clark, Wm. Petit.
Ackn'd Oct. 23, 1849.
Before Jno. W. Geary, First Alcade.
Recorded Oct. 23, 1849.
Liber H Deeds, 101.
Also recorded Feb. 25, 1865.
Liber 274, Deeds 279.
"With assignment as follows:
Fourteenth Streets Homestead Association. 61
F. H. HAHNE TO M. T. O'CONNOR.
"In consideration of the sum of $500 to me in hand paid
I hereby sell, assign, transfer, and set over unto M. T.
O'Connor all my right, title, and interest, claim and de-
mand to the within deed, and all the land therein contained,
and authorize said O'Connor, to use my name in all proper
ways to obtain said land and premises, and to sign all requi-
site conveyances and papers in order to convey the same in
as full a manner as I could do myself." "In witness," etc.
Not acknowledged.
peobate court of the city and county of san francisco—
in the matter of the estate of michael t. o'connor,
deceased.
Reg. 1, Case 684.
.Nov. 27, 1858. Petition of Maria O'Connor tiled, shows
that she is the relict of M. T. O'Connor, that said O'Connor
was a resident of the city and county of San Francisco,
that he died at the Mission Dolores, Nov. 21 last past, leav-
ing property worth $3,000, being real estate worth $2,500,
personal property worth $500; that said property is located
some in San Francisco county, some in San Mateo county;
that said property is encumbered to the amount of $800;
that deceased left no will save and excepting a document in
his own hand writing, which petitioner has found among
his papers, and wdiich is amended to this petition; that she
has heard and believes said document is void in law.
Prays that letters of administration by issued to her.
Said document recites that being sick in body but sound
of mind, etc., declares it to be his last will and testament,
revoking all other wills, and bequeaths to his wife, Marie
O'Connor, his farm, situate in Canada Raimundo, County
of San Mateo, being 709 acres, more or less, also house and
lot situate on Vallejo street, between Montgomery and San-
some, all his right in any property she may have which is
recorded as her separate property, and all property she may
have acquired as sole trader, (also certain personal proper-
ty), also bequeaths to his said wife all his interest in Mission
Blocks No. 39, and 40.
To his son, Francis O'Connor, his law library, if he elect
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the legal profession, should he not so elect, to his son Ed-
ward O'Connor, and should he not adopt said profession,
then to his wife, etc. Constitutes his wife Maria O'Connor
sole executor.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal
this 19th day of November, A. D. 1858. (No seal.)
Witness: Dr. Bernard Lambert.
Nov. 30. Order appointing Dec. 13, 1858, to show cause
why petition should not be granted.
Register shows filing of proof of posting.
Dec. 13. Order appointing Maria O'Connor, administra-
trix, that letters issue upon filing bond in $1,000.
(Register shows filing of bond.)
Letters of administration issued.
April 20, 1863. Order appointing Freeland Holmes, R.
W. Hent, and W. L. Crowell, appraisers.
April 27. Inventory and appraisement filed.
Real estate.
Any right, title, and interest claimed by deceased in land
in city and county of San Francisco, $50, (and other prop-
erty in San Mateo County.)
Affidavits of appraisers attached.
March 8, 1867. Report of sale of real estate filed, shows
that under a certain act of the Legislature, approved May
9, 1861, authorizing and empowering her to sell all the real
estate owned by said M. T. O'Connor, deceased, said admin-
istratrix on March 6, 1867, sold, at private sale, to Alvinza
Hayward, for $2,300, the following real estate:
Commencing at a fence in the Mission Dolores along side
an old ditch on north side of lane at a block of China gran-
ite 40J inches long, 7 inches wide, and 6 inches thick, from
which the south-west corner of Thompson's house bears
north 34| degs. east to the south gable end of the Hermitage
Hotel bears north 21 degs. west, and Richard's nursery-house
bears north 47J degs. west, thence along said ditch with
hedge' of willows on north side of lane south 81f clegs., west
16 chains, 85^ links to willow tree 5 inches in diameter,
marked S. D. 2, thence north 8J degs., west 16 chains, 85
J
links to a sawed red-wood post marked S. D. 3, from which
north-east corner of brick house bears north 86J clegs., west
23 chains, thence north 81| degs., east 16 chains, 85| links
to sawed red-wood post, marked S. D. 4, from which the
south gable of Hermitage Hotel bears south 37J degs. Avest,
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and Richard's nursery-house bears south 22 dags, west,
thence south 8| degs. east 16 chains, 85| links, to place of
beginning and containing 28
1
4
u
1
acres. The title of said M. T.
O'Connor is in litigation.
Prays for confirmation.
March 8, 1867. Order confirming sale and directing con-
veyance.
July 7. Petition of Eugene B. Drake, for citation on
administatrix, to show cause why she should not be com-
pelled to render an account, etc., made, entered, and filed.
July 12. Citation returned, served, filed.
Petition of E. B. Drake, jfor citation on administatrix, to
show cause, on July 19, 1870, why she should not be com-
pelled by attachment and order of this Court to pay to
petitioner $2,500, legal interest from September 1, 1868,
due for legal services rendered, made, entered, and filed.
July 18. Citation returned, served, filed.
July 19. Demurrer of Maria O'Connor to petition of
Eugene B. Drake, filed.
Continued till July 22, 1870.
July 22. Administrator's account filed.
Amended petition of Eugene B. Drake, to show cause
why petitioner's claim should not be allowed.
Demurrer of Maria O'Connor to amended petition of E.
B. Drake filed.
August 30. Second amended petition of E. B. Drake
for order on administatrix to allow and pay claim of E. B.
Drake filed.
September 6. Objections of administratrix to allowance
of Eugene B. Drake filed.
Objections of Frank O'Connor, one of the heirs of de-
ceased, to allowance of pretended claim of Eugene B.
Drake.
February 13, 1871. Finding on application of E. B.
Drake for an order to allow claim, entered and filed.
Ordered that judgment be entered that petitioner E. B.
Drake take nothing by his action herein.
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maria o'connor, administratrix of the estate of m.' t.
o'connor, deceased, vs. ellen bolton, a. thompson,'
james g. denniston, josefa de haro denniston, s. w.
lee, t. b. valentine, henry cowell, augustin guer-
rero, josefa de haro guerrero, administratrix of
the estate of francisco guerrero, deceased, et als.
Twelfth District Court.
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS.
Dated May 1, 1865.
To recover possession of the premises described as fol-
lows :
By following a line running south 88 clegs. 20 min. west,
2 97-100 chains from the south-east corner of Dolores and
Sparks streets, thence south 81| degs. west 44 links, to a
stone monument set in the ground, and which stone monu-
ment is the point of commencement, and running thence
south 81| degs. west 16 chains 85J links, thence north 8
J
degs. west 16 chains 85J links, thence north 81f degs. east
16 chains 85J links, and thence south 8£ degs. east 16
chains 85J links, to said stone monument the point of
commencement.
Containing 28.41 acres of land, and $10,000 damages.
Eugene B. Drake,
Att'y for Plaintiff.
Filed and recorded May 1, 1865. Liber 6, Lis Pendens
page 50.
Register L. Case 12,071.
1865.
May 1. Complaint in ejectment filed.
Summons issued.
1868.
December 10. Dismissal as to defendant Horace Hawes
filed.
Nothing further.
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MARIA O'CONNOR TO JOHN W. DWINELLE.
DEED.
Dated March 13th, 1866. Cons. $1.
(Stamp, 50-cents, canc'd.)
Grants, bargains and sells to second party, his heirs and
assigns forever, 3 certain acres of land, of average quality
and value with the rest to be taken and assigned out of the
right, title, and interest of first party in and to those certain
lands described as follows :
Commencing at a fence in the Mission Dolores (along
side of an old ditch), on the north side of a lane at a block
of China granite 40 J inches long, 7 inches wide, and 6 inches
thick, marked S. D. 1, from which the south-west corner of
Thompson's house bears north 34| degs. east, the south ga-
ble end of the Hermitage Hotel bears north 21 degs. west,
and Richard's nursery bouse bears north 47^ clegs, west,
thence along said ditch with hedge of willows on north side
of lane south 81f degs. west, 16.85^ chs. to willow tree 5
inches in diameter, marked S. D. 2, thence north 8J degs.
west 16.85Jchs., to a sawed red-wood post, marked S. D. 3,
from which north-east corner of brick house bears north 86J
degs. west 28 chains, thence north • 81f• degs., east 16.85J
chs. to sawed red-wood post marked S. D. 4, from
which the south gable of Hermitage Hotel bears south
37J degs. west, and Richard's nursery-house bears south 22
degs. west, thence south 8J degs. east, 16.85J chs. to begin-
ning, and containing 28.41 acres more or less.
The meaning and intention of this conveyance is, that
second party shall have three full acres in fee in his own
right, when said property comes to be divided or parti-
tioned.
"Witness: Eugene B. Drake.
Ackn'd March 15, 1866, before Eugene B. Drake, Justice
of Peace, Fourth Township.
Recorded March 16, 1866. Liber of Deeds 316, page 310.
QQ Abstract of Title of Lands of the Market and
MARIA O'CONNOR, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OP MICHAEL
T. O'CONNOR, DECEASED, TO ALVINZA HAYWARD.
DEED.
Dated March 9, 1867. Cons. $2,300.
(Stamp, $2.50, canc'd.)
Recites, that the Legislature of the State of California
passed An Act to authorize Maria O'Connor, administra-
trix of the estate of Michael T. O'Connor, deceased, to sell
and convey real estate, approved May 9, 1861, authorizing
her to sell at public or private sale all the real estate owned
or claimed by said M. T. O'Connor, deceased, as in the
judgment of administratrix shall best promote the interests
of said estate.
And said administratrix, by virtue of said powers, did, on
March 6, 1867, sell at private sale to second part}7, for
$2,300, and subject to confirmation by the Probate Court
ot the city and county of San Francisco, all the real estate
hereinafter described, owned by M. T. O'Connor, deceased,
at the time of his death: And on March 8, 1867, said
administratrix made a report of said sale to the Probate
Court, and said Court made an order confirming said sale,
and directing said administratrix to convey to second party
the premises sold as aforesaid, a certified copy of which
order was recorded in the office of the County Recorder of
said city and county, on March 9, 1867, and which said
order, on file in the Probate Court, and said record in the
Recorder's Office, are hereby referred to, and made a part
of this indenture.
ISTow, etc., grants, bargains, sells and conveys to second
party, his heirs and assigns forever, all right, title, and
interest of said Micbael O'Connor-, deceased, at the time of
his death, and all right, title and interest that said estate,
by operation of law or otherwise, may have acquired other
than or in addition to that of intestate at the time of his
death, in and to that certain piece of land in the city and
county of San Francisco, described as follows :
Commencing at a fence in the Mission Dolores (along
side of an old ditch) on the north side of a lane at a block of
China granite 40J inches long, 7 inches wide and 6 inches
thick, marked S. D. 1, from which the southwest corner of
Thompson's house bears north 34f° east, the south gable
end of the Hermitage Hotel bears north 21° west, and
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Richard's nursery house bears north 47|° west, thence
along said ditch with hedge of willows on north side of
lane south 81|° west, 16.85J chains to willow tree 5 inches
in diameter marked S. D. 2, thence north 8£° west, 16.85f
chains to a sawed redwood post marked S. D. 3, from which
northeast corner of brick house bears north 86J° west 28
chains, thence north 81|° east, 16.85J chains to sawed red-
wood post marked S. D. 4, from which the south gable of
Hermitage Hotel bears south 37J° west, and Richard's
nursery house bears south 22° west, thence south 8|° east
16.85J chains to beginning, and containing 28 14 1 acres,
more or less.
Witness : R. W. Hent.
Eugene B. Drake.
Ackn'd March 9, 1867, before John White, K P.
Recorded March 9, 1867. Liber 356 of Deeds, page 342.
The certified copy of the Order of Confirmation is re-
corded in the Recorder's Office, March 9, 1867. Liber R.
of Mi seel., page 240.
JOHN W. DWINELLE TO ALVINZA HAYWAED.
DEED.
Dated March 15, 1867. Cons. $1,000.
(Stamp, $1, cane'd.)
Grants, bargains and sells to second party, his heirs and
assigns forever, all the interest derived or conveyed by
Maria O'Connor by deed of conveyance dated March 13,
1866, in and to those certain acres of land, of equal average
quality and value with the rest, to be taken and assigned
out of the right, title, and interest of first party in and to
those certain lands situate in the city and county of San
Francisco.
(Same as described in 356 Deeds, page 342. Maria
O'Connor, Administratrix, to Hayward.)
Witness : Henry Haight.
Ackn'd March 21, 1867, before Henry Haight, N". P.
Recorded March 21, 1867. Liber 363 of Deeds, page 89.
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CONSOLIDATED TAXES.
MISSION BLOCKS 80, 81, 82, 83, 96, 97, 98, 99—MARKET AND FOUR-
TEENTH STREETS HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATION.
1856-57. Block 82 paid. Blocks 81, 83, not paid or
sold. Balance not assessed.
1857-58. Blocks 80, 82, 83, 96, off by Board.
Block 81 not paid or sold; balance not assessed.
1858-59. Blocks 80, 81, 82, 83, 96, paid. Block 97, por-
tion commencing on Market, 86 feet from south-west cor-
ner of Church, south 33 degs. east 159J feet, south 63 degs.
west 248 feet to south line of Market, east 280 feet to be-
ginning, assessed to Trustees of Santa Clara College. Not
paid or sold. Marked "exempt" in pencil. Balance of
block paid. Block 98. The portion commencing on south-
east corner of Sanchez and Tracy streets, east 431J feet,
south 33 degs. east 145 feet, west to north line of Market
469 feet, north 35J degs. west 429 feet, north on Sanchez
37J feet to beginning. Assessed to Trustees of Santa Clara
College. Not paid or sold. Marked "exempt "in pencil.
Balance of block paid.
Block 99. The portion commencing on the north-east
corner of Sanchez and Tracy street, north 281.6, north 56|
degs., east 345 feet, south 33£ degs., east 370J feet, west, on
north line of Tracy, 417 feet to beginning. Assessed to
Trustees of Santa Clara College. Not paid or sold. Bal-
ance of block paid.
1859-60. Portion sold does not affect the premises in
question.
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Portion block 96 sold and redeemed.
Sold certificate 3,442, portion of block 97, and redeemed.
Sold certificate 3,444, portion of block 98, and redeemed.
Balance paid.
1860-61. Sold certificate 1,462, portion of block 80. Lot
south-east Ridley and Church, streets, east 40x560. Dec.
28, 1860. To H. Ayres.
No deed, no redemption.
Sold certificate 1,464, portion of block 81 and redeemed.
Sold certificate 1,465, portion of block 82. Lot north-
west corner Sparks and Dolores, north 15x560 feet. Dec.
26, 1860. To Wm. Bosworth.
No deed, no redemption.
Sold certificate 1,468, portion of block 83. Lot west line
Dolores, 400 feet north of Center, north 20x560. Dec. 28,
1860. To E. J. Baldwin. No deed, no redemption.
Sold certificate 1,473, portion of block 96. Not covering
premises searched.
Sold certificate 1,474, portion block 97, and redeemed.
Sold certificate 1,475, portion block 98. Not covering
premises searched.
Sold certificate 1,476, portion block 99. Lot north-west
corner Tracy and Church streets, west 10x560 feet. Dec.
26, 1860. To E. W. Burr.
No deed, no redemption.
Balance paid.
1861-62. Sold certificate 836, portion of block 80. Lot
south-east Church and Ridley streets, east on Ridley 20
feet, south to land of Pelissier, north 57 degs. west to
Church, north 63 feet to beginning.
Jan. 2, 1862, to John B. Lewis. Assigned to E. L. Sulli-
van.
Deed issued Dec. 21, 1863.
Sold certificate 837, portion of block 81, not covering
premises searched.
Sold certificate 838, portion of block 82, not covering
premises searched.
Sold certificate 839, portion of block 82, not covering
premises searched.
Sold certificate 842, portion of block 83, lot north-east
Church and Center streets, east 30x365.10, Jan. 4, 1862, to
Michael Lynch. Deed issued Sept. 23, 1862.
Sold certificate 855, portion of block 98, lot north-east
Sanchez and Market streets, north on Market 407 feet, more
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or less, south 33J degs. east 335 feet, thence south b\ degs.
west 24 feet to Market street, south-west 86.6 feet to begin-
ning. This description cannot be located.
Jan. 4, 1862. To John Gr. Klumpke, assigned to John
Carroll, June 8, 1868. Deed issued June 25, 1868. Lot
north-west Church and Center, north 327, south 81 degs.
west 557, etc.
Sold certificate 854, portion not including any of the
premises searched. Balance paid.
1862-63. Sold certificate 1396, portion of block 80, not
covering premises searched.
Sold certificate 1397, portion block 80. Lot assessed to
Estate of Pelissier. North-west Market 335, south-west
from north-west corner of Dolores, north 57 degs. west 356
feet, south 17 degs. 45 min. east 235.5 feet, thence south
84 degs. 55 min., east 213 feet to Market, to place of begin-
ning. (" 18 feet to Marshutz.") Certificate in pencil. No
deed, no redemption.
Sold certificate 1,398, portion of block 81, not covering
premises searched.
Sold certificate 1,399, portion of block 82, not covering
premises searched.
Sold certificate 1,400, portion of block 82, not covering
premises searched.
Sold certificate 1,404, portion of block 83. Lot north-
east Church and 16th streets, east 290x365.10 feet. Dec.
30, 1862. To William Dehon. Deed issued April 29, 1864.
Sold certificate 1,417, lot in block 96. The portion sold
does not affect the property searched.
1863-64. Sold certificate 840, portion of block 80, and
redeemed.
Sold certificate 841, portion of block 80, and redeemed.
Sold certificate 843, portion of block 83. "5 feet to Vas-
sault." Certificate in pencil. No deed, no redemption.
Sold certificate 857, portion of block 99. Lot assessed to
Trustees Jesuit College. "All that portion not assessed, to
Jas. G. Denniston." "5 feet to Nelson." Certificate in pen-
cil. No deed, no redemption. Balance paid.
1864-65. Sold certificate 678, portion of block 81, not
covering premises searched.
Sold certificate 680, portion of block 83. Lot east Church,
365.10 north Center, thence south 87x290. Dec. 27, 1864.
To John Parnell. No deed, no redemption.
Sold certificate 696, portion of block 99. Lot north-east
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Sanchez and 14th, thence north on Sanchez 281.6, north
56£ clegs, east 345 feet, south 33f clegs, east 370.6 feet to
14th street, west 417 feet to beginning. Dec. 23, 1864. To
John B. Lewis, for Trustees of Jesuit College, Santa Clara.
Assigned to Alvinza Hayward, March 26, 1867. No deed,
no redemption.
Sold certificate 694, portion of block 96. The portion
sold does not affect the property searched.
1865-66. "Exempt No. 440," portion block 81, north-
west Dolores and Fourteenth, thence 92 feet west on
Fourteenth, north 198 to south line of Market, north-east
147 to Dolores, south on Dolores 300 feet to beginning.
Sold certificate 499, portion block 83. Lot north-east
Sixteenth and Church, east 290, north 90.10, west 5, north
36.1 1-7, east 5 feet, north 80 feet, west 5 feet, north 39.8
5-7, east 5 feet, north 119.2 1-7 feet, west 290, south 365.10.
January 11, 1866. To Isaac N. Thorne. Deed issued Jan-
uary 22, 1867.
Sold certificate 512, portion block 99, lot north-east
Sanchez and Fourteenth, north 281.6, north 56| degs. east
345, more or less, south 33f clegs, east 70.6 more or less to
Fourteenth street, west 417 feet to beginning. January 11,
1866. To John B. Lewis. Assigned to Alvinza Hayward.
No deed, no redemption ; balance paid.
1866-67. Sold certificate 633, portion block 83, and
redeemed.
Sold certificate 634, portion block 83.
Lot north Sixteenth 69 feet east of Church, east 221,
north at right-angles 361, more or less, to land assessed to
Cobb, south 81 clegs. 45 min. west 49 feet, more or less, to
land assessed to Halleck, Peachy & Billings, south 8 clegs.
15 min. east 289 feet, south 81 degs. west 194.8J, south 4
clegs, east 51.4 feet to point of beginning. December 22,
1866. To William B. Swain. No deed, no redemption.
Sold certificate 653, portion block 99. North-east corner
Sanchez and Fourteenth, north 281.6, thence north 72 clegs.
15 min. east 345 feet, south 17 degs. 15 min. east 370.6
feet to Fourteenth street, west 417 feet to beginning.
December 22, 1866. To John B. Lewis, assigned to
Alvinza Hayward. No deed, no redemption; balance paid.
1867-68. Sold certificate 667, portion block 96, lot
south-east Sanchez and Market, south 149J feet, north 84
degs. east 17.9 feet, north 5J degs., east 197| feet to
Market, south-west 64. 8J feet to beginning. December 23,
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1867. To Jonathan Peel. Deed issued July 1, 1868;
balance paid.
1868-69. Sold certificate 508, portion block 99. Not
covering premises searched. Balance paid.
1869-70. Sold certificate 421, portion block 99, not
covering premises searched. Balance paid.
1870-71. Sold certificate 490, portion block 99, not
covering premises searched. Balance paid.
1871-72. Sold certificate 414, portion block 99, not
covering premises searched. Balance paid.
1872-73. Lot north-west corner Fourteenth and Church,
west 143, north 17J degs. west 370.6 feet, south 72£ degs.
west 345 feet to east line of Sanchez, north 278.6 feet
along said line to south line of Ridley, east on said line 660
feet to Church, south 560 feet to beginning. Delinquent
$686.41. Offered for sale March 11, 1873, no bid. Balance
paid.
1873-74. Block 99. Sold certificate 556, lot north-west
corner of Fourteenth and Church streets, west on Four-
teenth street 143 feet, north 17J degs. west 370.6, south
72J degs. west 345 to Sanchez street, north 278.6 to Ridley
street, east 560 feet to Church, south 560 feet to beginning.
March 6, 1874. To Josiah H. Applegate. No deed, no
redemption. Balance paid.
1874-75. Block 83. Lot north line Sixteenth street, 270
feet west of Dolores, west 221 feet, north 4 degs. west 51.4
feet, south 81 degs. east 194.8J feet, north %\ degs. west
289.1 feet, north-east 49 feet, more or less, to line of land
assessed to Pruclencia de Haro, south 361 feet to beginning.
Sold certificate 407, March 17, 1875, to J. G. Klumpke.
Assigned to Julia M. Dehon.
Parts of block 98 sold. Certificates 439 and 440. Sales
cancelled. Taxes paid.
Block 99. Lot north-west corner of Fourteenth and
Church, west 143 feet, north 70J degs. west 370.6 feet,
south 72J degs. west 345 feet, north 218.6 feet, east 560
feet, south 560 feet.
Sold certificate 441, March 17, 1875, all to J. H. Apple-
gate. Balance paid.
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E. H. WASHBURN, TAX COLLECTOR, TO MICHAEL LYNCH.
TAX DEED.
Dated September 23, 1862. Cons. $38.66.
For non-payment of taxes for the fiscal year 1861-62.
Tax collector sold Jan, 4, 1862, to second party, the piece
of land
—
Commencing on the north-easterly corner of Church and
Center streets, thence running easterly on Center street
30 feet, with a uniform depth at right angles northerly
parallel with Church street of 365,10 feet.
Now, etc., grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm to
second party, his heirs and assigns forever, the said property,
etc.
"Witness : ¥m. R. "Wlieaton.
Ackn'd Sept. 4, 1862, before Henry Haight, K P.
Recorded Sept. 25, 1862. Liber 11 of Tax Deeds, page
56.
E. H. WASHBUEN, TAX COLLECTOR, TO EUGENE L. SULLIVAN.
TAX DEED.
Dated Dec. 21, 1863. Cons. $20.58.
For the non-payment of taxes for the fiscal year 1861-
62.
Tax collector sold Jan. 2, 1862, to John B. Lewis the
piece of land
—
Commencing on the south-easterly corner of Church and
Ridley streets, thence easterly on Ridley street 20 feet,
thence at right angles southerly to land of Pelissier, thence
north 57 degs. west to Church street, thence northerly
along the easterly line of Church street 63 feet to place of
beginning. And said Lewis has assigned his certificate to
second party.
Now, etc., grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm to
second party, his heirs and assigns forever, the piece of land
above described.
Witness : John Hanna.
Ackn'd December 21, 1863, before Henry Haight, K P.
Recorded Dec. 22, 1863.
Liber 11 of Tax Deeds, page 122.
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E. H. WASHBUKN, TAX COLLECTOR, TO WILLIAM DEHON.
TAX DEED.
Dated April 29, 1864. Cons. $74.56.
For non-payment of taxes for the fiscal year 1862-63.
Tax collector sold, Dec. 30, 1862, to second party, the
piece of land
—
Commencing on the north-easterly corner of Church and
Sixteenth streets, thence running easterly on Sixteenth
street 290 feet by 365.10 feet in depth, and no redemption
has been made.
Now, etc., grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm to
second party, his heirs and assigns forever, the above
described property, etc.
Witness: John Hanna.
Ackn'd April 30, 1864, before Henry Haight, K P.
Recorded April 30, 1864. Liber 12, Tax Deeds, page
124.
FERDINAND VASSAULT TO HENRY A. COBB.
DEED.
Dated Jan. 2, 1866. Cons. $1.
(50-cent stamp, canc'd.)
Remises, releases, and quit-claims to second party, his
heirs and assigns forever, all right, title, and interest in and
to the piece of land in the city ancl count}7 of San Francisco,
known as Mission block 82, bounded by Fourteenth, Fif-
teenth, Dolores and Church streets.
This deed being given to convey any interest acquired
by reason of purchase at tax sales of parts of said land for
the years 1863-64, and 1864-65.
Ackn'd Jan. 2, 1866, before J. W. McKenzie, K P.
Recorded Feb. 8, 1868. Liber 419 Deeds, page 6.
CHARLES R. STORY, TAX COLLECTOR, TO JOHN CARROLL.
TAX DEED.
Dated June 25, 1868. Cons. $5.51.
For non-payment of taxes for the fiscal year 1861-62.
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Tax collector sold on Jan. 4, 1862, to John G. Klumpke,
the lot of land
—
Beginning on the north-east corner of Sanchez and
Market streets, thence running northerly on Market street
407 feet more or less, thence south 33J degs. east 355 feet,
thence south 5J degs. west 24 feet to the line of Market
street, thence south-westerly 86.6 feet to the point of
beginning. And said Klumpke assigned his certificate to
second party.
Now, etc., grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm to
second party, his heirs and assigns forever, the lot above
described.
Witness : John Hanna.
Ackn'd June 25, 1868, before Henry S. Tibbey, E". P.
Kecorded July 21, 1868. Liber 15 Tax Deeds, page 81.
CHAELES E. STOEY, TAX COLLECTOE, TO JONATHAN PEEL.
TAX DEED.
Dated July 1, 1868. Cons. $6.44.
(Stamp, 50 cents, canc'cl.)
For non-payment of taxes for the fiscal year 1867-68.
Tax collector sold, Dec. 23, 1867, to second party, the
piece of land
Beginning on the south-east corner of Sanchez and Mar-
ket streets, thence running 149f feet southerly on Sanchez
street, thence north 84 degs. east 17.9 feet, thence north
5J degs. east 197 feet to Market street, thence south-
westerly 64.8J feet to the point of beginning. And no
redemption being made.
Now, etc., grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm to
second party, his heirs and assigns forever, the piece of
land above described.
Witness : John Hanna.
Ackn'd July 1, 1868, before Henry S. Tibbey, K P.
Kecorded July 2, 1868. Liber 15 Tax Deeds, page 75.
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ISAAC N. THORNE TO JOHN MORRISON.
DEED.
Dated April 3, 1869. Cons. $1.
(Stamp 50 c. Canceled).
Remises, releases and quit-claims to second party all
right, title and interest in and to certain portions of Mission
blocks ~Nos. 83, 95, and 96, which portions were assessed to
the estate of T. Dehon, for taxes for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1866, and were sold on January 11, 1866, by
Charles R. Story, tax collector, to said Thorne, as shown in
the book of descriptions of property, sold for delinquent
taxes for said year, on file in said office, and which certifi-
cates were numbered 499, 507, and 510, and for which said
Charles R. Story afterwards, on Jan. 22, 1867, made,
executed, and delivered to said Thorne, tax deeds in due
form for said premises, reference to which certificates and
tax deeds is hereby made, for a more definite description.
Witness : E. V. Sutter.
Ackn'd July 12, 1869, before E. V. Sutter, KP.
Recorded July 14, 1869. Liber 513 of Deeds, page 323.
JOHN MORRISON TO THOMAS M. J. DEHON.
DEED.
Dated May 18, 1869. Cons. $500.
(50-cent stamp, canc'd.)
Remises, releases, and quit-claims to second party, his
heirs and assigns, forever, all right, title, and interest in the
following described lots of land :
Commencing on the north-east corner of Sixteenth and
Church streets, thence running east 290 feet on Sixteenth
street, thence at right angles north 90.10 feet, thence at
right angles 5 feet west, thence at right angles north 36.7
feet, thence at right angles east 5 feet, thence at right angles
north 80 feet, thence at right angles west 5 feet, thence at
right angles north 39.8 5-7 feet, thence at right angles east
5 feet, thence at right angles north 119 2-7 feet, thence at
right angles west 290 feet, thence at right angles south
365.10 feet to the place of beginning.
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Also, commencing on the north-west corner of Church
and 16th streets, thence 338 feet north on Church street,
thence south-west 566.9 feet more or less to Sanchez street,
thence south 307 feet more or less to Sixteenth street,
thence at right angles east 560 feet to the point of begin-
ning.
Also, all right, title and claim in and to blocks 83, 95 and
96 at said Mission, etc. (And other property.)
Witness : Charles Nettleton.
Ackn'd May 18, 1869, before Charles Nettleton, Com-
missioner for California in ISTew York.
Recorded June 22, 1871. Liber 621 of Deeds, page 46.
Eo further search made of this title.
ALEXANDER AUSTIN, TAX COLLECTOE, TO EVANS S. PILLSBUEY.
TAX DEED.
Dated April 14, 1875.
(Consideration §734.14.)
For non-payment of taxes for the fiscal year 1873-74,
Tax Collector sold the lot of land hereinafter described to
Josiah H. Applegate, on March 6, 1874:
And said J. H. Applegate duly assigned his certificate of
sale, and his rights thereunder, to second party, and no re-
demption having been made, etc., conveys to second party
the lot of land : Commencing on the north-westerly cor-
ner of 14th and Church streets, thence running west-
erly on the northerly line of Fourteenth street 143 feet,
thence north 17J degs. west 370.6 feet, thence south 72J
degs. west 345 feet to Sanchez street, thence northerly
278.6 feet to Ridley street, thence easterly 560 feet to
Church street, and thence southerly 560 feet to the point of
beginning.
Witness: H. S. Tibbey.
Acknowledged April 17, 1875, before Henry S. Tibbey,
K". P.
Recorded Dec. 21, 1875. Liber 17, Tax Deeds, p. 95.
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EVANS S. PILLSBUEY TO THE MARKET AND FOURTEENTH
STEEETS HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATION.
DEED.
Dated January 20, 1876.
(Consideration $5.)
Doth, remise, release, and forever quit-claim unto second
party, and to its successors and assigns, all that lot of land in
the city and county of San Francisco, etc.
Commencing on the north-westerly corner of 14th and
Church streets, and running thence northerly along the
west line of Church street 275 feet, thence at right angles
westerly 125 feet, thence at right angles southerly 25 feet,
thence at right angles westerly 310 feet, thence at right an-
gles southerly 25 feet, thence at right angles westerly 125
feet to the easterly line of Sanchez street, thence southerly
along the easterly line of Sanchez street 225 feet to the
northerly line of 14th street 560 feet to point of commence-
ment. Being portion of Mission Block ~No. 99.
The interest hereby conveyed being the same as acquired
b}^ the first party by virtue of deed from Alexander Austin,
Tax Collector on sale of property in fiscal year 1873-74.
Deed dated April 14, 1875, and recorded Dec. 21, 1875.
Witness : James L. King.
Ackn'd Jan. 20, 1876, before James L. King, N. P.
Eecorded Jan. 20, 1876. Liber 820, Deeds p. 55.
JOSIAH H. APPLEGATE TO THE MAEKET AND FOURTEENTH
STEEETS HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATION.
DEED.
Dated January 13, 1876.
(Consideration $505.46.
)
Does remise, release, and forever quit-claim unto second
party, and to his successors and assigns, all that certain tract
of land in the city and county of San Francisco, State of
California, described as follows, to wit:
Commencing on the north-westerly corner of Church and
Fourteenth streets, and running thence northerly and along
the westerly line of Church street 275 feet, thence at right
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angles westerly 125 feet, thence at right angles southerly 25
feet, thence at right angles westerly 310 feet, thence at right
angles southerly 25 feet, thence at right angles westerly 125
feet to the easterly line of Sanchez street, thence at right
angles southerly and along the easterly line of Sanchez
street 225 feet to the northerly liue of Fourteenth street,
and thence easterly and along the northerly line of Four-
teenth street 560 feet to the point of commencement; the
same being a portion of Mission Block 99.
.
The interest hereby conveyed being the same as acquired
by iirst party by virtue of two sales thereof made by the
Tax Collector of San Francisco for the State, cit}7
,
and
county taxes for the fiscal year 1873-74, and 1874-75, and
none other.
"Witness : Samuel S. Murfey.
Ackn'd Jan. 13, 1876, before Samuel S. Murfey, IS". P.
Recorded Jan. 13, 1876. Liber 817 Deeds, p. 49.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA vs. JAS. G. DENNIS-
TON, LEVI PARSONS, I. E. DAVIS, and GEO. F. SHARP.
Third District Court. Reg. B., Case 1111.
Suit brought to recover $217.75, delinquent State taxes
for the 24th fiscal year, due against the lot of land:
On " northwest corner of Fourteenth and Church streets,
thence running west 143 feet on Fourteenth street, thence
north 17J degs. west 370.6 feet, thence south 72J degs.
west 345 feet to east line of Sanchez street, thence north
278.6 feet along said line to south line of Ridley street,
thence east along said line 560 feet to west line of Church
street, thence south along said line 560 feet to point of be-
ginning; together with the improvements thereon.
And for judgment, directing that said real property be
sold, and the proceeds applied to the payment of costs here-
in, the expenses of sale and the amount due plaintiffs, etc.
Sept. 26, 1874. Complaint for delinquent State taxes filed.
Summons issued.
N-ov. 18. Demurrer filed, (of I. E. Davis and Geo. F.
Sharp.)
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TAXES.
1875-76. Paid.
No personal taxes against Market and Fourteenth Streets
Homestead Association.
No street assessments.
No judgment liens.
STREET CONTRACT No. 5,872.
P. McATEE TO S. H. KENT, SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC
STREETS, ETC.
Dated, Oct. 27, 1874.
To grade Fifteenth street from Valencia to Sanchez
street.
The work to be commenced within seven days and com-
pleted within ninety days from date of contract.
Witness : R. A. Robinson.
Recorded Nov. 10, 1874. Liber 3 Contract Records,
page 169.
Time extended 90 days, Jan. 15, 1875.
Time extended 150 days, March 12, 1875.
No street assessments. No judgment liens.
The property searched is covered by the following claims,
none of which I have thought it necessary to investigate :
the Charles Crisman title, the Peter Smith title, the Bol-
ton and Barron title, the Dehon and Moses title.
Done at the City of San Francisco, State of California,
this twentieth day of January, one thousand, eight hundred
and seventy-six. F. A. Rouleau.
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I
Reclamation of Arid Lands
By Irrigation.
The questions presented are:
What is the physical condition of California so far as it
relates to irrigation ?
What amount of irrigable land is there in the State?
What amount of water can be obtained for the purpose
of irrigation ?
What are the advantages of irrigation ?
In this connection, does irrigation pay ?
What is the condition of irrigation as at present prac-
ticed in California, and what interest has the national
Government in the subject of irrigation on the Pacific
Coast and in relation to all that extent of country known
as the " Arid Region'1 '1 which lies west of the Missouri
river ?
I.
The Physical Condition of California and
its Adaptability to Irrigation.
California lies between the 32c! and 42d degrees of
north latitude ; it has a coast line of over 900 miles, and
in width is from 150 to 200 miles, and has an area of
157,801 square miles. Two ranges of mountains extend
north and south through the whole length of the State.
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The Coast Range, which lies just back of the ocean,
parallels its shore line from one end of the State to the
other. In many places it is but a range of low hills
covered with timber and open pasture lands, while in
other places great valleys cut wide swaths through the
hills to the sea, like the Salinas valley, Santa Inez and
Santa Ana valleys. But generally this range of low
mountains or high hills forms a continuous western wall
from the northern boundary of the State to the Mexican
line. In some places this range of mountains rises in
height to from 4,000 to 6,000 feet, and is cut up in
every direction with small but fertile valleys, fed by
canyons which carry living streams of water, flowing
both inland and to the sea.
The other and principal range of mountains is the
Sierra Nevadas. This mountain range also extends the
full length of the State, north and south, and for the
greater part forms its eastern boundary. Its sides are
covered with timber and its summits with perpetual
snows. Its average height is about 8,500 feet, while its
loftiest peaks are Mount Shasta, in the extreme northern
end of the State, which rises 14,440 feet above the level
of the sea; L,assen Peak, which is 10,557 e^et *n height;
Mount Whitney, which is 15,000 feet in height; and
Mount San Bernardino, which stands a solitary sentinel
at the extreme southern end of the State, and which is
11,000 feet above the sea-level. Both of these mountain
ranges are "storm-gatherers." Along the Coast Range
the rain is excessive in winter; and, as a rule, heavy fogs
prevail during the summer months.
In the Sierra Nevada range, the rains are also very
heavy in winter; in some places, for instance, at the base
of Mount Shasta, there has fallen as much as eighty inches
of water in a single season. The depth of snow in winter
on this range of mountains averages from eight to twenty
feet.
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Between these two mountain ranges is the great valley
of California. In the central and northern part of the
State this valley is divided into the valley of the Sacra-
mento and the valley of the San Joaquin. These valleys
are in width from 30 to 75 miles, and their combined
length is 450 miles. South of these valleys lies another
one of surpassing beauty, which extends through the
whole length of Los Angeles and San Bernardino counties,
and in which irrigation has recently been largely and
most successfully introduced.
II.
Tlie Peculiar Topographical Advantages of
California for Irrigation
will be noted when we observe that nearly every stream
heading in the Sierra Nevada mountains comes from the
snow belt, and is supplied by the melting snows which
continue until July or August of each year.
The two great valleys before referred to are almost on a
sea-level. Sacramento, which is 89 miles from San Fran-
cisco, has an altitude of but 30 feet. Bakersfield, in Kern
county, which is distant from San Francisco 314 miles, is
282 feet above sea-level. Redding, in the north, and which
is nearly at the head of the valley of the Sacramento, is
299 miles from San Francisco and has an altitude of 556
feet. Add to this the fact that in these great plains there
is very little rolling land, that there is an uniform trend
of the surface of the ground from the foothills of the
Sierra Nevadas west to the Sacramento and San Joaquin
rivers, and we must note the peculiar advantage of this
country for irrigation. Perhaps there is no country in the
world where so much land can be regularly and profitably
irrigated without making any serious changes to the
surface of the land as in California. These conditions
of things are found to exist in all the great valleys of
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the State. The two valleys of the Sacramento and the San
Joaquin, according to General Alexander, alone cover an
area of about 1 2, 000,000 acres of irrigable land. The drain-
age of this vast country is effected through the Sacra-
mento and San Joaquin rivers.
III.
The Peculiar Productions of California
is another reason why irrigation will soon be a great feature
in our agriculture. California is situated quite differently
from any other Pacific Coast State or Territory. Indeed,
many of the productions of its soil are peculiar to it. For
instance, there are planted in California, according to
authentic data, 50,000 acres in orange and lemon trees; all
these must be irrigated. Last year there were shipped East
for sale 1,850 carloads of oranges and lemons, and about 600
carloads were consumed at home. There are over 20,000
acres of olive trees planted in California. Most of these are
not bearing; some of them are; but enough are in bearing
to show that this remarkable fruit grows here with wonder-
ful luxuriance and bears abundantly. The olive thrives
nowhere else in the United States. Last year there were
produced in this State 3,400 cases of olive oil, and of the
very best quality. There are 140,000 acres of land now
planted in grape vines in the State of California; and for
the year 1888 there were produced 18,000,000 gallons of
wine, 20,500,000 pounds of raisins, and 1,000,000 pounds
of dried grapes. These vines are the European varieties,
which will not grow where the ground freezes; and they
are not successfully cultivated in any other part of the
United States. Both our wines and raisins are successfully
competing with European productions. There are about
1,000,000 prune trees growing in California, outside of the
acreage planted during the winter of 1888-1889. This
most-needed fruit is not produced in the United States
except on the Pacific Coast.
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In 1888 California produced 7,000,000 pounds of prunes;
and it will be observed that there were imported into the
United States for the same year, for consumption in America,
over 70,000,000 pounds. In a very short time, California
will be able to supply the American market. There are
300,000 fig trees planted in California; and the figs pro-
duced here are of the very best quality. The trees grow
luxuriantly and thrive well. It must be admitted that it
is of infinite importance to our country to encourage the
production at home of all these articles which otherwise we
would be compelled to import.
In this connection, it may be added that California is a great
nut-producing country ; the almond grows well and produces
well. There are now over 25,000 acres of land planted in
almond trees, and this acreage is yearly increasing. In
1888 California produced 180,000 pounds of almonds.
The so-called English walnut is also a most valuable Cali-
fornia nut, and grows well in nearly all sections of the State
where the soil is deep or irrigation possible. No mention
is made of the peach, the cherry, the pear, the apricot, the
nectarine, the plum or the apple. All these fruits are
grown in California in such abundance that the mention
of them seems unnecessary. Add to these fruits the whole
berry family, conspicuous among them the strawberry, the
blackberry and the raspberry, and we may well observe
the unlimited capabilities of this State for fruit culture.
IV.
The Facilities Within the State of California
for an Ample Water Supply for
Irrigation.
This is the most vital question we have to consider, be-
cause, however much irrigation may be needed in this State,
if there is not an ample supply of water, it would be more
than useless to attempt to carry on any extensive system
[ 8 ]
of irrigation. Owing to the peculiar topographical situa-
tion of California, and the fact that for over 900 miles it
borders the Pacific Ocean, the great ranges of mountains
before referred to and their high altitude, there are a large
number of living streams of water flowing from both these
ranges of mountains into the valleys below, and which
make the water supply most abundant. Two of these
streams are navigable rivers, namely, the Sacramento and
the San Joaquin,—the Sacramento for fully two hundred
miles and the San Joaquin for about one hundred miles.
On the extreme southern boundary of the State is the
Colorado.
V.
The Names and Character of the Streams
that May be Utilized for Irrigation.
The principal rivers which flow into the Sacramento from
'
the east, and whose tributaries reach the highest altitudes
in the Sierra Nevada mountains, are the Feather, Yuba,
Bear, American and Cosumnes rivers. There are a large
number of smaller streams which head in the snow belt of
the Sierra Nevada mountains, and which flow down
through the foothills across the Sacramento valley and
empty into that river. On the west side of the Sacramento
valley there are no large rivers which are tributaries to the
Sacramento; but there are a large number of creeks which
have a very extensive watershed and which bear a great
amount of water down their courses during the winter.
Some of them are perennial streams. Among the larger
of these streams flowing from the Coast Range east to the
Sacramento are Putah, Cache, Stoney and Cottonwood
creeks.
The San Joaquin valley is watered by a number of
rivers, all of which have their sources in the great snow
belt of the Sierra Nevadas. Chief among these rivers are
the Mokelumne, Calaveras, Stanislaus, Merced, Tuolumne,
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San Joaquin, Kaweah, Kings and Kern rivers; all of these
flow down into and through the San Joaquin valley. The
combined watershed of these rivers is 38,500 square miles.
The Mojave river lies south of the San Joaquin valley,
and contains a large amount of water which can be success-
fully used for irrigation on what is known as the Mojave
desert. The Mojave desert is a desert only in this sense:
there is not rainfall sufficient to make grass and crops
mature; but the soil is rich, the climate genial, and with
water almost anything will grow with luxuriance. The
capabilities of this river are more fully referred to hereafter.
South of this and forming the extreme southern boundary
of the State is the Colorado river, which, with the excep-
tion of the Columbia, is the largest river on the Pacific
Coast. It bounds the State of California on the south, and
it borders what is known as the Yuma desert. Wherever
water has been applied on this desert, the soil has proven
productive, instance Indio and other points. Much of this
desert is below the level of the river, and some of it below
sea-level; it is nearly all susceptible of irrigation, and by
bringing water upon it would make this one of the most
fertile places in the world. It is estimated that this river
will successfully irrigate 1,000,000 acres of land; the
most of which that can be thus irrigated is public land
and is now of no value.
VI.
The Rainfall in Different Parts of
California.
In considering the amount of water that can be appro-
priated in California for the purposes of irrigation, we
must take into view the average amount of rainfall in the
different parts of California, and what portions of the State
most need irrigation.
The average annual rainfall at San Francisco is 23^-
inches. In the foothills of nmch of Northern and
[ io ]
Central California the average rainfall exceeds 30 inches;
while in the great valleys of California it is much less,
varying in different localities, but generally increasing as
you go north from the lower part of the San Joaquin valley,
where it is about seven inches, until you reach Shasta at
the upper end of the Sacramento valley, where the
annual rainfall is thirty-five inches. At San Diego it is
9^q inches. In California fair crops can be raised from a
rainfall of from ten to twelve inches, if it comes at the
right time, but it rarely comes that way. The trouble is
that the annual rainfall is not uniform, that is, uniform
one year with the other. Some years there will be an
abundant rainfall, and another year there will be alto-
gether too light a fall of rain to make good crops.
To illustrate: at Fort Redding one year the rainfall
was 2>7to inches, while the next year it was iSjjf inches.
At Sacramento the rainfall one year was 27^ inches,
while the next year it was but twelve inches. At Fort
Tejon one year it was 34y2Q- inches, while the next year it
was 9^0- inches. Clear Lake had one year a rainfall of
66T
7
-g- inches, and the next year it had only i6T2g inches.
Visalia one year had io^j- inches of rain, while the next
year it had but 6 \ inches. These are extreme cases and
only referred to as an illustration; but it shows that
everywhere on the Pacific Coast there are years of drouth
and years of floods. It is true that in the northern and
central parts of the State there is rarely a failure of crops;
by summer fallowing and careful farming, good crops are
generally produced. In the coast counties north of
Monterey there has never been a failure, though some
years have been much better than others. South of
Monterey, for the years 1868, 1869, 1870 and 1871,
there was a noticeable drouth; stock-raisers were com-
pelled to drive their stock to the mountains or drive it
north. In the San Joaquin valley very little hay and less
grain was grown. Even the irrigation now practiced in
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that great valley would have been of infinite importance.
From Tulare to San Diego in 1871 the country was
almost barren of verdure; except in favored localities,
there was no grass for stock; thousands of sheep, horses
and cattle were lost. It is so long since this occurred that
we have almost forgotten it, but still it is an historical
fact, and what has been once may be again. It is the
part of wisdom to recognize the danger and provide
against its recurrence. This could have been avoided if
proper systems of irrigation had been introduced. Even
now, should a drouth occur, the irrigation that is prac-
ticed in the central and southern part of the State would
largely protect the people against disaster.
VII.
The Area of Lands that can be Successfully
Irrigated in California.
According to the survey made by Gen. Alexander, and
a report he afterwards submitted to Congress, the area of
land in California which may be readily irrigated is about
7,650,000 acres. This does not include the so-called
swamp and overflow lands. But should we include these
and also include, the low foothills in this estimate, there
would be about 12,000,000 acres of irrigable land in the
State of California. Nearly all the foothill country of
the Sierra Nevada mountains is not only irrigable, but is
wonderfully productive when irrigated. This is now
demonstrated in the counties of Placer and Butte, where
irrigation is very extensively carried on for the purpose of
fruit-raising. Practically only a small portion of this
State, as compared to its whole area, can be irrigated.
We should now add 1,000,000 of acres to the above esti-
mate, which would include Mojave and Yuma deserts,
Sierra and Honey Lake valleys, making quite 13,000,000
acres of irrigable land in California.
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The area of catchment or watershed outside of the
lands to be irrigated, and which forms a watershed of the
irrigable lands, is estimated at about 3^ square miles to
each square mile of land to be irrigated; and when we
bear in mind the fact that this watershed is most of it in
high altitudes, where storms are excessive and snow falls
to a great depth and remains for a large part of the year,
it will be readily observed that if catchment reservoirs
are made in the most favorable localities, and if the run-
ning streams are utilized, there is more than ample water
in the State of California to irrigate every foot of land
which is susceptible of irrigation.
VIII.
Is Irrigation Advantageous ?
The advantage of irrigation is two-fold : first, the water
is applied at a time when it will do the most good, and
when the ground is in such a condition that the grain or
the fruit trees will get the full benefit of all the water that
is run upon the land
;
and second, where irrigation is
practiced there are no drouths. In countries where there
is ordinarily an ample rainfall, the crops often fail by
reason of drouths. This arises from the fact that the rain
falls in vast quantities, but at unpropitious times, when it
does little or no good to the crops.
In California, from about the middle of May until the
last of October, we have no rains. During this period
grain is harvested.
The use of water is often more valuable for fruit grow-
ing than for small grains. We doubt whether the wheat
fields of 'California will ever be irrigated, because fruit is
more valuable and the irrigation of orchards is more
readily accomplished than the irrigation of the small
grains
; and because, as a rule, in the great wheat pro-
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ducing portions of California, irrigation for the purpose of
producing one crop of cereals is not necessary. But Cali-
fornia is especially a fruit-growing country. Its adapt-
ability to almost all kinds of fruit is peculiar. Perhaps no
country in the world is its equal; and in some of the great
interior valleys of the State, and also in the foothill
counties, successful fruit-growing can be made certain
only by irrigation. With the orange and lemon, irrigation
is a necessity. Where orchards require irrigation, it has
been proved that to sustain the trees in their growth and
fructification, water need not be put upon the land more
than from three to five times during the summer and fall
months. The practice is to run water in small ditches
between the rows of trees, through the orchard about once
a month, commencing in June and ending in September.
Then immediately after irrigating the ground, by allowing
the water to flow through these small ditches, the practice
is to put in the cultivator, stir up the ground anew so that
the evaporation will not be rapid, and the ground will not
settle down and become hard. The land thus remains
friable, and the trees grow with great rapidity.
The orchards and vineyards in the coast counties and in
Central and Northern California have hitherto never been
irrigated. Where the size of the grape is an especial and
important factor, like in the making of raisins, the irriga-
tion of the vines is advantageous, and especially where the
vineyard is planted in very hot and dry situations, like at
Fresno and Merced. Up to this time, no grapevines nor
orchards have been irrigated in any of the counties of
Santa Clara, Alameda, Contra Costa, Solano, Sonoma,
Marin or Napa, and the fruit-trees and the vines grow
there with great luxuriance and produce abundantly; and
yet, in each of these counties, vegetables and the smaller
fruits like strawberries are now irrigated during some of
the summer months.
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IX.
The Amount of Water necessary for Irriga-
tion in California.
There will not be required the same amount of water
for successful irrigation in California as is used in India.
In India it requires about one cubic foot of water running
every second to irrigate two hundred acres of land to pro-
duce cereals. In Granada, Spain, where cereals are pro-
duced, one cubic foot of water running per second irrigates
about two hundred and fifty acres.
One inch of water, running continually, irrigates in
Southern California about ten acres. Even less than this
amount would be required in portions of Central and
Northern California.
X.
The Results of Irrigation in California.
Los Angeles and San Bernardino counties are conspicuous
illustrations of what irrigation can accomplish. Nothing
can picture the change which has there been made by
means of irrigation. A great plain which once looked
like a desert is now covered with beautiful homes sur-
rounded with orange orchards and vineyards, dotted with
towns and cities which have grown up everywhere as if by
magic. The population has more than quadrupled in a
single decade; lands which sold ten years ago at from five
to twenty-five dollars per acre now sell at from one hundred
to one thousand dollars per acre; and these prices seem to be
fixed from what the lands actually produce. Nor is this
condition of things peculiar only to Southern California.
In Placer county, water has for some years been used for
the irrigation of orchards and vineyards there planted. It
is impossible to describe the change thus created. Orchards
of every variety of fruits,—from the orange and lemon to
the apple,—and vineyards of every rare variety of grape,
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and nuts of all known varieties grown in semi-tropical
climates, and the fig and the olive,—all seem to flourish in
the foothills of Placer county. Nor does the result in
Placer county seem to be peculiar to that locality; for
everywhere in the foothills of the Sierra Nevadas, where
irrigation has been introduced, the result has been equally
surprising.
The foothill country about Oroville, in the county of
Butte, where water has been introduced, is no less con-
spicuous for its luxuriant tree-growth. Within the last
four years i
,
500 acres of orange orchards have been planted,
and these trees seem to be thriving well. The oranges
are rich in color, luscious in taste and attractive as to size.
This is mentioned only to show the effect of irrigation upon
both the foothill and valley lands of the State of California.
More marvelous still is that section of country lying about
half-way between the extreme northern and southern part
of the State. We refer to Fresno. The writer of this has
seen Fresno a veritable desert ; it is now a garden of
surpassing luxuriance and great beauty. Within the past
few years a town has been built there, which has a pop-
ulation of over 10,000 ; the surrounding country is culti-
vated in everything the farm can produce. Indeed, Fresno
county is to-day the great raisin-growing center of the
State, and nearly every variety of fruit grows abundantly.
There a beautiful orchard stands side by side with an
alfalfa or grain field. Homes are literally hid away by
the remarkable ornamental tree-growth which irrigation
has caused. Ten years ago the lands of Fresno sold at
from $3 to $20 per acre ; now the same land with water on
it sells at from $75 to $750 per acre. This is all due to
irrigation. Kern county is another conspicuous landmark
on the road to successful irrigation ; more than 80,000
acres of land is being irrigated in that county. The pro-
duction is generally alfalfa.
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Everywhere in California during the summer months
garden vegetables are raised by irrigation. In the fall,
winter and spring months in most parts of the State they
require no irrigation, except such as they get from the
natural rainfall. So with strawberries
;
this fruit is uni-
versally irrigated. In Santa Clara county alone it is claimed
there are 1,500 acres of land cultivated in berries, all of
which are irrigated
;
and that there are over 500 acres
cultivated in garden vegetables, which are also irrigated.
Even in northern counties like Napa, where the annual
rainfall is almost three times as great as in some parts of
Southern California, strawberries, other small berries
and garden vegetables during the summer months are
universally irrigated.
Without wishing to select any portion of the State to
give it especial prominence in this report, yet it would
seem both wise and necessary that the most conspicuous
object lessons found in California, in the way of irrigation,
should be particularly and exhaustively referred to. We
do this for the purpose of illustrating what irrigation has
done in the past, what it is doing now, and what its possi-
bilities for the future are. Your committee has therefore
selected, as special examples for this purpose , some portions
of Southern California and the San Joaquin valley, where
irrigation has been carried on for a great many years, and
where it is now largely and most successfully adopted. And
as this report is intended, in so far as we are able to do so,
to place facts before the people both of our own State and
the people of other sections of the country, as well as the
committee of Congress which is soon to visit us, we have
ventured to select the most marked and illustrious exam-
ples within the range of our knowledge to give more forcible
expression to what is known upon this most interesting
subject. Los Angeles and San Bernardino counties are
most conspicuous illustrations of what is being done in
irrigation; and we therefore venture to present the follow-
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ing carefully prepared yet conservative reports from those
two counties, and also an equally interesting and conserva-
tive report from a part of the San Joaquin valley.
XI.
Necessity for Irrigation in Portions of
Northern California.
The Sacramento valley contains no lands strictly arid;
but most of that great valley would be benefited by irri-
gation, and as to which the Government might well lend
its assistance, at least to the extent of determining the
water storage supply or other means of irrigation.
Large areas of plain or bench lands, lying above the
bottom lands of the river, are to be found in Shasta,
Tehama, Butte, Colusa and other counties. They are all
within reach of the water flowing down the Sacramento
river and its lateral tributaries. Most of the streams
emptying into the Sacramento from the Coast Range sink
and disappear during the summer not far below where
they debouch from the mountains into the open country;
but at their sources there are large quantities of water and
extended areas of watersheds. It is believed that excel-
lent facilities for water storage can be found on all these
streams.
The creeks flowing from the Sierras, on the contrary,
are generally constant and unfailing, though diminishing
in quantity through the summer.
In Lassen and Modoc counties, especially in Lassen, will
be found an extended field of usefulness for Government
work. There are few places to be found in all the regions
to be examined by the Senate Committee, covering an area
of excellent lands, worthless without irrigation and invalu-
able with it, where all conditions are so favorable for
immediate results as in Lassen county. Nature has built
a reservoir in Lassen county called Eagle Lake, covering
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and area of 35,000 acres and of great depth, in many-
places over 1,500 feet. A tunnel 7,000 feet long would tap
the lake twelve feet below the surface ; and, by an addi-
tional open tunnel of like length, the lake could be tapped
twenty feet below the surface. It has a watershed of over
400,000 acres in the regions of our heaviest rains and snow-
fall. Its elevation is 5,115 feet.
Willow creek was probably once its outlet, and through
subterranean passages now receives its first escaping waters.
This creek runs through Willow Creek valley to-day and
into Honey Lake valley.
The Susan river rises west of Eagle Lake and has a
watershed separate from that of Eagle Lake and about as
large. It flows into Honey Lake valley; very fine storage
sites are to be found near the source of this stream, con-
sisting of lakes and extended flats.
The irrigable lands of Lassen county, lying about 1,000
feet below these sources of water, are are not far from
500,000 acres ; and east of these lands, in the State of
Nevada, is an area of like extent, which would form a part
of this scheme of irrigation. The lands are rich, sandy
loam, productive with water, but comparatively useless
without. The climate of Honey Lake valley is most
delightful, being free from excessive heat and not subject
to very low temperatures. Hardy fruits excel here, and
with irrigation alfalfa grows luxuriantly, producing three
crops in a season. To many Eastern people, the climate
would be preferred to the lower valleys. Here there is a
region of nearly or quite 1,000,000 acres of public lands
that cannot now be settled upon, but are nevertheless
capable of sustaining a large population.
A rough calculation shows that in Eagle Lake there is
already stored enough water to irrigate 500,000 acres of
land; and at the head of Susan river comparatively cheap
reservoir sites are available to store water sufficient for
a half million acres more.
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North of this region lies Madelin plains, a large area of
good lands if irrigated.
In Modoc county, like areas are lying idle and useless,
yet are capable of high cultivation and of sustaining a
large population.
These lands are all within reach of water, but the work
of survey is expensive; and, there being no way by which
capital can acquire the land, there is no probability of any
relief ever coming to these regions except by Govern-
mental interposition.
If it is true that there are one.million acres of laud which
may be irrigated at an expense of one million dollars,
and that these lands lie upon the great interior desert plain
of our continent, by what possible scheme could the
Government hope that enough people would go there in
advance and expend the money which they must do before
the land is available ? The Government must either do
the work, or it must give to capital something more than
the vague expectation that people will buy the water.
As a first step, the surveys of irrigable land and sites of
reservoirs will prove beneficial. The duties of the Senate
Committee must reach beyond the mere demonstration
that land and water may be brought together. It must
show how this may be done, and ought to be done, by the
general Government.
XII.
Owens Valley in Inyo County.
Inyo county, California, is especially adapted to irriga-
tion, particularly that part of it known as Owens valley.
From Olancha to the head of Round valley is ioo miles; the
whole of this distance, a strip of country from four to six
miles in width, is susceptible of irrigation. There are
from three to four hundred thousand acres of land of
unsurpassed fertility, which are utterly worthless without
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the use of water. It is claimed by experienced engi-
neers that the Owens river carries on an average, and
during the summer months, water enough to place at least
a surface depth of fifteen inches upon an area of three
hundred thousand acres of land, and this without preparing
catchment reservoirs. A large portion of this country is
still a part of the public domain. Less than 12,000
acres of land are now cultivated in Owens valley.
XIII.
Irrigation in L,os Angeles and Orange Coun-
ties.
In considering the subject of irrigation in Los Angeles
and Orange counties, we find it a complicated one. The
number of ditches run into the hundreds, and the number
of systems and sub-systems, companies and associations, to
several scores. The length of the ditches is hundreds of
miles, irrigating many varieties of soil and crops. The
area of actually irrigated land in the two counties is in the
vicinity of 150,000 acres.
THE SOURCES OF THE IRRIGATING WATER SUPPLY OE
THESE COUNTIES
are the rivers Los Angeles and San Gabriel in Los Angeles
county, the lower part of the Santa Ana in Orange county
(the upper part being in San Bernardino county), many
creeks and small streams whose flow is of short duration,
springs and springy lands (called cienegas), and many
hundreds of artesian wells. The rivers, except the Los
Angeles, rise in the high mountains and are practically
perennial. It is true their waters disappear in their sands
during most of the dry season soon after debouching from
the mountains; but they reappear at intervals all the way
to the sea, and can be taken out at almost any point along
their channels by simply running ditches into them. The
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water supply in the rivers alone is sufficient to irrigate all
the land of the counties to which water could be advanta-
geously applied, if properly stored and distributed. The
volume of the streams in winter is enormous,—utterly be-
yond computation; and but a small portion of it would need
to be saved for use in the dry season. The average sum-
mer flow of the San Gabriel river is about 10,000 inches;
that of the Los Angeles river is 3,750 inches, and that of
the lower Santa Ana 4,000 inches. This estimate is of
surface flow only. During the usual three months of
the irrigating season, the water is all appropriated; it
is not all utilized, however, as much is wasted both
by seepage and evaporation in the open, porous-earth
ditches in which it flows, and much is allowed to run to
waste. The streams whose waters rarely show outside the
mouths of their gorges, except under the influence of con-
siderable rainfall, are capable of furnishing a great quantity
of water for storage. In many instances they are the only
source of supply for the higher mesa and foothill lands,
and are well worth the expenses of storing; for some of
these lands yield fruits in the greatest perfection, and they
are unquestionably the most healthful and delightful
dwelling places. A great deal of water is obtained from
springs and springy lands. These lands are found all
the way from the mountains to the sea; but the greater
number of those used for irrigation are situated on the
higher plains, or at the base of the main range. The
most notable, instances of these sources of supply are
the springs and marshy lands of Pomona, on the eastern
border of Los Angeles county, the springs of Santa Anita
and San Gabriel, the marsh lands of the Rio Honda and
Paso de Bartola, near the center, and those at the head of
the Los Angeles river, on the San Bernardino plains near
the west line. They furnish many hundred inches of
water, and are among the most reliable and valuable of
water-rights.
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THE ARTESIAN WELLS OF THE TWO COUNTIES AFFORD A
VERY LARGE AMOUNT OF WATER.
Pomona orchards are largely supplied by them. So are
those of the Santa Anita and San Gabriel valleys; while
the lower coast plain has hundreds of such wells irrigating
fields of alfalfa, vegetables and most varieties of fruit.
These wells have an average bore of six inches, depth of
150 feet and a flow of two inches. Not more than one-
third of them, however, are flowing—that is, about 1,500.
There is promise of the development of great quan-
tities of water by the construction of submerged dams in
the gravel-filled channels of the streams. There are several
such dams in the county; but I have been unable to get
statistics with regard to but one. That was built in the
Pacorima, a stream in the northeast corner of the San
Fernando basin. The owner claims it to be the largest in
the world ; it is 600 feet long, with an average depth
of sixty feet. It consists of a wall six feet thick, of gran-
ite boulders and Portland cement, built up from bedrock
and filled against, back and front, with sand and gravel,
It developed a subterraneous stream forty feet wide and
sixteen feet deep. Unfortunately, through some fault in
construction, the dam was unable to retain the waters but
a short time after its completion last year.
SUB-IRRIGATING SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED.
They consist of cement pipe of the smaller dimensions
laid at a depth of the deepest plowing. The pipe cannot
endure much pressure and requires to be laid nearly level.
The ends of the pipes are perforated to admit a flow of
the water into the earth about the roots of the trees. By
a patented process, a continuous pipe is laid at the required
depth. Sub-irrigation requires much less water and no
surface work except cultivation. It discourages the growth
of weeds and prevents the hardening of the ground about
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the trees. As at present applied, however, it does not
uniformly moisten the earth inclosing the roots, and is not
regarded as a complete success.
THE FACILITIES FOR STORAGE.
There is a difference of opinion among engineers. Some
think there are many basins and canyons in the mountains
which are adapted to the purpose, and others think these,
on most streams, are wanting. Most, however, agree that
the bench lands furnish abundant opportunities for the
construction of reservoirs. The storage of water in the
canyons may be affected by throwing dams at favorable
places across the mouths of such canyons or basins as
have the least wash, and afford the largest capacity and
possibility of leading the water into them from adjacent
streams.
THE RESERVOIRS ON THE BENCH LANDS MAY BE
CONSTRUCTED
by excavating, and at much less expense, than those in the
canyons, and be of much safer character. They would not,
however, be able to deliver their waters at so high an eleva-
tion, and would leave considerable land to be supplied from
other sources. The filling of such reservoirs is effected by-
piping, fiuming or ditching from the upper waters of the
streams. There are a number of reservoirs of both kinds,
finished and in process of construction, of capacity vary-
ing from a few thousand to a billion gallons. One on
Mormon creek, in the rim of the San Fernando basin, is
of more than the latter capacity.
Suffice ,it to say there is no lack of facilities for the
storage of water with safety and profit. The first expense,
however, is very great; and private enterprise is not
ready to undertake it on a large scale except in the most
favorable localities. The waters of the San Gabriel river
brought out upon the higher hill lands of the Ayusa or
Duarte would suffice to irrigate all the great valley below,
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the coast plain beyond, and the intervening range of hills
to their very tops. The waters of Millard canyon and the
Arroyo Seco stored in the vicinity of the Giddings ranch,
or the lands of the John Brown's sons, or other available
places, could be made to flow over the San Rafael hills
and those in and adjoining east Los Angeles. So with
the San Dimas and the streams of Santa Anita, Baton,
Tejunga, Pacorima, San Fernando, Mormon Creek, Ver-
dugo and Santiago, whose flow in the aggregate is enough
to supply all the lands between them and the ocean many
times over. Also over the range in the hitherto regarded
irredeemable desert of the Mojave, where most of the
land still belongs to the Government, and the soil is as
rich as lies under the sun, whole townships of the finest
raisin grape, fig and deciduous fruit land may be irrigated
by the waters of the Mojave, Big and Little Rock creeks,
Oak creek and some others,—most of which show surface
water only in the rainy season,—if those waters are hus-
banded, as there are abundant facilities for doing. And
in the Newhall region, the Santa Clara, the San Fran-
cisquito and the Castaic may be made to greatly increase
the productiveness of the valley and the wealth of the
county.
THE NUMBER OF ACRES OF GOOD LAND WHICH
REQUIRE IRRIGATION
are, south of the mountains, according to the State en-
gineer's estimate, 460,900. North of the Sierra Madre
range, Los Angeles county shares with Kern and San
Bernardino in the great Mojave desert, so-called. This
desolate region contains many thousand square miles.
In these three counties, one-half of this is probably arid
beyond redemption; one-half of the remainder is too
rough and mountainous to be valuable for cultivation,
but the remainder is mostly highly fertile soil, lying
favorably for the application of water. Of this vast
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territory, Los Angeles county possesses 250,000 acres
which can be made to comfortably sustain a population of
100,000 people.
It is stated that the lowest summer flow of the Mojave
river is about 5,000 inches. The average flow for six
months in the year, the winter and spring months, is from
20,000 to 30,000 inches, during May, June and July, more
than 10,000, and for the rest of the season more than 5,000
inches. Of this the Hesperia Land and Water Company
has filed a claim of 5,000 inches. The Hesperia Company
irrigates about 300 acres of land, and is flooding 15,000
acres for the purpose of preparing it for cultivation with
the use of less water than it would otherwise require.
The remainder, properly cared for, will redeem half a
million acres of now absolute desert and make it as rich
and blooming as the plains of Babylon thirty centuries ago.
SITES FOR STORAGE RESERVOIRS ARE ABUNDANT.
The land is mostly Government land, and the profits
thereon would pay for enormous and elaborate works.
Big and Little Rock creeks, which debouch upon the
desert plain at higher elevation, west of the Mojave river,
are wholly within Los Angeles county. Their flow in
winter is thousands of inches, and in summer is sufficient,
as at present handled, to irrigate several hundred acres.
Facilities for storage on these creeks are as abundant as
on the Mojave. The land below is still owned, for the
most part, by the Government. The universal testimony
is that it is as fertile as the best. It is covered with grass
and flowers during several months of the year, and is
capable, under irrigation, of producing the most luxuriant
and profitable crops. Artesian well-boring has proved
successful in places on the desert, but the expense is of
course greater than elsewhere. The region is one of the
most healthful on the globe. Its hot, dry atmosphere is
found congenial to many people. It is especially adapted
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to the production of certain crops, as the fig and raisin
grape. It produces in some places as fine wheat as is
raised anywhere, but to become habitable for any more
than a few scattered families or small communities, it
must have water to save its crops in summer. We have
an engineer's report with regard to Little Rock creek. He
finds ample winter flow to furnish irrigation water, if
stored, for 270,000 acres, allowing one inch to five acres.
He allows for thirty inches of evaporation, and finds sites
and gives estimates for two reservoirs, the larger one
having a capacity of 644,000,000 gallons and to cost
$125,000. There is reported from the same locality 800
acres to which water is applied; 200,000 acres irrigable
—
one-half of which belongs to the Government; fourteen
miles of ditches. Value of irrigable land, $50.00 per acre;
non-irrigable land, $1.15 per acre; the number of artesian
wells in the region, seven, with an average depth of
340 feet and average flow of twelve inches. The counties
of Iyos Angeles and Orange have an area of 4,812 square
miles or 3,079,680 acres. Their population is fully
150,000 souls. Without irrigation not one quarter of this
number would be living there; and "this in spite of the
fact that those two counties produce more than one-half of
the corn of the State almost altogether without irrigation;
that there are nearly 90,000 acres of good land that
require no irrigation."
THE LAND NOW IRRIGATED IS ABOUT 150,000 ACRES,
and this is the basis of maintenance of 113,000 people.
Theoretically, no increase of this population is wanted
without a corresponding increase of irrigated lands.
Factories and mineral developments, travel and transporta-
tion by sea and land, and the healthfulness and delight-
fulness of the climate, would add to the population; but the
cost of living would be increased in proportion to growth,
the homes of the poor would no longer be those of people
[ 27 ]
who control their own destinies; and this would become
a rich man's paradise,—a thing not to be desired.
FORMER AND PRESENT POPULATION.
Ten years ago the population of the counties was little
over 30,000. Fifteen years ago the laud on which Pasa-
dena now stands was held at $7.00 per acre ; in seven years
it was valued and sold in large quantities at from $500
to $1,000 per acre. This was for orchards—not city lots
—
orchards made possible only by a supply of moisture for
the roots of the trees during the long arid season of the
year. So with the whole of the great foothill region
along the base of the Sierra Madre range from Tejunga
and Crescenda Canada on the west through Altadena,
Sierra Madre, Lamanda Park, Santa Anita, Monrovia,
Duarte, Ayusa, Glendora, Alosta, San Dimas, Lords-
burg, Cucamonga, Rialto, Redlands and over the San
Gorgonio Pass into the desert at Indio, and again at
Riverside and Arlington, and places too numerous to men-
tion. The growth has been proportionate to the extent to
which irrigation has been carried. The region mentioned
was almost worthless even for grazing purposes, and was
as incapable of sustaining a population as the Mojave
desert itself. Now visit it and you will find it the most
charming region and the most valuable land in all Cali-
fornia, or in the United States for that matter.
IRRIGATING CONDUITS FOR THE WATER OBTAINED FROM
THE MOUNTAINS.
In every direction, either above or below the surface
like a spider's web, the ditches, flumes and pipes are leading
the life-giving fluid. It is for the most part above the
region of wells, so that the water for all purposes has to be
brought in. Where no provision has been made for sup-
plying a locality from running streams, a reservoir is made
or other methods adopted. The mountains are bored and
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tunneled for seepage and spring water
; wet places in the
canyons and gulches are under-drained; springs are cleaned
out, and reservoirs of various sizes constructed to increase
and store the flow. Pipes are laid for long distances into
the canyons to bring the trickling streams from their hid-
ing places to the light and usefulness. Ingenuity and
experience as well as capital are required to find many of
these waters. Much money has been expended to little
purpose in such work; but a great many inches of flow
have been obtained in this way,—much more than enough
to compensate for the outlay in this direction.
In the ranges of hills between the mountains and ocean,
water has been and is being developed in the same way;
but the difference in the soil and the moisture borne on
the ocean breeze renders less water necessary, and the same
enterprise in obtaining it has not been displayed. The
Whittier Colony is a notable exception to this rule as to
enterprise, though not as to need of irrigation.
THERE PROBABLY ARE NOW FIFTEEN HUNDRED MILES
OF IRRIGATING CONDUITS IN THOSE TWO COUNTIES.
The character of these conduits is continually changing.
Flumes are being substituted for catch-ditches, and cement
or iron pipes for both. There are now quite four hundred
miles of underground conduits. Every system and char-
acter of irrigation is here exemplified,—from the ancient
methods of the Indians and Mexicans to the most im-
proved modern systems, including sub-irrigation, flooding
the lands, channels and basins, slow streams and deep-
wetting, quick, full and frequent flow, the use of one inch
to ten acres, and of an inch to one acre (the inch flow giv-
ing 12,560 gallons per day, equivalent to four and a half
inches rainfall in the one hundred days of the irrigating
season), and so on, ad infinitum. All phases of the subject
may be found treated here.
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IN MOST INSTANCES THE VALUE OF THE WATER-RIGHT
AND THE APPURTENANCES IS DIVIDED
INTO SHARES,
and then are owned by each irrigator in proportion to the
number of acres he wishes to irrigate. He pays his share
of the expenses, and takes his share of the water in his
turn, which is settled by agreement at the beginning of
the irrigating season. The amount of water applied to
irrigation depends upon contingencies. The water is
measured by inches or heads, one inch being the amount
that will flow through an inch-square orifice under four-
inch pressure. The head nominally is one hundred inches;
the run is for any number of hours according to agree-
ment, usually from twelve to twenty-four. The irrigating
season is ordinarily about three months, July, August and
September. A man is employed to turn the water to each
irrigator as his time comes; this man is called a "Yan-
jero," as the ditch in Spanish is called a "Yanja. " He
receives from $1.00 to $1.50 per day for the season. The
cost per acre is from thirty cents to $1.50 for the year,
which covers all expenses. Many of the open ditches are
injured during the rainy season, and a great deal of ditch
repairing is required at the beginning of every dry season.
The pipe system escapes this and other drawbacks which
attend the old, crude methods of the first settlers.
THE AVERAGE RAINFALL OF THE REGION IS ABOUT
TWELVE INCHES,
running from a light precipitation near the coast to a
copious one in the mountains and foothills, though differ-
ent parts of both localities are more or less differently
farmed. There have, been no drouths in ten years; but
drouths can have no such effect upon the region as for-
merly. The people know so well how to use and husband
the moisture, that no material damage could be done to
the country by a lack of rainfall that did not continue for
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several years. We have no general failure of crops; and
every year makes assurance doubly sure that it can never
occur again.
The value of land in this section lies in the water. In
the San Gabriel valley, water has actually been sold at
the price of $15,000 per inch, which price, at one inch to
ten acres, would be $1,500 per acre.
THE AVERAGE VALUE OF THE PRODUCT OF UNIRRIGATED
LAND IS NOT MORE THAN ONE-TENTH
THAT OF IRRIGATED
The difference in the variety of the crops possible to
raise, and in the capacity of the two kinds of land to sus-
tain population, is quite as great. The improvement in
the character of the population is as marked as in num-
bers
;
intelligence and energy distinguish the new occu-
pants of this country from the old. With regard to the
practical knowledge of irrigation, there is probably no
field in the world where it is more exhaustive than in
these two counties. It has been applied here for more
than a hundred years, and has gradually grown from the
simple methods of Spanish-American settlers to the most
elaborate of modern systems.
XIV.
Irrigation in San Bernardino County.
STORAGE RESERVOIRS AS AIDS TO IRRIGATING SYSTEMS.
The great value of storage reservoirs is just beginning
to be appreciated in Southern California since the actual
use of water from Bear Valley reservoir has commenced,
in connection with the natural flow of the Santa Ana
river.
The supply of water from a stream is just the reverse
to the demands made upon it for irrigating purposes. The
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natural stream is large in January, diminishes in size till
July or August, and then increases in volume till January
again.
The use of water for irrigating purposes is least in
January, and increases gradually until August, and then
diminishes again till January.
The value of a stream for irrigating purposes is meas-
ured by the duty its water will do at that season of the
year when the most water is required, or when the stream
will irrigate the smallest amount of land.
All surplus water at other seasons of the year is of no
value for irrigation purposes, except as it can be stored for
future use.
Suppose we have a stream of water that carries one
thousand inches under a four-inch pressure, or twenty
cubic feet of water per second, at the dryest time of the
season—say August—of each year. This stream of water
is sufficient, in San Bernardino county, to irrigate 5,000
acres of land in good shape, or, if conditions are favor-
able, perhaps 10,000 acres. The water in the stream is
not all called into use until the months of July and
August, and then at times every drop must be utilized.
During June and September, there is enough water for
20,000 acres; and during the balance of the year there is
enough to irrigate from 25,000 to 50,000 acres, or more.
These are rough estimates, but they are practically correct,
although in different seasons the irrigating capacity of the
stream will differ.
Now the theory of the people should be to furnish an
independent supply of water that could be turned into
this irrigating system at a time when it will do the most
good.
Suppose that it was desirable to make this stream irri-
gate 50,000 acres of land where it now irrigates but 5,000
acres.
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To do this work would require 9,000 inches additional
in July and August, perhaps 5,000 inches additional in
June and September, 2,000 inches additional in May and
October; and, as a rule, the stream would take care of the
entire tract during the remainder of the year.
Here we find that a stream of water equal to 30,000
inches for one month would irrigate 40,000 acres of land,
whereas if it were not used in connection with a natural
stream it would not irrigate one-quarter that amount.
This would require a reservoir one mile square and about
an average of fifty-five feet deep.
Bear Valley reservoir, in San Bernardino county, was
started as an experiment, but it has proved itself more val-
uable than its founders had hoped it would be; and steps
are being taken to make it still more valuable by in-
creasing its capacity, and constructing a dam to a height
of 120 feet, whereas its present height is but fifty feet.
This reservoir is located 6,000 feet above sea-level, where
the evaporation is very light, and where the water can be
stored in its natural purity.
This reservoir commands the entire San Bernardino
valley on both sides of the Santa Ana river, from the
mountains to the chain of hills which separate the interior
valley from the coast valleys of Orange county. This
great interior valley extends from Pomona on the west to
San Gorgonio Pass on the east, a distance of fifty miles,
and from the Sierra Madre mountains on the north to the
Temescal mountains on the south, a maximum width of
twenty-five miles.
In this great valley is to be found Pomona, watered by
the waters of San Antonio creek and artesian wells; Chino
with its vast extent of moist land, and its large tract of
dry land irrigated by artesian water from the Pomona
artesian belt ; Ontario irrigated from San Antonio canyon,
and by waters flowing from a tunnel run for half a mile
beneath the bed of the San Antonio creek ; Cucamonga
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irrigated by the waters of Cucamonga creek and by ar-
tesian wells and by tunnels run beneath large cienegas
;
Etiwanda irrigated by waters from Etiwanda and other
canyons; and Rialto watered by Lytle creek. These form
a group of thrifty settlements extending along the foot of
the mountains to the west of San Bernardino.
The city of San Bernardino is located in the midst of a
large tract of artesian land that is naturally moist, and
that covers over twenty square miles of territory.
Through this artesian belt flows the Santa Ana river,
which in summer time gets its entire available water sup-
ply from its tributaries, which take their rise in this moist-
land section; for at the mouth of the canyon, where the
river debouches from the mountains, the entire stream is
taken from the river-bed, one-half to irrigate Highlands
on the north, and the other half to irrigate Lugonia, Red-
lands and Old San Bernardino on the south.
The mouth of the Santa Ana canyon, where these waters
are taken out, is about 2,000 feet above sea-level.
Farther down the stream and on the southeast bank is
to be found the Riverside settlement. This valley, or
section of the valley, comprises 12,000 acres under the
Riverside system of canals, which take their water from
the Santa Ana river and from its principal tributary
—
Warm Creek. Above this lies the Gage tract of 10,000
acres, irrigated from the Gage canals, which take their
waters mostly from artesian wells; and still above this is
another strip of 5,000 acres, which is being irrigated from
a system of wells located to the northeast of San Bernar-
dino, and piped to the land, a distance of about ten miles.
This gives the Riverside section a tract of country amount-
ing to about 27,000 acres.
Still farther down the river, and on the same side, is
located South Riverside, with about 8,000 acres on the
scuth side of Temescal wash, and about 3,000 acres on
the north side of the wash, the latter tract being known
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as Auburndale. These tracts are being irrigated by. waters
from cienegas and artesian wells located in the Temescal
valley, about six miles above the upper edge of the tract.
These waters are conveyed to the tract in a thirty-two inch
cement pipe, and then distributed in smaller iron and
cement pipes.
On the opposite side of the river from Riverside is
situated the Jurupa tract of land, comprising about
25,000 acres, over half of which is moist or semi-moist
land, while the other half is fine orange land, and is to be
irrigated by water developed in the lowlands along the
Santa Ana river, and by water from the artesian belt.
Already the canal, with a capacity of 5,000 inches, is
nearly completed to the lands, at a cost of $150,000; and
about 1,000 inches of water are flowing therein,—more
water than is yet needed by the 3,000 acres now under
the completed portion of the canal.
This review completes the principal irrigated sections of
this great valley.
There is probably enough water in sight, to-day, to irri-
gate one-half of the irrigable, arable land in the San
Bernardino valley ; and storage reservoirs must be de-
pended upon largely to complete the work.
To the south and east of this valley is another large
valley, the San Jacinto, which is about twenty-five miles
long by fifteen miles wide. This is a large body of fine
land, at present mostly sparsely settled, principally be-
cause of lack of water. In the upper end of the valley is
situated the town of San Jacinto, in quite an extensive
artesian belt. The San Jacinto river furnishes some water
for irrigation purposes, but the supply is limited. Upon
the headwaters of this stream, which heads in the moun-
tains bearing the same name, is a small mountain valley
very similar to that of Bear valley, where the Hemet
Valley Reservoir Company has taken steps to construct a
reservoir that will do for San Jacinto what the Bear Valley
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reservoir is doing for the San Bernardino valley. It is a
feasible project, however, to irrigate this entire valley from
the waters of Bear Valley reservoir, by means . of a pipe,
ten or, perhaps, twenty miles long.
There are other reservoir sites in the mountain valleys
that can yet be utilized.
There is one located on the north side of the mountains
on a branch of the Mojave river high up in the mountains,
so that from the mouth of the reservoir a short tunnel
through the mountains would deliver the water out into
the San Bernardino valley, where it will be of greater value
than if used on the desert side. This reservoir when con-
structed will hold water enough to irrigate several thou-
sand acres of land, and can be made to supplement the
waters of Lytle creek to good advantage. The cost of this
reservoir and tunnel will not exceed $35,000; and as much
more money would probably deliver the water to the Lytle
Creek Water Company, which irrigates the lands about
Rial to.
The dry mesa lands of the San Bernardino valley have
no value until they are irrigated,—except a speculative
value. If a water-right can be bought for $100 an acre,
and the irrigated land sold for $200 an acre, these facts have
an influence on the speculative value of the dry land.
VALUE OF IRRIGATED EAND.
Choice land for orange culture is selling to-day at from
$125 per acre—extremely low—to $200, $250, and even
$400 and $500 per acre, according to location, and circum-
stances surrounding the owners. Without the water the
value is nominal.
A cubic foot of water per second is equal to fifty inches
of water under a four-inch pressure; and one inch of water
is a good water-right for five acres of land, and a fair water-
right for ten acres under favorable circumstances. Water
is being developed in various ways.
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Large amounts of water are being obtained from artesian
wells; and this supply, when obtained, appears to be per-
manent. •
Tunnels are frequently run under beds of creeks and
under cienegas; and the results have been very satisfactory.
In one instance, at Cucamonga, a tunnel was run under
a cienega covering five acres, and furnishing but six inches
of water. This tunnel was five hundred feet in length;
and a branch tunnel the same length was also run. The
two tunnels dried up the surface of the cienegas entirely,
and furnished a permanent flow of 196 inches, or four cubic
feet per second.
Storage reservoirs will become a necessity in the irriga-
tion of the arid lands ofAmerica, as they are in irrigating
the plains of India; and the Government should take a hand
in reclaiming these lands, either directly or by advancing
the funds to do the work, to be repaid back after the lands
are made productive.
Riverside has 3,000 acres of orange orchards, a portion
of which is yielding good crops, a portion is yielding
partial crops, and a portion is not in bearing at all. These
3,000 acres this year produced 1,000 carloads of oranges
and lemons, worth on the track an average of $750 a car,
or $750,000,—about $250 an acre. This is not picking out
sample orchards, but averaging all the orchards, whether
in bearing or not.
Budded trees yield the third year in orchard $1.50 per
tree; the fourth year, $3 per tree ; the fifth year, $4 to $5
per tree,—from $300 to $375 per acre; eight-year-old buds,
$10 per tree; and nine-year-old buds, $15 per tree, or $1,125
per acre. From six to seven boxes to the tree have been
received from fifteen-year-old seedling trees; and this
gives a net income of $1,225 an acre, counting the first but
$1 a box on the tree.
These are some of the reasons why choice lands have
sold at from $250 to $800 and $1,000 an acre in good
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locations; and why water has been developed and put
upon land at a cost of $150 and $200 an acre for the
water-right alone. During the past two years, there has
been an advance in the price of bearing orange orchards,
as the trees have grown in size and have increased the
amount and value of their crops.
There is no place in the United States where the
benefits of irrigation are more fully illustrated than they
are in the San Bernardino valley.
XV.
In San Diego County Irrigation is a
Necessity.
The streams of that county, except the Colorado, which
flows along its southern boundary, are not large, nor is the
water supply, without using catchment reservoirs, equal to
the demand. Within the past few years, much attention
has been given to the matter of irrigation in this locality.
One great reservoir has been constructed, and others have
been surveyed. And thus it will be observed that provis-
ions are being made to store the waste waters of winter
for practical uses in summer. This has already given
special activity to horticultural and agricultural interests
in this county, the possibilities of which have not hitherto
been known or appreciated even by those who have lived
there many years.
XVI.
The Amount of Land now Irrigated in the
San Joaquin Valley.
In Fresno county there are about 100,000 acres of land
now irrigated. This estimate is made by Mr. George
Manuel, a well-known civil engineer ; but he adds :
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"It is somewhat difficult to draw the line between irri-
gated and uniirigated lands, for the reason that the effects
of irrigation by filling up the country affect and render
fertile to a great extent lands lying contiguous to irrigated
lands, but not themselves subjected to irrigation by the
usual methods of application. Of this latter class of
lands," says he, "there are about 200,000 acres."
Thus it will be seen that the 200,000 acres are an
area double in extent of that which is actually irrigated,
and is reaping the benefits without being subjected to any
of the burdens of irrigation. Irrigation in Fresno county
has heretofore been carried on wholly by the private canal
system. It is a voluntary matter by this plan with each
land-owner whether or not he will contribute anything
towards the expense incident to the irrigation of lands.
His lands may be surrounded by irrigated lands, and thus
in a short time they become sufficiently irrigated by perco-
lation ; but he may and does decline to buy water where
he can get it by absorption without. By the district plan,
this iniquity is overcome ; and every man who owns
land that will be benefited is compelled to contribute his
portion of the expense incident to the system, and gets
in return all the water he may require.
The following is the estimates made by Mr. Manuel, of
the amount of lands in Fresno county which is now not
irrigated, but which is irrigable :
ACRES.
i st. In Madera Irrigation District about .... 300,000
2d. Under Chowchilla canal , excluding about
5,000 acres already irrigated 60,000
3d. Land lying above or east of Madera
District, but which can be irrigated
by a branch of the main canal of said
District (in Fresno county) 87,600
Carried forward 447,600
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Brought forward
4th. Lands lying above water in main canal
of Madera District, but which is sus-
ceptible of irrigation by a system of
storage reservoirs
5th. I,and lying between San Joaquin and
Kings rivers, excluding about 60,000
acres already irrigated, and which can
be irrigated by existing works or their
extensions
6th. Land lying above or east of Enterprise
canal, but which can be covered by
storage reservoirs or branch canal
taken out high up in the mountains
7th. On west side of Fresno slough, below
Hall survey in Fresno county, which
can be covered with extensive irri-
gation works
8th. In Sunset Irrigation District above Hall
survey, proposed to be irrigated by a
canal having levees 35 feet high at
highest point, and about 15 miles long,
and which lie above Hall survey ....
9th. Between the 240 and 300 feet contour line
on State Engineer's map, which can
be irrigated by canal taken from Kern
river, or by water pumped by water-
power as proposed by Sunset District
in Fresno county
10th. Land lying above the 300 feet grade line
in Fresno county on west side, which
can only be irrigated by storage reser-
voirs on the streams flowing from the
Coast Range
ACRES.
447,600
38,400
684,960
40,000
113,000
190,000
190,000
293,000
Total 1,996,960
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All of the above lands, with the exception of about
200,000 acres lying near and affected by the present irri-
gation, and possibly 50,000 acres lying near the foot of the
Sierras on the east side, is practically useless without irri-
gation.
Instancing the benefits of irrigation in Fresno county,
Mr. Manuel states : As examples of the benefits of irriga-
tion, the following is from the Assessor's Records of Fresno
county, for township 14 S., R. 20 F., showing the former
and present assessed value of property :
In 1870.
Sections 1 to 35 assessed to W. S. Chapman at $1.01 per
acre. Section 36 at $1.13 per acre.
In 1880.
Bank of California tract, 1 2 sections at $4 per acre.
Bank of California tract, 240 acres at $5 per acre.
C. A. Towue, section 2 (adjoining Fresno city) at $5
per acre,
C. H. Hoffman, section 12 (near Fresno city) at $5 per
acre.
E. Jansen, 6 sections (near Fresno city) at $4 per acre.
In 1888.
A. T. Covell, in Washington Colony, five miles from
Fresno, 60 acres at $150 per acre.
Sections 1 and 2, and 11 and 12, $250 to $350 per acre
—$250 about average for unimproved land.
Sections 30 to 31, unimproved, at $40 per acre.
Sections 6-7 at $100 per acre.
Section 19 at $75 per acre.
Sections 5-8 at $125 and $200 per acre (unimproved
and from one-half to one mile from city of Fresno).
Sections 17, 18 and 19 average $85 per acre.
Sections 23, 24, 25 and 26 at $75 per acre.
The above valuations from the assessment rolls of
Fresno county teach an instructive lesson.
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Ten years ago, when the effects of irrigation in Fresno
county had been but little felt, the present city of Fresno
was but a struggling village of probably from 1,200 to 1,500
souls. Now it is a bustling city of 10,000 inhabitants.
In Tulare county, much progress has been made in the
work of irrigation. The one criticism to be made on the
work in that section is that it is fragmentary and lacks
uniformity and systematic methods. Irrigation is conse-
quently patch-work, but enough has been done to demon-
strate the miraculous power or irrigation in the San Joaquin
valley.
Mr. P. Y. Baker, Civil Engineer, for many years de-
voted to the work, says : " There are about 15,000 acres
irrigated in this county, and 950,000 acres not irrigated.
There are about 250,000 practically useless without irriga-
tion. Of the above 950,000, there are perhaps 700,000 that
produce some crops without irrigation, but very little of
it produces fair crops. That is to say, one year with
another, the average would be so low that it would be a
serious question of making a bare living on most of it.
Experience- has shown that the proximity of irrigation
has added much to the productiveness of non-irrigated
lands."
MKRCED COUNTY.
In this county, provision has been made whereby a con-
siderable area of lands may be irrigated; but the acreage
actually subjected to irrigation is small. The famous
Crocker canal, which is said to have cost $1,500,000, is
situated in this county, and will eventually be applied to
a large area. The area of the plain lands which may be
profitably irrigated is large.
- So far as irrigation has become an accomplished fact in
the San Joaquin valley, it has been done through private
enterprise. Under the District Irrigation Law of 1887, a
number of irrigation districts have been organized; and by
this means the irrigated area will soon be rapidly extended.
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The following districts have been organized in this valley,
having the acreage shown :
Modesto Irrigation District . . 108,000 acres
Turlock " " 176,000
West side " " 300,000
Madera " " 330,000
Alta " "
. 160,000
White River " " 60,000
Poso " " 48,000
Sunset " u (Proposed) ..285,000
Total area San Joaquin valley 1,467,000 acres
XVII.
The Next Question is, Will Irrigation Pay?
For more "than 700 years, irrigation has been successfully
practiced in Lombardy, which covers a territory of but
9,000 square miles (an extent of country not half so large
as Southern California), which to-day supports by means
of irrigation a population of about 3,500,000 people, and
is the garden spot of Europe and of the world. It has paid
these people well, and it has built up a country and sus-
tained a vast population; but for irrigation this territory
would not otherwise support 500,000 people. Nor do we
find the condition of things different in India. There has
been expended for the irrigation canals of India, directly
and indirectly, $200,000,000. The system of canals there
constructed are the most stupendous ever built within
historic times. The great Ganges canal is ten feet in depth
and 175 feet in width. It is simply a vast river, and irri-
gates to-day a million and a half acres of land in a country
where irrigation is not only necessary, but where the evap-
oration is double what it is in California. By means of
this irrigation, that country produces, with certainty, from
two to three crops a year; and this certainty and regularity
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is a characteristic feature of irrigation. There is no such
thing as a failure, famine is rendered impossible, and a
reasonable reward for labor is made sure.
After examining the official reports relating to the price
of water in most of the irrigating districts of the world,
the average annual expense is from $1.50 to $2.50 per
acre. When only garden spots or small tracts are irri-
gated, the expense is greater.
In California the planting can be done in winter. By
irrigation there are no crop failures. Farming becomes
a certain business. There are no drouths, no dread of the
scorching "northers," no parching of the earth. An un-
certainty is changed to a certainty.
It has been estimated that, by irrigation, from ten to
twenty times the number of people can live and prosper
on the same extent of territory, and this even where there
are the usual rains, as in Lombardy. Of course, in parts
of India, in Arizona, and in Nevada, irrigation is a neces-
sity. It has been noted in California that the price of lands,
in districts like Fresno, Los Angeles and San Bernardino,
has, by reason of irrigation, increased from twenty to fifty
times its original value.
XVIII.
The Temperature of the West is Suited to
Irrigation.
To present the favorable climatic conditions of the
Pacific Coast, and especially of California, we append the
following statistics, showing the mean annual temperature
of the different localities in California, and of foreign
countries as well. The statistical information as to the
mean annual temperature of Washington Territory, Or-
egon, Montana, Nevada, Arizona and New Mexico, are
not in reach, and cannot, in the short time allowed, be
presented ; but it can be truthfully said that many of the
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favorable conditions as to irrigation in California are ap-
plicable to most of the States and Territories referred to,
except that in the western parts of Oregon and Washing-
ton Territory the rains are so ample that irrigation is quite
unnecessary. In Nevada, Arizona and New Mexico, irri-
gation must be resorted to that the lands may be made
productive; and to that end all the water in those sections
should be and soon will be utilized.
TABLE OF MEAN ANNUAL TEMPERATURE OF DIFFERENT
LOCALITIES.
California.
Marysville . . 63 . 58
Woodland 61 . 00
Calistoga 59 . 00
Auburn 58 . 00
Red Bluff. 64 . 00
Chico 65 . 00
Redding 61 . 58
Truckee 43 . 00
Napa 59 . 19
San Mateo 54 . 00
Stockton 58 . 00
San Jose 56 -75
Tulare 64 . 00
San Luis Obispo 57 .00
Paso Robles 56 . 00
Gilroy 58 . 00
Livermore 58 . 00
Merced 63 . 00
Monterey 57-4°
Colton 62 . 00
Yuma 74 . 00
Indio 73 . 00
Anaheim 67 . 00
Mojave 63 . 00
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Caliente 64.00
Los Angeles 64 . 75
San Diego 61 . 00
Santa Barbara 60 . 00
MEAN TEMPERATURE OF THE FOLLOWING FOREIGN
LOCALITIES.
Turin, Northern Italy 53 .00
Florence, Northern Italy 59 .00
Naples 6 1 . 00
Toulouse, Southern France 55. 00
Toulon, Southern France 59 .00
Madrid, Spain 57 . 00
Calcutta, India 68.00
Madras, India 82 . 00
Azores 65 . 00
Madeira . 65 . 84
It will be observed by the foregoing tables, that so far
as temperature is concerned, California is especially
adapted to the purposes of irrigation. If the average
mean temperature were too high, like that of Madras,
India, the evaporation would be so great that it would be
most difficult to carry on successful irrigation, and
especially during the hot or summer months.
XIX.
What Interest Has the National Govern-
ment in Irrigation?
The answer is, the whole nation is interested in the
subject of irrigation, because the whole nation is interested
in making the uninhabitable portion of our country hab-
itable. Most of that part of the United States west of
the 100th meridian either requires, or would be benefited
by, irrigation. Without it crops are not certain. Thus
irrigation not only becomes a question of national interest,
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but a question of national necessity. This is quite as
much so in the United States in relation to this part of
the republic as was irrigation in India to Great Britain,
or irrigation in Lombardy to Italy. The vast territory in
the United States requiring irrigation covers over one-
third of the inhabitable part of our country, and if the
national Government can wisely expend millions of dollars
in keeping the water off from a portion of the inhabited
part of the country, can it not, with equal wisdom, expend
wisely money to put water upon that portion of the land
which most needs it ?
It may be noted that the public lands are almost ex-
hausted
;
that the preparing of a new country for the
habitation and support of a large population is the equiv-
alent of the acquisition of a like amount of territory. By
these means the national Government will make useful to
the American people what before was of no use. To show
the extent of the United States where irrigation would be
advantageous, and where it is most necessary, we venture
to refer to the territorial area of those States and Territories
in parts of which the rainfall is too light to make farming
a certainty:
acres. sq. miles.
Area of California 100,992,640 157,801
Oregon 60,975,360 95)274
" Utah 54,380,800 84,970
" Washington Ty 44,769,160 69,994
" New Mexico 77,568,640 121,201
" Nevada 71,737,600 112,090
" Arizona 72,906,240 150,932
" Colorado 66,880,000 104,500
" Wyoming 62,645,120 97,883
" Idaho 55,228,160 86,294
" Montana 92,016,640 143,776
Add to this territory the northern and western part of
Texas, which covers an area of about 100,000 square
[ 47 ]
miles and an acreage of 64,000,000, and we see what an
empire would thus be brought into practical use. We
submit that the oft-repeated argument, that the national
Government cannot afford to promote private interests by
national means, does not apply to this question; for this is
one of national, not one of state or local, importance.
The population of our country is increasing at a remark-
able ratio. As the population increases, the opportunities
for young and ambitious men, who live in the older States
of the Union, to gain an honest livelihood, is every year
becoming less. L,abor is necessarily becoming cheaper.
If no more unoccupied lands are made fit for use, landhold-
ing will soon be the privilege of the rich, and tenantry
the only hope of the poor. The old adage so often quoted
by successful men, that "the fittest succeed, " maybe true;
but unless those who are not " fittest " have an opportunity
to establish for themselve homes, the poor will soon vastly
outnumber those who are able to help themselves; and when
there is little hope for the many, and the Government is
carried on for the benefit of the few, neither the property of
the one nor the labor of the other will be secure. Indeed, the
best safety that capital can have, or that labor may receive,
is universal ownership in the soil. Place land within the
reach of every citizen. The Government is then secure,
because the people are happy. Any system that will open
up for settlement a new country, that will change from an
arid waste to cultivated fields a region as big as half of
Europe, necessarily promotes not only the interest of the
whole nation, but benefits the whole civilized world.
Before this Republic should seek to acquire new terri-
tory, it should wisely utilize the territory it now has; and
it is most respectfully submitted that a national system of
irrigation, directed by wise and uniform laws, controlling
the rights of water and its uses, will be of the most infinite
advantage to the whole xA.merican people, and especially
so if carried out under the wise supervision of the national
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Government and engineered by its scientific and experi-
enced men. When this is accomplished, there will be
ample room in the unsettled portion of the United States
to find homes for the millions of people who are to come
after us.
Added to this we may say, that in considering the
interest which the people of the United States have in the
subject of irrigation throughout the arid regions of the
United States, it is obvious that that interest is paramount.
The time is within the recollection of men still young
when the population of these United States did not exceed
20,000,000. The time is also readily recalled when the
aggregate accession of population by European immigra-
tion did not exceed 50,000 per annum. To-day, the
population of the United States exceeds 60,000,000; and
the annual immigration equals, and for the past five years
has almost equaled, 1,000,000 per annum. With the
natural increase of 60,000,000 people, reinforced by the
artificial increase of an incoming foreign immigration,
reaching our shores at that period of life when the genera-
tions to be born of them are to be born in our own
country, we are fast approaching that period in our
national history when the condition known to political
economists as the pressure of population will be felt here.
Hitherto, the larger possibilities of the common life of
our country have been due largely to the opportunities of
acquiring fertile land at primitive or undeveloped values,
and enjoying the benefits of the increment which has
followed settlement.
Up to the line of the 100th meridian, by a general
classification, our country is fertilized by a natural pre-
cipitation of moisture, sufficient to mature annual crops of
cereals. West of that line, with the exceptions of small
portions of Washington, Oregon and California, the
country is devoid of sufficient rainfall to mature agricul-
tural crops. The soil is not wanting in fertility. The
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area embraces over one-third and nearly one-half of the
territorial area of the United States. We have already
shown that, under irrigation, land is more productive, and
its cultivation more certain of profit to the cultivator,
where the element of moisture is controlled and directed
by means of artificial irrigation. It therefore follows that
the application of water to the fertile areas lying west of
the iooth meridian is to confer upon them a productive
capacity even in excess of that capacity now inherent in
the lands east of that line. Their fertilization by arti-
ficial systems of irrigation is, therefore, equivalent to
acquiring a new territory, equal if not superior in fertility
to that now occupied by the great body of our civilization.
It is, therefore, equivalent to making room for 60,000,000
more industrious citizens. Nor would this great work
if undertaken, or aided, or even encouraged, in the
manner now proposed by the Congress of the United
States, be work done in the interest of a population
already settled in the territory under consideration.
Practically, that portion of the United States lying west
of the iooth meridian is unoccupied. It is a territory
1,600,000 square miles in extent, occupied by less than
2,000,000 inhabitants. An equal area, east of the line
of the iooth meridian, as has already been shown, is
occupied by an industrious citizenship of 60,000,000
inhabitants. The undertaking is, therefore, to be in the
interest of the posterity of the 60,000,000 people com-
prising the citizenship of the United States.
The census of 1880 disclosed the fact that the male
citizens of the United States between the ages of twenty-
one and twenty-four years, including native born, foreign
born and colored, aggregated 2,041,000. Of these,
1,556,000 were native. Assuming the present population
of the United States to be 65,000,000 inhabitants, and
allowing a proportionate number to the number of the
census of 1890, would give about 2,000,000 native born
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young men between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-
four, and 2,500,000 of all classes. From other statistical
facts, it is derivable that at least 1,000,000 young men in
each year reach their majority. In each year, therefore,
1,000,000 of the young male inhabitants of the United
States reach the age which entitles them to the full
rights of citizenship and independent action.
It is most obvious that if the territory lying west of the
100th meridian to-day possessed fertility equal to that of
the fertility lying east of that line, and if the western terri-
tory had yet been unacquired by the United States, and
was as sparsely settled or as nearly unoccupied as it is
to-day, it would be deemed the highest statesmanship to
acquire that territory, in order that the two and one-half
million young men between the ages of twenty-one and
twenty-four might find a proper field for the exercise of
those high faculties of energy and enterprise which the Amer-
ican youth possess. If this be true, the fertilization of
this field stands for the exact equivalent of its acquisition.
The territory is already a portion of the national domain.
Its reclamation, if it is reclaimed at all, will be in the
interest of the posterity of the people reclaiming it. The
attention our Government will bestow upon it will find
all the justification which would attend the attention
bestowed by a father upon the possible inheritance of his
children. We believe any other enlightened and civilized
nation of the earth would accept the possession of such a
territory as a valuable inheritance, and would give it the
attention we are now seeking at the hands of the Govern-
ment for the territory under consideration.
England expended $200,000,000,—not to reclaim an
arid and waste country in India, but for the purpose of
adding to the resources of that fertile country the increased
capacity which irrigation confers.
The overcrowded populations of Europe are seeking our
shores, encouraged thereto by the enlarged possibilities of
the common life in our country.
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Our fiscal systems are directed to the maintenance of high
wages to our working classes. The cost of transportation
between Europe and America, and the time consumed in
the passage, has so far diminished, that the difference
between the reward of one week's labor in the two
countries will fully compensate the loss of time and repay
the passage money.
The conditions with reference to the density of population
between Europe and America are very rapidly equalizing.
If no other new territory is added, either by way of acqui-
sition from adjacent territory or by the increased produc-
tiveness of our own, within the lifetime of children now
born the fertile portions of the United States will be occu-
pied by a population equal in density to that of England,
Belgium and France.
The reclamation of the sterile valleys lying west of the
iooth meridian can be achieved at a cost much less than
that which would attend the clearing of a forest and the
reduction to a state of cultivation of forest lands.
We are not now proposing that the Government of the
United States from its treasury shall construct the instru-
mentalities of irrigation. What we ask, and what we hope
will be granted, is that the preliminary cost of ascertain-
ing all the economic facts necessary to induce capital to
enter upon the completion of this great work shall be
borne by the Government of the United States, and, when
the public lands are effected, make such appropriations as
may be wise. Let it once be shown by conclusive data
that a reasonable reward awaits the investment of capital
in the reclamation of the arid lands belonging to this
nation, and private capital will not long be wanting to
engage in that undertaking. The necessary capital for
the prosecution of any reasonably profitable enterprise is not
wanting,when the opportunity for such investment is clearly
and officially pointed out. We believe, therefore, that the
proposed surveys for reservoir sites, and the approximate
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ascertainment and publication of the possibilities for the
reclamation of the sterile portions of our country, to be in
consonance with the wisest statesmanship.
The people of California are more deeply interested in
this subject than the people of the other States of the
Union, only because of the proximity of the territory to be
benefited. The development of a fertility in the soils now
sterile for want of artificial irrigation in the portions of our
State needing the vitalizing influence of artificial moisture,
and in the territory lying immediately contiguous to us,
would promote our wealth and prosperity, by building up
strong neighboring communities, whose purchasing power
would add to our wealth, and by adding that volume of
population to our own State, so necessary to the establish-
ment and maintenance of a higher civilization.
National life generates a surplus energy which in times
past has found war a congenial field for its expenditure.
Modern statesmanship addresses itself to directing this
national energy into channels of public enterprise. The
field under consideration is broad and full of promise in the
direction of promoting national prosperity and perpetuating
peace.
Respectfully submitted,
M. M. ESTEE (Chairman),
W. H. MILLS, San Francisco,
E. W. JONES, Los Angeles,
N. P. CHIPMAN, Tehama,
L. M. HOLT, San Bernardino,
JESSE D. CARR, Monterey,
C. C. WRIGHT, Stanislaus,
FRANK H. CUNNINGHAM, San Diego,
WM. THOMPSON, Reno, Nevada,
Committee.








